starfive-tech/linux.git/fs/proc, branch visionfive_v1_5.13

proc: Avoid mixing integer types in mem_rw()

2021-07-28T12:37:34+00:00

[ Upstream commit d238692b4b9f2c36e35af4c6e6f6da36184aeb3e ] Use size_t when capping the count argument received by mem_rw(). Since count is size_t, using min_t(int, ...) can lead to a negative value that will later be passed to access_remote_vm(), which can cause unexpected behavior. Since we are capping the value to at maximum PAGE_SIZE, the conversion from size_t to int when passing it to access_remote_vm() as "len" shouldn't be a problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210512125215.3348316-1-marcelo.cerri@canonical.com Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Signed-off-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Souza Cascardo Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Michel Lespinasse Cc: Helge Deller Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

mm/huge_memory.c: add missing read-only THP checking in transparent_hugepage_enabled()

2021-07-14T15:07:46+00:00

[ Upstream commit e6be37b2e7bddfe0c76585ee7c7eee5acc8efeab ] Since commit 99cb0dbd47a1 ("mm,thp: add read-only THP support for (non-shmem) FS"), read-only THP file mapping is supported. But it forgot to add checking for it in transparent_hugepage_enabled(). To fix it, we add checking for read-only THP file mapping and also introduce helper transhuge_vma_enabled() to check whether thp is enabled for specified vma to reduce duplicated code. We rename transparent_hugepage_enabled to transparent_hugepage_active to make the code easier to follow as suggested by David Hildenbrand. [linmiaohe@huawei.com: define transhuge_vma_enabled next to transhuge_vma_suitable] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210514093007.4117906-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511134857.1581273-4-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: 99cb0dbd47a1 ("mm,thp: add read-only THP support for (non-shmem) FS") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin Reviewed-by: Yang Shi Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K . V" Cc: Anshuman Khandual Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Minchan Kim Cc: Ralph Campbell Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Song Liu Cc: William Kucharski Cc: Zi Yan Cc: Mike Kravetz Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

proc: only require mm_struct for writing

2021-06-15T17:47:51+00:00

Commit 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct") we started using __mem_open() to track the mm_struct at open-time, so that we could then check it for writes. But that also ended up making the permission checks at open time much stricter - and not just for writes, but for reads too. And that in turn caused a regression for at least Fedora 29, where NIC interfaces fail to start when using NetworkManager. Since only the write side wanted the mm_struct test, ignore any failures by __mem_open() at open time, leaving reads unaffected. The write() time verification of the mm_struct pointer will then catch the failure case because a NULL pointer will not match a valid 'current->mm'. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/YMjTlp2FSJYvoyFa@unreal/ Fixes: 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct") Reported-and-tested-by: Leon Romanovsky Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Andrea Righi Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct

2021-06-08T17:24:09+00:00

Commit bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener") tried to make sure that there could not be a confusion between the opener of a /proc/$pid/attr/ file and the writer. It used struct cred to make sure the privileges didn't change. However, there were existing cases where a more privileged thread was passing the opened fd to a differently privileged thread (during container setup). Instead, use mm_struct to track whether the opener and writer are still the same process. (This is what several other proc files already do, though for different reasons.) Reported-by: Christian Brauner Reported-by: Andrea Righi Tested-by: Andrea Righi Fixes: bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener

2021-05-25T20:24:41+00:00

Fix another "confused deputy" weakness[1]. Writes to /proc/$pid/attr/ files need to check the opener credentials, since these fds do not transition state across execve(). Without this, it is possible to trick another process (which may have different credentials) to write to its own /proc/$pid/attr/ files, leading to unexpected and possibly exploitable behaviors. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html?highlight=confused#open-file-credentials Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc/sysctl: fix function name error in comments

2021-05-07T02:24:11+00:00

The function name should be modified to register_sysctl_paths instead of register_sysctl_table_path. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1615807194-79646-1-git-send-email-zhouchuangao@vivo.com Signed-off-by: zhouchuangao Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: delete redundant subset=pid check

2021-05-07T02:24:11+00:00

Two checks in lookup and readdir code should be enough to not have third check in open code. Can't open what can't be looked up? Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YFYYwIBIkytqnkxP@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Acked-by: Alexey Gladkov Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: mandate ->proc_lseek in "struct proc_ops"

2021-05-07T02:24:11+00:00

Now that proc_ops are separate from file_operations and other operations it easy to check all instances to have ->proc_lseek hook and remove check in main code. Note: nonseekable_open() files naturally don't require ->proc_lseek. Garbage collect pde_lseek() function. [adobriyan@gmail.com: smoke test lseek()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YG4OIhChOrVTPgdN@localhost.localdomain Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YFYX0Bzwxlc7aBa/@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: save LOC in __xlate_proc_name()

2021-05-07T02:24:11+00:00

Can't look at this verbosity anymore. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YFYXAp/fgq405qcy@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/proc/generic.c: fix incorrect pde_is_permanent check

2021-05-07T02:24:11+00:00

Currently the pde_is_permanent() check is being run on root multiple times rather than on the next proc directory entry. This looks like a copy-paste error. Fix this by replacing root with next. Addresses-Coverity: ("Copy-paste error") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210318122633.14222-1-colin.king@canonical.com Fixes: d919b33dafb3 ("proc: faster open/read/close with "permanent" files") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King Acked-by: Christian Brauner Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds