From bafbb9c73241760023d8981191ddd30bb1c6dbac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 17:05:47 -0400 Subject: tcp: eliminate negative reordering in tcp_clean_rtx_queue tcp_ack() can call tcp_fragment() which may dededuct the value tp->fackets_out when MSS changes. When prior_fackets is larger than tp->fackets_out, tcp_clean_rtx_queue() can invoke tcp_update_reordering() with negative values. This results in absurd tp->reodering values higher than sysctl_tcp_max_reordering. Note that tcp_update_reordering indeeds sets tp->reordering to min(sysctl_tcp_max_reordering, metric), but because the comparison is signed, a negative metric always wins. Fixes: c7caf8d3ed7a ("[TCP]: Fix reord detection due to snd_una covered holes") Reported-by: Rebecca Isaacs Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 06e2dbc2b4a2..174d4376baa5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -3190,7 +3190,7 @@ static int tcp_clean_rtx_queue(struct sock *sk, int prior_fackets, int delta; /* Non-retransmitted hole got filled? That's reordering */ - if (reord < prior_fackets) + if (reord < prior_fackets && reord <= tp->fackets_out) tcp_update_reordering(sk, tp->fackets_out - reord, 0); delta = tcp_is_fack(tp) ? pkts_acked : -- cgit v1.2.3 From bcfc7d33110b0f33069d74138eeb7ca9acbb3c85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Winter Date: Tue, 16 May 2017 10:14:44 +1200 Subject: ipmr: vrf: Find VIFs using the actual device The skb->dev that is passed into ip_mr_input is the loX device for VRFs. When we lookup a vif for this dev, none is found as we do not create vifs for loopbacks. Instead lookup a vif for the actual device that the packet was received on, eg the vlan. Signed-off-by: Thomas Winter cc: David Ahern cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov cc: roopa Acked-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c index 3a02d52ed50e..551de4d023a8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c @@ -1980,6 +1980,20 @@ int ip_mr_input(struct sk_buff *skb) struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev); int local = skb_rtable(skb)->rt_flags & RTCF_LOCAL; struct mr_table *mrt; + struct net_device *dev; + + /* skb->dev passed in is the loX master dev for vrfs. + * As there are no vifs associated with loopback devices, + * get the proper interface that does have a vif associated with it. + */ + dev = skb->dev; + if (netif_is_l3_master(skb->dev)) { + dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, IPCB(skb)->iif); + if (!dev) { + kfree_skb(skb); + return -ENODEV; + } + } /* Packet is looped back after forward, it should not be * forwarded second time, but still can be delivered locally. @@ -2017,7 +2031,7 @@ int ip_mr_input(struct sk_buff *skb) /* already under rcu_read_lock() */ cache = ipmr_cache_find(mrt, ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); if (!cache) { - int vif = ipmr_find_vif(mrt, skb->dev); + int vif = ipmr_find_vif(mrt, dev); if (vif >= 0) cache = ipmr_cache_find_any(mrt, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, @@ -2037,7 +2051,7 @@ int ip_mr_input(struct sk_buff *skb) } read_lock(&mrt_lock); - vif = ipmr_find_vif(mrt, skb->dev); + vif = ipmr_find_vif(mrt, dev); if (vif >= 0) { int err2 = ipmr_cache_unresolved(mrt, vif, skb); read_unlock(&mrt_lock); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 263eec9b2a82e8697d064709414914b5b10ac538 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ursula Braun Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 17:33:37 +0200 Subject: smc: switch to usage of IB_PD_UNSAFE_GLOBAL_RKEY Currently, SMC enables remote access to physical memory when a user has successfully configured and established an SMC-connection until ten minutes after the last SMC connection is closed. Because this is considered a security risk, drivers are supposed to use IB_PD_UNSAFE_GLOBAL_RKEY in such a case. This patch changes the current SMC code to use IB_PD_UNSAFE_GLOBAL_RKEY. This improves user awareness, but does not remove the security risk itself. Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/smc/smc_clc.c | 4 ++-- net/smc/smc_core.c | 16 +++------------- net/smc/smc_core.h | 2 +- net/smc/smc_ib.c | 21 ++------------------- net/smc/smc_ib.h | 2 -- 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/smc/smc_clc.c b/net/smc/smc_clc.c index e41f594a1e1d..03ec058d18df 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_clc.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_clc.c @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ int smc_clc_send_confirm(struct smc_sock *smc) memcpy(&cclc.lcl.mac, &link->smcibdev->mac[link->ibport - 1], ETH_ALEN); hton24(cclc.qpn, link->roce_qp->qp_num); cclc.rmb_rkey = - htonl(conn->rmb_desc->mr_rx[SMC_SINGLE_LINK]->rkey); + htonl(conn->rmb_desc->rkey[SMC_SINGLE_LINK]); cclc.conn_idx = 1; /* for now: 1 RMB = 1 RMBE */ cclc.rmbe_alert_token = htonl(conn->alert_token_local); cclc.qp_mtu = min(link->path_mtu, link->peer_mtu); @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ int smc_clc_send_accept(struct smc_sock *new_smc, int srv_first_contact) memcpy(&aclc.lcl.mac, link->smcibdev->mac[link->ibport - 1], ETH_ALEN); hton24(aclc.qpn, link->roce_qp->qp_num); aclc.rmb_rkey = - htonl(conn->rmb_desc->mr_rx[SMC_SINGLE_LINK]->rkey); + htonl(conn->rmb_desc->rkey[SMC_SINGLE_LINK]); aclc.conn_idx = 1; /* as long as 1 RMB = 1 RMBE */ aclc.rmbe_alert_token = htonl(conn->alert_token_local); aclc.qp_mtu = link->path_mtu; diff --git a/net/smc/smc_core.c b/net/smc/smc_core.c index 65020e93ff21..3ac09a629ea1 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_core.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_core.c @@ -613,19 +613,8 @@ int smc_rmb_create(struct smc_sock *smc) rmb_desc = NULL; continue; /* if mapping failed, try smaller one */ } - rc = smc_ib_get_memory_region(lgr->lnk[SMC_SINGLE_LINK].roce_pd, - IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_WRITE | - IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE, - &rmb_desc->mr_rx[SMC_SINGLE_LINK]); - if (rc) { - smc_ib_buf_unmap(lgr->lnk[SMC_SINGLE_LINK].smcibdev, - tmp_bufsize, rmb_desc, - DMA_FROM_DEVICE); - kfree(rmb_desc->cpu_addr); - kfree(rmb_desc); - rmb_desc = NULL; - continue; - } + rmb_desc->rkey[SMC_SINGLE_LINK] = + lgr->lnk[SMC_SINGLE_LINK].roce_pd->unsafe_global_rkey; rmb_desc->used = 1; write_lock_bh(&lgr->rmbs_lock); list_add(&rmb_desc->list, @@ -668,6 +657,7 @@ int smc_rmb_rtoken_handling(struct smc_connection *conn, for (i = 0; i < SMC_RMBS_PER_LGR_MAX; i++) { if ((lgr->rtokens[i][SMC_SINGLE_LINK].rkey == rkey) && + (lgr->rtokens[i][SMC_SINGLE_LINK].dma_addr == dma_addr) && test_bit(i, lgr->rtokens_used_mask)) { conn->rtoken_idx = i; return 0; diff --git a/net/smc/smc_core.h b/net/smc/smc_core.h index 27eb38056a27..b013cb43a327 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_core.h +++ b/net/smc/smc_core.h @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ struct smc_buf_desc { u64 dma_addr[SMC_LINKS_PER_LGR_MAX]; /* mapped address of buffer */ void *cpu_addr; /* virtual address of buffer */ - struct ib_mr *mr_rx[SMC_LINKS_PER_LGR_MAX]; + u32 rkey[SMC_LINKS_PER_LGR_MAX]; /* for rmb only: * rkey provided to peer */ diff --git a/net/smc/smc_ib.c b/net/smc/smc_ib.c index cb69ab977cd7..b31715505a35 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_ib.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_ib.c @@ -37,24 +37,6 @@ u8 local_systemid[SMC_SYSTEMID_LEN] = SMC_LOCAL_SYSTEMID_RESET; /* unique system * identifier */ -int smc_ib_get_memory_region(struct ib_pd *pd, int access_flags, - struct ib_mr **mr) -{ - int rc; - - if (*mr) - return 0; /* already done */ - - /* obtain unique key - - * next invocation of get_dma_mr returns a different key! - */ - *mr = pd->device->get_dma_mr(pd, access_flags); - rc = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(*mr); - if (IS_ERR(*mr)) - *mr = NULL; - return rc; -} - static int smc_ib_modify_qp_init(struct smc_link *lnk) { struct ib_qp_attr qp_attr; @@ -210,7 +192,8 @@ int smc_ib_create_protection_domain(struct smc_link *lnk) { int rc; - lnk->roce_pd = ib_alloc_pd(lnk->smcibdev->ibdev, 0); + lnk->roce_pd = ib_alloc_pd(lnk->smcibdev->ibdev, + IB_PD_UNSAFE_GLOBAL_RKEY); rc = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(lnk->roce_pd); if (IS_ERR(lnk->roce_pd)) lnk->roce_pd = NULL; diff --git a/net/smc/smc_ib.h b/net/smc/smc_ib.h index 7e1f0e24d177..b567152a526d 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_ib.h +++ b/net/smc/smc_ib.h @@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ void smc_ib_dealloc_protection_domain(struct smc_link *lnk); int smc_ib_create_protection_domain(struct smc_link *lnk); void smc_ib_destroy_queue_pair(struct smc_link *lnk); int smc_ib_create_queue_pair(struct smc_link *lnk); -int smc_ib_get_memory_region(struct ib_pd *pd, int access_flags, - struct ib_mr **mr); int smc_ib_ready_link(struct smc_link *lnk); int smc_ib_modify_qp_rts(struct smc_link *lnk); int smc_ib_modify_qp_reset(struct smc_link *lnk); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 19a0f7e37c0761a0a1cbf550705a6063c9675223 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoph Hellwig Date: Tue, 16 May 2017 09:51:38 +0300 Subject: net/smc: Add warning about remote memory exposure The driver explicitly bypasses APIs to register all memory once a connection is made, and thus allows remote access to memory. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Acked-by: Ursula Braun Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/smc/Kconfig | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/smc/Kconfig b/net/smc/Kconfig index c717ef0896aa..33954852f3f8 100644 --- a/net/smc/Kconfig +++ b/net/smc/Kconfig @@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ config SMC The Linux implementation of the SMC-R solution is designed as a separate socket family SMC. + Warning: SMC will expose all memory for remote reads and writes + once a connection is established. Don't enable this option except + for tightly controlled lab environment. + Select this option if you want to run SMC socket applications config SMC_DIAG -- cgit v1.2.3 From f6c5775ff0bfa62b072face6bf1d40f659f194b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Ahern Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 23:19:17 -0700 Subject: net: Improve handling of failures on link and route dumps In general, rtnetlink dumps do not anticipate failure to dump a single object (e.g., link or route) on a single pass. As both route and link objects have grown via more attributes, that is no longer a given. netlink dumps can handle a failure if the dump function returns an error; specifically, netlink_dump adds the return code to the response if it is <= 0 so userspace is notified of the failure. The missing piece is the rtnetlink dump functions returning the error. Fix route and link dump functions to return the errors if no object is added to an skb (detected by skb->len != 0). IPv6 route dumps (rt6_dump_route) already return the error; this patch updates IPv4 and link dumps. Other dump functions may need to be ajusted as well. Reported-by: Jan Moskyto Matejka Signed-off-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/rtnetlink.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c | 15 +++++++++++---- net/ipv4/fib_trie.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------ 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c index d7f82c3450b1..49a279a7cc15 100644 --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c @@ -1627,13 +1627,13 @@ static int rtnl_dump_ifinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, 0, flags, ext_filter_mask); - /* If we ran out of room on the first message, - * we're in trouble - */ - WARN_ON((err == -EMSGSIZE) && (skb->len == 0)); - if (err < 0) - goto out; + if (err < 0) { + if (likely(skb->len)) + goto out; + + goto out_err; + } nl_dump_check_consistent(cb, nlmsg_hdr(skb)); cont: @@ -1641,10 +1641,12 @@ cont: } } out: + err = skb->len; +out_err: cb->args[1] = idx; cb->args[0] = h; - return skb->len; + return err; } int rtnl_nla_parse_ifla(struct nlattr **tb, const struct nlattr *head, int len, @@ -3453,8 +3455,12 @@ static int rtnl_bridge_getlink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) err = br_dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_getlink( skb, portid, seq, dev, filter_mask, NLM_F_MULTI); - if (err < 0 && err != -EOPNOTSUPP) - break; + if (err < 0 && err != -EOPNOTSUPP) { + if (likely(skb->len)) + break; + + goto out_err; + } } idx++; } @@ -3465,16 +3471,22 @@ static int rtnl_bridge_getlink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) seq, dev, filter_mask, NLM_F_MULTI); - if (err < 0 && err != -EOPNOTSUPP) - break; + if (err < 0 && err != -EOPNOTSUPP) { + if (likely(skb->len)) + break; + + goto out_err; + } } idx++; } } + err = skb->len; +out_err: rcu_read_unlock(); cb->args[0] = idx; - return skb->len; + return err; } static inline size_t bridge_nlmsg_size(void) diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c index 39bd1edee676..83e3ed258467 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c @@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ static int inet_dump_fib(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) unsigned int e = 0, s_e; struct fib_table *tb; struct hlist_head *head; - int dumped = 0; + int dumped = 0, err; if (nlmsg_len(cb->nlh) >= sizeof(struct rtmsg) && ((struct rtmsg *) nlmsg_data(cb->nlh))->rtm_flags & RTM_F_CLONED) @@ -783,20 +783,27 @@ static int inet_dump_fib(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) if (dumped) memset(&cb->args[2], 0, sizeof(cb->args) - 2 * sizeof(cb->args[0])); - if (fib_table_dump(tb, skb, cb) < 0) - goto out; + err = fib_table_dump(tb, skb, cb); + if (err < 0) { + if (likely(skb->len)) + goto out; + + goto out_err; + } dumped = 1; next: e++; } } out: + err = skb->len; +out_err: rcu_read_unlock(); cb->args[1] = e; cb->args[0] = h; - return skb->len; + return err; } /* Prepare and feed intra-kernel routing request. diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c index 1201409ba1dc..51182ff2b441 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c @@ -1983,6 +1983,8 @@ static int fn_trie_dump_leaf(struct key_vector *l, struct fib_table *tb, /* rcu_read_lock is hold by caller */ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(fa, &l->leaf, fa_list) { + int err; + if (i < s_i) { i++; continue; @@ -1993,17 +1995,14 @@ static int fn_trie_dump_leaf(struct key_vector *l, struct fib_table *tb, continue; } - if (fib_dump_info(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid, - cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, - RTM_NEWROUTE, - tb->tb_id, - fa->fa_type, - xkey, - KEYLENGTH - fa->fa_slen, - fa->fa_tos, - fa->fa_info, NLM_F_MULTI) < 0) { + err = fib_dump_info(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid, + cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, RTM_NEWROUTE, + tb->tb_id, fa->fa_type, + xkey, KEYLENGTH - fa->fa_slen, + fa->fa_tos, fa->fa_info, NLM_F_MULTI); + if (err < 0) { cb->args[4] = i; - return -1; + return err; } i++; } @@ -2025,10 +2024,13 @@ int fib_table_dump(struct fib_table *tb, struct sk_buff *skb, t_key key = cb->args[3]; while ((l = leaf_walk_rcu(&tp, key)) != NULL) { - if (fn_trie_dump_leaf(l, tb, skb, cb) < 0) { + int err; + + err = fn_trie_dump_leaf(l, tb, skb, cb); + if (err < 0) { cb->args[3] = key; cb->args[2] = count; - return -1; + return err; } ++count; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 23d268eb240954e6e78f7cfab04f2b1e79f84489 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ihar Hrachyshka Date: Tue, 16 May 2017 07:53:43 -0700 Subject: arp: honour gratuitous ARP _replies_ When arp_accept is 1, gratuitous ARPs are supposed to override matching entries irrespective of whether they arrive during locktime. This was implemented in commit 56022a8fdd87 ("ipv4: arp: update neighbour address when a gratuitous arp is received and arp_accept is set") There is a glitch in the patch though. RFC 2002, section 4.6, "ARP, Proxy ARP, and Gratuitous ARP", defines gratuitous ARPs so that they can be either of Request or Reply type. Those Reply gratuitous ARPs can be triggered with standard tooling, for example, arping -A option does just that. This patch fixes the glitch, making both Request and Reply flavours of gratuitous ARPs to behave identically. As per RFC, if gratuitous ARPs are of Reply type, their Target Hardware Address field should also be set to the link-layer address to which this cache entry should be updated. The field is present in ARP over Ethernet but not in IEEE 1394. In this patch, I don't consider any broadcasted ARP replies as gratuitous if the field is not present, to conform the standard. It's not clear whether there is such a thing for IEEE 1394 as a gratuitous ARP reply; until it's cleared up, we will ignore such broadcasts. Note that they will still update existing ARP cache entries, assuming they arrive out of locktime time interval. Signed-off-by: Ihar Hrachyshka Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/arp.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/arp.c b/net/ipv4/arp.c index 0937b34c27ca..d54345a06f72 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/arp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/arp.c @@ -653,6 +653,7 @@ static int arp_process(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) unsigned char *arp_ptr; struct rtable *rt; unsigned char *sha; + unsigned char *tha = NULL; __be32 sip, tip; u16 dev_type = dev->type; int addr_type; @@ -724,6 +725,7 @@ static int arp_process(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) break; #endif default: + tha = arp_ptr; arp_ptr += dev->addr_len; } memcpy(&tip, arp_ptr, 4); @@ -842,8 +844,18 @@ static int arp_process(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) It is possible, that this option should be enabled for some devices (strip is candidate) */ - is_garp = arp->ar_op == htons(ARPOP_REQUEST) && tip == sip && - addr_type == RTN_UNICAST; + is_garp = tip == sip && addr_type == RTN_UNICAST; + + /* Unsolicited ARP _replies_ also require target hwaddr to be + * the same as source. + */ + if (is_garp && arp->ar_op == htons(ARPOP_REPLY)) + is_garp = + /* IPv4 over IEEE 1394 doesn't provide target + * hardware address field in its ARP payload. + */ + tha && + !memcmp(tha, sha, dev->addr_len); if (!n && ((arp->ar_op == htons(ARPOP_REPLY) && -- cgit v1.2.3 From 77d7123342dcf6442341b67816321d71da8b2b16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ihar Hrachyshka Date: Tue, 16 May 2017 08:44:24 -0700 Subject: neighbour: update neigh timestamps iff update is effective It's a common practice to send gratuitous ARPs after moving an IP address to another device to speed up healing of a service. To fulfill service availability constraints, the timing of network peers updating their caches to point to a new location of an IP address can be particularly important. Sometimes neigh_update calls won't touch neither lladdr nor state, for example if an update arrives in locktime interval. The neigh->updated value is tested by the protocol specific neigh code, which in turn will influence whether NEIGH_UPDATE_F_OVERRIDE gets set in the call to neigh_update() or not. As a result, we may effectively ignore the update request, bailing out of touching the neigh entry, except that we still bump its timestamps inside neigh_update. This may be a problem for updates arriving in quick succession. For example, consider the following scenario: A service is moved to another device with its IP address. The new device sends three gratuitous ARP requests into the network with ~1 seconds interval between them. Just before the first request arrives to one of network peer nodes, its neigh entry for the IP address transitions from STALE to DELAY. This transition, among other things, updates neigh->updated. Once the kernel receives the first gratuitous ARP, it ignores it because its arrival time is inside the locktime interval. The kernel still bumps neigh->updated. Then the second gratuitous ARP request arrives, and it's also ignored because it's still in the (new) locktime interval. Same happens for the third request. The node eventually heals itself (after delay_first_probe_time seconds since the initial transition to DELAY state), but it just wasted some time and require a new ARP request/reply round trip. This unfortunate behaviour both puts more load on the network, as well as reduces service availability. This patch changes neigh_update so that it bumps neigh->updated (as well as neigh->confirmed) only once we are sure that either lladdr or entry state will change). In the scenario described above, it means that the second gratuitous ARP request will actually update the entry lladdr. Ideally, we would update the neigh entry on the very first gratuitous ARP request. The locktime mechanism is designed to ignore ARP updates in a short timeframe after a previous ARP update was honoured by the kernel layer. This would require tracking timestamps for state transitions separately from timestamps when actual updates are received. This would probably involve changes in neighbour struct. Therefore, the patch doesn't tackle the issue of the first gratuitous APR ignored, leaving it for a follow-up. Signed-off-by: Ihar Hrachyshka Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/neighbour.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c index 58b0bcc125b5..d274f81fcc2c 100644 --- a/net/core/neighbour.c +++ b/net/core/neighbour.c @@ -1132,10 +1132,6 @@ int neigh_update(struct neighbour *neigh, const u8 *lladdr, u8 new, lladdr = neigh->ha; } - if (new & NUD_CONNECTED) - neigh->confirmed = jiffies; - neigh->updated = jiffies; - /* If entry was valid and address is not changed, do not change entry state, if new one is STALE. */ @@ -1157,6 +1153,16 @@ int neigh_update(struct neighbour *neigh, const u8 *lladdr, u8 new, } } + /* Update timestamps only once we know we will make a change to the + * neighbour entry. Otherwise we risk to move the locktime window with + * noop updates and ignore relevant ARP updates. + */ + if (new != old || lladdr != neigh->ha) { + if (new & NUD_CONNECTED) + neigh->confirmed = jiffies; + neigh->updated = jiffies; + } + if (new != old) { neigh_del_timer(neigh); if (new & NUD_PROBE) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2423496af35d94a87156b063ea5cedffc10a70a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Craig Gallek Date: Tue, 16 May 2017 14:36:23 -0400 Subject: ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller program. The reproducer is basically: int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP); send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE); send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0); The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path. The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data is read outside of it. This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects running out-of-bounds. [ 42.361487] ================================================================== [ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789 [ 42.366469] [ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41 [ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 42.368824] Call Trace: [ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b [ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290 [ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370 [ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0 [ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50 [ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110 [ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0 [ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30 [ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990 [ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690 [ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990 [ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730 [ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160 [ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330 [ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 [ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0 [ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0 [ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0 [ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930 [ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120 [ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290 [ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930 [ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540 [ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380 [ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310 [ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0 [ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0 [ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20 [ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 [ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260 [ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe [ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 [ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383 [ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383 [ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018 [ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad [ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00 [ 42.397257] [ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789: [ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380 [ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0 [ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580 [ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0 [ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0 [ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0 [ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0 [ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930 [ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190 [ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.403718] [ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794: [ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 [ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0 [ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0 [ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60 [ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0 [ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0 [ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40 [ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110 [ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580 [ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190 [ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.409513] [ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780 [ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of [ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980) [ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) [ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c [ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000 [ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 42.415604] [ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 42.418273] ^ [ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419882] ================================================================== Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 4 ++++ net/ipv6/output_core.c | 14 ++++++++------ net/ipv6/udp_offload.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c index 93e58a5e1837..eab36abc9f22 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c @@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *ipv6_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, if (udpfrag) { unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr); + if (unfrag_ip6hlen < 0) + return ERR_PTR(unfrag_ip6hlen); fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)((u8 *)ipv6h + unfrag_ip6hlen); fptr->frag_off = htons(offset); if (skb->next) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c index 58f6288e9ba5..01deecda2f84 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c @@ -598,6 +598,10 @@ int ip6_fragment(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *prevhdr, nexthdr = 0; hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr); + if (hlen < 0) { + err = hlen; + goto fail; + } nexthdr = *prevhdr; mtu = ip6_skb_dst_mtu(skb); diff --git a/net/ipv6/output_core.c b/net/ipv6/output_core.c index cd4252346a32..e9065b8d3af8 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/output_core.c +++ b/net/ipv6/output_core.c @@ -79,14 +79,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ipv6_select_ident); int ip6_find_1stfragopt(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 **nexthdr) { u16 offset = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr); - struct ipv6_opt_hdr *exthdr = - (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(ipv6_hdr(skb) + 1); unsigned int packet_len = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - skb_network_header(skb); int found_rhdr = 0; *nexthdr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->nexthdr; - while (offset + 1 <= packet_len) { + while (offset <= packet_len) { + struct ipv6_opt_hdr *exthdr; switch (**nexthdr) { @@ -107,13 +106,16 @@ int ip6_find_1stfragopt(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 **nexthdr) return offset; } - offset += ipv6_optlen(exthdr); - *nexthdr = &exthdr->nexthdr; + if (offset + sizeof(struct ipv6_opt_hdr) > packet_len) + return -EINVAL; + exthdr = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + offset); + offset += ipv6_optlen(exthdr); + *nexthdr = &exthdr->nexthdr; } - return offset; + return -EINVAL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip6_find_1stfragopt); diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c index ac858c480f2f..b348cff47395 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c @@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, * bytes to insert fragment header. */ unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr); + if (unfrag_ip6hlen < 0) + return ERR_PTR(unfrag_ip6hlen); nexthdr = *prevhdr; *prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT; unfrag_len = (skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb)) + -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9142e9007f2d7ab58a587a1e1d921b0064a339aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 16 May 2017 13:27:53 -0700 Subject: net: fix compile error in skb_orphan_partial() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit If CONFIG_INET is not set, net/core/sock.c can not compile : net/core/sock.c: In function ‘skb_orphan_partial’: net/core/sock.c:1810:2: error: implicit declaration of function ‘skb_is_tcp_pure_ack’ [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] if (skb_is_tcp_pure_ack(skb)) ^ Fix this by always including Fixes: f6ba8d33cfbb ("netem: fix skb_orphan_partial()") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Paul Gortmaker Reported-by: Randy Dunlap Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index e43e71d7856b..727f924b7f91 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -139,10 +139,7 @@ #include -#ifdef CONFIG_INET #include -#endif - #include static DEFINE_MUTEX(proto_list_mutex); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7dd7eb9513bd02184d45f000ab69d78cb1fa1531 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 22:54:11 -0400 Subject: ipv6: Check ip6_find_1stfragopt() return value properly. Do not use unsigned variables to see if it returns a negative error or not. Fixes: 2423496af35d ("ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options") Reported-by: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c | 9 ++++----- net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 7 +++---- net/ipv6/udp_offload.c | 8 +++++--- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c index eab36abc9f22..280268f1dd7b 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c @@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *ipv6_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_offload *ops; int proto; struct frag_hdr *fptr; - unsigned int unfrag_ip6hlen; unsigned int payload_len; u8 *prevhdr; int offset = 0; @@ -116,10 +115,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *ipv6_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, skb->network_header = (u8 *)ipv6h - skb->head; if (udpfrag) { - unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr); - if (unfrag_ip6hlen < 0) - return ERR_PTR(unfrag_ip6hlen); - fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)((u8 *)ipv6h + unfrag_ip6hlen); + int err = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr); + if (err < 0) + return ERR_PTR(err); + fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)((u8 *)ipv6h + err); fptr->frag_off = htons(offset); if (skb->next) fptr->frag_off |= htons(IP6_MF); diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c index 01deecda2f84..d4a31becbd25 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c @@ -597,11 +597,10 @@ int ip6_fragment(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int ptr, offset = 0, err = 0; u8 *prevhdr, nexthdr = 0; - hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr); - if (hlen < 0) { - err = hlen; + err = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr); + if (err < 0) goto fail; - } + hlen = err; nexthdr = *prevhdr; mtu = ip6_skb_dst_mtu(skb); diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c index b348cff47395..a2267f80febb 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 frag_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct frag_hdr); __wsum csum; int tnl_hlen; + int err; mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size; if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss)) @@ -90,9 +91,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, /* Find the unfragmentable header and shift it left by frag_hdr_sz * bytes to insert fragment header. */ - unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr); - if (unfrag_ip6hlen < 0) - return ERR_PTR(unfrag_ip6hlen); + err = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr); + if (err < 0) + return ERR_PTR(err); + unfrag_ip6hlen = err; nexthdr = *prevhdr; *prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT; unfrag_len = (skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb)) + -- cgit v1.2.3 From 64df6d525fcff1630098db9238bfd2b3e092d5c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: linzhang Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 12:05:07 +0800 Subject: net: x25: fix one potential use-after-free issue The function x25_init is not properly unregister related resources on error handler.It is will result in kernel oops if x25_init init failed, so add properly unregister call on error handler. Also, i adjust the coding style and make x25_register_sysctl properly return failure. Signed-off-by: linzhang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/x25.h | 4 ++-- net/x25/af_x25.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- net/x25/sysctl_net_x25.c | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/x25.h b/include/net/x25.h index c383aa4edbf0..6d30a01d281d 100644 --- a/include/net/x25.h +++ b/include/net/x25.h @@ -298,10 +298,10 @@ void x25_check_rbuf(struct sock *); /* sysctl_net_x25.c */ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL -void x25_register_sysctl(void); +int x25_register_sysctl(void); void x25_unregister_sysctl(void); #else -static inline void x25_register_sysctl(void) {}; +static inline int x25_register_sysctl(void) { return 0; }; static inline void x25_unregister_sysctl(void) {}; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ diff --git a/net/x25/af_x25.c b/net/x25/af_x25.c index 8b911c29860e..5a1a98df3499 100644 --- a/net/x25/af_x25.c +++ b/net/x25/af_x25.c @@ -1791,32 +1791,40 @@ void x25_kill_by_neigh(struct x25_neigh *nb) static int __init x25_init(void) { - int rc = proto_register(&x25_proto, 0); + int rc; - if (rc != 0) + rc = proto_register(&x25_proto, 0); + if (rc) goto out; rc = sock_register(&x25_family_ops); - if (rc != 0) + if (rc) goto out_proto; dev_add_pack(&x25_packet_type); rc = register_netdevice_notifier(&x25_dev_notifier); - if (rc != 0) + if (rc) goto out_sock; - pr_info("Linux Version 0.2\n"); + rc = x25_register_sysctl(); + if (rc) + goto out_dev; - x25_register_sysctl(); rc = x25_proc_init(); - if (rc != 0) - goto out_dev; + if (rc) + goto out_sysctl; + + pr_info("Linux Version 0.2\n"); + out: return rc; +out_sysctl: + x25_unregister_sysctl(); out_dev: unregister_netdevice_notifier(&x25_dev_notifier); out_sock: + dev_remove_pack(&x25_packet_type); sock_unregister(AF_X25); out_proto: proto_unregister(&x25_proto); diff --git a/net/x25/sysctl_net_x25.c b/net/x25/sysctl_net_x25.c index a06dfe143c67..ba078c85f0a1 100644 --- a/net/x25/sysctl_net_x25.c +++ b/net/x25/sysctl_net_x25.c @@ -73,9 +73,12 @@ static struct ctl_table x25_table[] = { { }, }; -void __init x25_register_sysctl(void) +int __init x25_register_sysctl(void) { x25_table_header = register_net_sysctl(&init_net, "net/x25", x25_table); + if (!x25_table_header) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; } void x25_unregister_sysctl(void) -- cgit v1.2.3 From a285860211bf257b0e6d522dac6006794be348af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tobias Jungel Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 09:29:12 +0200 Subject: bridge: netlink: check vlan_default_pvid range Currently it is allowed to set the default pvid of a bridge to a value above VLAN_VID_MASK (0xfff). This patch adds a check to br_validate and returns -EINVAL in case the pvid is out of bounds. Reproduce by calling: [root@test ~]# ip l a type bridge [root@test ~]# ip l a type dummy [root@test ~]# ip l s bridge0 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 [root@test ~]# ip l s bridge0 type bridge vlan_default_pvid 9999 [root@test ~]# ip l s dummy0 master bridge0 [root@test ~]# bridge vlan port vlan ids bridge0 9999 PVID Egress Untagged dummy0 9999 PVID Egress Untagged Fixes: 0f963b7592ef ("bridge: netlink: add support for default_pvid") Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov Signed-off-by: Tobias Jungel Acked-by: Sabrina Dubroca Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/bridge/br_netlink.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netlink.c b/net/bridge/br_netlink.c index c5ce7745b230..574f78824d8a 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_netlink.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_netlink.c @@ -835,6 +835,13 @@ static int br_validate(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[]) return -EPROTONOSUPPORT; } } + + if (data[IFLA_BR_VLAN_DEFAULT_PVID]) { + __u16 defpvid = nla_get_u16(data[IFLA_BR_VLAN_DEFAULT_PVID]); + + if (defpvid >= VLAN_VID_MASK) + return -EINVAL; + } #endif return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From a3f96c47c8d4c38be71fdbb440a99968c764ba62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 14:52:16 +0200 Subject: udp: make *udp*_queue_rcv_skb() functions static Since the udp memory accounting refactor, we don't need any more to export the *udp*_queue_rcv_skb(). Make them static and fix a couple of sparse warnings: net/ipv4/udp.c:1615:5: warning: symbol 'udp_queue_rcv_skb' was not declared. Should it be static? net/ipv6/udp.c:572:5: warning: symbol 'udpv6_queue_rcv_skb' was not declared. Should it be static? Fixes: 850cbaddb52d ("udp: use it's own memory accounting schema") Fixes: c915fe13cbaa ("udplite: fix NULL pointer dereference") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/udp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/udp_impl.h | 1 - net/ipv6/udp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv6/udp_impl.h | 1 - 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c index ea6e4cff9faf..1d6219bf2d6b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c @@ -1612,7 +1612,7 @@ static void udp_v4_rehash(struct sock *sk) udp_lib_rehash(sk, new_hash); } -int __udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +static int __udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int rc; @@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_encap_enable); * Note that in the success and error cases, the skb is assumed to * have either been requeued or freed. */ -int udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +static int udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk); int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk); diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp_impl.h b/net/ipv4/udp_impl.h index feb50a16398d..a8cf8c6fb60c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp_impl.h +++ b/net/ipv4/udp_impl.h @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ int udp_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len); int udp_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page, int offset, size_t size, int flags); -int __udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); void udp_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk); #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c index 04862abfe4ec..06ec39b79609 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ out: return; } -int __udpv6_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +static int __udpv6_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int rc; @@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ void udpv6_encap_enable(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(udpv6_encap_enable); -int udpv6_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +static int udpv6_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk); int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk); diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp_impl.h b/net/ipv6/udp_impl.h index e78bdc76dcc3..f180b3d85e31 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/udp_impl.h +++ b/net/ipv6/udp_impl.h @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ int compat_udpv6_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len); int udpv6_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len); -int __udpv6_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); void udpv6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk); #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS -- cgit v1.2.3 From fdcee2cbb8438702ea1b328fb6e0ac5e9a40c7f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 07:16:40 -0700 Subject: sctp: do not inherit ipv6_{mc|ac|fl}_list from parent SCTP needs fixes similar to 83eaddab4378 ("ipv6/dccp: do not inherit ipv6_mc_list from parent"), otherwise bad things can happen. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/ipv6.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/ipv6.c b/net/sctp/ipv6.c index 142b70e959af..f5b45b8b8b16 100644 --- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c +++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c @@ -677,6 +677,9 @@ static struct sock *sctp_v6_create_accept_sk(struct sock *sk, newnp = inet6_sk(newsk); memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo)); + newnp->ipv6_mc_list = NULL; + newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL; + newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL; rcu_read_lock(); opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt); -- cgit v1.2.3