From 25a0d04d3883888ccd59918aede44b109abdb099 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2025 23:43:08 +0800
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add cookies check for raw_tp fill_link_info test

Adding tests for getting cookie with fill_link_info for raw_tp.

Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250603154309.3063644-2-chen.dylane@linux.dev
---
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c  | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c
index 6befa870434b..0774ae6c1bec 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c
@@ -635,10 +635,29 @@ cleanup:
 	bpf_link__destroy(link);
 }
 
+static int verify_raw_tp_link_info(int fd, u64 cookie)
+{
+	struct bpf_link_info info;
+	int err;
+	u32 len = sizeof(info);
+
+	memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
+	err = bpf_link_get_info_by_fd(fd, &info, &len);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "get_link_info"))
+		return -1;
+
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(info.type, BPF_LINK_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT, "link_type"))
+		return -1;
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(info.raw_tracepoint.cookie, cookie, "raw_tp_cookie");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void raw_tp_subtest(struct test_bpf_cookie *skel)
 {
 	__u64 cookie;
-	int prog_fd, link_fd = -1;
+	int err, prog_fd, link_fd = -1;
 	struct bpf_link *link = NULL;
 	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_raw_tp_opts, raw_tp_opts);
 	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_raw_tracepoint_opts, opts);
@@ -656,6 +675,11 @@ static void raw_tp_subtest(struct test_bpf_cookie *skel)
 		goto cleanup;
 
 	usleep(1); /* trigger */
+
+	err = verify_raw_tp_link_info(link_fd, cookie);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "verify_raw_tp_link_info"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
 	close(link_fd); /* detach */
 	link_fd = -1;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a570f386f3d19aa64fb3764504ac80cddb42e579 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Blake Jones <blakejones@google.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2025 13:37:01 -0700
Subject: Tests for the ".emit_strings" functionality in the BTF dumper.

When this mode is turned on, "emit_zeroes" and "compact" have no effect,
and embedded NUL characters always terminate printing of an array.

Signed-off-by: Blake Jones <blakejones@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250603203701.520541-2-blakejones@google.com
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 118 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c
index c0a776feec23..82903585c870 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c
@@ -879,6 +879,122 @@ static void test_btf_dump_var_data(struct btf *btf, struct btf_dump *d,
 			  "static int bpf_cgrp_storage_busy = (int)2", 2);
 }
 
+struct btf_dump_string_ctx {
+	struct btf *btf;
+	struct btf_dump *d;
+	char *str;
+	struct btf_dump_type_data_opts *opts;
+	int array_id;
+};
+
+static int btf_dump_one_string(struct btf_dump_string_ctx *ctx,
+			       char *ptr, size_t ptr_sz,
+			       const char *expected_val)
+{
+	size_t type_sz;
+	int ret;
+
+	ctx->str[0] = '\0';
+	type_sz = btf__resolve_size(ctx->btf, ctx->array_id);
+	ret = btf_dump__dump_type_data(ctx->d, ctx->array_id, ptr, ptr_sz, ctx->opts);
+	if (type_sz <= ptr_sz) {
+		if (!ASSERT_EQ(ret, type_sz, "failed/unexpected type_sz"))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!ASSERT_STREQ(ctx->str, expected_val, "ensure expected/actual match"))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void btf_dump_strings(struct btf_dump_string_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct btf_dump_type_data_opts *opts = ctx->opts;
+
+	opts->emit_strings = true;
+
+	opts->compact = true;
+	opts->emit_zeroes = false;
+
+	opts->skip_names = false;
+	btf_dump_one_string(ctx, "foo", 4, "(char[4])\"foo\"");
+
+	opts->skip_names = true;
+	btf_dump_one_string(ctx, "foo", 4, "\"foo\"");
+
+	/* This should have no effect. */
+	opts->emit_zeroes = false;
+	btf_dump_one_string(ctx, "foo", 4, "\"foo\"");
+
+	/* This should have no effect. */
+	opts->compact = false;
+	btf_dump_one_string(ctx, "foo", 4, "\"foo\"");
+
+	/* Non-printable characters come out as hex. */
+	btf_dump_one_string(ctx, "fo\xff", 4, "\"fo\\xff\"");
+	btf_dump_one_string(ctx, "fo\x7", 4, "\"fo\\x07\"");
+
+	/*
+	 * Strings that are too long for the specified type ("char[4]")
+	 * should fall back to the current behavior.
+	 */
+	opts->compact = true;
+	btf_dump_one_string(ctx, "abcde", 6, "['a','b','c','d',]");
+
+	/*
+	 * Strings that are too short for the specified type ("char[4]")
+	 * should work normally.
+	 */
+	btf_dump_one_string(ctx, "ab", 3, "\"ab\"");
+
+	/* Non-NUL-terminated arrays don't get printed as strings. */
+	char food[4] = { 'f', 'o', 'o', 'd' };
+	char bye[3] = { 'b', 'y', 'e' };
+
+	btf_dump_one_string(ctx, food, 4, "['f','o','o','d',]");
+	btf_dump_one_string(ctx, bye, 3, "['b','y','e',]");
+
+	/* The embedded NUL should terminate the string. */
+	char embed[4] = { 'f', 'o', '\0', 'd' };
+
+	btf_dump_one_string(ctx, embed, 4, "\"fo\"");
+}
+
+static void test_btf_dump_string_data(void)
+{
+	struct test_ctx t = {};
+	char str[STRSIZE];
+	struct btf_dump *d;
+	DECLARE_LIBBPF_OPTS(btf_dump_type_data_opts, opts);
+	struct btf_dump_string_ctx ctx;
+	int char_id, int_id, array_id;
+
+	if (test_ctx__init(&t))
+		return;
+
+	d = btf_dump__new(t.btf, btf_dump_snprintf, str, NULL);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(d, "could not create BTF dump"))
+		return;
+
+	/* Generate BTF for a four-element char array. */
+	char_id = btf__add_int(t.btf, "char", 1, BTF_INT_CHAR);
+	ASSERT_EQ(char_id, 1, "char_id");
+	int_id = btf__add_int(t.btf, "int", 4, BTF_INT_SIGNED);
+	ASSERT_EQ(int_id, 2, "int_id");
+	array_id = btf__add_array(t.btf, int_id, char_id, 4);
+	ASSERT_EQ(array_id, 3, "array_id");
+
+	ctx.btf = t.btf;
+	ctx.d = d;
+	ctx.str = str;
+	ctx.opts = &opts;
+	ctx.array_id = array_id;
+
+	btf_dump_strings(&ctx);
+
+	btf_dump__free(d);
+	test_ctx__free(&t);
+}
+
 static void test_btf_datasec(struct btf *btf, struct btf_dump *d, char *str,
 			     const char *name, const char *expected_val,
 			     void *data, size_t data_sz)
@@ -970,6 +1086,8 @@ void test_btf_dump() {
 		test_btf_dump_struct_data(btf, d, str);
 	if (test__start_subtest("btf_dump: var_data"))
 		test_btf_dump_var_data(btf, d, str);
+	if (test__start_subtest("btf_dump: string_data"))
+		test_btf_dump_string_data();
 	btf_dump__free(d);
 	btf__free(btf);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 64a064ce33b193a681f1eb52ac1ad09aadda9944 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rong Tao <rongtao@cestc.cn>
Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2025 16:45:14 +0800
Subject: selftests/bpf: rbtree: Fix incorrect global variable usage

Within __add_three() function, should use function parameters instead of
global variables. So that the variables groot_nested.inner.root and
groot_nested.inner.glock in rbtree_add_nodes_nested() are tested
correctly.

Signed-off-by: Rong Tao <rongtao@cestc.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_3DD7405C0839EBE2724AC5FA357B5402B105@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree.c | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree.c
index a3620c15c136..49fe93d7e059 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree.c
@@ -61,19 +61,19 @@ static long __add_three(struct bpf_rb_root *root, struct bpf_spin_lock *lock)
 	}
 	m->key = 1;
 
-	bpf_spin_lock(&glock);
-	bpf_rbtree_add(&groot, &n->node, less);
-	bpf_rbtree_add(&groot, &m->node, less);
-	bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);
+	bpf_spin_lock(lock);
+	bpf_rbtree_add(root, &n->node, less);
+	bpf_rbtree_add(root, &m->node, less);
+	bpf_spin_unlock(lock);
 
 	n = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*n));
 	if (!n)
 		return 3;
 	n->key = 3;
 
-	bpf_spin_lock(&glock);
-	bpf_rbtree_add(&groot, &n->node, less);
-	bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);
+	bpf_spin_lock(lock);
+	bpf_rbtree_add(root, &n->node, less);
+	bpf_spin_unlock(lock);
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ae8824037a0ac550745b223aa3680819ed65e8db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2025 18:36:10 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Reduce test_xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow logs

For selftest xdp_adjust_tail/xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow, if tested failure,
I see a long list of log output like

    ...
    test_xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow:PASS:9Kb+10b-untouched 0 nsec
    test_xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow:PASS:9Kb+10b-untouched 0 nsec
    test_xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow:PASS:9Kb+10b-untouched 0 nsec
    test_xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow:PASS:9Kb+10b-untouched 0 nsec
    ...

There are total 7374 lines of the above which is too much. Let us
only issue such logs when it is an assert failure.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250607013610.1551399-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_adjust_tail.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_adjust_tail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_adjust_tail.c
index b2b2d85dbb1b..e361129402a1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_adjust_tail.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_adjust_tail.c
@@ -246,14 +246,20 @@ static void test_xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow(void)
 	ASSERT_EQ(topts.retval, XDP_TX, "9Kb+10b retval");
 	ASSERT_EQ(topts.data_size_out, exp_size, "9Kb+10b size");
 
-	for (i = 0; i < 9000; i++)
-		ASSERT_EQ(buf[i], 1, "9Kb+10b-old");
+	for (i = 0; i < 9000; i++) {
+		if (buf[i] != 1)
+			ASSERT_EQ(buf[i], 1, "9Kb+10b-old");
+	}
 
-	for (i = 9000; i < 9010; i++)
-		ASSERT_EQ(buf[i], 0, "9Kb+10b-new");
+	for (i = 9000; i < 9010; i++) {
+		if (buf[i] != 0)
+			ASSERT_EQ(buf[i], 0, "9Kb+10b-new");
+	}
 
-	for (i = 9010; i < 16384; i++)
-		ASSERT_EQ(buf[i], 1, "9Kb+10b-untouched");
+	for (i = 9010; i < 16384; i++) {
+		if (buf[i] != 1)
+			ASSERT_EQ(buf[i], 1, "9Kb+10b-untouched");
+	}
 
 	/* Test a too large grow */
 	memset(buf, 1, 16384);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 377d3715900c1f465a5ea8a6a11bcbdc42b18668 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2025 18:36:15 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix bpf_mod_race test failure with arm64 64KB page
 size

Currently, uffd_register.range.len is set to 4096 for command
'ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_REGISTER, &uffd_register)'. For arm64 64KB page size,
the len must be 64KB size aligned as page size alignment is required.
See fs/userfaultfd.c:validate_unaligned_range().

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250607013615.1551783-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_mod_race.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_mod_race.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_mod_race.c
index fe2c502e5089..ecc3d47919ad 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_mod_race.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_mod_race.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static int test_setup_uffd(void *fault_addr)
 	}
 
 	uffd_register.range.start = (unsigned long)fault_addr;
-	uffd_register.range.len = 4096;
+	uffd_register.range.len = getpagesize();
 	uffd_register.mode = UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING;
 	if (ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_REGISTER, &uffd_register)) {
 		close(uffd);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 8c8c5e3c854a2593ec90dacd868f3066b67de1c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2025 18:36:21 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix ringbuf/ringbuf_write test failure with arm64 64KB
 page size

The ringbuf max_entries must be PAGE_ALIGNED. See kernel function
ringbuf_map_alloc(). So for arm64 64KB page size, adjust max_entries
and other related metrics properly.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250607013621.1552332-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ringbuf.c       | 4 ++--
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ringbuf_write.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ringbuf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ringbuf.c
index da430df45aa4..d1e4cb28a72c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ringbuf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ringbuf.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static void ringbuf_write_subtest(void)
 	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_open"))
 		return;
 
-	skel->maps.ringbuf.max_entries = 0x4000;
+	skel->maps.ringbuf.max_entries = 0x40000;
 
 	err = test_ringbuf_write_lskel__load(skel);
 	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "skel_load"))
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static void ringbuf_write_subtest(void)
 	mmap_ptr = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, rb_fd, 0);
 	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(mmap_ptr, "rw_cons_pos"))
 		goto cleanup;
-	*mmap_ptr = 0x3000;
+	*mmap_ptr = 0x30000;
 	ASSERT_OK(munmap(mmap_ptr, page_size), "unmap_rw");
 
 	skel->bss->pid = getpid();
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ringbuf_write.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ringbuf_write.c
index 350513c0e4c9..f063a0013f85 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ringbuf_write.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ringbuf_write.c
@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ int test_ringbuf_write(void *ctx)
 	if (cur_pid != pid)
 		return 0;
 
-	sample1 = bpf_ringbuf_reserve(&ringbuf, 0x3000, 0);
+	sample1 = bpf_ringbuf_reserve(&ringbuf, 0x30000, 0);
 	if (!sample1)
 		return 0;
 	/* first one can pass */
-	sample2 = bpf_ringbuf_reserve(&ringbuf, 0x3000, 0);
+	sample2 = bpf_ringbuf_reserve(&ringbuf, 0x30000, 0);
 	if (!sample2) {
 		bpf_ringbuf_discard(sample1, 0);
 		__sync_fetch_and_add(&discarded, 1);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From bbc7bd658ddc662083639b9e9a280b90225ecd9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2025 18:36:26 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix a user_ringbuf failure with arm64 64KB page size

The ringbuf max_entries must be PAGE_ALIGNED. See kernel function
ringbuf_map_alloc(). So for arm64 64KB page size, adjust max_entries
properly.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250607013626.1553001-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/user_ringbuf.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/user_ringbuf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/user_ringbuf.c
index d424e7ecbd12..9fd3ae987321 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/user_ringbuf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/user_ringbuf.c
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@
 #include "../progs/test_user_ringbuf.h"
 
 static const long c_sample_size = sizeof(struct sample) + BPF_RINGBUF_HDR_SZ;
-static const long c_ringbuf_size = 1 << 12; /* 1 small page */
-static const long c_max_entries = c_ringbuf_size / c_sample_size;
+static long c_ringbuf_size, c_max_entries;
 
 static void drain_current_samples(void)
 {
@@ -424,7 +423,9 @@ static void test_user_ringbuf_loop(void)
 	uint32_t remaining_samples = total_samples;
 	int err;
 
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(total_samples <= c_max_entries);
+	if (!ASSERT_LT(c_max_entries, total_samples, "compare_c_max_entries"))
+		return;
+
 	err = load_skel_create_user_ringbuf(&skel, &ringbuf);
 	if (err)
 		return;
@@ -686,6 +687,9 @@ void test_user_ringbuf(void)
 {
 	int i;
 
+	c_ringbuf_size = getpagesize(); /* 1 page */
+	c_max_entries = c_ringbuf_size / c_sample_size;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(success_tests); i++) {
 		if (!test__start_subtest(success_tests[i].test_name))
 			continue;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c1bb68656bc18fd59bbd630fd1b5a86875b464b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2025 09:31:51 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Move some tc_helpers.h functions to test_progs.h

Move static inline functions id_from_prog_fd() and id_from_link_fd()
from prog_tests/tc_helpers.h to test_progs.h so these two functions
can be reused for later cgroup mprog selftests.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606163151.2429325-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
---
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tc_helpers.h  | 28 ----------------------
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h           | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tc_helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tc_helpers.h
index 924d0e25320c..d52a62af77bf 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tc_helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tc_helpers.h
@@ -8,34 +8,6 @@
 # define loopback 1
 #endif
 
-static inline __u32 id_from_prog_fd(int fd)
-{
-	struct bpf_prog_info prog_info = {};
-	__u32 prog_info_len = sizeof(prog_info);
-	int err;
-
-	err = bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd(fd, &prog_info, &prog_info_len);
-	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "id_from_prog_fd"))
-		return 0;
-
-	ASSERT_NEQ(prog_info.id, 0, "prog_info.id");
-	return prog_info.id;
-}
-
-static inline __u32 id_from_link_fd(int fd)
-{
-	struct bpf_link_info link_info = {};
-	__u32 link_info_len = sizeof(link_info);
-	int err;
-
-	err = bpf_link_get_info_by_fd(fd, &link_info, &link_info_len);
-	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "id_from_link_fd"))
-		return 0;
-
-	ASSERT_NEQ(link_info.id, 0, "link_info.id");
-	return link_info.id;
-}
-
 static inline __u32 ifindex_from_link_fd(int fd)
 {
 	struct bpf_link_info link_info = {};
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h
index 870694f2a359..df2222a1806f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h
@@ -460,6 +460,34 @@ static inline void *u64_to_ptr(__u64 ptr)
 	return (void *) (unsigned long) ptr;
 }
 
+static inline __u32 id_from_prog_fd(int fd)
+{
+	struct bpf_prog_info prog_info = {};
+	__u32 prog_info_len = sizeof(prog_info);
+	int err;
+
+	err = bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd(fd, &prog_info, &prog_info_len);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "id_from_prog_fd"))
+		return 0;
+
+	ASSERT_NEQ(prog_info.id, 0, "prog_info.id");
+	return prog_info.id;
+}
+
+static inline __u32 id_from_link_fd(int fd)
+{
+	struct bpf_link_info link_info = {};
+	__u32 link_info_len = sizeof(link_info);
+	int err;
+
+	err = bpf_link_get_info_by_fd(fd, &link_info, &link_info_len);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "id_from_link_fd"))
+		return 0;
+
+	ASSERT_NEQ(link_info.id, 0, "link_info.id");
+	return link_info.id;
+}
+
 int bpf_find_map(const char *test, struct bpf_object *obj, const char *name);
 int compare_map_keys(int map1_fd, int map2_fd);
 int compare_stack_ips(int smap_fd, int amap_fd, int stack_trace_len);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e422d5f118e4da5d15b57c5721ee68ae39b512ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2025 09:31:56 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add two selftests for mprog API based cgroup progs

Two tests are added:
  - cgroup_mprog_opts, which mimics tc_opts.c ([1]). Both prog and link
    attach are tested. Some negative tests are also included.
  - cgroup_mprog_ordering, which actually runs the program with some mprog
    API flags.

  [1] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tc_opts.c

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606163156.2429955-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_opts.c   | 617 +++++++++++++++++++++
 .../bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_ordering.c         |  77 +++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_mprog.c   |  30 +
 3 files changed, 724 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_opts.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_ordering.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_mprog.c

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_opts.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_opts.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bb60704a3ef9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_opts.c
@@ -0,0 +1,617 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include "cgroup_helpers.h"
+#include "cgroup_mprog.skel.h"
+
+static void assert_mprog_count(int cg, int atype, int expected)
+{
+	__u32 count = 0, attach_flags = 0;
+	int err;
+
+	err = bpf_prog_query(cg, atype, 0, &attach_flags,
+			     NULL, &count);
+	ASSERT_EQ(count, expected, "count");
+	ASSERT_EQ(err, 0, "prog_query");
+}
+
+static void test_prog_attach_detach(int atype)
+{
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_prog_attach_opts, opta);
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_prog_detach_opts, optd);
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_prog_query_opts, optq);
+	__u32 fd1, fd2, fd3, fd4, id1, id2, id3, id4;
+	struct cgroup_mprog *skel;
+	__u32 prog_ids[10];
+	int cg, err;
+
+	cg = test__join_cgroup("/prog_attach_detach");
+	if (!ASSERT_GE(cg, 0, "join_cgroup /prog_attach_detach"))
+		return;
+
+	skel = cgroup_mprog__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_load"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	fd1 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_1);
+	fd2 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_2);
+	fd3 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_3);
+	fd4 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_4);
+
+	id1 = id_from_prog_fd(fd1);
+	id2 = id_from_prog_fd(fd2);
+	id3 = id_from_prog_fd(fd3);
+	id4 = id_from_prog_fd(fd4);
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_BEFORE | BPF_F_AFTER,
+		.expected_revision = 1,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd1] */
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, 0, "prog_attach"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 1);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_BEFORE,
+		.expected_revision = 2,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd2, fd1] */
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd2, cg, atype, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, 0, "prog_attach"))
+		goto cleanup1;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 2);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_AFTER,
+		.relative_fd = fd2,
+		.expected_revision = 3,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd2, fd3, fd1] */
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd3, cg, atype, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, 0, "prog_attach"))
+		goto cleanup2;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 3);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI,
+		.expected_revision = 4,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd2, fd3, fd1, fd4] */
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd4, cg, atype, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, 0, "prog_attach"))
+		goto cleanup3;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 4);
+
+	/* retrieve optq.prog_cnt */
+	err = bpf_prog_query_opts(cg, atype, &optq);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_query"))
+		goto cleanup4;
+
+	/* optq.prog_cnt will be used in below query */
+	memset(prog_ids, 0, sizeof(prog_ids));
+	optq.prog_ids = prog_ids;
+	err = bpf_prog_query_opts(cg, atype, &optq);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_query"))
+		goto cleanup4;
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.count, 4, "count");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.revision, 5, "revision");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.prog_ids[0], id2, "prog_ids[0]");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.prog_ids[1], id3, "prog_ids[1]");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.prog_ids[2], id1, "prog_ids[2]");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.prog_ids[3], id4, "prog_ids[3]");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.prog_ids[4], 0, "prog_ids[4]");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.link_ids, NULL, "link_ids");
+
+cleanup4:
+	optd.expected_revision = 5;
+	err = bpf_prog_detach_opts(fd4, cg, atype, &optd);
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_detach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 3);
+
+cleanup3:
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(optd);
+	err = bpf_prog_detach_opts(fd3, cg, atype, &optd);
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_detach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 2);
+
+	/* Check revision after two detach operations */
+	err = bpf_prog_query_opts(cg, atype, &optq);
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_query");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.revision, 7, "revision");
+
+cleanup2:
+	err = bpf_prog_detach_opts(fd2, cg, atype, &optd);
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_detach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 1);
+
+cleanup1:
+	err = bpf_prog_detach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &optd);
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_detach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+cleanup:
+	cgroup_mprog__destroy(skel);
+	close(cg);
+}
+
+static void test_link_attach_detach(int atype)
+{
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_cgroup_opts, opta);
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_cgroup_opts, optd);
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_prog_query_opts, optq);
+	struct bpf_link *link1, *link2, *link3, *link4;
+	__u32 fd1, fd2, fd3, fd4, id1, id2, id3, id4;
+	struct cgroup_mprog *skel;
+	__u32 prog_ids[10];
+	int cg, err;
+
+	cg = test__join_cgroup("/link_attach_detach");
+	if (!ASSERT_GE(cg, 0, "join_cgroup /link_attach_detach"))
+		return;
+
+	skel = cgroup_mprog__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_load"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	fd1 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_1);
+	fd2 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_2);
+	fd3 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_3);
+	fd4 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_4);
+
+	id1 = id_from_prog_fd(fd1);
+	id2 = id_from_prog_fd(fd2);
+	id3 = id_from_prog_fd(fd3);
+	id4 = id_from_prog_fd(fd4);
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.expected_revision = 1,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd1] */
+	link1 = bpf_program__attach_cgroup_opts(skel->progs.getsockopt_1, cg, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link1, "link_attach"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 1);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_BEFORE | BPF_F_LINK,
+		.relative_id = id_from_link_fd(bpf_link__fd(link1)),
+		.expected_revision = 2,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd2, fd1] */
+	link2 = bpf_program__attach_cgroup_opts(skel->progs.getsockopt_2, cg, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link2, "link_attach"))
+		goto cleanup1;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 2);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_AFTER | BPF_F_LINK,
+		.relative_fd = bpf_link__fd(link2),
+		.expected_revision = 3,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd2, fd3, fd1] */
+	link3 = bpf_program__attach_cgroup_opts(skel->progs.getsockopt_3, cg, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link3, "link_attach"))
+		goto cleanup2;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 3);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.expected_revision = 4,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd2, fd3, fd1, fd4] */
+	link4 = bpf_program__attach_cgroup_opts(skel->progs.getsockopt_4, cg, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link4, "link_attach"))
+		goto cleanup3;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 4);
+
+	/* retrieve optq.prog_cnt */
+	err = bpf_prog_query_opts(cg, atype, &optq);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_query"))
+		goto cleanup4;
+
+	/* optq.prog_cnt will be used in below query */
+	memset(prog_ids, 0, sizeof(prog_ids));
+	optq.prog_ids = prog_ids;
+	err = bpf_prog_query_opts(cg, atype, &optq);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_query"))
+		goto cleanup4;
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.count, 4, "count");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.revision, 5, "revision");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.prog_ids[0], id2, "prog_ids[0]");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.prog_ids[1], id3, "prog_ids[1]");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.prog_ids[2], id1, "prog_ids[2]");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.prog_ids[3], id4, "prog_ids[3]");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.prog_ids[4], 0, "prog_ids[4]");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.link_ids, NULL, "link_ids");
+
+cleanup4:
+	bpf_link__destroy(link4);
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 3);
+
+cleanup3:
+	bpf_link__destroy(link3);
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 2);
+
+	/* Check revision after two detach operations */
+	err = bpf_prog_query_opts(cg, atype, &optq);
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_query");
+	ASSERT_EQ(optq.revision, 7, "revision");
+
+cleanup2:
+	bpf_link__destroy(link2);
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 1);
+
+cleanup1:
+	bpf_link__destroy(link1);
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+cleanup:
+	cgroup_mprog__destroy(skel);
+	close(cg);
+}
+
+static void test_preorder_prog_attach_detach(int atype)
+{
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_prog_attach_opts, opta);
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_prog_detach_opts, optd);
+	__u32 fd1, fd2, fd3, fd4;
+	struct cgroup_mprog *skel;
+	int cg, err;
+
+	cg = test__join_cgroup("/preorder_prog_attach_detach");
+	if (!ASSERT_GE(cg, 0, "join_cgroup /preorder_prog_attach_detach"))
+		return;
+
+	skel = cgroup_mprog__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_load"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	fd1 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_1);
+	fd2 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_2);
+	fd3 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_3);
+	fd4 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_4);
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI,
+		.expected_revision = 1,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd1] */
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, 0, "prog_attach"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 1);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_PREORDER,
+		.expected_revision = 2,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd1, fd2] */
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd2, cg, atype, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, 0, "prog_attach"))
+		goto cleanup1;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 2);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_AFTER,
+		.relative_fd = fd2,
+		.expected_revision = 3,
+	);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd3, cg, atype, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, -EINVAL, "prog_attach"))
+		goto cleanup2;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 2);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_AFTER | BPF_F_PREORDER,
+		.relative_fd = fd2,
+		.expected_revision = 3,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd1, fd2, fd3] */
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd3, cg, atype, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, 0, "prog_attach"))
+		goto cleanup2;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 3);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI,
+		.expected_revision = 4,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd2, fd3, fd1, fd4] */
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd4, cg, atype, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, 0, "prog_attach"))
+		goto cleanup3;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 4);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_detach_opts(fd4, cg, atype, &optd);
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_detach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 3);
+
+cleanup3:
+	err = bpf_prog_detach_opts(fd3, cg, atype, &optd);
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_detach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 2);
+
+cleanup2:
+	err = bpf_prog_detach_opts(fd2, cg, atype, &optd);
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_detach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 1);
+
+cleanup1:
+	err = bpf_prog_detach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &optd);
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_detach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+cleanup:
+	cgroup_mprog__destroy(skel);
+	close(cg);
+}
+
+static void test_preorder_link_attach_detach(int atype)
+{
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_cgroup_opts, opta);
+	struct bpf_link *link1, *link2, *link3, *link4;
+	struct cgroup_mprog *skel;
+	__u32 fd2;
+	int cg;
+
+	cg = test__join_cgroup("/preorder_link_attach_detach");
+	if (!ASSERT_GE(cg, 0, "join_cgroup /preorder_link_attach_detach"))
+		return;
+
+	skel = cgroup_mprog__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_load"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	fd2 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_2);
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.expected_revision = 1,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd1] */
+	link1 = bpf_program__attach_cgroup_opts(skel->progs.getsockopt_1, cg, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link1, "link_attach"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 1);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_PREORDER,
+		.expected_revision = 2,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd1, fd2] */
+	link2 = bpf_program__attach_cgroup_opts(skel->progs.getsockopt_2, cg, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link2, "link_attach"))
+		goto cleanup1;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 2);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_AFTER,
+		.relative_fd = fd2,
+		.expected_revision = 3,
+	);
+
+	link3 = bpf_program__attach_cgroup_opts(skel->progs.getsockopt_3, cg, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_ERR_PTR(link3, "link_attach"))
+		goto cleanup2;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 2);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_AFTER | BPF_F_PREORDER | BPF_F_LINK,
+		.relative_fd = bpf_link__fd(link2),
+		.expected_revision = 3,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd1, fd2, fd3] */
+	link3 = bpf_program__attach_cgroup_opts(skel->progs.getsockopt_3, cg, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link3, "link_attach"))
+		goto cleanup2;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 3);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.expected_revision = 4,
+	);
+
+	/* ordering: [fd2, fd3, fd1, fd4] */
+	link4 = bpf_program__attach_cgroup_opts(skel->progs.getsockopt_4, cg, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link4, "prog_attach"))
+		goto cleanup3;
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 4);
+
+	bpf_link__destroy(link4);
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 3);
+
+cleanup3:
+	bpf_link__destroy(link3);
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 2);
+
+cleanup2:
+	bpf_link__destroy(link2);
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 1);
+
+cleanup1:
+	bpf_link__destroy(link1);
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+cleanup:
+	cgroup_mprog__destroy(skel);
+	close(cg);
+}
+
+static void test_invalid_attach_detach(int atype)
+{
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_prog_attach_opts, opta);
+	__u32 fd1, fd2, id2;
+	struct cgroup_mprog *skel;
+	int cg, err;
+
+	cg = test__join_cgroup("/invalid_attach_detach");
+	if (!ASSERT_GE(cg, 0, "join_cgroup /invalid_attach_detach"))
+		return;
+
+	skel = cgroup_mprog__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_load"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	fd1 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_1);
+	fd2 = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.getsockopt_2);
+
+	id2 = id_from_prog_fd(fd2);
+
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_BEFORE | BPF_F_AFTER,
+		.relative_id = id2,
+	);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &opta);
+	ASSERT_EQ(err, -EINVAL, "prog_attach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_BEFORE | BPF_F_ID,
+	);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &opta);
+	ASSERT_EQ(err, -ENOENT, "prog_attach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_AFTER | BPF_F_ID,
+	);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &opta);
+	ASSERT_EQ(err, -ENOENT, "prog_attach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_BEFORE | BPF_F_AFTER,
+		.relative_id = id2,
+	);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &opta);
+	ASSERT_EQ(err, -EINVAL, "prog_attach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_LINK,
+		.relative_id = id2,
+	);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &opta);
+	ASSERT_EQ(err, -EINVAL, "prog_attach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI,
+		.relative_id = id2,
+	);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &opta);
+	ASSERT_EQ(err, -EINVAL, "prog_attach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_BEFORE,
+		.relative_fd = fd1,
+	);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &opta);
+	ASSERT_EQ(err, -ENOENT, "prog_attach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_AFTER,
+		.relative_fd = fd1,
+	);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &opta);
+	ASSERT_EQ(err, -ENOENT, "prog_attach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 0);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI,
+	);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &opta);
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, 0, "prog_attach"))
+		goto cleanup;
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 1);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_AFTER,
+	);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &opta);
+	ASSERT_EQ(err, -EINVAL, "prog_attach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 1);
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opta,
+		.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_REPLACE | BPF_F_AFTER,
+		.replace_prog_fd = fd1,
+	);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(fd1, cg, atype, &opta);
+	ASSERT_EQ(err, -EINVAL, "prog_attach");
+	assert_mprog_count(cg, atype, 1);
+cleanup:
+	cgroup_mprog__destroy(skel);
+	close(cg);
+}
+
+void test_cgroup_mprog_opts(void)
+{
+	if (test__start_subtest("prog_attach_detach"))
+		test_prog_attach_detach(BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT);
+	if (test__start_subtest("link_attach_detach"))
+		test_link_attach_detach(BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT);
+	if (test__start_subtest("preorder_prog_attach_detach"))
+		test_preorder_prog_attach_detach(BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT);
+	if (test__start_subtest("preorder_link_attach_detach"))
+		test_preorder_link_attach_detach(BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT);
+	if (test__start_subtest("invalid_attach_detach"))
+		test_invalid_attach_detach(BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_ordering.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_ordering.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4a4e9710b474
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_ordering.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include "cgroup_helpers.h"
+#include "cgroup_preorder.skel.h"
+
+static int run_getsockopt_test(int cg_parent, int sock_fd, bool has_relative_fd)
+{
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_prog_attach_opts, opts);
+	enum bpf_attach_type prog_p_atype, prog_p2_atype;
+	int prog_p_fd, prog_p2_fd;
+	struct cgroup_preorder *skel = NULL;
+	struct bpf_program *prog;
+	__u8 *result, buf;
+	socklen_t optlen;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	skel = cgroup_preorder__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "cgroup_preorder__open_and_load"))
+		return 0;
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS_RESET(opts);
+	opts.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI;
+	prog = skel->progs.parent;
+	prog_p_fd = bpf_program__fd(prog);
+	prog_p_atype = bpf_program__expected_attach_type(prog);
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(prog_p_fd, cg_parent, prog_p_atype, &opts);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_prog_attach_opts-parent"))
+		goto close_skel;
+
+	opts.flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | BPF_F_BEFORE;
+	if (has_relative_fd)
+		opts.relative_fd = prog_p_fd;
+	prog = skel->progs.parent_2;
+	prog_p2_fd = bpf_program__fd(prog);
+	prog_p2_atype = bpf_program__expected_attach_type(prog);
+	err = bpf_prog_attach_opts(prog_p2_fd, cg_parent, prog_p2_atype, &opts);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_prog_attach_opts-parent_2"))
+		goto detach_parent;
+
+	err = getsockopt(sock_fd, SOL_IP, IP_TOS, &buf, &optlen);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "getsockopt"))
+		goto detach_parent_2;
+
+	result = skel->bss->result;
+	ASSERT_TRUE(result[0] == 4 && result[1] == 3, "result values");
+
+detach_parent_2:
+	ASSERT_OK(bpf_prog_detach2(prog_p2_fd, cg_parent, prog_p2_atype),
+		  "bpf_prog_detach2-parent_2");
+detach_parent:
+	ASSERT_OK(bpf_prog_detach2(prog_p_fd, cg_parent, prog_p_atype),
+		  "bpf_prog_detach2-parent");
+close_skel:
+	cgroup_preorder__destroy(skel);
+	return err;
+}
+
+void test_cgroup_mprog_ordering(void)
+{
+	int cg_parent = -1, sock_fd = -1;
+
+	cg_parent = test__join_cgroup("/parent");
+	if (!ASSERT_GE(cg_parent, 0, "join_cgroup /parent"))
+		goto out;
+
+	sock_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (!ASSERT_GE(sock_fd, 0, "socket"))
+		goto out;
+
+	ASSERT_OK(run_getsockopt_test(cg_parent, sock_fd, false), "getsockopt_test_1");
+	ASSERT_OK(run_getsockopt_test(cg_parent, sock_fd, true), "getsockopt_test_2");
+
+out:
+	close(sock_fd);
+	close(cg_parent);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_mprog.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_mprog.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6a0ea02c4de2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_mprog.c
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+SEC("cgroup/getsockopt")
+int getsockopt_1(struct bpf_sockopt *ctx)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("cgroup/getsockopt")
+int getsockopt_2(struct bpf_sockopt *ctx)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("cgroup/getsockopt")
+int getsockopt_3(struct bpf_sockopt *ctx)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("cgroup/getsockopt")
+int getsockopt_4(struct bpf_sockopt *ctx)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5534e58f2e9bd72b253d033ee0af6e68eb8ac96b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2025 11:30:22 -0700
Subject: bpf: Make reg_not_null() true for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP

When reg->type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, it can not be null. However the
verifier explores the branches under rX == 0 in check_cond_jmp_op()
even if reg->type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, because it was not checked for
in reg_not_null().

Fix this by adding CONST_PTR_TO_MAP to the set of types that are
considered non nullable in reg_not_null().

An old "unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero" selftest fails with this
change, because now early out correctly triggers in
check_cond_jmp_op(), making the verification to pass.

In practice verifier may allow pointer to null comparison in unpriv,
since in many cases the relevant branch and comparison op are removed
as dead code. So change the expected test result to __success_unpriv.

Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250609183024.359974-2-isolodrai@meta.com
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                               | 3 ++-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index e31f6b0ccb30..48a3241cda0f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -405,7 +405,8 @@ static bool reg_not_null(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 		type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
 		type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON ||
 		(type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && is_trusted_reg(reg)) ||
-		type == PTR_TO_MEM;
+		type == PTR_TO_MEM ||
+		type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
 }
 
 static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
index a4a5e2071604..28200f068ce5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ __naked void pass_pointer_to_tail_call(void)
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison")
+__success __success_unpriv
 __retval(0)
 __naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_zero(void)
 {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From eb6c99278490a9045662cbc2df9e2a99489df37a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2025 11:30:23 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add cmp_map_pointer_with_const test

Add a test for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP comparison with a non-0 constant. A
BPF program with this code must not pass verification in unpriv.

Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250609183024.359974-3-isolodrai@meta.com
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
index 28200f068ce5..db52ba66e880 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
@@ -624,7 +624,6 @@ __retval(0)
 __naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_zero(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
-	r1 = 0;						\
 	r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;				\
 	if r1 == 0 goto l0_%=;				\
 l0_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
@@ -634,6 +633,22 @@ l0_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
 	: __clobber_all);
 }
 
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: cmp map pointer with const")
+__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 pointer comparison prohibited")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void cmp_map_pointer_with_const(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;				\
+	if r1 == 0x0000beef goto l0_%=;			\
+l0_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
+	exit;						\
+"	:
+	: __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
 SEC("socket")
 __description("unpriv: write into frame pointer")
 __failure __msg("frame pointer is read only")
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 260b8629189611ab5c4894205955b371bed9b75d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2025 11:30:24 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add test cases with CONST_PTR_TO_MAP null checks

A test requires the following to happen:
  * CONST_PTR_TO_MAP value is checked for null
  * the code in the null branch fails verification

Add test cases:
* direct global map_ptr comparison to null
* lookup inner map, then two checks (the first transforms
  map_value_or_null into map_ptr)
* lookup inner map, spill-fill it, then check for null
* use an array of ringbufs to recreate a common coding pattern [1]

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzZNU0gX_sQ8k8JaLe1e+Veth3Rk=4x7MDhv=hQxvO8EDw@mail.gmail.com/

Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250609183024.359974-4-isolodrai@meta.com
---
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c      | 118 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 118 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
index 7d088ba99ea5..16b761e510f0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c
@@ -139,4 +139,122 @@ __naked void on_the_inner_map_pointer(void)
 	: __clobber_all);
 }
 
+SEC("socket")
+__description("map_ptr is never null")
+__success
+__naked void map_ptr_is_never_null(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r0 = 0;						\
+	r1 = %[map_in_map] ll;				\
+	if r1 != 0 goto l0_%=;				\
+	r10 = 42;					\
+l0_%=:	exit;						\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+	  __imm_addr(map_in_map)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("map_ptr is never null inner")
+__success
+__naked void map_ptr_is_never_null_inner(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r1 = 0;						\
+	*(u32*)(r10 - 4) = r1;				\
+	r2 = r10;					\
+	r2 += -4;					\
+	r1 = %[map_in_map] ll;				\
+	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
+	if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=;				\
+	if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=;				\
+	r10 = 42;					\
+l0_%=:  exit;						\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+	  __imm_addr(map_in_map)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("map_ptr is never null inner spill fill")
+__success
+__naked void map_ptr_is_never_null_inner_spill_fill(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r1 = 0;						\
+	*(u32*)(r10 - 4) = r1;				\
+	r2 = r10;					\
+	r2 += -4;					\
+	r1 = %[map_in_map] ll;				\
+	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
+	if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=;				\
+	exit;						\
+l0_%=:	*(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0;				\
+	r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16);				\
+	if r1 == 0 goto l1_%=;				\
+	exit;						\
+l1_%=:	r10 = 42;					\
+	exit;						\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+	  __imm_addr(map_in_map)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+struct {
+	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS);
+	__uint(max_entries, 1);
+	__type(key, int);
+	__type(value, int);
+	__array(values, struct {
+		__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF);
+		__uint(max_entries, 64 * 1024);
+	});
+} rb_in_map SEC(".maps");
+
+struct rb_ctx {
+	void *rb;
+	struct bpf_dynptr dptr;
+};
+
+static __always_inline struct rb_ctx __rb_event_reserve(__u32 sz)
+{
+	struct rb_ctx rb_ctx = {};
+	void *rb;
+	__u32 cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id();
+	__u32 rb_slot = cpu & 1;
+
+	rb = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&rb_in_map, &rb_slot);
+	if (!rb)
+		return rb_ctx;
+
+	rb_ctx.rb = rb;
+	bpf_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr(rb, sz, 0, &rb_ctx.dptr);
+
+	return rb_ctx;
+}
+
+static __noinline void __rb_event_submit(struct rb_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (!ctx->rb)
+		return;
+
+	/* If the verifier (incorrectly) concludes that ctx->rb can be
+	 * NULL at this point, we'll get "BPF_EXIT instruction in main
+	 * prog would lead to reference leak" error
+	 */
+	bpf_ringbuf_submit_dynptr(&ctx->dptr, 0);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+int map_ptr_is_never_null_rb(void *ctx)
+{
+	struct rb_ctx event_ctx = __rb_event_reserve(256);
+	__rb_event_submit(&event_ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d77efc0ef5b0adb0de3c15f5c9d33ea6d60bd449 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Date: Sat, 7 Jun 2025 00:58:15 +0800
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add cookies check for tracing fill_link_info test

Adding tests for getting cookie with fill_link_info for tracing.

Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606165818.3394397-2-chen.dylane@linux.dev
---
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c  | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c
index 0774ae6c1bec..4a0670c056ba 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c
@@ -489,10 +489,28 @@ cleanup:
 	bpf_link__destroy(link);
 }
 
+static int verify_tracing_link_info(int fd, u64 cookie)
+{
+	struct bpf_link_info info;
+	int err;
+	u32 len = sizeof(info);
+
+	err = bpf_link_get_info_by_fd(fd, &info, &len);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "get_link_info"))
+		return -1;
+
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(info.type, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TRACING, "link_type"))
+		return -1;
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(info.tracing.cookie, cookie, "tracing_cookie");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void tracing_subtest(struct test_bpf_cookie *skel)
 {
 	__u64 cookie;
-	int prog_fd;
+	int prog_fd, err;
 	int fentry_fd = -1, fexit_fd = -1, fmod_ret_fd = -1;
 	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, opts);
 	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_link_create_opts, link_opts);
@@ -507,6 +525,10 @@ static void tracing_subtest(struct test_bpf_cookie *skel)
 	if (!ASSERT_GE(fentry_fd, 0, "fentry.link_create"))
 		goto cleanup;
 
+	err = verify_tracing_link_info(fentry_fd, cookie);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "verify_tracing_link_info"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
 	cookie = 0x20000000000000L;
 	prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.fexit_test1);
 	link_opts.tracing.cookie = cookie;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d6f1c85f22534d2d9fea9b32645da19c91ebe7d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2025 23:24:28 +0200
Subject: bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This implements the core of the series and causes the verifier to fall
back to mitigating Spectre v1 using speculation barriers. The approach
was presented at LPC'24 [1] and RAID'24 [2].

If we find any forbidden behavior on a speculative path, we insert a
nospec (e.g., lfence speculation barrier on x86) before the instruction
and stop verifying the path. While verifying a speculative path, we can
furthermore stop verification of that path whenever we encounter a
nospec instruction.

A minimal example program would look as follows:

	A = true
	B = true
	if A goto e
	f()
	if B goto e
	unsafe()
e:	exit

There are the following speculative and non-speculative paths
(`cur->speculative` and `speculative` referring to the value of the
push_stack() parameters):

- A = true
- B = true
- if A goto e
  - A && !cur->speculative && !speculative
    - exit
  - !A && !cur->speculative && speculative
    - f()
    - if B goto e
      - B && cur->speculative && !speculative
        - exit
      - !B && cur->speculative && speculative
        - unsafe()

If f() contains any unsafe behavior under Spectre v1 and the unsafe
behavior matches `state->speculative &&
error_recoverable_with_nospec(err)`, do_check() will now add a nospec
before f() instead of rejecting the program:

	A = true
	B = true
	if A goto e
	nospec
	f()
	if B goto e
	unsafe()
e:	exit

Alternatively, the algorithm also takes advantage of nospec instructions
inserted for other reasons (e.g., Spectre v4). Taking the program above
as an example, speculative path exploration can stop before f() if a
nospec was inserted there because of Spectre v4 sanitization.

In this example, all instructions after the nospec are dead code (and
with the nospec they are also dead code speculatively).

For this, it relies on the fact that speculation barriers generally
prevent all later instructions from executing if the speculation was not
correct:

* On Intel x86_64, lfence acts as full speculation barrier, not only as
  a load fence [3]:

    An LFENCE instruction or a serializing instruction will ensure that
    no later instructions execute, even speculatively, until all prior
    instructions complete locally. [...] Inserting an LFENCE instruction
    after a bounds check prevents later operations from executing before
    the bound check completes.

  This was experimentally confirmed in [4].

* On AMD x86_64, lfence is dispatch-serializing [5] (requires MSR
  C001_1029[1] to be set if the MSR is supported, this happens in
  init_amd()). AMD further specifies "A dispatch serializing instruction
  forces the processor to retire the serializing instruction and all
  previous instructions before the next instruction is executed" [8]. As
  dispatch is not specific to memory loads or branches, lfence therefore
  also affects all instructions there. Also, if retiring a branch means
  it's PC change becomes architectural (should be), this means any
  "wrong" speculation is aborted as required for this series.

* ARM's SB speculation barrier instruction also affects "any instruction
  that appears later in the program order than the barrier" [6].

* PowerPC's barrier also affects all subsequent instructions [7]:

    [...] executing an ori R31,R31,0 instruction ensures that all
    instructions preceding the ori R31,R31,0 instruction have completed
    before the ori R31,R31,0 instruction completes, and that no
    subsequent instructions are initiated, even out-of-order, until
    after the ori R31,R31,0 instruction completes. The ori R31,R31,0
    instruction may complete before storage accesses associated with
    instructions preceding the ori R31,R31,0 instruction have been
    performed

Regarding the example, this implies that `if B goto e` will not execute
before `if A goto e` completes. Once `if A goto e` completes, the CPU
should find that the speculation was wrong and continue with `exit`.

If there is any other path that leads to `if B goto e` (and therefore
`unsafe()`) without going through `if A goto e`, then a nospec will
still be needed there. However, this patch assumes this other path will
be explored separately and therefore be discovered by the verifier even
if the exploration discussed here stops at the nospec.

This patch furthermore has the unfortunate consequence that Spectre v1
mitigations now only support architectures which implement BPF_NOSPEC.
Before this commit, Spectre v1 mitigations prevented exploits by
rejecting the programs on all architectures. Because some JITs do not
implement BPF_NOSPEC, this patch therefore may regress unpriv BPF's
security to a limited extent:

* The regression is limited to systems vulnerable to Spectre v1, have
  unprivileged BPF enabled, and do NOT emit insns for BPF_NOSPEC. The
  latter is not the case for x86 64- and 32-bit, arm64, and powerpc
  64-bit and they are therefore not affected by the regression.
  According to commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip
  speculation barrier opcode"), LoongArch is not vulnerable to Spectre
  v1 and therefore also not affected by the regression.

* To the best of my knowledge this regression may therefore only affect
  MIPS. This is deemed acceptable because unpriv BPF is still disabled
  there by default. As stated in a previous commit, BPF_NOSPEC could be
  implemented for MIPS based on GCC's speculation_barrier
  implementation.

* It is unclear which other architectures (besides x86 64- and 32-bit,
  ARM64, PowerPC 64-bit, LoongArch, and MIPS) supported by the kernel
  are vulnerable to Spectre v1. Also, it is not clear if barriers are
  available on these architectures. Implementing BPF_NOSPEC on these
  architectures therefore is non-trivial. Searching GCC and the kernel
  for speculation barrier implementations for these architectures
  yielded no result.

* If any of those regressed systems is also vulnerable to Spectre v4,
  the system was already vulnerable to Spectre v4 attacks based on
  unpriv BPF before this patch and the impact is therefore further
  limited.

As an alternative to regressing security, one could still reject
programs if the architecture does not emit BPF_NOSPEC (e.g., by removing
the empty BPF_NOSPEC-case from all JITs except for LoongArch where it
appears justified). However, this will cause rejections on these archs
that are likely unfounded in the vast majority of cases.

In the tests, some are now successful where we previously had a
false-positive (i.e., rejection). Change them to reflect where the
nospec should be inserted (using __xlated_unpriv) and modify the error
message if the nospec is able to mitigate a problem that previously
shadowed another problem (in that case __xlated_unpriv does not work,
therefore just add a comment).

Define SPEC_V1 to avoid duplicating this ifdef whenever we check for
nospec insns using __xlated_unpriv, define it here once. This also
improves readability. PowerPC can probably also be added here. However,
omit it for now because the BPF CI currently does not include a test.

Limit it to EPERM, EACCES, and EINVAL (and not everything except for
EFAULT and ENOMEM) as it already has the desired effect for most
real-world programs. Briefly went through all the occurrences of EPERM,
EINVAL, and EACCESS in verifier.c to validate that catching them like
this makes sense.

Thanks to Dustin for their help in checking the vendor documentation.

[1] https://lpc.events/event/18/contributions/1954/ ("Mitigating
    Spectre-PHT using Speculation Barriers in Linux eBPF")
[2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.00078 ("VeriFence: Lightweight and
    Precise Spectre Defenses for Untrusted Linux Kernel Extensions")
[3] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/runtime-speculative-side-channel-mitigations.html
    ("Managed Runtime Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations")
[4] https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3359789.3359837 ("Speculator: a
    tool to analyze speculative execution attacks and mitigations" -
    Section 4.6 "Stopping Speculative Execution")
[5] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/software-techniques-for-managing-speculation.pdf
    ("White Paper - SOFTWARE TECHNIQUES FOR MANAGING SPECULATION ON AMD
    PROCESSORS - REVISION 5.09.23")
[6] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0597/2020-12/Base-Instructions/SB--Speculation-Barrier-
    ("SB - Speculation Barrier - Arm Armv8-A A32/T32 Instruction Set
    Architecture (2020-12)")
[7] https://wiki.raptorcs.com/w/images/5/5f/OPF_PowerISA_v3.1C.pdf
    ("Power ISA™ - Version 3.1C - May 26, 2024 - Section 9.2.1 of Book
    III")
[8] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/40332.pdf
    ("AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual Volumes 1–5 - Revision 4.08
    - April 2024 - 7.6.4 Serializing Instructions")

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Dustin Nguyen <nguyen@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603212428.338473-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h                       |  1 +
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                              | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++--
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h       |  4 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_and.c   |  8 ++-
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c  | 61 +++++++++++++----
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_movsx.c | 16 ++++-
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c  |  8 ++-
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c | 16 +++--
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/dead_code.c   |  3 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jmp32.c       | 33 +++------
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jset.c        | 10 ++-
 11 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 2b0954202226..e6c26393c029 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -580,6 +580,7 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
 	u64 map_key_state; /* constant (32 bit) key tracking for maps */
 	int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
 	u32 seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier at env->pass_cnt */
+	bool nospec; /* do not execute this instruction speculatively */
 	bool nospec_result; /* result is unsafe under speculation, nospec must follow */
 	bool zext_dst; /* this insn zero extends dst reg */
 	bool needs_zext; /* alu op needs to clear upper bits */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 79ae0ee395b0..b1f797616f20 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2013,6 +2013,18 @@ static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool error_recoverable_with_nospec(int err)
+{
+	/* Should only return true for non-fatal errors that are allowed to
+	 * occur during speculative verification. For these we can insert a
+	 * nospec and the program might still be accepted. Do not include
+	 * something like ENOMEM because it is likely to re-occur for the next
+	 * architectural path once it has been recovered-from in all speculative
+	 * paths.
+	 */
+	return err == -EPERM || err == -EACCES || err == -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 					     int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx,
 					     bool speculative)
@@ -11147,7 +11159,7 @@ static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	return -ENOTSUPP;
 }
 
-static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 {
 	return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
 }
@@ -14015,7 +14027,9 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 				    const struct bpf_insn *insn)
 {
-	return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K;
+	return env->bypass_spec_v1 ||
+		BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K ||
+		cur_aux(env)->nospec;
 }
 
 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
@@ -19732,10 +19746,41 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
 		prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx;
 
+		/* Reduce verification complexity by stopping speculative path
+		 * verification when a nospec is encountered.
+		 */
+		if (state->speculative && cur_aux(env)->nospec)
+			goto process_bpf_exit;
+
 		err = do_check_insn(env, &do_print_state);
-		if (err < 0) {
+		if (state->speculative && error_recoverable_with_nospec(err)) {
+			/* Prevent this speculative path from ever reaching the
+			 * insn that would have been unsafe to execute.
+			 */
+			cur_aux(env)->nospec = true;
+			/* If it was an ADD/SUB insn, potentially remove any
+			 * markings for alu sanitization.
+			 */
+			cur_aux(env)->alu_state = 0;
+			goto process_bpf_exit;
+		} else if (err < 0) {
 			return err;
 		} else if (err == PROCESS_BPF_EXIT) {
+			goto process_bpf_exit;
+		}
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(err);
+
+		if (state->speculative && cur_aux(env)->nospec_result) {
+			/* If we are on a path that performed a jump-op, this
+			 * may skip a nospec patched-in after the jump. This can
+			 * currently never happen because nospec_result is only
+			 * used for the write-ops
+			 * `*(size*)(dst_reg+off)=src_reg|imm32` which must
+			 * never skip the following insn. Still, add a warning
+			 * to document this in case nospec_result is used
+			 * elsewhere in the future.
+			 */
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx != prev_insn_idx + 1);
 process_bpf_exit:
 			mark_verifier_state_scratched(env);
 			update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state);
@@ -19753,7 +19798,6 @@ process_bpf_exit:
 				continue;
 			}
 		}
-		WARN_ON_ONCE(err);
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -20881,6 +20925,29 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access;
 		u8 mode;
 
+		if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].nospec) {
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].alu_state);
+			struct bpf_insn patch[] = {
+				BPF_ST_NOSPEC(),
+				*insn,
+			};
+
+			cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch);
+			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt);
+			if (!new_prog)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+
+			delta    += cnt - 1;
+			env->prog = new_prog;
+			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
+			/* This can not be easily merged with the
+			 * nospec_result-case, because an insn may require a
+			 * nospec before and after itself. Therefore also do not
+			 * 'continue' here but potentially apply further
+			 * patching to insn. *insn should equal patch[1] now.
+			 */
+		}
+
 		if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
 		    insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
 		    insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
@@ -20931,6 +20998,9 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 
 		if (type == BPF_WRITE &&
 		    env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].nospec_result) {
+			/* nospec_result is only used to mitigate Spectre v4 and
+			 * to limit verification-time for Spectre v1.
+			 */
 			struct bpf_insn patch[] = {
 				*insn,
 				BPF_ST_NOSPEC(),
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h
index 6e208e24ba3b..a678463e972c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h
@@ -231,4 +231,8 @@
 #define CAN_USE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL
 #endif
 
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm64) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#define SPEC_V1
+#endif
+
 #endif
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_and.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_and.c
index e97e518516b6..2b4fdca162be 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_and.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_and.c
@@ -85,8 +85,14 @@ l0_%=:	r0 = r0;					\
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("check known subreg with unknown reg")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R1 !read_ok")
+__success __success_unpriv
 __retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if w0 < 0x1 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R1 !read_ok'` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* `r1 = *(u32*)(r1 + 512)`, sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 = 0")
+#endif
 __naked void known_subreg_with_unknown_reg(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
index 0eb33bb801b5..30e16153fdf1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
@@ -620,8 +620,14 @@ l1_%=:	exit;						\
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("bounds check mixed 32bit and 64bit arithmetic. test1")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__success __success_unpriv
 __retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("exit")
+#endif
 __naked void _32bit_and_64bit_arithmetic_test1(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
@@ -643,8 +649,14 @@ l1_%=:	exit;						\
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("bounds check mixed 32bit and 64bit arithmetic. test2")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__success __success_unpriv
 __retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("exit")
+#endif
 __naked void _32bit_and_64bit_arithmetic_test2(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
@@ -691,9 +703,14 @@ l0_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("bounds check for reg = 0, reg xor 1")
-__success __failure_unpriv
-__msg_unpriv("R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+__success __success_unpriv
 __retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if r1 != 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 = 0")
+#endif
 __naked void reg_0_reg_xor_1(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
@@ -719,9 +736,14 @@ l1_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("bounds check for reg32 = 0, reg32 xor 1")
-__success __failure_unpriv
-__msg_unpriv("R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+__success __success_unpriv
 __retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if w1 != 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 = 0")
+#endif
 __naked void reg32_0_reg32_xor_1(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
@@ -747,9 +769,14 @@ l1_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("bounds check for reg = 2, reg xor 3")
-__success __failure_unpriv
-__msg_unpriv("R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+__success __success_unpriv
 __retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if r1 > 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 = 0")
+#endif
 __naked void reg_2_reg_xor_3(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
@@ -829,9 +856,14 @@ l1_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("bounds check for reg > 0, reg xor 3")
-__success __failure_unpriv
-__msg_unpriv("R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+__success __success_unpriv
 __retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if r1 >= 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 = 0")
+#endif
 __naked void reg_0_reg_xor_3(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
@@ -858,9 +890,14 @@ l1_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("bounds check for reg32 > 0, reg32 xor 3")
-__success __failure_unpriv
-__msg_unpriv("R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+__success __success_unpriv
 __retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if w1 >= 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 = 0")
+#endif
 __naked void reg32_0_reg32_xor_3(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_movsx.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_movsx.c
index 994bbc346d25..a4d8814eb5ed 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_movsx.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_movsx.c
@@ -245,7 +245,13 @@ l0_%=:							\
 SEC("socket")
 __description("MOV32SX, S8, var_off not u32_max, positive after s8 extension")
 __success __retval(0)
-__failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("frame pointer is read only")
+__success_unpriv
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("w0 = 0")
+__xlated_unpriv("exit")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `frame pointer is read only` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1")
+#endif
 __naked void mov64sx_s32_varoff_2(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
@@ -267,7 +273,13 @@ l0_%=:							\
 SEC("socket")
 __description("MOV32SX, S8, var_off not u32_max, negative after s8 extension")
 __success __retval(0)
-__failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("frame pointer is read only")
+__success_unpriv
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("w0 = 0")
+__xlated_unpriv("exit")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `frame pointer is read only` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1")
+#endif
 __naked void mov64sx_s32_varoff_3(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
index db52ba66e880..9bd4aef72140 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
@@ -572,8 +572,14 @@ l0_%=:	exit;						\
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("alu32: mov u32 const")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R7 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__success __success_unpriv
 __retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R7 invalid mem access 'scalar'` */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* sanitized dead code */
+__xlated_unpriv("exit")
+#endif
 __naked void alu32_mov_u32_const(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c
index 5ba6e53571c8..fcea9819e359 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c
@@ -398,7 +398,8 @@ l2_%=:	r0 = 1;						\
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("map access: mixing value pointer and scalar, 1")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R2 pointer comparison prohibited")
+__success __failure_unpriv
+__msg_unpriv("R2 tried to add from different maps, paths or scalars, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root")
 __retval(0)
 __naked void value_pointer_and_scalar_1(void)
 {
@@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ l2_%=:	/* common instruction */			\
 l3_%=:	/* branch B */					\
 	r0 = 0x13371337;				\
 	/* verifier follows fall-through */		\
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent `R2 pointer comparison prohibited`) */\
 	if r2 != 0x100000 goto l4_%=;			\
 	r0 = 0;						\
 	exit;						\
@@ -450,7 +452,8 @@ l4_%=:	/* fake-dead code; targeted from branch A to	\
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("map access: mixing value pointer and scalar, 2")
-__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__success __failure_unpriv
+__msg_unpriv("R2 tried to add from different maps, paths or scalars, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root")
 __retval(0)
 __naked void value_pointer_and_scalar_2(void)
 {
@@ -492,6 +495,7 @@ l4_%=:	/* fake-dead code; targeted from branch A to	\
 	 * prevent dead code sanitization, rejected	\
 	 * via branch B however				\
 	 */						\
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent `R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'`) */\
 	r0 = *(u8*)(r0 + 0);				\
 	r0 = 0;						\
 	exit;						\
@@ -1296,9 +1300,13 @@ l0_%=:	r0 = 1;						\
 
 SEC("socket")
 __description("map access: value_ptr -= unknown scalar, 2")
-__success __failure_unpriv
-__msg_unpriv("R0 pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range")
+__success __success_unpriv
 __retval(1)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("r1 &= 7")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* inserted to prevent `R0 pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range` */
+__xlated_unpriv("r0 -= r1")
+#endif
 __naked void value_ptr_unknown_scalar_2_2(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/dead_code.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/dead_code.c
index ee454327e5c6..77207b498c6f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/dead_code.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/dead_code.c
@@ -2,14 +2,13 @@
 	"dead code: start",
 	.insns = {
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 2),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R9 !read_ok") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9, 0),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 2),
 	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 7),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_0, 10, -4),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 	.retval = 7,
 },
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jmp32.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jmp32.c
index 43776f6f92f4..91d83e9cb148 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jmp32.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jmp32.c
@@ -84,11 +84,10 @@
 	BPF_JMP32_IMM(BPF_JSET, BPF_REG_7, 0x10, 1),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	BPF_JMP32_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_7, 0x10, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R9 !read_ok") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
 {
@@ -149,11 +148,10 @@
 	BPF_JMP32_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_7, 0x10, 1),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	BPF_JMP32_IMM(BPF_JSGE, BPF_REG_7, 0xf, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R9 !read_ok") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
 {
@@ -214,11 +212,10 @@
 	BPF_JMP32_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_7, 0x10, 1),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_7, 0x10, 1),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R9 !read_ok") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
 {
@@ -283,11 +280,10 @@
 	BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_8, 1),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	BPF_JMP32_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_7, 0x7ffffff0, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 	.retval = 2,
 	.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
@@ -354,11 +350,10 @@
 	BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_8, 1),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_7, 0x7ffffff0, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 	.retval = 2,
 	.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
@@ -425,11 +420,10 @@
 	BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_8, 1),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	BPF_JMP32_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_7, 0x7ffffff0, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 	.retval = 2,
 	.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
@@ -496,11 +490,10 @@
 	BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JLT, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_8, 1),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSLT, BPF_REG_7, 0x7ffffff0, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 	.retval = 2,
 	.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
@@ -567,11 +560,10 @@
 	BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JSGE, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_8, 1),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGE, BPF_REG_7, 0x7ffffff0, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 	.retval = 2,
 	.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
@@ -638,11 +630,10 @@
 	BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_8, 1),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_7, -2, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 	.retval = 2,
 	.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
@@ -709,11 +700,10 @@
 	BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JSLE, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_8, 1),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSLE, BPF_REG_7, 0x7ffffff0, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 	.retval = 2,
 	.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
@@ -780,11 +770,10 @@
 	BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JSLT, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_8, 1),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	BPF_JMP32_IMM(BPF_JSLT, BPF_REG_7, -1, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 	.retval = 2,
 	.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jset.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jset.c
index 11fc68da735e..e901eefd774a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jset.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jset.c
@@ -78,12 +78,11 @@
 	.insns = {
 	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSET, BPF_REG_0, 1, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R9 !read_ok") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
 	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.retval = 1,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
@@ -136,13 +135,12 @@
 	BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
 	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_0, 2),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSET, BPF_REG_0, 3, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R9 !read_ok") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9, 0),
 	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
 	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
 {
@@ -154,16 +152,16 @@
 	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_1, 0xff),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSET, BPF_REG_1, 0xf0, 3),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLT, BPF_REG_1, 0x10, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R9 !read_ok") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSET, BPF_REG_1, 0x10, 1),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_1, 0x10, 1),
+	/* unpriv: nospec (inserted to prevent "R9 !read_ok") */
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
 	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
-	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4a8765d9a5278a9ff9341678ae60eb4f8d0f5d8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2025 23:28:14 +0200
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add test for Spectre v1 mitigation
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This is based on the gadget from the description of commit 9183671af6db
("bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches").

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603212814.338867-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c  | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
index 9bd4aef72140..4470541b5e71 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
@@ -744,4 +744,61 @@ l0_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
 "	::: __clobber_all);
 }
 
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: Spectre v1 path-based type confusion of scalar as stack-ptr")
+__success __success_unpriv __retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if r0 != 0x1 goto pc+2")
+/* This nospec prevents the exploit because it forces the mispredicted (not
+ * taken) `if r0 != 0x0 goto l0_%=` to resolve before using r6 as a pointer.
+ * This causes the CPU to realize that `r6 = r9` should have never executed. It
+ * ensures that r6 always contains a readable stack slot ptr when the insn after
+ * the nospec executes.
+ */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+__xlated_unpriv("r9 = *(u8 *)(r6 +0)")
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_spec_v1_type_confusion(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r1 = 0;						\
+	*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1;				\
+	r2 = r10;					\
+	r2 += -8;					\
+	r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;				\
+	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
+	if r0 == 0 goto l2_%=;				\
+	/* r0: pointer to a map array entry */		\
+	r2 = r10;					\
+	r2 += -8;					\
+	r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;				\
+	/* r1, r2: prepared call args */		\
+	r6 = r10;					\
+	r6 += -8;					\
+	/* r6: pointer to readable stack slot */	\
+	r9 = 0xffffc900;				\
+	r9 <<= 32;					\
+	/* r9: scalar controlled by attacker */		\
+	r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0); /* cache miss */		\
+	if r0 != 0x0 goto l0_%=;			\
+	r6 = r9;					\
+l0_%=:	if r0 != 0x1 goto l1_%=;			\
+	r9 = *(u8 *)(r6 + 0);				\
+l1_%=:  /* leak r9 */					\
+	r9 &= 1;					\
+	r9 <<= 9;					\
+	*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r9;				\
+	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
+	if r0 == 0 goto l2_%=;				\
+	/* leak secret into is_cached(map[0|512]): */	\
+	r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0);				\
+l2_%=:							\
+	r0 = 0;						\
+	exit;						\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+	  __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 517b088a846b3ce56b3ff07cdf24cd68c89b3a9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 09:21:03 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix cgroup_mprog_ordering failure due to uninitialized
 variable

On arm64, the cgroup_mprog_ordering selftest failed with test_progs run
when building with clang compiler. The reason is due to socklen_t optlen
not initialized.

In kernel function do_ip_getsockopt(), we have

        if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int)))
                return -EFAULT;
        if (len < 0)
                return -EINVAL;

The above 'len' variable is a negative value and hence the test failed.

But the test is okay on x86_64. I checked the x86_64 asm code and I didn't
see explicit initialization of 'optlen' but its value is 0 so kernel
didn't return error. This should be a pure luck.

Fix the bug by initializing 'oplen' var properly.

Fixes: e422d5f118e4 ("selftests/bpf: Add two selftests for mprog API based cgroup progs")
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611162103.1623692-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_ordering.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_ordering.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_ordering.c
index 4a4e9710b474..a36d2e968bc5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_ordering.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_mprog_ordering.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ static int run_getsockopt_test(int cg_parent, int sock_fd, bool has_relative_fd)
 	struct cgroup_preorder *skel = NULL;
 	struct bpf_program *prog;
 	__u8 *result, buf;
-	socklen_t optlen;
+	socklen_t optlen = 1;
 	int err = 0;
 
 	skel = cgroup_preorder__open_and_load();
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5159482fdb2b4c15cb0a087e41d8bc5d730bb697 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 13:08:36 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: tests with a loop state missing read/precision mark

The test case absent_mark_in_the_middle_state is equivalent of the
following C program:

   1: r8 = bpf_get_prandom_u32();
   2: r6 = -32;
   3: bpf_iter_num_new(&fp[-8], 0, 10);
   4: if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
   5:   r6 = -31;
   6: for (;;) {
   7:   if (!bpf_iter_num_next(&fp[-8]))
   8:     break;
   9:   if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
  10:     *(u64 *)(fp + r6) = 7;
  11: }
  12: bpf_iter_num_destroy(&fp[-8]);
  13: return 0;

W/o a fix that instructs verifier to ignore branches count for loop
entries verification proceeds as follows:
- 1-4, state is {r6=-32,fp-8=active};
- 6, checkpoint A is created with {r6=-32,fp-8=active};
- 7, checkpoint B is created with {r6=-32,fp-8=active},
     push state {r6=-32,fp-8=active} from 7 to 9;
- 8,12,13, {r6=-32,fp-8=drained}, exit;
- pop state with {r6=-32,fp-8=active} from 7 to 9;
- 9, push state {r6=-32,fp-8=active} from 9 to 10;
- 6, checkpoint C is created with {r6=-32,fp-8=active};
- 7, checkpoint A is hit, no precision propagated for r6 to C;
- pop state {r6=-32,fp-8=active} from 9 to 10;
- 10, state is {r6=-31,fp-8=active}, r6 is marked as read and precise,
      these marks are propagated to checkpoints A and B (but not C, as
      it is not the parent of current state;
- 6, {r6=-31,fp-8=active} checkpoint C is hit, because r6 is not
     marked precise for this checkpoint;
- the program is accepted, despite a possibility of unaligned u64
  stack access at offset -31.

The test case absent_mark_in_the_middle_state2 is similar except the
following change:

       r8 = bpf_get_prandom_u32();
       r6 = -32;
       bpf_iter_num_new(&fp[-8], 0, 10);
       if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32())) {
         r6 = -31;
 + jump_into_loop:
 +       goto +0;
 +       goto loop;
 +     }
 +     if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
 +       goto jump_into_loop;
 + loop:
       for (;;) {
         if (!bpf_iter_num_next(&fp[-8]))
           break;
         if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
           *(u64 *)(fp + r6) = 7;
       }
       bpf_iter_num_destroy(&fp[-8])
       return 0

The goal is to check that read/precision marks are propagated to
checkpoint created at 'goto +0' that resides outside of the loop.

The test case absent_mark_in_the_middle_state3 is a bit different and
is equivalent to the C program below:

    int absent_mark_in_the_middle_state3(void)
    {
      bpf_iter_num_new(&fp[-8], 0, 10)
      loop1(-32, &fp[-8])
      loop1_wrapper(&fp[-8])
      bpf_iter_num_destroy(&fp[-8])
    }

    int loop1(num, iter)
    {
      while (bpf_iter_num_next(iter)) {
        if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
          *(fp + num) = 7;
      }
      return 0
    }

    int loop1_wrapper(iter)
    {
      r6 = -32;
      if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
        r6 = -31;
      loop1(r6, iter);
      return 0;
    }

The unsafe state is reached in a similar manner, but the loop is
located inside a subprogram that is called from two locations in the
main subprogram. This detail is important for exercising
bpf_scc_visit->backedges memory management.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-11-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c | 277 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 277 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c
index 76adf4a8f2da..7dd92a303bf6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c
@@ -1649,4 +1649,281 @@ int clean_live_states(const void *ctx)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("misaligned stack access off 0+-31+0 size 8")
+__naked int absent_mark_in_the_middle_state(void)
+{
+	/* This is equivalent to C program below.
+	 *
+	 * r8 = bpf_get_prandom_u32();
+	 * r6 = -32;
+	 * bpf_iter_num_new(&fp[-8], 0, 10);
+	 * if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
+	 *   r6 = -31;
+	 * while (bpf_iter_num_next(&fp[-8])) {
+	 *   if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
+	 *     *(fp + r6) = 7;
+	 * }
+	 * bpf_iter_num_destroy(&fp[-8])
+	 * return 0
+	 */
+	asm volatile (
+		"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+		"r8 = r0;"
+		"r7 = 0;"
+		"r6 = -32;"
+		"r0 = 0;"
+		"*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r0;"
+		"r1 = r10;"
+		"r1 += -8;"
+		"r2 = 0;"
+		"r3 = 10;"
+		"call %[bpf_iter_num_new];"
+		"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+		"if r0 == r8 goto change_r6_%=;"
+	"loop_%=:"
+		"call noop;"
+		"r1 = r10;"
+		"r1 += -8;"
+		"call %[bpf_iter_num_next];"
+		"if r0 == 0 goto loop_end_%=;"
+		"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+		"if r0 == r8 goto use_r6_%=;"
+		"goto loop_%=;"
+	"loop_end_%=:"
+		"r1 = r10;"
+		"r1 += -8;"
+		"call %[bpf_iter_num_destroy];"
+		"r0 = 0;"
+		"exit;"
+	"use_r6_%=:"
+		"r0 = r10;"
+		"r0 += r6;"
+		"r1 = 7;"
+		"*(u64 *)(r0 + 0) = r1;"
+		"goto loop_%=;"
+	"change_r6_%=:"
+		"r6 = -31;"
+		"goto loop_%=;"
+		:
+		: __imm(bpf_iter_num_new),
+		  __imm(bpf_iter_num_next),
+		  __imm(bpf_iter_num_destroy),
+		  __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+		: __clobber_all
+	);
+}
+
+__used __naked
+static int noop(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+		"r0 = 0;"
+		"exit;"
+	);
+}
+
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("misaligned stack access off 0+-31+0 size 8")
+__naked int absent_mark_in_the_middle_state2(void)
+{
+	/* This is equivalent to C program below.
+	 *
+	 *     r8 = bpf_get_prandom_u32();
+	 *     r6 = -32;
+	 *     bpf_iter_num_new(&fp[-8], 0, 10);
+	 *     if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32())) {
+	 *       r6 = -31;
+	 * jump_into_loop:
+	 *       goto +0;
+	 *       goto loop;
+	 *     }
+	 *     if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
+	 *       goto jump_into_loop;
+	 * loop:
+	 *     while (bpf_iter_num_next(&fp[-8])) {
+	 *       if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
+	 *         *(fp + r6) = 7;
+	 *     }
+	 *     bpf_iter_num_destroy(&fp[-8])
+	 *     return 0
+	 */
+	asm volatile (
+		"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+		"r8 = r0;"
+		"r7 = 0;"
+		"r6 = -32;"
+		"r0 = 0;"
+		"*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r0;"
+		"r1 = r10;"
+		"r1 += -8;"
+		"r2 = 0;"
+		"r3 = 10;"
+		"call %[bpf_iter_num_new];"
+		"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+		"if r0 == r8 goto change_r6_%=;"
+		"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+		"if r0 == r8 goto jump_into_loop_%=;"
+	"loop_%=:"
+		"r1 = r10;"
+		"r1 += -8;"
+		"call %[bpf_iter_num_next];"
+		"if r0 == 0 goto loop_end_%=;"
+		"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+		"if r0 == r8 goto use_r6_%=;"
+		"goto loop_%=;"
+	"loop_end_%=:"
+		"r1 = r10;"
+		"r1 += -8;"
+		"call %[bpf_iter_num_destroy];"
+		"r0 = 0;"
+		"exit;"
+	"use_r6_%=:"
+		"r0 = r10;"
+		"r0 += r6;"
+		"r1 = 7;"
+		"*(u64 *)(r0 + 0) = r1;"
+		"goto loop_%=;"
+	"change_r6_%=:"
+		"r6 = -31;"
+	"jump_into_loop_%=: "
+		"goto +0;"
+		"goto loop_%=;"
+		:
+		: __imm(bpf_iter_num_new),
+		  __imm(bpf_iter_num_next),
+		  __imm(bpf_iter_num_destroy),
+		  __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+		: __clobber_all
+	);
+}
+
+SEC("?raw_tp")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("misaligned stack access off 0+-31+0 size 8")
+__naked int absent_mark_in_the_middle_state3(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * bpf_iter_num_new(&fp[-8], 0, 10)
+	 * loop1(-32, &fp[-8])
+	 * loop1_wrapper(&fp[-8])
+	 * bpf_iter_num_destroy(&fp[-8])
+	 */
+	asm volatile (
+		"r1 = r10;"
+		"r1 += -8;"
+		"r2 = 0;"
+		"r3 = 10;"
+		"call %[bpf_iter_num_new];"
+		/* call #1 */
+		"r1 = -32;"
+		"r2 = r10;"
+		"r2 += -8;"
+		"call loop1;"
+		"r1 = r10;"
+		"r1 += -8;"
+		"call %[bpf_iter_num_destroy];"
+		/* call #2 */
+		"r1 = r10;"
+		"r1 += -8;"
+		"r2 = 0;"
+		"r3 = 10;"
+		"call %[bpf_iter_num_new];"
+		"r1 = r10;"
+		"r1 += -8;"
+		"call loop1_wrapper;"
+		/* return */
+		"r1 = r10;"
+		"r1 += -8;"
+		"call %[bpf_iter_num_destroy];"
+		"r0 = 0;"
+		"exit;"
+		:
+		: __imm(bpf_iter_num_new),
+		  __imm(bpf_iter_num_destroy),
+		  __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+		: __clobber_all
+	);
+}
+
+__used __naked
+static int loop1(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 *  int loop1(num, iter) {
+	 *     r6 = num;
+	 *     r7 = iter;
+	 *     while (bpf_iter_num_next(r7)) {
+	 *       if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
+	 *         *(fp + r6) = 7;
+	 *     }
+	 *     return 0
+	 *  }
+	 */
+	asm volatile (
+		"r6 = r1;"
+		"r7 = r2;"
+		"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+		"r8 = r0;"
+	"loop_%=:"
+		"r1 = r7;"
+		"call %[bpf_iter_num_next];"
+		"if r0 == 0 goto loop_end_%=;"
+		"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+		"if r0 == r8 goto use_r6_%=;"
+		"goto loop_%=;"
+	"loop_end_%=:"
+		"r0 = 0;"
+		"exit;"
+	"use_r6_%=:"
+		"r0 = r10;"
+		"r0 += r6;"
+		"r1 = 7;"
+		"*(u64 *)(r0 + 0) = r1;"
+		"goto loop_%=;"
+		:
+		: __imm(bpf_iter_num_next),
+		  __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+		: __clobber_all
+	);
+}
+
+__used __naked
+static int loop1_wrapper(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 *  int loop1_wrapper(iter) {
+	 *    r6 = -32;
+	 *    r7 = iter;
+	 *    if (unlikely(bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
+	 *      r6 = -31;
+	 *    loop1(r6, r7);
+	 *    return 0;
+	 *  }
+	 */
+	asm volatile (
+		"r6 = -32;"
+		"r7 = r1;"
+		"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+		"r8 = r0;"
+		"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+		"if r0 == r8 goto change_r6_%=;"
+	"loop_%=:"
+		"r1 = r6;"
+		"r2 = r7;"
+		"call loop1;"
+		"r0 = 0;"
+		"exit;"
+	"change_r6_%=:"
+		"r6 = -31;"
+		"goto loop_%=;"
+		:
+		: __imm(bpf_iter_num_next),
+		  __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+		: __clobber_all
+	);
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6a4bd31f680a1d1cf06492fe6dc4f08da09769e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Fushuai Wang <wangfushuai@baidu.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2025 16:42:08 +0800
Subject: selftests/bpf: fix signedness bug in redir_partial()

When xsend() returns -1 (error), the check 'n < sizeof(buf)' incorrectly
treats it as success due to unsigned promotion. Explicitly check for -1
first.

Fixes: a4b7193d8efd ("selftests/bpf: Add sockmap test for redirecting partial skb data")
Signed-off-by: Fushuai Wang <wangfushuai@baidu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250612084208.27722-1-wangfushuai@baidu.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_listen.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_listen.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_listen.c
index 1d98eee7a2c3..f1bdccc7e4e7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_listen.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_listen.c
@@ -924,6 +924,8 @@ static void redir_partial(int family, int sotype, int sock_map, int parser_map)
 		goto close;
 
 	n = xsend(c1, buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
+	if (n == -1)
+		goto close;
 	if (n < sizeof(buf))
 		FAIL("incomplete write");
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4fc012daf9c074772421c904357abf586336b1ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 20:50:32 -0700
Subject: bpf: Fix an issue in bpf_prog_test_run_xdp when page size greater
 than 4K

The bpf selftest xdp_adjust_tail/xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow failed on
arm64 with 64KB page:
   xdp_adjust_tail/xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow:FAIL

In bpf_prog_test_run_xdp(), the xdp->frame_sz is set to 4K, but later on
when constructing frags, with 64K page size, the frag data_len could
be more than 4K. This will cause problems in bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail().

To fix the failure, the xdp->frame_sz is set to be PAGE_SIZE so kernel
can test different page size properly. With the kernel change, the user
space and bpf prog needs adjustment. Currently, the MAX_SKB_FRAGS default
value is 17, so for 4K page, the maximum packet size will be less than 68K.
To test 64K page, a bigger maximum packet size than 68K is desired. So two
different functions are implemented for subtest xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow.
Depending on different page size, different data input/output sizes are used
to adapt with different page size.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250612035032.2207498-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 net/bpf/test_run.c                                 |  2 +-
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_adjust_tail.c     | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++--
 .../bpf/progs/test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow.c          |  8 +-
 3 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/net/bpf/test_run.c b/net/bpf/test_run.c
index aaf13a7d58ed..9728dbd4c66c 100644
--- a/net/bpf/test_run.c
+++ b/net/bpf/test_run.c
@@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_xdp(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr,
 		headroom -= ctx->data;
 	}
 
-	max_data_sz = 4096 - headroom - tailroom;
+	max_data_sz = PAGE_SIZE - headroom - tailroom;
 	if (size > max_data_sz) {
 		/* disallow live data mode for jumbo frames */
 		if (do_live)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_adjust_tail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_adjust_tail.c
index e361129402a1..43264347e7d7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_adjust_tail.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_adjust_tail.c
@@ -37,21 +37,26 @@ static void test_xdp_adjust_tail_shrink(void)
 	bpf_object__close(obj);
 }
 
-static void test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow(void)
+static void test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow(bool is_64k_pagesize)
 {
 	const char *file = "./test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow.bpf.o";
 	struct bpf_object *obj;
-	char buf[4096]; /* avoid segfault: large buf to hold grow results */
+	char buf[8192]; /* avoid segfault: large buf to hold grow results */
 	__u32 expect_sz;
 	int err, prog_fd;
 	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts,
 		.data_in = &pkt_v4,
-		.data_size_in = sizeof(pkt_v4),
 		.data_out = buf,
 		.data_size_out = sizeof(buf),
 		.repeat = 1,
 	);
 
+	/* topts.data_size_in as a special signal to bpf prog */
+	if (is_64k_pagesize)
+		topts.data_size_in = sizeof(pkt_v4) - 1;
+	else
+		topts.data_size_in = sizeof(pkt_v4);
+
 	err = bpf_prog_test_load(file, BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, &obj, &prog_fd);
 	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow"))
 		return;
@@ -208,7 +213,7 @@ out:
 	bpf_object__close(obj);
 }
 
-static void test_xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow(void)
+static void test_xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow_4k(void)
 {
 	const char *file = "./test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow.bpf.o";
 	__u32 exp_size;
@@ -279,16 +284,93 @@ out:
 	bpf_object__close(obj);
 }
 
+static void test_xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow_64k(void)
+{
+	const char *file = "./test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow.bpf.o";
+	__u32 exp_size;
+	struct bpf_program *prog;
+	struct bpf_object *obj;
+	int err, i, prog_fd;
+	__u8 *buf;
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts);
+
+	obj = bpf_object__open(file);
+	if (libbpf_get_error(obj))
+		return;
+
+	prog = bpf_object__next_program(obj, NULL);
+	if (bpf_object__load(obj))
+		goto out;
+
+	prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(prog);
+
+	buf = malloc(262144);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(buf, "alloc buf 256Kb"))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Test case add 10 bytes to last frag */
+	memset(buf, 1, 262144);
+	exp_size = 90000 + 10;
+
+	topts.data_in = buf;
+	topts.data_out = buf;
+	topts.data_size_in = 90000;
+	topts.data_size_out = 262144;
+	err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &topts);
+
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "90Kb+10b");
+	ASSERT_EQ(topts.retval, XDP_TX, "90Kb+10b retval");
+	ASSERT_EQ(topts.data_size_out, exp_size, "90Kb+10b size");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 90000; i++) {
+		if (buf[i] != 1)
+			ASSERT_EQ(buf[i], 1, "90Kb+10b-old");
+	}
+
+	for (i = 90000; i < 90010; i++) {
+		if (buf[i] != 0)
+			ASSERT_EQ(buf[i], 0, "90Kb+10b-new");
+	}
+
+	for (i = 90010; i < 262144; i++) {
+		if (buf[i] != 1)
+			ASSERT_EQ(buf[i], 1, "90Kb+10b-untouched");
+	}
+
+	/* Test a too large grow */
+	memset(buf, 1, 262144);
+	exp_size = 90001;
+
+	topts.data_in = topts.data_out = buf;
+	topts.data_size_in = 90001;
+	topts.data_size_out = 262144;
+	err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &topts);
+
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "90Kb+10b");
+	ASSERT_EQ(topts.retval, XDP_DROP, "90Kb+10b retval");
+	ASSERT_EQ(topts.data_size_out, exp_size, "90Kb+10b size");
+
+	free(buf);
+out:
+	bpf_object__close(obj);
+}
+
 void test_xdp_adjust_tail(void)
 {
+	int page_size = getpagesize();
+
 	if (test__start_subtest("xdp_adjust_tail_shrink"))
 		test_xdp_adjust_tail_shrink();
 	if (test__start_subtest("xdp_adjust_tail_grow"))
-		test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow();
+		test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow(page_size == 65536);
 	if (test__start_subtest("xdp_adjust_tail_grow2"))
 		test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow2();
 	if (test__start_subtest("xdp_adjust_frags_tail_shrink"))
 		test_xdp_adjust_frags_tail_shrink();
-	if (test__start_subtest("xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow"))
-		test_xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow();
+	if (test__start_subtest("xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow")) {
+		if (page_size == 65536)
+			test_xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow_64k();
+		else
+			test_xdp_adjust_frags_tail_grow_4k();
+	}
 }
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow.c
index dc74d8cf9e3f..5904f45cfbc4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_xdp_adjust_tail_grow.c
@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ int _xdp_adjust_tail_grow(struct xdp_md *xdp)
 	/* Data length determine test case */
 
 	if (data_len == 54) { /* sizeof(pkt_v4) */
-		offset = 4096; /* test too large offset */
+		offset = 4096; /* test too large offset, 4k page size */
+	} else if (data_len == 53) { /* sizeof(pkt_v4) - 1 */
+		offset = 65536; /* test too large offset, 64k page size */
 	} else if (data_len == 74) { /* sizeof(pkt_v6) */
 		offset = 40;
 	} else if (data_len == 64) {
@@ -31,6 +33,10 @@ int _xdp_adjust_tail_grow(struct xdp_md *xdp)
 		offset = 10;
 	} else if (data_len == 9001) {
 		offset = 4096;
+	} else if (data_len == 90000) {
+		offset = 10; /* test a small offset, 64k page size */
+	} else if (data_len == 90001) {
+		offset = 65536; /* test too large offset, 64k page size */
 	} else {
 		return XDP_ABORTED; /* No matching test */
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 96fcf7e7a71c2b21c002e9ba9362d88f8beac09a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 20:50:37 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix two net related test failures with 64K page size

When running BPF selftests on arm64 with a 64K page size, I encountered
the following two test failures:
  sockmap_basic/sockmap skb_verdict change tail:FAIL
  tc_change_tail:FAIL

With further debugging, I identified the root cause in the following
kernel code within __bpf_skb_change_tail():

    u32 max_len = BPF_SKB_MAX_LEN;
    u32 min_len = __bpf_skb_min_len(skb);
    int ret;

    if (unlikely(flags || new_len > max_len || new_len < min_len))
        return -EINVAL;

With a 4K page size, new_len = 65535 and max_len = 16064, the function
returns -EINVAL. However, With a 64K page size, max_len increases to
261824, allowing execution to proceed further in the function. This is
because BPF_SKB_MAX_LEN scales with the page size and larger page sizes
result in higher max_len values.

Updating the new_len parameter in both tests based on actual kernel
page size resolved both failures.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250612035037.2207911-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_change_tail.c |  9 +++++++--
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tc_change_tail.c    | 14 +++++++-------
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_change_tail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_change_tail.c
index 2796dd8545eb..1c7941a4ad00 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_change_tail.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_change_tail.c
@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 /* Copyright (c) 2024 ByteDance */
-#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include "vmlinux.h"
 #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
 
+#ifndef PAGE_SIZE
+#define PAGE_SIZE __PAGE_SIZE
+#endif
+#define BPF_SKB_MAX_LEN (PAGE_SIZE << 2)
+
 struct {
 	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP);
 	__uint(max_entries, 1);
@@ -31,7 +36,7 @@ int prog_skb_verdict(struct __sk_buff *skb)
 		change_tail_ret = bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, skb->len + 1, 0);
 		return SK_PASS;
 	} else if (data[0] == 'E') { /* Error */
-		change_tail_ret = bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, 65535, 0);
+		change_tail_ret = bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, BPF_SKB_MAX_LEN, 0);
 		return SK_PASS;
 	}
 	return SK_PASS;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tc_change_tail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tc_change_tail.c
index 28edafe803f0..fcba8299f0bc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tc_change_tail.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tc_change_tail.c
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include "vmlinux.h"
 #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
-#include <linux/if_ether.h>
-#include <linux/in.h>
-#include <linux/ip.h>
-#include <linux/udp.h>
-#include <linux/pkt_cls.h>
+
+#ifndef PAGE_SIZE
+#define PAGE_SIZE __PAGE_SIZE
+#endif
+#define BPF_SKB_MAX_LEN (PAGE_SIZE << 2)
 
 long change_tail_ret = 1;
 
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ int change_tail(struct __sk_buff *skb)
 			bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, len, 0);
 		return TCX_PASS;
 	} else if (payload[0] == 'E') { /* Error */
-		change_tail_ret = bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, 65535, 0);
+		change_tail_ret = bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, BPF_SKB_MAX_LEN, 0);
 		return TCX_PASS;
 	} else if (payload[0] == 'Z') { /* Zero */
 		change_tail_ret = bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, 0, 0);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 44df9e0d4eec45060ccee72217f56fe3178074a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 20:50:42 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix xdp_do_redirect failure with 64KB page size

On arm64 with 64KB page size, the selftest xdp_do_redirect failed like
below:
  ...
  test_xdp_do_redirect:PASS:pkt_count_tc 0 nsec
  test_max_pkt_size:PASS:prog_run_max_size 0 nsec
  test_max_pkt_size:FAIL:prog_run_too_big unexpected prog_run_too_big: actual -28 != expected -22

With 64KB page size, the xdp frame size will be much bigger so
the existing test will fail.

Adjust various parameters so the test can also work on 64K page size.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250612035042.2208630-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_do_redirect.c | 13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_do_redirect.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_do_redirect.c
index 7dac044664ac..dd34b0cc4b4e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_do_redirect.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_do_redirect.c
@@ -66,16 +66,25 @@ static int attach_tc_prog(struct bpf_tc_hook *hook, int fd)
 #else
 #define MAX_PKT_SIZE 3408
 #endif
+
+#define PAGE_SIZE_4K  4096
+#define PAGE_SIZE_64K 65536
+
 static void test_max_pkt_size(int fd)
 {
-	char data[MAX_PKT_SIZE + 1] = {};
+	char data[PAGE_SIZE_64K + 1] = {};
 	int err;
 	DECLARE_LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, opts,
 			    .data_in = &data,
-			    .data_size_in = MAX_PKT_SIZE,
 			    .flags = BPF_F_TEST_XDP_LIVE_FRAMES,
 			    .repeat = 1,
 		);
+
+	if (getpagesize() == PAGE_SIZE_64K)
+		opts.data_size_in = MAX_PKT_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE_64K - PAGE_SIZE_4K;
+	else
+		opts.data_size_in = MAX_PKT_SIZE;
+
 	err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(fd, &opts);
 	ASSERT_OK(err, "prog_run_max_size");
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ccefa19335a0b81f11b0856e951ca909445b3783 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2025 22:00:01 -0700
Subject: bpf/veristat: Fix veristat for map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE

BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE doesn't allow non-zero max_entries. So veristat
should not set it to 1.

Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250613050001.1058733-1-song@kernel.org
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
index b2bb20b00952..70cdabd88c50 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
@@ -1182,6 +1182,7 @@ static void fixup_obj(struct bpf_object *obj, struct bpf_program *prog, const ch
 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE:
 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE:
 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE:
+		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE:
 			break;
 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
 			mask_unrelated_struct_ops_progs(obj, map, prog);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 67cdcc405b46c13446d6d220a108daa2f8de3436 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2025 00:21:47 -0700
Subject: veristat: Memory accounting for bpf programs

This commit adds a new field mem_peak / "Peak memory (MiB)" field to a
set of gathered statistics. The field is intended as an estimate for
peak verifier memory consumption for processing of a given program.

Mechanically stat is collected as follows:
- At the beginning of handle_verif_mode() a new cgroup is created
  and veristat process is moved into this cgroup.
- At each program load:
  - bpf_object__load() is split into bpf_object__prepare() and
    bpf_object__load() to avoid accounting for memory allocated for
    maps;
  - before bpf_object__load():
    - a write to "memory.peak" file of the new cgroup is used to reset
      cgroup statistics;
    - updated value is read from "memory.peak" file and stashed;
  - after bpf_object__load() "memory.peak" is read again and
    difference between new and stashed values is used as a metric.

If any of the above steps fails veristat proceeds w/o collecting
mem_peak information for a program, reporting mem_peak as -1.

While memcg provides data in bytes (converted from pages), veristat
converts it to megabytes to avoid jitter when comparing results of
different executions.

The change has no measurable impact on veristat running time.

A correlation between "Peak states" and "Peak memory" fields provides
a sanity check for gathered statistics, e.g. a sample of data for
sched_ext programs:

Program                   Peak states  Peak memory (MiB)
------------------------  -----------  -----------------
lavd_select_cpu                  2153                 44
lavd_enqueue                     1982                 41
lavd_dispatch                    3480                 28
layered_dispatch                 1417                 17
layered_enqueue                   760                 11
lavd_cpu_offline                  349                  6
lavd_cpu_online                   349                  6
lavd_init                         394                  6
rusty_init                        350                  5
layered_select_cpu                391                  4
...
rusty_stopping                    134                  1
arena_topology_node_init          170                  0

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250613072147.3938139-3-eddyz87@gmail.com
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile   |   5 +
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c | 248 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 246 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile
index cf5ed3bee573..97013c49920b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile
@@ -841,6 +841,11 @@ $(OUTPUT)/bench: $(OUTPUT)/bench.o \
 	$(call msg,BINARY,,$@)
 	$(Q)$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $(filter %.a %.o,$^) $(LDLIBS) -o $@
 
+# This works around GCC warning about snprintf truncating strings like:
+#
+#   char a[PATH_MAX], b[PATH_MAX];
+#   snprintf(a, "%s/foo", b);      // triggers -Wformat-truncation
+$(OUTPUT)/veristat.o: CFLAGS += -Wno-format-truncation
 $(OUTPUT)/veristat.o: $(BPFOBJ)
 $(OUTPUT)/veristat: $(OUTPUT)/veristat.o
 	$(call msg,BINARY,,$@)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
index 70cdabd88c50..56771650ee8c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ enum stat_id {
 	STACK,
 	PROG_TYPE,
 	ATTACH_TYPE,
+	MEMORY_PEAK,
 
 	FILE_NAME,
 	PROG_NAME,
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ static struct env {
 	int top_src_lines;
 	struct var_preset *presets;
 	int npresets;
+	char orig_cgroup[PATH_MAX];
+	char stat_cgroup[PATH_MAX];
+	int memory_peak_fd;
 } env;
 
 static int libbpf_print_fn(enum libbpf_print_level level, const char *format, va_list args)
@@ -219,6 +223,22 @@ static int libbpf_print_fn(enum libbpf_print_level level, const char *format, va
 	return vfprintf(stderr, format, args);
 }
 
+#define log_errno(fmt, ...) log_errno_aux(__FILE__, __LINE__, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+__printf(3, 4)
+static int log_errno_aux(const char *file, int line, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	int err = -errno;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: ", file, line);
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+	fprintf(stderr, " failed with error '%s'.\n", strerror(errno));
+	va_end(ap);
+	return err;
+}
+
 #ifndef VERISTAT_VERSION
 #define VERISTAT_VERSION "<kernel>"
 #endif
@@ -734,13 +754,13 @@ cleanup:
 }
 
 static const struct stat_specs default_csv_output_spec = {
-	.spec_cnt = 14,
+	.spec_cnt = 15,
 	.ids = {
 		FILE_NAME, PROG_NAME, VERDICT, DURATION,
 		TOTAL_INSNS, TOTAL_STATES, PEAK_STATES,
 		MAX_STATES_PER_INSN, MARK_READ_MAX_LEN,
 		SIZE, JITED_SIZE, PROG_TYPE, ATTACH_TYPE,
-		STACK,
+		STACK, MEMORY_PEAK,
 	},
 };
 
@@ -781,6 +801,7 @@ static struct stat_def {
 	[STACK] = {"Stack depth", {"stack_depth", "stack"}, },
 	[PROG_TYPE] = { "Program type", {"prog_type"}, },
 	[ATTACH_TYPE] = { "Attach type", {"attach_type", }, },
+	[MEMORY_PEAK] = { "Peak memory (MiB)", {"mem_peak", }, },
 };
 
 static bool parse_stat_id_var(const char *name, size_t len, int *id,
@@ -1279,16 +1300,214 @@ static int max_verifier_log_size(void)
 	return log_size;
 }
 
+static bool output_stat_enabled(int id)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < env.output_spec.spec_cnt; i++)
+		if (env.output_spec.ids[i] == id)
+			return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+__printf(2, 3)
+static int write_one_line(const char *file, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	int err, saved_errno;
+	va_list ap;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	f = fopen(file, "w");
+	if (!f)
+		return -1;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	errno = 0;
+	err = vfprintf(f, fmt, ap);
+	saved_errno = errno;
+	va_end(ap);
+	fclose(f);
+	errno = saved_errno;
+	return err < 0 ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+__scanf(3, 4)
+static int scanf_one_line(const char *file, int fields_expected, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	int res = 0, saved_errno = 0;
+	char *line = NULL;
+	size_t line_len;
+	va_list ap;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	f = fopen(file, "r");
+	if (!f)
+		return -1;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	while (getline(&line, &line_len, f) > 0) {
+		res = vsscanf(line, fmt, ap);
+		if (res == fields_expected)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (ferror(f)) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		res = -1;
+	}
+
+out:
+	va_end(ap);
+	free(line);
+	fclose(f);
+	errno = saved_errno;
+	return res;
+}
+
+static void destroy_stat_cgroup(void)
+{
+	char buf[PATH_MAX];
+	int err;
+
+	close(env.memory_peak_fd);
+
+	if (env.orig_cgroup[0]) {
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/cgroup.procs", env.orig_cgroup);
+		err = write_one_line(buf, "%d\n", getpid());
+		if (err < 0)
+			log_errno("moving self to original cgroup %s\n", env.orig_cgroup);
+	}
+
+	if (env.stat_cgroup[0]) {
+		err = rmdir(env.stat_cgroup);
+		if (err < 0)
+			log_errno("deletion of cgroup %s", env.stat_cgroup);
+	}
+
+	env.memory_peak_fd = -1;
+	env.orig_cgroup[0] = 0;
+	env.stat_cgroup[0] = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Creates a cgroup at /sys/fs/cgroup/veristat-accounting-<pid>,
+ * moves current process to this cgroup.
+ */
+static void create_stat_cgroup(void)
+{
+	char cgroup_fs_mount[4096];
+	char buf[4096];
+	int err;
+
+	env.memory_peak_fd = -1;
+
+	if (!output_stat_enabled(MEMORY_PEAK))
+		return;
+
+	err = scanf_one_line("/proc/self/mounts", 2, "%*s %4095s cgroup2 %s",
+			     cgroup_fs_mount, buf);
+	if (err != 2) {
+		if (err < 0)
+			log_errno("reading /proc/self/mounts");
+		else if (!env.quiet)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Can't find cgroupfs v2 mount point.\n");
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
+	/* cgroup-v2.rst promises the line "0::<group>" for cgroups v2 */
+	err = scanf_one_line("/proc/self/cgroup", 1, "0::%4095s", buf);
+	if (err != 1) {
+		if (err < 0)
+			log_errno("reading /proc/self/cgroup");
+		else if (!env.quiet)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Can't infer veristat process cgroup.");
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
+	snprintf(env.orig_cgroup, sizeof(env.orig_cgroup), "%s/%s", cgroup_fs_mount, buf);
+
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/veristat-accounting-%d", cgroup_fs_mount, getpid());
+	err = mkdir(buf, 0777);
+	if (err < 0) {
+		log_errno("creation of cgroup %s", buf);
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+	strcpy(env.stat_cgroup, buf);
+
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/cgroup.procs", env.stat_cgroup);
+	err = write_one_line(buf, "%d\n", getpid());
+	if (err < 0) {
+		log_errno("entering cgroup %s", buf);
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/memory.peak", env.stat_cgroup);
+	env.memory_peak_fd = open(buf, O_RDWR | O_APPEND);
+	if (env.memory_peak_fd < 0) {
+		log_errno("opening %s", buf);
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
+	return;
+
+err_out:
+	if (!env.quiet)
+		fprintf(stderr, "Memory usage metric unavailable.\n");
+	destroy_stat_cgroup();
+}
+
+/* Current value of /sys/fs/cgroup/veristat-accounting-<pid>/memory.peak */
+static long cgroup_memory_peak(void)
+{
+	long err, memory_peak;
+	char buf[32];
+
+	if (env.memory_peak_fd < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	err = pread(env.memory_peak_fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, 0);
+	if (err <= 0) {
+		log_errno("pread(%s/memory.peak)", env.stat_cgroup);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	buf[err] = 0;
+	errno = 0;
+	memory_peak = strtoll(buf, NULL, 10);
+	if (errno) {
+		log_errno("%s/memory.peak:strtoll(%s)", env.stat_cgroup, buf);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return memory_peak;
+}
+
+static int reset_stat_cgroup(void)
+{
+	char buf[] = "r\n";
+	int err;
+
+	if (env.memory_peak_fd < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	err = pwrite(env.memory_peak_fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
+	if (err <= 0) {
+		log_errno("pwrite(%s/memory.peak)", env.stat_cgroup);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int process_prog(const char *filename, struct bpf_object *obj, struct bpf_program *prog)
 {
 	const char *base_filename = basename(strdupa(filename));
 	const char *prog_name = bpf_program__name(prog);
+	long mem_peak_a, mem_peak_b, mem_peak = -1;
 	char *buf;
 	int buf_sz, log_level;
 	struct verif_stats *stats;
 	struct bpf_prog_info info;
 	__u32 info_len = sizeof(info);
-	int err = 0;
+	int err = 0, cgroup_err;
 	void *tmp;
 	int fd;
 
@@ -1333,7 +1552,15 @@ static int process_prog(const char *filename, struct bpf_object *obj, struct bpf
 	if (env.force_reg_invariants)
 		bpf_program__set_flags(prog, bpf_program__flags(prog) | BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS);
 
-	err = bpf_object__load(obj);
+	err = bpf_object__prepare(obj);
+	if (!err) {
+		cgroup_err = reset_stat_cgroup();
+		mem_peak_a = cgroup_memory_peak();
+		err = bpf_object__load(obj);
+		mem_peak_b = cgroup_memory_peak();
+		if (!cgroup_err && mem_peak_a >= 0 && mem_peak_b >= 0)
+			mem_peak = mem_peak_b - mem_peak_a;
+	}
 	env.progs_processed++;
 
 	stats->file_name = strdup(base_filename);
@@ -1342,6 +1569,7 @@ static int process_prog(const char *filename, struct bpf_object *obj, struct bpf
 	stats->stats[SIZE] = bpf_program__insn_cnt(prog);
 	stats->stats[PROG_TYPE] = bpf_program__type(prog);
 	stats->stats[ATTACH_TYPE] = bpf_program__expected_attach_type(prog);
+	stats->stats[MEMORY_PEAK] = mem_peak < 0 ? -1 : mem_peak / (1024 * 1024);
 
 	memset(&info, 0, info_len);
 	fd = bpf_program__fd(prog);
@@ -1825,6 +2053,7 @@ static int cmp_stat(const struct verif_stats *s1, const struct verif_stats *s2,
 	case TOTAL_STATES:
 	case PEAK_STATES:
 	case MAX_STATES_PER_INSN:
+	case MEMORY_PEAK:
 	case MARK_READ_MAX_LEN: {
 		long v1 = s1->stats[id];
 		long v2 = s2->stats[id];
@@ -2054,6 +2283,7 @@ static void prepare_value(const struct verif_stats *s, enum stat_id id,
 	case STACK:
 	case SIZE:
 	case JITED_SIZE:
+	case MEMORY_PEAK:
 		*val = s ? s->stats[id] : 0;
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -2140,6 +2370,7 @@ static int parse_stat_value(const char *str, enum stat_id id, struct verif_stats
 	case MARK_READ_MAX_LEN:
 	case SIZE:
 	case JITED_SIZE:
+	case MEMORY_PEAK:
 	case STACK: {
 		long val;
 		int err, n;
@@ -2777,7 +3008,7 @@ static void output_prog_stats(void)
 
 static int handle_verif_mode(void)
 {
-	int i, err;
+	int i, err = 0;
 
 	if (env.filename_cnt == 0) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Please provide path to BPF object file!\n\n");
@@ -2785,11 +3016,12 @@ static int handle_verif_mode(void)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	create_stat_cgroup();
 	for (i = 0; i < env.filename_cnt; i++) {
 		err = process_obj(env.filenames[i]);
 		if (err) {
 			fprintf(stderr, "Failed to process '%s': %d\n", env.filenames[i], err);
-			return err;
+			goto out;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -2797,7 +3029,9 @@ static int handle_verif_mode(void)
 
 	output_prog_stats();
 
-	return 0;
+out:
+	destroy_stat_cgroup();
+	return err;
 }
 
 static int handle_replay_mode(void)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4a4b84ba9e453295c746d81cb245c0c5d80050f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2025 10:53:31 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: verify jset handling in CFG computation

A test case to check if both branches of jset are explored when
computing program CFG.

At 'if r1 & 0x7 ...':
- register 'r2' is computed alive only if jump branch of jset
  instruction is followed;
- register 'r0' is computed alive only if fallthrough branch of jset
  instruction is followed.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250613175331.3238739-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/compute_live_registers.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/compute_live_registers.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/compute_live_registers.c
index f3d79aecbf93..6884ab99a421 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/compute_live_registers.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/compute_live_registers.c
@@ -240,6 +240,22 @@ __naked void if2(void)
 		::: __clobber_all);
 }
 
+/* Verifier misses that r2 is alive if jset is not handled properly */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("2: 012....... (45) if r1 & 0x7 goto pc+1")
+__naked void if3_jset_bug(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+		"r0 = 1;"
+		"r2 = 2;"
+		"if r1 & 0x7 goto +1;"
+		"exit;"
+		"r0 = r2;"
+		"exit;"
+		::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
 SEC("socket")
 __log_level(2)
 __msg("0: .......... (b7) r1 = 0")
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a633dab4b4d2f06c0fcb3caa6f110efabdf889f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 21:49:56 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix RELEASE build failure with gcc14
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

With gcc14, when building with RELEASE=1, I hit four below compilation
failure:

Error 1:
  In file included from test_loader.c:6:
  test_loader.c: In function ‘run_subtest’: test_progs.h:194:17:
      error: ‘retval’ may be used uninitialized in this function
   [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
    194 |                 fprintf(stdout, ##format);           \
        |                 ^~~~~~~
  test_loader.c:958:13: note: ‘retval’ was declared here
    958 |         int retval, err, i;
        |             ^~~~~~

  The uninitialized var 'retval' actually could cause incorrect result.

Error 2:
  In function ‘test_fd_array_cnt’:
  prog_tests/fd_array.c:71:14: error: ‘btf_id’ may be used uninitialized in this
      function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
     71 |         fd = bpf_btf_get_fd_by_id(id);
        |              ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  prog_tests/fd_array.c:302:15: note: ‘btf_id’ was declared here
    302 |         __u32 btf_id;
        |               ^~~~~~

  Changing ASSERT_GE to ASSERT_EQ can fix the compilation error. Otherwise,
  there is no functionality change.

Error 3:
  prog_tests/tailcalls.c: In function ‘test_tailcall_hierarchy_count’:
  prog_tests/tailcalls.c:1402:23: error: ‘fentry_data_fd’ may be used uninitialized
      in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
     1402 |                 err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(fentry_data_fd, &i, &val);
          |                       ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

  The code is correct. The change intends to silence gcc errors.

Error 4: (this error only happens on arm64)
  In file included from prog_tests/log_buf.c:4:
  prog_tests/log_buf.c: In function ‘bpf_prog_load_log_buf’:
  ./test_progs.h:390:22: error: ‘log_buf’ may be used uninitialized [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
    390 |         int ___err = libbpf_get_error(___res);             \
        |                      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  prog_tests/log_buf.c:158:14: note: in expansion of macro ‘ASSERT_OK_PTR’
    158 |         if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(log_buf, "log_buf_alloc"))
        |              ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
  In file included from selftests/bpf/tools/include/bpf/bpf.h:32,
                 from ./test_progs.h:36:
  selftests/bpf/tools/include/bpf/libbpf_legacy.h:113:17:
    note: by argument 1 of type ‘const void *’ to ‘libbpf_get_error’ declared here
    113 | LIBBPF_API long libbpf_get_error(const void *ptr);
        |                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

  Adding a pragma to disable maybe-uninitialized fixed the issue.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250617044956.2686668-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fd_array.c  | 2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/log_buf.c   | 4 ++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tailcalls.c | 2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c          | 6 +++---
 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fd_array.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fd_array.c
index 9add890c2d37..241b2c8c6e0f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fd_array.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fd_array.c
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static void check_fd_array_cnt__referenced_btfs(void)
 
 	/* btf should still exist when original file descriptor is closed */
 	err = get_btf_id_by_fd(extra_fds[0], &btf_id);
-	if (!ASSERT_GE(err, 0, "get_btf_id_by_fd"))
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, 0, "get_btf_id_by_fd"))
 		goto cleanup;
 
 	Close(extra_fds[0]);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/log_buf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/log_buf.c
index 169ce689b97c..d6f14a232002 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/log_buf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/log_buf.c
@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@
 #include "test_log_buf.skel.h"
 #include "bpf_util.h"
 
+#if !defined(__clang__)
+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wmaybe-uninitialized"
+#endif
+
 static size_t libbpf_log_pos;
 static char libbpf_log_buf[1024 * 1024];
 static bool libbpf_log_error;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tailcalls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tailcalls.c
index 66a900327f91..0ab36503c3b2 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tailcalls.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tailcalls.c
@@ -1195,7 +1195,7 @@ static void test_tailcall_hierarchy_count(const char *which, bool test_fentry,
 					  bool test_fexit,
 					  bool test_fentry_entry)
 {
-	int err, map_fd, prog_fd, main_data_fd, fentry_data_fd, fexit_data_fd, i, val;
+	int err, map_fd, prog_fd, main_data_fd, fentry_data_fd = 0, fexit_data_fd = 0, i, val;
 	struct bpf_object *obj = NULL, *fentry_obj = NULL, *fexit_obj = NULL;
 	struct bpf_link *fentry_link = NULL, *fexit_link = NULL;
 	struct bpf_program *prog, *fentry_prog;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c
index 9551d8d5f8f9..2c7e9729d5fe 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c
@@ -1103,9 +1103,9 @@ void run_subtest(struct test_loader *tester,
 			}
 		}
 
-		do_prog_test_run(bpf_program__fd(tprog), &retval,
-				 bpf_program__type(tprog) == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL ? true : false);
-		if (retval != subspec->retval && subspec->retval != POINTER_VALUE) {
+		err = do_prog_test_run(bpf_program__fd(tprog), &retval,
+				       bpf_program__type(tprog) == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL ? true : false);
+		if (!err && retval != subspec->retval && subspec->retval != POINTER_VALUE) {
 			PRINT_FAIL("Unexpected retval: %d != %d\n", retval, subspec->retval);
 			goto tobj_cleanup;
 		}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fc2915bb8bfcfdc6e5ea2cfc8d13fbaefe77c2c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 17:57:10 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: More precise cpu_mitigations state detection

test_progs and test_verifier binaries execute unpriv tests under the
following conditions:
- unpriv BPF is enabled;
- CPU mitigations are enabled (see [1] for details).

The detection of the "mitigations enabled" state is performed by
unpriv_helpers.c:get_mitigations_off() via inspecting kernel boot
command line, looking for a parameter "mitigations=off".

Such detection scheme won't work for certain configurations,
e.g. when CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS is disabled and boot parameter is
not supplied.

Miss-detection leads to test_progs executing tests meant to be run
only with mitigations enabled, e.g.
verifier_and.c:known_subreg_with_unknown_reg(), and reporting false
failures.

Internally, verifier sets bpf_verifier_env->bypass_spec_{v1,v4}
basing on the value returned by kernel/cpu.c:cpu_mitigations_off().
This function is backed by a variable kernel/cpu.c:cpu_mitigations.

This state is not fully introspect-able via sysfs. The closest proxy
is /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1, but it reports
"vulnerable" state only if mitigations are disabled *and* current cpu
is vulnerable, while verifier does not check cpu state.

There are only two ways the kernel/cpu.c:cpu_mitigations can be set:
- via boot parameter;
- via CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS option.

This commit updates unpriv_helpers.c:get_mitigations_off() to scan
/boot/config-$(uname -r) and /proc/config.gz for
CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS value in addition to boot command line check.

Tested using the following configurations:
- mitigations enabled (unpriv tests are enabled)
- mitigations disabled via boot cmdline (unpriv tests skipped)
- mitigations disabled via CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS
  (unpriv tests skipped)

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231025031144.5508-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com/

Reported-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250617005710.1066165-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c
index 220f6a963813..3aa9ee80a55e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c
@@ -1,15 +1,75 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 
+#include <errno.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
+#include <zlib.h>
 
 #include "unpriv_helpers.h"
 
-static bool get_mitigations_off(void)
+static gzFile open_config(void)
+{
+	struct utsname uts;
+	char buf[PATH_MAX];
+	gzFile config;
+
+	if (uname(&uts)) {
+		perror("uname");
+		goto config_gz;
+	}
+
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/boot/config-%s", uts.release);
+	config = gzopen(buf, "rb");
+	if (config)
+		return config;
+	fprintf(stderr, "gzopen %s: %s\n", buf, strerror(errno));
+
+config_gz:
+	config = gzopen("/proc/config.gz", "rb");
+	if (!config)
+		perror("gzopen /proc/config.gz");
+	return config;
+}
+
+static int config_contains(const char *pat)
+{
+	const char *msg;
+	char buf[1024];
+	gzFile config;
+	int n, err;
+
+	config = open_config();
+	if (!config)
+		return -1;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if (!gzgets(config, buf, sizeof(buf))) {
+			msg = gzerror(config, &err);
+			if (err == Z_ERRNO)
+				perror("gzgets /proc/config.gz");
+			else if (err != Z_OK)
+				fprintf(stderr, "gzgets /proc/config.gz: %s", msg);
+			gzclose(config);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		n = strlen(buf);
+		if (buf[n - 1] == '\n')
+			buf[n - 1] = 0;
+		if (strcmp(buf, pat) == 0) {
+			gzclose(config);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+	gzclose(config);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool cmdline_contains(const char *pat)
 {
 	char cmdline[4096], *c;
 	int fd, ret = false;
@@ -27,7 +87,7 @@ static bool get_mitigations_off(void)
 
 	cmdline[sizeof(cmdline) - 1] = '\0';
 	for (c = strtok(cmdline, " \n"); c; c = strtok(NULL, " \n")) {
-		if (strncmp(c, "mitigations=off", strlen(c)))
+		if (strncmp(c, pat, strlen(c)))
 			continue;
 		ret = true;
 		break;
@@ -37,8 +97,21 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int get_mitigations_off(void)
+{
+	int enabled_in_config;
+
+	if (cmdline_contains("mitigations=off"))
+		return 1;
+	enabled_in_config = config_contains("CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS=y");
+	if (enabled_in_config < 0)
+		return -1;
+	return !enabled_in_config;
+}
+
 bool get_unpriv_disabled(void)
 {
+	int mitigations_off;
 	bool disabled;
 	char buf[2];
 	FILE *fd;
@@ -52,5 +125,19 @@ bool get_unpriv_disabled(void)
 		disabled = true;
 	}
 
-	return disabled ? true : get_mitigations_off();
+	if (disabled)
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Some unpriv tests rely on spectre mitigations being on.
+	 * If mitigations are off or status can't be determined
+	 * assume that unpriv tests are disabled.
+	 */
+	mitigations_off = get_mitigations_off();
+	if (mitigations_off < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+			"Can't determine if mitigations are enabled, disabling unpriv tests.");
+		return true;
+	}
+	return mitigations_off;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 66ab68c9de89672366fdc474f4f185bb58cecf2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 13:15:36 +0100
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix unintentional switch case fall through

Break from switch expression after parsing -n CLI argument in veristat,
instead of falling through and enabling comparison mode.

Fixes: a5c57f81eb2b ("veristat: add ability to set BPF_F_TEST_SANITY_STRICT flag with -r flag")
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250617121536.1320074-1-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
index 56771650ee8c..4da627ca5749 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ static error_t parse_arg(int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
 			fprintf(stderr, "invalid top N specifier: %s\n", arg);
 			argp_usage(state);
 		}
+		break;
 	case 'C':
 		env.comparison_mode = true;
 		break;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From bd07bd12f2c17d3e13d58c09f5eac5d021ec14ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 10:57:36 -0400
Subject: bpf: Fix key serial argument of bpf_lookup_user_key()

The underlying lookup_user_key() function uses a signed 32 bit integer
for key serial numbers because legitimate serial numbers are positive
(and > 3) and keyrings are negative.  Using a u32 for the keyring in
the bpf function doesn't currently cause any conversion problems but
will start to trip the signed to unsigned conversion warnings when the
kernel enables them, so convert the argument to signed (and update the
tests accordingly) before it acquires more users.

Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/84cdb0775254d297d75e21f577089f64abdfbd28.camel@HansenPartnership.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c                                  | 2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h                  | 2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c         | 5 +++--
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c       | 4 ++--
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c     | 2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c | 2 +-
 7 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index 132c8be6f635..0a06ea6638fe 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ __bpf_kfunc_start_defs();
  * Return: a bpf_key pointer with a valid key pointer if the key is found, a
  *         NULL pointer otherwise.
  */
-__bpf_kfunc struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(u32 serial, u64 flags)
+__bpf_kfunc struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(s32 serial, u64 flags)
 {
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
 	struct bpf_key *bkey;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h
index 8215c9b3115e..9386dfe8b884 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ extern int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name,
 			      struct bpf_dynptr *value_ptr) __ksym;
 extern int bpf_get_fsverity_digest(struct file *file, struct bpf_dynptr *digest_ptr) __ksym;
 
-extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__u32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
+extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__s32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
 extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_system_key(__u64 id) __ksym;
 extern void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *key) __ksym;
 extern int bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr *data_ptr,
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c
index 43637ee2cdcd..3a868a199349 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c
@@ -16,10 +16,11 @@ struct {
 	__type(value, long);
 } map_a SEC(".maps");
 
-__u32 user_data, key_serial, target_pid;
+__u32 user_data, target_pid;
+__s32 key_serial;
 __u64 flags, task_storage_val, cgroup_id;
 
-struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__u32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
+struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__s32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
 void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *key) __ksym;
 void bpf_rcu_read_lock(void) __ksym;
 void bpf_rcu_read_unlock(void) __ksym;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c
index cdbbb12f1491..1f7e1e59b073 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c
@@ -14,11 +14,11 @@
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
 
 __u32 monitored_pid;
-__u32 key_serial;
+__s32 key_serial;
 __u32 key_id;
 __u64 flags;
 
-extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__u32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
+extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__s32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
 extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_system_key(__u64 id) __ksym;
 extern void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *key) __ksym;
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c
index 8ef6b39335b6..34b30e2603f0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ char digest[MAGIC_SIZE + SIZEOF_STRUCT_FSVERITY_DIGEST + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
 __u32 monitored_pid;
 char sig[MAX_SIG_SIZE];
 __u32 sig_size;
-__u32 user_keyring_serial;
+__s32 user_keyring_serial;
 
 SEC("lsm.s/file_open")
 int BPF_PROG(test_file_open, struct file *f)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c
index e96d09e11115..ff8d755548b9 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 #define MAX_SIG_SIZE 1024
 
 __u32 monitored_pid;
-__u32 user_keyring_serial;
+__s32 user_keyring_serial;
 __u64 system_keyring_id;
 
 struct data {
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c
index 683a882b3e6d..910365201f68 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ struct bpf_key {} __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
 
 extern void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *key) __ksym;
 extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_system_key(__u64 id) __ksym;
-extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__u32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
+extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__s32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
 
 /* BTF FUNC records are not generated for kfuncs referenced
  * from inline assembly. These records are necessary for
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From cd7312a78f36e981939abe1cd1f21d355e083dfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 02:31:34 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: include limits.h needed for PATH_MAX directly

Constant PATH_MAX is used in function unpriv_helpers.c:open_config().
This constant is provided by include file <limits.h>.
The dependency was added by commit [1], which does not include
<limits.h> directly, relying instead on <limits.h> being included from
zlib.h -> zconf.h.
As it turns out, this is not the case for all systems, e.g. on
Fedora 41 zlib 1.3.1 is used, and there <limits.h> is not included
from zconf.h. Hence, there is a compilation error on Fedora 41.

[1] commit fc2915bb8bfc ("selftests/bpf: More precise cpu_mitigations state detection")

Fixes: fc2915bb8bfc ("selftests/bpf: More precise cpu_mitigations state detection")
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250618093134.3078870-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c
index 3aa9ee80a55e..f997d7ec8fd0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 
 #include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f8b19aeca1652fcadefce8529cd85e5fd475dd69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Slava Imameev <slava.imameev@crowdstrike.com>
Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2025 01:18:12 +1000
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add test for bpftool access to read-only protected
 maps

Add selftest cases that validate bpftool's expected behavior when
accessing maps protected from modification via security_bpf_map.

The test includes a BPF program attached to security_bpf_map with two maps:
- A protected map that only allows read-only access
- An unprotected map that allows full access

The test script attaches the BPF program to security_bpf_map and
verifies that for the bpftool map command:
- Read access works on both maps
- Write access fails on the protected map
- Write access succeeds on the unprotected map
- These behaviors remain consistent when the maps are pinned

Signed-off-by: Slava Imameev <slava.imameev@crowdstrike.com>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250620151812.13952-2-slava.imameev@crowdstrike.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile               |   1 +
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_map_elem.c        |  22 ++
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/security_bpf_map.c |  69 ++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_bpftool_map.sh    | 398 +++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 490 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_map_elem.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/security_bpf_map.c
 create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_bpftool_map.sh

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile
index 97013c49920b..da868bb8c421 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ TEST_PROGS := test_kmod.sh \
 	test_xdping.sh \
 	test_bpftool_build.sh \
 	test_bpftool.sh \
+	test_bpftool_map.sh \
 	test_bpftool_metadata.sh \
 	test_doc_build.sh \
 	test_xsk.sh \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_map_elem.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_map_elem.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2f20485e0de3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_map_elem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+__u32 value_sum = 0;
+
+SEC("iter/bpf_map_elem")
+int dump_bpf_map_values(struct bpf_iter__bpf_map_elem *ctx)
+{
+	__u32 value = 0;
+
+	if (ctx->value == (void *)0)
+		return 0;
+
+	bpf_probe_read_kernel(&value, sizeof(value), ctx->value);
+	value_sum += value;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/security_bpf_map.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/security_bpf_map.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7216b3450e96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/security_bpf_map.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+#define EPERM 1 /* Operation not permitted */
+
+/* From include/linux/mm.h. */
+#define FMODE_WRITE	0x2
+
+struct map;
+
+struct {
+	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
+	__type(key, __u32);
+	__type(value, __u32);
+	__uint(max_entries, 1);
+} prot_status_map SEC(".maps");
+
+struct {
+	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
+	__type(key, __u32);
+	__type(value, __u32);
+	__uint(max_entries, 3);
+} prot_map SEC(".maps");
+
+struct {
+	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
+	__type(key, __u32);
+	__type(value, __u32);
+	__uint(max_entries, 3);
+} not_prot_map SEC(".maps");
+
+SEC("fmod_ret/security_bpf_map")
+int BPF_PROG(fmod_bpf_map, struct bpf_map *map, int fmode)
+{
+	__u32 key = 0;
+	__u32 *status_ptr = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&prot_status_map, &key);
+
+	if (!status_ptr || !*status_ptr)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (map == &prot_map) {
+		/* Allow read-only access */
+		if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This program keeps references to maps. This is needed to prevent
+ * optimizing them out.
+ */
+SEC("fentry/bpf_fentry_test1")
+int BPF_PROG(fentry_dummy1, int a)
+{
+	__u32 key = 0;
+	__u32 val1 = a;
+	__u32 val2 = a + 1;
+
+	bpf_map_update_elem(&prot_map, &key, &val1, BPF_ANY);
+	bpf_map_update_elem(&not_prot_map, &key, &val2, BPF_ANY);
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_bpftool_map.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_bpftool_map.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..515b1df0501e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_bpftool_map.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+# Kselftest framework requirement - SKIP code is 4.
+ksft_skip=4
+
+TESTNAME="bpftool_map"
+BPF_FILE="security_bpf_map.bpf.o"
+BPF_ITER_FILE="bpf_iter_map_elem.bpf.o"
+PROTECTED_MAP_NAME="prot_map"
+NOT_PROTECTED_MAP_NAME="not_prot_map"
+BPF_FS_TMP_PARENT="/tmp"
+BPF_FS_PARENT=$(awk '$3 == "bpf" {print $2; exit}' /proc/mounts)
+BPF_FS_PARENT=${BPF_FS_PARENT:-$BPF_FS_TMP_PARENT}
+# bpftool will mount bpf file system under BPF_DIR if it is not mounted
+# under BPF_FS_PARENT.
+BPF_DIR="$BPF_FS_PARENT/test_$TESTNAME"
+SCRIPT_DIR=$(dirname $(realpath "$0"))
+BPF_FILE_PATH="$SCRIPT_DIR/$BPF_FILE"
+BPF_ITER_FILE_PATH="$SCRIPT_DIR/$BPF_ITER_FILE"
+BPFTOOL_PATH="bpftool"
+# Assume the script is located under tools/testing/selftests/bpf/
+KDIR_ROOT_DIR=$(realpath "$SCRIPT_DIR"/../../../../)
+
+_cleanup()
+{
+	set +eu
+
+	# If BPF_DIR is a mount point this will not remove the mount point itself.
+	[ -d "$BPF_DIR" ] && rm -rf "$BPF_DIR" 2> /dev/null
+
+	# Unmount if BPF filesystem was temporarily created.
+	if [ "$BPF_FS_PARENT" = "$BPF_FS_TMP_PARENT" ]; then
+		# A loop and recursive unmount are required as bpftool might
+		# create multiple mounts. For example, a bind mount of the directory
+		# to itself. The bind mount is created to change mount propagation
+		# flags on an actual mount point.
+		max_attempts=3
+		attempt=0
+		while mountpoint -q "$BPF_DIR" && [ $attempt -lt $max_attempts ]; do
+			umount -R "$BPF_DIR" 2>/dev/null
+			attempt=$((attempt+1))
+		done
+
+		# The directory still exists. Remove it now.
+		[ -d "$BPF_DIR" ] && rm -rf "$BPF_DIR" 2>/dev/null
+	fi
+}
+
+cleanup_skip()
+{
+	echo "selftests: $TESTNAME [SKIP]"
+	_cleanup
+
+	exit $ksft_skip
+}
+
+cleanup()
+{
+	if [ "$?" = 0 ]; then
+		echo "selftests: $TESTNAME [PASS]"
+	else
+		echo "selftests: $TESTNAME [FAILED]"
+	fi
+	_cleanup
+}
+
+check_root_privileges() {
+	if [ $(id -u) -ne 0 ]; then
+		echo "Need root privileges"
+		exit $ksft_skip
+	fi
+}
+
+# Function to verify bpftool path.
+# Parameters:
+#   $1: bpftool path
+verify_bpftool_path() {
+	local bpftool_path="$1"
+	if ! "$bpftool_path" version > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+		echo "Could not run test without bpftool"
+		exit $ksft_skip
+	fi
+}
+
+# Function to verify BTF support.
+# The test requires BTF support for fmod_ret programs.
+verify_btf_support() {
+	if [ ! -f /sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux ]; then
+		echo "Could not run test without BTF support"
+		exit $ksft_skip
+	fi
+}
+
+# Function to initialize map entries with keys [0..2] and values set to 0.
+# Parameters:
+#  $1: Map name
+#  $2: bpftool path
+initialize_map_entries() {
+	local map_name="$1"
+	local bpftool_path="$2"
+
+	for key in 0 1 2; do
+		"$bpftool_path" map update name "$map_name" key $key 0 0 0 value 0 0 0 $key
+	done
+}
+
+# Test read access to the map.
+# Parameters:
+#   $1: Name command (name/pinned)
+#   $2: Map name
+#   $3: bpftool path
+#   $4: key
+access_for_read() {
+	local name_cmd="$1"
+	local map_name="$2"
+	local bpftool_path="$3"
+	local key="$4"
+
+	# Test read access to the map.
+	if ! "$bpftool_path" map lookup "$name_cmd" "$map_name" key $key 1>/dev/null; then
+		echo " Read access to $key in $map_name failed"
+		exit 1
+	fi
+
+	# Test read access to map's BTF data.
+	if ! "$bpftool_path" btf dump map "$name_cmd" "$map_name" 1>/dev/null; then
+		echo " Read access to $map_name for BTF data failed"
+		exit 1
+	fi
+}
+
+# Test write access to the map.
+# Parameters:
+#   $1: Name command (name/pinned)
+#   $2: Map name
+#   $3: bpftool path
+#   $4: key
+#   $5: Whether write should succeed (true/false)
+access_for_write() {
+	local name_cmd="$1"
+	local map_name="$2"
+	local bpftool_path="$3"
+	local key="$4"
+	local write_should_succeed="$5"
+	local value="1 1 1 1"
+
+	if "$bpftool_path" map update "$name_cmd" "$map_name" key $key value \
+			$value 2>/dev/null; then
+		if [ "$write_should_succeed" = "false" ]; then
+			echo " Write access to $key in $map_name succeeded but should have failed"
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	else
+		if [ "$write_should_succeed" = "true" ]; then
+			echo " Write access to $key in $map_name failed but should have succeeded"
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+# Test entry deletion for the map.
+# Parameters:
+#   $1: Name command (name/pinned)
+#   $2: Map name
+#   $3: bpftool path
+#   $4: key
+#   $5: Whether write should succeed (true/false)
+access_for_deletion() {
+	local name_cmd="$1"
+	local map_name="$2"
+	local bpftool_path="$3"
+	local key="$4"
+	local write_should_succeed="$5"
+	local value="1 1 1 1"
+
+	# Test deletion by key for the map.
+	# Before deleting, check the key exists.
+	if ! "$bpftool_path" map lookup "$name_cmd" "$map_name" key $key 1>/dev/null; then
+		echo " Key $key does not exist in $map_name"
+		exit 1
+	fi
+
+	# Delete by key.
+	if "$bpftool_path" map delete "$name_cmd" "$map_name" key $key 2>/dev/null; then
+		if [ "$write_should_succeed" = "false" ]; then
+			echo " Deletion for $key in $map_name succeeded but should have failed"
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	else
+		if [ "$write_should_succeed" = "true" ]; then
+			echo " Deletion for $key in $map_name failed but should have succeeded"
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	# After deleting, check the entry existence according to the expected status.
+	if "$bpftool_path" map lookup "$name_cmd" "$map_name" key $key 1>/dev/null; then
+		if [ "$write_should_succeed" = "true" ]; then
+			echo " Key $key for $map_name was not deleted but should have been deleted"
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	else
+		if [ "$write_should_succeed" = "false" ]; then
+			echo "Key $key for $map_name was deleted but should have not been deleted"
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	# Test creation of map's deleted entry, if deletion was successful.
+	# Otherwise, the entry exists.
+	if "$bpftool_path" map update "$name_cmd" "$map_name" key $key value \
+				$value 2>/dev/null; then
+		if [ "$write_should_succeed" = "false" ]; then
+			echo " Write access to $key in $map_name succeeded after deletion attempt but should have failed"
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	else
+		if [ "$write_should_succeed" = "true" ]; then
+			echo " Write access to $key in $map_name failed after deletion attempt but should have succeeded"
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+# Test map elements iterator.
+# Parameters:
+#   $1: Name command (name/pinned)
+#   $2: Map name
+#   $3: bpftool path
+#   $4: BPF_DIR
+#   $5: bpf iterator object file path
+iterate_map_elem() {
+	local name_cmd="$1"
+	local map_name="$2"
+	local bpftool_path="$3"
+	local bpf_dir="$4"
+	local bpf_file="$5"
+	local pin_path="$bpf_dir/map_iterator"
+
+	"$bpftool_path" iter pin "$bpf_file" "$pin_path" map "$name_cmd" "$map_name"
+	if [ ! -f "$pin_path" ]; then
+		echo " Failed to pin iterator to $pin_path"
+		exit 1
+	fi
+
+	cat "$pin_path" 1>/dev/null
+	rm "$pin_path" 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+# Function to test map access with configurable write expectations
+# Parameters:
+#   $1: Name command (name/pinned)
+#   $2: Map name
+#   $3: bpftool path
+#   $4: key for rw
+#   $5: key to delete
+#   $6: Whether write should succeed (true/false)
+#   $7: BPF_DIR
+#   $8: bpf iterator object file path
+access_map() {
+	local name_cmd="$1"
+	local map_name="$2"
+	local bpftool_path="$3"
+	local key_for_rw="$4"
+	local key_to_del="$5"
+	local write_should_succeed="$6"
+	local bpf_dir="$7"
+	local bpf_iter_file_path="$8"
+
+	access_for_read "$name_cmd" "$map_name" "$bpftool_path" "$key_for_rw"
+	access_for_write "$name_cmd" "$map_name" "$bpftool_path" "$key_for_rw" \
+		"$write_should_succeed"
+	access_for_deletion "$name_cmd" "$map_name" "$bpftool_path" "$key_to_del" \
+		"$write_should_succeed"
+	iterate_map_elem "$name_cmd" "$map_name" "$bpftool_path" "$bpf_dir" \
+		"$bpf_iter_file_path"
+}
+
+# Function to test map access with configurable write expectations
+# Parameters:
+#   $1: Map name
+#   $2: bpftool path
+#   $3: BPF_DIR
+#   $4: Whether write should succeed (true/false)
+#   $5: bpf iterator object file path
+test_map_access() {
+	local map_name="$1"
+	local bpftool_path="$2"
+	local bpf_dir="$3"
+	local pin_path="$bpf_dir/${map_name}_pinned"
+	local write_should_succeed="$4"
+	local bpf_iter_file_path="$5"
+
+	# Test access to the map by name.
+	access_map "name" "$map_name" "$bpftool_path" "0 0 0 0" "1 0 0 0" \
+		"$write_should_succeed" "$bpf_dir" "$bpf_iter_file_path"
+
+	# Pin the map to the BPF filesystem
+	"$bpftool_path" map pin name "$map_name" "$pin_path"
+	if [ ! -e "$pin_path" ]; then
+		echo " Failed to pin $map_name"
+		exit 1
+	fi
+
+	# Test access to the pinned map.
+	access_map "pinned" "$pin_path" "$bpftool_path" "0 0 0 0" "2 0 0 0" \
+		"$write_should_succeed" "$bpf_dir" "$bpf_iter_file_path"
+}
+
+# Function to test map creation and map-of-maps
+# Parameters:
+#   $1: bpftool path
+#   $2: BPF_DIR
+test_map_creation_and_map_of_maps() {
+	local bpftool_path="$1"
+	local bpf_dir="$2"
+	local outer_map_name="outer_map_tt"
+	local inner_map_name="inner_map_tt"
+
+	"$bpftool_path" map create "$bpf_dir/$inner_map_name" type array key 4 \
+		value 4 entries 4 name "$inner_map_name"
+	if [ ! -f "$bpf_dir/$inner_map_name" ]; then
+		echo " Failed to create inner map file at $bpf_dir/$outer_map_name"
+		return 1
+	fi
+
+	"$bpftool_path" map create "$bpf_dir/$outer_map_name" type hash_of_maps \
+		key 4 value 4 entries 2 name "$outer_map_name" inner_map name "$inner_map_name"
+	if [ ! -f "$bpf_dir/$outer_map_name" ]; then
+		echo " Failed to create outer map file at $bpf_dir/$outer_map_name"
+		return 1
+	fi
+
+	# Add entries to the outer map by name and by pinned path.
+	"$bpftool_path" map update pinned "$bpf_dir/$outer_map_name" key 0 0 0 0 \
+		value pinned "$bpf_dir/$inner_map_name"
+	"$bpftool_path" map update name "$outer_map_name" key 1 0 0 0 value \
+		name "$inner_map_name"
+
+	# The outer map should be full by now.
+	# The following map update command is expected to fail.
+	if "$bpftool_path" map update name "$outer_map_name" key 2 0 0 0 value name \
+		"$inner_map_name" 2>/dev/null; then
+		echo " Update for $outer_map_name succeeded but should have failed"
+		exit 1
+	fi
+}
+
+# Function to test map access with the btf list command
+# Parameters:
+#   $1: bpftool path
+test_map_access_with_btf_list() {
+	local bpftool_path="$1"
+
+	# The btf list command iterates over maps for
+	# loaded BPF programs.
+	if ! "$bpftool_path" btf list 1>/dev/null; then
+		echo " Failed to access btf data"
+		exit 1
+	fi
+}
+
+set -eu
+
+trap cleanup_skip EXIT
+
+check_root_privileges
+
+verify_bpftool_path "$BPFTOOL_PATH"
+
+verify_btf_support
+
+trap cleanup EXIT
+
+# Load and attach the BPF programs to control maps access.
+"$BPFTOOL_PATH" prog loadall "$BPF_FILE_PATH" "$BPF_DIR" autoattach
+
+initialize_map_entries "$PROTECTED_MAP_NAME" "$BPFTOOL_PATH"
+initialize_map_entries "$NOT_PROTECTED_MAP_NAME" "$BPFTOOL_PATH"
+
+# Activate the map protection mechanism. Protection status is controlled
+# by a value stored in the prot_status_map at index 0.
+"$BPFTOOL_PATH" map update name prot_status_map key 0 0 0 0 value 1 0 0 0
+
+# Test protected map (write should fail).
+test_map_access "$PROTECTED_MAP_NAME" "$BPFTOOL_PATH" "$BPF_DIR" "false" \
+ "$BPF_ITER_FILE_PATH"
+
+# Test not protected map (write should succeed).
+test_map_access "$NOT_PROTECTED_MAP_NAME" "$BPFTOOL_PATH" "$BPF_DIR" "true" \
+ "$BPF_ITER_FILE_PATH"
+
+test_map_creation_and_map_of_maps "$BPFTOOL_PATH" "$BPF_DIR"
+
+test_map_access_with_btf_list "$BPFTOOL_PATH"
+
+exit 0
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f4fba2d6d2822efd2733949c0831435dcd96cbd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2025 23:38:54 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add tests for bpf_cgroup_read_xattr

Add tests for different scenarios with bpf_cgroup_read_xattr:
1. Read cgroup xattr from bpf_cgroup_from_id;
2. Read cgroup xattr from bpf_cgroup_ancestor;
3. Read cgroup xattr from css_iter;
4. Use bpf_cgroup_read_xattr in LSM hook security_socket_connect.
5. Use bpf_cgroup_read_xattr in cgroup program.

Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250623063854.1896364-5-song@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_experimental.h     |   3 +
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_xattr.c        | 145 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_read_xattr.c        | 158 +++++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c      |  60 ++++++++
 4 files changed, 366 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_xattr.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_read_xattr.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_experimental.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_experimental.h
index 5e512a1d09d1..da7e230f2781 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_experimental.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_experimental.h
@@ -596,4 +596,7 @@ extern int bpf_iter_dmabuf_new(struct bpf_iter_dmabuf *it) __weak __ksym;
 extern struct dma_buf *bpf_iter_dmabuf_next(struct bpf_iter_dmabuf *it) __weak __ksym;
 extern void bpf_iter_dmabuf_destroy(struct bpf_iter_dmabuf *it) __weak __ksym;
 
+extern int bpf_cgroup_read_xattr(struct cgroup *cgroup, const char *name__str,
+				 struct bpf_dynptr *value_p) __weak __ksym;
+
 #endif
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_xattr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_xattr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..87978a0f7eb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_xattr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/xattr.h>
+
+#include <test_progs.h>
+
+#include "read_cgroupfs_xattr.skel.h"
+#include "cgroup_read_xattr.skel.h"
+
+#define CGROUP_FS_ROOT "/sys/fs/cgroup/"
+#define CGROUP_FS_PARENT CGROUP_FS_ROOT "foo/"
+#define CGROUP_FS_CHILD CGROUP_FS_PARENT "bar/"
+
+static int move_pid_to_cgroup(const char *cgroup_folder, pid_t pid)
+{
+	char filename[128];
+	char pid_str[64];
+	int procs_fd;
+	int ret;
+
+	snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%scgroup.procs", cgroup_folder);
+	snprintf(pid_str, sizeof(pid_str), "%d", pid);
+
+	procs_fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_FD(procs_fd, "open"))
+		return -1;
+
+	ret = write(procs_fd, pid_str, strlen(pid_str));
+	close(procs_fd);
+	if (!ASSERT_GT(ret, 0, "write cgroup.procs"))
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void reset_cgroups_and_lo(void)
+{
+	rmdir(CGROUP_FS_CHILD);
+	rmdir(CGROUP_FS_PARENT);
+	system("ip addr del 1.1.1.1/32 dev lo");
+	system("ip link set dev lo down");
+}
+
+static const char xattr_value_a[] = "bpf_selftest_value_a";
+static const char xattr_value_b[] = "bpf_selftest_value_b";
+static const char xattr_name[] = "user.bpf_test";
+
+static int setup_cgroups_and_lo(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = mkdir(CGROUP_FS_PARENT, 0755);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "mkdir 1"))
+		goto error;
+	err = mkdir(CGROUP_FS_CHILD, 0755);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "mkdir 2"))
+		goto error;
+
+	err = setxattr(CGROUP_FS_PARENT, xattr_name, xattr_value_a,
+		       strlen(xattr_value_a) + 1, 0);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "setxattr 1"))
+		goto error;
+
+	err = setxattr(CGROUP_FS_CHILD, xattr_name, xattr_value_b,
+		       strlen(xattr_value_b) + 1, 0);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "setxattr 2"))
+		goto error;
+
+	err = system("ip link set dev lo up");
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "lo up"))
+		goto error;
+
+	err = system("ip addr add 1.1.1.1 dev lo");
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "lo addr v4"))
+		goto error;
+
+	err = write_sysctl("/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range", "0 0");
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "write_sysctl"))
+		goto error;
+
+	return 0;
+error:
+	reset_cgroups_and_lo();
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void test_read_cgroup_xattr(void)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in sa4 = {
+		.sin_family = AF_INET,
+		.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK),
+	};
+	struct read_cgroupfs_xattr *skel = NULL;
+	pid_t pid = gettid();
+	int sock_fd = -1;
+	int connect_fd = -1;
+
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(setup_cgroups_and_lo(), "setup_cgroups_and_lo"))
+		return;
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(move_pid_to_cgroup(CGROUP_FS_CHILD, pid),
+		       "move_pid_to_cgroup"))
+		goto out;
+
+	skel = read_cgroupfs_xattr__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "read_cgroupfs_xattr__open_and_load"))
+		goto out;
+
+	skel->bss->target_pid = pid;
+
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(read_cgroupfs_xattr__attach(skel), "read_cgroupfs_xattr__attach"))
+		goto out;
+
+	sock_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_ICMP);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_FD(sock_fd, "sock create"))
+		goto out;
+
+	connect_fd = connect(sock_fd, &sa4, sizeof(sa4));
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_FD(connect_fd, "connect 1"))
+		goto out;
+	close(connect_fd);
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(skel->bss->found_value_a, "found_value_a");
+	ASSERT_TRUE(skel->bss->found_value_b, "found_value_b");
+
+out:
+	close(connect_fd);
+	close(sock_fd);
+	read_cgroupfs_xattr__destroy(skel);
+	move_pid_to_cgroup(CGROUP_FS_ROOT, pid);
+	reset_cgroups_and_lo();
+}
+
+void test_cgroup_xattr(void)
+{
+	RUN_TESTS(cgroup_read_xattr);
+
+	if (test__start_subtest("read_cgroupfs_xattr"))
+		test_read_cgroup_xattr();
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_read_xattr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_read_xattr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..092db1d0435e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgroup_read_xattr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_core_read.h>
+#include "bpf_experimental.h"
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+char value[16];
+
+static __always_inline void read_xattr(struct cgroup *cgroup)
+{
+	struct bpf_dynptr value_ptr;
+
+	bpf_dynptr_from_mem(value, sizeof(value), 0, &value_ptr);
+	bpf_cgroup_read_xattr(cgroup, "user.bpf_test",
+			      &value_ptr);
+}
+
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(trusted_cgroup_ptr_sleepable)
+{
+	u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+	struct cgroup *cgrp;
+
+	cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+	if (!cgrp)
+		return 0;
+
+	read_xattr(cgrp);
+	bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("lsm/socket_connect")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(trusted_cgroup_ptr_non_sleepable)
+{
+	u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+	struct cgroup *cgrp;
+
+	cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+	if (!cgrp)
+		return 0;
+
+	read_xattr(cgrp);
+	bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("lsm/socket_connect")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(use_css_iter_non_sleepable)
+{
+	u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+	struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
+	struct cgroup *cgrp;
+
+	cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+	if (!cgrp)
+		return 0;
+
+	bpf_for_each(css, css, &cgrp->self, BPF_CGROUP_ITER_ANCESTORS_UP)
+		read_xattr(css->cgroup);
+
+	bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__failure __msg("expected an RCU CS")
+int BPF_PROG(use_css_iter_sleepable_missing_rcu_lock)
+{
+	u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+	struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
+	struct cgroup *cgrp;
+
+	cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+	if (!cgrp)
+		return 0;
+
+	bpf_for_each(css, css, &cgrp->self, BPF_CGROUP_ITER_ANCESTORS_UP)
+		read_xattr(css->cgroup);
+
+	bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(use_css_iter_sleepable_with_rcu_lock)
+{
+	u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+	struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
+	struct cgroup *cgrp;
+
+	bpf_rcu_read_lock();
+	cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+	if (!cgrp)
+		goto out;
+
+	bpf_for_each(css, css, &cgrp->self, BPF_CGROUP_ITER_ANCESTORS_UP)
+		read_xattr(css->cgroup);
+
+	bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+out:
+	bpf_rcu_read_unlock();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("lsm/socket_connect")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(use_bpf_cgroup_ancestor)
+{
+	u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+	struct cgroup *cgrp, *ancestor;
+
+	cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+	if (!cgrp)
+		return 0;
+
+	ancestor = bpf_cgroup_ancestor(cgrp, 1);
+	if (!ancestor)
+		goto out;
+
+	read_xattr(cgrp);
+	bpf_cgroup_release(ancestor);
+out:
+	bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("cgroup/sendmsg4")
+__success
+int BPF_PROG(cgroup_skb)
+{
+	u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+	struct cgroup *cgrp, *ancestor;
+
+	cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+	if (!cgrp)
+		return 0;
+
+	ancestor = bpf_cgroup_ancestor(cgrp, 1);
+	if (!ancestor)
+		goto out;
+
+	read_xattr(cgrp);
+	bpf_cgroup_release(ancestor);
+out:
+	bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..855f85fc5522
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_core_read.h>
+#include "bpf_experimental.h"
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+pid_t target_pid = 0;
+
+char xattr_value[64];
+static const char expected_value_a[] = "bpf_selftest_value_a";
+static const char expected_value_b[] = "bpf_selftest_value_b";
+bool found_value_a;
+bool found_value_b;
+
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+int BPF_PROG(test_socket_connect)
+{
+	u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
+	struct cgroup_subsys_state *css, *tmp;
+	struct bpf_dynptr value_ptr;
+	struct cgroup *cgrp;
+
+	if ((bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32) != target_pid)
+		return 0;
+
+	bpf_rcu_read_lock();
+	cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(cgrp_id);
+	if (!cgrp) {
+		bpf_rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	css = &cgrp->self;
+	bpf_dynptr_from_mem(xattr_value, sizeof(xattr_value), 0, &value_ptr);
+	bpf_for_each(css, tmp, css, BPF_CGROUP_ITER_ANCESTORS_UP) {
+		int ret;
+
+		ret = bpf_cgroup_read_xattr(tmp->cgroup, "user.bpf_test",
+					    &value_ptr);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (ret == sizeof(expected_value_a) &&
+		    !bpf_strncmp(xattr_value, sizeof(expected_value_a), expected_value_a))
+			found_value_a = true;
+		if (ret == sizeof(expected_value_b) &&
+		    !bpf_strncmp(xattr_value, sizeof(expected_value_b), expected_value_b))
+			found_value_b = true;
+	}
+
+	bpf_rcu_read_unlock();
+	bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
+
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3ce7cdde66e65a400b2d1b2a7f72c499e1db26b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2025 16:08:53 +0200
Subject: selftests/bpf: Support ppc64el in vmtest

With a rootfs built using libbpf's BPF CI [1], we can run specific tests
as follows:

$ ../libbpf-ci/rootfs/mkrootfs_debian.sh --arch ppc64el --distro noble
$ PLATFORM=ppc64el CROSS_COMPILE=powerpc64le-linux-gnu- \
    tools/testing/selftests/bpf/vmtest.sh \
    -l libbpf-vmtest-rootfs-*-noble-ppc64el.tar.zst \
    -- ./test_progs -t verifier_array_access

Does not include a DENYLIST or support for KVM for now.

[1] https://github.com/libbpf/ci

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250619140854.2135283-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config.ppc64el | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/vmtest.sh      |  9 +++
 2 files changed, 102 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config.ppc64el

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config.ppc64el b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config.ppc64el
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9acf389dc4ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config.ppc64el
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+CONFIG_ALTIVEC=y
+CONFIG_AUDIT=y
+CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP=y
+CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD=y
+CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RAM=y
+CONFIG_BONDING=y
+CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=y
+CONFIG_BPF_PRELOAD_UMD=y
+CONFIG_BPF_PRELOAD=y
+CONFIG_CGROUP_CPUACCT=y
+CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=y
+CONFIG_CGROUP_FREEZER=y
+CONFIG_CGROUP_HUGETLB=y
+CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_CLASSID=y
+CONFIG_CGROUP_PERF=y
+CONFIG_CGROUP_PIDS=y
+CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED=y
+CONFIG_CGROUPS=y
+CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y
+CONFIG_CMDLINE="console=hvc0 wg.success=hvc1 panic_on_warn=1"
+CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN=y
+CONFIG_CPUSETS=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y
+CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK=y
+CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT=y
+CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
+CONFIG_EXPERT=y
+CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
+CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY=y
+CONFIG_EXT4_FS=y
+CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y
+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=1280
+CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y
+CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y
+CONFIG_HUGETLBFS=y
+CONFIG_HVC_CONSOLE=y
+CONFIG_INET=y
+CONFIG_IP_ADVANCED_ROUTER=y
+CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST=y
+CONFIG_IP_MULTIPLE_TABLES=y
+CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_LWTUNNEL=y
+CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL=y
+CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL=y
+CONFIG_KPROBES=y
+CONFIG_MEMCG=y
+CONFIG_NAMESPACES=y
+CONFIG_NET_ACT_BPF=y
+CONFIG_NETDEVICES=y
+CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_BPF=y
+CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV=y
+CONFIG_NET_VRF=y
+CONFIG_NET=y
+CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y
+CONFIG_NONPORTABLE=y
+CONFIG_NR_CPUS=256
+CONFIG_PACKET=y
+CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS=y
+CONFIG_PARTITION_ADVANCED=y
+CONFIG_PCI_HOST_GENERIC=y
+CONFIG_PCI=y
+CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
+CONFIG_PPC64=y
+CONFIG_PPC_OF_BOOT_TRAMPOLINE=y
+CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES=y
+CONFIG_PPC_RADIX_MMU=y
+CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
+CONFIG_PROC_KCORE=y
+CONFIG_PROFILING=y
+CONFIG_RCU_CPU_STALL_TIMEOUT=60
+CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED=y
+CONFIG_SECTION_MISMATCH_WARN_ONLY=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y
+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y
+CONFIG_SERIAL_OF_PLATFORM=y
+CONFIG_SMP=y
+CONFIG_SOC_VIRT=y
+CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
+CONFIG_TCP_CONG_ADVANCED=y
+CONFIG_THREAD_SHIFT=14
+CONFIG_TLS=y
+CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL=y
+CONFIG_TMPFS=y
+CONFIG_TUN=y
+CONFIG_UNIX=y
+CONFIG_UPROBES=y
+CONFIG_USER_NS=y
+CONFIG_VETH=y
+CONFIG_VLAN_8021Q=y
+CONFIG_VSOCKETS_LOOPBACK=y
+CONFIG_VSX=y
+CONFIG_XFRM_USER=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/vmtest.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/vmtest.sh
index 79505d294c44..2f869daf8a06 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/vmtest.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/vmtest.sh
@@ -43,6 +43,15 @@ riscv64)
 	BZIMAGE="arch/riscv/boot/Image"
 	ARCH="riscv"
 	;;
+ppc64el)
+	QEMU_BINARY=qemu-system-ppc64
+	QEMU_CONSOLE="hvc0"
+	# KVM could not be tested for powerpc, therefore not enabled for now.
+	HOST_FLAGS=(-machine pseries -cpu POWER9)
+	CROSS_FLAGS=(-machine pseries -cpu POWER9)
+	BZIMAGE="vmlinux"
+	ARCH="powerpc"
+	;;
 *)
 	echo "Unsupported architecture"
 	exit 1
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e1d794541b3f17c37f66d4134ee7c044fac4dc87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harishankar Vishwanathan <harishankar.vishwanathan@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 00:03:57 -0400
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add testcases for BPF_ADD and BPF_SUB

The previous commit improves the precision in scalar(32)_min_max_add,
and scalar(32)_min_max_sub. The improvement in precision occurs in cases
when all outcomes overflow or underflow, respectively.

This commit adds selftests that exercise those cases.

This commit also adds selftests for cases where the output register
state bounds for u(32)_min/u(32)_max are conservatively set to unbounded
(when there is partial overflow or underflow).

Signed-off-by: Harishankar Vishwanathan <harishankar.vishwanathan@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Matan Shachnai <m.shachnai@rutgers.edu>
Signed-off-by: Matan Shachnai <m.shachnai@rutgers.edu>
Suggested-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250623040359.343235-3-harishankar.vishwanathan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c  | 161 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 161 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
index 30e16153fdf1..e52a24e15b34 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
@@ -1371,4 +1371,165 @@ __naked void mult_sign_ovf(void)
 	  __imm(bpf_skb_store_bytes)
 	: __clobber_all);
 }
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("64-bit addition, all outcomes overflow")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("5: (0f) r3 += r3 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar(umin=0x4000000000000000,umax=0xfffffffffffffffe)")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void add64_full_overflow(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+	"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+	"r4 = r0;"
+	"r3 = 0xa000000000000000 ll;"
+	"r3 |= r4;"
+	"r3 += r3;"
+	"r0 = 0;"
+	"exit"
+	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("64-bit addition, partial overflow, result in unbounded reg")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("4: (0f) r3 += r3 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar()")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void add64_partial_overflow(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+	"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+	"r4 = r0;"
+	"r3 = 2;"
+	"r3 |= r4;"
+	"r3 += r3;"
+	"r0 = 0;"
+	"exit"
+	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("32-bit addition overflow, all outcomes overflow")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("4: (0c) w3 += w3 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=0x40000000,smax=umax=umax32=0xfffffffe,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void add32_full_overflow(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+	"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+	"w4 = w0;"
+	"w3 = 0xa0000000;"
+	"w3 |= w4;"
+	"w3 += w3;"
+	"r0 = 0;"
+	"exit"
+	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("32-bit addition, partial overflow, result in unbounded u32 bounds")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("4: (0c) w3 += w3 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void add32_partial_overflow(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+	"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+	"w4 = w0;"
+	"w3 = 2;"
+	"w3 |= w4;"
+	"w3 += w3;"
+	"r0 = 0;"
+	"exit"
+	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("64-bit subtraction, all outcomes underflow")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("6: (1f) r3 -= r1 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar(umin=1,umax=0x8000000000000000)")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void sub64_full_overflow(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+	"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+	"r1 = r0;"
+	"r2 = 0x8000000000000000 ll;"
+	"r1 |= r2;"
+	"r3 = 0;"
+	"r3 -= r1;"
+	"r0 = 0;"
+	"exit"
+	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("64-bit subtration, partial overflow, result in unbounded reg")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("3: (1f) r3 -= r2 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar()")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void sub64_partial_overflow(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+	"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+	"r3 = r0;"
+	"r2 = 1;"
+	"r3 -= r2;"
+	"r0 = 0;"
+	"exit"
+	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("32-bit subtraction overflow, all outcomes underflow")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("5: (1c) w3 -= w1 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=1,smax=umax=umax32=0x80000000,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void sub32_full_overflow(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+	"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+	"w1 = w0;"
+	"w2 = 0x80000000;"
+	"w1 |= w2;"
+	"w3 = 0;"
+	"w3 -= w1;"
+	"r0 = 0;"
+	"exit"
+	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("32-bit subtration, partial overflow, result in unbounded u32 bounds")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("3: (1c) w3 -= w2 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void sub32_partial_overflow(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+	"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+	"w3 = w0;"
+	"w2 = 1;"
+	"w3 -= w2;"
+	"r0 = 0;"
+	"exit"
+	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d69bafe6ee2b5eff6099fa26626ecc2963f0f363 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2025 14:18:02 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix usdt multispec failure with arm64/clang20 selftest
 build

When building the selftest with arm64/clang20, the following test failed:
  ...
  ubtest_multispec_usdt:PASS:usdt_100_called 0 nsec
  subtest_multispec_usdt:PASS:usdt_100_sum 0 nsec
  subtest_multispec_usdt:FAIL:usdt_300_bad_attach unexpected pointer: 0xaaaad82a2a80
  #471/2   usdt/multispec:FAIL
  #471     usdt:FAIL

But arm64/gcc11 built kernel selftests succeeded. Further debug found arm64/clang
generated code has much less argument pattern after dedup, but gcc generated
code has a lot more.

Check usdt probes with usdt.test.o on arm64 platform:

with gcc11 build binary:
  stapsdt              0x0000002e       NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
    Provider: test
    Name: usdt_300
    Location: 0x00000000000054f8, Base: 0x0000000000000000, Semaphore: 0x0000000000000008
    Arguments: -4@[sp]
  stapsdt              0x00000031       NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
    Provider: test
    Name: usdt_300
    Location: 0x0000000000005510, Base: 0x0000000000000000, Semaphore: 0x0000000000000008
    Arguments: -4@[sp, 4]
  ...
  stapsdt              0x00000032       NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
    Provider: test
    Name: usdt_300
    Location: 0x0000000000005660, Base: 0x0000000000000000, Semaphore: 0x0000000000000008
    Arguments: -4@[sp, 60]
  ...
  stapsdt              0x00000034       NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
    Provider: test
    Name: usdt_300
    Location: 0x00000000000070e8, Base: 0x0000000000000000, Semaphore: 0x0000000000000008
    Arguments: -4@[sp, 1192]
  stapsdt              0x00000034       NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
    Provider: test
    Name: usdt_300
    Location: 0x0000000000007100, Base: 0x0000000000000000, Semaphore: 0x0000000000000008
    Arguments: -4@[sp, 1196]
  ...
  stapsdt              0x00000032       NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
    Provider: test
    Name: usdt_300
    Location: 0x0000000000009ec4, Base: 0x0000000000000000, Semaphore: 0x0000000000000008
    Arguments: -4@[sp, 60]

with clang20 build binary:
  stapsdt              0x0000002e       NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
    Provider: test
    Name: usdt_300
    Location: 0x00000000000009a0, Base: 0x0000000000000000, Semaphore: 0x0000000000000008
    Arguments: -4@[x9]
  stapsdt              0x0000002e       NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
    Provider: test
    Name: usdt_300
    Location: 0x00000000000009b8, Base: 0x0000000000000000, Semaphore: 0x0000000000000008
    Arguments: -4@[x9]
  ...
  stapsdt              0x0000002e       NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
    Provider: test
    Name: usdt_300
    Location: 0x0000000000002590, Base: 0x0000000000000000, Semaphore: 0x0000000000000008
    Arguments: -4@[x9]
  stapsdt              0x0000002e       NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
    Provider: test
    Name: usdt_300
    Location: 0x00000000000025a8, Base: 0x0000000000000000, Semaphore: 0x0000000000000008
    Arguments: -4@[x8]
  ...
  stapsdt              0x0000002f       NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
    Provider: test
    Name: usdt_300
    Location: 0x0000000000007fdc, Base: 0x0000000000000000, Semaphore: 0x0000000000000008
    Arguments: -4@[x10]

There are total 300 locations for usdt_300. For gcc11 built binary, there are
300 spec's. But for clang20 built binary, there are 3 spec's. The default
BPF_USDT_MAX_SPEC_CNT is 256, so bpf_program__attach_usdt() will fail for gcc
but it will succeed with clang.

To fix the problem, do not do bpf_program__attach_usdt() for usdt_300
with arm64/clang setup.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250624211802.2198821-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/usdt.c | 14 ++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/usdt.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/usdt.c
index 495d66414b57..9057e983cc54 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/usdt.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/usdt.c
@@ -270,8 +270,16 @@ static void subtest_multispec_usdt(void)
 	 */
 	trigger_300_usdts();
 
-	/* we'll reuse usdt_100 BPF program for usdt_300 test */
 	bpf_link__destroy(skel->links.usdt_100);
+
+	bss->usdt_100_called = 0;
+	bss->usdt_100_sum = 0;
+
+	/* If built with arm64/clang, there will be much less number of specs
+	 * for usdt_300 call sites.
+	 */
+#if !defined(__aarch64__) || !defined(__clang__)
+	/* we'll reuse usdt_100 BPF program for usdt_300 test */
 	skel->links.usdt_100 = bpf_program__attach_usdt(skel->progs.usdt_100, -1, "/proc/self/exe",
 							"test", "usdt_300", NULL);
 	err = -errno;
@@ -282,13 +290,11 @@ static void subtest_multispec_usdt(void)
 	/* let's check that there are no "dangling" BPF programs attached due
 	 * to partial success of the above test:usdt_300 attachment
 	 */
-	bss->usdt_100_called = 0;
-	bss->usdt_100_sum = 0;
-
 	f300(777); /* this is 301st instance of usdt_300 */
 
 	ASSERT_EQ(bss->usdt_100_called, 0, "usdt_301_called");
 	ASSERT_EQ(bss->usdt_100_sum, 0, "usdt_301_sum");
+#endif
 
 	/* This time we have USDT with 400 inlined invocations, but arg specs
 	 * should be the same across all sites, so libbpf will only need to
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From aced132599b3c8884c050218d4c48eef203678f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 09:40:24 -0700
Subject: bpf: Add range tracking for BPF_NEG

Add range tracking for instruction BPF_NEG. Without this logic, a trivial
program like the following will fail

    volatile bool found_value_b;
    SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
    int BPF_PROG(test_socket_connect)
    {
        if (!found_value_b)
                return -1;
        return 0;
    }

with verifier log:

"At program exit the register R0 has smin=0 smax=4294967295 should have
been in [-4095, 0]".

This is because range information is lost in BPF_NEG:

0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
; if (!found_value_b) @ xxxx.c:24
0: (18) r1 = 0xffa00000011e7048       ; R1_w=map_value(...)
2: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r1 +0)           ; R0_w=scalar(smin32=0,smax=255)
3: (a4) w0 ^= 1                       ; R0_w=scalar(smin32=0,smax=255)
4: (84) w0 = -w0                      ; R0_w=scalar(range info lost)

Note that, the log above is manually modified to highlight relevant bits.

Fix this by maintaining proper range information with BPF_NEG, so that
the verifier will know:

4: (84) w0 = -w0                      ; R0_w=scalar(smin32=-255,smax=0)

Also updated selftests based on the expected behavior.

Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625164025.3310203-2-song@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/tnum.h                               |  2 ++
 kernel/bpf/tnum.c                                  |  5 +++++
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                              | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 .../bpf/progs/verifier_bounds_deduction.c          | 11 +++++++----
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
 5 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/include/linux/tnum.h b/include/linux/tnum.h
index 3c13240077b8..57ed3035cc30 100644
--- a/include/linux/tnum.h
+++ b/include/linux/tnum.h
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ struct tnum tnum_arshift(struct tnum a, u8 min_shift, u8 insn_bitness);
 struct tnum tnum_add(struct tnum a, struct tnum b);
 /* Subtract two tnums, return @a - @b */
 struct tnum tnum_sub(struct tnum a, struct tnum b);
+/* Neg of a tnum, return  0 - @a */
+struct tnum tnum_neg(struct tnum a);
 /* Bitwise-AND, return @a & @b */
 struct tnum tnum_and(struct tnum a, struct tnum b);
 /* Bitwise-OR, return @a | @b */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/tnum.c b/kernel/bpf/tnum.c
index 9dbc31b25e3d..fa353c5d550f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/tnum.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/tnum.c
@@ -83,6 +83,11 @@ struct tnum tnum_sub(struct tnum a, struct tnum b)
 	return TNUM(dv & ~mu, mu);
 }
 
+struct tnum tnum_neg(struct tnum a)
+{
+	return tnum_sub(TNUM(0, 0), a);
+}
+
 struct tnum tnum_and(struct tnum a, struct tnum b)
 {
 	u64 alpha, beta, v;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index f403524bd215..2ff22ef42348 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -15182,6 +15182,7 @@ static bool is_safe_to_compute_dst_reg_range(struct bpf_insn *insn,
 	switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) {
 	case BPF_ADD:
 	case BPF_SUB:
+	case BPF_NEG:
 	case BPF_AND:
 	case BPF_XOR:
 	case BPF_OR:
@@ -15250,6 +15251,13 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg);
 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
 		break;
+	case BPF_NEG:
+		env->fake_reg[0] = *dst_reg;
+		__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, 0);
+		scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[0]);
+		scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[0]);
+		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_neg(env->fake_reg[0].var_off);
+		break;
 	case BPF_MUL:
 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
 		scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg);
@@ -15473,7 +15481,14 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 		}
 
 		/* check dest operand */
-		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
+		if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
+			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
+			err = err ?: adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn,
+							 &regs[insn->dst_reg],
+							 regs[insn->dst_reg]);
+		} else {
+			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
+		}
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds_deduction.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds_deduction.c
index c506afbdd936..260a6df264e3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds_deduction.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds_deduction.c
@@ -159,13 +159,16 @@ __failure_unpriv
 __naked void deducing_bounds_from_const_10(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
+	r6 = r1;					\
 	r0 = 0;						\
 	if r0 s<= 0 goto l0_%=;				\
-l0_%=:	/* Marks reg as unknown. */			\
-	r0 = -r0;					\
-	r0 -= r1;					\
+l0_%=: /* Marks r0 as unknown. */			\
+	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];			\
+	r0 -= r6;					\
 	exit;						\
-"	::: __clobber_all);
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
 }
 
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c
index fcea9819e359..af7938ce56cb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_value_ptr_arith.c
@@ -231,6 +231,10 @@ __retval(1)
 __naked void ptr_unknown_vs_unknown_lt(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
+	r8 = r1;					\
+	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];			\
+	r9 = r0;					\
+	r1 = r8;					\
 	r0 = *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_len]);		\
 	r1 = 0;						\
 	*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1;				\
@@ -245,11 +249,11 @@ l1_%=:	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
 	r4 = *(u8*)(r0 + 0);				\
 	if r4 == 1 goto l3_%=;				\
 	r1 = 6;						\
-	r1 = -r1;					\
+	r1 = r9;					\
 	r1 &= 0x3;					\
 	goto l4_%=;					\
 l3_%=:	r1 = 6;						\
-	r1 = -r1;					\
+	r1 = r9;					\
 	r1 &= 0x7;					\
 l4_%=:	r1 += r0;					\
 	r0 = *(u8*)(r1 + 0);				\
@@ -259,7 +263,8 @@ l2_%=:	r0 = 1;						\
 	: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
 	  __imm_addr(map_array_48b),
 	  __imm_addr(map_hash_16b),
-	  __imm_const(__sk_buff_len, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, len))
+	  __imm_const(__sk_buff_len, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, len)),
+	  __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
 	: __clobber_all);
 }
 
@@ -271,6 +276,10 @@ __retval(1)
 __naked void ptr_unknown_vs_unknown_gt(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
+	r8 = r1;					\
+	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];			\
+	r9 = r0;					\
+	r1 = r8;					\
 	r0 = *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_len]);		\
 	r1 = 0;						\
 	*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1;				\
@@ -285,11 +294,11 @@ l1_%=:	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
 	r4 = *(u8*)(r0 + 0);				\
 	if r4 == 1 goto l3_%=;				\
 	r1 = 6;						\
-	r1 = -r1;					\
+	r1 = r9;					\
 	r1 &= 0x7;					\
 	goto l4_%=;					\
 l3_%=:	r1 = 6;						\
-	r1 = -r1;					\
+	r1 = r9;					\
 	r1 &= 0x3;					\
 l4_%=:	r1 += r0;					\
 	r0 = *(u8*)(r1 + 0);				\
@@ -299,7 +308,8 @@ l2_%=:	r0 = 1;						\
 	: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
 	  __imm_addr(map_array_48b),
 	  __imm_addr(map_hash_16b),
-	  __imm_const(__sk_buff_len, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, len))
+	  __imm_const(__sk_buff_len, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, len)),
+	  __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
 	: __clobber_all);
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2945434e248fc66e0b44b054fa18b16b25c1c1f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 09:40:25 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add tests for BPF_NEG range tracking logic

BPF_REG now has range tracking logic. Add selftests for BPF_NEG.
Specifically, return value of LSM hook lsm.s/socket_connect is used to
show that the verifer tracks BPF_NEG(1) falls in the [-4095, 0] range;
while BPF_NEG(100000) does not fall in that range.

Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625164025.3310203-3-song@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_precision.c       | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_precision.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_precision.c
index 9fe5d255ee37..73fee2aec698 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_precision.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_precision.c
@@ -231,4 +231,74 @@ __naked void bpf_cond_op_not_r10(void)
 	::: __clobber_all);
 }
 
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("0: (b7) r0 = 1                        ; R0_w=1")
+__msg("1: (84) w0 = -w0                      ; R0_w=0xffffffff")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 2 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 1: (84) w0 = -w0")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 0: (b7) r0 = 1")
+__naked int bpf_neg_2(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * lsm.s/socket_connect requires a return value within [-4095, 0].
+	 * Returning -1 is allowed
+	 */
+	asm volatile (
+	"r0 = 1;"
+	"w0 = -w0;"
+	"exit;"
+	::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__failure __msg("At program exit the register R0 has")
+__naked int bpf_neg_3(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * lsm.s/socket_connect requires a return value within [-4095, 0].
+	 * Returning -10000 is not allowed.
+	 */
+	asm volatile (
+	"r0 = 10000;"
+	"w0 = -w0;"
+	"exit;"
+	::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg("0: (b7) r0 = 1                        ; R0_w=1")
+__msg("1: (87) r0 = -r0                      ; R0_w=-1")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 2 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 1: (87) r0 = -r0")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 0: (b7) r0 = 1")
+__naked int bpf_neg_4(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * lsm.s/socket_connect requires a return value within [-4095, 0].
+	 * Returning -1 is allowed
+	 */
+	asm volatile (
+	"r0 = 1;"
+	"r0 = -r0;"
+	"exit;"
+	::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
+__failure __msg("At program exit the register R0 has")
+__naked int bpf_neg_5(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * lsm.s/socket_connect requires a return value within [-4095, 0].
+	 * Returning -10000 is not allowed.
+	 */
+	asm volatile (
+	"r0 = 10000;"
+	"r0 = -r0;"
+	"exit;"
+	::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 12ed81f82391d073982cf0cd0b2d14e374e5112a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 11:24:14 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: check operations on untrusted ro pointers to mem

The following cases are tested:
- it is ok to load memory at any offset from rdonly_untrusted_mem;
- rdonly_untrusted_mem offset/bounds are not tracked;
- writes into rdonly_untrusted_mem are forbidden;
- atomic operations on rdonly_untrusted_mem are forbidden;
- rdonly_untrusted_mem can't be passed as a memory argument of a
  helper of kfunc;
- it is ok to use PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_BTF_ID in a same load
  instruction.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625182414.30659-4-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../bpf/prog_tests/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c          |   9 ++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c     | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 145 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..40d4f687bd9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include "mem_rdonly_untrusted.skel.h"
+
+void test_mem_rdonly_untrusted(void)
+{
+	RUN_TESTS(mem_rdonly_untrusted);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..00604755e698
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_core_read.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+#include "../test_kmods/bpf_testmod_kfunc.h"
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__retval(0)
+int ldx_is_ok_bad_addr(void *ctx)
+{
+	char *p;
+
+	if (!bpf_core_enum_value_exists(enum bpf_features, BPF_FEAT_RDONLY_CAST_TO_VOID))
+		return 42;
+
+	p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+	return p[0x7fff];
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__retval(1)
+int ldx_is_ok_good_addr(void *ctx)
+{
+	int v, *p;
+
+	v = 1;
+	p = bpf_rdonly_cast(&v, 0);
+	return *p;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+int offset_not_tracked(void *ctx)
+{
+	int *p, i, s;
+
+	p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+	s = 0;
+	bpf_for(i, 0, 1000 * 1000 * 1000) {
+		p++;
+		s += *p;
+	}
+	return s;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("cannot write into rdonly_untrusted_mem")
+int stx_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+	int v, *p;
+
+	v = 1;
+	p = bpf_rdonly_cast(&v, 0);
+	*p = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("cannot write into rdonly_untrusted_mem")
+int atomic_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+	int v, *p;
+
+	v = 1;
+	p = bpf_rdonly_cast(&v, 0);
+	__sync_fetch_and_add(p, 1);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("cannot write into rdonly_untrusted_mem")
+int atomic_rmw_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+	long v, *p;
+
+	v = 1;
+	p = bpf_rdonly_cast(&v, 0);
+	return __sync_val_compare_and_swap(p, 0, 42);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("invalid access to memory, mem_size=0 off=0 size=4")
+__msg("R1 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+int kfunc_param_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+	int *p;
+
+	p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+	bpf_kfunc_trusted_num_test(p);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("?fentry.s/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_getpgid")
+__failure
+__msg("R1 type=rdonly_untrusted_mem expected=")
+int helper_param_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+	char *p;
+
+	p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+	/*
+	 * Any helper with ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO constraint will do,
+	 * the most permissive constraint
+	 */
+	bpf_copy_from_user(p, 0, (void *)42);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __noinline u64 *get_some_addr(void)
+{
+	if (bpf_get_prandom_u32())
+		return bpf_rdonly_cast(0, bpf_core_type_id_kernel(struct sock));
+	else
+		return bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__retval(0)
+int mixed_mem_type(void *ctx)
+{
+	u64 *p;
+
+	/* Try to avoid compiler hoisting load to if branches by using __noinline func. */
+	p = get_some_addr();
+	return *p;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a55b7d39328bc6de1131cb5496816129cab2728b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 08:08:30 +0200
Subject: selftests/bpf: Allow macros in __retval

Allow macro expansion for values passed to the `__retval` and
`__retval_unpriv` attributes. This is especially useful for testing
programs which return various error codes.

With this change, the code for parsing special literals can be made
simpler, as the literals are defined via macros. The only exception is
INT_MIN which expands to (-INT_MAX -1), which is not single number and
cannot be parsed by strtol. So, we instead use a prefixed literal
_INT_MIN in __retval and handle it separately (assign the expected
return to INT_MIN). Also, strtol cannot handle the "ll" suffix so change
the value of POINTER_VALUE from 0xcafe4all to 0xbadcafe.

Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a6c6b551ae0575351faa7b7a1df52f9341a5cbe8.1750917800.git.vmalik@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h       | 14 +++++++------
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_overflow.c    |  4 ++--
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c          | 24 ++++++++--------------
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h
index a678463e972c..20dce508d8e0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h
@@ -83,9 +83,11 @@
  *                   expect return value to match passed parameter:
  *                   - a decimal number
  *                   - a hexadecimal number, when starts from 0x
- *                   - literal INT_MIN
- *                   - literal POINTER_VALUE (see definition below)
- *                   - literal TEST_DATA_LEN (see definition below)
+ *                   - a macro which expands to one of the above
+ *                   - literal _INT_MIN (expands to INT_MIN)
+ *                   In addition, two special macros are defined below:
+ *                   - POINTER_VALUE
+ *                   - TEST_DATA_LEN
  * __retval_unpriv   Same, but load program in unprivileged mode.
  *
  * __description     Text to be used instead of a program name for display
@@ -125,8 +127,8 @@
 #define __success_unpriv	__attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_expect_success_unpriv")))
 #define __log_level(lvl)	__attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_log_level="#lvl)))
 #define __flag(flag)		__attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_prog_flags="#flag)))
-#define __retval(val)		__attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_retval="#val)))
-#define __retval_unpriv(val)	__attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_retval_unpriv="#val)))
+#define __retval(val)		__attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_retval="XSTR(val))))
+#define __retval_unpriv(val)	__attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_retval_unpriv="XSTR(val))))
 #define __auxiliary		__attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_auxiliary")))
 #define __auxiliary_unpriv	__attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_auxiliary_unpriv")))
 #define __btf_path(path)	__attribute__((btf_decl_tag("comment:test_btf_path=" path)))
@@ -155,7 +157,7 @@
 #define __imm_insn(name, expr) [name]"i"(*(long *)&(expr))
 
 /* Magic constants used with __retval() */
-#define POINTER_VALUE	0xcafe4all
+#define POINTER_VALUE	0xbadcafe
 #define TEST_DATA_LEN	64
 
 #ifndef __used
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_overflow.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_overflow.c
index 458984da804c..34e0c012ee76 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_overflow.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_overflow.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ l0_%=:	exit;						\
 
 SEC("tc")
 __description("MOD32 overflow, check 1")
-__success __retval(INT_MIN)
+__success __retval(_INT_MIN)
 __naked void mod32_overflow_check_1(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ __naked void mod32_overflow_check_1(void)
 
 SEC("tc")
 __description("MOD32 overflow, check 2")
-__success __retval(INT_MIN)
+__success __retval(_INT_MIN)
 __naked void mod32_overflow_check_2(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c
index 2c7e9729d5fe..78423cf89e01 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 #define TEST_TAG_LOAD_MODE_PFX "comment:load_mode="
 
 /* Warning: duplicated in bpf_misc.h */
-#define POINTER_VALUE	0xcafe4all
+#define POINTER_VALUE	0xbadcafe
 #define TEST_DATA_LEN	64
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
@@ -318,20 +318,14 @@ static int parse_caps(const char *str, __u64 *val, const char *name)
 
 static int parse_retval(const char *str, int *val, const char *name)
 {
-	struct {
-		char *name;
-		int val;
-	} named_values[] = {
-		{ "INT_MIN"      , INT_MIN },
-		{ "POINTER_VALUE", POINTER_VALUE },
-		{ "TEST_DATA_LEN", TEST_DATA_LEN },
-	};
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(named_values); ++i) {
-		if (strcmp(str, named_values[i].name) != 0)
-			continue;
-		*val = named_values[i].val;
+	/*
+	 * INT_MIN is defined as (-INT_MAX -1), i.e. it doesn't expand to a
+	 * single int and cannot be parsed with strtol, so we handle it
+	 * separately here. In addition, it expands to different expressions in
+	 * different compilers so we use a prefixed _INT_MIN instead.
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(str, "_INT_MIN") == 0) {
+		*val = INT_MIN;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e8763fb66a386843f091925dab757c4f55633d0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 08:08:31 +0200
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add tests for string kfuncs

Add both positive and negative tests cases using string kfuncs added in
the previous patches.

Positive tests check that the functions work as expected.

Negative tests pass various incorrect strings to the kfuncs and check
for the expected error codes:
  -E2BIG  when passing too long strings
  -EFAULT when trying to read inaccessible kernel memory
  -ERANGE when passing userspace pointers on arches with non-overlapping
          address spaces

A majority of the tests use the RUN_TESTS helper which executes BPF
programs with BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN and check for the expected return value.
An exception to this are tests for long strings as we need to memset the
long string from userspace (at least I haven't found an ergonomic way to
memset it from a BPF program), which cannot be done using the RUN_TESTS
infrastructure.

Suggested-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/090451a2e60c9ae1dceb4d1bfafa3479db5c7481.1750917800.git.vmalik@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/string_kfuncs.c       | 65 ++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c   | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c   | 23 ++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c    | 37 +++++++++
 4 files changed, 212 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/string_kfuncs.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/string_kfuncs.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/string_kfuncs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..35af8044d059
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/string_kfuncs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc.*/
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include "string_kfuncs_success.skel.h"
+#include "string_kfuncs_failure1.skel.h"
+#include "string_kfuncs_failure2.skel.h"
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+
+static const char * const test_cases[] = {
+	"strcmp",
+	"strchr",
+	"strchrnul",
+	"strnchr",
+	"strrchr",
+	"strlen",
+	"strnlen",
+	"strspn_str",
+	"strspn_accept",
+	"strcspn_str",
+	"strcspn_reject",
+	"strstr",
+	"strnstr",
+};
+
+void run_too_long_tests(void)
+{
+	struct string_kfuncs_failure2 *skel;
+	struct bpf_program *prog;
+	char test_name[256];
+	int err, i;
+
+	skel = string_kfuncs_failure2__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "string_kfuncs_failure2__open_and_load"))
+		return;
+
+	memset(skel->bss->long_str, 'a', sizeof(skel->bss->long_str));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test_cases); i++) {
+		sprintf(test_name, "test_%s_too_long", test_cases[i]);
+		if (!test__start_subtest(test_name))
+			continue;
+
+		prog = bpf_object__find_program_by_name(skel->obj, test_name);
+		if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(prog, "bpf_object__find_program_by_name"))
+			goto cleanup;
+
+		LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts);
+		err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(bpf_program__fd(prog), &topts);
+		if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_prog_test_run"))
+			goto cleanup;
+
+		ASSERT_EQ(topts.retval, -E2BIG, "reading too long string fails with -E2BIG");
+	}
+
+cleanup:
+	string_kfuncs_failure2__destroy(skel);
+}
+
+void test_string_kfuncs(void)
+{
+	RUN_TESTS(string_kfuncs_success);
+	RUN_TESTS(string_kfuncs_failure1);
+
+	run_too_long_tests();
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..53af438bd998
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc.*/
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+#include "errno.h"
+
+char *user_ptr = (char *)1;
+char *invalid_kern_ptr = (char *)-1;
+
+/*
+ * When passing userspace pointers, the error code differs based on arch:
+ *   -ERANGE on arches with non-overlapping address spaces
+ *   -EFAULT on other arches
+ */
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_loongarch) || \
+    defined(__TARGET_ARCH_powerpc) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#define USER_PTR_ERR -ERANGE
+#else
+#define USER_PTR_ERR -EFAULT
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * On s390, __get_kernel_nofault (used in string kfuncs) returns 0 for NULL and
+ * user_ptr (instead of causing an exception) so the below two groups of tests
+ * are not applicable.
+ */
+#ifndef __TARGET_ARCH_s390
+
+/* Passing NULL to string kfuncs (treated as a userspace ptr) */
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcmp_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(NULL, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strcmp_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp("hello", NULL); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strchr_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(NULL, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strchrnul_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchrnul(NULL, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strnchr_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(NULL, 1, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strrchr_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(NULL, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strlen_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strlen(NULL); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strnlen_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnlen(NULL, 1); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strspn_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn(NULL, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strspn_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn("hello", NULL); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strcspn_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn(NULL, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strcspn_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn("hello", NULL); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strstr_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(NULL, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strstr_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr("hello", NULL); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strnstr_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(NULL, "hello", 1); }
+SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strnstr_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr("hello", NULL, 1); }
+
+/* Passing userspace ptr to string kfuncs */
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcmp_user_ptr1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(user_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcmp_user_ptr2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp("hello", user_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strchr_user_ptr(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(user_ptr, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strchrnul_user_ptr(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchrnul(user_ptr, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strnchr_user_ptr(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(user_ptr, 1, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strrchr_user_ptr(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(user_ptr, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strlen_user_ptr(void *ctx) { return bpf_strlen(user_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strnlen_user_ptr(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnlen(user_ptr, 1); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strspn_user_ptr1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn(user_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strspn_user_ptr2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn("hello", user_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcspn_user_ptr1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn(user_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcspn_user_ptr2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn("hello", user_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strstr_user_ptr1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(user_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strstr_user_ptr2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr("hello", user_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strnstr_user_ptr1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(user_ptr, "hello", 1); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strnstr_user_ptr2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr("hello", user_ptr, 1); }
+
+#endif /* __TARGET_ARCH_s390 */
+
+/* Passing invalid kernel ptr to string kfuncs should always return -EFAULT */
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strcmp_pagefault1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(invalid_kern_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strcmp_pagefault2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp("hello", invalid_kern_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strchr_pagefault(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(invalid_kern_ptr, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strchrnul_pagefault(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchrnul(invalid_kern_ptr, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strnchr_pagefault(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(invalid_kern_ptr, 1, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strrchr_pagefault(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(invalid_kern_ptr, 'a'); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strlen_pagefault(void *ctx) { return bpf_strlen(invalid_kern_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strnlen_pagefault(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnlen(invalid_kern_ptr, 1); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strspn_pagefault1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn(invalid_kern_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strspn_pagefault2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn("hello", invalid_kern_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strcspn_pagefault1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn(invalid_kern_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strcspn_pagefault2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn("hello", invalid_kern_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strstr_pagefault1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(invalid_kern_ptr, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strstr_pagefault2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr("hello", invalid_kern_ptr); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strnstr_pagefault1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(invalid_kern_ptr, "hello", 1); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(-EFAULT) int test_strnstr_pagefault2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr("hello", invalid_kern_ptr, 1); }
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..89fb4669b0e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc.*/
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+
+char long_str[XATTR_SIZE_MAX + 1];
+
+SEC("syscall") int test_strcmp_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(long_str, long_str); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strchr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(long_str, 'b'); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strchrnul_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchrnul(long_str, 'b'); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strnchr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(long_str, sizeof(long_str), 'b'); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strrchr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(long_str, 'b'); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strlen_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strlen(long_str); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strnlen_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnlen(long_str, sizeof(long_str)); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strspn_str_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn(long_str, "a"); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strspn_accept_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn("b", long_str); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strcspn_str_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn(long_str, "b"); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strcspn_reject_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn("b", long_str); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strstr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(long_str, "hello"); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strnstr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(long_str, "hello", sizeof(long_str)); }
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..46697f381878
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc.*/
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+#include "errno.h"
+
+char str[] = "hello world";
+
+#define __test(retval) SEC("syscall") __success __retval(retval)
+
+/* Functional tests */
+__test(0) int test_strcmp_eq(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(str, "hello world"); }
+__test(1) int test_strcmp_neq(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(str, "hello"); }
+__test(1) int test_strchr_found(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(str, 'e'); }
+__test(11) int test_strchr_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(str, '\0'); }
+__test(-ENOENT) int test_strchr_notfound(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchr(str, 'x'); }
+__test(1) int test_strchrnul_found(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchrnul(str, 'e'); }
+__test(11) int test_strchrnul_notfound(void *ctx) { return bpf_strchrnul(str, 'x'); }
+__test(1) int test_strnchr_found(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(str, 5, 'e'); }
+__test(11) int test_strnchr_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(str, 12, '\0'); }
+__test(-ENOENT) int test_strnchr_notfound(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnchr(str, 5, 'w'); }
+__test(9) int test_strrchr_found(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(str, 'l'); }
+__test(11) int test_strrchr_null(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(str, '\0'); }
+__test(-ENOENT) int test_strrchr_notfound(void *ctx) { return bpf_strrchr(str, 'x'); }
+__test(11) int test_strlen(void *ctx) { return bpf_strlen(str); }
+__test(11) int test_strnlen(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnlen(str, 12); }
+__test(5) int test_strspn(void *ctx) { return bpf_strspn(str, "ehlo"); }
+__test(2) int test_strcspn(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcspn(str, "lo"); }
+__test(6) int test_strstr_found(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(str, "world"); }
+__test(-ENOENT) int test_strstr_notfound(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(str, "hi"); }
+__test(0) int test_strstr_empty(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(str, ""); }
+__test(0) int test_strnstr_found(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(str, "hello", 6); }
+__test(-ENOENT) int test_strnstr_notfound(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(str, "hi", 10); }
+__test(0) int test_strnstr_empty(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(str, "", 1); }
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From be898cb5cbf4dede2f760303d73f5a427107282a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 17:59:02 +0100
Subject: selftests/bpf: Separate var preset parsing in veristat

Refactor var preset parsing in veristat to simplify implementation.
Prepare parsed variable beforehand so that parsing logic is separated
from functionality of calculating offsets and searching fields.
Introduce rvalue struct, storing either int or enum (string value),
will be reused in the next patch, extract parsing rvalue into a
separate function.

Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250625165904.87820-2-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c | 152 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 99 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
index 4da627ca5749..4049d4dda97a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
@@ -156,13 +156,23 @@ struct filter {
 	bool abs;
 };
 
-struct var_preset {
-	char *name;
+struct rvalue {
 	enum { INTEGRAL, ENUMERATOR } type;
 	union {
 		long long ivalue;
 		char *svalue;
 	};
+};
+
+struct field_access {
+	char *name;
+};
+
+struct var_preset {
+	struct field_access *atoms;
+	int atom_count;
+	char *full_name;
+	struct rvalue value;
 	bool applied;
 };
 
@@ -1498,6 +1508,35 @@ static int reset_stat_cgroup(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int parse_rvalue(const char *val, struct rvalue *rvalue)
+{
+	long long value;
+	char *val_end;
+
+	if (val[0] == '-' || isdigit(val[0])) {
+		/* must be a number */
+		errno = 0;
+		value = strtoll(val, &val_end, 0);
+		if (errno == ERANGE) {
+			errno = 0;
+			value = strtoull(val, &val_end, 0);
+		}
+		if (errno || *val_end != '\0') {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse value '%s'\n", val);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		rvalue->ivalue = value;
+		rvalue->type = INTEGRAL;
+	} else {
+		/* if not a number, consider it enum value */
+		rvalue->svalue = strdup(val);
+		if (!rvalue->svalue)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		rvalue->type = ENUMERATOR;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int process_prog(const char *filename, struct bpf_object *obj, struct bpf_program *prog)
 {
 	const char *base_filename = basename(strdupa(filename));
@@ -1593,13 +1632,36 @@ static int process_prog(const char *filename, struct bpf_object *obj, struct bpf
 	return 0;
 };
 
+static int parse_var_atoms(const char *full_var, struct var_preset *preset)
+{
+	char expr[256], *name, *saveptr;
+
+	snprintf(expr, sizeof(expr), "%s", full_var);
+	preset->atom_count = 0;
+	while ((name = strtok_r(preset->atom_count ? NULL : expr, ".", &saveptr))) {
+		struct field_access *tmp;
+		int i = preset->atom_count;
+
+		tmp = reallocarray(preset->atoms, i + 1, sizeof(*preset->atoms));
+		if (!tmp)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		preset->atoms = tmp;
+		preset->atom_count++;
+
+		preset->atoms[i].name = strdup(name);
+		if (!preset->atoms[i].name)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int append_var_preset(struct var_preset **presets, int *cnt, const char *expr)
 {
 	void *tmp;
 	struct var_preset *cur;
-	char var[256], val[256], *val_end;
-	long long value;
-	int n;
+	char var[256], val[256];
+	int n, err;
 
 	tmp = realloc(*presets, (*cnt + 1) * sizeof(**presets));
 	if (!tmp)
@@ -1614,32 +1676,18 @@ static int append_var_preset(struct var_preset **presets, int *cnt, const char *
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (val[0] == '-' || isdigit(val[0])) {
-		/* must be a number */
-		errno = 0;
-		value = strtoll(val, &val_end, 0);
-		if (errno == ERANGE) {
-			errno = 0;
-			value = strtoull(val, &val_end, 0);
-		}
-		if (errno || *val_end != '\0') {
-			fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse value '%s'\n", val);
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-		cur->ivalue = value;
-		cur->type = INTEGRAL;
-	} else {
-		/* if not a number, consider it enum value */
-		cur->svalue = strdup(val);
-		if (!cur->svalue)
-			return -ENOMEM;
-		cur->type = ENUMERATOR;
-	}
+	err = parse_rvalue(val, &cur->value);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 
-	cur->name = strdup(var);
-	if (!cur->name)
+	cur->full_name = strdup(var);
+	if (!cur->full_name)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	err = parse_var_atoms(var, cur);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1766,22 +1814,20 @@ const int btf_find_member(const struct btf *btf,
 }
 
 static int adjust_var_secinfo(struct btf *btf, const struct btf_type *t,
-			      struct btf_var_secinfo *sinfo, const char *var)
+			      struct btf_var_secinfo *sinfo, struct var_preset *preset)
 {
-	char expr[256], *saveptr;
 	const struct btf_type *base_type, *member_type;
-	int err, member_tid;
-	char *name;
+	int err, member_tid, i;
 	__u32 member_offset = 0;
 
 	base_type = btf__type_by_id(btf, btf__resolve_type(btf, t->type));
-	snprintf(expr, sizeof(expr), "%s", var);
-	strtok_r(expr, ".", &saveptr);
 
-	while ((name = strtok_r(NULL, ".", &saveptr))) {
-		err = btf_find_member(btf, base_type, 0, name, &member_tid, &member_offset);
+	for (i = 1; i < preset->atom_count; ++i) {
+		err = btf_find_member(btf, base_type, 0, preset->atoms[i].name,
+				      &member_tid, &member_offset);
 		if (err) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "Could not find member %s for variable %s\n", name, var);
+			fprintf(stderr, "Could not find member %s for variable %s\n",
+				preset->atoms[i].name, preset->atoms[i - 1].name);
 			return err;
 		}
 		member_type = btf__type_by_id(btf, member_tid);
@@ -1799,7 +1845,7 @@ static int set_global_var(struct bpf_object *obj, struct btf *btf,
 {
 	const struct btf_type *base_type;
 	void *ptr;
-	long long value = preset->ivalue;
+	long long value = preset->value.ivalue;
 	size_t size;
 
 	base_type = btf__type_by_id(btf, btf__resolve_type(btf, sinfo->type));
@@ -1813,17 +1859,18 @@ static int set_global_var(struct bpf_object *obj, struct btf *btf,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (preset->type == ENUMERATOR) {
+	if (preset->value.type == ENUMERATOR) {
 		if (btf_is_any_enum(base_type)) {
-			if (enum_value_from_name(btf, base_type, preset->svalue, &value)) {
+			if (enum_value_from_name(btf, base_type, preset->value.svalue, &value)) {
 				fprintf(stderr,
 					"Failed to find integer value for enum element %s\n",
-					preset->svalue);
+					preset->value.svalue);
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 		} else {
 			fprintf(stderr, "Value %s is not supported for type %s\n",
-				preset->svalue, btf__name_by_offset(btf, base_type->name_off));
+				preset->value.svalue,
+				btf__name_by_offset(btf, base_type->name_off));
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
@@ -1890,20 +1937,16 @@ static int set_global_vars(struct bpf_object *obj, struct var_preset *presets, i
 		for (j = 0; j < n; ++j, ++sinfo) {
 			const struct btf_type *var_type = btf__type_by_id(btf, sinfo->type);
 			const char *var_name;
-			int var_len;
 
 			if (!btf_is_var(var_type))
 				continue;
 
 			var_name = btf__name_by_offset(btf, var_type->name_off);
-			var_len = strlen(var_name);
 
 			for (k = 0; k < npresets; ++k) {
 				struct btf_var_secinfo tmp_sinfo;
 
-				if (strncmp(var_name, presets[k].name, var_len) != 0 ||
-				    (presets[k].name[var_len] != '\0' &&
-				     presets[k].name[var_len] != '.'))
+				if (strcmp(var_name, presets[k].atoms[0].name) != 0)
 					continue;
 
 				if (presets[k].applied) {
@@ -1913,7 +1956,7 @@ static int set_global_vars(struct bpf_object *obj, struct var_preset *presets, i
 				}
 				tmp_sinfo = *sinfo;
 				err = adjust_var_secinfo(btf, var_type,
-							 &tmp_sinfo, presets[k].name);
+							 &tmp_sinfo, presets + k);
 				if (err)
 					return err;
 
@@ -1928,7 +1971,7 @@ static int set_global_vars(struct bpf_object *obj, struct var_preset *presets, i
 	for (i = 0; i < npresets; ++i) {
 		if (!presets[i].applied) {
 			fprintf(stderr, "Global variable preset %s has not been applied\n",
-				presets[i].name);
+				presets[i].full_name);
 		}
 		presets[i].applied = false;
 	}
@@ -3062,7 +3105,7 @@ static int handle_replay_mode(void)
 
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
-	int err = 0, i;
+	int err = 0, i, j;
 
 	if (argp_parse(&argp, argc, argv, 0, NULL, NULL))
 		return 1;
@@ -3121,9 +3164,12 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	}
 	free(env.deny_filters);
 	for (i = 0; i < env.npresets; ++i) {
-		free(env.presets[i].name);
-		if (env.presets[i].type == ENUMERATOR)
-			free(env.presets[i].svalue);
+		free(env.presets[i].full_name);
+		for (j = 0; j < env.presets[i].atom_count; ++j)
+			free(env.presets[i].atoms[j].name);
+		free(env.presets[i].atoms);
+		if (env.presets[i].value.type == ENUMERATOR)
+			free(env.presets[i].value.svalue);
 	}
 	free(env.presets);
 	return -err;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From edc99d0b021c1b345af3a27150d5d23799c1bc25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 17:59:03 +0100
Subject: selftests/bpf: Support array presets in veristat

Implement support for presetting values for array elements in veristat.
For example:
```
sudo ./veristat set_global_vars.bpf.o -G "arr[3] = 1"
```
Arrays of structures and structure of arrays work, but each individual
scalar value has to be set separately: `foo[1].bar[2] = value`.

Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250625165904.87820-3-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c | 239 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 189 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
index 4049d4dda97a..1e9f61f9fd0a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
@@ -165,7 +165,11 @@ struct rvalue {
 };
 
 struct field_access {
-	char *name;
+	enum { FIELD_NAME, ARRAY_INDEX } type;
+	union {
+		char *name;
+		struct rvalue index;
+	};
 };
 
 struct var_preset {
@@ -1630,28 +1634,60 @@ static int process_prog(const char *filename, struct bpf_object *obj, struct bpf
 		free(buf);
 
 	return 0;
-};
+}
+
+static int append_preset_atom(struct var_preset *preset, char *value, bool is_index)
+{
+	struct field_access *tmp;
+	int i = preset->atom_count;
+	int err;
+
+	tmp = reallocarray(preset->atoms, i + 1, sizeof(*preset->atoms));
+	if (!tmp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	preset->atoms = tmp;
+	preset->atom_count++;
+
+	if (is_index) {
+		preset->atoms[i].type = ARRAY_INDEX;
+		err = parse_rvalue(value, &preset->atoms[i].index);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	} else {
+		preset->atoms[i].type = FIELD_NAME;
+		preset->atoms[i].name = strdup(value);
+		if (!preset->atoms[i].name)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
 
 static int parse_var_atoms(const char *full_var, struct var_preset *preset)
 {
-	char expr[256], *name, *saveptr;
+	char expr[256], var[256], *name, *saveptr;
+	int n, len, off;
 
 	snprintf(expr, sizeof(expr), "%s", full_var);
 	preset->atom_count = 0;
 	while ((name = strtok_r(preset->atom_count ? NULL : expr, ".", &saveptr))) {
-		struct field_access *tmp;
-		int i = preset->atom_count;
-
-		tmp = reallocarray(preset->atoms, i + 1, sizeof(*preset->atoms));
-		if (!tmp)
-			return -ENOMEM;
-
-		preset->atoms = tmp;
-		preset->atom_count++;
+		len = strlen(name);
+		/* parse variable name */
+		if (sscanf(name, "%[a-zA-Z0-9_] %n", var, &off) != 1) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Can't parse %s\n", name);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		append_preset_atom(preset, var, false);
 
-		preset->atoms[i].name = strdup(name);
-		if (!preset->atoms[i].name)
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		/* parse optional array indexes */
+		while (off < len) {
+			if (sscanf(name + off, " [ %[a-zA-Z0-9_] ] %n", var, &n) != 1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Can't parse %s as index\n", name + off);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			append_preset_atom(preset, var, true);
+			off += n;
+		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1661,7 +1697,7 @@ static int append_var_preset(struct var_preset **presets, int *cnt, const char *
 	void *tmp;
 	struct var_preset *cur;
 	char var[256], val[256];
-	int n, err;
+	int n, err, i;
 
 	tmp = realloc(*presets, (*cnt + 1) * sizeof(**presets));
 	if (!tmp)
@@ -1671,10 +1707,16 @@ static int append_var_preset(struct var_preset **presets, int *cnt, const char *
 	memset(cur, 0, sizeof(*cur));
 	(*cnt)++;
 
-	if (sscanf(expr, "%s = %s %n", var, val, &n) != 2 || n != strlen(expr)) {
+	if (sscanf(expr, " %[][a-zA-Z0-9_. ] = %s %n", var, val, &n) != 2 || n != strlen(expr)) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse expression '%s'\n", expr);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
+	/* Remove trailing spaces from var, as scanf may add those */
+	for (i = strlen(var) - 1; i > 0; --i) {
+		if (!isspace(var[i]))
+			break;
+		var[i] = '\0';
+	}
 
 	err = parse_rvalue(val, &cur->value);
 	if (err)
@@ -1764,22 +1806,96 @@ static bool is_preset_supported(const struct btf_type *t)
 	return btf_is_int(t) || btf_is_enum(t) || btf_is_enum64(t);
 }
 
-const int btf_find_member(const struct btf *btf,
-			  const struct btf_type *parent_type,
-			  __u32 parent_offset,
-			  const char *member_name,
-			  int *member_tid,
-			  __u32 *member_offset)
+static int find_enum_value(const struct btf *btf, const char *name, long long *value)
+{
+	const struct btf_type *t;
+	int cnt, i;
+	long long lvalue;
+
+	cnt = btf__type_cnt(btf);
+	for (i = 1; i != cnt; ++i) {
+		t = btf__type_by_id(btf, i);
+
+		if (!btf_is_any_enum(t))
+			continue;
+
+		if (enum_value_from_name(btf, t, name, &lvalue) == 0) {
+			*value = lvalue;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	return -ESRCH;
+}
+
+static int resolve_rvalue(struct btf *btf, const struct rvalue *rvalue, long long *result)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	switch (rvalue->type) {
+	case INTEGRAL:
+		*result = rvalue->ivalue;
+		return 0;
+	case ENUMERATOR:
+		err = find_enum_value(btf, rvalue->svalue, result);
+		if (err) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Can't resolve enum value %s\n", rvalue->svalue);
+			return err;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		fprintf(stderr, "Unknown rvalue type\n");
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int adjust_var_secinfo_array(struct btf *btf, int tid, struct field_access *atom,
+				    const char *array_name, struct btf_var_secinfo *sinfo)
+{
+	const struct btf_type *t;
+	struct btf_array *barr;
+	long long idx;
+	int err;
+
+	tid = btf__resolve_type(btf, tid);
+	t = btf__type_by_id(btf, tid);
+	if (!btf_is_array(t)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Array index is not expected for %s\n",
+			array_name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	barr = btf_array(t);
+	err = resolve_rvalue(btf, &atom->index, &idx);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	if (idx < 0 || idx >= barr->nelems) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Array index %lld is out of bounds [0, %u]: %s\n",
+			idx, barr->nelems, array_name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	sinfo->size = btf__resolve_size(btf, barr->type);
+	sinfo->offset += sinfo->size * idx;
+	sinfo->type = btf__resolve_type(btf, barr->type);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int adjust_var_secinfo_member(const struct btf *btf,
+				     const struct btf_type *parent_type,
+				     __u32 parent_offset,
+				     const char *member_name,
+				     struct btf_var_secinfo *sinfo)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	if (!btf_is_composite(parent_type))
+	if (!btf_is_composite(parent_type)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Can't resolve field %s for non-composite type\n", member_name);
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < btf_vlen(parent_type); ++i) {
 		const struct btf_member *member;
 		const struct btf_type *member_type;
-		int tid;
+		int tid, off;
 
 		member = btf_members(parent_type) + i;
 		tid =  btf__resolve_type(btf, member->type);
@@ -1787,6 +1903,7 @@ const int btf_find_member(const struct btf *btf,
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		member_type = btf__type_by_id(btf, tid);
+		off = parent_offset + member->offset;
 		if (member->name_off) {
 			const char *name = btf__name_by_offset(btf, member->name_off);
 
@@ -1796,15 +1913,16 @@ const int btf_find_member(const struct btf *btf,
 						name);
 					return -EINVAL;
 				}
-				*member_offset = parent_offset + member->offset;
-				*member_tid = tid;
+				sinfo->offset += off / 8;
+				sinfo->type = tid;
+				sinfo->size = member_type->size;
 				return 0;
 			}
 		} else if (btf_is_composite(member_type)) {
 			int err;
 
-			err = btf_find_member(btf, member_type, parent_offset + member->offset,
-					      member_name, member_tid, member_offset);
+			err = adjust_var_secinfo_member(btf, member_type, off,
+							member_name, sinfo);
 			if (!err)
 				return 0;
 		}
@@ -1816,26 +1934,39 @@ const int btf_find_member(const struct btf *btf,
 static int adjust_var_secinfo(struct btf *btf, const struct btf_type *t,
 			      struct btf_var_secinfo *sinfo, struct var_preset *preset)
 {
-	const struct btf_type *base_type, *member_type;
-	int err, member_tid, i;
-	__u32 member_offset = 0;
+	const struct btf_type *base_type;
+	const char *prev_name;
+	int err, i;
+	int tid;
+
+	assert(preset->atom_count > 0);
+	assert(preset->atoms[0].type == FIELD_NAME);
 
-	base_type = btf__type_by_id(btf, btf__resolve_type(btf, t->type));
+	tid = btf__resolve_type(btf, t->type);
+	base_type = btf__type_by_id(btf, tid);
+	prev_name = preset->atoms[0].name;
 
 	for (i = 1; i < preset->atom_count; ++i) {
-		err = btf_find_member(btf, base_type, 0, preset->atoms[i].name,
-				      &member_tid, &member_offset);
-		if (err) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "Could not find member %s for variable %s\n",
-				preset->atoms[i].name, preset->atoms[i - 1].name);
-			return err;
+		struct field_access *atom = preset->atoms + i;
+
+		switch (atom->type) {
+		case ARRAY_INDEX:
+			err = adjust_var_secinfo_array(btf, tid, atom, prev_name, sinfo);
+			break;
+		case FIELD_NAME:
+			err = adjust_var_secinfo_member(btf, base_type, 0, atom->name, sinfo);
+			prev_name = atom->name;
+			break;
+		default:
+			fprintf(stderr, "Unknown field_access type\n");
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		}
-		member_type = btf__type_by_id(btf, member_tid);
-		sinfo->offset += member_offset / 8;
-		sinfo->size = member_type->size;
-		sinfo->type = member_tid;
-		base_type = member_type;
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		base_type = btf__type_by_id(btf, sinfo->type);
+		tid = sinfo->type;
 	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1854,8 +1985,8 @@ static int set_global_var(struct bpf_object *obj, struct btf *btf,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	if (!is_preset_supported(base_type)) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "Setting value for type %s is not supported\n",
-			btf__name_by_offset(btf, base_type->name_off));
+		fprintf(stderr, "Can't set %s. Only ints and enums are supported\n",
+			preset->full_name);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -1972,6 +2103,7 @@ static int set_global_vars(struct bpf_object *obj, struct var_preset *presets, i
 		if (!presets[i].applied) {
 			fprintf(stderr, "Global variable preset %s has not been applied\n",
 				presets[i].full_name);
+			err = -EINVAL;
 		}
 		presets[i].applied = false;
 	}
@@ -3165,11 +3297,18 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	free(env.deny_filters);
 	for (i = 0; i < env.npresets; ++i) {
 		free(env.presets[i].full_name);
-		for (j = 0; j < env.presets[i].atom_count; ++j)
-			free(env.presets[i].atoms[j].name);
+		for (j = 0; j < env.presets[i].atom_count; ++j) {
+			switch (env.presets[i].atoms[j].type) {
+			case FIELD_NAME:
+				free(env.presets[i].atoms[j].name);
+				break;
+			case ARRAY_INDEX:
+				if (env.presets[i].atoms[j].index.type == ENUMERATOR)
+					free(env.presets[i].atoms[j].index.svalue);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
 		free(env.presets[i].atoms);
-		if (env.presets[i].value.type == ENUMERATOR)
-			free(env.presets[i].value.svalue);
 	}
 	free(env.presets);
 	return -err;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 583588594b249e0ad3a64c68846d17018295ebe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 17:59:04 +0100
Subject: selftests/bpf: Test array presets in veristat

Modify existing veristat tests to verify that array presets are applied
as expected.
Introduce few negative tests as well to check that common error modes
are handled.

Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250625165904.87820-4-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_veristat.c       | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/set_global_vars.c  |  56 ++++++---
 2 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_veristat.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_veristat.c
index 47b56c258f3f..367f47e4a936 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_veristat.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_veristat.c
@@ -60,13 +60,19 @@ static void test_set_global_vars_succeeds(void)
 	    " -G \"var_s8 = -128\" "\
 	    " -G \"var_u8 = 255\" "\
 	    " -G \"var_ea = EA2\" "\
-	    " -G \"var_eb = EB2\" "\
-	    " -G \"var_ec = EC2\" "\
+	    " -G \"var_eb  =  EB2\" "\
+	    " -G \"var_ec=EC2\" "\
 	    " -G \"var_b = 1\" "\
-	    " -G \"struct1.struct2.u.var_u8 = 170\" "\
+	    " -G \"struct1[2].struct2[1][2].u.var_u8[2]=170\" "\
 	    " -G \"union1.struct3.var_u8_l = 0xaa\" "\
 	    " -G \"union1.struct3.var_u8_h = 0xaa\" "\
-	    "-vl2 > %s", fix->veristat, fix->tmpfile);
+	    " -G \"arr[3]= 171\" "	\
+	    " -G \"arr[EA2] =172\" "	\
+	    " -G \"enum_arr[EC2]=EA3\" " \
+	    " -G \"three_d[31][7][EA2]=173\"" \
+	    " -G \"struct1[2].struct2[1][2].u.mat[5][3]=174\" " \
+	    " -G \"struct11 [ 7 ] [ 5 ] .struct2[0][1].u.mat[3][0] = 175\" " \
+	    " -vl2 > %s", fix->veristat, fix->tmpfile);
 
 	read(fix->fd, fix->output, fix->sz);
 	__CHECK_STR("_w=0xf000000000000001 ", "var_s64 = 0xf000000000000001");
@@ -81,8 +87,14 @@ static void test_set_global_vars_succeeds(void)
 	__CHECK_STR("_w=12 ", "var_eb = EB2");
 	__CHECK_STR("_w=13 ", "var_ec = EC2");
 	__CHECK_STR("_w=1 ", "var_b = 1");
-	__CHECK_STR("_w=170 ", "struct1.struct2.u.var_u8 = 170");
+	__CHECK_STR("_w=170 ", "struct1[2].struct2[1][2].u.var_u8[2]=170");
 	__CHECK_STR("_w=0xaaaa ", "union1.var_u16 = 0xaaaa");
+	__CHECK_STR("_w=171 ", "arr[3]= 171");
+	__CHECK_STR("_w=172 ", "arr[EA2] =172");
+	__CHECK_STR("_w=10 ", "enum_arr[EC2]=EA3");
+	__CHECK_STR("_w=173 ", "matrix[31][7][11]=173");
+	__CHECK_STR("_w=174 ", "struct1[2].struct2[1][2].u.mat[5][3]=174");
+	__CHECK_STR("_w=175 ", "struct11[7][5].struct2[0][1].u.mat[3][0]=175");
 
 out:
 	teardown_fixture(fix);
@@ -129,6 +141,95 @@ out:
 	teardown_fixture(fix);
 }
 
+static void test_unsupported_ptr_array_type(void)
+{
+	struct fixture *fix = init_fixture();
+
+	SYS_FAIL(out,
+		 "%s set_global_vars.bpf.o -G \"ptr_arr[0] = 0\" -vl2 2> %s",
+		 fix->veristat, fix->tmpfile);
+
+	read(fix->fd, fix->output, fix->sz);
+	__CHECK_STR("Can't set ptr_arr[0]. Only ints and enums are supported", "ptr_arr");
+
+out:
+	teardown_fixture(fix);
+}
+
+static void test_array_out_of_bounds(void)
+{
+	struct fixture *fix = init_fixture();
+
+	SYS_FAIL(out,
+		 "%s set_global_vars.bpf.o -G \"arr[99] = 0\" -vl2 2> %s",
+		 fix->veristat, fix->tmpfile);
+
+	read(fix->fd, fix->output, fix->sz);
+	__CHECK_STR("Array index 99 is out of bounds", "arr[99]");
+
+out:
+	teardown_fixture(fix);
+}
+
+static void test_array_index_not_found(void)
+{
+	struct fixture *fix = init_fixture();
+
+	SYS_FAIL(out,
+		 "%s set_global_vars.bpf.o -G \"arr[EG2] = 0\" -vl2 2> %s",
+		 fix->veristat, fix->tmpfile);
+
+	read(fix->fd, fix->output, fix->sz);
+	__CHECK_STR("Can't resolve enum value EG2", "arr[EG2]");
+
+out:
+	teardown_fixture(fix);
+}
+
+static void test_array_index_for_non_array(void)
+{
+	struct fixture *fix = init_fixture();
+
+	SYS_FAIL(out,
+		 "%s set_global_vars.bpf.o -G \"var_b[0] = 1\" -vl2 2> %s",
+		 fix->veristat, fix->tmpfile);
+
+	pread(fix->fd, fix->output, fix->sz, 0);
+	__CHECK_STR("Array index is not expected for var_b", "var_b[0] = 1");
+
+	SYS_FAIL(out,
+		 "%s set_global_vars.bpf.o -G \"union1.struct3[0].var_u8_l=1\" -vl2 2> %s",
+		 fix->veristat, fix->tmpfile);
+
+	pread(fix->fd, fix->output, fix->sz, 0);
+	__CHECK_STR("Array index is not expected for struct3", "union1.struct3[0].var_u8_l=1");
+
+out:
+	teardown_fixture(fix);
+}
+
+static void test_no_array_index_for_array(void)
+{
+	struct fixture *fix = init_fixture();
+
+	SYS_FAIL(out,
+		 "%s set_global_vars.bpf.o -G \"arr = 1\" -vl2 2> %s",
+		 fix->veristat, fix->tmpfile);
+
+	pread(fix->fd, fix->output, fix->sz, 0);
+	__CHECK_STR("Can't set arr. Only ints and enums are supported", "arr = 1");
+
+	SYS_FAIL(out,
+		 "%s set_global_vars.bpf.o -G \"struct1[0].struct2.u.var_u8[2]=1\" -vl2 2> %s",
+		 fix->veristat, fix->tmpfile);
+
+	pread(fix->fd, fix->output, fix->sz, 0);
+	__CHECK_STR("Can't resolve field u for non-composite type", "struct1[0].struct2.u.var_u8[2]=1");
+
+out:
+	teardown_fixture(fix);
+}
+
 void test_veristat(void)
 {
 	if (test__start_subtest("set_global_vars_succeeds"))
@@ -139,6 +240,22 @@ void test_veristat(void)
 
 	if (test__start_subtest("set_global_vars_from_file_succeeds"))
 		test_set_global_vars_from_file_succeeds();
+
+	if (test__start_subtest("test_unsupported_ptr_array_type"))
+		test_unsupported_ptr_array_type();
+
+	if (test__start_subtest("test_array_out_of_bounds"))
+		test_array_out_of_bounds();
+
+	if (test__start_subtest("test_array_index_not_found"))
+		test_array_index_not_found();
+
+	if (test__start_subtest("test_array_index_for_non_array"))
+		test_array_index_for_non_array();
+
+	if (test__start_subtest("test_no_array_index_for_array"))
+		test_no_array_index_for_array();
+
 }
 
 #undef __CHECK_STR
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/set_global_vars.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/set_global_vars.c
index 90f5656c3991..ebaef28b2cb3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/set_global_vars.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/set_global_vars.c
@@ -7,22 +7,30 @@
 
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
 
-enum Enum { EA1 = 0, EA2 = 11 };
+typedef __s32 s32;
+typedef s32 i32;
+typedef __u8 u8;
+
+enum Enum { EA1 = 0, EA2 = 11, EA3 = 10 };
 enum Enumu64 {EB1 = 0llu, EB2 = 12llu };
 enum Enums64 { EC1 = 0ll, EC2 = 13ll };
 
 const volatile __s64 var_s64 = -1;
 const volatile __u64 var_u64 = 0;
-const volatile __s32 var_s32 = -1;
+const volatile i32 var_s32 = -1;
 const volatile __u32 var_u32 = 0;
 const volatile __s16 var_s16 = -1;
 const volatile __u16 var_u16 = 0;
 const volatile __s8 var_s8 = -1;
-const volatile __u8 var_u8 = 0;
+const volatile u8 var_u8 = 0;
 const volatile enum Enum var_ea = EA1;
 const volatile enum Enumu64 var_eb = EB1;
 const volatile enum Enums64 var_ec = EC1;
 const volatile bool var_b = false;
+const volatile i32 arr[32];
+const volatile enum Enum enum_arr[32];
+const volatile i32 three_d[47][19][17];
+const volatile i32 *ptr_arr[32];
 
 struct Struct {
 	int:16;
@@ -35,34 +43,38 @@ struct Struct {
 		volatile struct {
 			const int:1;
 			union {
-				const volatile __u8 var_u8;
+				const volatile u8 var_u8[3];
 				const volatile __s16 filler3;
 				const int:1;
+				s32 mat[7][5];
 			} u;
 		};
-	} struct2;
+	} struct2[2][4];
 };
 
 const volatile __u32 stru = 0; /* same prefix as below */
-const volatile struct Struct struct1 = {.struct2 = {.u = {.var_u8 = 1}}};
+const volatile struct Struct struct1[3];
+const volatile struct Struct struct11[11][7];
 
-union Union {
-	__u16 var_u16;
-	struct Struct3 {
-		struct {
-			__u8 var_u8_l;
-		};
+struct Struct3 {
+	struct {
+		u8 var_u8_l;
+	};
+	struct {
 		struct {
-			struct {
-				__u8 var_u8_h;
-			};
+			u8 var_u8_h;
 		};
-	} struct3;
+	};
 };
 
-const volatile union Union union1 = {.var_u16 = -1};
+typedef struct Struct3 Struct3_t;
 
-char arr[4] = {0};
+union Union {
+	__u16 var_u16;
+	Struct3_t struct3;
+};
+
+const volatile union Union union1 = {.var_u16 = -1};
 
 SEC("socket")
 int test_set_globals(void *ctx)
@@ -81,8 +93,14 @@ int test_set_globals(void *ctx)
 	a = var_eb;
 	a = var_ec;
 	a = var_b;
-	a = struct1.struct2.u.var_u8;
+	a = struct1[2].struct2[1][2].u.var_u8[2];
 	a = union1.var_u16;
+	a = arr[3];
+	a = arr[EA2];
+	a = enum_arr[EC2];
+	a = three_d[31][7][EA2];
+	a = struct1[2].struct2[1][2].u.mat[5][3];
+	a = struct11[7][5].struct2[0][1].u.mat[3][0];
 
 	return a;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From bacdf5a0e69d343e2a380be768c1f277088e35d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2025 12:12:21 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix cgroup_xattr/read_cgroupfs_xattr

cgroup_xattr/read_cgroupfs_xattr has two issues:

1. cgroup_xattr/read_cgroupfs_xattr messes up lo without creating a netns
   first. This causes issue with other tests.

   Fix this by using a different hook (lsm.s/file_open) and not messing
   with lo.

2. cgroup_xattr/read_cgroupfs_xattr sets up cgroups without proper
   mount namespaces.

   Fix this by using the existing cgroup helpers. A new helper
   set_cgroup_xattr() is added to set xattr on cgroup files.

Fixes: f4fba2d6d282 ("selftests/bpf: Add tests for bpf_cgroup_read_xattr")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+iqMi2HEj_iH7hsx+XJAsqaMWqSDe4tzcGAnehFWA9Sw@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250627191221.765921-1-song@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/cgroup_helpers.c       |  21 ++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/cgroup_helpers.h       |   4 +
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_xattr.c        | 117 ++++-----------------
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c      |   4 +-
 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/cgroup_helpers.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/cgroup_helpers.c
index e4535451322e..15f626014872 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/cgroup_helpers.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/cgroup_helpers.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include <sys/mount.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/limits.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -318,6 +319,26 @@ int join_parent_cgroup(const char *relative_path)
 	return join_cgroup_from_top(cgroup_path);
 }
 
+/**
+ * set_cgroup_xattr() - Set xattr on a cgroup dir
+ * @relative_path: The cgroup path, relative to the workdir, to set xattr
+ * @name: xattr name
+ * @value: xattr value
+ *
+ * This function set xattr on cgroup dir.
+ *
+ * On success, it returns 0, otherwise on failure it returns -1.
+ */
+int set_cgroup_xattr(const char *relative_path,
+		     const char *name,
+		     const char *value)
+{
+	char cgroup_path[PATH_MAX + 1];
+
+	format_cgroup_path(cgroup_path, relative_path);
+	return setxattr(cgroup_path, name, value, strlen(value) + 1, 0);
+}
+
 /**
  * __cleanup_cgroup_environment() - Delete temporary cgroups
  *
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/cgroup_helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/cgroup_helpers.h
index 502845160d88..182e1ac36c95 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/cgroup_helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/cgroup_helpers.h
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ int join_cgroup(const char *relative_path);
 int join_root_cgroup(void);
 int join_parent_cgroup(const char *relative_path);
 
+int set_cgroup_xattr(const char *relative_path,
+		     const char *name,
+		     const char *value);
+
 int setup_cgroup_environment(void);
 void cleanup_cgroup_environment(void);
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_xattr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_xattr.c
index 87978a0f7eb7..e0dd966e4a3e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_xattr.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cgroup_xattr.c
@@ -7,133 +7,60 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/xattr.h>
-
 #include <test_progs.h>
+#include "cgroup_helpers.h"
 
 #include "read_cgroupfs_xattr.skel.h"
 #include "cgroup_read_xattr.skel.h"
 
-#define CGROUP_FS_ROOT "/sys/fs/cgroup/"
-#define CGROUP_FS_PARENT CGROUP_FS_ROOT "foo/"
+#define CGROUP_FS_PARENT "foo/"
 #define CGROUP_FS_CHILD CGROUP_FS_PARENT "bar/"
-
-static int move_pid_to_cgroup(const char *cgroup_folder, pid_t pid)
-{
-	char filename[128];
-	char pid_str[64];
-	int procs_fd;
-	int ret;
-
-	snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%scgroup.procs", cgroup_folder);
-	snprintf(pid_str, sizeof(pid_str), "%d", pid);
-
-	procs_fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND);
-	if (!ASSERT_OK_FD(procs_fd, "open"))
-		return -1;
-
-	ret = write(procs_fd, pid_str, strlen(pid_str));
-	close(procs_fd);
-	if (!ASSERT_GT(ret, 0, "write cgroup.procs"))
-		return -1;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void reset_cgroups_and_lo(void)
-{
-	rmdir(CGROUP_FS_CHILD);
-	rmdir(CGROUP_FS_PARENT);
-	system("ip addr del 1.1.1.1/32 dev lo");
-	system("ip link set dev lo down");
-}
+#define TMP_FILE "/tmp/selftests_cgroup_xattr"
 
 static const char xattr_value_a[] = "bpf_selftest_value_a";
 static const char xattr_value_b[] = "bpf_selftest_value_b";
 static const char xattr_name[] = "user.bpf_test";
 
-static int setup_cgroups_and_lo(void)
-{
-	int err;
-
-	err = mkdir(CGROUP_FS_PARENT, 0755);
-	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "mkdir 1"))
-		goto error;
-	err = mkdir(CGROUP_FS_CHILD, 0755);
-	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "mkdir 2"))
-		goto error;
-
-	err = setxattr(CGROUP_FS_PARENT, xattr_name, xattr_value_a,
-		       strlen(xattr_value_a) + 1, 0);
-	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "setxattr 1"))
-		goto error;
-
-	err = setxattr(CGROUP_FS_CHILD, xattr_name, xattr_value_b,
-		       strlen(xattr_value_b) + 1, 0);
-	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "setxattr 2"))
-		goto error;
-
-	err = system("ip link set dev lo up");
-	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "lo up"))
-		goto error;
-
-	err = system("ip addr add 1.1.1.1 dev lo");
-	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "lo addr v4"))
-		goto error;
-
-	err = write_sysctl("/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range", "0 0");
-	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "write_sysctl"))
-		goto error;
-
-	return 0;
-error:
-	reset_cgroups_and_lo();
-	return err;
-}
-
 static void test_read_cgroup_xattr(void)
 {
-	struct sockaddr_in sa4 = {
-		.sin_family = AF_INET,
-		.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK),
-	};
+	int tmp_fd, parent_cgroup_fd = -1, child_cgroup_fd = -1;
 	struct read_cgroupfs_xattr *skel = NULL;
-	pid_t pid = gettid();
-	int sock_fd = -1;
-	int connect_fd = -1;
 
-	if (!ASSERT_OK(setup_cgroups_and_lo(), "setup_cgroups_and_lo"))
+	parent_cgroup_fd = test__join_cgroup(CGROUP_FS_PARENT);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_FD(parent_cgroup_fd, "create parent cgroup"))
 		return;
-	if (!ASSERT_OK(move_pid_to_cgroup(CGROUP_FS_CHILD, pid),
-		       "move_pid_to_cgroup"))
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(set_cgroup_xattr(CGROUP_FS_PARENT, xattr_name, xattr_value_a),
+		       "set parent xattr"))
+		goto out;
+
+	child_cgroup_fd = test__join_cgroup(CGROUP_FS_CHILD);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_FD(child_cgroup_fd, "create child cgroup"))
+		goto out;
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(set_cgroup_xattr(CGROUP_FS_CHILD, xattr_name, xattr_value_b),
+		       "set child xattr"))
 		goto out;
 
 	skel = read_cgroupfs_xattr__open_and_load();
 	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "read_cgroupfs_xattr__open_and_load"))
 		goto out;
 
-	skel->bss->target_pid = pid;
+	skel->bss->target_pid = gettid();
 
 	if (!ASSERT_OK(read_cgroupfs_xattr__attach(skel), "read_cgroupfs_xattr__attach"))
 		goto out;
 
-	sock_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_ICMP);
-	if (!ASSERT_OK_FD(sock_fd, "sock create"))
-		goto out;
-
-	connect_fd = connect(sock_fd, &sa4, sizeof(sa4));
-	if (!ASSERT_OK_FD(connect_fd, "connect 1"))
-		goto out;
-	close(connect_fd);
+	tmp_fd = open(TMP_FILE, O_RDONLY | O_CREAT);
+	ASSERT_OK_FD(tmp_fd, "open tmp file");
+	close(tmp_fd);
 
 	ASSERT_TRUE(skel->bss->found_value_a, "found_value_a");
 	ASSERT_TRUE(skel->bss->found_value_b, "found_value_b");
 
 out:
-	close(connect_fd);
-	close(sock_fd);
+	close(child_cgroup_fd);
+	close(parent_cgroup_fd);
 	read_cgroupfs_xattr__destroy(skel);
-	move_pid_to_cgroup(CGROUP_FS_ROOT, pid);
-	reset_cgroups_and_lo();
+	unlink(TMP_FILE);
 }
 
 void test_cgroup_xattr(void)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c
index 855f85fc5522..405adbe5e8b0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/read_cgroupfs_xattr.c
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ static const char expected_value_b[] = "bpf_selftest_value_b";
 bool found_value_a;
 bool found_value_b;
 
-SEC("lsm.s/socket_connect")
-int BPF_PROG(test_socket_connect)
+SEC("lsm.s/file_open")
+int BPF_PROG(test_file_open)
 {
 	u64 cgrp_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
 	struct cgroup_subsys_state *css, *tmp;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ffaff1804e2ca1e88caa9d2e13ac6b4b7ecf011c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2025 15:43:42 +0100
Subject: selftests/bpf: improve error messages in veristat

Return error if preset parsing fails. Avoid proceeding with veristat run
if preset does not parse.
Before:
```
./veristat set_global_vars.bpf.o -G "arr[999999999999999999999] = 1"
Failed to parse value '999999999999999999999'
Processing 'set_global_vars.bpf.o'...
File                   Program           Verdict  Duration (us)  Insns  States  Program size  Jited size
---------------------  ----------------  -------  -------------  -----  ------  ------------  ----------
set_global_vars.bpf.o  test_set_globals  success             27     64       0            82           0
---------------------  ----------------  -------  -------------  -----  ------  ------------  ----------
Done. Processed 1 files, 0 programs. Skipped 1 files, 0 programs.
```
After:
```
./veristat set_global_vars.bpf.o -G "arr[999999999999999999999] = 1"
Failed to parse value '999999999999999999999'
Failed to parse global variable presets: arr[999999999999999999999] = 1
```

Improve error messages:
 * If preset struct member can't be found.
 * Array index out of bounds

Extract rtrim function.

Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250627144342.686896-1-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
index 1e9f61f9fd0a..09cfbd486f92 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
@@ -890,6 +890,18 @@ static bool is_desc_sym(char c)
 	return c == 'v' || c == 'V' || c == '.' || c == '!' || c == '_';
 }
 
+static char *rtrim(char *str)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = strlen(str) - 1; i > 0; --i) {
+		if (!isspace(str[i]))
+			break;
+		str[i] = '\0';
+	}
+	return str;
+}
+
 static int parse_stat(const char *stat_name, struct stat_specs *specs)
 {
 	int id;
@@ -1666,7 +1678,7 @@ static int append_preset_atom(struct var_preset *preset, char *value, bool is_in
 static int parse_var_atoms(const char *full_var, struct var_preset *preset)
 {
 	char expr[256], var[256], *name, *saveptr;
-	int n, len, off;
+	int n, len, off, err;
 
 	snprintf(expr, sizeof(expr), "%s", full_var);
 	preset->atom_count = 0;
@@ -1677,7 +1689,9 @@ static int parse_var_atoms(const char *full_var, struct var_preset *preset)
 			fprintf(stderr, "Can't parse %s\n", name);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-		append_preset_atom(preset, var, false);
+		err = append_preset_atom(preset, var, false);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 
 		/* parse optional array indexes */
 		while (off < len) {
@@ -1685,7 +1699,9 @@ static int parse_var_atoms(const char *full_var, struct var_preset *preset)
 				fprintf(stderr, "Can't parse %s as index\n", name + off);
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
-			append_preset_atom(preset, var, true);
+			err = append_preset_atom(preset, var, true);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
 			off += n;
 		}
 	}
@@ -1697,7 +1713,7 @@ static int append_var_preset(struct var_preset **presets, int *cnt, const char *
 	void *tmp;
 	struct var_preset *cur;
 	char var[256], val[256];
-	int n, err, i;
+	int n, err;
 
 	tmp = realloc(*presets, (*cnt + 1) * sizeof(**presets));
 	if (!tmp)
@@ -1712,11 +1728,7 @@ static int append_var_preset(struct var_preset **presets, int *cnt, const char *
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	/* Remove trailing spaces from var, as scanf may add those */
-	for (i = strlen(var) - 1; i > 0; --i) {
-		if (!isspace(var[i]))
-			break;
-		var[i] = '\0';
-	}
+	rtrim(var);
 
 	err = parse_rvalue(val, &cur->value);
 	if (err)
@@ -1869,7 +1881,7 @@ static int adjust_var_secinfo_array(struct btf *btf, int tid, struct field_acces
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 	if (idx < 0 || idx >= barr->nelems) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "Array index %lld is out of bounds [0, %u]: %s\n",
+		fprintf(stderr, "Array index %lld is out of bounds [0, %u): %s\n",
 			idx, barr->nelems, array_name);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -1928,7 +1940,7 @@ static int adjust_var_secinfo_member(const struct btf *btf,
 		}
 	}
 
-	return -EINVAL;
+	return -ESRCH;
 }
 
 static int adjust_var_secinfo(struct btf *btf, const struct btf_type *t,
@@ -1955,6 +1967,8 @@ static int adjust_var_secinfo(struct btf *btf, const struct btf_type *t,
 			break;
 		case FIELD_NAME:
 			err = adjust_var_secinfo_member(btf, base_type, 0, atom->name, sinfo);
+			if (err == -ESRCH)
+				fprintf(stderr, "Can't find '%s'\n", atom->name);
 			prev_name = atom->name;
 			break;
 		default:
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c4b1be928ea05add0e0f9334e5bc44932395782e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 18:55:39 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: bpf_rdonly_cast u{8,16,32,64} access tests

Tests with aligned and misaligned memory access of different sizes via
pointer returned by bpf_rdonly_cast().

Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250627015539.1439656-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c     | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
index 00604755e698..b0486af36f55 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
@@ -133,4 +133,45 @@ int mixed_mem_type(void *ctx)
 	return *p;
 }
 
+__attribute__((__aligned__(8)))
+u8 global[] = {
+	0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44,
+	0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88,
+	0x99
+};
+
+__always_inline
+static u64 combine(void *p)
+{
+	u64 acc;
+
+	acc = 0;
+#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__
+	acc |= (*(u64 *)p >> 56) << 24;
+	acc |= (*(u32 *)p >> 24) << 16;
+	acc |= (*(u16 *)p >> 8)  << 8;
+	acc |= *(u8 *)p;
+#else
+	acc |= (*(u64 *)p & 0xff) << 24;
+	acc |= (*(u32 *)p & 0xff) << 16;
+	acc |= (*(u16 *)p & 0xff) << 8;
+	acc |= *(u8 *)p;
+#endif
+	return acc;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__retval(0x88442211)
+int diff_size_access(void *ctx)
+{
+	return combine(bpf_rdonly_cast(&global, 0));
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__retval(0x99553322)
+int misaligned_access(void *ctx)
+{
+	return combine(bpf_rdonly_cast(&global, 0) + 1);
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From cce3fee729ee18caa03bade7f4c360343e863bb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2025 14:35:14 +0100
Subject: selftests/bpf: Enable dynptr/test_probe_read_user_str_dynptr

Enable previously disabled dynptr/test_probe_read_user_str_dynptr test,
after the fix it depended on was merged into bpf-next.

Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250630133515.1108325-1-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST
index 1789a61d0a9b..f748f2c33b22 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 # TEMPORARY
 # Alphabetical order
-dynptr/test_probe_read_user_str_dynptr # disabled until https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-mm/patch/20250422131449.57177-1-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com/ makes it into the bpf-next
 get_stack_raw_tp    # spams with kernel warnings until next bpf -> bpf-next merge
 stacktrace_build_id
 stacktrace_build_id_nmi
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1230be820981a3ef0fb9abc011f1b3d093f3b1e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2025 13:55:28 +0100
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix spelling mistake "subtration" -> "subtraction"

There are spelling mistakes in description text. Fix these.

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250630125528.563077-1-colin.i.king@gmail.com
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
index e52a24e15b34..6f986ae5085e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
@@ -1474,7 +1474,7 @@ __naked void sub64_full_overflow(void)
 }
 
 SEC("socket")
-__description("64-bit subtration, partial overflow, result in unbounded reg")
+__description("64-bit subtraction, partial overflow, result in unbounded reg")
 __success __log_level(2)
 __msg("3: (1f) r3 -= r2 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar()")
 __retval(0)
@@ -1514,7 +1514,7 @@ __naked void sub32_full_overflow(void)
 }
 
 SEC("socket")
-__description("32-bit subtration, partial overflow, result in unbounded u32 bounds")
+__description("32-bit subtraction, partial overflow, result in unbounded u32 bounds")
 __success __log_level(2)
 __msg("3: (1c) w3 -= w2 {{.*}} R3_w=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))")
 __retval(0)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 07ee18a0bc946b6b407942c88faed089e20f47d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matteo Croce <teknoraver@meta.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2025 20:31:23 +0200
Subject: selftests/bpf: Don't call fsopen() as privileged user

In the BPF token example, the fsopen() syscall is called as privileged
user. This is unneeded because fsopen() can be called also as
unprivileged user from the user namespace.
As the `fs_fd` file descriptor which was sent back and forth is still the
same, keep it open instead of cloning and closing it twice via SCM_RIGHTS.

cfr. https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/36134

Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <teknoraver@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250701183123.31781-1-technoboy85@gmail.com
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c | 41 +++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c
index f9392df23f8a..cfc032b910c4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static int create_bpffs_fd(void)
 
 static int materialize_bpffs_fd(int fs_fd, struct bpffs_opts *opts)
 {
-	int mnt_fd, err;
+	int err;
 
 	/* set up token delegation mount options */
 	err = set_delegate_mask(fs_fd, "delegate_cmds", opts->cmds, opts->cmds_str);
@@ -136,12 +136,7 @@ static int materialize_bpffs_fd(int fs_fd, struct bpffs_opts *opts)
 	if (err < 0)
 		return -errno;
 
-	/* create O_PATH fd for detached mount */
-	mnt_fd = sys_fsmount(fs_fd, 0, 0);
-	if (err < 0)
-		return -errno;
-
-	return mnt_fd;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* send FD over Unix domain (AF_UNIX) socket */
@@ -287,6 +282,7 @@ static void child(int sock_fd, struct bpffs_opts *opts, child_callback_fn callba
 {
 	int mnt_fd = -1, fs_fd = -1, err = 0, bpffs_fd = -1, token_fd = -1;
 	struct token_lsm *lsm_skel = NULL;
+	char one;
 
 	/* load and attach LSM "policy" before we go into unpriv userns */
 	lsm_skel = token_lsm__open_and_load();
@@ -333,13 +329,19 @@ static void child(int sock_fd, struct bpffs_opts *opts, child_callback_fn callba
 	err = sendfd(sock_fd, fs_fd);
 	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "send_fs_fd"))
 		goto cleanup;
-	zclose(fs_fd);
+
+	/* wait that the parent reads the fd, does the fsconfig() calls
+	 * and send us a signal that it is done
+	 */
+	err = read(sock_fd, &one, sizeof(one));
+	if (!ASSERT_GE(err, 0, "read_one"))
+		goto cleanup;
 
 	/* avoid mucking around with mount namespaces and mounting at
-	 * well-known path, just get detach-mounted BPF FS fd back from parent
+	 * well-known path, just create O_PATH fd for detached mount
 	 */
-	err = recvfd(sock_fd, &mnt_fd);
-	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "recv_mnt_fd"))
+	mnt_fd = sys_fsmount(fs_fd, 0, 0);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_FD(mnt_fd, "mnt_fd"))
 		goto cleanup;
 
 	/* try to fspick() BPF FS and try to add some delegation options */
@@ -429,24 +431,24 @@ again:
 
 static void parent(int child_pid, struct bpffs_opts *bpffs_opts, int sock_fd)
 {
-	int fs_fd = -1, mnt_fd = -1, token_fd = -1, err;
+	int fs_fd = -1, token_fd = -1, err;
+	char one = 1;
 
 	err = recvfd(sock_fd, &fs_fd);
 	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "recv_bpffs_fd"))
 		goto cleanup;
 
-	mnt_fd = materialize_bpffs_fd(fs_fd, bpffs_opts);
-	if (!ASSERT_GE(mnt_fd, 0, "materialize_bpffs_fd")) {
+	err = materialize_bpffs_fd(fs_fd, bpffs_opts);
+	if (!ASSERT_GE(err, 0, "materialize_bpffs_fd")) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
-	zclose(fs_fd);
 
-	/* pass BPF FS context object to parent */
-	err = sendfd(sock_fd, mnt_fd);
-	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "send_mnt_fd"))
+	/* notify the child that we did the fsconfig() calls and it can proceed. */
+	err = write(sock_fd, &one, sizeof(one));
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, sizeof(one), "send_one"))
 		goto cleanup;
-	zclose(mnt_fd);
+	zclose(fs_fd);
 
 	/* receive BPF token FD back from child for some extra tests */
 	err = recvfd(sock_fd, &token_fd);
@@ -459,7 +461,6 @@ static void parent(int child_pid, struct bpffs_opts *bpffs_opts, int sock_fd)
 cleanup:
 	zclose(sock_fd);
 	zclose(fs_fd);
-	zclose(mnt_fd);
 	zclose(token_fd);
 
 	if (child_pid > 0)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a90f5f7370c283863d3872f231debc9b2227b27f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 00:36:20 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: null checks for rdonly_untrusted_mem should be
 preserved

Test case checking that verifier does not assume rdonly_untrusted_mem
values as not null.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250702073620.897517-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c      | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
index b0486af36f55..8185130ede95 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
@@ -174,4 +174,25 @@ int misaligned_access(void *ctx)
 	return combine(bpf_rdonly_cast(&global, 0) + 1);
 }
 
+__weak int return_one(void)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__retval(1)
+int null_check(void *ctx)
+{
+	int *p;
+
+	p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+	if (p == 0)
+		/* make this a function call to avoid compiler
+		 * moving r0 assignment before check.
+		 */
+		return return_one();
+	return 0;
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 7ec899ac90a205090275cd4a5c96c9606a93f3a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 15:53:23 +0200
Subject: selftests/bpf: Negative test case for ref_obj_id in args

This patch adds a test case, as shown below, for the verifier error
"more than one arg with ref_obj_id".

    0: (b7) r2 = 20
    1: (b7) r3 = 0
    2: (18) r1 = 0xffff92cee3cbc600
    4: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_reserve#131
    5: (55) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+3
    6: (bf) r1 = r0
    7: (bf) r2 = r0
    8: (85) call bpf_tcp_raw_gen_syncookie_ipv4#204
    9: (95) exit

This error is currently incorrectly reported as a verifier bug, with a
warning. The next patch in this series will address that.

Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3ba78e6cda47ccafd6ea70dadbc718d020154664.1751463262.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c
index 18596ae0b0c1..f3492efc8834 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c
@@ -2409,3 +2409,27 @@
 	.errstr_unpriv = "",
 	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
 },
+{
+	"calls: several args with ref_obj_id",
+	.insns = {
+	/* Reserve at least sizeof(struct iphdr) bytes in the ring buffer.
+	 * With a smaller size, the verifier would reject the call to
+	 * bpf_tcp_raw_gen_syncookie_ipv4 before we can reach the
+	 * ref_obj_id error.
+	 */
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 20),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+	BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+	BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve),
+	/* if r0 == 0 goto <exit> */
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 3),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0),
+	BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_tcp_raw_gen_syncookie_ipv4),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.fixup_map_ringbuf = { 2 },
+	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr = "more than one arg with ref_obj_id",
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
+},
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 38d95beb4b24301362f8bdae7fbdb82d74b803ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 18:56:22 +0100
Subject: selftests/bpf: Allow veristat compile standalone

Veristat is synced into the standalone repo, where it compiles without
kernel private dependencies. This patch fixes compilation errors in
standalone veristat.

Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250702175622.358405-1-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
index 09cfbd486f92..d532dd82a3a8 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <float.h>
 #include <math.h>
 #include <limits.h>
+#include <assert.h>
 
 #ifndef ARRAY_SIZE
 #define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]))
@@ -239,7 +240,7 @@ static int libbpf_print_fn(enum libbpf_print_level level, const char *format, va
 
 #define log_errno(fmt, ...) log_errno_aux(__FILE__, __LINE__, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
 
-__printf(3, 4)
+__attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)))
 static int log_errno_aux(const char *file, int line, const char *fmt, ...)
 {
 	int err = -errno;
@@ -1337,7 +1338,7 @@ static bool output_stat_enabled(int id)
 	return false;
 }
 
-__printf(2, 3)
+__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)))
 static int write_one_line(const char *file, const char *fmt, ...)
 {
 	int err, saved_errno;
@@ -1358,7 +1359,7 @@ static int write_one_line(const char *file, const char *fmt, ...)
 	return err < 0 ? -1 : 0;
 }
 
-__scanf(3, 4)
+__attribute__((format(scanf, 3, 4)))
 static int scanf_one_line(const char *file, int fields_expected, const char *fmt, ...)
 {
 	int res = 0, saved_errno = 0;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 7b29689263fb21cd0394a664d7d2d1cbc9d1fff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 14:03:09 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add test cases for bpf_dynptr_memset()

Add tests to verify the behavior of bpf_dynptr_memset():
  * normal memset 0
  * normal memset non-0
  * memset with an offset
  * memset in dynptr that was adjusted
  * error: size overflow
  * error: offset+size overflow
  * error: readonly dynptr
  * memset into non-linear xdp dynptr

Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250702210309.3115903-3-isolodrai@meta.com
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/dynptr.c    |   8 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c | 158 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 166 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/dynptr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/dynptr.c
index 62e7ec775f24..f2b65398afce 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/dynptr.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/dynptr.c
@@ -21,6 +21,14 @@ static struct {
 	{"test_dynptr_data", SETUP_SYSCALL_SLEEP},
 	{"test_dynptr_copy", SETUP_SYSCALL_SLEEP},
 	{"test_dynptr_copy_xdp", SETUP_XDP_PROG},
+	{"test_dynptr_memset_zero", SETUP_SYSCALL_SLEEP},
+	{"test_dynptr_memset_notzero", SETUP_SYSCALL_SLEEP},
+	{"test_dynptr_memset_zero_offset", SETUP_SYSCALL_SLEEP},
+	{"test_dynptr_memset_zero_adjusted", SETUP_SYSCALL_SLEEP},
+	{"test_dynptr_memset_overflow", SETUP_SYSCALL_SLEEP},
+	{"test_dynptr_memset_overflow_offset", SETUP_SYSCALL_SLEEP},
+	{"test_dynptr_memset_readonly", SETUP_SKB_PROG},
+	{"test_dynptr_memset_xdp_chunks", SETUP_XDP_PROG},
 	{"test_ringbuf", SETUP_SYSCALL_SLEEP},
 	{"test_skb_readonly", SETUP_SKB_PROG},
 	{"test_dynptr_skb_data", SETUP_SKB_PROG},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c
index a0391f9da2d4..7d7081d05d47 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c
@@ -681,6 +681,164 @@ out:
 	return XDP_DROP;
 }
 
+char memset_zero_data[] = "data to be zeroed";
+
+SEC("?tp/syscalls/sys_enter_nanosleep")
+int test_dynptr_memset_zero(void *ctx)
+{
+	__u32 data_sz = sizeof(memset_zero_data);
+	char zeroes[32] = {'\0'};
+	struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+
+	err = bpf_dynptr_from_mem(memset_zero_data, data_sz, 0, &ptr);
+	err = err ?: bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 0, data_sz, 0);
+	err = err ?: bpf_memcmp(zeroes, memset_zero_data, data_sz);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define DYNPTR_MEMSET_VAL 42
+
+char memset_notzero_data[] = "data to be overwritten";
+
+SEC("?tp/syscalls/sys_enter_nanosleep")
+int test_dynptr_memset_notzero(void *ctx)
+{
+	u32 data_sz = sizeof(memset_notzero_data);
+	struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+	char expected[32];
+
+	__builtin_memset(expected, DYNPTR_MEMSET_VAL, data_sz);
+
+	err = bpf_dynptr_from_mem(memset_notzero_data, data_sz, 0, &ptr);
+	err = err ?: bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 0, data_sz, DYNPTR_MEMSET_VAL);
+	err = err ?: bpf_memcmp(expected, memset_notzero_data, data_sz);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+char memset_zero_offset_data[] = "data to be zeroed partially";
+
+SEC("?tp/syscalls/sys_enter_nanosleep")
+int test_dynptr_memset_zero_offset(void *ctx)
+{
+	char expected[] = "data to \0\0\0\0eroed partially";
+	__u32 data_sz = sizeof(memset_zero_offset_data);
+	struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+
+	err = bpf_dynptr_from_mem(memset_zero_offset_data, data_sz, 0, &ptr);
+	err = err ?: bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 8, 4, 0);
+	err = err ?: bpf_memcmp(expected, memset_zero_offset_data, data_sz);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+char memset_zero_adjusted_data[] = "data to be zeroed partially";
+
+SEC("?tp/syscalls/sys_enter_nanosleep")
+int test_dynptr_memset_zero_adjusted(void *ctx)
+{
+	char expected[] = "data\0\0\0\0be zeroed partially";
+	__u32 data_sz = sizeof(memset_zero_adjusted_data);
+	struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+
+	err = bpf_dynptr_from_mem(memset_zero_adjusted_data, data_sz, 0, &ptr);
+	err = err ?: bpf_dynptr_adjust(&ptr, 4, 8);
+	err = err ?: bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 0, bpf_dynptr_size(&ptr), 0);
+	err = err ?: bpf_memcmp(expected, memset_zero_adjusted_data, data_sz);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+char memset_overflow_data[] = "memset overflow data";
+
+SEC("?tp/syscalls/sys_enter_nanosleep")
+int test_dynptr_memset_overflow(void *ctx)
+{
+	__u32 data_sz = sizeof(memset_overflow_data);
+	struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+	int ret;
+
+	err = bpf_dynptr_from_mem(memset_overflow_data, data_sz, 0, &ptr);
+	ret = bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 0, data_sz + 1, 0);
+	if (ret != -E2BIG)
+		err = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("?tp/syscalls/sys_enter_nanosleep")
+int test_dynptr_memset_overflow_offset(void *ctx)
+{
+	__u32 data_sz = sizeof(memset_overflow_data);
+	struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+	int ret;
+
+	err = bpf_dynptr_from_mem(memset_overflow_data, data_sz, 0, &ptr);
+	ret = bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 1, data_sz, 0);
+	if (ret != -E2BIG)
+		err = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("?cgroup_skb/egress")
+int test_dynptr_memset_readonly(struct __sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
+	int ret;
+
+	err = bpf_dynptr_from_skb(skb, 0, &ptr);
+
+	/* cgroup skbs are read only, memset should fail */
+	ret = bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr, 0, bpf_dynptr_size(&ptr), 0);
+	if (ret != -EINVAL)
+		err = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define min_t(type, x, y) ({		\
+	type __x = (x);			\
+	type __y = (y);			\
+	__x < __y ? __x : __y; })
+
+SEC("xdp")
+int test_dynptr_memset_xdp_chunks(struct xdp_md *xdp)
+{
+	u32 data_sz, chunk_sz, offset = 0;
+	const int max_chunks = 200;
+	struct bpf_dynptr ptr_xdp;
+	char expected_buf[32];
+	char buf[32];
+	int i;
+
+	__builtin_memset(expected_buf, DYNPTR_MEMSET_VAL, sizeof(expected_buf));
+
+	/* ptr_xdp is backed by non-contiguous memory */
+	bpf_dynptr_from_xdp(xdp, 0, &ptr_xdp);
+	data_sz = bpf_dynptr_size(&ptr_xdp);
+
+	err = bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr_xdp, 0, data_sz, DYNPTR_MEMSET_VAL);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	bpf_for(i, 0, max_chunks) {
+		offset = i * sizeof(buf);
+		if (offset >= data_sz)
+			goto out;
+		chunk_sz = min_t(u32, sizeof(buf), data_sz - offset);
+		err = bpf_dynptr_read(&buf, chunk_sz, &ptr_xdp, offset, 0);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+		err = bpf_memcmp(buf, expected_buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+out:
+	return XDP_DROP;
+}
+
 void *user_ptr;
 /* Contains the copy of the data pointed by user_ptr.
  * Size 384 to make it not fit into a single kernel chunk when copying
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5697683e133d05e6333ee1f12a7e8dd402593258 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2025 13:48:18 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add tests for prog streams

Add selftests to stress test the various facets of the stream API,
memory allocation pattern, and ensuring dumping support is tested and
functional.

Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703204818.925464-13-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stream.c | 141 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream.c      |  79 +++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c |  33 ++++++
 3 files changed, 253 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stream.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stream.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stream.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d9f0185dca61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stream.c
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <regex.h>
+
+#include "stream.skel.h"
+#include "stream_fail.skel.h"
+
+void test_stream_failure(void)
+{
+	RUN_TESTS(stream_fail);
+}
+
+void test_stream_success(void)
+{
+	RUN_TESTS(stream);
+	return;
+}
+
+struct {
+	int prog_off;
+	const char *errstr;
+} stream_error_arr[] = {
+	{
+		offsetof(struct stream, progs.stream_cond_break),
+		"ERROR: Timeout detected for may_goto instruction\n"
+		"CPU: [0-9]+ UID: 0 PID: [0-9]+ Comm: .*\n"
+		"Call trace:\n"
+		"([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\\+0x[0-9a-fA-F]+/0x[0-9a-fA-F]+\n"
+		"|[ \t]+[^\n]+\n)*",
+	},
+	{
+		offsetof(struct stream, progs.stream_deadlock),
+		"ERROR: AA or ABBA deadlock detected for bpf_res_spin_lock\n"
+		"Attempted lock   = (0x[0-9a-fA-F]+)\n"
+		"Total held locks = 1\n"
+		"Held lock\\[ 0\\] = \\1\n"  // Lock address must match
+		"CPU: [0-9]+ UID: 0 PID: [0-9]+ Comm: .*\n"
+		"Call trace:\n"
+		"([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\\+0x[0-9a-fA-F]+/0x[0-9a-fA-F]+\n"
+		"|[ \t]+[^\n]+\n)*",
+	},
+};
+
+static int match_regex(const char *pattern, const char *string)
+{
+	int err, rc;
+	regex_t re;
+
+	err = regcomp(&re, pattern, REG_EXTENDED | REG_NEWLINE);
+	if (err)
+		return -1;
+	rc = regexec(&re, string, 0, NULL, 0);
+	regfree(&re);
+	return rc == 0 ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+void test_stream_errors(void)
+{
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, opts);
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_prog_stream_read_opts, ropts);
+	struct stream *skel;
+	int ret, prog_fd;
+	char buf[1024];
+
+	skel = stream__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "stream__open_and_load"))
+		return;
+
+	for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(stream_error_arr); i++) {
+		struct bpf_program **prog;
+
+		prog = (struct bpf_program **)(((char *)skel) + stream_error_arr[i].prog_off);
+		prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(*prog);
+		ret = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &opts);
+		ASSERT_OK(ret, "ret");
+		ASSERT_OK(opts.retval, "retval");
+
+#if !defined(__x86_64__)
+		ASSERT_TRUE(1, "Timed may_goto unsupported, skip.");
+		if (i == 0) {
+			ret = bpf_prog_stream_read(prog_fd, 2, buf, sizeof(buf), &ropts);
+			ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0, "stream read");
+			continue;
+		}
+#endif
+
+		ret = bpf_prog_stream_read(prog_fd, BPF_STREAM_STDERR, buf, sizeof(buf), &ropts);
+		ASSERT_GT(ret, 0, "stream read");
+		ASSERT_LE(ret, 1023, "len for buf");
+		buf[ret] = '\0';
+
+		ret = match_regex(stream_error_arr[i].errstr, buf);
+		if (!ASSERT_TRUE(ret == 1, "regex match"))
+			fprintf(stderr, "Output from stream:\n%s\n", buf);
+	}
+
+	stream__destroy(skel);
+}
+
+void test_stream_syscall(void)
+{
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, opts);
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_prog_stream_read_opts, ropts);
+	struct stream *skel;
+	int ret, prog_fd;
+	char buf[64];
+
+	skel = stream__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "stream__open_and_load"))
+		return;
+
+	prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.stream_syscall);
+	ret = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &opts);
+	ASSERT_OK(ret, "ret");
+	ASSERT_OK(opts.retval, "retval");
+
+	ASSERT_LT(bpf_prog_stream_read(0, BPF_STREAM_STDOUT, buf, sizeof(buf), &ropts), 0, "error");
+	ret = -errno;
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, -EINVAL, "bad prog_fd");
+
+	ASSERT_LT(bpf_prog_stream_read(prog_fd, 0, buf, sizeof(buf), &ropts), 0, "error");
+	ret = -errno;
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, -ENOENT, "bad stream id");
+
+	ASSERT_LT(bpf_prog_stream_read(prog_fd, BPF_STREAM_STDOUT, NULL, sizeof(buf), NULL), 0, "error");
+	ret = -errno;
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, -EFAULT, "bad stream buf");
+
+	ret = bpf_prog_stream_read(prog_fd, BPF_STREAM_STDOUT, buf, 2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, 2, "bytes");
+	ret = bpf_prog_stream_read(prog_fd, BPF_STREAM_STDOUT, buf, 2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, 1, "bytes");
+	ret = bpf_prog_stream_read(prog_fd, BPF_STREAM_STDOUT, buf, 1, &ropts);
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0, "no bytes stdout");
+	ret = bpf_prog_stream_read(prog_fd, BPF_STREAM_STDERR, buf, 1, &ropts);
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0, "no bytes stderr");
+
+	stream__destroy(skel);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..35790897dc87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+#include "bpf_experimental.h"
+
+struct arr_elem {
+	struct bpf_res_spin_lock lock;
+};
+
+struct {
+	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
+	__uint(max_entries, 1);
+	__type(key, int);
+	__type(value, struct arr_elem);
+} arrmap SEC(".maps");
+
+#define ENOSPC 28
+#define _STR "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
+
+int size;
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int stream_exhaust(void *ctx)
+{
+	/* Use global variable for loop convergence. */
+	size = 0;
+	bpf_repeat(BPF_MAX_LOOPS) {
+		if (bpf_stream_printk(BPF_STDOUT, _STR) == -ENOSPC && size == 99954)
+			return 0;
+		size += sizeof(_STR) - 1;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int stream_cond_break(void *ctx)
+{
+	while (can_loop)
+		;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int stream_deadlock(void *ctx)
+{
+	struct bpf_res_spin_lock *lock, *nlock;
+
+	lock = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&arrmap, &(int){0});
+	if (!lock)
+		return 1;
+	nlock = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&arrmap, &(int){0});
+	if (!nlock)
+		return 1;
+	if (bpf_res_spin_lock(lock))
+		return 1;
+	if (bpf_res_spin_lock(nlock)) {
+		bpf_res_spin_unlock(lock);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	bpf_res_spin_unlock(nlock);
+	bpf_res_spin_unlock(lock);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int stream_syscall(void *ctx)
+{
+	bpf_stream_printk(BPF_STDOUT, "foo");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b4a0d0cc8ec8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_core_read.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed")
+int stream_vprintk_null_arg(void *ctx)
+{
+	bpf_stream_vprintk(BPF_STDOUT, "", NULL, 0, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__failure __msg("R3 type=scalar expected=")
+int stream_vprintk_scalar_arg(void *ctx)
+{
+	bpf_stream_vprintk(BPF_STDOUT, "", (void *)46, 0, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__failure __msg("arg#1 doesn't point to a const string")
+int stream_vprintk_string_arg(void *ctx)
+{
+	bpf_stream_vprintk(BPF_STDOUT, ctx, NULL, 0, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2d5c91e1cc14c3511d163ac36ee869ecf3a29cc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2025 16:03:48 -0700
Subject: bpf: rdonly_untrusted_mem for btf id walk pointer leafs

When processing a load from a PTR_TO_BTF_ID, the verifier calculates
the type of the loaded structure field based on the load offset.
For example, given the following types:

  struct foo {
    struct foo *a;
    int *b;
  } *p;

The verifier would calculate the type of `p->a` as a pointer to
`struct foo`. However, the type of `p->b` is currently calculated as a
SCALAR_VALUE.

This commit updates the logic for processing PTR_TO_BTF_ID to instead
calculate the type of p->b as PTR_TO_MEM|MEM_RDONLY|PTR_UNTRUSTED.
This change allows further dereferencing of such pointers (using probe
memory instructions).

Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250704230354.1323244-3-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/btf.c                                     | 6 ++++++
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                                | 5 +++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
index 05fd64a371af..b3c8a95d38fb 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
@@ -6915,6 +6915,7 @@ enum bpf_struct_walk_result {
 	/* < 0 error */
 	WALK_SCALAR = 0,
 	WALK_PTR,
+	WALK_PTR_UNTRUSTED,
 	WALK_STRUCT,
 };
 
@@ -7156,6 +7157,8 @@ error:
 					*field_name = mname;
 				return WALK_PTR;
 			}
+
+			return WALK_PTR_UNTRUSTED;
 		}
 
 		/* Allow more flexible access within an int as long as
@@ -7228,6 +7231,9 @@ int btf_struct_access(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
 			*next_btf_id = id;
 			*flag = tmp_flag;
 			return PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
+		case WALK_PTR_UNTRUSTED:
+			*flag = MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED;
+			return PTR_TO_MEM;
 		case WALK_SCALAR:
 			return SCALAR_VALUE;
 		case WALK_STRUCT:
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 9e8328f40b88..87ab00b40d9f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2814,6 +2814,11 @@ static int mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		if (type_may_be_null(flag))
 			regs[regno].id = ++env->id_gen;
 		return 0;
+	case PTR_TO_MEM:
+		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno);
+		regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_MEM | flag;
+		regs[regno].mem_size = 0;
+		return 0;
 	default:
 		verifier_bug(env, "unexpected reg_type %d in %s\n", reg_type, __func__);
 		return -EFAULT;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c
index 5266c7022863..14c5a7ef0e87 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "new_null_ret", "R0 invalid mem access 'ptr_or_null_'" },
 	{ "obj_new_acq", "Unreleased reference id=" },
 	{ "use_after_drop", "invalid mem access 'scalar'" },
-	{ "ptr_walk_scalar", "type=scalar expected=percpu_ptr_" },
+	{ "ptr_walk_scalar", "type=rdonly_untrusted_mem expected=percpu_ptr_" },
 	{ "direct_read_lock", "direct access to bpf_spin_lock is disallowed" },
 	{ "direct_write_lock", "direct access to bpf_spin_lock is disallowed" },
 	{ "direct_read_head", "direct access to bpf_list_head is disallowed" },
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f1f5d6f25d098e21b0a53237cfd055fc28787c46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2025 16:03:49 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: ptr_to_btf_id struct walk ending with primitive
 pointer

Validate that reading a PTR_TO_BTF_ID field produces a value of type
PTR_TO_MEM|MEM_RDONLY|PTR_UNTRUSTED, if field is a pointer to a
primitive type.

Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250704230354.1323244-4-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c     | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
index 8185130ede95..4f94c971ae86 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
@@ -5,6 +5,37 @@
 #include "bpf_misc.h"
 #include "../test_kmods/bpf_testmod_kfunc.h"
 
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)          ; R7_w=ptr_nameidata(off={{[0-9]+}}) R8_w=rdonly_untrusted_mem(sz=0)")
+__msg("r9 = *(u8 *)(r8 +0)           ; R8_w=rdonly_untrusted_mem(sz=0) R9_w=scalar")
+int btf_id_to_ptr_mem(void *ctx)
+{
+	struct task_struct *task;
+	struct nameidata *idata;
+	u64 ret, off;
+
+	task = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
+	idata = task->nameidata;
+	off = bpf_core_field_offset(struct nameidata, pathname);
+	/*
+	 * asm block to have reliable match target for __msg, equivalent of:
+	 *   ret = task->nameidata->pathname[0];
+	 */
+	asm volatile (
+	"r7 = %[idata];"
+	"r7 += %[off];"
+	"r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0);"
+	"r9 = *(u8 *)(r8 + 0);"
+	"%[ret] = r9;"
+	: [ret]"=r"(ret)
+	: [idata]"r"(idata),
+	  [off]"r"(off)
+	: "r7", "r8", "r9");
+	return ret;
+}
+
 SEC("socket")
 __success
 __retval(0)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 54ac2c9418af2f115ca42419e6c6633b88f3d49d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2025 16:03:52 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: test cases for __arg_untrusted

Check usage of __arg_untrusted parameters with PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
- combining __arg_untrusted with other tags is forbidden;
- non-kernel (program local) types for __arg_untrusted are forbidden;
- passing of {trusted, untrusted, map value, scalar value, values with
  variable offset} to untrusted is ok;
- passing of PTR_TO_BTF_ID with a different type to untrusted is ok;
- passing of untrusted to trusted is forbidden.

Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250704230354.1323244-7-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
index 4ab0ef18d7eb..4bd436a35826 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
@@ -179,4 +179,85 @@ int BPF_PROG(trusted_acq_rel, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
 	return subprog_trusted_acq_rel(task);
 }
 
+__weak int subprog_untrusted_bad_tags(struct task_struct *task __arg_untrusted __arg_nullable)
+{
+	return task->pid;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__failure
+__msg("arg#0 untrusted cannot be combined with any other tags")
+int untrusted_bad_tags(void *ctx)
+{
+	return subprog_untrusted_bad_tags(0);
+}
+
+struct local_type_wont_be_accepted {};
+
+__weak int subprog_untrusted_bad_type(struct local_type_wont_be_accepted *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__failure
+__msg("arg#0 reference type('STRUCT local_type_wont_be_accepted') has no matches")
+int untrusted_bad_type(void *ctx)
+{
+	return subprog_untrusted_bad_type(bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0));
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_untrusted(const volatile struct task_struct *restrict task __arg_untrusted)
+{
+	return task->pid;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("r1 = {{.*}}; {{.*}}R1_w=trusted_ptr_task_struct()")
+__msg("Func#1 ('subprog_untrusted') is global and assumed valid.")
+__msg("Validating subprog_untrusted() func#1...")
+__msg(": R1=untrusted_ptr_task_struct")
+int trusted_to_untrusted(void *ctx)
+{
+	return subprog_untrusted(bpf_get_current_task_btf());
+}
+
+char mem[16];
+u32 off;
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+int anything_to_untrusted(void *ctx)
+{
+	/* untrusted to untrusted */
+	subprog_untrusted(bpf_core_cast(0, struct task_struct));
+	/* wrong type to untrusted */
+	subprog_untrusted((void *)bpf_core_cast(0, struct bpf_verifier_env));
+	/* map value to untrusted */
+	subprog_untrusted((void *)mem);
+	/* scalar to untrusted */
+	subprog_untrusted(0);
+	/* variable offset to untrusted (map) */
+	subprog_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
+	/* variable offset to untrusted (trusted) */
+	subprog_untrusted((void *)bpf_get_current_task_btf() + off);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_untrusted2(struct task_struct *task __arg_untrusted)
+{
+	return subprog_trusted_task_nullable(task);
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__failure
+__msg("R1 type=untrusted_ptr_ expected=ptr_, trusted_ptr_, rcu_ptr_")
+__msg("Caller passes invalid args into func#{{.*}} ('subprog_trusted_task_nullable')")
+int untrusted_to_trusted(void *ctx)
+{
+	return subprog_untrusted2(bpf_get_current_task_btf());
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 68cca81fd57fd9f5b8fd8da0dccd1d00522592f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2025 16:03:54 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: tests for __arg_untrusted void * global func params

Check usage of __arg_untrusted parameters of primitive type:
- passing of {trusted, untrusted, map value, scalar value, values with
  variable offset} to untrusted `void *`, `char *` or enum is ok;
- varifier represents such parameters as rdonly_untrusted_mem(sz=0).

Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250704230354.1323244-9-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
index 4bd436a35826..b346f669d159 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
@@ -260,4 +260,57 @@ int untrusted_to_trusted(void *ctx)
 	return subprog_untrusted2(bpf_get_current_task_btf());
 }
 
+__weak int subprog_void_untrusted(void *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+	return *(int *)p;
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_char_untrusted(char *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+	return *(int *)p;
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_enum_untrusted(enum bpf_attach_type *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+	return *(int *)p;
+}
+
+__weak int subprog_enum64_untrusted(enum scx_public_consts *p __arg_untrusted)
+{
+	return *(int *)p;
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("r1 = {{.*}}; {{.*}}R1_w=trusted_ptr_task_struct()")
+__msg("Func#1 ('subprog_void_untrusted') is global and assumed valid.")
+__msg("Validating subprog_void_untrusted() func#1...")
+__msg(": R1=rdonly_untrusted_mem(sz=0)")
+int trusted_to_untrusted_mem(void *ctx)
+{
+	return subprog_void_untrusted(bpf_get_current_task_btf());
+}
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+__success
+int anything_to_untrusted_mem(void *ctx)
+{
+	/* untrusted to untrusted mem */
+	subprog_void_untrusted(bpf_core_cast(0, struct task_struct));
+	/* map value to untrusted mem */
+	subprog_void_untrusted(mem);
+	/* scalar to untrusted mem */
+	subprog_void_untrusted(0);
+	/* variable offset to untrusted mem (map) */
+	subprog_void_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
+	/* variable offset to untrusted mem (trusted) */
+	subprog_void_untrusted(bpf_get_current_task_btf() + off);
+	/* variable offset to untrusted char/enum/enum64 (map) */
+	subprog_char_untrusted(mem + off);
+	subprog_enum_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
+	subprog_enum64_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0f626c98fd10330da0420029a1c4fa35e39fb873 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Saket Kumar Bhaskar <skb99@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2025 12:47:35 +0530
Subject: selftests/bpf: Set CONFIG_PACKET=y for selftests

BPF selftest fails to build with below error:

  CLNG-BPF [test_progs] lsm_cgroup.bpf.o
progs/lsm_cgroup.c:105:21: error: variable has incomplete type 'struct sockaddr_ll'
  105 |         struct sockaddr_ll sa = {};
      |                            ^
progs/lsm_cgroup.c:105:9: note: forward declaration of 'struct sockaddr_ll'
  105 |         struct sockaddr_ll sa = {};
      |                ^
1 error generated.

lsm_cgroup selftest requires sockaddr_ll structure which is not there
in vmlinux.h when the kernel is built with CONFIG_PACKET=m.

Enabling CONFIG_PACKET=y ensures that sockaddr_ll is available in vmlinux,
allowing it to be captured in the generated vmlinux.h for bpf selftests.

Reported-by: Sachin P Bappalige <sachinpb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Saket Kumar Bhaskar <skb99@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250707071735.705137-1-skb99@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
index f74e1ea0ad3b..7247833fe623 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES=y
 CONFIG_IP6_NF_IPTABLES=y
 CONFIG_IP6_NF_FILTER=y
 CONFIG_NF_NAT=y
+CONFIG_PACKET=y
 CONFIG_RC_CORE=y
 CONFIG_SECURITY=y
 CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 92974cef83b560175fc52acb53aa833cb1e93306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2025 21:09:08 +0200
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add Spectre v4 tests

Add the following tests:

1. A test with an (unimportant) ldimm64 (16 byte insn) and a
   Spectre-v4--induced nospec that clarifies and serves as a basic
   Spectre v4 test.

2. Make sure a Spectre v4 nospec_result does not prevent a Spectre v1
   nospec from being added before the dangerous instruction (tests that
   [1] is fixed).

3. Combine the two, which is the combination that triggers the warning
   in [2]. This is because the unanalyzed stack write has nospec_result
   set, but the ldimm64 (which was just analyzed) had incremented
   insn_idx by 2. That violates the assertion that nospec_result is only
   used after insns that increment insn_idx by 1 (i.e., stack writes).

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/4266fd5de04092aa4971cbef14f1b4b96961f432.camel@gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/685b3c1b.050a0220.2303ee.0010.GAE@google.com/

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250705190908.1756862-3-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h       |   4 +
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c  | 149 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 153 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h
index 20dce508d8e0..530752ddde8e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h
@@ -237,4 +237,8 @@
 #define SPEC_V1
 #endif
 
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#define SPEC_V4
+#endif
+
 #endif
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
index 4470541b5e71..28b4f7035ceb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
@@ -801,4 +801,153 @@ l2_%=:							\
 	: __clobber_all);
 }
 
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: ldimm64 before Spectre v4 barrier")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V4
+__xlated_unpriv("r1 = 0x2020200005642020") /* should not matter */
+__xlated_unpriv("*(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_ldimm64_spectre_v4(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r1 = 0x2020200005642020 ll;			\
+	*(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1;				\
+	r0 = 0;						\
+	exit;						\
+"	::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: Spectre v1 and v4 barrier")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+#ifdef SPEC_V4
+/* starts with r0 == r8 == r9 == 0 */
+__xlated_unpriv("if r8 != 0x0 goto pc+1")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("if r9 == 0x0 goto pc+4")
+__xlated_unpriv("r2 = r0")
+/* Following nospec required to prevent following dangerous `*(u64 *)(NOT_FP -64)
+ * = r1` iff `if r9 == 0 goto pc+4` was mispredicted because of Spectre v1. The
+ * test therefore ensures the Spectre-v4--induced nospec does not prevent the
+ * Spectre-v1--induced speculative path from being fully analyzed.
+ */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* Spectre v1 */
+__xlated_unpriv("*(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1") /* could be used to leak r2 */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec") /* Spectre v4 */
+#endif
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_spectre_v1_and_v4(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r1 = 0;						\
+	*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1;				\
+	r2 = r10;					\
+	r2 += -8;					\
+	r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;				\
+	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
+	r8 = r0;					\
+	r2 = r10;					\
+	r2 += -8;					\
+	r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;				\
+	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
+	r9 = r0;					\
+	r0 = r10;					\
+	r1 = 0;						\
+	r2 = r10;					\
+	if r8 != 0 goto l0_%=;				\
+	if r9 != 0 goto l0_%=;				\
+	r0 = 0;						\
+l0_%=:	if r8 != 0 goto l1_%=;				\
+	goto l2_%=;					\
+l1_%=:	if r9 == 0 goto l3_%=;				\
+	r2 = r0;					\
+l2_%=:	*(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1;				\
+l3_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
+	exit;						\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+	  __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: Spectre v1 and v4 barrier (simple)")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+#ifdef SPEC_V4
+__xlated_unpriv("if r8 != 0x0 goto pc+1")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc+2")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* if r9 == 0 goto l3_%= */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* r2 = r0 */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+__xlated_unpriv("*(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+#endif
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_spectre_v1_and_v4_simple(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r8 = 0;						\
+	r9 = 0;						\
+	r0 = r10;					\
+	r1 = 0;						\
+	r2 = r10;					\
+	if r8 != 0 goto l0_%=;				\
+	if r9 != 0 goto l0_%=;				\
+	r0 = 0;						\
+l0_%=:	if r8 != 0 goto l1_%=;				\
+	goto l2_%=;					\
+l1_%=:	if r9 == 0 goto l3_%=;				\
+	r2 = r0;					\
+l2_%=:	*(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1;				\
+l3_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
+	exit;						\
+"	::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: ldimm64 before Spectre v1 and v4 barrier (simple)")
+__success __success_unpriv
+__retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+#ifdef SPEC_V4
+__xlated_unpriv("if r8 != 0x0 goto pc+1")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc+4")
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* if r9 == 0 goto l3_%= */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* r2 = r0 */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* r1 = 0x2020200005642020 ll */
+__xlated_unpriv("goto pc-1") /* second part of ldimm64 */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+__xlated_unpriv("*(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1")
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+#endif
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_ldimm64_spectre_v1_and_v4_simple(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r8 = 0;						\
+	r9 = 0;						\
+	r0 = r10;					\
+	r1 = 0;						\
+	r2 = r10;					\
+	if r8 != 0 goto l0_%=;				\
+	if r9 != 0 goto l0_%=;				\
+	r0 = 0;						\
+l0_%=:	if r8 != 0 goto l1_%=;				\
+	goto l2_%=;					\
+l1_%=:	if r9 == 0 goto l3_%=;				\
+	r2 = r0;					\
+	r1 = 0x2020200005642020 ll;			\
+l2_%=:	*(u64 *)(r2 -64) = r1;				\
+l3_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
+	exit;						\
+"	::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 192e3aa145292bad69f1d702ab21755ae07dda40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2025 13:50:35 +0200
Subject: selftests/bpf: Negative test case for tail call map

This patch adds a negative test case for the following verifier error.

    expected prog array map for tail call

Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aGu0i1X_jII-3aFa@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c  |  2 ++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_tailcall.c        | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_tailcall.c

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c
index c9da06741104..77ec95d4ffaa 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
 #include "verifier_store_release.skel.h"
 #include "verifier_subprog_precision.skel.h"
 #include "verifier_subreg.skel.h"
+#include "verifier_tailcall.skel.h"
 #include "verifier_tailcall_jit.skel.h"
 #include "verifier_typedef.skel.h"
 #include "verifier_uninit.skel.h"
@@ -219,6 +220,7 @@ void test_verifier_stack_ptr(void)            { RUN(verifier_stack_ptr); }
 void test_verifier_store_release(void)        { RUN(verifier_store_release); }
 void test_verifier_subprog_precision(void)    { RUN(verifier_subprog_precision); }
 void test_verifier_subreg(void)               { RUN(verifier_subreg); }
+void test_verifier_tailcall(void)             { RUN(verifier_tailcall); }
 void test_verifier_tailcall_jit(void)         { RUN(verifier_tailcall_jit); }
 void test_verifier_typedef(void)              { RUN(verifier_typedef); }
 void test_verifier_uninit(void)               { RUN(verifier_uninit); }
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_tailcall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_tailcall.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b4acce60fb9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_tailcall.c
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+struct {
+	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
+	__uint(max_entries, 1);
+	__type(key, __u32);
+	__type(value, __u32);
+} map_array SEC(".maps");
+
+SEC("socket")
+__description("invalid map type for tail call")
+__failure __msg("expected prog array map for tail call")
+__failure_unpriv
+__naked void invalid_map_for_tail_call(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("			\
+	r2 = %[map_array] ll;	\
+	r3 = 0;				\
+	call %[bpf_tail_call];		\
+	exit;				\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_tail_call),
+	  __imm_addr(map_array)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ad97cb2ed06a6ba9025fd8bd14fa24369550cbb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2025 15:08:56 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Remove enum64 case from __arg_untrusted test suite

The enum64 type used by verifier_global_ptr_args test case requires
CONFIG_SCHED_CLASS_EXT. At the moment selftets do not depend on this
option. There are just a few enum64 types in the kernel. Instead of
tying selftests to implementation details of unrelated sub-systems,
just remove enum64 test case. Simple enums are covered and that should
be sufficient.

Fixes: 68cca81fd57f ("selftests/bpf: tests for __arg_untrusted void * global func params")
Reported-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250708220856.3059578-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c | 8 +-------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
index b346f669d159..181da86ba5f0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_global_ptr_args.c
@@ -275,11 +275,6 @@ __weak int subprog_enum_untrusted(enum bpf_attach_type *p __arg_untrusted)
 	return *(int *)p;
 }
 
-__weak int subprog_enum64_untrusted(enum scx_public_consts *p __arg_untrusted)
-{
-	return *(int *)p;
-}
-
 SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
 __success
 __log_level(2)
@@ -306,10 +301,9 @@ int anything_to_untrusted_mem(void *ctx)
 	subprog_void_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
 	/* variable offset to untrusted mem (trusted) */
 	subprog_void_untrusted(bpf_get_current_task_btf() + off);
-	/* variable offset to untrusted char/enum/enum64 (map) */
+	/* variable offset to untrusted char/enum (map) */
 	subprog_char_untrusted(mem + off);
 	subprog_enum_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
-	subprog_enum64_untrusted((void *)mem + off);
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 9f9559f0acc42e98709017951144ef6334dad187 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2025 15:13:12 -0400
Subject: selftests/bpf: add selftests for bpf_arena_reserve_pages

Add selftests for the new bpf_arena_reserve_pages kfunc.

Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250709191312.29840-3-emil@etsalapatis.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_arena_common.h     |   3 +
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena_large.c     |  98 +++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 207 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_arena_common.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_arena_common.h
index 68a51dcc0669..16f8ce832004 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_arena_common.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_arena_common.h
@@ -46,8 +46,11 @@
 
 void __arena* bpf_arena_alloc_pages(void *map, void __arena *addr, __u32 page_cnt,
 				    int node_id, __u64 flags) __ksym __weak;
+int bpf_arena_reserve_pages(void *map, void __arena *addr, __u32 page_cnt) __ksym __weak;
 void bpf_arena_free_pages(void *map, void __arena *ptr, __u32 page_cnt) __ksym __weak;
 
+#define arena_base(map) ((void __arena *)((struct bpf_arena *)(map))->user_vm_start)
+
 #else /* when compiled as user space code */
 
 #define __arena
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena.c
index 67509c5d3982..7f4827eede3c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 
 #define BPF_NO_KFUNC_PROTOTYPES
 #include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <errno.h>
 #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
 #include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
 #include "bpf_misc.h"
@@ -114,6 +115,111 @@ int basic_alloc3(void *ctx)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int basic_reserve1(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+	char __arena *page;
+	int ret;
+
+	page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, NULL, 1, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+	if (!page)
+		return 1;
+
+	page += __PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/* Reserve the second page */
+	ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, 1);
+	if (ret)
+		return 2;
+
+	/* Try to explicitly allocate the reserved page. */
+	page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, page, 1, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+	if (page)
+		return 3;
+
+	/* Try to implicitly allocate the page (since there's only 2 of them). */
+	page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, NULL, 1, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+	if (page)
+		return 4;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int basic_reserve2(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+	char __arena *page;
+	int ret;
+
+	page = arena_base(&arena);
+	ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, 1);
+	if (ret)
+		return 1;
+
+	page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, page, 1, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+	if ((u64)page)
+		return 2;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Reserve the same page twice, should return -EBUSY. */
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int reserve_twice(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+	char __arena *page;
+	int ret;
+
+	page = arena_base(&arena);
+
+	ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, 1);
+	if (ret)
+		return 1;
+
+	ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, 1);
+	if (ret != -EBUSY)
+		return 2;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Try to reserve past the end of the arena. */
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int reserve_invalid_region(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+	char __arena *page;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Try a NULL pointer. */
+	ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, NULL, 3);
+	if (ret != -EINVAL)
+		return 1;
+
+	page = arena_base(&arena);
+
+	ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, 3);
+	if (ret != -EINVAL)
+		return 2;
+
+	ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, 4096);
+	if (ret != -EINVAL)
+		return 3;
+
+	ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, page, (1ULL << 32) - 1);
+	if (ret != -EINVAL)
+		return 4;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
 SEC("iter.s/bpf_map")
 __success __log_level(2)
 int iter_maps1(struct bpf_iter__bpf_map *ctx)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena_large.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena_large.c
index f94f30cf1bb8..9dbdf123542d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena_large.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_arena_large.c
@@ -67,6 +67,104 @@ int big_alloc1(void *ctx)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/* Try to access a reserved page. Behavior should be identical with accessing unallocated pages. */
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int access_reserved(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+	volatile char __arena *page;
+	char __arena *base;
+	const size_t len = 4;
+	int ret, i;
+
+	/* Get a separate region of the arena. */
+	page = base = arena_base(&arena) + 16384 * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, base, len);
+	if (ret)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Try to dirty reserved memory. */
+	for (i = 0; i < len && can_loop; i++)
+		*page = 0x5a;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len && can_loop; i++) {
+		page = (volatile char __arena *)(base + i * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+		/*
+		 * Error out in case either the write went through,
+		 * or the address has random garbage.
+		 */
+		if (*page == 0x5a)
+			return 2 + 2 * i;
+
+		if (*page)
+			return 2 + 2 * i + 1;
+	}
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Try to allocate a region overlapping with a reservation. */
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int request_partially_reserved(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+	volatile char __arena *page;
+	char __arena *base;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Add an arbitrary page offset. */
+	page = base = arena_base(&arena) + 4096 * __PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, base + 3 * __PAGE_SIZE, 4);
+	if (ret)
+		return 1;
+
+	page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, base, 5, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+	if ((u64)page != 0ULL)
+		return 2;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+__success __retval(0)
+int free_reserved(void *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
+	char __arena *addr;
+	char __arena *page;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Add an arbitrary page offset. */
+	addr = arena_base(&arena) + 32768 * __PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, addr, 2, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+	if (!page)
+		return 1;
+
+	ret = bpf_arena_reserve_pages(&arena, addr + 2 * __PAGE_SIZE, 2);
+	if (ret)
+		return 2;
+
+	/*
+	 * Reserved and allocated pages should be interchangeable for
+	 * bpf_arena_free_pages(). Free a reserved and an allocated
+	 * page with a single call.
+	 */
+	bpf_arena_free_pages(&arena, addr + __PAGE_SIZE , 2);
+
+	/* The free call above should have succeeded, so this allocation should too. */
+	page = bpf_arena_alloc_pages(&arena, addr + __PAGE_SIZE, 2, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0);
+	if (!page)
+		return 3;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #if defined(__BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST)
 #define PAGE_CNT 100
 __u8 __arena * __arena page[PAGE_CNT]; /* occupies the first page */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d81526a6ebff4ac2358b71d40271c8f95212fac1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 20:21:41 +0200
Subject: selftests/bpf: Range analysis test case for JSET

This patch adds coverage for the warning detected by syzkaller and fixed
in the previous patch. Without the previous patch, this test fails with:

  verifier bug: REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg1): range bounds
  violation u64=[0x0, 0x0] s64=[0x0, 0x0] u32=[0x1, 0x0] s32=[0x0, 0x0]
  var_off=(0x0, 0x0)(1)

Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c7893be1170fdbcf64e0200c110cdbd360ce7086.1752171365.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
index 6f986ae5085e..63b533ca4933 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 /* Converted from tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c */
 
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <../../../include/linux/filter.h>
 #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
 #include "bpf_misc.h"
 
@@ -1532,4 +1533,21 @@ __naked void sub32_partial_overflow(void)
 	: __clobber_all);
 }
 
+SEC("socket")
+__description("dead branch on jset, does not result in invariants violation error")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__retval(0) __flag(BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS)
+__naked void jset_range_analysis(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("			\
+	call %[bpf_get_netns_cookie];	\
+	if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=;		\
+	if r0 & 0xffffffff goto +0; 	\
+l0_%=:	r0 = 0;				\
+	exit;				\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_netns_cookie)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e860a98c8aebd8de82c0ee901acf5a759acd4570 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2025 11:59:10 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix build error due to certain uninitialized variables

With the latest llvm21 compiler, I hit several errors when building bpf
selftests. Some of errors look like below:

  test_maps.c:565:40: error: variable 'val' is uninitialized when passed as a
      const pointer argument here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized-const-pointer]
    565 |         assert(bpf_map_update_elem(fd, NULL, &val, 0) < 0 &&
        |                                               ^~~

  prog_tests/bpf_iter.c:400:25: error: variable 'c' is uninitialized when passed
      as a const pointer argument here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized-const-pointer]
  400 |         write(finish_pipe[1], &c, 1);
      |                                ^

Some other errors have similar the pattern as the above.

These errors are fixed by initializing those variables properly.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250715185910.3659447-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bloom_filter_map.c | 2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_iter.c         | 2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c   | 2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c                   | 4 ++--
 5 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bloom_filter_map.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bloom_filter_map.c
index 67557cda2208..42b49870e520 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bloom_filter_map.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bloom_filter_map.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 static void test_fail_cases(void)
 {
 	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_map_create_opts, opts);
-	__u32 value;
+	__u32 value = 0;
 	int fd, err;
 
 	/* Invalid key size */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_iter.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_iter.c
index add4a18c33bd..5225d69bf79b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_iter.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_iter.c
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static void test_task_pidfd(void)
 static void test_task_sleepable(void)
 {
 	struct bpf_iter_tasks *skel;
-	int pid, status, err, data_pipe[2], finish_pipe[2], c;
+	int pid, status, err, data_pipe[2], finish_pipe[2], c = 0;
 	char *test_data = NULL;
 	char *test_data_long = NULL;
 	char *data[2];
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
index c397336fe1ed..b17dc39a23db 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static void test_uretprobe_syscall_call(void)
 		.retprobe = true,
 	);
 	struct uprobe_syscall_executed *skel;
-	int pid, status, err, go[2], c;
+	int pid, status, err, go[2], c = 0;
 
 	if (!ASSERT_OK(pipe(go), "pipe"))
 		return;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c
index ab0f02faa80c..4d69d9d55e17 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static void test_verify_pkcs7_sig_from_map(void)
 	char *tmp_dir;
 	struct test_verify_pkcs7_sig *skel = NULL;
 	struct bpf_map *map;
-	struct data data;
+	struct data data = {};
 	int ret, zero = 0;
 
 	/* Trigger creation of session keyring. */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c
index 986ce32b113a..3fae9ce46ca9 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static void test_devmap_hash(unsigned int task, void *data)
 static void test_queuemap(unsigned int task, void *data)
 {
 	const int MAP_SIZE = 32;
-	__u32 vals[MAP_SIZE + MAP_SIZE/2], val;
+	__u32 vals[MAP_SIZE + MAP_SIZE/2], val = 0;
 	int fd, i;
 
 	/* Fill test values to be used */
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ static void test_queuemap(unsigned int task, void *data)
 static void test_stackmap(unsigned int task, void *data)
 {
 	const int MAP_SIZE = 32;
-	__u32 vals[MAP_SIZE + MAP_SIZE/2], val;
+	__u32 vals[MAP_SIZE + MAP_SIZE/2], val = 0;
 	int fd, i;
 
 	/* Fill test values to be used */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4a760d2d7aa6357428eadb6c3714f21a8b85cf6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)" <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2025 10:36:56 +0200
Subject: selftests/bpf: enable tracing_struct tests for arm64
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Now that the constraint preventing attachment to functions consuming
struct on stack has been removed from the kernel (and moved to pahole,
with a slightly smarter detection, to prevent only those that are
packed), re-enable the tracing_struct tests for arm64.

Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250709-arm64_relax_jit_comp-v1-2-3850fe189092@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.aarch64 | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
 delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.aarch64

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.aarch64 b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.aarch64
deleted file mode 100644
index 12e99c0277a8..000000000000
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.aarch64
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-tracing_struct/struct_many_args                  # struct_many_args:FAIL:tracing_struct_many_args__attach unexpected error: -524
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fd60aa0a45c1508cdcb982dbf25fd003a6b34e92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2025 21:46:54 +0800
Subject: bpf/selftests: Add selftests for token info

A previous change added bpf_token_info to get token info with
bpf_get_obj_info_by_fd, this patch adds a new test for token info.

 #461/12  token/bpf_token_info:OK

Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250716134654.1162635-2-chen.dylane@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c
index cfc032b910c4..b81dde283052 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c
@@ -1047,6 +1047,41 @@ err_out:
 
 #define bit(n) (1ULL << (n))
 
+static int userns_bpf_token_info(int mnt_fd, struct token_lsm *lsm_skel)
+{
+	int err, token_fd = -1;
+	struct bpf_token_info info;
+	u32 len = sizeof(struct bpf_token_info);
+
+	/* create BPF token from BPF FS mount */
+	token_fd = bpf_token_create(mnt_fd, NULL);
+	if (!ASSERT_GT(token_fd, 0, "token_create")) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	memset(&info, 0, len);
+	err = bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd(token_fd, &info, &len);
+	if (!ASSERT_ERR(err, "bpf_obj_get_token_info"))
+		goto cleanup;
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(info.allowed_cmds, bit(BPF_MAP_CREATE), "token_info_cmds_map_create")) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+	if (!ASSERT_EQ(info.allowed_progs, bit(BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP), "token_info_progs_xdp")) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	/* The BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is not set in token */
+	if (ASSERT_EQ(info.allowed_progs, bit(BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT), "token_info_progs_ext"))
+		err = -EINVAL;
+
+cleanup:
+	zclose(token_fd);
+	return err;
+}
+
 void test_token(void)
 {
 	if (test__start_subtest("map_token")) {
@@ -1150,4 +1185,13 @@ void test_token(void)
 
 		subtest_userns(&opts, userns_obj_priv_implicit_token_envvar);
 	}
+	if (test__start_subtest("bpf_token_info")) {
+		struct bpffs_opts opts = {
+			.cmds = bit(BPF_MAP_CREATE),
+			.progs = bit(BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP),
+			.attachs = ~0ULL,
+		};
+
+		subtest_userns(&opts, userns_bpf_token_info);
+	}
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0769857a07b4451a1dc1c3ad1f1c86a6f4ce136a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 17:54:33 +0000
Subject: selftests/bpf: fix implementation of smp_mb()

As BPF doesn't include any barrier instructions, smp_mb() is implemented
by doing a dummy value returning atomic operation. Such an operation
acts a full barrier as enforced by LKMM and also by the work in progress
BPF memory model.

If the returned value is not used, clang[1] can optimize the value
returning atomic instruction in to a normal atomic instruction which
provides no ordering guarantees.

Mark the variable as volatile so the above optimization is never
performed and smp_mb() works as expected.

[1] https://godbolt.org/z/qzze7bG6z

Fixes: 88d706ba7cc5 ("selftests/bpf: Introduce arena spin lock")
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250710175434.18829-2-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_atomic.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_atomic.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_atomic.h
index a9674e544322..c550e5711967 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_atomic.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_atomic.h
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ extern bool CONFIG_X86_64 __kconfig __weak;
 
 #define smp_mb()                                 \
 	({                                       \
-		unsigned long __val;             \
+		volatile unsigned long __val;    \
 		__sync_fetch_and_add(&__val, 0); \
 	})
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4c82768e413402c329043ed2a30a36bdfc82127b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2025 21:34:30 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Increase xdp data size for arm64 64K page size

With arm64 64K page size, the following 4 subtests failed:
  #97/25   dynptr/test_probe_read_user_dynptr:FAIL
  #97/26   dynptr/test_probe_read_kernel_dynptr:FAIL
  #97/27   dynptr/test_probe_read_user_str_dynptr:FAIL
  #97/28   dynptr/test_probe_read_kernel_str_dynptr:FAIL

These failures are due to function bpf_dynptr_check_off_len() in
include/linux/bpf.h where there is a test
  if (len > size || offset > size - len)
    return -E2BIG;
With 64K page size, the 'offset' is greater than 'size - len',
which caused the test failure.

For 64KB page size, this patch increased the xdp buffer size from 5000 to
90000. The above 4 test failures are fixed as 'size' value is increased.
But it introduced two new failures:
  #97/4    dynptr/test_dynptr_copy_xdp:FAIL
  #97/12   dynptr/test_dynptr_memset_xdp_chunks:FAIL

These two failures will be addressed in subsequent patches.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250725043430.208469-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/dynptr.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/dynptr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/dynptr.c
index f2b65398afce..9b2d9ceda210 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/dynptr.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/dynptr.c
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ static struct {
 	{"test_copy_from_user_task_str_dynptr", SETUP_SYSCALL_SLEEP},
 };
 
+#define PAGE_SIZE_64K 65536
+
 static void verify_success(const char *prog_name, enum test_setup_type setup_type)
 {
 	char user_data[384] = {[0 ... 382] = 'a', '\0'};
@@ -146,14 +148,18 @@ static void verify_success(const char *prog_name, enum test_setup_type setup_typ
 	}
 	case SETUP_XDP_PROG:
 	{
-		char data[5000];
+		char data[90000];
 		int err, prog_fd;
 		LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, opts,
 			    .data_in = &data,
-			    .data_size_in = sizeof(data),
 			    .repeat = 1,
 		);
 
+		if (getpagesize() == PAGE_SIZE_64K)
+			opts.data_size_in = sizeof(data);
+		else
+			opts.data_size_in = 5000;
+
 		prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(prog);
 		err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &opts);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 90f791a975af80964b1ae6a370598c5bb8f565a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2025 21:34:35 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix test dynptr/test_dynptr_copy_xdp failure

For arm64 64K page size, the bpf_dynptr_copy() in test dynptr/test_dynptr_copy_xdp
will succeed, but the test will failure with 4K page size. This patch made a change
so the test will fail expectedly for both 4K and 64K page sizes.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250725043435.208974-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c
index 7d7081d05d47..3094a1e4ee91 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c
@@ -611,11 +611,12 @@ int test_dynptr_copy_xdp(struct xdp_md *xdp)
 	struct bpf_dynptr ptr_buf, ptr_xdp;
 	char data[] = "qwertyuiopasdfghjkl";
 	char buf[32] = {'\0'};
-	__u32 len = sizeof(data);
+	__u32 len = sizeof(data), xdp_data_size;
 	int i, chunks = 200;
 
 	/* ptr_xdp is backed by non-contiguous memory */
 	bpf_dynptr_from_xdp(xdp, 0, &ptr_xdp);
+	xdp_data_size = bpf_dynptr_size(&ptr_xdp);
 	bpf_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr(&ringbuf, len * chunks, 0, &ptr_buf);
 
 	/* Destination dynptr is backed by non-contiguous memory */
@@ -673,7 +674,7 @@ int test_dynptr_copy_xdp(struct xdp_md *xdp)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (bpf_dynptr_copy(&ptr_xdp, 2000, &ptr_xdp, 0, len * chunks) != -E2BIG)
+	if (bpf_dynptr_copy(&ptr_xdp, xdp_data_size - 3000, &ptr_xdp, 0, len * chunks) != -E2BIG)
 		err = 1;
 
 out:
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4a5dcb337395db24976090e84f52d48e597697f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2025 21:34:40 -0700
Subject: selftests/bpf: Fix test dynptr/test_dynptr_memset_xdp_chunks failure

For arm64 64K page size, the xdp data size was set to be more than 64K
in one of previous patches. This will cause failure for bpf_dynptr_memset().
Since the failure of bpf_dynptr_memset() is expected with 64K page size,
return success.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250725043440.209266-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c
index 3094a1e4ee91..8315273cb900 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_success.c
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
 #include "bpf_misc.h"
 #include "errno.h"
 
+#define PAGE_SIZE_64K 65536
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
 
 int pid, err, val;
@@ -821,8 +823,17 @@ int test_dynptr_memset_xdp_chunks(struct xdp_md *xdp)
 	data_sz = bpf_dynptr_size(&ptr_xdp);
 
 	err = bpf_dynptr_memset(&ptr_xdp, 0, data_sz, DYNPTR_MEMSET_VAL);
-	if (err)
+	if (err) {
+		/* bpf_dynptr_memset() eventually called bpf_xdp_pointer()
+		 * where if data_sz is greater than 0xffff, -EFAULT will be
+		 * returned. For 64K page size, data_sz is greater than
+		 * 64K, so error is expected and let us zero out error and
+		 * return success.
+		 */
+		if (data_sz >= PAGE_SIZE_64K)
+			err = 0;
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	bpf_for(i, 0, max_chunks) {
 		offset = i * sizeof(buf);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e9f545d0d336b37ece594a0bfd8d2d13ccbed6ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2025 12:02:55 +0000
Subject: selftests/bpf: Enable private stack tests for arm64

As arm64 JIT now supports private stack, make sure all relevant tests
run on arm64 architecture.

Relevant tests:

 #415/1   struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack:OK
 #415/2   struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_fail:OK
 #415/3   struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_recur:OK
 #415     struct_ops_private_stack:OK
 #549/1   verifier_private_stack/Private stack, single prog:OK
 #549/2   verifier_private_stack/Private stack, subtree > MAX_BPF_STACK:OK
 #549/3   verifier_private_stack/No private stack:OK
 #549/4   verifier_private_stack/Private stack, callback:OK
 #549/5   verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in mainprog:OK
 #549/6   verifier_private_stack/Private stack, exception in subprog:OK
 #549/7   verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, not nested:OK
 #549/8   verifier_private_stack/Private stack, async callback, potential nesting:OK
 #549     verifier_private_stack:OK
 Summary: 2/11 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250724120257.7299-4-puranjay@kernel.org
---
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack.c |  2 +-
 .../bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_fail.c      |  2 +-
 .../bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_recur.c     |  2 +-
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_private_stack.c   | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack.c
index 0e4d2ff63ab8..dbe646013811 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
 
-#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm64)
 bool skip __attribute((__section__(".data"))) = false;
 #else
 bool skip = true;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_fail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_fail.c
index 58d5d8dc2235..3d89ad7cbe2a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_fail.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_fail.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
 
-#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm64)
 bool skip __attribute((__section__(".data"))) = false;
 #else
 bool skip = true;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_recur.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_recur.c
index 31e58389bb8b..b1f6d7e5a8e5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_recur.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_recur.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
 
-#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm64)
 bool skip __attribute((__section__(".data"))) = false;
 #else
 bool skip = true;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_private_stack.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_private_stack.c
index fc91b414364e..1ecd34ebde19 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_private_stack.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_private_stack.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 /* From include/linux/filter.h */
 #define MAX_BPF_STACK    512
 
-#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86)
+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86) || defined(__TARGET_ARCH_arm64)
 
 struct elem {
 	struct bpf_timer t;
@@ -30,6 +30,18 @@ __jited("	movabsq	$0x{{.*}}, %r9")
 __jited("	addq	%gs:{{.*}}, %r9")
 __jited("	movl	$0x2a, %edi")
 __jited("	movq	%rdi, -0x100(%r9)")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited("	stp	x25, x27, [sp, {{.*}}]!")
+__jited("	mov	x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	movk	x27, {{.*}}, lsl #16")
+__jited("	movk	x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	mrs	x10, TPIDR_EL{{[0-1]}}")
+__jited("	add	x27, x27, x10")
+__jited("	add	x25, x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	mov	x0, #0x2a")
+__jited("	str	x0, [x27]")
+__jited("...")
+__jited("	ldp	x25, x27, [sp], {{.*}}")
 __naked void private_stack_single_prog(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("			\
@@ -45,6 +57,9 @@ __description("No private stack")
 __success
 __arch_x86_64
 __jited("	subq	$0x8, %rsp")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited("	mov	x25, sp")
+__jited("	sub	sp, sp, #0x10")
 __naked void no_private_stack_nested(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("			\
@@ -81,6 +96,19 @@ __jited("	pushq	%r9")
 __jited("	callq	0x{{.*}}")
 __jited("	popq	%r9")
 __jited("	xorl	%eax, %eax")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited("	stp	x25, x27, [sp, {{.*}}]!")
+__jited("	mov	x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	movk	x27, {{.*}}, lsl #16")
+__jited("	movk	x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	mrs	x10, TPIDR_EL{{[0-1]}}")
+__jited("	add	x27, x27, x10")
+__jited("	add	x25, x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	mov	x0, #0x2a")
+__jited("	str	x0, [x27]")
+__jited("	bl	{{.*}}")
+__jited("...")
+__jited("	ldp	x25, x27, [sp], {{.*}}")
 __naked void private_stack_nested_1(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("				\
@@ -131,6 +159,24 @@ __jited("	movq	%rdi, -0x200(%r9)")
 __jited("	pushq	%r9")
 __jited("	callq")
 __jited("	popq	%r9")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited("func #1")
+__jited("...")
+__jited("	stp	x25, x27, [sp, {{.*}}]!")
+__jited("	mov	x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	movk	x27, {{.*}}, lsl #16")
+__jited("	movk	x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	mrs	x10, TPIDR_EL{{[0-1]}}")
+__jited("	add	x27, x27, x10")
+__jited("	add	x25, x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	bl	0x{{.*}}")
+__jited("	add	x7, x0, #0x0")
+__jited("	mov	x0, #0x2a")
+__jited("	str	x0, [x27]")
+__jited("	bl	0x{{.*}}")
+__jited("	add	x7, x0, #0x0")
+__jited("	mov	x7, #0x0")
+__jited("	ldp	x25, x27, [sp], {{.*}}")
 __naked void private_stack_callback(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("			\
@@ -154,6 +200,28 @@ __arch_x86_64
 __jited("	pushq	%r9")
 __jited("	callq")
 __jited("	popq	%r9")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited("	stp	x29, x30, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited("	mov	x29, sp")
+__jited("	stp	xzr, x26, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited("	mov	x26, sp")
+__jited("	stp	x19, x20, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited("	stp	x21, x22, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited("	stp	x23, x24, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited("	stp	x25, x26, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited("	stp	x27, x28, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited("	mov	x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	movk	x27, {{.*}}, lsl #16")
+__jited("	movk	x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	mrs	x10, TPIDR_EL{{[0-1]}}")
+__jited("	add	x27, x27, x10")
+__jited("	add	x25, x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	mov	x0, #0x2a")
+__jited("	str	x0, [x27]")
+__jited("	mov	x0, #0x0")
+__jited("	bl	0x{{.*}}")
+__jited("	add	x7, x0, #0x0")
+__jited("	ldp	x27, x28, [sp], #0x10")
 int private_stack_exception_main_prog(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("			\
@@ -179,6 +247,19 @@ __jited("	movq	%rdi, -0x200(%r9)")
 __jited("	pushq	%r9")
 __jited("	callq")
 __jited("	popq	%r9")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited("	stp	x27, x28, [sp, #-0x10]!")
+__jited("	mov	x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	movk	x27, {{.*}}, lsl #16")
+__jited("	movk	x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	mrs	x10, TPIDR_EL{{[0-1]}}")
+__jited("	add	x27, x27, x10")
+__jited("	add	x25, x27, {{.*}}")
+__jited("	mov	x0, #0x2a")
+__jited("	str	x0, [x27]")
+__jited("	bl	0x{{.*}}")
+__jited("	add	x7, x0, #0x0")
+__jited("	ldp	x27, x28, [sp], #0x10")
 int private_stack_exception_sub_prog(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("			\
@@ -220,6 +301,10 @@ __description("Private stack, async callback, not nested")
 __success __retval(0)
 __arch_x86_64
 __jited("	movabsq	$0x{{.*}}, %r9")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited("	mrs	x10, TPIDR_EL{{[0-1]}}")
+__jited("	add	x27, x27, x10")
+__jited("	add	x25, x27, {{.*}}")
 int private_stack_async_callback_1(void)
 {
 	struct bpf_timer *arr_timer;
@@ -241,6 +326,8 @@ __description("Private stack, async callback, potential nesting")
 __success __retval(0)
 __arch_x86_64
 __jited("	subq	$0x100, %rsp")
+__arch_arm64
+__jited("	sub	sp, sp, #0x100")
 int private_stack_async_callback_2(void)
 {
 	struct bpf_timer *arr_timer;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From da653de268d32a80e135c9eb960a8147c186f1bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2025 11:51:16 +0200
Subject: selftests/bpf: Update reg_bound range refinement logic

This patch updates the range refinement logic in the reg_bound test to
match the new logic from the previous commit. Without this change, tests
would fail because we end with more precise ranges than the tests
expect.

Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b7f6b1fbe03373cca4e1bb6a113035a6cd2b3ff7.1753695655.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/reg_bounds.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/reg_bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/reg_bounds.c
index 39d42271cc46..e261b0e872db 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/reg_bounds.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/reg_bounds.c
@@ -465,6 +465,20 @@ static struct range range_refine(enum num_t x_t, struct range x, enum num_t y_t,
 		return range_improve(x_t, x, x_swap);
 	}
 
+	if (!t_is_32(x_t) && !t_is_32(y_t) && x_t != y_t) {
+		if (x_t == S64 && x.a > x.b) {
+			if (x.b < y.a && x.a <= y.b)
+				return range(x_t, x.a, y.b);
+			if (x.a > y.b && x.b >= y.a)
+				return range(x_t, y.a, x.b);
+		} else if (x_t == U64 && y.a > y.b) {
+			if (y.b < x.a && y.a <= x.b)
+				return range(x_t, y.a, x.b);
+			if (y.a > x.b && y.b >= x.a)
+				return range(x_t, x.a, y.b);
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* otherwise, plain range cast and intersection works */
 	return range_improve(x_t, x, y_cast);
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 26e5e346a52c796190e63af1c2a80a417fda261a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2025 11:51:30 +0200
Subject: selftests/bpf: Test cross-sign 64bits range refinement

This patch adds coverage for the new cross-sign 64bits range refinement
logic. The three tests cover the cases when the u64 and s64 ranges
overlap (1) in the negative portion of s64, (2) in the positive portion
of s64, and (3) in both portions.

The first test is a simplified version of a BPF program generated by
syzkaller that caused an invariant violation [1]. It looks like
syzkaller could not extract the reproducer itself (and therefore didn't
report it to the mailing list), but I was able to extract it from the
console logs of a crash.

The principle is similar to the invariant violation described in
commit 6279846b9b25 ("bpf: Forget ranges when refining tnum after
JSET"): the verifier walks a dead branch, uses the condition to refine
ranges, and ends up with inconsistent ranges. In this case, the dead
branch is when we fallthrough on both jumps. The new refinement logic
improves the bounds such that the second jump is properly detected as
always-taken and the verifier doesn't end up walking a dead branch.

The second and third tests are inspired by the first, but rely on
condition jumps to prepare the bounds instead of ALU instructions. An
R10 write is used to trigger a verifier error when the bounds can't be
refined.

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c711ce17dd78e5d4fdcf [1]
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a0e17b00dab8dabcfa6f8384e7e151186efedfdd.1753695655.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c  | 118 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 118 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
index 63b533ca4933..41f4389e08c7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
@@ -1550,4 +1550,122 @@ l0_%=:	r0 = 0;				\
 	: __clobber_all);
 }
 
+/* This test covers the bounds deduction on 64bits when the s64 and u64 ranges
+ * overlap on the negative side. At instruction 7, the ranges look as follows:
+ *
+ * 0          umin=0xfffffcf1                 umax=0xff..ff6e  U64_MAX
+ * |                [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]        |
+ * |----------------------------|------------------------------|
+ * |xxxxxxxxxx]                                   [xxxxxxxxxxxx|
+ * 0    smax=0xeffffeee                       smin=-655        -1
+ *
+ * We should therefore deduce the following new bounds:
+ *
+ * 0                             u64=[0xff..ffd71;0xff..ff6e]  U64_MAX
+ * |                                              [xxx]        |
+ * |----------------------------|------------------------------|
+ * |                                              [xxx]        |
+ * 0                                        s64=[-655;-146]    -1
+ *
+ * Without the deduction cross sign boundary, we end up with an invariant
+ * violation error.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__description("bounds deduction cross sign boundary, negative overlap")
+__success __log_level(2) __flag(BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS)
+__msg("7: (1f) r0 -= r6 {{.*}} R0=scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffc00; 0x3ff))")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void bounds_deduct_negative_overlap(void)
+{
+	asm volatile("			\
+	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];	\
+	w3 = w0;			\
+	w6 = (s8)w0;			\
+	r0 = (s8)r0;			\
+	if w6 >= 0xf0000000 goto l0_%=;	\
+	r0 += r6;			\
+	r6 += 400;			\
+	r0 -= r6;			\
+	if r3 < r0 goto l0_%=;		\
+l0_%=:	r0 = 0;				\
+	exit;				\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* This test covers the bounds deduction on 64bits when the s64 and u64 ranges
+ * overlap on the positive side. At instruction 3, the ranges look as follows:
+ *
+ * 0 umin=0                      umax=0xffffffffffffff00       U64_MAX
+ * [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]            |
+ * |----------------------------|------------------------------|
+ * |xxxxxxxx]                                         [xxxxxxxx|
+ * 0      smax=127                                smin=-128    -1
+ *
+ * We should therefore deduce the following new bounds:
+ *
+ * 0  u64=[0;127]                                              U64_MAX
+ * [xxxxxxxx]                                                  |
+ * |----------------------------|------------------------------|
+ * [xxxxxxxx]                                                  |
+ * 0  s64=[0;127]                                              -1
+ *
+ * Without the deduction cross sign boundary, the program is rejected due to
+ * the frame pointer write.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__description("bounds deduction cross sign boundary, positive overlap")
+__success __log_level(2) __flag(BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS)
+__msg("3: (2d) if r0 > r1 {{.*}} R0_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=127,var_off=(0x0; 0x7f))")
+__retval(0)
+__naked void bounds_deduct_positive_overlap(void)
+{
+	asm volatile("			\
+	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];	\
+	r0 = (s8)r0;			\
+	r1 = 0xffffffffffffff00;	\
+	if r0 > r1 goto l0_%=;		\
+	if r0 < 128 goto l0_%=;		\
+	r10 = 0;			\
+l0_%=:	r0 = 0;				\
+	exit;				\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* This test is the same as above, but the s64 and u64 ranges overlap in two
+ * places. At instruction 3, the ranges look as follows:
+ *
+ * 0 umin=0                           umax=0xffffffffffffff80  U64_MAX
+ * [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]        |
+ * |----------------------------|------------------------------|
+ * |xxxxxxxx]                                         [xxxxxxxx|
+ * 0      smax=127                                smin=-128    -1
+ *
+ * 0xffffffffffffff80 = (u64)-128. We therefore can't deduce anything new and
+ * the program should fail due to the frame pointer write.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__description("bounds deduction cross sign boundary, two overlaps")
+__failure __flag(BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS)
+__msg("3: (2d) if r0 > r1 {{.*}} R0_w=scalar(smin=smin32=-128,smax=smax32=127,umax=0xffffffffffffff80)")
+__msg("frame pointer is read only")
+__naked void bounds_deduct_two_overlaps(void)
+{
+	asm volatile("			\
+	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];	\
+	r0 = (s8)r0;			\
+	r1 = 0xffffffffffffff80;	\
+	if r0 > r1 goto l0_%=;		\
+	if r0 < 128 goto l0_%=;		\
+	r10 = 0;			\
+l0_%=:	r0 = 0;				\
+	exit;				\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f96841bbf4a1ee4ed0336ba192a01278fdea6383 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2025 11:51:45 +0200
Subject: selftests/bpf: Test invariants on JSLT crossing sign

The improvement of the u64/s64 range refinement fixed the invariant
violation that was happening on this test for BPF_JSLT when crossing the
sign boundary.

After this patch, we have one test remaining with a known invariant
violation. It's the same test as fixed here but for 32 bits ranges.

Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ad046fb0016428f1a33c3b81617aabf31b51183f.1753695655.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
index 41f4389e08c7..34b3f259b7a4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
@@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ l0_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
 SEC("xdp")
 __description("bound check with JMP_JSLT for crossing 64-bit signed boundary")
 __success __retval(0)
-__flag(!BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS) /* known invariants violation */
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS)
 __naked void crossing_64_bit_signed_boundary_2(void)
 {
 	asm volatile ("					\
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5dbb19b16ac498b0b7f3a8a85f9d25d6d8af397d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2025 11:52:00 +0200
Subject: bpf: Add third round of bounds deduction

Commit d7f008738171 ("bpf: try harder to deduce register bounds from
different numeric domains") added a second call to __reg_deduce_bounds
in reg_bounds_sync because a single call wasn't enough to converge to a
fixed point in terms of register bounds.

With patch "bpf: Improve bounds when s64 crosses sign boundary" from
this series, Eduard noticed that calling __reg_deduce_bounds twice isn't
enough anymore to converge. The first selftest added in "selftests/bpf:
Test cross-sign 64bits range refinement" highlights the need for a third
call to __reg_deduce_bounds. After instruction 7, reg_bounds_sync
performs the following bounds deduction:

  reg_bounds_sync entry:          scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,smin32=-783,smax32=-146)
  __update_reg_bounds:            scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,smin32=-783,smax32=-146)
  __reg_deduce_bounds:
      __reg32_deduce_bounds:      scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,smin32=-783,smax32=-146,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e)
      __reg64_deduce_bounds:      scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,smin32=-783,smax32=-146,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e)
      __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds:  scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,umin=umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,smax32=-146,umax32=0xffffff6e)
  __reg_deduce_bounds:
      __reg32_deduce_bounds:      scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,umin=umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,smax32=-146,umax32=0xffffff6e)
      __reg64_deduce_bounds:      scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e)
      __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds:  scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e)
  __reg_bound_offset:             scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffc00; 0x3ff))
  __update_reg_bounds:            scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffc00; 0x3ff))

In particular, notice how:
1. In the first call to __reg_deduce_bounds, __reg32_deduce_bounds
   learns new u32 bounds.
2. __reg64_deduce_bounds is unable to improve bounds at this point.
3. __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds derives new u64 bounds from the u32 bounds.
4. In the second call to __reg_deduce_bounds, __reg64_deduce_bounds
   improves the smax and umin bounds thanks to patch "bpf: Improve
   bounds when s64 crosses sign boundary" from this series.
5. Subsequent functions are unable to improve the ranges further (only
   tnums). Yet, a better smin32 bound could be learned from the smin
   bound.

__reg32_deduce_bounds is able to improve smin32 from smin, but for that
we need a third call to __reg_deduce_bounds.

As discussed in [1], there may be a better way to organize the deduction
rules to learn the same information with less calls to the same
functions. Such an optimization requires further analysis and is
orthogonal to the present patchset.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/aIKtSK9LjQXB8FLY@mail.gmail.com/ [1]
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/79619d3b42e5525e0e174ed534b75879a5ba15de.1753695655.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                               | 1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 251e06dc07eb..72e3f2b03349 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2672,6 +2672,7 @@ static void reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 	/* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */
 	__reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
 	__reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
+	__reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
 	/* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
 	__reg_bound_offset(reg);
 	/* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
index 34b3f259b7a4..87a2c60d86e6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
@@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ l0_%=:	r0 = 0;				\
 SEC("socket")
 __description("bounds deduction cross sign boundary, negative overlap")
 __success __log_level(2) __flag(BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS)
-__msg("7: (1f) r0 -= r6 {{.*}} R0=scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffc00; 0x3ff))")
+__msg("7: (1f) r0 -= r6 {{.*}} R0=scalar(smin=smin32=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,umin32=0xfffffd71,umax32=0xffffff6e,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffc00; 0x3ff))")
 __retval(0)
 __naked void bounds_deduct_negative_overlap(void)
 {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a5a6b29a700fda1dd766cc42dde2cbba9b19f470 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev>
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2025 23:14:51 +0800
Subject: bpf: Show precise rejected function when attaching fexit/fmod_ret to
 __noreturn functions

With this change, we know the precise rejected function name when
attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn functions from log.

$ ./fexit
libbpf: prog 'fexit': BPF program load failed: -EINVAL
libbpf: prog 'fexit': -- BEGIN PROG LOAD LOG --
Attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn function 'do_exit' is rejected.

Suggested-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250724151454.499040-2-kafai.wan@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                               | 3 ++-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index e50d3d43be67..4bf7392fd2c3 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -23985,7 +23985,8 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	} else if ((prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT ||
 		   prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) &&
 		   btf_id_set_contains(&noreturn_deny, btf_id)) {
-		verbose(env, "Attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn functions is rejected.\n");
+		verbose(env, "Attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn function '%s' is rejected.\n",
+			tgt_info.tgt_name);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c
index 54654539f550..b1c33d958ae2 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
 
 SEC("fexit/do_exit")
-__failure __msg("Attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn functions is rejected.")
+__failure __msg("Attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn function 'do_exit' is rejected.")
 int BPF_PROG(noreturns)
 {
 	return 0;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a32f6f17a74d0e897b48bd4c697cc9782a38bf4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev>
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2025 23:14:53 +0800
Subject: selftests/bpf: Add selftest for attaching tracing programs to
 functions in deny list

The result:

 $ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs -t tracing_failure/tracing_deny
 #468/3   tracing_failure/tracing_deny:OK
 #468     tracing_failure:OK
 Summary: 1/1 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

Signed-off-by: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250724151454.499040-4-kafai.wan@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tracing_failure.c     | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c  |  6 ++++
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+)

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tracing_failure.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tracing_failure.c
index a222df765bc3..39b59276884a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tracing_failure.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tracing_failure.c
@@ -28,10 +28,43 @@ out:
 	tracing_failure__destroy(skel);
 }
 
+static void test_tracing_deny(void)
+{
+	struct tracing_failure *skel;
+	char log_buf[256];
+	int btf_id, err;
+
+	/* __rcu_read_lock depends on CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU */
+	btf_id = libbpf_find_vmlinux_btf_id("__rcu_read_lock", BPF_TRACE_FENTRY);
+	if (btf_id <= 0) {
+		test__skip();
+		return;
+	}
+
+	skel = tracing_failure__open();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "tracing_failure__open"))
+		return;
+
+	bpf_program__set_autoload(skel->progs.tracing_deny, true);
+	bpf_program__set_log_buf(skel->progs.tracing_deny, log_buf, sizeof(log_buf));
+
+	err = tracing_failure__load(skel);
+	if (!ASSERT_ERR(err, "tracing_failure__load"))
+		goto out;
+
+	ASSERT_HAS_SUBSTR(log_buf,
+			  "Attaching tracing programs to function '__rcu_read_lock' is rejected.",
+			  "log_buf");
+out:
+	tracing_failure__destroy(skel);
+}
+
 void test_tracing_failure(void)
 {
 	if (test__start_subtest("bpf_spin_lock"))
 		test_bpf_spin_lock(true);
 	if (test__start_subtest("bpf_spin_unlock"))
 		test_bpf_spin_lock(false);
+	if (test__start_subtest("tracing_deny"))
+		test_tracing_deny();
 }
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c
index d41665d2ec8c..58d2777014e1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c
@@ -18,3 +18,9 @@ int BPF_PROG(test_spin_unlock, struct bpf_spin_lock *lock)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+SEC("?fentry/__rcu_read_lock")
+int BPF_PROG(tracing_deny)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 51d3750aba798335568970f3157629c6ca5dc91a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev>
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2025 23:14:54 +0800
Subject: selftests/bpf: Migrate fexit_noreturns case into tracing_failure test
 suite

Delete fexit_noreturns.c files and migrate the cases into
tracing_failure.c files.

The result:

 $ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs -t tracing_failure/fexit_noreturns
 #467/4   tracing_failure/fexit_noreturns:OK
 #467     tracing_failure:OK
 Summary: 1/1 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

Signed-off-by: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250724151454.499040-5-kafai.wan@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fexit_noreturns.c     |  9 -----
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tracing_failure.c     | 47 +++++++++++++++-------
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c  | 15 -------
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c  |  6 +++
 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fexit_noreturns.c
 delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c

(limited to 'tools/testing')

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fexit_noreturns.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fexit_noreturns.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 568d3aa48a78..000000000000
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fexit_noreturns.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-
-#include <test_progs.h>
-#include "fexit_noreturns.skel.h"
-
-void test_fexit_noreturns(void)
-{
-	RUN_TESTS(fexit_noreturns);
-}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tracing_failure.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tracing_failure.c
index 39b59276884a..10e231965589 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tracing_failure.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tracing_failure.c
@@ -28,37 +28,54 @@ out:
 	tracing_failure__destroy(skel);
 }
 
-static void test_tracing_deny(void)
+static void test_tracing_fail_prog(const char *prog_name, const char *exp_msg)
 {
 	struct tracing_failure *skel;
+	struct bpf_program *prog;
 	char log_buf[256];
-	int btf_id, err;
-
-	/* __rcu_read_lock depends on CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU */
-	btf_id = libbpf_find_vmlinux_btf_id("__rcu_read_lock", BPF_TRACE_FENTRY);
-	if (btf_id <= 0) {
-		test__skip();
-		return;
-	}
+	int err;
 
 	skel = tracing_failure__open();
 	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "tracing_failure__open"))
 		return;
 
-	bpf_program__set_autoload(skel->progs.tracing_deny, true);
-	bpf_program__set_log_buf(skel->progs.tracing_deny, log_buf, sizeof(log_buf));
+	prog = bpf_object__find_program_by_name(skel->obj, prog_name);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(prog, "bpf_object__find_program_by_name"))
+		goto out;
+
+	bpf_program__set_autoload(prog, true);
+	bpf_program__set_log_buf(prog, log_buf, sizeof(log_buf));
 
 	err = tracing_failure__load(skel);
 	if (!ASSERT_ERR(err, "tracing_failure__load"))
 		goto out;
 
-	ASSERT_HAS_SUBSTR(log_buf,
-			  "Attaching tracing programs to function '__rcu_read_lock' is rejected.",
-			  "log_buf");
+	ASSERT_HAS_SUBSTR(log_buf, exp_msg, "log_buf");
 out:
 	tracing_failure__destroy(skel);
 }
 
+static void test_tracing_deny(void)
+{
+	int btf_id;
+
+	/* __rcu_read_lock depends on CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU */
+	btf_id = libbpf_find_vmlinux_btf_id("__rcu_read_lock", BPF_TRACE_FENTRY);
+	if (btf_id <= 0) {
+		test__skip();
+		return;
+	}
+
+	test_tracing_fail_prog("tracing_deny",
+			       "Attaching tracing programs to function '__rcu_read_lock' is rejected.");
+}
+
+static void test_fexit_noreturns(void)
+{
+	test_tracing_fail_prog("fexit_noreturns",
+			       "Attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn function 'do_exit' is rejected.");
+}
+
 void test_tracing_failure(void)
 {
 	if (test__start_subtest("bpf_spin_lock"))
@@ -67,4 +84,6 @@ void test_tracing_failure(void)
 		test_bpf_spin_lock(false);
 	if (test__start_subtest("tracing_deny"))
 		test_tracing_deny();
+	if (test__start_subtest("fexit_noreturns"))
+		test_fexit_noreturns();
 }
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c
deleted file mode 100644
index b1c33d958ae2..000000000000
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/fexit_noreturns.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-
-#include <linux/bpf.h>
-#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
-#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
-#include "bpf_misc.h"
-
-char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-
-SEC("fexit/do_exit")
-__failure __msg("Attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn function 'do_exit' is rejected.")
-int BPF_PROG(noreturns)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c
index 58d2777014e1..65e485c4468c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tracing_failure.c
@@ -24,3 +24,9 @@ int BPF_PROG(tracing_deny)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+SEC("?fexit/do_exit")
+int BPF_PROG(fexit_noreturns)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
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