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| author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2019-12-07 08:05:14 +0300 | 
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2019-12-07 08:05:14 +0300 | 
| commit | 5532946e339576097d7a0f5facc828e4d53d901b (patch) | |
| tree | 725d07517fb3ffada269bee3a5c69861c6a831c8 | |
| parent | 537d0779a19941efe9044e7e259743d5b054bf7b (diff) | |
| parent | 721c8dafad26ccfa90ff659ee19755e3377b829d (diff) | |
| download | linux-5532946e339576097d7a0f5facc828e4d53d901b.tar.xz | |
Merge branch 'tcp-fix-handling-of-stale-syncookies-timestamps'
Guillaume Nault says:
====================
tcp: fix handling of stale syncookies timestamps
The synflood timestamps (->ts_recent_stamp and ->synq_overflow_ts) are
only refreshed when the syncookie protection triggers. Therefore, their
value can become very far apart from jiffies if no synflood happens for
a long time.
If jiffies grows too much and wraps while the synflood timestamp isn't
refreshed, then time_after32() might consider the later to be in the
future. This can trick tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() into returning
erroneous values and rejecting valid ACKs.
Patch 1 handles the case of ACKs using legitimate syncookies.
Patch 2 handles the case of stray ACKs.
Patch 3 annotates lockless timestamp operations with READ_ONCE() and
WRITE_ONCE().
Changes from v3:
  - Fix description of time_between32() (found by Eric Dumazet).
  - Use more accurate Fixes tag in patch 3 (suggested by Eric Dumazet).
Changes from v2:
  - Define and use time_between32() instead of a pair of
    time_before32/time_after32 (suggested by Eric Dumazet).
  - Use 'last_overflow - HZ' as lower bound in
    tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(), to accommodate for concurrent
    timestamp updates (found by Eric Dumazet).
  - Add a third patch to annotate lockless accesses to .ts_recent_stamp.
Changes from v1:
  - Initialising timestamps at socket creation time is not enough
    because jiffies wraps in 24 days with HZ=1000 (Eric Dumazet).
    Handle stale timestamps in tcp_synq_overflow() and
    tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() instead.
  - Rework commit description.
  - Add a second patch to handle the case of stray ACKs.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/time.h | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/tcp.h | 27 | 
2 files changed, 32 insertions, 8 deletions
| diff --git a/include/linux/time.h b/include/linux/time.h index 0760a4f5a15c..8e10b9dbd8c2 100644 --- a/include/linux/time.h +++ b/include/linux/time.h @@ -97,4 +97,17 @@ static inline bool itimerspec64_valid(const struct itimerspec64 *its)   */  #define time_after32(a, b)	((s32)((u32)(b) - (u32)(a)) < 0)  #define time_before32(b, a)	time_after32(a, b) + +/** + * time_between32 - check if a 32-bit timestamp is within a given time range + * @t:	the time which may be within [l,h] + * @l:	the lower bound of the range + * @h:	the higher bound of the range + * + * time_before32(t, l, h) returns true if @l <= @t <= @h. All operands are + * treated as 32-bit integers. + * + * Equivalent to !(time_before32(@t, @l) || time_after32(@t, @h)). + */ +#define time_between32(t, l, h) ((u32)(h) - (u32)(l) >= (u32)(t) - (u32)(l))  #endif diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index 36f195fb576a..86b9a8766648 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -494,15 +494,16 @@ static inline void tcp_synq_overflow(const struct sock *sk)  		reuse = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_reuseport_cb);  		if (likely(reuse)) {  			last_overflow = READ_ONCE(reuse->synq_overflow_ts); -			if (time_after32(now, last_overflow + HZ)) +			if (!time_between32(now, last_overflow, +					    last_overflow + HZ))  				WRITE_ONCE(reuse->synq_overflow_ts, now);  			return;  		}  	} -	last_overflow = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp; -	if (time_after32(now, last_overflow + HZ)) -		tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = now; +	last_overflow = READ_ONCE(tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp); +	if (!time_between32(now, last_overflow, last_overflow + HZ)) +		WRITE_ONCE(tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp, now);  }  /* syncookies: no recent synqueue overflow on this listening socket? */ @@ -517,13 +518,23 @@ static inline bool tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(const struct sock *sk)  		reuse = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_reuseport_cb);  		if (likely(reuse)) {  			last_overflow = READ_ONCE(reuse->synq_overflow_ts); -			return time_after32(now, last_overflow + -					    TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID); +			return !time_between32(now, last_overflow - HZ, +					       last_overflow + +					       TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID);  		}  	} -	last_overflow = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp; -	return time_after32(now, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID); +	last_overflow = READ_ONCE(tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp); + +	/* If last_overflow <= jiffies <= last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID, +	 * then we're under synflood. However, we have to use +	 * 'last_overflow - HZ' as lower bound. That's because a concurrent +	 * tcp_synq_overflow() could update .ts_recent_stamp after we read +	 * jiffies but before we store .ts_recent_stamp into last_overflow, +	 * which could lead to rejecting a valid syncookie. +	 */ +	return !time_between32(now, last_overflow - HZ, +			       last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID);  }  static inline u32 tcp_cookie_time(void) | 
