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authorPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2020-01-30 20:47:38 +0300
committerPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2020-01-30 20:47:59 +0300
commit4cbc418a44d5067133271bb6eeac2382f2bf94f7 (patch)
tree67084da88ee7651804b98c939b1284f4f6f1aaf1 /arch/arm64/include
parent1d5920c306f11db2c9e517f12843216b58c15046 (diff)
parenta6bd811f1209fe1c64c9f6fd578101d6436c6b6e (diff)
downloadlinux-4cbc418a44d5067133271bb6eeac2382f2bf94f7.tar.xz
Merge branch 'cve-2019-3016' into kvm-next-5.6
From Boris Ostrovsky: The KVM hypervisor may provide a guest with ability to defer remote TLB flush when the remote VCPU is not running. When this feature is used, the TLB flush will happen only when the remote VPCU is scheduled to run again. This will avoid unnecessary (and expensive) IPIs. Under certain circumstances, when a guest initiates such deferred action, the hypervisor may miss the request. It is also possible that the guest may mistakenly assume that it has already marked remote VCPU as needing a flush when in fact that request had already been processed by the hypervisor. In both cases this will result in an invalid translation being present in a vCPU, potentially allowing accesses to memory locations in that guest's address space that should not be accessible. Note that only intra-guest memory is vulnerable. The five patches address both of these problems: 1. The first patch makes sure the hypervisor doesn't accidentally clear a guest's remote flush request 2. The rest of the patches prevent the race between hypervisor acknowledging a remote flush request and guest issuing a new one. Conflicts: arch/x86/kvm/x86.c [move from kvm_arch_vcpu_free to kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy]
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/include')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h5
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h10
2 files changed, 5 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
index 8dc6c5cdabe6..baf52baaa2a5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
@@ -85,13 +85,12 @@
#define PAGE_SHARED_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_WRITE)
#define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN)
#define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
-#define PAGE_EXECONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
#define __P000 PAGE_NONE
#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY
#define __P010 PAGE_READONLY
#define __P011 PAGE_READONLY
-#define __P100 PAGE_EXECONLY
+#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __P110 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __P111 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
@@ -100,7 +99,7 @@
#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY
#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED
#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED
-#define __S100 PAGE_EXECONLY
+#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
#define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 5d15b4735a0e..cd5de0e40bfa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -96,12 +96,8 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)];
#define pte_dirty(pte) (pte_sw_dirty(pte) || pte_hw_dirty(pte))
#define pte_valid(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_VALID))
-/*
- * Execute-only user mappings do not have the PTE_USER bit set. All valid
- * kernel mappings have the PTE_UXN bit set.
- */
#define pte_valid_not_user(pte) \
- ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER | PTE_UXN)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_UXN))
+ ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) == PTE_VALID)
#define pte_valid_young(pte) \
((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_AF)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_AF))
#define pte_valid_user(pte) \
@@ -117,8 +113,8 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)];
/*
* p??_access_permitted() is true for valid user mappings (subject to the
- * write permission check) other than user execute-only which do not have the
- * PTE_USER bit set. PROT_NONE mappings do not have the PTE_VALID bit set.
+ * write permission check). PROT_NONE mappings do not have the PTE_VALID bit
+ * set.
*/
#define pte_access_permitted(pte, write) \
(pte_valid_user(pte) && (!(write) || pte_write(pte)))