From 14d2f38df67fadee34625fcbd282ee22514c4846 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Elder Date: Wed, 15 May 2013 16:28:33 -0500 Subject: libceph: must hold mutex for reset_changed_osds() An osd client has a red-black tree describing its osds, and occasionally we would get crashes due to one of these trees tree becoming corrupt somehow. The problem turned out to be that reset_changed_osds() was being called without protection of the osd client request mutex. That function would call __reset_osd() for any osd that had changed, and __reset_osd() would call __remove_osd() for any osd with no outstanding requests, and finally __remove_osd() would remove the corresponding entry from the red-black tree. Thus, the tree was getting modified without having any lock protection, and was vulnerable to problems due to concurrent updates. This appears to be the only osd tree updating path that has this problem. It can be fairly easily fixed by moving the call up a few lines, to just before the request mutex gets dropped in kick_requests(). This resolves: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/5043 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.4+ Signed-off-by: Alex Elder Reviewed-by: Sage Weil --- net/ceph/osd_client.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c index d5953b87918c..3a246a6cab47 100644 --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c @@ -1675,13 +1675,13 @@ static void kick_requests(struct ceph_osd_client *osdc, int force_resend) __register_request(osdc, req); __unregister_linger_request(osdc, req); } + reset_changed_osds(osdc); mutex_unlock(&osdc->request_mutex); if (needmap) { dout("%d requests for down osds, need new map\n", needmap); ceph_monc_request_next_osdmap(&osdc->client->monc); } - reset_changed_osds(osdc); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6390460af8a672754dd6743f326515e98f52b2a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 23:05:15 +0530 Subject: net/9p: Handle error in zero copy request correctly for 9p2000.u For zero copy request, error will be encoded in the user space buffer. So copy the error code correctly using copy_from_user. Here we use the extra bytes we allocate for zero copy request. If total error details are more than P9_ZC_HDR_SZ - 7 bytes, we return -EFAULT. The patch also avoid a memory allocation in the error path. Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen --- net/9p/client.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/9p/client.c b/net/9p/client.c index 8eb75425e6e6..addc116cecf0 100644 --- a/net/9p/client.c +++ b/net/9p/client.c @@ -562,36 +562,19 @@ static int p9_check_zc_errors(struct p9_client *c, struct p9_req_t *req, if (!p9_is_proto_dotl(c)) { /* Error is reported in string format */ - uint16_t len; - /* 7 = header size for RERROR, 2 is the size of string len; */ - int inline_len = in_hdrlen - (7 + 2); + int len; + /* 7 = header size for RERROR; */ + int inline_len = in_hdrlen - 7; - /* Read the size of error string */ - err = p9pdu_readf(req->rc, c->proto_version, "w", &len); - if (err) - goto out_err; - - ename = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS); - if (!ename) { - err = -ENOMEM; + len = req->rc->size - req->rc->offset; + if (len > (P9_ZC_HDR_SZ - 7)) { + err = -EFAULT; goto out_err; } - if (len <= inline_len) { - /* We have error in protocol buffer itself */ - if (pdu_read(req->rc, ename, len)) { - err = -EFAULT; - goto out_free; - } - } else { - /* - * Part of the data is in user space buffer. - */ - if (pdu_read(req->rc, ename, inline_len)) { - err = -EFAULT; - goto out_free; - - } + ename = &req->rc->sdata[req->rc->offset]; + if (len > inline_len) { + /* We have error in external buffer */ if (kern_buf) { memcpy(ename + inline_len, uidata, len - inline_len); @@ -600,19 +583,19 @@ static int p9_check_zc_errors(struct p9_client *c, struct p9_req_t *req, uidata, len - inline_len); if (err) { err = -EFAULT; - goto out_free; + goto out_err; } } } - ename[len] = 0; - if (p9_is_proto_dotu(c)) { - /* For dotu we also have error code */ - err = p9pdu_readf(req->rc, - c->proto_version, "d", &ecode); - if (err) - goto out_free; + ename = NULL; + err = p9pdu_readf(req->rc, c->proto_version, "s?d", + &ename, &ecode); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + if (p9_is_proto_dotu(c)) err = -ecode; - } + if (!err || !IS_ERR_VALUE(err)) { err = p9_errstr2errno(ename, strlen(ename)); @@ -628,8 +611,6 @@ static int p9_check_zc_errors(struct p9_client *c, struct p9_req_t *req, } return err; -out_free: - kfree(ename); out_err: p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_ERROR, "couldn't parse error%d\n", err); return err; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 991a6b735ff47710769545b11e481bb140b2e6f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Sat, 1 Jun 2013 15:31:40 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nfnetlink_acct: fix incomplete dumping of objects Fix broken incomplete object dumping if the list of objects does not fit into one single netlink message. Reported-by: Gabriel Lazar Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c index dc3fd5d44464..c7b6d466a662 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c @@ -149,9 +149,12 @@ nfnl_acct_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(cur, &nfnl_acct_list, head) { - if (last && cur != last) - continue; + if (last) { + if (cur != last) + continue; + last = NULL; + } if (nfnl_acct_fill_info(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid, cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NFNL_MSG_TYPE(cb->nlh->nlmsg_type), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 37bc4f8dfa72fb43b84381abca39cfdbbc8ff2df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Sat, 1 Jun 2013 15:36:02 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nfnetlink_cttimeout: fix incomplete dumping of objects Fix broken incomplete object dumping if the list of objects does not fit into one single netlink message. Reported-by: Gabriel Lazar Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cttimeout.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cttimeout.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cttimeout.c index 701c88a20fea..65074dfb9383 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cttimeout.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cttimeout.c @@ -220,9 +220,12 @@ ctnl_timeout_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(cur, &cttimeout_list, head) { - if (last && cur != last) - continue; + if (last) { + if (cur != last) + continue; + last = NULL; + } if (ctnl_timeout_fill_info(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid, cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NFNL_MSG_TYPE(cb->nlh->nlmsg_type), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 409b545ac10d9548929557a75ad86540f59a2c83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phil Oester Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2013 05:09:27 +0000 Subject: netfilter: xt_TCPMSS: Fix violation of RFC879 in absence of MSS option The clamp-mss-to-pmtu option of the xt_TCPMSS target can cause issues connecting to websites if there was no MSS option present in the original SYN packet from the client. In these cases, it may add a MSS higher than the default specified in RFC879. Fix this by never setting a value > 536 if no MSS option was specified by the client. This closes netfilter's bugzilla #662. Signed-off-by: Phil Oester Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c b/net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c index a75240f0d42b..afaebc766933 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c @@ -125,6 +125,12 @@ tcpmss_mangle_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, skb_put(skb, TCPOLEN_MSS); + /* RFC 879 states that the default MSS is 536 without specific + * knowledge that the destination host is prepared to accept larger. + * Since no MSS was provided, we MUST NOT set a value > 536. + */ + newmss = min(newmss, (u16)536); + opt = (u_int8_t *)tcph + sizeof(struct tcphdr); memmove(opt + TCPOLEN_MSS, opt, tcplen - sizeof(struct tcphdr)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7b8dfe289fdde0066be343a3e0271ad6d7b6dbcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 18:42:00 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: fix missing HW protocol Locally generated IPv4 and IPv6 traffic gets skb->protocol unset, thus passing zero. ip6tables -I OUTPUT -j NFQUEUE libmnl/examples/netfilter# ./nf-queue 0 & ping6 ::1 packet received (id=1 hw=0x0000 hook=3) ^^^^^^ Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue_core.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue_core.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue_core.c index 4e27fa035814..5352b2d2d5bf 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue_core.c @@ -637,9 +637,6 @@ nfqnl_enqueue_packet(struct nf_queue_entry *entry, unsigned int queuenum) if (queue->copy_mode == NFQNL_COPY_NONE) return -EINVAL; - if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_GSO) || !skb_is_gso(entry->skb)) - return __nfqnl_enqueue_packet(net, queue, entry); - skb = entry->skb; switch (entry->pf) { @@ -651,6 +648,9 @@ nfqnl_enqueue_packet(struct nf_queue_entry *entry, unsigned int queuenum) break; } + if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_GSO) || !skb_is_gso(skb)) + return __nfqnl_enqueue_packet(net, queue, entry); + nf_bridge_adjust_skb_data(skb); segs = skb_gso_segment(skb, 0); /* Does not use PTR_ERR to limit the number of error codes that can be -- cgit v1.2.3 From 40edeff6e1c6f9a6f16536ae3375e3af9d648449 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2013 11:15:55 +0000 Subject: net_sched: qdisc_get_rtab() must check data[] array qdisc_get_rtab() should check not only the keys in struct tc_ratespec, but also the full data[] array. "tc ... linklayer atm " only perturbs values in the 256 slots array. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/sch_api.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c index 2b935e7cfe7b..281c1bded1f6 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_api.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c @@ -291,17 +291,18 @@ struct qdisc_rate_table *qdisc_get_rtab(struct tc_ratespec *r, struct nlattr *ta { struct qdisc_rate_table *rtab; + if (tab == NULL || r->rate == 0 || r->cell_log == 0 || + nla_len(tab) != TC_RTAB_SIZE) + return NULL; + for (rtab = qdisc_rtab_list; rtab; rtab = rtab->next) { - if (memcmp(&rtab->rate, r, sizeof(struct tc_ratespec)) == 0) { + if (!memcmp(&rtab->rate, r, sizeof(struct tc_ratespec)) && + !memcmp(&rtab->data, nla_data(tab), 1024)) { rtab->refcnt++; return rtab; } } - if (tab == NULL || r->rate == 0 || r->cell_log == 0 || - nla_len(tab) != TC_RTAB_SIZE) - return NULL; - rtab = kmalloc(sizeof(*rtab), GFP_KERNEL); if (rtab) { rtab->rate = *r; -- cgit v1.2.3 From ac16d1484efd5d2d9077c55453b1f8abff49fc18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthias Schiffer Date: Tue, 28 May 2013 17:32:32 +0200 Subject: batman-adv: wait for rtnl in batadv_store_mesh_iface instead of failing if it is taken The rtnl_lock in batadv_store_mesh_iface has been converted to a rtnl_trylock some time ago to avoid a possible deadlock between rtnl and s_active on removal of the sysfs nodes. The behaviour introduced by that was quite confusing as it could lead to the sysfs store to fail, making batman-adv setup scripts unreliable. As recently the sysfs removal was postponed to a worker not running with the rtnl taken, the deadlock can't occur any more and it is safe to change the trylock back to a lock to make the sysfs store reliable again. Signed-off-by: Matthias Schiffer Reviewed-by: Simon Wunderlich Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli --- net/batman-adv/sysfs.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/batman-adv/sysfs.c b/net/batman-adv/sysfs.c index 15a22efa9a67..929e304dacb2 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/sysfs.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/sysfs.c @@ -582,10 +582,7 @@ static ssize_t batadv_store_mesh_iface(struct kobject *kobj, (strncmp(hard_iface->soft_iface->name, buff, IFNAMSIZ) == 0)) goto out; - if (!rtnl_trylock()) { - ret = -ERESTARTSYS; - goto out; - } + rtnl_lock(); if (status_tmp == BATADV_IF_NOT_IN_USE) { batadv_hardif_disable_interface(hard_iface, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7c24bbbeab4159f924b65b1e94878e597b762714 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Simon Wunderlich Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 13:07:42 +0200 Subject: batman-adv: forward late OGMs from best next hop When a packet is received from another node first and later from the best next hop, this packet is dropped. However the first OGM was sent with the BATADV_NOT_BEST_NEXT_HOP flag and thus dropped by neighbors. The late OGM from the best neighbor is then dropped because it is a duplicate. If this situation happens constantly, a node might end up not forwarding the "valid" OGMs anymore, and nodes behind will starve from not getting valid OGMs. Fix this by refining the duplicate checking behaviour: The actions should depend on whether it was a duplicate for a neighbor only or for the originator. OGMs which are not duplicates for a specific neighbor will now be considered in batadv_iv_ogm_forward(), but only actually forwarded for the best next hop. Therefore, late OGMs from the best next hop are forwarded now and not dropped as duplicates anymore. Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli --- net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c b/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c index 071f288b77a8..f680ee101878 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c @@ -29,6 +29,21 @@ #include "bat_algo.h" #include "network-coding.h" +/** + * batadv_dup_status - duplicate status + * @BATADV_NO_DUP: the packet is a duplicate + * @BATADV_ORIG_DUP: OGM is a duplicate in the originator (but not for the + * neighbor) + * @BATADV_NEIGH_DUP: OGM is a duplicate for the neighbor + * @BATADV_PROTECTED: originator is currently protected (after reboot) + */ +enum batadv_dup_status { + BATADV_NO_DUP = 0, + BATADV_ORIG_DUP, + BATADV_NEIGH_DUP, + BATADV_PROTECTED, +}; + static struct batadv_neigh_node * batadv_iv_ogm_neigh_new(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface, const uint8_t *neigh_addr, @@ -650,7 +665,7 @@ batadv_iv_ogm_orig_update(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const struct batadv_ogm_packet *batadv_ogm_packet, struct batadv_hard_iface *if_incoming, const unsigned char *tt_buff, - int is_duplicate) + enum batadv_dup_status dup_status) { struct batadv_neigh_node *neigh_node = NULL, *tmp_neigh_node = NULL; struct batadv_neigh_node *router = NULL; @@ -676,7 +691,7 @@ batadv_iv_ogm_orig_update(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, continue; } - if (is_duplicate) + if (dup_status != BATADV_NO_DUP) continue; spin_lock_bh(&tmp_neigh_node->lq_update_lock); @@ -718,7 +733,7 @@ batadv_iv_ogm_orig_update(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, neigh_node->tq_avg = batadv_ring_buffer_avg(neigh_node->tq_recv); spin_unlock_bh(&neigh_node->lq_update_lock); - if (!is_duplicate) { + if (dup_status == BATADV_NO_DUP) { orig_node->last_ttl = batadv_ogm_packet->header.ttl; neigh_node->last_ttl = batadv_ogm_packet->header.ttl; } @@ -902,15 +917,16 @@ out: return ret; } -/* processes a batman packet for all interfaces, adjusts the sequence number and - * finds out whether it is a duplicate. - * returns: - * 1 the packet is a duplicate - * 0 the packet has not yet been received - * -1 the packet is old and has been received while the seqno window - * was protected. Caller should drop it. +/** + * batadv_iv_ogm_update_seqnos - process a batman packet for all interfaces, + * adjust the sequence number and find out whether it is a duplicate + * @ethhdr: ethernet header of the packet + * @batadv_ogm_packet: OGM packet to be considered + * @if_incoming: interface on which the OGM packet was received + * + * Returns duplicate status as enum batadv_dup_status */ -static int +static enum batadv_dup_status batadv_iv_ogm_update_seqnos(const struct ethhdr *ethhdr, const struct batadv_ogm_packet *batadv_ogm_packet, const struct batadv_hard_iface *if_incoming) @@ -918,17 +934,18 @@ batadv_iv_ogm_update_seqnos(const struct ethhdr *ethhdr, struct batadv_priv *bat_priv = netdev_priv(if_incoming->soft_iface); struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node; struct batadv_neigh_node *tmp_neigh_node; - int is_duplicate = 0; + int is_dup; int32_t seq_diff; int need_update = 0; - int set_mark, ret = -1; + int set_mark; + enum batadv_dup_status ret = BATADV_NO_DUP; uint32_t seqno = ntohl(batadv_ogm_packet->seqno); uint8_t *neigh_addr; uint8_t packet_count; orig_node = batadv_get_orig_node(bat_priv, batadv_ogm_packet->orig); if (!orig_node) - return 0; + return BATADV_NO_DUP; spin_lock_bh(&orig_node->ogm_cnt_lock); seq_diff = seqno - orig_node->last_real_seqno; @@ -936,22 +953,29 @@ batadv_iv_ogm_update_seqnos(const struct ethhdr *ethhdr, /* signalize caller that the packet is to be dropped. */ if (!hlist_empty(&orig_node->neigh_list) && batadv_window_protected(bat_priv, seq_diff, - &orig_node->batman_seqno_reset)) + &orig_node->batman_seqno_reset)) { + ret = BATADV_PROTECTED; goto out; + } rcu_read_lock(); hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(tmp_neigh_node, &orig_node->neigh_list, list) { - is_duplicate |= batadv_test_bit(tmp_neigh_node->real_bits, - orig_node->last_real_seqno, - seqno); - neigh_addr = tmp_neigh_node->addr; + is_dup = batadv_test_bit(tmp_neigh_node->real_bits, + orig_node->last_real_seqno, + seqno); + if (batadv_compare_eth(neigh_addr, ethhdr->h_source) && - tmp_neigh_node->if_incoming == if_incoming) + tmp_neigh_node->if_incoming == if_incoming) { set_mark = 1; - else + if (is_dup) + ret = BATADV_NEIGH_DUP; + } else { set_mark = 0; + if (is_dup && (ret != BATADV_NEIGH_DUP)) + ret = BATADV_ORIG_DUP; + } /* if the window moved, set the update flag. */ need_update |= batadv_bit_get_packet(bat_priv, @@ -971,8 +995,6 @@ batadv_iv_ogm_update_seqnos(const struct ethhdr *ethhdr, orig_node->last_real_seqno = seqno; } - ret = is_duplicate; - out: spin_unlock_bh(&orig_node->ogm_cnt_lock); batadv_orig_node_free_ref(orig_node); @@ -994,7 +1016,8 @@ static void batadv_iv_ogm_process(const struct ethhdr *ethhdr, int is_broadcast = 0, is_bidirect; bool is_single_hop_neigh = false; bool is_from_best_next_hop = false; - int is_duplicate, sameseq, simlar_ttl; + int sameseq, similar_ttl; + enum batadv_dup_status dup_status; uint32_t if_incoming_seqno; uint8_t *prev_sender; @@ -1138,10 +1161,10 @@ static void batadv_iv_ogm_process(const struct ethhdr *ethhdr, if (!orig_node) return; - is_duplicate = batadv_iv_ogm_update_seqnos(ethhdr, batadv_ogm_packet, - if_incoming); + dup_status = batadv_iv_ogm_update_seqnos(ethhdr, batadv_ogm_packet, + if_incoming); - if (is_duplicate == -1) { + if (dup_status == BATADV_PROTECTED) { batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_BATMAN, bat_priv, "Drop packet: packet within seqno protection time (sender: %pM)\n", ethhdr->h_source); @@ -1211,11 +1234,12 @@ static void batadv_iv_ogm_process(const struct ethhdr *ethhdr, * seqno and similar ttl as the non-duplicate */ sameseq = orig_node->last_real_seqno == ntohl(batadv_ogm_packet->seqno); - simlar_ttl = orig_node->last_ttl - 3 <= batadv_ogm_packet->header.ttl; - if (is_bidirect && (!is_duplicate || (sameseq && simlar_ttl))) + similar_ttl = orig_node->last_ttl - 3 <= batadv_ogm_packet->header.ttl; + if (is_bidirect && ((dup_status == BATADV_NO_DUP) || + (sameseq && similar_ttl))) batadv_iv_ogm_orig_update(bat_priv, orig_node, ethhdr, batadv_ogm_packet, if_incoming, - tt_buff, is_duplicate); + tt_buff, dup_status); /* is single hop (direct) neighbor */ if (is_single_hop_neigh) { @@ -1236,7 +1260,7 @@ static void batadv_iv_ogm_process(const struct ethhdr *ethhdr, goto out_neigh; } - if (is_duplicate) { + if (dup_status == BATADV_NEIGH_DUP) { batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_BATMAN, bat_priv, "Drop packet: duplicate packet received\n"); goto out_neigh; -- cgit v1.2.3 From d5b4c93e67b0b1291aa8e2aaf694e40afc3412d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Simon Wunderlich Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 16:52:05 +0200 Subject: batman-adv: Don't handle address updates when bla is disabled The bridge loop avoidance has a hook to handle address updates of the originator. These should not be handled when bridge loop avoidance is disabled - it might send some bridge loop avoidance packets which should not appear if bla is disabled. Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli --- net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c index 379061c72549..de27b3175cfd 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c @@ -1067,6 +1067,10 @@ void batadv_bla_update_orig_address(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, group = htons(crc16(0, primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr, ETH_ALEN)); bat_priv->bla.claim_dest.group = group; + /* purge everything when bridge loop avoidance is turned off */ + if (!atomic_read(&bat_priv->bridge_loop_avoidance)) + oldif = NULL; + if (!oldif) { batadv_bla_purge_claims(bat_priv, NULL, 1); batadv_bla_purge_backbone_gw(bat_priv, 1); -- cgit v1.2.3 From a8241c63517ec0b900695daa9003cddc41c536a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2013 12:00:49 +0300 Subject: ipvs: info leak in __ip_vs_get_dest_entries() The entry struct has a 2 byte hole after ->port and another 4 byte hole after ->stats.outpkts. You must have CAP_NET_ADMIN in your namespace to hit this information leak. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Acked-by: Julian Anastasov Signed-off-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c index 5b142fb16480..9e6c2a075a4c 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c @@ -2542,6 +2542,7 @@ __ip_vs_get_dest_entries(struct net *net, const struct ip_vs_get_dests *get, struct ip_vs_dest *dest; struct ip_vs_dest_entry entry; + memset(&entry, 0, sizeof(entry)); list_for_each_entry(dest, &svc->destinations, n_list) { if (count >= get->num_dests) break; -- cgit v1.2.3 From ed13998c319b050fc9abdb73915859dfdbe1fb38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dichtel Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2013 15:30:55 +0200 Subject: sock_diag: fix filter code sent to userspace Filters need to be translated to real BPF code for userland, like SO_GETFILTER. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/filter.h | 1 + net/core/filter.c | 2 +- net/core/sock_diag.c | 9 +++++++-- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index c050dcc322a4..f65f5a69db8f 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ extern int sk_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog, struct sock *sk); extern int sk_detach_filter(struct sock *sk); extern int sk_chk_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen); extern int sk_get_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sock_filter __user *filter, unsigned len); +extern void sk_decode_filter(struct sock_filter *filt, struct sock_filter *to); #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT #include diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index dad2a178f9f8..6438f29ff266 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -778,7 +778,7 @@ int sk_detach_filter(struct sock *sk) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sk_detach_filter); -static void sk_decode_filter(struct sock_filter *filt, struct sock_filter *to) +void sk_decode_filter(struct sock_filter *filt, struct sock_filter *to) { static const u16 decodes[] = { [BPF_S_ALU_ADD_K] = BPF_ALU|BPF_ADD|BPF_K, diff --git a/net/core/sock_diag.c b/net/core/sock_diag.c index d5bef0b0f639..a0e9cf6379de 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_diag.c +++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c @@ -73,8 +73,13 @@ int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct sock *sk, goto out; } - if (filter) - memcpy(nla_data(attr), filter->insns, len); + if (filter) { + struct sock_filter *fb = (struct sock_filter *)nla_data(attr); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < filter->len; i++, fb++) + sk_decode_filter(&filter->insns[i], fb); + } out: rcu_read_unlock(); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1abd165ed757db1afdefaac0a4bc8a70f97d258c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2013 15:53:47 +0200 Subject: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in socket destruction While stress testing sctp sockets, I hit the following panic: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: [] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp] PGD 7cead067 PUD 7ce76067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: sctp(F) libcrc32c(F) [...] CPU: 7 PID: 2950 Comm: acc Tainted: GF 3.10.0-rc2+ #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T410/0H19HD, BIOS 1.6.3 02/01/2011 task: ffff88007ce0e0c0 ti: ffff88007b568000 task.ti: ffff88007b568000 RIP: 0010:[] [] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp] RSP: 0018:ffff88007b569e08 EFLAGS: 00010292 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88007db78a00 RCX: dead000000200200 RDX: ffffffffa049fdb0 RSI: ffff8800379baf38 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88007b569e18 R08: ffff88007c230da0 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff880077990d00 R14: 0000000000000084 R15: ffff88007db78a00 FS: 00007fc18ab61700(0000) GS:ffff88007fc60000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000007cf9d000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Stack: ffff88007b569e38 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e38 ffffffffa049fded ffffffff81abf0c0 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e58 ffffffff8145b60e 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff88007b569eb8 ffffffff814df36e Call Trace: [] sctp_destroy_sock+0x3d/0x80 [sctp] [] sk_common_release+0x1e/0xf0 [] inet_create+0x2ae/0x350 [] __sock_create+0x11f/0x240 [] sock_create+0x30/0x40 [] SyS_socket+0x4c/0xc0 [] ? do_page_fault+0xe/0x10 [] ? page_fault+0x22/0x30 [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 0c c9 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e8 fb fe ff ff c9 c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 66 66 66 66 90 <48> 8b 47 20 48 89 fb c6 47 1c 01 c6 40 12 07 e8 9e 68 01 00 48 RIP [] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp] RSP CR2: 0000000000000020 ---[ end trace e0d71ec1108c1dd9 ]--- I did not hit this with the lksctp-tools functional tests, but with a small, multi-threaded test program, that heavily allocates, binds, listens and waits in accept on sctp sockets, and then randomly kills some of them (no need for an actual client in this case to hit this). Then, again, allocating, binding, etc, and then killing child processes. This panic then only occurs when ``echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable'' is set. The cause for that is actually very simple: in sctp_endpoint_init() we enter the path of sctp_auth_init_hmacs(). There, we try to allocate our crypto transforms through crypto_alloc_hash(). In our scenario, it then can happen that crypto_alloc_hash() fails with -EINTR from crypto_larval_wait(), thus we bail out and release the socket via sk_common_release(), sctp_destroy_sock() and hit the NULL pointer dereference as soon as we try to access members in the endpoint during sctp_endpoint_free(), since endpoint at that time is still NULL. Now, if we have that case, we do not need to do any cleanup work and just leave the destruction handler. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Neil Horman Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/socket.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index f631c5ff4dbf..6abb1caf9836 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -4003,6 +4003,12 @@ SCTP_STATIC void sctp_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk) /* Release our hold on the endpoint. */ sp = sctp_sk(sk); + /* This could happen during socket init, thus we bail out + * early, since the rest of the below is not setup either. + */ + if (sp->ep == NULL) + return; + if (sp->do_auto_asconf) { sp->do_auto_asconf = 0; list_del(&sp->auto_asconf_list); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7cdbac71f911494aa7d0343be23c092ca84a5ed4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick McHardy Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2013 02:52:47 -0700 Subject: netlink: fix error propagation in netlink_mmap() Return the error if something went wrong instead of unconditionally returning 0. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c index d0b3dd60d386..57ee84d21470 100644 --- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c @@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static int netlink_mmap(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, err = 0; out: mutex_unlock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock); - return 0; + return err; } static void netlink_frame_flush_dcache(const struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 757aee0f7177b7c7528aa0c120fc131aca8bf641 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hedberg Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2013 13:05:32 +0300 Subject: Bluetooth: Fix checks for LE support on LE-only controllers LE-only controllers do not support extended features so any kind of host feature bit checks do not make sense for them. This patch fixes code used for both single-mode (LE-only) and dual-mode (BR/EDR/LE) to use the HCI_LE_ENABLED flag instead of the "Host LE supported" feature bit for LE support tests. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan Signed-off-by: John W. Linville --- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 2 +- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index 35fef22703e9..5e93b24d01fd 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -2700,7 +2700,7 @@ static int start_discovery(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, break; case DISCOV_TYPE_LE: - if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hdev)) { + if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) { err = cmd_status(sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY, MGMT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED); mgmt_pending_remove(cmd); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index b2296d3857a0..b5562abdd6e0 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level); - if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon->hdev)) + if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) return 1; if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW) @@ -851,7 +851,7 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) __u8 reason; int err = 0; - if (!lmp_host_le_capable(conn->hcon->hdev)) { + if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) { err = -ENOTSUPP; reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; goto done; -- cgit v1.2.3 From cb3b3152b2f5939d67005cff841a1ca748b19888 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hedberg Date: Tue, 28 May 2013 13:46:30 +0300 Subject: Bluetooth: Fix missing length checks for L2CAP signalling PDUs There has been code in place to check that the L2CAP length header matches the amount of data received, but many PDU handlers have not been checking that the data received actually matches that expected by the specific PDU. This patch adds passing the length header to the specific handler functions and ensures that those functions fail cleanly in the case of an incorrect amount of data. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan Signed-off-by: John W. Linville --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index a76d1ac0321b..24bee07ee4ce 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -3677,10 +3677,14 @@ static void l2cap_conf_rfc_get(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *rsp, int len) } static inline int l2cap_command_rej(struct l2cap_conn *conn, - struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data) + struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u16 cmd_len, + u8 *data) { struct l2cap_cmd_rej_unk *rej = (struct l2cap_cmd_rej_unk *) data; + if (cmd_len < sizeof(*rej)) + return -EPROTO; + if (rej->reason != L2CAP_REJ_NOT_UNDERSTOOD) return 0; @@ -3829,11 +3833,14 @@ sendresp: } static int l2cap_connect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, - struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data) + struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u16 cmd_len, u8 *data) { struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; + if (cmd_len < sizeof(struct l2cap_conn_req)) + return -EPROTO; + hci_dev_lock(hdev); if (test_bit(HCI_MGMT, &hdev->dev_flags) && !test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_MGMT_CONNECTED, &hcon->flags)) @@ -3847,7 +3854,8 @@ static int l2cap_connect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, } static int l2cap_connect_create_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, - struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data) + struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u16 cmd_len, + u8 *data) { struct l2cap_conn_rsp *rsp = (struct l2cap_conn_rsp *) data; u16 scid, dcid, result, status; @@ -3855,6 +3863,9 @@ static int l2cap_connect_create_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 req[128]; int err; + if (cmd_len < sizeof(*rsp)) + return -EPROTO; + scid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->scid); dcid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->dcid); result = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->result); @@ -3952,6 +3963,9 @@ static inline int l2cap_config_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_chan *chan; int len, err = 0; + if (cmd_len < sizeof(*req)) + return -EPROTO; + dcid = __le16_to_cpu(req->dcid); flags = __le16_to_cpu(req->flags); @@ -3975,7 +3989,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_config_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, /* Reject if config buffer is too small. */ len = cmd_len - sizeof(*req); - if (len < 0 || chan->conf_len + len > sizeof(chan->conf_req)) { + if (chan->conf_len + len > sizeof(chan->conf_req)) { l2cap_send_cmd(conn, cmd->ident, L2CAP_CONF_RSP, l2cap_build_conf_rsp(chan, rsp, L2CAP_CONF_REJECT, flags), rsp); @@ -4053,14 +4067,18 @@ unlock: } static inline int l2cap_config_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, - struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data) + struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u16 cmd_len, + u8 *data) { struct l2cap_conf_rsp *rsp = (struct l2cap_conf_rsp *)data; u16 scid, flags, result; struct l2cap_chan *chan; - int len = le16_to_cpu(cmd->len) - sizeof(*rsp); + int len = cmd_len - sizeof(*rsp); int err = 0; + if (cmd_len < sizeof(*rsp)) + return -EPROTO; + scid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->scid); flags = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->flags); result = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->result); @@ -4161,7 +4179,8 @@ done: } static inline int l2cap_disconnect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, - struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data) + struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u16 cmd_len, + u8 *data) { struct l2cap_disconn_req *req = (struct l2cap_disconn_req *) data; struct l2cap_disconn_rsp rsp; @@ -4169,6 +4188,9 @@ static inline int l2cap_disconnect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_chan *chan; struct sock *sk; + if (cmd_len != sizeof(*req)) + return -EPROTO; + scid = __le16_to_cpu(req->scid); dcid = __le16_to_cpu(req->dcid); @@ -4208,12 +4230,16 @@ static inline int l2cap_disconnect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, } static inline int l2cap_disconnect_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, - struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data) + struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u16 cmd_len, + u8 *data) { struct l2cap_disconn_rsp *rsp = (struct l2cap_disconn_rsp *) data; u16 dcid, scid; struct l2cap_chan *chan; + if (cmd_len != sizeof(*rsp)) + return -EPROTO; + scid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->scid); dcid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->dcid); @@ -4243,11 +4269,15 @@ static inline int l2cap_disconnect_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, } static inline int l2cap_information_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, - struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data) + struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u16 cmd_len, + u8 *data) { struct l2cap_info_req *req = (struct l2cap_info_req *) data; u16 type; + if (cmd_len != sizeof(*req)) + return -EPROTO; + type = __le16_to_cpu(req->type); BT_DBG("type 0x%4.4x", type); @@ -4294,11 +4324,15 @@ static inline int l2cap_information_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, } static inline int l2cap_information_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, - struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data) + struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u16 cmd_len, + u8 *data) { struct l2cap_info_rsp *rsp = (struct l2cap_info_rsp *) data; u16 type, result; + if (cmd_len != sizeof(*rsp)) + return -EPROTO; + type = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->type); result = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->result); @@ -5164,16 +5198,16 @@ static inline int l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, switch (cmd->code) { case L2CAP_COMMAND_REJ: - l2cap_command_rej(conn, cmd, data); + l2cap_command_rej(conn, cmd, cmd_len, data); break; case L2CAP_CONN_REQ: - err = l2cap_connect_req(conn, cmd, data); + err = l2cap_connect_req(conn, cmd, cmd_len, data); break; case L2CAP_CONN_RSP: case L2CAP_CREATE_CHAN_RSP: - err = l2cap_connect_create_rsp(conn, cmd, data); + err = l2cap_connect_create_rsp(conn, cmd, cmd_len, data); break; case L2CAP_CONF_REQ: @@ -5181,15 +5215,15 @@ static inline int l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, break; case L2CAP_CONF_RSP: - err = l2cap_config_rsp(conn, cmd, data); + err = l2cap_config_rsp(conn, cmd, cmd_len, data); break; case L2CAP_DISCONN_REQ: - err = l2cap_disconnect_req(conn, cmd, data); + err = l2cap_disconnect_req(conn, cmd, cmd_len, data); break; case L2CAP_DISCONN_RSP: - err = l2cap_disconnect_rsp(conn, cmd, data); + err = l2cap_disconnect_rsp(conn, cmd, cmd_len, data); break; case L2CAP_ECHO_REQ: @@ -5200,11 +5234,11 @@ static inline int l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, break; case L2CAP_INFO_REQ: - err = l2cap_information_req(conn, cmd, data); + err = l2cap_information_req(conn, cmd, cmd_len, data); break; case L2CAP_INFO_RSP: - err = l2cap_information_rsp(conn, cmd, data); + err = l2cap_information_rsp(conn, cmd, cmd_len, data); break; case L2CAP_CREATE_CHAN_REQ: -- cgit v1.2.3 From 96570ffcca0b872dc8626e97569d2697f374d868 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hedberg Date: Wed, 29 May 2013 09:51:29 +0300 Subject: Bluetooth: Fix mgmt handling of power on failures If hci_dev_open fails we need to ensure that the corresponding mgmt_set_powered command gets an appropriate response. This patch fixes the missing response by adding a new mgmt_set_powered_failed function that's used to indicate a power on failure to mgmt. Since a situation with the device being rfkilled may require special handling in user space the patch uses a new dedicated mgmt status code for this. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan Signed-off-by: John W. Linville --- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 1 + include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 6 +++++- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h index 35a57cd1704c..7cb6d360d147 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h @@ -1117,6 +1117,7 @@ void hci_sock_dev_event(struct hci_dev *hdev, int event); int mgmt_control(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len); int mgmt_index_added(struct hci_dev *hdev); int mgmt_index_removed(struct hci_dev *hdev); +int mgmt_set_powered_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, int err); int mgmt_powered(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 powered); int mgmt_discoverable(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 discoverable); int mgmt_connectable(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 connectable); diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h b/include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h index 22980a7c3873..9944c3e68c5d 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #define MGMT_STATUS_NOT_POWERED 0x0f #define MGMT_STATUS_CANCELLED 0x10 #define MGMT_STATUS_INVALID_INDEX 0x11 +#define MGMT_STATUS_RFKILLED 0x12 struct mgmt_hdr { __le16 opcode; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c index 33843c5c4939..d817c932d634 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c @@ -1555,11 +1555,15 @@ static const struct rfkill_ops hci_rfkill_ops = { static void hci_power_on(struct work_struct *work) { struct hci_dev *hdev = container_of(work, struct hci_dev, power_on); + int err; BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); - if (hci_dev_open(hdev->id) < 0) + err = hci_dev_open(hdev->id); + if (err < 0) { + mgmt_set_powered_failed(hdev, err); return; + } if (test_bit(HCI_AUTO_OFF, &hdev->dev_flags)) queue_delayed_work(hdev->req_workqueue, &hdev->power_off, diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index 5e93b24d01fd..f8ecbc70293d 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -3418,6 +3418,27 @@ new_settings: return err; } +int mgmt_set_powered_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, int err) +{ + struct pending_cmd *cmd; + u8 status; + + cmd = mgmt_pending_find(MGMT_OP_SET_POWERED, hdev); + if (!cmd) + return -ENOENT; + + if (err == -ERFKILL) + status = MGMT_STATUS_RFKILLED; + else + status = MGMT_STATUS_FAILED; + + err = cmd_status(cmd->sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_SET_POWERED, status); + + mgmt_pending_remove(cmd); + + return err; +} + int mgmt_discoverable(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 discoverable) { struct cmd_lookup match = { NULL, hdev }; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2dc85bf323515e59e15dfa858d1472bb25cad0fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 16:02:27 +0200 Subject: packet: packet_getname_spkt: make sure string is always 0-terminated uaddr->sa_data is exactly of size 14, which is hard-coded here and passed as a size argument to strncpy(). A device name can be of size IFNAMSIZ (== 16), meaning we might leave the destination string unterminated. Thus, use strlcpy() and also sizeof() while we're at it. We need to memset the data area beforehand, since strlcpy does not padd the remaining buffer with zeroes for user space, so that we do not possibly leak anything. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 8ec1bca7f859..20a1bd0e6549 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -2851,12 +2851,11 @@ static int packet_getname_spkt(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, return -EOPNOTSUPP; uaddr->sa_family = AF_PACKET; + memset(uaddr->sa_data, 0, sizeof(uaddr->sa_data)); rcu_read_lock(); dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex); if (dev) - strncpy(uaddr->sa_data, dev->name, 14); - else - memset(uaddr->sa_data, 0, 14); + strlcpy(uaddr->sa_data, dev->name, sizeof(uaddr->sa_data)); rcu_read_unlock(); *uaddr_len = sizeof(*uaddr); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 55b92b7a11690bc377b5d373872a6b650ae88e64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 16:07:23 +0200 Subject: l2tp: Fix PPP header erasure and memory leak Copy user data after PPP framing header. This prevents erasure of the added PPP header and avoids leaking two bytes of uninitialised memory at the end of skb's data buffer. Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c index 637a341c1e2d..681c626068b4 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c @@ -346,12 +346,12 @@ static int pppol2tp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msgh skb_put(skb, 2); /* Copy user data into skb */ - error = memcpy_fromiovec(skb->data, m->msg_iov, total_len); + error = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, total_len), m->msg_iov, + total_len); if (error < 0) { kfree_skb(skb); goto error_put_sess_tun; } - skb_put(skb, total_len); l2tp_xmit_skb(session, skb, session->hdr_len); -- cgit v1.2.3 From a6f79d0f26704214b5b702bbac525cb72997f984 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 16:07:36 +0200 Subject: l2tp: Fix sendmsg() return value PPPoL2TP sockets should comply with the standard send*() return values (i.e. return number of bytes sent instead of 0 upon success). Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c index 681c626068b4..8dec6876dc50 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static int pppol2tp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msgh sock_put(ps->tunnel_sock); sock_put(sk); - return error; + return total_len; error_put_sess_tun: sock_put(ps->tunnel_sock); -- cgit v1.2.3 From baafc77b32f647daa7c45825f7af8cdd55d00817 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Saurabh Mohan Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2013 17:45:10 -0700 Subject: net/ipv4: ip_vti clear skb cb before tunneling. If users apply shaper to vti tunnel then it will cause a kernel crash. The problem seems to be due to the vti_tunnel_xmit function not clearing skb->opt field before passing the packet to xfrm tunneling code. Signed-off-by: Saurabh Mohan Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ip_vti.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_vti.c b/net/ipv4/ip_vti.c index 9d2bdb2c1d3f..c118f6b576bb 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_vti.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_vti.c @@ -361,8 +361,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t vti_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) tunnel->err_count = 0; } - IPCB(skb)->flags &= ~(IPSKB_XFRM_TUNNEL_SIZE | IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED | - IPSKB_REROUTED); + memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb))); skb_dst_drop(skb); skb_dst_set(skb, &rt->dst); nf_reset(skb); -- cgit v1.2.3 From d3b6f6141831b6e2d414edea6cc7af5b9bc6fac2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2013 13:26:05 -0700 Subject: ip_tunnel: remove __net_init/exit from exported functions If CONFIG_NET_NS is not set then __net_init is the same as __init and __net_exit is the same as __exit. These functions will be removed from memory after the module loads or is removed. Functions that are exported for use by other functions should never be labeled for removal. Bug introduced by commit c54419321455631079c ("GRE: Refactor GRE tunneling code.") Reported-by: Steinar H. Gunderson Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/ip_tunnels.h | 6 +++--- net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h index 4b6f0b28f41f..09b1360e10bf 100644 --- a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h +++ b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h @@ -95,10 +95,10 @@ struct ip_tunnel_net { int ip_tunnel_init(struct net_device *dev); void ip_tunnel_uninit(struct net_device *dev); void ip_tunnel_dellink(struct net_device *dev, struct list_head *head); -int __net_init ip_tunnel_init_net(struct net *net, int ip_tnl_net_id, - struct rtnl_link_ops *ops, char *devname); +int ip_tunnel_init_net(struct net *net, int ip_tnl_net_id, + struct rtnl_link_ops *ops, char *devname); -void __net_exit ip_tunnel_delete_net(struct ip_tunnel_net *itn); +void ip_tunnel_delete_net(struct ip_tunnel_net *itn); void ip_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, const struct iphdr *tnl_params); diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c index be2f8da0ae8e..7fa8f08fa7ae 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c @@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ void ip_tunnel_dellink(struct net_device *dev, struct list_head *head) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ip_tunnel_dellink); -int __net_init ip_tunnel_init_net(struct net *net, int ip_tnl_net_id, +int ip_tunnel_init_net(struct net *net, int ip_tnl_net_id, struct rtnl_link_ops *ops, char *devname) { struct ip_tunnel_net *itn = net_generic(net, ip_tnl_net_id); @@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ static void ip_tunnel_destroy(struct ip_tunnel_net *itn, struct list_head *head) unregister_netdevice_queue(itn->fb_tunnel_dev, head); } -void __net_exit ip_tunnel_delete_net(struct ip_tunnel_net *itn) +void ip_tunnel_delete_net(struct ip_tunnel_net *itn) { LIST_HEAD(list); -- cgit v1.2.3 From c5c7774d7eb4397891edca9ebdf750ba90977a69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Neil Horman Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 14:26:44 -0400 Subject: sctp: fully initialize sctp_outq in sctp_outq_init In commit 2f94aabd9f6c925d77aecb3ff020f1cc12ed8f86 (refactor sctp_outq_teardown to insure proper re-initalization) we modified sctp_outq_teardown to use sctp_outq_init to fully re-initalize the outq structure. Steve West recently asked me why I removed the q->error = 0 initalization from sctp_outq_teardown. I did so because I was operating under the impression that sctp_outq_init would properly initalize that value for us, but it doesn't. sctp_outq_init operates under the assumption that the outq struct is all 0's (as it is when called from sctp_association_init), but using it in __sctp_outq_teardown violates that assumption. We should do a memset in sctp_outq_init to ensure that the entire structure is in a known state there instead. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman Reported-by: "West, Steve (NSN - US/Fort Worth)" CC: Vlad Yasevich CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org CC: davem@davemloft.net Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/outqueue.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/outqueue.c b/net/sctp/outqueue.c index 32a4625fef77..be35e2dbcc9a 100644 --- a/net/sctp/outqueue.c +++ b/net/sctp/outqueue.c @@ -206,6 +206,8 @@ static inline int sctp_cacc_skip(struct sctp_transport *primary, */ void sctp_outq_init(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_outq *q) { + memset(q, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_outq)); + q->asoc = asoc; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->out_chunk_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->control_chunk_list); @@ -213,11 +215,7 @@ void sctp_outq_init(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_outq *q) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->sacked); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->abandoned); - q->fast_rtx = 0; - q->outstanding_bytes = 0; q->empty = 1; - q->cork = 0; - q->out_qlen = 0; } /* Free the outqueue structure and any related pending chunks. -- cgit v1.2.3