From 83c7d09173fdb6b06b109e65895392db3e49ac9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2005 15:54:44 +0100 Subject: AUDIT: Avoid log pollution by untrusted strings. We log strings from userspace, such as arguments to open(). These could be formatted to contain \n followed by fake audit log entries. Provide a function for logging such strings, which gives a hex dump when the string contains anything but basic printable ASCII characters. Use it for logging filenames. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- include/linux/audit.h | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 3628f7cfb178..9b77992c4888 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -174,11 +174,15 @@ extern void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf,2,3))); extern void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab); +extern void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len); +extern void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, + const char *string); extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix, struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt); - /* Private API (for auditsc.c only) */ extern void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, int done, int multi, @@ -190,6 +194,8 @@ extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message); #define audit_log_vformat(b,f,a) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_log_format(b,f,...) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_log_end(b) do { ; } while (0) +#define audit_log_hex(a,b,l) do { ; } while (0) +#define audit_log_untrustedstring(a,s) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_log_d_path(b,p,d,v) do { ; } while (0) #endif #endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2fd6f58ba6efc82ea2c9c2630f7ff5ed9eeaf34a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2005 16:08:28 +0100 Subject: [AUDIT] Don't allow ptrace to fool auditing, log arch of audited syscalls. We were calling ptrace_notify() after auditing the syscall and arguments, but the debugger could have _changed_ them before the syscall was actually invoked. Reorder the calls to fix that. While we're touching ever call to audit_syscall_entry(), we also make it take an extra argument: the architecture of the syscall which was made, because some architectures allow more than one type of syscall. Also add an explicit success/failure flag to audit_syscall_exit(), for the benefit of architectures which return that in a condition register rather than only returning a single register. Change type of syscall return value to 'long' not 'int'. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c | 19 +++++++++--------- arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c | 21 ++++++++++++-------- arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c | 15 +++++++++----- arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c | 21 ++++++++++---------- arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c | 13 +++++++----- include/linux/audit.h | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++++++++------ 8 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c index b2f17640ceff..5606ec7a5c2b 100644 --- a/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -682,24 +682,18 @@ void do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit) /* do the secure computing check first */ secure_computing(regs->orig_eax); - if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) { - if (!entryexit) - audit_syscall_entry(current, regs->orig_eax, - regs->ebx, regs->ecx, - regs->edx, regs->esi); - else - audit_syscall_exit(current, regs->eax); - } + if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && entryexit) + audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->eax), regs->eax); if (!(current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) - return; + goto out; /* Fake a debug trap */ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP)) send_sigtrap(current, regs, 0); if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) - return; + goto out; /* the 0x80 provides a way for the tracing parent to distinguish between a syscall stop and SIGTRAP delivery */ @@ -714,4 +708,9 @@ void do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit) send_sig(current->exit_code, current, 1); current->exit_code = 0; } + out: + if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && !entryexit) + audit_syscall_entry(current, AUDIT_ARCH_I386, regs->orig_eax, + regs->ebx, regs->ecx, regs->edx, regs->esi); + } diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c index 55789fcd7210..8dde0b16d4c8 100644 --- a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -1595,20 +1595,25 @@ syscall_trace_enter (long arg0, long arg1, long arg2, long arg3, long arg4, long arg5, long arg6, long arg7, struct pt_regs regs) { - long syscall; + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) + && (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) + syscall_trace(); if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) { - if (IS_IA32_PROCESS(®s)) + long syscall; + int arch; + + if (IS_IA32_PROCESS(®s)) { syscall = regs.r1; - else + arch = AUDIT_ARCH_I386; + } else { syscall = regs.r15; + arch = AUDIT_ARCH_IA64; + } - audit_syscall_entry(current, syscall, arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3); + audit_syscall_entry(current, arch, syscall, arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3); } - if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) - && (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) - syscall_trace(); } /* "asmlinkage" so the input arguments are preserved... */ @@ -1619,7 +1624,7 @@ syscall_trace_leave (long arg0, long arg1, long arg2, long arg3, struct pt_regs regs) { if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) - audit_syscall_exit(current, regs.r8); + audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs.r10), regs.r8); if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) && (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c index 92f2c39afe27..eaf7be9d0b0a 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -300,25 +300,38 @@ out: return ret; } +static inline int audit_arch() +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN +#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS64 + if (!(current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_REGS)) + return AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64; +#endif /* MIPS64 */ + return AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL; + +#else /* big endian... */ +#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS64 + if (!(current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_REGS)) + return AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64; +#endif /* MIPS64 */ + return AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS; + +#endif /* endian */ +} + /* * Notification of system call entry/exit * - triggered by current->work.syscall_trace */ asmlinkage void do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit) { - if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) { - if (!entryexit) - audit_syscall_entry(current, regs->regs[2], - regs->regs[4], regs->regs[5], - regs->regs[6], regs->regs[7]); - else - audit_syscall_exit(current, regs->regs[2]); - } + if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && entryexit) + audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->regs[2]), regs->regs[2]); if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) - return; + goto out; if (!(current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) - return; + goto out; /* The 0x80 provides a way for the tracing parent to distinguish between a syscall stop and SIGTRAP delivery */ @@ -334,4 +347,9 @@ asmlinkage void do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit) send_sig(current->exit_code, current, 1); current->exit_code = 0; } + out: + if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && !entryexit) + audit_syscall_entry(current, audit_arch(), regs->regs[2], + regs->regs[4], regs->regs[5], + regs->regs[6], regs->regs[7]); } diff --git a/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c index 354a287c67eb..3c76333ec3a9 100644 --- a/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -304,14 +304,17 @@ static void do_syscall_trace(void) void do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) + && (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) + do_syscall_trace(); + if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) - audit_syscall_entry(current, regs->gpr[0], + audit_syscall_entry(current, + test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)?AUDIT_ARCH_PPC:AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64, + regs->gpr[0], regs->gpr[3], regs->gpr[4], regs->gpr[5], regs->gpr[6]); - if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) - && (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) - do_syscall_trace(); } void do_syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs) @@ -319,7 +322,9 @@ void do_syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs) secure_computing(regs->gpr[0]); if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) - audit_syscall_exit(current, regs->result); + audit_syscall_exit(current, + (regs->ccr&0x1000)?AUDITSC_FAILURE:AUDITSC_SUCCESS, + regs->result); if ((test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) || test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP)) diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c index 647233c02fc8..2d546c67f7c3 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -711,18 +711,13 @@ out: asmlinkage void syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit) { - if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) { - if (!entryexit) - audit_syscall_entry(current, regs->gprs[2], - regs->orig_gpr2, regs->gprs[3], - regs->gprs[4], regs->gprs[5]); - else - audit_syscall_exit(current, regs->gprs[2]); - } + if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && entryexit) + audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->gprs[2]), regs->gprs[2]); + if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) - return; + goto out; if (!(current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) - return; + goto out; ptrace_notify(SIGTRAP | ((current->ptrace & PT_TRACESYSGOOD) ? 0x80 : 0)); @@ -735,4 +730,10 @@ syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit) send_sig(current->exit_code, current, 1); current->exit_code = 0; } + out: + if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && !entryexit) + audit_syscall_entry(current, + test_thread_flag(TIF_31BIT)?AUDIT_ARCH_S390:AUDIT_ARCH_S390X, + regs->gprs[2], regs->orig_gpr2, regs->gprs[3], + regs->gprs[4], regs->gprs[5]); } diff --git a/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c index c7011675007d..ecbccbbf5c2a 100644 --- a/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -629,25 +629,28 @@ static void syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs) } } +#define audit_arch() (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? AUDIT_ARCH_I386 : AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64) + asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { /* do the secure computing check first */ secure_computing(regs->orig_rax); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) + && (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) + syscall_trace(regs); + if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) - audit_syscall_entry(current, regs->orig_rax, + audit_syscall_entry(current, audit_arch(), regs->orig_rax, regs->rdi, regs->rsi, regs->rdx, regs->r10); - if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) - && (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) - syscall_trace(regs); } asmlinkage void syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs) { if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) - audit_syscall_exit(current, regs->rax); + audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->rax), regs->rax); if ((test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) || test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP)) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 9b77992c4888..fad0c1dc21a9 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_AUDIT_H_ #define _LINUX_AUDIT_H_ +#include +#include + /* Request and reply types */ #define AUDIT_GET 1000 /* Get status */ #define AUDIT_SET 1001 /* Set status (enable/disable/auditd) */ @@ -67,6 +70,7 @@ #define AUDIT_FSGID 8 #define AUDIT_LOGINUID 9 #define AUDIT_PERS 10 +#define AUDIT_ARCH 11 /* These are ONLY useful when checking * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */ @@ -96,6 +100,38 @@ #define AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK 1 #define AUDIT_FAIL_PANIC 2 +/* distinguish syscall tables */ +#define __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT 0x80000000 +#define __AUDIT_ARCH_LE 0x40000000 +#define AUDIT_ARCH_ALPHA (EM_ALPHA|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_ARM (EM_ARM|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_ARMEB (EM_ARM) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_CRIS (EM_CRIS|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_FRV (EM_FRV) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_H8300 (EM_H8_300) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_I386 (EM_386|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_IA64 (EM_IA_64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_M32R (EM_M32R) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_M68K (EM_68K) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS (EM_MIPS) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL (EM_MIPS|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64 (EM_MIPS|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64 (EM_MIPS|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_PARISC (EM_PARISC) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_PARISC64 (EM_PARISC|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_PPC (EM_PPC) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64 (EM_PPC64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_S390 (EM_S390) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_S390X (EM_S390|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_SH (EM_SH) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_SHEL (EM_SH|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_SH64 (EM_SH|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_SHEL64 (EM_SH|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_SPARC (EM_SPARC) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_SPARC64 (EM_SPARC64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_V850 (EM_V850|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) +#define AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 (EM_X86_64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) + #ifndef __KERNEL__ struct audit_message { struct nlmsghdr nlh; @@ -129,15 +165,19 @@ struct audit_buffer; struct audit_context; struct inode; +#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0 +#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1 +#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2 +#define AUDITSC_RESULT(x) ( ((long)(x))<0?AUDITSC_FAILURE:AUDITSC_SUCCESS ) #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL /* These are defined in auditsc.c */ /* Public API */ extern int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task); extern void audit_free(struct task_struct *task); -extern void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *task, +extern void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *task, int arch, int major, unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3); -extern void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *task, int return_code); +extern void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *task, int failed, long return_code); extern void audit_getname(const char *name); extern void audit_putname(const char *name); extern void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode); @@ -153,8 +193,8 @@ extern int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mo #else #define audit_alloc(t) ({ 0; }) #define audit_free(t) do { ; } while (0) -#define audit_syscall_entry(t,a,b,c,d,e) do { ; } while (0) -#define audit_syscall_exit(t,r) do { ; } while (0) +#define audit_syscall_entry(t,ta,a,b,c,d,e) do { ; } while (0) +#define audit_syscall_exit(t,f,r) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_getname(n) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_putname(n) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_inode(n,i) do { ; } while (0) diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 00e87ffff13b..77e92592de57 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ struct audit_context { int major; /* syscall number */ unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ - int return_code;/* syscall return code */ + long return_code;/* syscall return code */ int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */ int name_count; struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ struct audit_context { uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; unsigned long personality; + int arch; #if AUDIT_DEBUG int put_count; @@ -348,6 +349,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_PERS: result = (tsk->personality == value); break; + case AUDIT_ARCH: + if (ctx) + result = (ctx->arch == value); + break; case AUDIT_EXIT: if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) @@ -355,7 +360,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, break; case AUDIT_SUCCESS: if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) - result = (ctx->return_code >= 0); + result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS); break; case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: if (ctx) { @@ -648,8 +653,11 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context) audit_log_format(ab, "syscall=%d", context->major); if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); + audit_log_format(ab, " arch=%x", context->arch); if (context->return_valid) - audit_log_format(ab, " exit=%d", context->return_code); + audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", + (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", + context->return_code); audit_log_format(ab, " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" " pid=%d loginuid=%d uid=%d gid=%d" @@ -773,7 +781,7 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_serial(void) * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it * be written). */ -void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int major, +void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) { @@ -827,6 +835,7 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int major, if (!audit_enabled) return; + context->arch = arch; context->major = major; context->argv[0] = a1; context->argv[1] = a2; @@ -850,13 +859,13 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int major, * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, * free the names stored from getname(). */ -void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int return_code) +void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code) { struct audit_context *context; get_task_struct(tsk); task_lock(tsk); - context = audit_get_context(tsk, 1, return_code); + context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); task_unlock(tsk); /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have @@ -869,6 +878,7 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int return_code) context->in_syscall = 0; context->auditable = 0; + if (context->previous) { struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous; context->previous = NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3 From d812ddbb89e323d054a7d073466225966c8350c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve Grubb Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2005 16:09:52 +0100 Subject: [AUDIT] Fix signedness of 'serial' in various routines. Attached is a patch that corrects a signed/unsigned warning. I also noticed that we needlessly init serial to 0. That only needs to occur if the kernel was compiled without the audit system. -Steve Grubb Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- include/linux/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/audit.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index fad0c1dc21a9..0467f2441b68 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ extern void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode); extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data); extern void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, - struct timespec *t, int *serial); + struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial); extern int audit_set_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx, uid_t loginuid); extern uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx); extern int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode); diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index e7bff8000d23..aa35422c0c42 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx) struct audit_buffer *ab = NULL; unsigned long flags; struct timespec t; - int serial = 0; + unsigned int serial; if (!audit_initialized) return NULL; @@ -669,8 +669,10 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx) audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &t, &serial); else #endif + { t = CURRENT_TIME; - + serial = 0; + } audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%lu.%03lu:%u): ", t.tv_sec, t.tv_nsec/1000000, serial); return ab; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 77e92592de57..49ecd707b953 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode) } void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, - struct timespec *t, int *serial) + struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) { if (ctx) { t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 85c8721ff3bc96b702427a440616079e8daf8a2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2005 16:23:29 +0100 Subject: audit: update pointer to userspace tools, remove emacs mode tags --- include/linux/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/audit.c | 4 ++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 0467f2441b68..5fabe8481011 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* audit.h -- Auditing support -*- linux-c -*- +/* audit.h -- Auditing support * * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. * All Rights Reserved. diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 42ce282728b6..58c7d7e47299 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* audit.c -- Auditing support -*- linux-c -*- +/* audit.c -- Auditing support * Gateway between the kernel (e.g., selinux) and the user-space audit daemon. * System-call specific features have moved to auditsc.c * @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ * 6) Support low-overhead kernel-based filtering to minimize the * information that must be passed to user-space. * - * Example user-space utilities: http://people.redhat.com/faith/audit/ + * Example user-space utilities: http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit/ */ #include diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 49ecd707b953..9ff2c1b1033e 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support -*- linux-c -*- +/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. * * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. -- cgit v1.2.3 From c94c257c88c517f251da273a15c654224c7b6e21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Serge Hallyn Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2005 16:27:17 +0100 Subject: Add audit uid to netlink credentials Most audit control messages are sent over netlink.In order to properly log the identity of the sender of audit control messages, we would like to add the loginuid to the netlink_creds structure, as per the attached patch. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- include/linux/audit.h | 2 +- include/linux/netlink.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++- net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 5fabe8481011..19f214230fec 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ extern void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode); /* Private API (for audit.c only) */ extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, - void *data); + void *data, uid_t loginuid); extern void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial); extern int audit_set_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx, uid_t loginuid); diff --git a/include/linux/netlink.h b/include/linux/netlink.h index f731abdc1a29..b2738ac8bc99 100644 --- a/include/linux/netlink.h +++ b/include/linux/netlink.h @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms __u32 dst_pid; __u32 dst_groups; kernel_cap_t eff_cap; + __u32 loginuid; /* Login (audit) uid */ }; #define NETLINK_CB(skb) (*(struct netlink_skb_parms*)&((skb)->cb)) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 58c7d7e47299..587d3b2eba7f 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -239,36 +239,36 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message) } -static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit) +static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid) { int old = audit_rate_limit; audit_rate_limit = limit; - audit_log(current->audit_context, "audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d", - audit_rate_limit, old); + audit_log(NULL, "audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid %u", + audit_rate_limit, old, loginuid); return old; } -static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit) +static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid) { int old = audit_backlog_limit; audit_backlog_limit = limit; - audit_log(current->audit_context, "audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d", - audit_backlog_limit, old); + audit_log(NULL, "audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid %u", + audit_backlog_limit, old, loginuid); return old; } -static int audit_set_enabled(int state) +static int audit_set_enabled(int state, uid_t loginuid) { int old = audit_enabled; if (state != 0 && state != 1) return -EINVAL; audit_enabled = state; - audit_log(current->audit_context, "audit_enabled=%d old=%d", - audit_enabled, old); + audit_log(NULL, "audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid %u", + audit_enabled, old, loginuid); return old; } -static int audit_set_failure(int state) +static int audit_set_failure(int state, uid_t loginuid) { int old = audit_failure; if (state != AUDIT_FAIL_SILENT @@ -276,8 +276,8 @@ static int audit_set_failure(int state) && state != AUDIT_FAIL_PANIC) return -EINVAL; audit_failure = state; - audit_log(current->audit_context, "audit_failure=%d old=%d", - audit_failure, old); + audit_log(NULL, "audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid %u", + audit_failure, old, loginuid); return old; } @@ -344,6 +344,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) int err; struct audit_buffer *ab; u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type; + uid_t loginuid; /* loginuid of sender */ err = audit_netlink_ok(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, msg_type); if (err) @@ -351,6 +352,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) pid = NETLINK_CREDS(skb)->pid; uid = NETLINK_CREDS(skb)->uid; + loginuid = NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid; seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq; data = NLMSG_DATA(nlh); @@ -371,34 +373,36 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) return -EINVAL; status_get = (struct audit_status *)data; if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_ENABLED) { - err = audit_set_enabled(status_get->enabled); + err = audit_set_enabled(status_get->enabled, loginuid); if (err < 0) return err; } if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_FAILURE) { - err = audit_set_failure(status_get->failure); + err = audit_set_failure(status_get->failure, loginuid); if (err < 0) return err; } if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_PID) { int old = audit_pid; audit_pid = status_get->pid; - audit_log(current->audit_context, - "audit_pid=%d old=%d", audit_pid, old); + audit_log(NULL, "audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid %u", + audit_pid, old, loginuid); } if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT) - audit_set_rate_limit(status_get->rate_limit); + audit_set_rate_limit(status_get->rate_limit, loginuid); if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_BACKLOG_LIMIT) - audit_set_backlog_limit(status_get->backlog_limit); + audit_set_backlog_limit(status_get->backlog_limit, + loginuid); break; case AUDIT_USER: ab = audit_log_start(NULL); if (!ab) break; /* audit_panic has been called */ audit_log_format(ab, - "user pid=%d uid=%d length=%d msg='%.1024s'", + "user pid=%d uid=%d length=%d loginuid=%u" + " msg='%.1024s'", pid, uid, (int)(nlh->nlmsg_len - ((char *)data - (char *)nlh)), - (char *)data); + loginuid, (char *)data); ab->type = AUDIT_USER; ab->pid = pid; audit_log_end(ab); @@ -411,7 +415,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) case AUDIT_LIST: #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, - uid, seq, data); + uid, seq, data, loginuid); #else err = -EOPNOTSUPP; #endif diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 9ff2c1b1033e..66148f81d783 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s) return 0; } -int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data) +int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, + uid_t loginuid) { u32 flags; struct audit_entry *entry; @@ -286,6 +287,7 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data) err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_entlist); if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT)) err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_extlist); + audit_log(NULL, "auid %u added an audit rule\n", loginuid); break; case AUDIT_DEL: flags =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags; @@ -295,6 +297,7 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data) err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_entlist); if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT)) err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_extlist); + audit_log(NULL, "auid %u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid); break; default: return -EINVAL; diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c index 29a5fd231eac..cb64cff3e339 100644 --- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c @@ -905,6 +905,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock, NETLINK_CB(skb).groups = nlk->groups; NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_pid = dst_pid; NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_groups = dst_groups; + NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context); memcpy(NETLINK_CREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred)); /* What can I do? Netlink is asynchronous, so that -- cgit v1.2.3 From 456be6cd90dbbb9b0ea01d56932d56d110d51cf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve Grubb Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2005 17:30:07 +0100 Subject: [AUDIT] LOGIN message credentials Attached is a new patch that solves the issue of getting valid credentials into the LOGIN message. The current code was assuming that the audit context had already been copied. This is not always the case for LOGIN messages. To solve the problem, the patch passes the task struct to the function that emits the message where it can get valid credentials. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- fs/proc/base.c | 2 +- include/linux/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 9 +++++---- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 39fd336cfdb9..57554bfbed79 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_loginuid_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, goto out_free_page; } - length = audit_set_loginuid(task->audit_context, loginuid); + length = audit_set_loginuid(task, loginuid); if (likely(length == 0)) length = count; diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 19f214230fec..19f04b049798 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, uid_t loginuid); extern void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial); -extern int audit_set_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx, uid_t loginuid); +extern int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid); extern uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx); extern int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode); #else diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 66148f81d783..37b3ac94bc47 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1010,20 +1010,21 @@ void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, extern int audit_set_type(struct audit_buffer *ab, int type); -int audit_set_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx, uid_t loginuid) +int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) { - if (ctx) { + if (task->audit_context) { struct audit_buffer *ab; ab = audit_log_start(NULL); if (ab) { audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " "old loginuid=%u new loginuid=%u", - ctx->pid, ctx->uid, ctx->loginuid, loginuid); + task->pid, task->uid, + task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid); audit_set_type(ab, AUDIT_LOGIN); audit_log_end(ab); } - ctx->loginuid = loginuid; + task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid; } return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3