From c77cecee52e9b599da1f8ffd9170d4374c99a345 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2013 23:37:49 +0100 Subject: Replace a bunch of file->dentry->d_inode refs with file_inode() Replace a bunch of file->dentry->d_inode refs with file_inode(). In __fput(), use file->f_inode instead so as not to be affected by any tricks that file_inode() might grow. Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 6c491a63128e..e9508d5bbfcf 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup); static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) { struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; - struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; int must_measure; bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 13f8e9810bff12d01807b6f92329111f45218235 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2013 23:37:55 +0100 Subject: SELinux: Institute file_path_has_perm() Create a file_path_has_perm() function that is like path_has_perm() but instead takes a file struct that is the source of both the path and the inode (rather than getting the inode from the dentry in the path). This is then used where appropriate. This will be useful for situations like unionmount where it will be possible to have an apparently-negative dentry (eg. a fallthrough) that is open with the file struct pointing to an inode on the lower fs. Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 5c6f2cd2d095..db1fca990a24 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1547,6 +1547,18 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); } +/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */ +static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, + struct file *file, + u32 av) +{ + struct common_audit_data ad; + + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; + ad.u.path = file->f_path; + return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad, 0); +} + /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to access an inode in a given way. Check access to the descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to @@ -2141,14 +2153,14 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, struct tty_file_private *file_priv; /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. - Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather - than using file_has_perm, as this particular open - file may belong to another process and we are only - interested in the inode-based check here. */ + Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly + rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular + open file may belong to another process and we are + only interested in the inode-based check here. */ file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct tty_file_private, list); file = file_priv->file; - if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE)) + if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE)) drop_tty = 1; } spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock); @@ -3259,7 +3271,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) * new inode label or new policy. * This check is not redundant - do not remove. */ - return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file)); + return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); } /* task security operations */ -- cgit v1.2.3