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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-10-04 03:24:22 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-10-04 03:24:22 +0300 |
commit | d0989d01c66fed6a741820a96b8cca6688f183ff (patch) | |
tree | 8454b0329481fec3c2ff8fa6663fd544d8bcd919 /Documentation/process | |
parent | 865dad2022c52ac6c5c9a87c5cec78a69f633fb6 (diff) | |
parent | 2120635108b35ecad9c59c8b44f6cbdf4f98214e (diff) | |
download | linux-d0989d01c66fed6a741820a96b8cca6688f183ff.tar.xz |
Merge tag 'hardening-v6.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull kernel hardening updates from Kees Cook:
"Most of the collected changes here are fixes across the tree for
various hardening features (details noted below).
The most notable new feature here is the addition of the memcpy()
overflow warning (under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE), which is the next step
on the path to killing the common class of "trivially detectable"
buffer overflow conditions (i.e. on arrays with sizes known at compile
time) that have resulted in many exploitable vulnerabilities over the
years (e.g. BleedingTooth).
This feature is expected to still have some undiscovered false
positives. It's been in -next for a full development cycle and all the
reported false positives have been fixed in their respective trees.
All the known-bad code patterns we could find with Coccinelle are also
either fixed in their respective trees or in flight.
The commit message in commit 54d9469bc515 ("fortify: Add run-time WARN
for cross-field memcpy()") for the feature has extensive details, but
I'll repeat here that this is a warning _only_, and is not intended to
actually block overflows (yet). The many patches fixing array sizes
and struct members have been landing for several years now, and we're
finally able to turn this on to find any remaining stragglers.
Summary:
Various fixes across several hardening areas:
- loadpin: Fix verity target enforcement (Matthias Kaehlcke).
- zero-call-used-regs: Add missing clobbers in paravirt (Bill
Wendling).
- CFI: clean up sparc function pointer type mismatches (Bart Van
Assche).
- Clang: Adjust compiler flag detection for various Clang changes
(Sami Tolvanen, Kees Cook).
- fortify: Fix warnings in arch-specific code in sh, ARM, and xen.
Improvements to existing features:
- testing: improve overflow KUnit test, introduce fortify KUnit test,
add more coverage to LKDTM tests (Bart Van Assche, Kees Cook).
- overflow: Relax overflow type checking for wider utility.
New features:
- string: Introduce strtomem() and strtomem_pad() to fill a gap in
strncpy() replacement needs.
- um: Enable FORTIFY_SOURCE support.
- fortify: Enable run-time struct member memcpy() overflow warning"
* tag 'hardening-v6.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (27 commits)
Makefile.extrawarn: Move -Wcast-function-type-strict to W=1
hardening: Remove Clang's enable flag for -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero
sparc: Unbreak the build
x86/paravirt: add extra clobbers with ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS enabled
x86/paravirt: clean up typos and grammaros
fortify: Convert to struct vs member helpers
fortify: Explicitly check bounds are compile-time constants
x86/entry: Work around Clang __bdos() bug
ARM: decompressor: Include .data.rel.ro.local
fortify: Adjust KUnit test for modular build
sh: machvec: Use char[] for section boundaries
kunit/memcpy: Avoid pathological compile-time string size
lib: Improve the is_signed_type() kunit test
LoadPin: Require file with verity root digests to have a header
dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
LoadPin: Fix Kconfig doc about format of file with verity digests
um: Enable FORTIFY_SOURCE
lkdtm: Update tests for memcpy() run-time warnings
fortify: Add run-time WARN for cross-field memcpy()
fortify: Use SIZE_MAX instead of (size_t)-1
...
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/process')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/deprecated.rst | 11 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst b/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst index a6e36d9c3d14..c8fd53a11a20 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst @@ -138,17 +138,20 @@ be NUL terminated. This can lead to various linear read overflows and other misbehavior due to the missing termination. It also NUL-pads the destination buffer if the source contents are shorter than the destination buffer size, which may be a needless performance penalty -for callers using only NUL-terminated strings. The safe replacement is +for callers using only NUL-terminated strings. + +When the destination is required to be NUL-terminated, the replacement is strscpy(), though care must be given to any cases where the return value of strncpy() was used, since strscpy() does not return a pointer to the destination, but rather a count of non-NUL bytes copied (or negative errno when it truncates). Any cases still needing NUL-padding should instead use strscpy_pad(). -If a caller is using non-NUL-terminated strings, strncpy() can -still be used, but destinations should be marked with the `__nonstring +If a caller is using non-NUL-terminated strings, strtomem() should be +used, and the destinations should be marked with the `__nonstring <https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Common-Variable-Attributes.html>`_ -attribute to avoid future compiler warnings. +attribute to avoid future compiler warnings. For cases still needing +NUL-padding, strtomem_pad() can be used. strlcpy() --------- |