ARM: remove user cmpxchg syscall

Mark Brand reports that a NEEDS_SYSCALL_FOR_CMPXCHG enabled kernel would
open a security hole in the ghost syscall used to implement cmpxchg, as
it fails to validate the user pointer.

However, in order for this option to be enabled, you'd need to be
building a pre-ARMv6 kernel with SMP support.  There is only one system
known which fits that, which is an early ARM SMP FPGA implementation
based on the ARM926T.

In any case, the Kconfig does not allow SMP to be enabled for pre-ARMv6
systems.

Moreover, even if NEEDS_SYSCALL_FOR_CMPXCHG were to be enabled, the
kernel would not build as __ARM_NR_cmpxchg64 is not defined.

The simple answer is to remove the buggy code.

Reported-by: Mark Brand <markbrand@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 52 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
index 969f9d9e665f..bc698383e822 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
@@ -625,58 +625,6 @@ asmlinkage int arm_syscall(int no, struct pt_regs *regs)
 		set_tls(regs->ARM_r0);
 		return 0;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_NEEDS_SYSCALL_FOR_CMPXCHG
-	/*
-	 * Atomically store r1 in *r2 if *r2 is equal to r0 for user space.
-	 * Return zero in r0 if *MEM was changed or non-zero if no exchange
-	 * happened.  Also set the user C flag accordingly.
-	 * If access permissions have to be fixed up then non-zero is
-	 * returned and the operation has to be re-attempted.
-	 *
-	 * *NOTE*: This is a ghost syscall private to the kernel.  Only the
-	 * __kuser_cmpxchg code in entry-armv.S should be aware of its
-	 * existence.  Don't ever use this from user code.
-	 */
-	case NR(cmpxchg):
-	for (;;) {
-		extern void do_DataAbort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
-					 struct pt_regs *regs);
-		unsigned long val;
-		unsigned long addr = regs->ARM_r2;
-		struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
-		pgd_t *pgd; pmd_t *pmd; pte_t *pte;
-		spinlock_t *ptl;
-
-		regs->ARM_cpsr &= ~PSR_C_BIT;
-		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-		pgd = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
-		if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
-			goto bad_access;
-		pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, addr);
-		if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
-			goto bad_access;
-		pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
-		if (!pte_present(*pte) || !pte_write(*pte) || !pte_dirty(*pte)) {
-			pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
-			goto bad_access;
-		}
-		val = *(unsigned long *)addr;
-		val -= regs->ARM_r0;
-		if (val == 0) {
-			*(unsigned long *)addr = regs->ARM_r1;
-			regs->ARM_cpsr |= PSR_C_BIT;
-		}
-		pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
-		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-		return val;
-
-		bad_access:
-		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-		/* simulate a write access fault */
-		do_DataAbort(addr, 15 + (1 << 11), regs);
-	}
-#endif
-
 	default:
 		/* Calls 9f00xx..9f07ff are defined to return -ENOSYS
 		   if not implemented, rather than raising SIGILL.  This