diff options
| author | Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org> | 2016-11-23 18:52:28 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2016-11-26 00:26:04 +0300 |
| commit | c11cd3a6ec3a817c6b71b00c559e25d855f7e5b4 (patch) | |
| tree | 5156c0612dd01bccfa91c89e3862b919f7ad9066 | |
| parent | f4324551489e8781d838f941b7aee4208e52e8bf (diff) | |
| download | linux-c11cd3a6ec3a817c6b71b00c559e25d855f7e5b4.tar.xz | |
net: filter: run cgroup eBPF ingress programs
If the cgroup associated with the receiving socket has an eBPF
programs installed, run them from sk_filter_trim_cap().
eBPF programs used in this context are expected to either return 1 to
let the packet pass, or != 1 to drop them. The programs have access to
the skb through bpf_skb_load_bytes(), and the payload starts at the
network headers (L3).
Note that cgroup_bpf_run_filter() is stubbed out as static inline nop
for !CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF, and is otherwise guarded by a static key if
the feature is unused.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| -rw-r--r-- | net/core/filter.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 2de302d68038..ea315af56511 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ int sk_filter_trim_cap(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int cap) if (skb_pfmemalloc(skb) && !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_MEMALLOC)) return -ENOMEM; + err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_INGRESS(sk, skb); + if (err) + return err; + err = security_sock_rcv_skb(sk, skb); if (err) return err; |