From 074e61ec3751da9ab88ee66d3818574556c03489 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morris Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 09:01:31 +1100 Subject: kernel: add roundup() code comment from akpm Add roundup() code comment from akpm. Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: James Morris --- include/linux/kernel.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h index b526947bdf48..3f648d204c37 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ extern const char linux_proc_banner[]; #define FIELD_SIZEOF(t, f) (sizeof(((t*)0)->f)) #define DIV_ROUND_UP(n,d) (((n) + (d) - 1) / (d)) + +/* The `const' in roundup() prevents gcc-3.3 from calling __divdi3 */ #define roundup(x, y) ( \ { \ const typeof(y) __y = y; \ -- cgit v1.2.3 From ce6ada35bdf710d16582cc4869c26722547e6f11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2010 17:11:32 +0000 Subject: security: Define CAP_SYSLOG Privileged syslog operations currently require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Split this off into a new CAP_SYSLOG privilege which we can sanely take away from a container through the capability bounding set. With this patch, an lxc container can be prevented from messing with the host's syslog (i.e. dmesg -c). Changelog: mar 12 2010: add selinux capability2:cap_syslog perm Changelog: nov 22 2010: . port to new kernel . add a WARN_ONCE if userspace isn't using CAP_SYSLOG Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan Acked-By: Kees Cook Cc: James Morris Cc: Michael Kerrisk Cc: Stephen Smalley Cc: "Christopher J. PeBenito" Cc: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris --- include/linux/capability.h | 7 +++++-- kernel/printk.c | 8 +++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index 90012b9ddbf3..fb16a3699b99 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { /* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */ /* Allow administration of the random device */ /* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */ -/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */ /* Allow setting the domainname */ /* Allow setting the hostname */ /* Allow calling bdflush() */ @@ -352,7 +351,11 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { #define CAP_MAC_ADMIN 33 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_MAC_ADMIN +/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */ + +#define CAP_SYSLOG 34 + +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYSLOG #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) diff --git a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c index 9a2264fc42ca..0712380737b3 100644 --- a/kernel/printk.c +++ b/kernel/printk.c @@ -283,8 +283,14 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file) return -EPERM; if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + !capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) { + /* remove after 2.6.38 */ + if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + WARN_ONCE(1, "Attempt to access syslog with " + "CAP_SYS_ADMIN but no CAP_SYSLOG " + "(deprecated and denied).\n"); return -EPERM; + } } error = security_syslog(type); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 8858d2b2d4b6..7ed3663332ec 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } }, { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } }, { "peer", { "recv", NULL } }, - { "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", NULL } }, + { "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", NULL } }, { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } }, { "tun_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, -- cgit v1.2.3 From dc88e46029486ed475c71fe1bb696d39511ac8fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2010 17:50:31 -0500 Subject: lib: hex2bin converts ascii hexadecimal string to binary Similar to the kgdb_hex2mem() code, hex2bin converts a string to binary using the hex_to_bin() library call. Changelog: - Replace parameter names with src/dst (based on David Howell's comment) - Add 'const' where needed (based on David Howell's comment) - Replace int with size_t (based on David Howell's comment) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn Acked-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: James Morris --- include/linux/kernel.h | 1 + lib/hexdump.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h index a35b4f7332f0..d0fbc043de60 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h @@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ static inline char *pack_hex_byte(char *buf, u8 byte) } extern int hex_to_bin(char ch); +extern void hex2bin(u8 *dst, const char *src, size_t count); /* * General tracing related utility functions - trace_printk(), diff --git a/lib/hexdump.c b/lib/hexdump.c index 5d7a4802c562..b66b2bd67952 100644 --- a/lib/hexdump.c +++ b/lib/hexdump.c @@ -33,6 +33,22 @@ int hex_to_bin(char ch) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(hex_to_bin); +/** + * hex2bin - convert an ascii hexadecimal string to its binary representation + * @dst: binary result + * @src: ascii hexadecimal string + * @count: result length + */ +void hex2bin(u8 *dst, const char *src, size_t count) +{ + while (count--) { + *dst = hex_to_bin(*src++) << 4; + *dst += hex_to_bin(*src++); + dst++; + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(hex2bin); + /** * hex_dump_to_buffer - convert a blob of data to "hex ASCII" in memory * @buf: data blob to dump -- cgit v1.2.3 From c749ba912e87ccebd674ae24b97462176c63732e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2010 18:54:16 -0500 Subject: key: add tpm_send command Add internal kernel tpm_send() command used to seal/unseal keys. Changelog: - replaced module_put in tpm_send() with new tpm_chip_put() wrapper (suggested by David Howells) - Make tpm_send() cmd argument a 'void *' (suggested by David Howells) Signed-off-by: David Safford Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: David Howells Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ include/linux/tpm.h | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c index 26c09f3b4a74..068bac858b4a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c @@ -780,6 +780,22 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_extend); +int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip; + int rc; + + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); + if (chip == NULL) + return -ENODEV; + + rc = transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, buflen, "attempting tpm_cmd"); + + tpm_chip_put(chip); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_send); + ssize_t tpm_show_pcrs(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index ac5d1c1285d9..fdc718abf83b 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf); extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash); +extern int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen); #else static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) { return -ENODEV; @@ -38,5 +39,8 @@ static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) { static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) { return -ENODEV; } +static inline int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) { + return -ENODEV; +} #endif #endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From d00a1c72f7f4661212299e6cb132dfa58030bcdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2010 17:50:34 -0500 Subject: keys: add new trusted key-type Define a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace can only ever see encrypted blobs. Based on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have been added to support additional usages. The new options are: migratable= designates that the key may/may not ever be updated (resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.) pcrlock=n extends the designated PCR 'n' with a random value, so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed again until after a reboot. keyhandle= specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle. keyauth= specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth. blobauth= specifies the sealed data auth. Implementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys will be investigated for a possible future extension. Changelog: - Updated and added examples to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt - Moved generic TPM constants to include/linux/tpm_command.h (David Howell's suggestion.) - trusted_defined.c: replaced kzalloc with kmalloc, added pcrlock failure error handling, added const qualifiers where appropriate. - moved to late_initcall - updated from hash to shash (suggestion by David Howells) - reduced worst stack usage (tpm_seal) from 530 to 312 bytes - moved documentation to Documentation directory (suggestion by David Howells) - all the other code cleanups suggested by David Howells - Add pcrlock CAP_SYS_ADMIN dependency (based on comment by Jason Gunthorpe) - New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on discussions with Jason Gunthorpe) - Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu) - Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion) - Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn) Signed-off-by: David Safford Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: James Morris --- Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt | 145 ++++ include/keys/trusted-type.h | 31 + include/linux/tpm_command.h | 28 + security/Kconfig | 15 + security/keys/Makefile | 1 + security/keys/trusted_defined.c | 1151 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted_defined.h | 134 ++++ 7 files changed, 1505 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted-type.h create mode 100644 include/linux/tpm_command.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted_defined.c create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted_defined.h (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt b/Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8fb79bc1ac4b --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ + Trusted and Encrypted Keys + +Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the existing kernel +key ring service. Both of these new types are variable length symmetic keys, +and in both cases all keys are created in the kernel, and user space sees, +stores, and loads only encrypted blobs. Trusted Keys require the availability +of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip for greater security, while Encrypted +Keys can be used on any system. All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded +in hex ascii for convenience, and are integrity verified. + +Trusted Keys use a TPM both to generate and to seal the keys. Keys are sealed +under a 2048 bit RSA key in the TPM, and optionally sealed to specified PCR +(integrity measurement) values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob +integrity verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new +(future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new pcr values, such as +when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can have many saved +blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are easily supported. + +By default, trusted keys are sealed under the SRK, which has the default +authorization value (20 zeros). This can be set at takeownership time with the +trouser's utility: "tpm_takeownership -u -z". + +Usage: + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [pcrlock=pcrnum]" ring + keyctl update key "update [options]" + keyctl print keyid + + options: + keyhandle= ascii hex value of sealing key default 0x40000000 (SRK) + keyauth= ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i + (40 ascii zeros) + blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... + (40 ascii zeros) + blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... + (40 ascii zeros) + pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default) + pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob + migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, + default 1 (resealing allowed) + +"keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard +TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes. +Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits), the upper limit is to fit +within the 2048 bit SRK (RSA) keylength, with all necessary structure/padding. + +Encrypted keys do not depend on a TPM, and are faster, as they use AES for +encryption/decryption. New keys are created from kernel generated random +numbers, and are encrypted/decrypted using a specified 'master' key. The +'master' key can either be a trusted-key or user-key type. The main +disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not rooted in a trusted key, +they are only as secure as the user key encrypting them. The master user key +should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as possible, preferably early in +boot. + +Usage: + keyctl add encrypted name "new key-type:master-key-name keylen" ring + keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name" + +where 'key-type' is either 'trusted' or 'user'. + +Examples of trusted and encrypted key usage: + +Create and save a trusted key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32" @u + 440502848 + + $ keyctl show + Session Keyring + -3 --alswrv 500 500 keyring: _ses + 97833714 --alswrv 500 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.500 + 440502848 --alswrv 500 500 \_ trusted: kmk + + $ keyctl print 440502848 + 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915 + 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b + 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722 + a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec + d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d + dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0 + f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b + e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba + + $ keyctl pipe 440502848 > kmk.blob + +Load a trusted key from the saved blob: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob`" @u + 268728824 + + $ keyctl print 268728824 + 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915 + 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b + 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722 + a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec + d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d + dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0 + f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b + e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba + +Reseal a trusted key under new pcr values: + + $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`" + $ keyctl print 268728824 + 010100000000002c0002800093c35a09b70fff26e7a98ae786c641e678ec6ffb6b46d805 + 77c8a6377aed9d3219c6dfec4b23ffe3000001005d37d472ac8a44023fbb3d18583a4f73 + d3a076c0858f6f1dcaa39ea0f119911ff03f5406df4f7f27f41da8d7194f45c9f4e00f2e + df449f266253aa3f52e55c53de147773e00f0f9aca86c64d94c95382265968c354c5eab4 + 9638c5ae99c89de1e0997242edfb0b501744e11ff9762dfd951cffd93227cc513384e7e6 + e782c29435c7ec2edafaa2f4c1fe6e7a781b59549ff5296371b42133777dcc5b8b971610 + 94bc67ede19e43ddb9dc2baacad374a36feaf0314d700af0a65c164b7082401740e489c9 + 7ef6a24defe4846104209bf0c3eced7fa1a672ed5b125fc9d8cd88b476a658a4434644ef + df8ae9a178e9f83ba9f08d10fa47e4226b98b0702f06b3b8 + +Create and save an encrypted key "evm" using the above trusted key "kmk": + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new trusted:kmk 32" @u + 159771175 + + $ keyctl print 159771175 + trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382dbbc55 + be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e024717c64 + 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc + + $ keyctl pipe 159771175 > evm.blob + +Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob: + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "load `cat evm.blob`" @u + 831684262 + + $ keyctl print 831684262 + trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382dbbc55 + be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e024717c64 + 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc + + +The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time needs a high +quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file metadata. The use of a +trusted key provides strong guarantees that the EVM key has not been +compromised by a user level problem, and when sealed to specific boot PCR +values, protects against boot and offline attacks. Other uses for trusted and +encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption are anticipated. diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..56f82e5c9975 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation + * Author: David Safford + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + */ + +#ifndef _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H +#define _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H + +#include +#include + +#define MIN_KEY_SIZE 32 +#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128 +#define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 320 + +struct trusted_key_payload { + struct rcu_head rcu; + unsigned int key_len; + unsigned int blob_len; + unsigned char migratable; + unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1]; + unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; +}; + +extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; + +#endif /* _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_command.h b/include/linux/tpm_command.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..727512e249b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/tpm_command.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +#ifndef __LINUX_TPM_COMMAND_H__ +#define __LINUX_TPM_COMMAND_H__ + +/* + * TPM Command constants from specifications at + * http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org + */ + +/* Command TAGS */ +#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND 193 +#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND 194 +#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND 195 +#define TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND 196 +#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND 197 +#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND 198 + +/* Command Ordinals */ +#define TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM 70 +#define TPM_ORD_OSAP 11 +#define TPM_ORD_OIAP 10 +#define TPM_ORD_SEAL 23 +#define TPM_ORD_UNSEAL 24 + +/* Other constants */ +#define SRKHANDLE 0x40000000 +#define TPM_NONCE_SIZE 20 + +#endif diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index e80da955e687..24b8f9b491b8 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -21,6 +21,21 @@ config KEYS If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. +config TRUSTED_KEYS + tristate "TRUSTED KEYS" + depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + help + This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing + keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, + generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys, + if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever + see encrypted blobs. + + If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. + config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed" depends on KEYS diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile index 74d5447d7df7..fcb107020b4a 100644 --- a/security/keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/Makefile @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ obj-y := \ request_key_auth.o \ user_defined.o +obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted_defined.o obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted_defined.c b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1bec72e7596d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c @@ -0,0 +1,1151 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation + * + * Author: + * David Safford + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + * + * See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "trusted_defined.h" + +static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; +static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1"; + +struct sdesc { + struct shash_desc shash; + char ctx[]; +}; + +static struct crypto_shash *hashalg; +static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg; + +static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc; + int size; + + size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg); + sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sdesc) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + sdesc->shash.tfm = alg; + sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0; + return sdesc; +} + +static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, const unsigned int datalen, + unsigned char *digest) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc; + int ret; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + + ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest); + kfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, + const unsigned int keylen, ...) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc; + va_list argp; + unsigned int dlen; + unsigned char *data; + int ret; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + va_start(argp, keylen); + for (;;) { + dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + if (dlen == 0) + break; + data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *); + if (data == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + } + va_end(argp); + ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest); +out: + kfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM + */ +static uint32_t TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, + const unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1, + unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...) +{ + unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct sdesc *sdesc; + unsigned int dlen; + unsigned char *data; + unsigned char c; + int ret; + va_list argp; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + + c = h3; + ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + va_start(argp, h3); + for (;;) { + dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + if (dlen == 0) + break; + data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *); + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + } + va_end(argp); + ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); + if (!ret) + TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1, + TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0); +out: + kfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM + */ +static uint32_t TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, + const uint32_t command, + const unsigned char *ononce, + const unsigned char *key, + const unsigned int keylen, ...) +{ + uint32_t bufsize; + uint16_t tag; + uint32_t ordinal; + uint32_t result; + unsigned char *enonce; + unsigned char *continueflag; + unsigned char *authdata; + unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct sdesc *sdesc; + unsigned int dlen; + unsigned int dpos; + va_list argp; + int ret; + + bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); + tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0); + ordinal = command; + result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET); + if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND) + return 0; + if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND) + return -EINVAL; + authdata = buffer + bufsize - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; + continueflag = authdata - 1; + enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, + sizeof result); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, + sizeof ordinal); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + va_start(argp, keylen); + for (;;) { + dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + if (dlen == 0) + break; + dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + } + va_end(argp); + ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest, + TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, + 1, continueflag, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) + ret = -EINVAL; +out: + kfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM + */ +static uint32_t TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, + const uint32_t command, + const unsigned char *ononce, + const unsigned char *key1, + const unsigned int keylen1, + const unsigned char *key2, + const unsigned int keylen2, ...) +{ + uint32_t bufsize; + uint16_t tag; + uint32_t ordinal; + uint32_t result; + unsigned char *enonce1; + unsigned char *continueflag1; + unsigned char *authdata1; + unsigned char *enonce2; + unsigned char *continueflag2; + unsigned char *authdata2; + unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct sdesc *sdesc; + unsigned int dlen; + unsigned int dpos; + va_list argp; + int ret; + + bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); + tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0); + ordinal = command; + result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET); + + if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND) + return 0; + if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND) + return -EINVAL; + authdata1 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1 + + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + authdata2 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1; + continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1; + enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; + enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, + sizeof result); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, + sizeof ordinal); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + va_start(argp, keylen2); + for (;;) { + dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + if (dlen == 0) + break; + dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + } + ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1, + TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0); + if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2, + TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0); + if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) + ret = -EINVAL; +out: + kfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our + * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function. + */ +static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd, + size_t buflen) +{ + int rc; + + dump_tpm_buf(cmd); + rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen); + dump_tpm_buf(cmd); + if (rc > 0) + /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */ + rc = -EPERM; + return rc; +} + +/* + * get a random value from TPM + */ +static int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_buf *tb, unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len) +{ + int ret; + + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM); + store32(tb, len); + ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, sizeof tb->data); + memcpy(buf, tb->data + TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE, len); + + return ret; +} + +static int my_get_random(unsigned char *buf, int len) +{ + struct tpm_buf *tb; + int ret; + + tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tb) + return -ENOMEM; + ret = tpm_get_random(tb, buf, len); + + kfree(tb); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR. + * + * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed. + * This uses the tpm driver's extend function. + */ +static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) +{ + unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + my_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; +} + +/* + * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session + */ +static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, + const unsigned char *key, const uint16_t type, + const uint32_t handle) +{ + unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + int ret; + + ret = tpm_get_random(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP); + store16(tb, type); + store32(tb, handle); + storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + + ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); + memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]), + TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) + + TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + ret = TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, + enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session + */ +static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) +{ + int ret; + + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP); + ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + *handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); + memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)], + TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + return ret; +} + +struct tpm_digests { + unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2]; + unsigned char xorhash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; +}; + +/* + * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on + * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key. + */ +static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, const uint16_t keytype, + const uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, + const unsigned char *data, const uint32_t datalen, + unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen, + const unsigned char *blobauth, + const unsigned char *pcrinfo, const uint32_t pcrinfosize) +{ + struct osapsess sess; + struct tpm_digests *td; + unsigned char cont; + uint32_t ordinal; + uint32_t pcrsize; + uint32_t datsize; + int sealinfosize; + int encdatasize; + int storedsize; + int ret; + int i; + + /* alloc some work space for all the hashes */ + td = kmalloc(sizeof *td, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!td) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* get session for sealing key */ + ret = osap(tb, &sess, keyauth, keytype, keyhandle); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + dump_sess(&sess); + + /* calculate encrypted authorization value */ + memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + ret = tpm_get_random(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); + datsize = htonl(datalen); + pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize); + cont = 0; + + /* encrypt data authorization key */ + for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; ++i) + td->encauth[i] = td->xorhash[i] ^ blobauth[i]; + + /* calculate authorization HMAC value */ + if (pcrinfosize == 0) { + /* no pcr info specified */ + TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), + &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, td->encauth, + sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize, sizeof(uint32_t), + &datsize, datalen, data, 0, 0); + } else { + /* pcr info specified */ + TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), + &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, td->encauth, + sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize, pcrinfosize, + pcrinfo, sizeof(uint32_t), &datsize, datalen, + data, 0, 0); + } + + /* build and send the TPM request packet */ + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_SEAL_SIZE + pcrinfosize + datalen); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SEAL); + store32(tb, keyhandle); + storebytes(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + store32(tb, pcrinfosize); + storebytes(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize); + store32(tb, datalen); + storebytes(tb, data, datalen); + store32(tb, sess.handle); + storebytes(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + store8(tb, cont); + storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + + ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + /* calculate the size of the returned Blob */ + sealinfosize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)); + encdatasize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) + + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize); + storedsize = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize + + sizeof(uint32_t) + encdatasize; + + /* check the HMAC in the response */ + ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, td->nonceodd, sess.secret, + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, storedsize, TPM_DATA_OFFSET, 0, + 0); + + /* copy the returned blob to caller */ + memcpy(blob, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET, storedsize); + *bloblen = storedsize; + return ret; +} + +/* + * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob + */ +static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, + const uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, + const unsigned char *blob, const int bloblen, + const unsigned char *blobauth, + unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen) +{ + unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char enonce1[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char enonce2[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char authdata1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char authdata2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t authhandle1 = 0; + uint32_t authhandle2 = 0; + unsigned char cont = 0; + uint32_t ordinal; + uint32_t keyhndl; + int ret; + + /* sessions for unsealing key and data */ + ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); + keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE); + ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, + enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), + &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0); + TSS_authhmac(authdata2, blobauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, + enonce2, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), + &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0); + + /* build and send TPM request packet */ + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE + bloblen); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); + store32(tb, keyhandle); + storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen); + store32(tb, authhandle1); + storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + store8(tb, cont); + storebytes(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + store32(tb, authhandle2); + storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + store8(tb, cont); + storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + + ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + *datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); + ret = TSS_checkhmac2(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd, + keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + blobauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET, + *datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), 0, + 0); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret); + memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), *datalen); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, + struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ + struct tpm_buf *tb; + int ret; + + tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tb) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ + p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; + + ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, + p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, + o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + + kfree(tb); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TPM unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, + struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ + struct tpm_buf *tb; + int ret; + + tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tb) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, + o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); + /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */ + p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len]; + + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + + kfree(tb); + return ret; +} + +enum { + Opt_err = -1, + Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, + Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth, + Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable +}; + +static const match_table_t key_tokens = { + {Opt_new, "new"}, + {Opt_load, "load"}, + {Opt_update, "update"}, + {Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"}, + {Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"}, + {Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"}, + {Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"}, + {Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"}, + {Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"}, + {Opt_err, NULL} +}; + +/* can have zero or more token= options */ +static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, + struct trusted_key_options *opt) +{ + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + char *p = c; + int token; + int res; + unsigned long handle; + unsigned long lock; + + while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) { + if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t') + continue; + token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args); + + switch (token) { + case Opt_pcrinfo: + opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; + if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, opt->pcrinfo_len); + break; + case Opt_keyhandle: + res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; + opt->keyhandle = handle; + break; + case Opt_keyauth: + if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + break; + case Opt_blobauth: + if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + break; + case Opt_migratable: + if (*args[0].from == '0') + pay->migratable = 0; + else + return -EINVAL; + break; + case Opt_pcrlock: + res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->pcrlock = lock; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the + * payload and options structures + * + * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. + */ +static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p, + struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + long keylen; + int ret = -EINVAL; + int key_cmd; + char *c; + + /* main command */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args); + switch (key_cmd) { + case Opt_new: + /* first argument is key size */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + ret = strict_strtol(c, 10, &keylen); + if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + p->key_len = keylen; + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = Opt_new; + break; + case Opt_load: + /* first argument is sealed blob */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2; + if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len); + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = Opt_load; + break; + case Opt_update: + /* all arguments are options */ + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = Opt_update; + break; + case Opt_err: + return -EINVAL; + break; + } + return ret; +} + +static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) +{ + struct trusted_key_options *options; + + options = kzalloc(sizeof *options, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!options) + return options; + + /* set any non-zero defaults */ + options->keytype = SRK_keytype; + options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; + return options; +} + +static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL; + int ret; + + ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p); + if (ret < 0) + return p; + p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL); + + /* migratable by default */ + p->migratable = 1; + return p; +} + +/* + * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key + * + * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a + * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key, + * adding it to the specified keyring. + * + * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. + */ +static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, + const size_t datalen) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; + struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; + char *datablob; + int ret = 0; + int key_cmd; + + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!datablob) + return -ENOMEM; + memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); + datablob[datalen] = '\0'; + + options = trusted_options_alloc(); + if (!options) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key); + if (!payload) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options); + if (key_cmd < 0) { + ret = key_cmd; + goto out; + } + + dump_payload(payload); + dump_options(options); + + switch (key_cmd) { + case Opt_load: + ret = key_unseal(payload, options); + dump_payload(payload); + dump_options(options); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + break; + case Opt_new: + ret = my_get_random(payload->key, payload->key_len); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); + goto out; + } + ret = key_seal(payload, options); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + break; + default: + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + if (!ret && options->pcrlock) + ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); +out: + kfree(datablob); + kfree(options); + if (!ret) + rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, payload); + else + kfree(payload); + return ret; +} + +static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p; + + p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); + memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len); + kfree(p); +} + +/* + * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values + */ +static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, + const size_t datalen) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; + struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; + struct trusted_key_options *new_o; + char *datablob; + int ret = 0; + + if (!p->migratable) + return -EPERM; + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!datablob) + return -ENOMEM; + new_o = trusted_options_alloc(); + if (!new_o) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key); + if (!new_p) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); + datablob[datalen] = '\0'; + ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); + if (ret != Opt_update) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */ + new_p->migratable = p->migratable; + new_p->key_len = p->key_len; + memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len); + dump_payload(p); + dump_payload(new_p); + + ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + kfree(new_p); + goto out; + } + if (new_o->pcrlock) { + ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); + kfree(new_p); + goto out; + } + } + rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, new_p); + call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free); +out: + kfree(datablob); + kfree(new_o); + return ret; +} + +/* + * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex. + * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size. + */ +static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, + size_t buflen) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p; + char *ascii_buf; + char *bufp; + int i; + + p = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data, + rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem)); + if (!p) + return -EINVAL; + if (!buffer || buflen <= 0) + return 2 * p->blob_len; + ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ascii_buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + bufp = ascii_buf; + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) + bufp = pack_hex_byte(bufp, p->blob[i]); + if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) { + kfree(ascii_buf); + return -EFAULT; + } + kfree(ascii_buf); + return 2 * p->blob_len; +} + +/* + * trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data + */ +static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; + + if (!p) + return; + memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len); + kfree(key->payload.data); +} + +struct key_type key_type_trusted = { + .name = "trusted", + .instantiate = trusted_instantiate, + .update = trusted_update, + .match = user_match, + .destroy = trusted_destroy, + .describe = user_describe, + .read = trusted_read, +}; + +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted); + +static void trusted_shash_release(void) +{ + if (hashalg) + crypto_free_shash(hashalg); + if (hmacalg) + crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); +} + +static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void) +{ + int ret; + + hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", + hmac_alg); + return PTR_ERR(hmacalg); + } + + hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", + hash_alg); + ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg); + goto hashalg_fail; + } + + return 0; + +hashalg_fail: + crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); + return ret; +} + +static int __init init_trusted(void) +{ + int ret; + + ret = trusted_shash_alloc(); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + if (ret < 0) + trusted_shash_release(); + return ret; +} + +static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) +{ + trusted_shash_release(); + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); +} + +late_initcall(init_trusted); +module_exit(cleanup_trusted); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted_defined.h b/security/keys/trusted_defined.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3249fbd2b653 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted_defined.h @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +#ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H +#define __TRUSTED_KEY_H + +/* implementation specific TPM constants */ +#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64 +#define MAX_BUF_SIZE 512 +#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14 +#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36 +#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10 +#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87 +#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104 +#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2 +#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6 +#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10 + +#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])) +#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) +#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) + +struct tpm_buf { + int len; + unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE]; +}; + +#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0) + +struct osapsess { + uint32_t handle; + unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; +}; + +/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */ +enum { + SEAL_keytype = 1, + SRK_keytype = 4 +}; + +struct trusted_key_options { + uint16_t keytype; + uint32_t keyhandle; + unsigned char keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char blobauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t pcrinfo_len; + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; + int pcrlock; +}; + +#define TPM_DEBUG 0 + +#if TPM_DEBUG +static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ + pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); + pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); + pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); + pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); +} + +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ + pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); + pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); + pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable); +} + +static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) +{ + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); + pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n"); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); + pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); +} + +static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) +{ + int len; + + pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n"); + len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); +} +#else +static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) +{ +} +#endif + +static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char value) +{ + buf->data[buf->len++] = value; +} + +static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint16_t value) +{ + *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value); + buf->len += sizeof value; +} + +static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint32_t value) +{ + *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value); + buf->len += sizeof value; +} + +static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in, + const int len) +{ + memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len); + buf->len += len; +} +#endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From ad9c2b048b605fbc8d50526e330b88abdd631ab2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tetsuo Handa Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2010 11:06:47 +0900 Subject: security: Fix comment of security_key_permission Comment for return value of security_key_permission() has been wrong since it was added in 2.6.15. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa Signed-off-by: James Morris --- include/linux/security.h | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index fd4d55fb8845..e7d89b0c1fd8 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1058,8 +1058,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @cred points to the credentials to provide the context against which to * evaluate the security data on the key. * @perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key. - * Return 1 if permission granted, 0 if permission denied and -ve it the - * normal permissions model should be effected. + * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. * @key_getsecurity: * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key * for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function -- cgit v1.2.3 From c41ab6a1b9028de33e74101cb0aae13098a56fdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2010 15:47:09 -0500 Subject: flex_array: fix flex_array_put_ptr macro to be valid C MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Using flex_array_put_ptr() results in a compile error "error: lvalue required as unary ‘&’ operand" fix the casting order to fix this. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- include/linux/flex_array.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/flex_array.h b/include/linux/flex_array.h index 631b77f2ac70..70e4efabe0fb 100644 --- a/include/linux/flex_array.h +++ b/include/linux/flex_array.h @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ void *flex_array_get(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int element_nr); int flex_array_shrink(struct flex_array *fa); #define flex_array_put_ptr(fa, nr, src, gfp) \ - flex_array_put(fa, nr, &(void *)(src), gfp) + flex_array_put(fa, nr, (void *)&(src), gfp) void *flex_array_get_ptr(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int element_nr); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 676dac4b1bee0469d6932f698aeb77e8489f5861 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2010 06:43:39 -0800 Subject: This patch adds a new security attribute to Smack called SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is running. Exception: in smack_task_wait() child task is checked for write access to parent task using label inherited from the task that forked it. Fixed issues from previous submit: - SMACK64EXEC was not read when SMACK64 was not set. - inode security blob was not updated after setting SMACK64EXEC - inode security blob was not updated when removing SMACK64EXEC --- include/linux/xattr.h | 2 + security/smack/smack.h | 30 +++++++ security/smack/smack_access.c | 4 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 192 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- security/smack/smackfs.c | 4 +- 5 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h index f1e5bde4b35a..351c7901d74a 100644 --- a/include/linux/xattr.h +++ b/include/linux/xattr.h @@ -40,9 +40,11 @@ #define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64" #define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN" #define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" +#define XATTR_SMACK_EXEC "SMACK64EXEC" #define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT +#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_EXEC #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 43ae747a5aa4..a2e2cdfab4ef 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -51,10 +51,16 @@ struct socket_smack { */ struct inode_smack { char *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */ + char *smk_task; /* label of the task */ struct mutex smk_lock; /* initialization lock */ int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */ }; +struct task_smack { + char *smk_task; /* label used for access control */ + char *smk_forked; /* label when forked */ +}; + #define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */ /* @@ -242,6 +248,30 @@ static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp) return sip->smk_inode; } +/* + * Present a pointer to the smack label in an task blob. + */ +static inline char *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp) +{ + return tsp->smk_task; +} + +/* + * Present a pointer to the forked smack label in an task blob. + */ +static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp) +{ + return tsp->smk_forked; +} + +/* + * Present a pointer to the smack label in the curren task blob. + */ +static inline char *smk_of_current(void) +{ + return smk_of_task(current_security()); +} + /* * logging functions */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index f4fac64c4da8..42becbc1ce33 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ out_audit: int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a) { int rc; - char *sp = current_security(); + char *sp = smk_of_current(); rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL); if (rc == 0) @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a) * only one that gets privilege and current does not * have that label. */ - if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->cred->security) + if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp) goto out_audit; if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 04a98c361a65..7e19afe0e738 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label * or NULL if there was no label to fetch. */ -static char *smk_fetch(struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp) +static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp) { int rc; char in[SMK_LABELLEN]; @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static char *smk_fetch(struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp) if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL) return NULL; - rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, in, SMK_LABELLEN); + rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, in, SMK_LABELLEN); if (rc < 0) return NULL; @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) if (rc != 0) return rc; - sp = current_security(); - tsp = task_security(ctp); + sp = smk_of_current(); + tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp)); smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp); @@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp); - sp = current_security(); - tsp = task_security(ptp); + sp = smk_of_current(); + tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp)); /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */ rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL); if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file) { int rc = 0; - char *sp = current_security(); + char *sp = smk_of_current(); if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; @@ -390,6 +390,40 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad); } +/* + * BPRM hooks + */ + +static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = bprm->cred->security; + struct inode_smack *isp; + struct dentry *dp; + int rc; + + rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + + if (bprm->cred_prepared) + return 0; + + if (bprm->file == NULL || bprm->file->f_dentry == NULL) + return 0; + + dp = bprm->file->f_dentry; + + if (dp->d_inode == NULL) + return 0; + + isp = dp->d_inode->i_security; + + if (isp->smk_task != NULL) + tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task; + + return 0; +} + /* * Inode hooks */ @@ -402,7 +436,7 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) */ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) { - inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current_security()); + inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smk_of_current()); if (inode->i_security == NULL) return -ENOMEM; return 0; @@ -664,7 +698,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) { + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; /* @@ -704,9 +739,10 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, char *nsp; /* - * Not SMACK + * Not SMACK or SMACKEXEC */ - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK)) + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) && + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC)) return; isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security; @@ -716,10 +752,18 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, * assignment. */ nsp = smk_import(value, size); - if (nsp != NULL) - isp->smk_inode = nsp; - else - isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known; + + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) { + if (nsp != NULL) + isp->smk_inode = nsp; + else + isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known; + } else { + if (nsp != NULL) + isp->smk_task = nsp; + else + isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known; + } return; } @@ -752,12 +796,14 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) */ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { + struct inode_smack *isp; struct smk_audit_info ad; int rc = 0; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) { + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; } else @@ -768,6 +814,11 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) if (rc == 0) rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + if (rc == 0) { + isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security; + isp->smk_task = NULL; + } + return rc; } @@ -895,7 +946,7 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) */ static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) { - file->f_security = current_security(); + file->f_security = smk_of_current(); return 0; } @@ -1005,7 +1056,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, */ static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) { - file->f_security = current_security(); + file->f_security = smk_of_current(); return 0; } @@ -1025,7 +1076,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, { struct file *file; int rc; - char *tsp = tsk->cred->security; + char *tsp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security); struct smk_audit_info ad; /* @@ -1082,7 +1133,9 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) */ static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) { - cred->security = NULL; + cred->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp); + if (cred->security == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; return 0; } @@ -1097,7 +1150,7 @@ static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) */ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred) { - cred->security = NULL; + kfree(cred->security); } /** @@ -1111,7 +1164,16 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred) static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { - new->security = old->security; + struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security; + struct task_smack *new_tsp; + + new_tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp); + if (new_tsp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task; + new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task; + new->security = new_tsp; return 0; } @@ -1124,7 +1186,11 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, */ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { - new->security = old->security; + struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security; + struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security; + + new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task; + new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task; } /** @@ -1136,12 +1202,13 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) */ static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { + struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security; char *smack = smack_from_secid(secid); if (smack == NULL) return -EINVAL; - new->security = smack; + new_tsp->smk_task = smack; return 0; } @@ -1157,8 +1224,10 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; + struct task_smack *tsp = new->security; - new->security = isp->smk_inode; + tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode; + tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode; return 0; } @@ -1175,7 +1244,7 @@ static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access) smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p); - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), access, &ad); + return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), access, &ad); } /** @@ -1221,7 +1290,7 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) */ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { - *secid = smack_to_secid(task_security(p)); + *secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_task(task_security(p))); } /** @@ -1333,14 +1402,15 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, * can write the receiver. */ if (secid == 0) - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, + &ad); /* * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing * we can't take privilege into account. */ - return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), task_security(p), - MAY_WRITE, &ad); + return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), + smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, &ad); } /** @@ -1352,12 +1422,12 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) { struct smk_audit_info ad; - char *sp = current_security(); - char *tsp = task_security(p); + char *sp = smk_of_current(); + char *tsp = smk_of_forked(task_security(p)); int rc; /* we don't log here, we can be overriden */ - rc = smk_access(sp, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL); + rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, NULL); if (rc == 0) goto out_log; @@ -1378,7 +1448,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) out_log: smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p); - smack_log(sp, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad); + smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad); return rc; } @@ -1392,7 +1462,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; - isp->smk_inode = task_security(p); + isp->smk_inode = smk_of_task(task_security(p)); } /* @@ -1411,7 +1481,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) */ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags) { - char *csp = current_security(); + char *csp = smk_of_current(); struct socket_smack *ssp; ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags); @@ -1752,7 +1822,7 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags) */ static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) { - msg->security = current_security(); + msg->security = smk_of_current(); return 0; } @@ -1788,7 +1858,7 @@ static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) { struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm; - isp->security = current_security(); + isp->security = smk_of_current(); return 0; } @@ -1911,7 +1981,7 @@ static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) { struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm; - isp->security = current_security(); + isp->security = smk_of_current(); return 0; } @@ -2029,7 +2099,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) { struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm; - kisp->security = current_security(); + kisp->security = smk_of_current(); return 0; } @@ -2201,7 +2271,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) struct super_block *sbp; struct superblock_smack *sbsp; struct inode_smack *isp; - char *csp = current_security(); + char *csp = smk_of_current(); char *fetched; char *final; struct dentry *dp; @@ -2321,9 +2391,12 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) * Get the dentry for xattr. */ dp = dget(opt_dentry); - fetched = smk_fetch(inode, dp); + fetched = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp); if (fetched != NULL) final = fetched; + isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, + dp); + dput(dp); break; } @@ -2358,7 +2431,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) return -EINVAL; - cp = kstrdup(task_security(p), GFP_KERNEL); + cp = kstrdup(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), GFP_KERNEL); if (cp == NULL) return -ENOMEM; @@ -2382,6 +2455,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) { + struct task_smack *tsp; struct cred *new; char *newsmack; @@ -2414,7 +2488,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, new = prepare_creds(); if (new == NULL) return -ENOMEM; - new->security = newsmack; + tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL); + if (tsp == NULL) { + kfree(new); + return -ENOMEM; + } + tsp->smk_task = newsmack; + new->security = tsp; commit_creds(new); return size; } @@ -2715,7 +2795,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) return; ssp = sk->sk_security; - ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = current_security(); + ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = smk_of_current(); /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */ } @@ -2836,7 +2916,7 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) { - key->security = cred->security; + key->security = smk_of_task(cred->security); return 0; } @@ -2865,6 +2945,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, { struct key *keyp; struct smk_audit_info ad; + char *tsp = smk_of_task(cred->security); keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); if (keyp == NULL) @@ -2878,14 +2959,14 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, /* * This should not occur */ - if (cred->security == NULL) + if (tsp == NULL) return -EACCES; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY); ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial; ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description; #endif - return smk_access(cred->security, keyp->security, + return smk_access(tsp, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); } #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ @@ -3087,6 +3168,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { .sb_mount = smack_sb_mount, .sb_umount = smack_sb_umount, + .bprm_set_creds = smack_bprm_set_creds, + .inode_alloc_security = smack_inode_alloc_security, .inode_free_security = smack_inode_free_security, .inode_init_security = smack_inode_init_security, @@ -3223,9 +3306,16 @@ static __init void init_smack_know_list(void) static __init int smack_init(void) { struct cred *cred; + struct task_smack *tsp; - if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) + tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL); + if (tsp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) { + kfree(tsp); return 0; + } printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n"); @@ -3233,7 +3323,9 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) * Set the security state for the initial task. */ cred = (struct cred *) current->cred; - cred->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known; + tsp->smk_forked = smack_known_floor.smk_known; + tsp->smk_task = smack_known_floor.smk_known; + cred->security = tsp; /* initialize the smack_know_list */ init_smack_know_list(); diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index dc1fd6239f24..01a0be93d8d0 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap) { nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); - nap->secid = smack_to_secid(current_security()); + nap->secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_current()); } /* @@ -1160,7 +1160,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { char in[SMK_LABELLEN]; - char *sp = current->cred->security; + char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security); if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5c6d1125f8dbd1bfef39e38fbc2837003be78a59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2010 13:34:01 +0200 Subject: Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories In a situation where Smack access rules allow processes with multiple labels to write to a directory it is easy to get into a situation where the directory gets cluttered with files that the owner can't deal with because while they could be written to the directory a process at the label of the directory can't write them. This is generally the desired behavior, but when it isn't it is a real issue. This patch introduces a new attribute SMACK64TRANSMUTE that instructs Smack to create the file with the label of the directory under certain circumstances. A new access mode, "t" for transmute, is made available to Smack access rules, which are expanded from "rwxa" to "rwxat". If a file is created in a directory marked as transmutable and if access was granted to perform the operation by a rule that included the transmute mode, then the file gets the Smack label of the directory instead of the Smack label of the creating process. Note that this is equivalent to creating an empty file at the label of the directory and then having the other process write to it. The transmute scheme requires that both the access rule allows transmutation and that the directory be explicitly marked. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- include/linux/xattr.h | 2 ++ security/smack/smack.h | 17 +++++++++- security/smack/smack_access.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- security/smack/smackfs.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++--- 5 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h index 351c7901d74a..e6131ef98d8f 100644 --- a/include/linux/xattr.h +++ b/include/linux/xattr.h @@ -41,10 +41,12 @@ #define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN" #define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" #define XATTR_SMACK_EXEC "SMACK64EXEC" +#define XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE "SMACK64TRANSMUTE" #define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_EXEC +#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index a2e2cdfab4ef..129c4eb8ffb1 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct task_smack { }; #define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */ +#define SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE 0x02 /* directory is transmuting */ /* * A label access rule. @@ -166,6 +167,10 @@ struct smack_known { #define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL 255 /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */ #define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM 239 /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */ +/* + * Flag for transmute access + */ +#define MAY_TRANSMUTE 64 /* * Just to make the common cases easier to deal with */ @@ -197,6 +202,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *); /* * These functions are in smack_access.c */ +int smk_access_entry(char *, char *); int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *); int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *); int smack_to_cipso(const char *, struct smack_cipso *); @@ -239,6 +245,15 @@ static inline void smack_catset_bit(int cat, char *catsetp) catsetp[(cat - 1) / 8] |= 0x80 >> ((cat - 1) % 8); } +/* + * Is the directory transmuting? + */ +static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp) +{ + struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security; + return (sip->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) != 0; +} + /* * Present a pointer to the smack label in an inode blob. */ @@ -265,7 +280,7 @@ static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp) } /* - * Present a pointer to the smack label in the curren task blob. + * Present a pointer to the smack label in the current task blob. */ static inline char *smk_of_current(void) { diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 42becbc1ce33..7ba8478f599e 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -66,6 +66,46 @@ static u32 smack_next_secid = 10; */ int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED; +/** + * smk_access_entry - look up matching access rule + * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label + * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label + * + * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the + * access rule list and returns pointer to the matching rule if found, + * NULL otherwise. + * + * NOTE: + * Even though Smack labels are usually shared on smack_list + * labels that come in off the network can't be imported + * and added to the list for locking reasons. + * + * Therefore, it is necessary to check the contents of the labels, + * not just the pointer values. Of course, in most cases the labels + * will be on the list, so checking the pointers may be a worthwhile + * optimization. + */ +int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label) +{ + u32 may = MAY_NOT; + struct smack_rule *srp; + + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) { + if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label || + strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) { + if (srp->smk_object == object_label || + strcmp(srp->smk_object, object_label) == 0) { + may = srp->smk_access; + break; + } + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return may; +} + /** * smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label @@ -90,7 +130,6 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, struct smk_audit_info *a) { u32 may = MAY_NOT; - struct smack_rule *srp; int rc = 0; /* @@ -144,18 +183,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, * access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's * good. */ - rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) { - if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label || - strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) { - if (srp->smk_object == object_label || - strcmp(srp->smk_object, object_label) == 0) { - may = srp->smk_access; - break; - } - } - } - rcu_read_unlock(); + may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label); /* * This is a bit map operation. */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 7e19afe0e738..05dc4da2e25f 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3,12 +3,14 @@ * * This file contains the smack hook function implementations. * - * Author: + * Authors: * Casey Schaufler + * Jarkko Sakkinen * * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Paul Moore + * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, @@ -35,6 +37,9 @@ #define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security)) +#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE" +#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4 + /** * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file. * @ip: a pointer to the inode @@ -468,6 +473,8 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, char **name, void **value, size_t *len) { char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode); + char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir); + u32 may; if (name) { *name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -476,6 +483,16 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, } if (value) { + may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp); + + /* + * If the access rule allows transmutation and + * the directory requests transmutation then + * by all means transmute. + */ + if (((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) && smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) + isp = dsp; + *value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL); if (*value == NULL) return -ENOMEM; @@ -709,6 +726,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN || smk_import(value, size) == NULL) rc = -EINVAL; + } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) { + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + rc = -EPERM; + if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE || + strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) + rc = -EINVAL; } else rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); @@ -735,35 +758,23 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - struct inode_smack *isp; char *nsp; - - /* - * Not SMACK or SMACKEXEC - */ - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) && - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC)) - return; - - isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security; - - /* - * No locking is done here. This is a pointer - * assignment. - */ - nsp = smk_import(value, size); + struct inode_smack *isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) { + nsp = smk_import(value, size); if (nsp != NULL) isp->smk_inode = nsp; else isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known; - } else { + } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) { + nsp = smk_import(value, size); if (nsp != NULL) isp->smk_task = nsp; else isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known; - } + } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; return; } @@ -803,7 +814,8 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) { + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; } else @@ -2274,6 +2286,8 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) char *csp = smk_of_current(); char *fetched; char *final; + char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE]; + int transflag = 0; struct dentry *dp; if (inode == NULL) @@ -2392,10 +2406,19 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) */ dp = dget(opt_dentry); fetched = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp); - if (fetched != NULL) + if (fetched != NULL) { final = fetched; - isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, - dp); + if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) { + trattr[0] = '\0'; + inode->i_op->getxattr(dp, + XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, + trattr, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE); + if (strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE, + TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) == 0) + transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; + } + } + isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp); dput(dp); break; @@ -2406,7 +2429,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) else isp->smk_inode = final; - isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT; + isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag); unlockandout: mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock); @@ -2456,6 +2479,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) { struct task_smack *tsp; + struct task_smack *oldtsp; struct cred *new; char *newsmack; @@ -2485,6 +2509,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known) return -EPERM; + oldtsp = p->cred->security; new = prepare_creds(); if (new == NULL) return -ENOMEM; @@ -2494,6 +2519,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, return -ENOMEM; } tsp->smk_task = newsmack; + tsp->smk_forked = oldtsp->smk_forked; new->security = tsp; commit_creds(new); return size; diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 01a0be93d8d0..362d5eda948b 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -109,9 +109,12 @@ const char *smack_cipso_option = SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION; * SMK_ACCESSLEN: Maximum length for a rule access field * SMK_LOADLEN: Smack rule length */ -#define SMK_ACCESS "rwxa" -#define SMK_ACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1) -#define SMK_LOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN) +#define SMK_OACCESS "rwxa" +#define SMK_ACCESS "rwxat" +#define SMK_OACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_OACCESS) - 1) +#define SMK_ACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1) +#define SMK_OLOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_OACCESSLEN) +#define SMK_LOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN) /** * smk_netlabel_audit_set - fill a netlbl_audit struct @@ -175,6 +178,8 @@ static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) seq_putc(s, 'x'); if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND) seq_putc(s, 'a'); + if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE) + seq_putc(s, 't'); if (srp->smk_access == 0) seq_putc(s, '-'); @@ -273,10 +278,15 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - if (*ppos != 0 || count != SMK_LOADLEN) + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + /* + * Minor hack for backward compatability + */ + if (count < (SMK_OLOADLEN) || count > SMK_LOADLEN) return -EINVAL; - data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL); + data = kzalloc(SMK_LOADLEN, GFP_KERNEL); if (data == NULL) return -ENOMEM; @@ -285,6 +295,12 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out; } + /* + * More on the minor hack for backward compatability + */ + if (count == (SMK_OLOADLEN)) + data[SMK_OLOADLEN] = '-'; + rule = kzalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL); if (rule == NULL) { rc = -ENOMEM; @@ -345,6 +361,17 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out_free_rule; } + switch (data[SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + 4]) { + case '-': + break; + case 't': + case 'T': + rule->smk_access |= MAY_TRANSMUTE; + break; + default: + goto out_free_rule; + } + rc = smk_set_access(rule); if (!rc) -- cgit v1.2.3