From a3034bf0746d88a00cceda9541534a5721445a24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Veerendranath Jakkam Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2026 20:30:04 +0530 Subject: wifi: cfg80211: Fix bitrate calculation overflow for HE rates An integer overflow occurs in cfg80211_calculate_bitrate_he() when calculating bitrates for high throughput HE configurations. For example, with 160 MHz bandwidth, HE-MCS 13, HE-NSS 4, and HE-GI 0, the multiplication (result * rate->nss) overflows the 32-bit 'result' variable before division by 8, leading to significantly underestimated bitrate values. The overflow occurs because the NSS multiplication operates on a 32-bit integer that cannot accommodate intermediate values exceeding 4,294,967,295. When overflow happens, the value wraps around, producing incorrect bitrates for high MCS and NSS combinations. Fix this by utilizing the 64-bit 'tmp' variable for the NSS multiplication and subsequent divisions via do_div(). This approach preserves full precision throughout the entire calculation, with the final value assigned to 'result' only after completing all operations. Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260109-he_bitrate_overflow-v1-1-95575e466b6e@oss.qualcomm.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/wireless/util.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index 27e8a2f52f04..4f581aed45b7 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -1561,12 +1561,14 @@ static u32 cfg80211_calculate_bitrate_he(struct rate_info *rate) tmp = result; tmp *= SCALE; do_div(tmp, mcs_divisors[rate->mcs]); - result = tmp; /* and take NSS, DCM into account */ - result = (result * rate->nss) / 8; + tmp *= rate->nss; + do_div(tmp, 8); if (rate->he_dcm) - result /= 2; + do_div(tmp, 2); + + result = tmp; return result / 10000; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From db1d0b6ab11f612ea8a327663a578c8946efeee9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miri Korenblit Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2026 19:19:30 +0200 Subject: wifi: mac80211: correctly check if CSA is active We are not adding an interface if an existing one is doing CSA. But the check won't work for MLO station interfaces, since for those, vif->bss_conf is zeroed out. Fix this by checking if any link of the vif has an active CSA. Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260111191912.7ceff62fc561.Ia38d27f42684d1cfd82d930d232bd5dea6ab9282@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/iface.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/iface.c b/net/mac80211/iface.c index 7b0aa24c1f97..515384ca2f8f 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/iface.c +++ b/net/mac80211/iface.c @@ -350,6 +350,8 @@ static int ieee80211_check_concurrent_iface(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, /* we hold the RTNL here so can safely walk the list */ list_for_each_entry(nsdata, &local->interfaces, list) { if (nsdata != sdata && ieee80211_sdata_running(nsdata)) { + struct ieee80211_link_data *link; + /* * Only OCB and monitor mode may coexist */ @@ -376,8 +378,10 @@ static int ieee80211_check_concurrent_iface(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, * will not add another interface while any channel * switch is active. */ - if (nsdata->vif.bss_conf.csa_active) - return -EBUSY; + for_each_link_data(nsdata, link) { + if (link->conf->csa_active) + return -EBUSY; + } /* * The remaining checks are only performed for interfaces -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0386bd321d0f95d041a7b3d7b07643411b044a96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Luczaj Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2026 16:08:18 +0100 Subject: vsock/virtio: Coalesce only linear skb vsock/virtio common tries to coalesce buffers in rx queue: if a linear skb (with a spare tail room) is followed by a small skb (length limited by GOOD_COPY_LEN = 128), an attempt is made to join them. Since the introduction of MSG_ZEROCOPY support, assumption that a small skb will always be linear is incorrect. In the zerocopy case, data is lost and the linear skb is appended with uninitialized kernel memory. Of all 3 supported virtio-based transports, only loopback-transport is affected. G2H virtio-transport rx queue operates on explicitly linear skbs; see virtio_vsock_alloc_linear_skb() in virtio_vsock_rx_fill(). H2G vhost-transport may allocate non-linear skbs, but only for sizes that are not considered for coalescence; see PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER in virtio_vsock_alloc_skb(). Ensure only linear skbs are coalesced. Note that skb_tailroom(last_skb) > 0 guarantees last_skb is linear. Fixes: 581512a6dc93 ("vsock/virtio: MSG_ZEROCOPY flag support") Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260113-vsock-recv-coalescence-v2-1-552b17837cf4@rbox.co Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c index dcc8a1d5851e..26b979ad71f0 100644 --- a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c @@ -1359,9 +1359,11 @@ virtio_transport_recv_enqueue(struct vsock_sock *vsk, /* Try to copy small packets into the buffer of last packet queued, * to avoid wasting memory queueing the entire buffer with a small - * payload. + * payload. Skip non-linear (e.g. zerocopy) skbs; these carry payload + * in skb_shinfo. */ - if (len <= GOOD_COPY_LEN && !skb_queue_empty(&vvs->rx_queue)) { + if (len <= GOOD_COPY_LEN && !skb_queue_empty(&vvs->rx_queue) && + !skb_is_nonlinear(skb)) { struct virtio_vsock_hdr *last_hdr; struct sk_buff *last_skb; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 220d89df1da6ed95ac74883a72a5fb43abf2a586 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2026 17:26:21 +0000 Subject: net: add skb->data_len and (skb>end - skb->tail) to skb_dump() While working on a syzbot report, I found that skb_dump() is lacking two important parts : - skb->data_len. - (skb>end - skb->tail) tailroom is zero if skb is not linear. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260112172621.4188700-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/core/skbuff.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index a56133902c0d..61746c2b95f6 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -1312,14 +1312,15 @@ void skb_dump(const char *level, const struct sk_buff *skb, bool full_pkt) has_mac = skb_mac_header_was_set(skb); has_trans = skb_transport_header_was_set(skb); - printk("%sskb len=%u headroom=%u headlen=%u tailroom=%u\n" - "mac=(%d,%d) mac_len=%u net=(%d,%d) trans=%d\n" + printk("%sskb len=%u data_len=%u headroom=%u headlen=%u tailroom=%u\n" + "end-tail=%u mac=(%d,%d) mac_len=%u net=(%d,%d) trans=%d\n" "shinfo(txflags=%u nr_frags=%u gso(size=%hu type=%u segs=%hu))\n" "csum(0x%x start=%u offset=%u ip_summed=%u complete_sw=%u valid=%u level=%u)\n" "hash(0x%x sw=%u l4=%u) proto=0x%04x pkttype=%u iif=%d\n" "priority=0x%x mark=0x%x alloc_cpu=%u vlan_all=0x%x\n" "encapsulation=%d inner(proto=0x%04x, mac=%u, net=%u, trans=%u)\n", - level, skb->len, headroom, skb_headlen(skb), tailroom, + level, skb->len, skb->data_len, headroom, skb_headlen(skb), + tailroom, skb->end - skb->tail, has_mac ? skb->mac_header : -1, has_mac ? skb_mac_header_len(skb) : -1, skb->mac_len, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4d10edfd1475b69dbd4c47f34b61a3772ece83ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2026 18:54:44 +0000 Subject: l2tp: Fix memleak in l2tp_udp_encap_recv(). syzbot reported memleak of struct l2tp_session, l2tp_tunnel, sock, etc. [0] The cited commit moved down the validation of the protocol version in l2tp_udp_encap_recv(). The new place requires an extra error handling to avoid the memleak. Let's call l2tp_session_put() there. [0]: BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff88810a290200 (size 512): comm "syz.0.17", pid 6086, jiffies 4294944299 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 7d eb 04 0c 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }............... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace (crc babb6a4f): kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:44 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4958 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5656 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x3e0/0x660 mm/slub.c:5669 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:961 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1094 [inline] l2tp_session_create+0x3a/0x3b0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1778 pppol2tp_connect+0x48b/0x920 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c:755 __sys_connect_file+0x7a/0xb0 net/socket.c:2089 __sys_connect+0xde/0x110 net/socket.c:2108 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2114 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2111 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:2111 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xa4/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 364798056f518 ("l2tp: Support different protocol versions with same IP/port quadruple") Reported-by: syzbot+2c42ea4485b29beb0643@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/696693f2.a70a0220.245e30.0001.GAE@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260113185446.2533333-1-kuniyu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c index 687c1366a4d0..70335667ef03 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c @@ -1086,8 +1086,10 @@ int l2tp_udp_encap_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) tunnel = session->tunnel; /* Check protocol version */ - if (version != tunnel->version) + if (version != tunnel->version) { + l2tp_session_put(session); goto invalid; + } if (version == L2TP_HDR_VER_3 && l2tp_v3_ensure_opt_in_linear(session, skb, &ptr, &optr)) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From a80c9d945aef55b23b54838334345f20251dad83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2026 12:10:26 -0500 Subject: sctp: move SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY right after SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT A null-ptr-deref was reported in the SCTP transmit path when SCTP-AUTH key initialization fails: ================================================================== KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f] CPU: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G W 6.6.0 #2 RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_bundle_auth net/sctp/output.c:264 [inline] RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_append_chunk+0xb36/0x1260 net/sctp/output.c:401 Call Trace: sctp_packet_transmit_chunk+0x31/0x250 net/sctp/output.c:189 sctp_outq_flush_data+0xa29/0x26d0 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1111 sctp_outq_flush+0xc80/0x1240 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1217 sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.0+0x19a5/0x62c0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1787 sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1198 [inline] sctp_do_sm+0x1a3/0x670 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1169 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x33e/0x640 net/sctp/associola.c:1052 sctp_inq_push+0x1dd/0x280 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88 sctp_rcv+0x11ae/0x3100 net/sctp/input.c:243 sctp6_rcv+0x3d/0x60 net/sctp/ipv6.c:1127 The issue is triggered when sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() fails in sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack() while processing an INIT_ACK. In this case, the command sequence is currently: - SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT - SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP (T1_INIT) - SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START (T1_COOKIE) - SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE (COOKIE_ECHOED) - SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY - SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO If SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY fails, asoc->shkey remains NULL, while asoc->peer.auth_capable and asoc->peer.peer_chunks have already been set by SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT. This allows a DATA chunk with auth = 1 and shkey = NULL to be queued by sctp_datamsg_from_user(). Since command interpretation stops on failure, no COOKIE_ECHO should been sent via SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO. However, the T1_COOKIE timer has already been started, and it may enqueue a COOKIE_ECHO into the outqueue later. As a result, the DATA chunk can be transmitted together with the COOKIE_ECHO in sctp_outq_flush_data(), leading to the observed issue. Similar to the other places where it calls sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() right after sctp_process_init(), this patch moves the SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY immediately after SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT, before stopping T1_INIT and starting T1_COOKIE. This ensures that if shared key generation fails, authenticated DATA cannot be sent. It also allows the T1_INIT timer to retransmit INIT, giving the client another chance to process INIT_ACK and retry key setup. Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing") Reported-by: Zhen Chen Tested-by: Zhen Chen Signed-off-by: Xin Long Link: https://patch.msgid.link/44881224b375aa8853f5e19b4055a1a56d895813.1768324226.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 3755ba079d07..7b823d759141 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -603,6 +603,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net, sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT, SCTP_PEER_INIT(initchunk)); + /* SCTP-AUTH: generate the association shared keys so that + * we can potentially sign the COOKIE-ECHO. + */ + sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY, SCTP_NULL()); + /* Reset init error count upon receipt of INIT-ACK. */ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_COUNTER_RESET, SCTP_NULL()); @@ -617,11 +622,6 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net, sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE, SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED)); - /* SCTP-AUTH: generate the association shared keys so that - * we can potentially sign the COOKIE-ECHO. - */ - sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY, SCTP_NULL()); - /* 5.1 C) "A" shall then send the State Cookie received in the * INIT ACK chunk in a COOKIE ECHO chunk, ... */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9a56796ad258786d3624eef5aefba394fc9bdded Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2026 17:24:46 +0000 Subject: gue: Fix skb memleak with inner IP protocol 0. syzbot reported skb memleak below. [0] The repro generated a GUE packet with its inner protocol 0. gue_udp_recv() returns -guehdr->proto_ctype for "resubmit" in ip_protocol_deliver_rcu(), but this only works with non-zero protocol number. Let's drop such packets. Note that 0 is a valid number (IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option). I think it is not practical to encap HOPOPT in GUE, so once someone starts to complain, we could pass down a resubmit flag pointer to distinguish two zeros from the upper layer: * no error * resubmit HOPOPT [0] BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888109695a00 (size 240): comm "syz.0.17", pid 6088, jiffies 4294943096 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 40 c2 10 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .@.............. backtrace (crc a84b336f): kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:44 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4958 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x3b4/0x590 mm/slub.c:5270 __build_skb+0x23/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:474 build_skb+0x20/0x190 net/core/skbuff.c:490 __tun_build_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1541 [inline] tun_build_skb+0x4a1/0xa40 drivers/net/tun.c:1636 tun_get_user+0xc12/0x2030 drivers/net/tun.c:1770 tun_chr_write_iter+0x71/0x120 drivers/net/tun.c:1999 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0x45d/0x710 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0xa7/0x170 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xa4/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 37dd0247797b1 ("gue: Receive side for Generic UDP Encapsulation") Reported-by: syzbot+4d8c7d16b0e95c0d0f0d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6965534b.050a0220.38aacd.0001.GAE@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260115172533.693652-2-kuniyu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/ipv4/fou_core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/fou_core.c b/net/ipv4/fou_core.c index 3970b6b7ace5..ab8f309f8925 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fou_core.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fou_core.c @@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ static int gue_udp_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) return gue_control_message(skb, guehdr); proto_ctype = guehdr->proto_ctype; + if (unlikely(!proto_ctype)) + goto drop; + __skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr) + hdrlen); skb_reset_transport_header(skb); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7a9bc9e3f42391e4c187e099263cf7a1c4b69ff5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2026 17:24:48 +0000 Subject: fou: Don't allow 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO. fou_udp_recv() has the same problem mentioned in the previous patch. If FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO is set to 0, skb is not freed by fou_udp_recv() nor "resubmit"-ted in ip_protocol_deliver_rcu(). Let's forbid 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO. Fixes: 23461551c0062 ("fou: Support for foo-over-udp RX path") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260115172533.693652-4-kuniyu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- Documentation/netlink/specs/fou.yaml | 2 ++ net/ipv4/fou_nl.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/Documentation/netlink/specs/fou.yaml b/Documentation/netlink/specs/fou.yaml index 8e7974ec453f..331f1b342b3a 100644 --- a/Documentation/netlink/specs/fou.yaml +++ b/Documentation/netlink/specs/fou.yaml @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ attribute-sets: - name: ipproto type: u8 + checks: + min: 1 - name: type type: u8 diff --git a/net/ipv4/fou_nl.c b/net/ipv4/fou_nl.c index 7a99639204b1..309d5ba983d0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fou_nl.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fou_nl.c @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ const struct nla_policy fou_nl_policy[FOU_ATTR_IFINDEX + 1] = { [FOU_ATTR_PORT] = { .type = NLA_BE16, }, [FOU_ATTR_AF] = { .type = NLA_U8, }, - [FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO] = { .type = NLA_U8, }, + [FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO] = NLA_POLICY_MIN(NLA_U8, 1), [FOU_ATTR_TYPE] = { .type = NLA_U8, }, [FOU_ATTR_REMCSUM_NOPARTIAL] = { .type = NLA_FLAG, }, [FOU_ATTR_LOCAL_V4] = { .type = NLA_U32, }, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7a29f6bf60f2590fe5e9c4decb451e19afad2bcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2026 09:21:39 +0000 Subject: l2tp: avoid one data-race in l2tp_tunnel_del_work() We should read sk->sk_socket only when dealing with kernel sockets. syzbot reported the following data-race: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in l2tp_tunnel_del_work / sk_common_release write to 0xffff88811c182b20 of 8 bytes by task 5365 on cpu 0: sk_set_socket include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline] sock_orphan include/net/sock.h:2118 [inline] sk_common_release+0xae/0x230 net/core/sock.c:4003 udp_lib_close+0x15/0x20 include/net/udp.h:325 inet_release+0xce/0xf0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437 __sock_release net/socket.c:662 [inline] sock_close+0x6b/0x150 net/socket.c:1455 __fput+0x29b/0x650 fs/file_table.c:468 ____fput+0x1c/0x30 fs/file_table.c:496 task_work_run+0x131/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:233 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] __exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:44 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x1fe/0x740 kernel/entry/common.c:75 __exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:226 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:256 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:159 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:194 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x1e1/0x2b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f read to 0xffff88811c182b20 of 8 bytes by task 827 on cpu 1: l2tp_tunnel_del_work+0x2f/0x1a0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1418 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x4ce/0x9d0 kernel/workqueue.c:3340 worker_thread+0x582/0x770 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x489/0x510 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x149/0x290 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 value changed: 0xffff88811b818000 -> 0x0000000000000000 Fixes: d00fa9adc528 ("l2tp: fix races with tunnel socket close") Reported-by: syzbot+7312e82745f7fa2526db@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6968b029.050a0220.58bed.0016.GAE@google.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: James Chapman Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260115092139.3066180-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c index 70335667ef03..f9b0f666600f 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c @@ -1416,8 +1416,6 @@ static void l2tp_tunnel_del_work(struct work_struct *work) { struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = container_of(work, struct l2tp_tunnel, del_work); - struct sock *sk = tunnel->sock; - struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket; l2tp_tunnel_closeall(tunnel); @@ -1425,6 +1423,8 @@ static void l2tp_tunnel_del_work(struct work_struct *work) * the sk API to release it here. */ if (tunnel->fd < 0) { + struct socket *sock = tunnel->sock->sk_socket; + if (sock) { kernel_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR); sock_release(sock); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2c28769a51deb6022d7fbd499987e237a01dd63a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2026 22:03:23 +0000 Subject: rxrpc: Fix recvmsg() unconditional requeue If rxrpc_recvmsg() fails because MSG_DONTWAIT was specified but the call at the front of the recvmsg queue already has its mutex locked, it requeues the call - whether or not the call is already queued. The call may be on the queue because MSG_PEEK was also passed and so the call was not dequeued or because the I/O thread requeued it. The unconditional requeue may then corrupt the recvmsg queue, leading to things like UAFs or refcount underruns. Fix this by only requeuing the call if it isn't already on the queue - and moving it to the front if it is already queued. If we don't queue it, we have to put the ref we obtained by dequeuing it. Also, MSG_PEEK doesn't dequeue the call so shouldn't call rxrpc_notify_socket() for the call if we didn't use up all the data on the queue, so fix that also. Fixes: 540b1c48c37a ("rxrpc: Fix deadlock between call creation and sendmsg/recvmsg") Reported-by: Faith Reported-by: Pumpkin Chang Signed-off-by: David Howells Acked-by: Marc Dionne cc: Nir Ohfeld cc: Willy Tarreau cc: Simon Horman cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/95163.1768428203@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 4 ++++ net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h index de6f6d25767c..869f97c9bf73 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +++ b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h @@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ EM(rxrpc_call_put_kernel, "PUT kernel ") \ EM(rxrpc_call_put_poke, "PUT poke ") \ EM(rxrpc_call_put_recvmsg, "PUT recvmsg ") \ + EM(rxrpc_call_put_recvmsg_peek_nowait, "PUT peek-nwt") \ EM(rxrpc_call_put_release_recvmsg_q, "PUT rls-rcmq") \ EM(rxrpc_call_put_release_sock, "PUT rls-sock") \ EM(rxrpc_call_put_release_sock_tba, "PUT rls-sk-a") \ @@ -340,6 +341,9 @@ EM(rxrpc_call_see_input, "SEE input ") \ EM(rxrpc_call_see_notify_released, "SEE nfy-rlsd") \ EM(rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg, "SEE recvmsg ") \ + EM(rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg_requeue, "SEE recv-rqu") \ + EM(rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg_requeue_first, "SEE recv-rqF") \ + EM(rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg_requeue_move, "SEE recv-rqM") \ EM(rxrpc_call_see_release, "SEE release ") \ EM(rxrpc_call_see_userid_exists, "SEE u-exists") \ EM(rxrpc_call_see_waiting_call, "SEE q-conn ") \ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c index 7fa7e77f6bb9..e1f7513a46db 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c @@ -518,7 +518,8 @@ try_again: if (rxrpc_call_has_failed(call)) goto call_failed; - if (!skb_queue_empty(&call->recvmsg_queue)) + if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK) && + !skb_queue_empty(&call->recvmsg_queue)) rxrpc_notify_socket(call); goto not_yet_complete; @@ -549,11 +550,21 @@ error_unlock_call: error_requeue_call: if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) { spin_lock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock); - list_add(&call->recvmsg_link, &rx->recvmsg_q); - spin_unlock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock); + if (list_empty(&call->recvmsg_link)) { + list_add(&call->recvmsg_link, &rx->recvmsg_q); + rxrpc_see_call(call, rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg_requeue); + spin_unlock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock); + } else if (list_is_first(&call->recvmsg_link, &rx->recvmsg_q)) { + spin_unlock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock); + rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg_requeue_first); + } else { + list_move(&call->recvmsg_link, &rx->recvmsg_q); + spin_unlock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock); + rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg_requeue_move); + } trace_rxrpc_recvmsg(call_debug_id, rxrpc_recvmsg_requeue, 0); } else { - rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_put_recvmsg); + rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_put_recvmsg_peek_nowait); } error_no_call: release_sock(&rx->sk); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 50da4b9d07a7a463e2cfb738f3ad4cff6b2c9c3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jamal Hadi Salim Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2026 11:02:41 -0500 Subject: net/sched: Enforce that teql can only be used as root qdisc MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Design intent of teql is that it is only supposed to be used as root qdisc. We need to check for that constraint. Although not important, I will describe the scenario that unearthed this issue for the curious. GangMin Kim managed to concot a scenario as follows: ROOT qdisc 1:0 (QFQ) ├── class 1:1 (weight=15, lmax=16384) netem with delay 6.4s └── class 1:2 (weight=1, lmax=1514) teql GangMin sends a packet which is enqueued to 1:1 (netem). Any invocation of dequeue by QFQ from this class will not return a packet until after 6.4s. In the meantime, a second packet is sent and it lands on 1:2. teql's enqueue will return success and this will activate class 1:2. Main issue is that teql only updates the parent visible qlen (sch->q.qlen) at dequeue. Since QFQ will only call dequeue if peek succeeds (and teql's peek always returns NULL), dequeue will never be called and thus the qlen will remain as 0. With that in mind, when GangMin updates 1:2's lmax value, the qfq_change_class calls qfq_deact_rm_from_agg. Since the child qdisc's qlen was not incremented, qfq fails to deactivate the class, but still frees its pointers from the aggregate. So when the first packet is rescheduled after 6.4 seconds (netem's delay), a dangling pointer is accessed causing GangMin's causing a UAF. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: GangMin Kim Tested-by: Victor Nogueira Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260114160243.913069-2-jhs@mojatatu.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/sched/sch_teql.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_teql.c b/net/sched/sch_teql.c index 8badec6d82a2..6e4bdaa876ed 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_teql.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_teql.c @@ -178,6 +178,11 @@ static int teql_qdisc_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt, if (m->dev == dev) return -ELOOP; + if (sch->parent != TC_H_ROOT) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "teql can only be used as root"); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } + q->m = m; skb_queue_head_init(&q->q); -- cgit v1.2.3 From d837fbee92453fbb829f950c8e7cf76207d73f33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jamal Hadi Salim Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2026 11:02:42 -0500 Subject: net/sched: qfq: Use cl_is_active to determine whether class is active in qfq_rm_from_ag This is more of a preventive patch to make the code more consistent and to prevent possible exploits that employ child qlen manipulations on qfq. use cl_is_active instead of relying on the child qdisc's qlen to determine class activation. Fixes: 462dbc9101acd ("pkt_sched: QFQ Plus: fair-queueing service at DRR cost") Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260114160243.913069-3-jhs@mojatatu.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/sched/sch_qfq.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c index 9d59090bbe93..e7778413e72f 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static void qfq_rm_from_agg(struct qfq_sched *q, struct qfq_class *cl) /* Deschedule class and remove it from its parent aggregate. */ static void qfq_deact_rm_from_agg(struct qfq_sched *q, struct qfq_class *cl) { - if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen > 0) /* class is active */ + if (cl_is_active(cl)) /* class is active */ qfq_deactivate_class(q, cl); qfq_rm_from_agg(q, cl); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5dc6975566f5d142ec53eb7e97af688c45dd314d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lachlan Hodges Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 14:11:21 +1100 Subject: wifi: mac80211: don't perform DA check on S1G beacon S1G beacons don't contain the DA field as per IEEE80211-2024 9.3.4.3, so the DA broadcast check reads the SA address of the S1G beacon which will subsequently lead to the beacon being dropped. As a result, passive scanning is not possible. Fix this by only performing the check on non-S1G beacons to allow S1G long beacons to be processed during a passive scan. Fixes: ddf82e752f8a ("wifi: mac80211: Allow beacons to update BSS table regardless of scan") Signed-off-by: Lachlan Hodges Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260120031122.309942-1-lachlan.hodges@morsemicro.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/scan.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/scan.c b/net/mac80211/scan.c index 5ef315ed3b0f..4823c8d45639 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/scan.c +++ b/net/mac80211/scan.c @@ -347,8 +347,13 @@ void ieee80211_scan_rx(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb) mgmt->da)) return; } else { - /* Beacons are expected only with broadcast address */ - if (!is_broadcast_ether_addr(mgmt->da)) + /* + * Non-S1G beacons are expected only with broadcast address. + * S1G beacons only carry the SA so no DA check is required + * nor possible. + */ + if (!ieee80211_is_s1g_beacon(mgmt->frame_control) && + !is_broadcast_ether_addr(mgmt->da)) return; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3f3d8ff31496874a69b131866f62474eb24ed20a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miri Korenblit Date: Sun, 18 Jan 2026 09:28:29 +0200 Subject: wifi: mac80211: don't increment crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt twice In reconfig, in case the driver asks to disconnect during the reconfig, all the keys of the interface are marked as tainted. Then ieee80211_reenable_keys will loop over all the interface keys, and for each one it will a) increment crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt b) call ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel, which in turn will detect that this key is tainted, so it will mark it as "not in hardware", which is paired with crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt incrementation, so we get two incrementations for each tainted key. Then we get a warning in ieee80211_free_keys. To fix it, don't increment the count in ieee80211_reenable_keys for tainted keys Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260118092821.4ca111fddcda.Id6e554f4b1c83760aa02d5a9e4e3080edb197aa2@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/key.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c index d5da7ccea66e..04c8809173d7 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.c +++ b/net/mac80211/key.c @@ -987,7 +987,8 @@ void ieee80211_reenable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) if (ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata)) { list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) { - increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); + if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED)) + increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3fa2886d11d4545dc0dcfd0759ffbd03f88b5410 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Benjamin Berg Date: Sun, 18 Jan 2026 09:51:13 +0200 Subject: wifi: mac80211: parse all TTLM entries For the follow up patch, we need to properly parse TTLM entries that do not have a switch time. Change the logic so that ieee80211_parse_adv_t2l returns usable values in all non-error cases. Before the values filled in were technically incorrect but enough for ieee80211_process_adv_ttlm. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Berg Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg Reviewed-by: Ilan Peer Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260118093904.ccd324e2dd59.I69f0bee0a22e9b11bb95beef313e305dab17c051@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/mlme.c | 25 ++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c index ad53dedd929c..3f6bbe4e0175 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c @@ -7015,10 +7015,6 @@ ieee80211_parse_adv_t2l(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, pos = (void *)ttlm->optional; control = ttlm->control; - if ((control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_DEF_LINK_MAP) || - !(control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_SWITCH_TIME_PRESENT)) - return 0; - if ((control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_DIRECTION) != IEEE80211_TTLM_DIRECTION_BOTH) { sdata_info(sdata, "Invalid advertised T2L map direction\n"); @@ -7028,21 +7024,28 @@ ieee80211_parse_adv_t2l(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, link_map_presence = *pos; pos++; - ttlm_info->switch_time = get_unaligned_le16(pos); + if (control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_SWITCH_TIME_PRESENT) { + ttlm_info->switch_time = get_unaligned_le16(pos); - /* Since ttlm_info->switch_time == 0 means no switch time, bump it - * by 1. - */ - if (!ttlm_info->switch_time) - ttlm_info->switch_time = 1; + /* Since ttlm_info->switch_time == 0 means no switch time, bump + * it by 1. + */ + if (!ttlm_info->switch_time) + ttlm_info->switch_time = 1; - pos += 2; + pos += 2; + } if (control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_EXPECTED_DUR_PRESENT) { ttlm_info->duration = pos[0] | pos[1] << 8 | pos[2] << 16; pos += 3; } + if (control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_DEF_LINK_MAP) { + ttlm_info->map = 0xffff; + return 0; + } + if (control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_LINK_MAP_SIZE) map_size = 1; else -- cgit v1.2.3 From aebc29dec67aa998a9ea6d34aacba7b5c6a74d33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Benjamin Berg Date: Sun, 18 Jan 2026 09:51:14 +0200 Subject: wifi: mac80211: apply advertised TTLM from association response When the AP has a disabled link that the station can include in the association, the fact that the link is dormant needs to be advertised in the TID to Link Mapping (TTLM). Section 35.3.7.2.3 ("Negotiation of TTLM") of Draft P802.11REVmf_D1.0 also states that the mapping needs to be included in the association response frame. As such, we can simply rely on the TTLM from the association response. Before this change mac80211 would not properly track that an advertised TTLM was effectively active, resulting in it not enabling the link once it became available again. For the link reconfiguration case, the data was not used at all. This behaviour is actually correct because Draft P802.11REVmf_D1.0 states in section 35.3.6.4 that we "shall operate with all the TIDs mapped to the newly added links ..." Fixes: 6d543b34dbcf ("wifi: mac80211: Support disabled links during association") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Berg Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260118093904.43c861424543.I067f702ac46b84ac3f8b4ea16fb0db9cbbfae7e2@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 2 - net/mac80211/mlme.c | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index 9d9313eee59f..bd573f8e61fb 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -451,8 +451,6 @@ struct ieee80211_mgd_assoc_data { struct ieee80211_conn_settings conn; u16 status; - - bool disabled; } link[IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS]; u8 ap_addr[ETH_ALEN] __aligned(2); diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c index 3f6bbe4e0175..b72345c779c0 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c @@ -6161,6 +6161,98 @@ static bool ieee80211_get_dtim(const struct cfg80211_bss_ies *ies, return true; } +static u16 ieee80211_get_ttlm(u8 bm_size, u8 *data) +{ + if (bm_size == 1) + return *data; + + return get_unaligned_le16(data); +} + +static int +ieee80211_parse_adv_t2l(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, + const struct ieee80211_ttlm_elem *ttlm, + struct ieee80211_adv_ttlm_info *ttlm_info) +{ + /* The element size was already validated in + * ieee80211_tid_to_link_map_size_ok() + */ + u8 control, link_map_presence, map_size, tid; + u8 *pos; + + memset(ttlm_info, 0, sizeof(*ttlm_info)); + pos = (void *)ttlm->optional; + control = ttlm->control; + + if ((control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_DIRECTION) != + IEEE80211_TTLM_DIRECTION_BOTH) { + sdata_info(sdata, "Invalid advertised T2L map direction\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + link_map_presence = *pos; + pos++; + + if (control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_SWITCH_TIME_PRESENT) { + ttlm_info->switch_time = get_unaligned_le16(pos); + + /* Since ttlm_info->switch_time == 0 means no switch time, bump + * it by 1. + */ + if (!ttlm_info->switch_time) + ttlm_info->switch_time = 1; + + pos += 2; + } + + if (control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_EXPECTED_DUR_PRESENT) { + ttlm_info->duration = pos[0] | pos[1] << 8 | pos[2] << 16; + pos += 3; + } + + if (control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_DEF_LINK_MAP) { + ttlm_info->map = 0xffff; + return 0; + } + + if (control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_LINK_MAP_SIZE) + map_size = 1; + else + map_size = 2; + + /* According to Draft P802.11be_D3.0 clause 35.3.7.1.7, an AP MLD shall + * not advertise a TID-to-link mapping that does not map all TIDs to the + * same link set, reject frame if not all links have mapping + */ + if (link_map_presence != 0xff) { + sdata_info(sdata, + "Invalid advertised T2L mapping presence indicator\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + ttlm_info->map = ieee80211_get_ttlm(map_size, pos); + if (!ttlm_info->map) { + sdata_info(sdata, + "Invalid advertised T2L map for TID 0\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + pos += map_size; + + for (tid = 1; tid < 8; tid++) { + u16 map = ieee80211_get_ttlm(map_size, pos); + + if (map != ttlm_info->map) { + sdata_info(sdata, "Invalid advertised T2L map for tid %d\n", + tid); + return -EINVAL; + } + + pos += map_size; + } + return 0; +} + static bool ieee80211_assoc_success(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt, struct ieee802_11_elems *elems, @@ -6192,8 +6284,6 @@ static bool ieee80211_assoc_success(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, continue; valid_links |= BIT(link_id); - if (assoc_data->link[link_id].disabled) - dormant_links |= BIT(link_id); if (link_id != assoc_data->assoc_link_id) { err = ieee80211_sta_allocate_link(sta, link_id); @@ -6202,6 +6292,33 @@ static bool ieee80211_assoc_success(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, } } + /* + * We do not support setting a negotiated TTLM during + * association. As such, we can assume that if there is a TTLM, + * then it is the currently active advertised TTLM. + * In that case, there must be exactly one TTLM that does not + * have a switch time set. This mapping should also leave us + * with at least one usable link. + */ + if (elems->ttlm_num > 1) { + sdata_info(sdata, + "More than one advertised TTLM in association response\n"); + goto out_err; + } else if (elems->ttlm_num == 1) { + if (ieee80211_parse_adv_t2l(sdata, elems->ttlm[0], + &sdata->u.mgd.ttlm_info) || + sdata->u.mgd.ttlm_info.switch_time != 0 || + !(valid_links & sdata->u.mgd.ttlm_info.map)) { + sdata_info(sdata, + "Invalid advertised TTLM in association response\n"); + goto out_err; + } + + sdata->u.mgd.ttlm_info.active = true; + dormant_links = + valid_links & ~sdata->u.mgd.ttlm_info.map; + } + ieee80211_vif_set_links(sdata, valid_links, dormant_links); } @@ -6992,98 +7109,6 @@ static void ieee80211_tid_to_link_map_work(struct wiphy *wiphy, sdata->u.mgd.ttlm_info.switch_time = 0; } -static u16 ieee80211_get_ttlm(u8 bm_size, u8 *data) -{ - if (bm_size == 1) - return *data; - else - return get_unaligned_le16(data); -} - -static int -ieee80211_parse_adv_t2l(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, - const struct ieee80211_ttlm_elem *ttlm, - struct ieee80211_adv_ttlm_info *ttlm_info) -{ - /* The element size was already validated in - * ieee80211_tid_to_link_map_size_ok() - */ - u8 control, link_map_presence, map_size, tid; - u8 *pos; - - memset(ttlm_info, 0, sizeof(*ttlm_info)); - pos = (void *)ttlm->optional; - control = ttlm->control; - - if ((control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_DIRECTION) != - IEEE80211_TTLM_DIRECTION_BOTH) { - sdata_info(sdata, "Invalid advertised T2L map direction\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - - link_map_presence = *pos; - pos++; - - if (control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_SWITCH_TIME_PRESENT) { - ttlm_info->switch_time = get_unaligned_le16(pos); - - /* Since ttlm_info->switch_time == 0 means no switch time, bump - * it by 1. - */ - if (!ttlm_info->switch_time) - ttlm_info->switch_time = 1; - - pos += 2; - } - - if (control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_EXPECTED_DUR_PRESENT) { - ttlm_info->duration = pos[0] | pos[1] << 8 | pos[2] << 16; - pos += 3; - } - - if (control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_DEF_LINK_MAP) { - ttlm_info->map = 0xffff; - return 0; - } - - if (control & IEEE80211_TTLM_CONTROL_LINK_MAP_SIZE) - map_size = 1; - else - map_size = 2; - - /* According to Draft P802.11be_D3.0 clause 35.3.7.1.7, an AP MLD shall - * not advertise a TID-to-link mapping that does not map all TIDs to the - * same link set, reject frame if not all links have mapping - */ - if (link_map_presence != 0xff) { - sdata_info(sdata, - "Invalid advertised T2L mapping presence indicator\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - - ttlm_info->map = ieee80211_get_ttlm(map_size, pos); - if (!ttlm_info->map) { - sdata_info(sdata, - "Invalid advertised T2L map for TID 0\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - - pos += map_size; - - for (tid = 1; tid < 8; tid++) { - u16 map = ieee80211_get_ttlm(map_size, pos); - - if (map != ttlm_info->map) { - sdata_info(sdata, "Invalid advertised T2L map for tid %d\n", - tid); - return -EINVAL; - } - - pos += map_size; - } - return 0; -} - static void ieee80211_process_adv_ttlm(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, struct ieee802_11_elems *elems, u64 beacon_ts) @@ -9740,7 +9765,6 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, req, true, i, &assoc_data->link[i].conn); assoc_data->link[i].bss = link_cbss; - assoc_data->link[i].disabled = req->links[i].disabled; if (!bss->uapsd_supported) uapsd_supported = false; @@ -10722,8 +10746,6 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_assoc_ml_reconf(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, &data->link[link_id].conn); data->link[link_id].bss = link_cbss; - data->link[link_id].disabled = - req->add_links[link_id].disabled; data->link[link_id].elems = (u8 *)req->add_links[link_id].elems; data->link[link_id].elems_len = -- cgit v1.2.3 From 50b359896fe55d0443ed550e1fabba71d242031a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Benjamin Berg Date: Sun, 18 Jan 2026 09:51:15 +0200 Subject: wifi: cfg80211: ignore link disabled flag from userspace When the AP has an advertised TID to Link Mapping (TTLM) it shall include the element in the association response. As such, when this element is present it needs to be used for the currently dormant links. See Draft P802.11REVmf_D1.0 section 35.3.7.2.3 ("Negotiation of TTLM") for the details. The flag is also not usable in case userspace wants to specify a negotiated TTLM during association. Note that for the link reconfiguration case, mac80211 did not use the information. Draft P802.11REVmf_D1.0 states in section 35.3.6.4 ("Link reconfiguration to the setup links) that we "shall operate with all the TIDs mapped to the newly added links ..." All this means that the flag is not needed. The implementation should parse the information from the association response. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Berg Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg Reviewed-by: Ilan Peer Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260118093904.754e057896a5.Ifd06f5ef839a93bfd54d0593dc932870f95f3242@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- include/net/cfg80211.h | 3 --- include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h | 5 +++-- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 10 ---------- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/cfg80211.h b/include/net/cfg80211.h index 899f267b7cf9..2900202588a5 100644 --- a/include/net/cfg80211.h +++ b/include/net/cfg80211.h @@ -3221,8 +3221,6 @@ struct cfg80211_auth_request { * if this is %NULL for a link, that link is not requested * @elems: extra elements for the per-STA profile for this link * @elems_len: length of the elements - * @disabled: If set this link should be included during association etc. but it - * should not be used until enabled by the AP MLD. * @error: per-link error code, must be <= 0. If there is an error, then the * operation as a whole must fail. */ @@ -3230,7 +3228,6 @@ struct cfg80211_assoc_link { struct cfg80211_bss *bss; const u8 *elems; size_t elems_len; - bool disabled; int error; }; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h b/include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h index 8134f10e4e6c..8433bac48112 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h @@ -2880,8 +2880,9 @@ enum nl80211_commands { * index. If the userspace includes more RNR elements than number of * MBSSID elements then these will be added in every EMA beacon. * - * @NL80211_ATTR_MLO_LINK_DISABLED: Flag attribute indicating that the link is - * disabled. + * @NL80211_ATTR_MLO_LINK_DISABLED: Unused. It was used to indicate that a link + * is disabled during association. However, the AP will send the + * information by including a TTLM in the association response. * * @NL80211_ATTR_BSS_DUMP_INCLUDE_USE_DATA: Include BSS usage data, i.e. * include BSSes that can only be used in restricted scenarios and/or diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index c961cd42a832..03efd45c007f 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -12241,9 +12241,6 @@ static int nl80211_process_links(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev, return -EINVAL; } } - - links[link_id].disabled = - nla_get_flag(attrs[NL80211_ATTR_MLO_LINK_DISABLED]); } return 0; @@ -12423,13 +12420,6 @@ static int nl80211_associate(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) goto free; } - if (req.links[req.link_id].disabled) { - GENL_SET_ERR_MSG(info, - "cannot have assoc link disabled"); - err = -EINVAL; - goto free; - } - if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_ASSOC_MLD_EXT_CAPA_OPS]) req.ext_mld_capa_ops = nla_get_u16(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_ASSOC_MLD_EXT_CAPA_OPS]); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9a063f96d87efc3a6cc667f8de096a3d38d74bb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sun, 18 Jan 2026 15:29:41 +0000 Subject: ipv6: annotate data-race in ndisc_router_discovery() syzbot found that ndisc_router_discovery() could read and write in6_dev->ra_mtu without holding a lock [1] This looks fine, IFLA_INET6_RA_MTU is best effort. Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to document the race. Note that we might also reject illegal MTU values (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU || mtu > skb->dev->mtu) in a future patch. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ndisc_router_discovery / ndisc_router_discovery read to 0xffff888119809c20 of 4 bytes by task 25817 on cpu 1: ndisc_router_discovery+0x151d/0x1c90 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1558 ndisc_rcv+0x2ad/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1841 icmpv6_rcv+0xe5a/0x12f0 net/ipv6/icmp.c:989 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xb2a/0x10d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438 ip6_input_finish+0xf0/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline] ip6_input+0x5e/0x140 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500 ip6_mc_input+0x27c/0x470 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590 dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish+0x336/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 ... write to 0xffff888119809c20 of 4 bytes by task 25816 on cpu 0: ndisc_router_discovery+0x155a/0x1c90 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1559 ndisc_rcv+0x2ad/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1841 icmpv6_rcv+0xe5a/0x12f0 net/ipv6/icmp.c:989 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xb2a/0x10d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438 ip6_input_finish+0xf0/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline] ip6_input+0x5e/0x140 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500 ip6_mc_input+0x27c/0x470 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590 dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish+0x336/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 ... value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0xe5400659 Fixes: 49b99da2c9ce ("ipv6: add IFLA_INET6_RA_MTU to expose mtu value") Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Rocco Yue Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260118152941.2563857-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/ipv6/ndisc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c index 59d17b6f06bf..f6a5d8c73af9 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c @@ -1555,8 +1555,8 @@ skip_routeinfo: memcpy(&n, ((u8 *)(ndopts.nd_opts_mtu+1))+2, sizeof(mtu)); mtu = ntohl(n); - if (in6_dev->ra_mtu != mtu) { - in6_dev->ra_mtu = mtu; + if (READ_ONCE(in6_dev->ra_mtu) != mtu) { + WRITE_ONCE(in6_dev->ra_mtu, mtu); send_ifinfo_notify = true; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From ba1096c315283ee3292765f6aea4cca15816c4f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeongjun Park Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2026 15:33:59 +0900 Subject: netrom: fix double-free in nr_route_frame() In nr_route_frame(), old_skb is immediately freed without checking if nr_neigh->ax25 pointer is NULL. Therefore, if nr_neigh->ax25 is NULL, the caller function will free old_skb again, causing a double-free bug. Therefore, to prevent this, we need to modify it to check whether nr_neigh->ax25 is NULL before freeing old_skb. Cc: Reported-by: syzbot+999115c3bf275797dc27@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/69694d6f.050a0220.58bed.0029.GAE@google.com/ Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260119063359.10604-1-aha310510@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/netrom/nr_route.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c index b94cb2ffbaf8..9cc29ae85b06 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c @@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ int nr_route_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, ax25_cb *ax25) unsigned char *dptr; ax25_cb *ax25s; int ret; - struct sk_buff *skbn; + struct sk_buff *nskb, *oskb; /* * Reject malformed packets early. Check that it contains at least 2 @@ -811,14 +811,16 @@ int nr_route_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, ax25_cb *ax25) /* We are going to change the netrom headers so we should get our own skb, we also did not know until now how much header space we had to reserve... - RXQ */ - if ((skbn=skb_copy_expand(skb, dev->hard_header_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) { + nskb = skb_copy_expand(skb, dev->hard_header_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC); + + if (!nskb) { nr_node_unlock(nr_node); nr_node_put(nr_node); dev_put(dev); return 0; } - kfree_skb(skb); - skb=skbn; + oskb = skb; + skb = nskb; skb->data[14]--; dptr = skb_push(skb, 1); @@ -837,6 +839,9 @@ int nr_route_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, ax25_cb *ax25) nr_node_unlock(nr_node); nr_node_put(nr_node); + if (ret) + kfree_skb(oskb); + return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From dfca045cd4d0ea07ff4198ba392be3e718acaddc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 23:10:39 +0200 Subject: net: dsa: fix off-by-one in maximum bridge ID determination Prior to the blamed commit, the bridge_num range was from 0 to ds->max_num_bridges - 1. After the commit, it is from 1 to ds->max_num_bridges. So this check: if (bridge_num >= max) return 0; must be updated to: if (bridge_num > max) return 0; in order to allow the last bridge_num value (==max) to be used. This is easiest visible when a driver sets ds->max_num_bridges=1. The observed behaviour is that even the first created bridge triggers the netlink extack "Range of offloadable bridges exceeded" warning, and is handled in software rather than being offloaded. Fixes: 3f9bb0301d50 ("net: dsa: make dp->bridge_num one-based") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260120211039.3228999-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/dsa/dsa.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/dsa.c b/net/dsa/dsa.c index 99ede37698ac..35ce3941fae3 100644 --- a/net/dsa/dsa.c +++ b/net/dsa/dsa.c @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ unsigned int dsa_bridge_num_get(const struct net_device *bridge_dev, int max) bridge_num = find_next_zero_bit(&dsa_fwd_offloading_bridges, DSA_MAX_NUM_OFFLOADING_BRIDGES, 1); - if (bridge_num >= max) + if (bridge_num > max) return 0; set_bit(bridge_num, &dsa_fwd_offloading_bridges); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5d5fe8bcd331f1e34e0943ec7c18432edfcf0e8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 10:13:05 +0000 Subject: rxrpc: Fix data-race warning and potential load/store tearing Fix the following: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker / rxrpc_send_data_packet which is reporting an issue with the reads and writes to ->last_tx_at in: conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); and: keepalive_at = peer->last_tx_at + RXRPC_KEEPALIVE_TIME; The lockless accesses to these to values aren't actually a problem as the read only needs an approximate time of last transmission for the purposes of deciding whether or not the transmission of a keepalive packet is warranted yet. Also, as ->last_tx_at is a 64-bit value, tearing can occur on a 32-bit arch. Fix both of these by switching to an unsigned int for ->last_tx_at and only storing the LSW of the time64_t. It can then be reconstructed at need provided no more than 68 years has elapsed since the last transmission. Fixes: ace45bec6d77 ("rxrpc: Fix firewall route keepalive") Reported-by: syzbot+6182afad5045e6703b3d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/695e7cfb.050a0220.1c677c.036b.GAE@google.com/ Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Marc Dionne cc: Simon Horman cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1107124.1768903985@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 9 ++++++++- net/rxrpc/conn_event.c | 2 +- net/rxrpc/output.c | 14 +++++++------- net/rxrpc/peer_event.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- net/rxrpc/proc.c | 4 ++-- net/rxrpc/rxgk.c | 2 +- net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h index 5b7342d43486..36d6ca0d1089 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h @@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ struct rxrpc_peer { struct rb_root service_conns; /* Service connections */ struct list_head keepalive_link; /* Link in net->peer_keepalive[] */ unsigned long app_data; /* Application data (e.g. afs_server) */ - time64_t last_tx_at; /* Last time packet sent here */ + unsigned int last_tx_at; /* Last time packet sent here (time64_t LSW) */ seqlock_t service_conn_lock; spinlock_t lock; /* access lock */ int debug_id; /* debug ID for printks */ @@ -1379,6 +1379,13 @@ void rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker(struct work_struct *); void rxrpc_input_probe_for_pmtud(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, rxrpc_serial_t acked_serial, bool sendmsg_fail); +/* Update the last transmission time on a peer for keepalive purposes. */ +static inline void rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(struct rxrpc_peer *peer) +{ + /* To avoid tearing on 32-bit systems, we only keep the LSW. */ + WRITE_ONCE(peer->last_tx_at, ktime_get_seconds()); +} + /* * peer_object.c */ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c index 232b6986da83..98ad9b51ca2c 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ void rxrpc_conn_retransmit_call(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, } ret = kernel_sendmsg(conn->local->socket, &msg, iov, ioc, len); - conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); + rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer); if (ret < 0) trace_rxrpc_tx_fail(chan->call_debug_id, serial, ret, rxrpc_tx_point_call_final_resend); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/output.c b/net/rxrpc/output.c index 8b5903b6e481..d70db367e358 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/output.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/output.c @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static void rxrpc_send_ack_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, int nr_kv, size_t len rxrpc_local_dont_fragment(conn->local, why == rxrpc_propose_ack_ping_for_mtu_probe); ret = do_udp_sendmsg(conn->local->socket, &msg, len); - call->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); + rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(call->peer); if (ret < 0) { trace_rxrpc_tx_fail(call->debug_id, serial, ret, rxrpc_tx_point_call_ack); @@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int rxrpc_send_abort_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call) iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, iov, 1, sizeof(pkt)); ret = do_udp_sendmsg(conn->local->socket, &msg, sizeof(pkt)); - conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); + rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer); if (ret < 0) trace_rxrpc_tx_fail(call->debug_id, serial, ret, rxrpc_tx_point_call_abort); @@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ void rxrpc_send_data_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_send_data_req ret = 0; trace_rxrpc_tx_data(call, txb->seq, txb->serial, txb->flags, rxrpc_txdata_inject_loss); - conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); + rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer); goto done; } } @@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ void rxrpc_send_data_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_send_data_req */ rxrpc_inc_stat(call->rxnet, stat_tx_data_send); ret = do_udp_sendmsg(conn->local->socket, &msg, len); - conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); + rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer); if (ret == -EMSGSIZE) { rxrpc_inc_stat(call->rxnet, stat_tx_data_send_msgsize); @@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ void rxrpc_send_conn_abort(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) trace_rxrpc_tx_packet(conn->debug_id, &whdr, rxrpc_tx_point_conn_abort); - conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); + rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer); } /* @@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ void rxrpc_send_keepalive(struct rxrpc_peer *peer) trace_rxrpc_tx_packet(peer->debug_id, &whdr, rxrpc_tx_point_version_keepalive); - peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); + rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(peer); _leave(""); } @@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ void rxrpc_send_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *response if (ret < 0) goto fail; - conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); + rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer); return; fail: diff --git a/net/rxrpc/peer_event.c b/net/rxrpc/peer_event.c index 7f4729234957..9d02448ac062 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/peer_event.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/peer_event.c @@ -237,6 +237,21 @@ static void rxrpc_distribute_error(struct rxrpc_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb, spin_unlock_irq(&peer->lock); } +/* + * Reconstruct the last transmission time. The difference calculated should be + * valid provided no more than ~68 years elapsed since the last transmission. + */ +static time64_t rxrpc_peer_get_tx_mark(const struct rxrpc_peer *peer, time64_t base) +{ + s32 last_tx_at = READ_ONCE(peer->last_tx_at); + s32 base_lsw = base; + s32 diff = last_tx_at - base_lsw; + + diff = clamp(diff, -RXRPC_KEEPALIVE_TIME, RXRPC_KEEPALIVE_TIME); + + return diff + base; +} + /* * Perform keep-alive pings. */ @@ -265,7 +280,7 @@ static void rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch(struct rxrpc_net *rxnet, spin_unlock_bh(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock); if (use) { - keepalive_at = peer->last_tx_at + RXRPC_KEEPALIVE_TIME; + keepalive_at = rxrpc_peer_get_tx_mark(peer, base) + RXRPC_KEEPALIVE_TIME; slot = keepalive_at - base; _debug("%02x peer %u t=%d {%pISp}", cursor, peer->debug_id, slot, &peer->srx.transport); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/proc.c b/net/rxrpc/proc.c index d803562ca0ac..59292f7f9205 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/proc.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/proc.c @@ -296,13 +296,13 @@ static int rxrpc_peer_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) now = ktime_get_seconds(); seq_printf(seq, - "UDP %-47.47s %-47.47s %3u %4u %5u %6llus %8d %8d\n", + "UDP %-47.47s %-47.47s %3u %4u %5u %6ds %8d %8d\n", lbuff, rbuff, refcount_read(&peer->ref), peer->cong_ssthresh, peer->max_data, - now - peer->last_tx_at, + (s32)now - (s32)READ_ONCE(peer->last_tx_at), READ_ONCE(peer->recent_srtt_us), READ_ONCE(peer->recent_rto_us)); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c b/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c index dce5a3d8a964..43cbf9efd89f 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c @@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static int rxgk_issue_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) ret = do_udp_sendmsg(conn->local->socket, &msg, len); if (ret > 0) - conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); + rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer); __free_page(page); if (ret < 0) { diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c index 3657c0661cdc..a756855a0a62 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c @@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static int rxkad_issue_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) return -EAGAIN; } - conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds(); + rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer); trace_rxrpc_tx_packet(conn->debug_id, &whdr, rxrpc_tx_point_rxkad_challenge); _leave(" = 0"); -- cgit v1.2.3 From cc4816bdb08639e5cd9acb295a02d6f0f09736b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Yang Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2026 15:29:26 +0800 Subject: net: openvswitch: fix data race in ovs_vport_get_upcall_stats In ovs_vport_get_upcall_stats(), some statistics protected by u64_stats_sync, are read and accumulated in ignorance of possible u64_stats_fetch_retry() events. These statistics are already accumulated by u64_stats_inc(). Fix this by reading them into temporary variables first. Fixes: 1933ea365aa7 ("net: openvswitch: Add support to count upcall packets") Signed-off-by: David Yang Acked-by: Ilya Maximets Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260121072932.2360971-1-mmyangfl@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- net/openvswitch/vport.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/openvswitch/vport.c b/net/openvswitch/vport.c index 6bbbc16ab778..f0ce8ce1dce0 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/vport.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/vport.c @@ -310,22 +310,23 @@ void ovs_vport_get_stats(struct vport *vport, struct ovs_vport_stats *stats) */ int ovs_vport_get_upcall_stats(struct vport *vport, struct sk_buff *skb) { + u64 tx_success = 0, tx_fail = 0; struct nlattr *nla; int i; - __u64 tx_success = 0; - __u64 tx_fail = 0; - for_each_possible_cpu(i) { const struct vport_upcall_stats_percpu *stats; + u64 n_success, n_fail; unsigned int start; stats = per_cpu_ptr(vport->upcall_stats, i); do { start = u64_stats_fetch_begin(&stats->syncp); - tx_success += u64_stats_read(&stats->n_success); - tx_fail += u64_stats_read(&stats->n_fail); + n_success = u64_stats_read(&stats->n_success); + n_fail = u64_stats_read(&stats->n_fail); } while (u64_stats_fetch_retry(&stats->syncp, start)); + tx_success += n_success; + tx_fail += n_fail; } nla = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, OVS_VPORT_ATTR_UPCALL_STATS); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3ef3d52a1a9860d094395c7a3e593f3aa26ff012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Melbin K Mathew Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2026 10:36:25 +0100 Subject: vsock/virtio: fix potential underflow in virtio_transport_get_credit() The credit calculation in virtio_transport_get_credit() uses unsigned arithmetic: ret = vvs->peer_buf_alloc - (vvs->tx_cnt - vvs->peer_fwd_cnt); If the peer shrinks its advertised buffer (peer_buf_alloc) while bytes are in flight, the subtraction can underflow and produce a large positive value, potentially allowing more data to be queued than the peer can handle. Reuse virtio_transport_has_space() which already handles this case and add a comment to make it clear why we are doing that. Fixes: 06a8fc78367d ("VSOCK: Introduce virtio_vsock_common.ko") Suggested-by: Stefano Garzarella Signed-off-by: Melbin K Mathew [Stefano: use virtio_transport_has_space() instead of duplicating the code] [Stefano: tweak the commit message] Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella Reviewed-by: Luigi Leonardi Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260121093628.9941-2-sgarzare@redhat.com Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c | 16 +++++++++------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c index 26b979ad71f0..6175124d63d3 100644 --- a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ static void virtio_transport_cancel_close_work(struct vsock_sock *vsk, bool cancel_timeout); +static s64 virtio_transport_has_space(struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs); static const struct virtio_transport * virtio_transport_get_ops(struct vsock_sock *vsk) @@ -499,9 +500,7 @@ u32 virtio_transport_get_credit(struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs, u32 credit) return 0; spin_lock_bh(&vvs->tx_lock); - ret = vvs->peer_buf_alloc - (vvs->tx_cnt - vvs->peer_fwd_cnt); - if (ret > credit) - ret = credit; + ret = min_t(u32, credit, virtio_transport_has_space(vvs)); vvs->tx_cnt += ret; vvs->bytes_unsent += ret; spin_unlock_bh(&vvs->tx_lock); @@ -877,11 +876,14 @@ u32 virtio_transport_seqpacket_has_data(struct vsock_sock *vsk) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(virtio_transport_seqpacket_has_data); -static s64 virtio_transport_has_space(struct vsock_sock *vsk) +static s64 virtio_transport_has_space(struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs) { - struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs = vsk->trans; s64 bytes; + /* Use s64 arithmetic so if the peer shrinks peer_buf_alloc while + * we have bytes in flight (tx_cnt - peer_fwd_cnt), the subtraction + * does not underflow. + */ bytes = (s64)vvs->peer_buf_alloc - (vvs->tx_cnt - vvs->peer_fwd_cnt); if (bytes < 0) bytes = 0; @@ -895,7 +897,7 @@ s64 virtio_transport_stream_has_space(struct vsock_sock *vsk) s64 bytes; spin_lock_bh(&vvs->tx_lock); - bytes = virtio_transport_has_space(vsk); + bytes = virtio_transport_has_space(vvs); spin_unlock_bh(&vvs->tx_lock); return bytes; @@ -1492,7 +1494,7 @@ static bool virtio_transport_space_update(struct sock *sk, spin_lock_bh(&vvs->tx_lock); vvs->peer_buf_alloc = le32_to_cpu(hdr->buf_alloc); vvs->peer_fwd_cnt = le32_to_cpu(hdr->fwd_cnt); - space_available = virtio_transport_has_space(vsk); + space_available = virtio_transport_has_space(vvs); spin_unlock_bh(&vvs->tx_lock); return space_available; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8ee784fdf006cbe8739cfa093f54d326cbf54037 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Melbin K Mathew Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2026 10:36:27 +0100 Subject: vsock/virtio: cap TX credit to local buffer size The virtio transports derives its TX credit directly from peer_buf_alloc, which is set from the remote endpoint's SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_SIZE value. On the host side this means that the amount of data we are willing to queue for a connection is scaled by a guest-chosen buffer size, rather than the host's own vsock configuration. A malicious guest can advertise a large buffer and read slowly, causing the host to allocate a correspondingly large amount of sk_buff memory. The same thing would happen in the guest with a malicious host, since virtio transports share the same code base. Introduce a small helper, virtio_transport_tx_buf_size(), that returns min(peer_buf_alloc, buf_alloc), and use it wherever we consume peer_buf_alloc. This ensures the effective TX window is bounded by both the peer's advertised buffer and our own buf_alloc (already clamped to buffer_max_size via SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_MAX_SIZE), so a remote peer cannot force the other to queue more data than allowed by its own vsock settings. On an unpatched Ubuntu 22.04 host (~64 GiB RAM), running a PoC with 32 guest vsock connections advertising 2 GiB each and reading slowly drove Slab/SUnreclaim from ~0.5 GiB to ~57 GiB; the system only recovered after killing the QEMU process. That said, if QEMU memory is limited with cgroups, the maximum memory used will be limited. With this patch applied: Before: MemFree: ~61.6 GiB Slab: ~142 MiB SUnreclaim: ~117 MiB After 32 high-credit connections: MemFree: ~61.5 GiB Slab: ~178 MiB SUnreclaim: ~152 MiB Only ~35 MiB increase in Slab/SUnreclaim, no host OOM, and the guest remains responsive. Compatibility with non-virtio transports: - VMCI uses the AF_VSOCK buffer knobs to size its queue pairs per socket based on the local vsk->buffer_* values; the remote side cannot enlarge those queues beyond what the local endpoint configured. - Hyper-V's vsock transport uses fixed-size VMBus ring buffers and an MTU bound; there is no peer-controlled credit field comparable to peer_buf_alloc, and the remote endpoint cannot drive in-flight kernel memory above those ring sizes. - The loopback path reuses virtio_transport_common.c, so it naturally follows the same semantics as the virtio transport. This change is limited to virtio_transport_common.c and thus affects virtio-vsock, vhost-vsock, and loopback, bringing them in line with the "remote window intersected with local policy" behaviour that VMCI and Hyper-V already effectively have. Fixes: 06a8fc78367d ("VSOCK: Introduce virtio_vsock_common.ko") Suggested-by: Stefano Garzarella Signed-off-by: Melbin K Mathew [Stefano: small adjustments after changing the previous patch] [Stefano: tweak the commit message] Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella Reviewed-by: Luigi Leonardi Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260121093628.9941-4-sgarzare@redhat.com Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c index 6175124d63d3..d3e26025ef58 100644 --- a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c @@ -821,6 +821,15 @@ virtio_transport_seqpacket_dequeue(struct vsock_sock *vsk, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(virtio_transport_seqpacket_dequeue); +static u32 virtio_transport_tx_buf_size(struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs) +{ + /* The peer advertises its receive buffer via peer_buf_alloc, but we + * cap it to our local buf_alloc so a remote peer cannot force us to + * queue more data than our own buffer configuration allows. + */ + return min(vvs->peer_buf_alloc, vvs->buf_alloc); +} + int virtio_transport_seqpacket_enqueue(struct vsock_sock *vsk, struct msghdr *msg, @@ -830,7 +839,7 @@ virtio_transport_seqpacket_enqueue(struct vsock_sock *vsk, spin_lock_bh(&vvs->tx_lock); - if (len > vvs->peer_buf_alloc) { + if (len > virtio_transport_tx_buf_size(vvs)) { spin_unlock_bh(&vvs->tx_lock); return -EMSGSIZE; } @@ -884,7 +893,8 @@ static s64 virtio_transport_has_space(struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs) * we have bytes in flight (tx_cnt - peer_fwd_cnt), the subtraction * does not underflow. */ - bytes = (s64)vvs->peer_buf_alloc - (vvs->tx_cnt - vvs->peer_fwd_cnt); + bytes = (s64)virtio_transport_tx_buf_size(vvs) - + (vvs->tx_cnt - vvs->peer_fwd_cnt); if (bytes < 0) bytes = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 27880b0b0d35ad1c98863d09788254e36f874968 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2026 13:37:24 +0000 Subject: net/sched: act_ife: avoid possible NULL deref tcf_ife_encode() must make sure ife_encode() does not return NULL. syzbot reported: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: 0010:ife_tlv_meta_encode+0x41/0xa0 net/ife/ife.c:166 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 8990 Comm: syz.0.696 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Call Trace: ife_encode_meta_u32+0x153/0x180 net/sched/act_ife.c:101 tcf_ife_encode net/sched/act_ife.c:841 [inline] tcf_ife_act+0x1022/0x1de0 net/sched/act_ife.c:877 tc_act include/net/tc_wrapper.h:130 [inline] tcf_action_exec+0x1c0/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1152 tcf_exts_exec include/net/pkt_cls.h:349 [inline] mall_classify+0x1a0/0x2a0 net/sched/cls_matchall.c:42 tc_classify include/net/tc_wrapper.h:197 [inline] __tcf_classify net/sched/cls_api.c:1764 [inline] tcf_classify+0x7f2/0x1380 net/sched/cls_api.c:1860 multiq_classify net/sched/sch_multiq.c:39 [inline] multiq_enqueue+0xe0/0x510 net/sched/sch_multiq.c:66 dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x45/0x250 net/core/dev.c:4147 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:4262 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2998/0x46c0 net/core/dev.c:4798 Fixes: 295a6e06d21e ("net/sched: act_ife: Change to use ife module") Reported-by: syzbot+5cf914f193dffde3bd3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6970d61d.050a0220.706b.0010.GAE@google.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Yotam Gigi Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260121133724.3400020-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/sched/act_ife.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/act_ife.c b/net/sched/act_ife.c index 1dfdda6c2d4c..8e8f6af731d5 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_ife.c +++ b/net/sched/act_ife.c @@ -821,6 +821,7 @@ static int tcf_ife_encode(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a, /* could be stupid policy setup or mtu config * so lets be conservative.. */ if ((action == TC_ACT_SHOT) || exceed_mtu) { +drop: qstats_drop_inc(this_cpu_ptr(ife->common.cpu_qstats)); return TC_ACT_SHOT; } @@ -829,6 +830,8 @@ static int tcf_ife_encode(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a, skb_push(skb, skb->dev->hard_header_len); ife_meta = ife_encode(skb, metalen); + if (!ife_meta) + goto drop; spin_lock(&ife->tcf_lock); @@ -844,8 +847,7 @@ static int tcf_ife_encode(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a, if (err < 0) { /* too corrupt to keep around if overwritten */ spin_unlock(&ife->tcf_lock); - qstats_drop_inc(this_cpu_ptr(ife->common.cpu_qstats)); - return TC_ACT_SHOT; + goto drop; } skboff += err; } -- cgit v1.2.3