<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>starfive-tech/linux.git/kernel/ucount.c, branch visionfive_v1_5.13</title>
<subtitle>StarFive Tech Linux Kernel for VisionFive (JH7110) boards (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/starfive-tech/linux.git/atom?h=visionfive_v1_5.13</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/starfive-tech/linux.git/atom?h=visionfive_v1_5.13'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/starfive-tech/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2021-07-14T15:06:19+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Add a reference to ucounts for each cred</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T15:06:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Gladkov</name>
<email>legion@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-22T12:27:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/starfive-tech/linux.git/commit/?id=1199573d26016f59a6c3e55833065a2b38a4abd5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1199573d26016f59a6c3e55833065a2b38a4abd5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 905ae01c4ae2ae3df05bb141801b1db4b7d83c61 ]

For RLIMIT_NPROC and some other rlimits the user_struct that holds the
global limit is kept alive for the lifetime of a process by keeping it
in struct cred. Adding a pointer to ucounts in the struct cred will
allow to track RLIMIT_NPROC not only for user in the system, but for
user in the user_namespace.

Updating ucounts may require memory allocation which may fail. So, we
cannot change cred.ucounts in the commit_creds() because this function
cannot fail and it should always return 0. For this reason, we modify
cred.ucounts before calling the commit_creds().

Changelog

v6:
* Fix null-ptr-deref in is_ucounts_overlimit() detected by trinity. This
  error was caused by the fact that cred_alloc_blank() left the ucounts
  pointer empty.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;oliver.sang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov &lt;legion@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b37aaef28d8b9b0d757e07ba6dd27281bbe39259.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fanotify: configurable limits via sysfs</title>
<updated>2021-03-16T15:49:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Goldstein</name>
<email>amir73il@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-04T11:29:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/starfive-tech/linux.git/commit/?id=5b8fea65d197f408bb00b251c70d842826d6b70b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5b8fea65d197f408bb00b251c70d842826d6b70b</id>
<content type='text'>
fanotify has some hardcoded limits. The only APIs to escape those limits
are FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE and FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS.

Allow finer grained tuning of the system limits via sysfs tunables under
/proc/sys/fs/fanotify, similar to tunables under /proc/sys/fs/inotify,
with some minor differences.

- max_queued_events - global system tunable for group queue size limit.
  Like the inotify tunable with the same name, it defaults to 16384 and
  applies on initialization of a new group.

- max_user_marks - user ns tunable for marks limit per user.
  Like the inotify tunable named max_user_watches, on a machine with
  sufficient RAM and it defaults to 1048576 in init userns and can be
  further limited per containing user ns.

- max_user_groups - user ns tunable for number of groups per user.
  Like the inotify tunable named max_user_instances, it defaults to 128
  in init userns and can be further limited per containing user ns.

The slightly different tunable names used for fanotify are derived from
the "group" and "mark" terminology used in the fanotify man pages and
throughout the code.

Considering the fact that the default value for max_user_instances was
increased in kernel v5.10 from 8192 to 1048576, leaving the legacy
fanotify limit of 8192 marks per group in addition to the max_user_marks
limit makes little sense, so the per group marks limit has been removed.

Note that when a group is initialized with FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS, its own
marks are not accounted in the per user marks account, so in effect the
limit of max_user_marks is only for the collection of groups that are
not initialized with FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304112921.3996419-2-amir73il@gmail.com
Suggested-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ucount: Make sure ucounts in /proc/sys/user don't regress again</title>
<updated>2020-04-07T19:51:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-07T15:46:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/starfive-tech/linux.git/commit/?id=0f538e3e712a517bd351607de50cd298102c7c08'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0f538e3e712a517bd351607de50cd298102c7c08</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 769071ac9f20 "ns: Introduce Time Namespace" broke reporting of
inotify ucounts (max_inotify_instances, max_inotify_watches) in
/proc/sys/user because it has added UCOUNT_TIME_NAMESPACES into enum
ucount_type but didn't properly update reporting in
kernel/ucount.c:setup_userns_sysctls(). This problem got fixed in commit
eeec26d5da82 "time/namespace: Add max_time_namespaces ucount".

Add BUILD_BUG_ON to catch a similar problem in the future.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407154643.10102-1-jack@suse.cz

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>time/namespace: Add max_time_namespaces ucount</title>
<updated>2020-04-07T10:37:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Safonov</name>
<email>dima@arista.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-06T17:13:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/starfive-tech/linux.git/commit/?id=eeec26d5da8248ea4e240b8795bb4364213d3247'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eeec26d5da8248ea4e240b8795bb4364213d3247</id>
<content type='text'>
Michael noticed that userns limit for number of time namespaces is missing.

Furthermore, time namespace introduced UCOUNT_TIME_NAMESPACES, but didn't
introduce an array member in user_table[]. It would make array's
initialisation OOB write, but by luck the user_table array has an excessive
empty member (all accesses to the array are limited with UCOUNT_COUNTS - so
it silently reuses the last free member.

Fixes user-visible regression: max_inotify_instances by reason of the
missing UCOUNT_ENTRY() has limited max number of namespaces instead of the
number of inotify instances.

Fixes: 769071ac9f20 ("ns: Introduce Time Namespace")
Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200406171342.128733-1-dima@arista.com

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check</title>
<updated>2019-07-19T00:08:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matteo Croce</name>
<email>mcroce@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-18T22:58:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/starfive-tech/linux.git/commit/?id=eec4844fae7c033a0c1fc1eb3b8517aeb8b6cc49'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eec4844fae7c033a0c1fc1eb3b8517aeb8b6cc49</id>
<content type='text'>
In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to
validate the user supplied value between an allowed range.  This
function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as
minimum and maximum allowed value.

On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some
readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned
to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced.

The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range
boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1,
int_max=INT_MAX in different source files:

    $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&amp;(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l
    248

Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some
macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them
instead of creating a local one for every object file.

This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary
compiled with the default Fedora config:

    # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o
    add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164)
    Data                                         old     new   delta
    sysctl_vals                                    -      12     +12
    __kstrtab_sysctl_vals                          -      12     +12
    max                                           14      10      -4
    int_max                                       16       -     -16
    one                                           68       -     -68
    zero                                         128      28    -100
    Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00%

[mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c]
[arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce &lt;mcroce@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin &lt;atomlin@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441</title>
<updated>2019-06-05T15:37:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-01T08:08:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/starfive-tech/linux.git/commit/?id=b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b886d83c5b621abc84ff9616f14c529be3f6b147</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2 of the license

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel &lt;armijn@tjaldur.nl&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>headers: untangle kmemleak.h from mm.h</title>
<updated>2018-04-06T04:36:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-05T23:25:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/starfive-tech/linux.git/commit/?id=514c60324960137e74457fdc233a339b985fa8a8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:514c60324960137e74457fdc233a339b985fa8a8</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently &lt;linux/slab.h&gt; #includes &lt;linux/kmemleak.h&gt; for no obvious
reason.  It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h
from slab.h and add &lt;linux/kmemleak.h&gt; to any users of kmemleak_* that
don't already #include it.  Also remove &lt;linux/kmemleak.h&gt; from source
files that do not use it.

This is tested on i386 allmodconfig and x86_64 allmodconfig.  It would
be good to run it through the 0day bot for other $ARCHes.  I have
neither the horsepower nor the storage space for the other $ARCHes.

Update: This patch has been extensively build-tested by both the 0day
bot &amp; kisskb/ozlabs build farms.  Both of them reported 2 build failures
for which patches are included here (in v2).

[ slab.h is the second most used header file after module.h; kernel.h is
  right there with slab.h. There could be some minor error in the
  counting due to some #includes having comments after them and I didn't
  combine all of those. ]

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: security/keys/big_key.c needs vmalloc.h, per sfr]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4309f98-3749-93e1-4bb7-d9501a39d015@infradead.org
Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;	[2 build failures]
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;	[2 build failures]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Wei Yongjun &lt;weiyongjun1@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ucount: Remove the atomicity from ucount-&gt;count</title>
<updated>2017-03-06T21:26:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-05T21:03:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/starfive-tech/linux.git/commit/?id=040757f738e13caaa9c5078bca79aa97e11dde88'/>
<id>urn:sha1:040757f738e13caaa9c5078bca79aa97e11dde88</id>
<content type='text'>
Always increment/decrement ucount-&gt;count under the ucounts_lock.  The
increments are there already and moving the decrements there means the
locking logic of the code is simpler.  This simplification in the
locking logic fixes a race between put_ucounts and get_ucounts that
could result in a use-after-free because the count could go zero then
be found by get_ucounts and then be freed by put_ucounts.

A bug presumably this one was found by a combination of syzkaller and
KASAN.  JongWhan Kim reported the syzkaller failure and Dmitry Vyukov
spotted the race in the code.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f6b2db1a3e8d ("userns: Make the count of user namespaces per user")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim &lt;zzoru007@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare to remove &lt;linux/cred.h&gt; inclusion from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-02T16:54:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/starfive-tech/linux.git/commit/?id=5b825c3af1d8a0af4deb4a5eb349d0d0050c62e5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5b825c3af1d8a0af4deb4a5eb349d0d0050c62e5</id>
<content type='text'>
Add #include &lt;linux/cred.h&gt; dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.

Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; is included in over
2,200 files ...

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2017-02-24T04:33:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-24T04:33:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/starfive-tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f1ef09fde17f9b77ca1435a5b53a28b203afb81c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f1ef09fde17f9b77ca1435a5b53a28b203afb81c</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
  visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
  care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
  up.

  From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
  ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
  prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
  but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.

  Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
  standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
  children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
  children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
  systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
  regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
  rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
  to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.

  There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
  instances inside a user namespace.

  Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
  namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
  hierachy and properties of namespaces.

  Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
  network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
  in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.

  Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
  on the wrong inode were being checked.

  I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
  be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
  credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
  in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
  executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
  mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
  better.

  A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
  fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
  as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
  to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
  check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.

  Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
  unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
  simpler which benefits CRIU.

  The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
  ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
  fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
  how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
  fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
  uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
  vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
  proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
  mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
  prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
  introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
  nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
  fs: Better permission checking for submounts
  exit: fix the setns() &amp;&amp; PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
  vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
  nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
  proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
  exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
  exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
  exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
  inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
