From 8bd753be7a96443dd5111cb07ed5907a3787c978 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 12:43:06 -0700 Subject: x86-32, mm: The WP test should be done on a kernel page PAGE_READONLY includes user permission, but this is a page used exclusively by the kernel; use PAGE_KERNEL_RO instead. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-3-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/mm/init_32.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c index 575d86f85ce4..e537b351e8ce 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c @@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ static void __init test_wp_bit(void) "Checking if this processor honours the WP bit even in supervisor mode..."); /* Any page-aligned address will do, the test is non-destructive */ - __set_fixmap(FIX_WP_TEST, __pa(&swapper_pg_dir), PAGE_READONLY); + __set_fixmap(FIX_WP_TEST, __pa(&swapper_pg_dir), PAGE_KERNEL_RO); boot_cpu_data.wp_works_ok = do_test_wp_bit(); clear_fixmap(FIX_WP_TEST); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 85fdf05cc395f23384cb0adb22765cbaa9653b54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 12:43:07 -0700 Subject: x86, smap: Add CR4 bit for SMAP Add X86_CR4_SMAP to . Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-4-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h index aea1d1d848c7..680cf09ed100 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ #define X86_CR4_PCIDE 0x00020000 /* enable PCID support */ #define X86_CR4_OSXSAVE 0x00040000 /* enable xsave and xrestore */ #define X86_CR4_SMEP 0x00100000 /* enable SMEP support */ +#define X86_CR4_SMAP 0x00200000 /* enable SMAP support */ /* * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8 -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9cebed423c84a56b871327dd77e555d1d2186a6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 12:43:08 -0700 Subject: x86, alternative: Use .pushsection/.popsection .section/.previous doesn't nest. Use .pushsection/.popsection in so that they can be properly nested. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-5-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/alternative-asm.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++---------------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative-asm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative-asm.h index 952bd0100c5c..018d29fe634a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative-asm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative-asm.h @@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP .macro LOCK_PREFIX 672: lock - .section .smp_locks,"a" + .pushsection .smp_locks,"a" .balign 4 .long 672b - . - .previous + .popsection .endm #else .macro LOCK_PREFIX diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h index 70780689599a..87bc00d4efe9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h @@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP #define LOCK_PREFIX_HERE \ - ".section .smp_locks,\"a\"\n" \ - ".balign 4\n" \ - ".long 671f - .\n" /* offset */ \ - ".previous\n" \ + ".pushsection .smp_locks,\"a\"\n" \ + ".balign 4\n" \ + ".long 671f - .\n" /* offset */ \ + ".popsection\n" \ "671:" #define LOCK_PREFIX LOCK_PREFIX_HERE "\n\tlock; " @@ -99,30 +99,30 @@ static inline int alternatives_text_reserved(void *start, void *end) /* alternative assembly primitive: */ #define ALTERNATIVE(oldinstr, newinstr, feature) \ OLDINSTR(oldinstr) \ - ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" \ + ".pushsection .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" \ ALTINSTR_ENTRY(feature, 1) \ - ".previous\n" \ - ".section .discard,\"aw\",@progbits\n" \ + ".popsection\n" \ + ".pushsection .discard,\"aw\",@progbits\n" \ DISCARD_ENTRY(1) \ - ".previous\n" \ - ".section .altinstr_replacement, \"ax\"\n" \ + ".popsection\n" \ + ".pushsection .altinstr_replacement, \"ax\"\n" \ ALTINSTR_REPLACEMENT(newinstr, feature, 1) \ - ".previous" + ".popsection" #define ALTERNATIVE_2(oldinstr, newinstr1, feature1, newinstr2, feature2)\ OLDINSTR(oldinstr) \ - ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" \ + ".pushsection .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" \ ALTINSTR_ENTRY(feature1, 1) \ ALTINSTR_ENTRY(feature2, 2) \ - ".previous\n" \ - ".section .discard,\"aw\",@progbits\n" \ + ".popsection\n" \ + ".pushsection .discard,\"aw\",@progbits\n" \ DISCARD_ENTRY(1) \ DISCARD_ENTRY(2) \ - ".previous\n" \ - ".section .altinstr_replacement, \"ax\"\n" \ + ".popsection\n" \ + ".pushsection .altinstr_replacement, \"ax\"\n" \ ALTINSTR_REPLACEMENT(newinstr1, feature1, 1) \ ALTINSTR_REPLACEMENT(newinstr2, feature2, 2) \ - ".previous" + ".popsection" /* * This must be included *after* the definition of ALTERNATIVE due to -- cgit v1.2.3 From 76f30759f690db21ca567a20665ed2679ad3235b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 12:43:09 -0700 Subject: x86, alternative: Add header guards to Add header guards to protect against multiple inclusion. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-6-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/alternative-asm.h | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative-asm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative-asm.h index 018d29fe634a..372231c22a47 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative-asm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative-asm.h @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_ALTERNATIVE_ASM_H +#define _ASM_X86_ALTERNATIVE_ASM_H + #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ #include @@ -24,3 +27,5 @@ .endm #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_ALTERNATIVE_ASM_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 51ae4a2d775e1ee456282d7c60e49693d0a8555d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 12:43:10 -0700 Subject: x86, smap: Add a header file with macros for STAC/CLAC The STAC/CLAC instructions are only available with SMAP, but on the other hand they aren't needed if SMAP is not available, or before we start to run userspace, so construct them as alternatives which start out as noops and are enabled by the alternatives mechanism. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-7-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 11 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 102 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 8ec3a1aa4abd..5ce86941333f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1487,6 +1487,17 @@ config ARCH_RANDOM If supported, this is a high bandwidth, cryptographically secure hardware random number generator. +config X86_SMAP + def_bool y + prompt "Supervisor Mode Access Prevention" if EXPERT + ---help--- + Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is a security + feature in newer Intel processors. There is a small + performance cost if this enabled and turned on; there is + also a small increase in the kernel size if this is enabled. + + If unsure, say Y. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3989c2492eb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* + * Supervisor Mode Access Prevention support + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Intel Corporation + * Author: H. Peter Anvin + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; version 2 + * of the License. + */ + +#ifndef _ASM_X86_SMAP_H +#define _ASM_X86_SMAP_H + +#include +#include +#include + +/* "Raw" instruction opcodes */ +#define __ASM_CLAC .byte 0x0f,0x01,0xca +#define __ASM_STAC .byte 0x0f,0x01,0xcb + +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ + +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SMAP + +#define ASM_CLAC \ + 661: ASM_NOP3 ; \ + .pushsection .altinstr_replacement, "ax" ; \ + 662: __ASM_CLAC ; \ + .popsection ; \ + .pushsection .altinstructions, "a" ; \ + altinstruction_entry 661b, 662b, X86_FEATURE_SMAP, 3, 3 ; \ + .popsection + +#define ASM_STAC \ + 661: ASM_NOP3 ; \ + .pushsection .altinstr_replacement, "ax" ; \ + 662: __ASM_STAC ; \ + .popsection ; \ + .pushsection .altinstructions, "a" ; \ + altinstruction_entry 661b, 662b, X86_FEATURE_SMAP, 3, 3 ; \ + .popsection + +#else /* CONFIG_X86_SMAP */ + +#define ASM_CLAC +#define ASM_STAC + +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SMAP */ + +#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SMAP + +static inline void clac(void) +{ + /* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */ + alternative(ASM_NOP3, __stringify(__ASM_CLAC), X86_FEATURE_SMAP); +} + +static inline void stac(void) +{ + /* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */ + alternative(ASM_NOP3, __stringify(__ASM_STAC), X86_FEATURE_SMAP); +} + +/* These macros can be used in asm() statements */ +#define ASM_CLAC \ + ALTERNATIVE(ASM_NOP3, __stringify(__ASM_CLAC), X86_FEATURE_SMAP) +#define ASM_STAC \ + ALTERNATIVE(ASM_NOP3, __stringify(__ASM_STAC), X86_FEATURE_SMAP) + +#else /* CONFIG_X86_SMAP */ + +static inline void clac(void) { } +static inline void stac(void) { } + +#define ASM_CLAC +#define ASM_STAC + +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SMAP */ + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_SMAP_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From a052858fabb376b695f2c125633daa6728e0f284 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 12:43:11 -0700 Subject: x86, uaccess: Merge prototypes for clear_user/__clear_user The prototypes for clear_user() and __clear_user() are identical in the 32- and 64-bit headers. No functionality change. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-8-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 3 --- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 3 --- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index e1f3a17034fc..2c7df3d184f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -569,6 +569,9 @@ strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count); extern __must_check long strlen_user(const char __user *str); extern __must_check long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long n); +unsigned long __must_check clear_user(void __user *mem, unsigned long len); +unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *mem, unsigned long len); + /* * movsl can be slow when source and dest are not both 8-byte aligned */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h index 576e39bca6ad..7f760a9f1f61 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h @@ -213,7 +213,4 @@ static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, return n; } -unsigned long __must_check clear_user(void __user *mem, unsigned long len); -unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *mem, unsigned long len); - #endif /* _ASM_X86_UACCESS_32_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h index d8def8b3dba0..142810c457dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h @@ -217,9 +217,6 @@ int __copy_in_user(void __user *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size) } } -__must_check unsigned long clear_user(void __user *mem, unsigned long len); -__must_check unsigned long __clear_user(void __user *mem, unsigned long len); - static __must_check __always_inline int __copy_from_user_inatomic(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 63bcff2a307b9bcc712a8251eb27df8b2e117967 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 12:43:12 -0700 Subject: x86, smap: Add STAC and CLAC instructions to control user space access When Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is enabled, access to userspace from the kernel is controlled by the AC flag. To make the performance of manipulating that flag acceptable, there are two new instructions, STAC and CLAC, to set and clear it. This patch adds those instructions, via alternative(), when the SMAP feature is enabled. It also adds X86_EFLAGS_AC unconditionally to the SYSCALL entry mask; there is simply no reason to make that one conditional. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-9-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/fpu-internal.h | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h | 19 +++++++++++++------ arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 31 +++++++++++++++++++------------ arch/x86/include/asm/xsave.h | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 11 ++++++++++- arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S | 7 +++++++ arch/x86/lib/copy_user_nocache_64.S | 3 +++ arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 10 ++++++++++ arch/x86/lib/putuser.S | 8 +++++++- arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 13 ++++++++++++- arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c | 3 +++ 14 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S index 20e5f7ba0e6b..9c289504e680 100644 --- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S +++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -146,8 +147,10 @@ ENTRY(ia32_sysenter_target) SAVE_ARGS 0,1,0 /* no need to do an access_ok check here because rbp has been 32bit zero extended */ + ASM_STAC 1: movl (%rbp),%ebp _ASM_EXTABLE(1b,ia32_badarg) + ASM_CLAC orl $TS_COMPAT,TI_status+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP-ARGOFFSET) testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY,TI_flags+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP-ARGOFFSET) CFI_REMEMBER_STATE @@ -301,8 +304,10 @@ ENTRY(ia32_cstar_target) /* no need to do an access_ok check here because r8 has been 32bit zero extended */ /* hardware stack frame is complete now */ + ASM_STAC 1: movl (%r8),%r9d _ASM_EXTABLE(1b,ia32_badarg) + ASM_CLAC orl $TS_COMPAT,TI_status+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP-ARGOFFSET) testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY,TI_flags+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP-ARGOFFSET) CFI_REMEMBER_STATE @@ -365,6 +370,7 @@ cstar_tracesys: END(ia32_cstar_target) ia32_badarg: + ASM_CLAC movq $-EFAULT,%rax jmp ia32_sysret CFI_ENDPROC diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu-internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu-internal.h index 75f4c6d6a331..0fe13583a028 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu-internal.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu-internal.h @@ -126,8 +126,9 @@ static inline int fxsave_user(struct i387_fxsave_struct __user *fx) /* See comment in fxsave() below. */ #ifdef CONFIG_AS_FXSAVEQ - asm volatile("1: fxsaveq %[fx]\n\t" - "2:\n" + asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" + "1: fxsaveq %[fx]\n\t" + "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" "3: movl $-1,%[err]\n" " jmp 2b\n" @@ -136,8 +137,9 @@ static inline int fxsave_user(struct i387_fxsave_struct __user *fx) : [err] "=r" (err), [fx] "=m" (*fx) : "0" (0)); #else - asm volatile("1: rex64/fxsave (%[fx])\n\t" - "2:\n" + asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" + "1: rex64/fxsave (%[fx])\n\t" + "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" "3: movl $-1,%[err]\n" " jmp 2b\n" diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h index 71ecbcba1a4e..f373046e63ec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h @@ -9,10 +9,13 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define __futex_atomic_op1(insn, ret, oldval, uaddr, oparg) \ - asm volatile("1:\t" insn "\n" \ - "2:\t.section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ + asm volatile("\t" ASM_STAC "\n" \ + "1:\t" insn "\n" \ + "2:\t" ASM_CLAC "\n" \ + "\t.section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ "3:\tmov\t%3, %1\n" \ "\tjmp\t2b\n" \ "\t.previous\n" \ @@ -21,12 +24,14 @@ : "i" (-EFAULT), "0" (oparg), "1" (0)) #define __futex_atomic_op2(insn, ret, oldval, uaddr, oparg) \ - asm volatile("1:\tmovl %2, %0\n" \ + asm volatile("\t" ASM_STAC "\n" \ + "1:\tmovl %2, %0\n" \ "\tmovl\t%0, %3\n" \ "\t" insn "\n" \ "2:\t" LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchgl %3, %2\n" \ "\tjnz\t1b\n" \ - "3:\t.section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ + "3:\t" ASM_CLAC "\n" \ + "\t.section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ "4:\tmov\t%5, %1\n" \ "\tjmp\t3b\n" \ "\t.previous\n" \ @@ -122,8 +127,10 @@ static inline int futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 *uval, u32 __user *uaddr, if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uaddr, sizeof(u32))) return -EFAULT; - asm volatile("1:\t" LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchgl %4, %2\n" - "2:\t.section .fixup, \"ax\"\n" + asm volatile("\t" ASM_STAC "\n" + "1:\t" LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchgl %4, %2\n" + "2:\t" ASM_CLAC "\n" + "\t.section .fixup, \"ax\"\n" "3:\tmov %3, %0\n" "\tjmp 2b\n" "\t.previous\n" diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h index 3989c2492eb5..8d3120f4e270 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h @@ -58,13 +58,13 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SMAP -static inline void clac(void) +static __always_inline void clac(void) { /* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */ alternative(ASM_NOP3, __stringify(__ASM_CLAC), X86_FEATURE_SMAP); } -static inline void stac(void) +static __always_inline void stac(void) { /* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */ alternative(ASM_NOP3, __stringify(__ASM_STAC), X86_FEATURE_SMAP); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index 2c7df3d184f2..b92ece13c238 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define VERIFY_READ 0 #define VERIFY_WRITE 1 @@ -192,9 +193,10 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 #define __put_user_asm_u64(x, addr, err, errret) \ - asm volatile("1: movl %%eax,0(%2)\n" \ + asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" \ + "1: movl %%eax,0(%2)\n" \ "2: movl %%edx,4(%2)\n" \ - "3:\n" \ + "3: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \ ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ "4: movl %3,%0\n" \ " jmp 3b\n" \ @@ -205,9 +207,10 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void); : "A" (x), "r" (addr), "i" (errret), "0" (err)) #define __put_user_asm_ex_u64(x, addr) \ - asm volatile("1: movl %%eax,0(%1)\n" \ + asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" \ + "1: movl %%eax,0(%1)\n" \ "2: movl %%edx,4(%1)\n" \ - "3:\n" \ + "3: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \ _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(1b, 2b) \ _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(2b, 3b) \ : : "A" (x), "r" (addr)) @@ -379,8 +382,9 @@ do { \ } while (0) #define __get_user_asm(x, addr, err, itype, rtype, ltype, errret) \ - asm volatile("1: mov"itype" %2,%"rtype"1\n" \ - "2:\n" \ + asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" \ + "1: mov"itype" %2,%"rtype"1\n" \ + "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \ ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ "3: mov %3,%0\n" \ " xor"itype" %"rtype"1,%"rtype"1\n" \ @@ -412,8 +416,9 @@ do { \ } while (0) #define __get_user_asm_ex(x, addr, itype, rtype, ltype) \ - asm volatile("1: mov"itype" %1,%"rtype"0\n" \ - "2:\n" \ + asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" \ + "1: mov"itype" %1,%"rtype"0\n" \ + "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \ _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(1b, 2b) \ : ltype(x) : "m" (__m(addr))) @@ -443,8 +448,9 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; }; * aliasing issues. */ #define __put_user_asm(x, addr, err, itype, rtype, ltype, errret) \ - asm volatile("1: mov"itype" %"rtype"1,%2\n" \ - "2:\n" \ + asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" \ + "1: mov"itype" %"rtype"1,%2\n" \ + "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \ ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ "3: mov %3,%0\n" \ " jmp 2b\n" \ @@ -454,8 +460,9 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; }; : ltype(x), "m" (__m(addr)), "i" (errret), "0" (err)) #define __put_user_asm_ex(x, addr, itype, rtype, ltype) \ - asm volatile("1: mov"itype" %"rtype"0,%1\n" \ - "2:\n" \ + asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" \ + "1: mov"itype" %"rtype"0,%1\n" \ + "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \ _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(1b, 2b) \ : : ltype(x), "m" (__m(addr))) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/xsave.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/xsave.h index 8a1b6f9b594a..2a923bd54341 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xsave.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xsave.h @@ -74,8 +74,9 @@ static inline int xsave_user(struct xsave_struct __user *buf) if (unlikely(err)) return -EFAULT; - __asm__ __volatile__("1: .byte " REX_PREFIX "0x0f,0xae,0x27\n" - "2:\n" + __asm__ __volatile__(ASM_STAC "\n" + "1: .byte " REX_PREFIX "0x0f,0xae,0x27\n" + "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" "3: movl $-1,%[err]\n" " jmp 2b\n" @@ -97,8 +98,9 @@ static inline int xrestore_user(struct xsave_struct __user *buf, u64 mask) u32 lmask = mask; u32 hmask = mask >> 32; - __asm__ __volatile__("1: .byte " REX_PREFIX "0x0f,0xae,0x2f\n" - "2:\n" + __asm__ __volatile__(ASM_STAC "\n" + "1: .byte " REX_PREFIX "0x0f,0xae,0x2f\n" + "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" "3: movl $-1,%[err]\n" " jmp 2b\n" diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index a5fbc3c5fccc..cd43e525fde8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1113,7 +1113,8 @@ void syscall_init(void) /* Flags to clear on syscall */ wrmsrl(MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, - X86_EFLAGS_TF|X86_EFLAGS_DF|X86_EFLAGS_IF|X86_EFLAGS_IOPL); + X86_EFLAGS_TF|X86_EFLAGS_DF|X86_EFLAGS_IF| + X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_AC); } unsigned long kernel_eflags; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S index 69babd8c834f..ce87e3d10c63 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /* Avoid __ASSEMBLER__'ifying just for this. */ @@ -465,7 +466,8 @@ END(ret_from_fork) * System call entry. Up to 6 arguments in registers are supported. * * SYSCALL does not save anything on the stack and does not change the - * stack pointer. + * stack pointer. However, it does mask the flags register for us, so + * CLD and CLAC are not needed. */ /* @@ -884,6 +886,7 @@ END(interrupt) */ .p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT common_interrupt: + ASM_CLAC XCPT_FRAME addq $-0x80,(%rsp) /* Adjust vector to [-256,-1] range */ interrupt do_IRQ @@ -1023,6 +1026,7 @@ END(common_interrupt) */ .macro apicinterrupt num sym do_sym ENTRY(\sym) + ASM_CLAC INTR_FRAME pushq_cfi $~(\num) .Lcommon_\sym: @@ -1077,6 +1081,7 @@ apicinterrupt IRQ_WORK_VECTOR \ */ .macro zeroentry sym do_sym ENTRY(\sym) + ASM_CLAC INTR_FRAME PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME pushq_cfi $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */ @@ -1094,6 +1099,7 @@ END(\sym) .macro paranoidzeroentry sym do_sym ENTRY(\sym) + ASM_CLAC INTR_FRAME PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME pushq_cfi $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */ @@ -1112,6 +1118,7 @@ END(\sym) #define INIT_TSS_IST(x) PER_CPU_VAR(init_tss) + (TSS_ist + ((x) - 1) * 8) .macro paranoidzeroentry_ist sym do_sym ist ENTRY(\sym) + ASM_CLAC INTR_FRAME PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME pushq_cfi $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */ @@ -1131,6 +1138,7 @@ END(\sym) .macro errorentry sym do_sym ENTRY(\sym) + ASM_CLAC XCPT_FRAME PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME subq $ORIG_RAX-R15, %rsp @@ -1149,6 +1157,7 @@ END(\sym) /* error code is on the stack already */ .macro paranoiderrorentry sym do_sym ENTRY(\sym) + ASM_CLAC XCPT_FRAME PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME subq $ORIG_RAX-R15, %rsp diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S index 5b2995f4557a..a30ca15be21c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* * By placing feature2 after feature1 in altinstructions section, we logically @@ -130,6 +131,7 @@ ENDPROC(bad_from_user) */ ENTRY(copy_user_generic_unrolled) CFI_STARTPROC + ASM_STAC cmpl $8,%edx jb 20f /* less then 8 bytes, go to byte copy loop */ ALIGN_DESTINATION @@ -177,6 +179,7 @@ ENTRY(copy_user_generic_unrolled) decl %ecx jnz 21b 23: xor %eax,%eax + ASM_CLAC ret .section .fixup,"ax" @@ -232,6 +235,7 @@ ENDPROC(copy_user_generic_unrolled) */ ENTRY(copy_user_generic_string) CFI_STARTPROC + ASM_STAC andl %edx,%edx jz 4f cmpl $8,%edx @@ -246,6 +250,7 @@ ENTRY(copy_user_generic_string) 3: rep movsb 4: xorl %eax,%eax + ASM_CLAC ret .section .fixup,"ax" @@ -273,12 +278,14 @@ ENDPROC(copy_user_generic_string) */ ENTRY(copy_user_enhanced_fast_string) CFI_STARTPROC + ASM_STAC andl %edx,%edx jz 2f movl %edx,%ecx 1: rep movsb 2: xorl %eax,%eax + ASM_CLAC ret .section .fixup,"ax" diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_nocache_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_nocache_64.S index cacddc7163eb..6a4f43c2d9e6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_nocache_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_nocache_64.S @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include .macro ALIGN_DESTINATION #ifdef FIX_ALIGNMENT @@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ */ ENTRY(__copy_user_nocache) CFI_STARTPROC + ASM_STAC cmpl $8,%edx jb 20f /* less then 8 bytes, go to byte copy loop */ ALIGN_DESTINATION @@ -95,6 +97,7 @@ ENTRY(__copy_user_nocache) decl %ecx jnz 21b 23: xorl %eax,%eax + ASM_CLAC sfence ret diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S index b33b1fb1e6d4..156b9c804670 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include .text ENTRY(__get_user_1) @@ -40,8 +41,10 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_1) GET_THREAD_INFO(%_ASM_DX) cmp TI_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + ASM_STAC 1: movzb (%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax + ASM_CLAC ret CFI_ENDPROC ENDPROC(__get_user_1) @@ -53,8 +56,10 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_2) GET_THREAD_INFO(%_ASM_DX) cmp TI_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + ASM_STAC 2: movzwl -1(%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax + ASM_CLAC ret CFI_ENDPROC ENDPROC(__get_user_2) @@ -66,8 +71,10 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_4) GET_THREAD_INFO(%_ASM_DX) cmp TI_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + ASM_STAC 3: mov -3(%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax + ASM_CLAC ret CFI_ENDPROC ENDPROC(__get_user_4) @@ -80,8 +87,10 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8) GET_THREAD_INFO(%_ASM_DX) cmp TI_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX jae bad_get_user + ASM_STAC 4: movq -7(%_ASM_AX),%_ASM_DX xor %eax,%eax + ASM_CLAC ret CFI_ENDPROC ENDPROC(__get_user_8) @@ -91,6 +100,7 @@ bad_get_user: CFI_STARTPROC xor %edx,%edx mov $(-EFAULT),%_ASM_AX + ASM_CLAC ret CFI_ENDPROC END(bad_get_user) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S index 7f951c8f76c4..fc6ba17a7eec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* @@ -31,7 +32,8 @@ #define ENTER CFI_STARTPROC ; \ GET_THREAD_INFO(%_ASM_BX) -#define EXIT ret ; \ +#define EXIT ASM_CLAC ; \ + ret ; \ CFI_ENDPROC .text @@ -39,6 +41,7 @@ ENTRY(__put_user_1) ENTER cmp TI_addr_limit(%_ASM_BX),%_ASM_CX jae bad_put_user + ASM_STAC 1: movb %al,(%_ASM_CX) xor %eax,%eax EXIT @@ -50,6 +53,7 @@ ENTRY(__put_user_2) sub $1,%_ASM_BX cmp %_ASM_BX,%_ASM_CX jae bad_put_user + ASM_STAC 2: movw %ax,(%_ASM_CX) xor %eax,%eax EXIT @@ -61,6 +65,7 @@ ENTRY(__put_user_4) sub $3,%_ASM_BX cmp %_ASM_BX,%_ASM_CX jae bad_put_user + ASM_STAC 3: movl %eax,(%_ASM_CX) xor %eax,%eax EXIT @@ -72,6 +77,7 @@ ENTRY(__put_user_8) sub $7,%_ASM_BX cmp %_ASM_BX,%_ASM_CX jae bad_put_user + ASM_STAC 4: mov %_ASM_AX,(%_ASM_CX) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 5: movl %edx,4(%_ASM_CX) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c index 1781b2f950e2..98f6d6b68f5a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c @@ -42,10 +42,11 @@ do { \ int __d0; \ might_fault(); \ __asm__ __volatile__( \ + ASM_STAC "\n" \ "0: rep; stosl\n" \ " movl %2,%0\n" \ "1: rep; stosb\n" \ - "2:\n" \ + "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \ ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ "3: lea 0(%2,%0,4),%0\n" \ " jmp 2b\n" \ @@ -626,10 +627,12 @@ survive: return n; } #endif + stac(); if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n)) __copy_user(to, from, n); else n = __copy_user_intel(to, from, n); + clac(); return n; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_to_user_ll); @@ -637,10 +640,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_to_user_ll); unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { + stac(); if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n)) __copy_user_zeroing(to, from, n); else n = __copy_user_zeroing_intel(to, from, n); + clac(); return n; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll); @@ -648,11 +653,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll); unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nozero(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { + stac(); if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n)) __copy_user(to, from, n); else n = __copy_user_intel((void __user *)to, (const void *)from, n); + clac(); return n; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nozero); @@ -660,6 +667,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nozero); unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { + stac(); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY if (n > 64 && cpu_has_xmm2) n = __copy_user_zeroing_intel_nocache(to, from, n); @@ -668,6 +676,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache(void *to, const void __user *from, #else __copy_user_zeroing(to, from, n); #endif + clac(); return n; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocache); @@ -675,6 +684,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocache); unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { + stac(); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY if (n > 64 && cpu_has_xmm2) n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n); @@ -683,6 +693,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *fr #else __copy_user(to, from, n); #endif + clac(); return n; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero); diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c index e5b130bc2d0e..05928aae911e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ unsigned long __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size) might_fault(); /* no memory constraint because it doesn't change any memory gcc knows about */ + stac(); asm volatile( " testq %[size8],%[size8]\n" " jz 4f\n" @@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ unsigned long __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size) : [size8] "=&c"(size), [dst] "=&D" (__d0) : [size1] "r"(size & 7), "[size8]" (size / 8), "[dst]"(addr), [zero] "r" (0UL), [eight] "r" (8UL)); + clac(); return size; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__clear_user); @@ -82,5 +84,6 @@ copy_user_handle_tail(char *to, char *from, unsigned len, unsigned zerorest) for (c = 0, zero_len = len; zerorest && zero_len; --zero_len) if (__put_user_nocheck(c, to++, sizeof(char))) break; + clac(); return len; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 52b6179ac87d33c2eeaff5292786a10fe98cff64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 12:43:13 -0700 Subject: x86, smap: Turn on Supervisor Mode Access Prevention If Supervisor Mode Access Prevention is available and not disabled by the user, turn it on. Also fix the expansion of SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention.) Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-10-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com --- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 +++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index ad7e2e5088c1..49c5c41b07e1 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1812,8 +1812,12 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default) noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings + nosmap [X86] + Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention) + even if it is supported by processor. + nosmep [X86] - Disable SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection) + Disable SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention) even if it is supported by processor. noexec32 [X86-64] diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index cd43e525fde8..7d35d6594118 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -278,6 +278,31 @@ static __cpuinit void setup_smep(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } } +static int disable_smap __cpuinitdata; +static __init int setup_disable_smap(char *arg) +{ + disable_smap = 1; + return 1; +} +__setup("nosmap", setup_disable_smap); + +static __cpuinit void setup_smap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMAP)) { + if (unlikely(disable_smap)) { + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMAP); + clear_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMAP); + } else { + set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMAP); + /* + * Don't use clac() here since alternatives + * haven't run yet... + */ + asm volatile(__stringify(__ASM_CLAC) ::: "memory"); + } + } +} + /* * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization @@ -713,6 +738,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) filter_cpuid_features(c, false); setup_smep(c); + setup_smap(c); if (this_cpu->c_bsp_init) this_cpu->c_bsp_init(c); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 40d3cd6695014bf3c44e2ca66b610b18acaf923d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 12:43:14 -0700 Subject: x86, smap: A page fault due to SMAP is an oops If we get a page fault due to SMAP, trigger an oops rather than spinning forever. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-11-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 76dcd9d8e0bc..f2fb75d46b96 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -995,6 +995,17 @@ static int fault_in_kernel_space(unsigned long address) return address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX; } +static inline bool smap_violation(int error_code, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + if (error_code & PF_USER) + return false; + + if (!user_mode_vm(regs) && (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC)) + return false; + + return true; +} + /* * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address, * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate @@ -1088,6 +1099,13 @@ do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code) if (unlikely(error_code & PF_RSVD)) pgtable_bad(regs, error_code, address); + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP)) { + if (unlikely(smap_violation(error_code, regs))) { + bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address); + return; + } + } + perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address); /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5e88353d8b5f483bc1c873ad24ac2b59a6b66c73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 12:43:15 -0700 Subject: x86, smap: Reduce the SMAP overhead for signal handling Signal handling contains a bunch of accesses to individual user space items, which causes an excessive number of STAC and CLAC instructions. Instead, let get/put_user_try ... get/put_user_catch() contain the STAC and CLAC instructions. This means that get/put_user_try no longer nests, and furthermore that it is no longer legal to use user space access functions other than __get/put_user_ex() inside those blocks. However, these macros are x86-specific anyway and are only used in the signal-handling paths; a simple reordering of moving the larger subroutine calls out of the try...catch blocks resolves that problem. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-12-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c | 12 +++++++----- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 14 ++++++-------- arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 24 ++++++++++++++---------- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c index 673ac9b63d6b..05e62a312bd9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c @@ -250,11 +250,12 @@ static int ia32_restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs, get_user_ex(tmp, &sc->fpstate); buf = compat_ptr(tmp); - err |= restore_i387_xstate_ia32(buf); get_user_ex(*pax, &sc->ax); } get_user_catch(err); + err |= restore_i387_xstate_ia32(buf); + return err; } @@ -502,7 +503,6 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info, put_user_ex(sig, &frame->sig); put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(&frame->info), &frame->pinfo); put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(&frame->uc), &frame->puc); - err |= copy_siginfo_to_user32(&frame->info, info); /* Create the ucontext. */ if (cpu_has_xsave) @@ -514,9 +514,6 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info, put_user_ex(sas_ss_flags(regs->sp), &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_flags); put_user_ex(current->sas_ss_size, &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_size); - err |= ia32_setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, fpstate, - regs, set->sig[0]); - err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set)); if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer; @@ -532,6 +529,11 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info, put_user_ex(*((u64 *)&code), (u64 *)frame->retcode); } put_user_catch(err); + err |= copy_siginfo_to_user32(&frame->info, info); + err |= ia32_setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, fpstate, + regs, set->sig[0]); + err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set)); + if (err) return -EFAULT; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index b92ece13c238..a91acfbb1a98 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -416,9 +416,8 @@ do { \ } while (0) #define __get_user_asm_ex(x, addr, itype, rtype, ltype) \ - asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" \ - "1: mov"itype" %1,%"rtype"0\n" \ - "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \ + asm volatile("1: mov"itype" %1,%"rtype"0\n" \ + "2:\n" \ _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(1b, 2b) \ : ltype(x) : "m" (__m(addr))) @@ -460,9 +459,8 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; }; : ltype(x), "m" (__m(addr)), "i" (errret), "0" (err)) #define __put_user_asm_ex(x, addr, itype, rtype, ltype) \ - asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" \ - "1: mov"itype" %"rtype"0,%1\n" \ - "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \ + asm volatile("1: mov"itype" %"rtype"0,%1\n" \ + "2:\n" \ _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(1b, 2b) \ : : ltype(x), "m" (__m(addr))) @@ -470,13 +468,13 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; }; * uaccess_try and catch */ #define uaccess_try do { \ - int prev_err = current_thread_info()->uaccess_err; \ current_thread_info()->uaccess_err = 0; \ + stac(); \ barrier(); #define uaccess_catch(err) \ + clac(); \ (err) |= (current_thread_info()->uaccess_err ? -EFAULT : 0); \ - current_thread_info()->uaccess_err = prev_err; \ } while (0) /** diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c index b280908a376e..932612887e92 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c @@ -114,11 +114,12 @@ int restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs, struct sigcontext __user *sc, regs->orig_ax = -1; /* disable syscall checks */ get_user_ex(buf, &sc->fpstate); - err |= restore_i387_xstate(buf); get_user_ex(*pax, &sc->ax); } get_user_catch(err); + err |= restore_i387_xstate(buf); + return err; } @@ -357,7 +358,6 @@ static int __setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info, put_user_ex(sig, &frame->sig); put_user_ex(&frame->info, &frame->pinfo); put_user_ex(&frame->uc, &frame->puc); - err |= copy_siginfo_to_user(&frame->info, info); /* Create the ucontext. */ if (cpu_has_xsave) @@ -369,9 +369,6 @@ static int __setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info, put_user_ex(sas_ss_flags(regs->sp), &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_flags); put_user_ex(current->sas_ss_size, &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_size); - err |= setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, fpstate, - regs, set->sig[0]); - err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set)); /* Set up to return from userspace. */ restorer = VDSO32_SYMBOL(current->mm->context.vdso, rt_sigreturn); @@ -389,6 +386,11 @@ static int __setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info, put_user_ex(*((u64 *)&rt_retcode), (u64 *)frame->retcode); } put_user_catch(err); + err |= copy_siginfo_to_user(&frame->info, info); + err |= setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, fpstate, + regs, set->sig[0]); + err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set)); + if (err) return -EFAULT; @@ -436,8 +438,6 @@ static int __setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info, put_user_ex(sas_ss_flags(regs->sp), &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_flags); put_user_ex(me->sas_ss_size, &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_size); - err |= setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, fp, regs, set->sig[0]); - err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set)); /* Set up to return from userspace. If provided, use a stub already in userspace. */ @@ -450,6 +450,9 @@ static int __setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info, } } put_user_catch(err); + err |= setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, fp, regs, set->sig[0]); + err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set)); + if (err) return -EFAULT; @@ -855,9 +858,6 @@ static int x32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_flags); put_user_ex(current->sas_ss_size, &frame->uc.uc_stack.ss_size); put_user_ex(0, &frame->uc.uc__pad0); - err |= setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, fpstate, - regs, set->sig[0]); - err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set)); if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) { restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer; @@ -869,6 +869,10 @@ static int x32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, put_user_ex(restorer, &frame->pretcode); } put_user_catch(err); + err |= setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, fpstate, + regs, set->sig[0]); + err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set)); + if (err) return -EFAULT; -- cgit v1.2.3 From e59d1b0a24199db01978e6c1e89859eda93ce683 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2012 13:58:10 -0700 Subject: x86-32, smap: Add STAC/CLAC instructions to 32-bit kernel entry The changes to entry_32.S got missed in checkin: 63bcff2a x86, smap: Add STAC and CLAC instructions to control user space access The resulting kernel was largely functional but SMAP protection could have been bypassed. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-9-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S index 623f28837476..9ebbecab6e92 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* Avoid __ASSEMBLER__'ifying just for this. */ #include @@ -407,7 +408,9 @@ sysenter_past_esp: */ cmpl $__PAGE_OFFSET-3,%ebp jae syscall_fault + ASM_STAC 1: movl (%ebp),%ebp + ASM_CLAC movl %ebp,PT_EBP(%esp) _ASM_EXTABLE(1b,syscall_fault) @@ -488,6 +491,7 @@ ENDPROC(ia32_sysenter_target) # system call handler stub ENTRY(system_call) RING0_INT_FRAME # can't unwind into user space anyway + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi %eax # save orig_eax SAVE_ALL GET_THREAD_INFO(%ebp) @@ -670,6 +674,7 @@ END(syscall_exit_work) RING0_INT_FRAME # can't unwind into user space anyway syscall_fault: + ASM_CLAC GET_THREAD_INFO(%ebp) movl $-EFAULT,PT_EAX(%esp) jmp resume_userspace @@ -825,6 +830,7 @@ END(interrupt) */ .p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT common_interrupt: + ASM_CLAC addl $-0x80,(%esp) /* Adjust vector into the [-256,-1] range */ SAVE_ALL TRACE_IRQS_OFF @@ -841,6 +847,7 @@ ENDPROC(common_interrupt) #define BUILD_INTERRUPT3(name, nr, fn) \ ENTRY(name) \ RING0_INT_FRAME; \ + ASM_CLAC; \ pushl_cfi $~(nr); \ SAVE_ALL; \ TRACE_IRQS_OFF \ @@ -857,6 +864,7 @@ ENDPROC(name) ENTRY(coprocessor_error) RING0_INT_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $0 pushl_cfi $do_coprocessor_error jmp error_code @@ -865,6 +873,7 @@ END(coprocessor_error) ENTRY(simd_coprocessor_error) RING0_INT_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $0 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INVD_BUG /* AMD 486 bug: invd from userspace calls exception 19 instead of #GP */ @@ -886,6 +895,7 @@ END(simd_coprocessor_error) ENTRY(device_not_available) RING0_INT_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $-1 # mark this as an int pushl_cfi $do_device_not_available jmp error_code @@ -906,6 +916,7 @@ END(native_irq_enable_sysexit) ENTRY(overflow) RING0_INT_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $0 pushl_cfi $do_overflow jmp error_code @@ -914,6 +925,7 @@ END(overflow) ENTRY(bounds) RING0_INT_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $0 pushl_cfi $do_bounds jmp error_code @@ -922,6 +934,7 @@ END(bounds) ENTRY(invalid_op) RING0_INT_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $0 pushl_cfi $do_invalid_op jmp error_code @@ -930,6 +943,7 @@ END(invalid_op) ENTRY(coprocessor_segment_overrun) RING0_INT_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $0 pushl_cfi $do_coprocessor_segment_overrun jmp error_code @@ -938,6 +952,7 @@ END(coprocessor_segment_overrun) ENTRY(invalid_TSS) RING0_EC_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $do_invalid_TSS jmp error_code CFI_ENDPROC @@ -945,6 +960,7 @@ END(invalid_TSS) ENTRY(segment_not_present) RING0_EC_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $do_segment_not_present jmp error_code CFI_ENDPROC @@ -952,6 +968,7 @@ END(segment_not_present) ENTRY(stack_segment) RING0_EC_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $do_stack_segment jmp error_code CFI_ENDPROC @@ -959,6 +976,7 @@ END(stack_segment) ENTRY(alignment_check) RING0_EC_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $do_alignment_check jmp error_code CFI_ENDPROC @@ -966,6 +984,7 @@ END(alignment_check) ENTRY(divide_error) RING0_INT_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $0 # no error code pushl_cfi $do_divide_error jmp error_code @@ -975,6 +994,7 @@ END(divide_error) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE ENTRY(machine_check) RING0_INT_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $0 pushl_cfi machine_check_vector jmp error_code @@ -984,6 +1004,7 @@ END(machine_check) ENTRY(spurious_interrupt_bug) RING0_INT_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $0 pushl_cfi $do_spurious_interrupt_bug jmp error_code @@ -1207,6 +1228,7 @@ return_to_handler: ENTRY(page_fault) RING0_EC_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $do_page_fault ALIGN error_code: @@ -1279,6 +1301,7 @@ END(page_fault) ENTRY(debug) RING0_INT_FRAME + ASM_CLAC cmpl $ia32_sysenter_target,(%esp) jne debug_stack_correct FIX_STACK 12, debug_stack_correct, debug_esp_fix_insn @@ -1303,6 +1326,7 @@ END(debug) */ ENTRY(nmi) RING0_INT_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi %eax movl %ss, %eax cmpw $__ESPFIX_SS, %ax @@ -1373,6 +1397,7 @@ END(nmi) ENTRY(int3) RING0_INT_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $-1 # mark this as an int SAVE_ALL TRACE_IRQS_OFF @@ -1393,6 +1418,7 @@ END(general_protection) #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST ENTRY(async_page_fault) RING0_EC_FRAME + ASM_CLAC pushl_cfi $do_async_page_fault jmp error_code CFI_ENDPROC -- cgit v1.2.3 From e139e95590dfebab81841bf7a3ac46500f51a47c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2012 15:42:18 -0700 Subject: x86, smap: Do not abuse the [f][x]rstor_checking() functions for user space With SMAP, the [f][x]rstor_checking() functions are no longer usable for user-space pointers by applying a simple __force cast. Instead, create new [f][x]rstor_user() functions which do the proper SMAP magic. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Suresh Siddha Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1343171129-2747-3-git-send-email-suresh.b.siddha@intel.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu-internal.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/xsave.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu-internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu-internal.h index 409b9ccf5518..831dbb9c6c02 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu-internal.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu-internal.h @@ -181,11 +181,28 @@ static inline int fxrstor_checking(struct i387_fxsave_struct *fx) "m" (*fx)); } +static inline int fxrstor_user(struct i387_fxsave_struct __user *fx) +{ + if (config_enabled(CONFIG_X86_32)) + return user_insn(fxrstor %[fx], "=m" (*fx), [fx] "m" (*fx)); + else if (config_enabled(CONFIG_AS_FXSAVEQ)) + return user_insn(fxrstorq %[fx], "=m" (*fx), [fx] "m" (*fx)); + + /* See comment in fpu_fxsave() below. */ + return user_insn(rex64/fxrstor (%[fx]), "=m" (*fx), [fx] "R" (fx), + "m" (*fx)); +} + static inline int frstor_checking(struct i387_fsave_struct *fx) { return check_insn(frstor %[fx], "=m" (*fx), [fx] "m" (*fx)); } +static inline int frstor_user(struct i387_fsave_struct __user *fx) +{ + return user_insn(frstor %[fx], "=m" (*fx), [fx] "m" (*fx)); +} + static inline void fpu_fxsave(struct fpu *fpu) { if (config_enabled(CONFIG_X86_32)) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/xsave.c b/arch/x86/kernel/xsave.c index 4e89b3dd408d..ada87a329edc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/xsave.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/xsave.c @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static inline int restore_user_xstate(void __user *buf, u64 xbv, int fx_only) if ((unsigned long)buf % 64 || fx_only) { u64 init_bv = pcntxt_mask & ~XSTATE_FPSSE; xrstor_state(init_xstate_buf, init_bv); - return fxrstor_checking((__force void *) buf); + return fxrstor_user(buf); } else { u64 init_bv = pcntxt_mask & ~xbv; if (unlikely(init_bv)) @@ -323,9 +323,9 @@ static inline int restore_user_xstate(void __user *buf, u64 xbv, int fx_only) return xrestore_user(buf, xbv); } } else if (use_fxsr()) { - return fxrstor_checking((__force void *) buf); + return fxrstor_user(buf); } else - return frstor_checking((__force void *) buf); + return frstor_user(buf); } int __restore_xstate_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5a5a51db78ef24aa61a4cb2ae36f07f6fa37356d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 16:05:48 -0700 Subject: x86-32: Start out eflags and cr4 clean %cr4 is supposed to reflect a set of features into which the operating system is opting in. If the BIOS or bootloader leaks bits here, this is not desirable. Consider a bootloader passing in %cr4.pae set to a legacy paging kernel, for example -- it will not have any immediate effect, but the kernel would crash when turning paging on. A similar argument applies to %eflags, and since we have to look for %eflags.id being settable we can use a sequence which clears %eflags as a side effect. Note that we already do this for x86-64. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348529239-17943-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S | 31 ++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S index d42ab17b7397..957a47aec64e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S @@ -287,27 +287,28 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp) leal -__PAGE_OFFSET(%ecx),%esp default_entry: - /* * New page tables may be in 4Mbyte page mode and may * be using the global pages. * * NOTE! If we are on a 486 we may have no cr4 at all! - * So we do not try to touch it unless we really have - * some bits in it to set. This won't work if the BSP - * implements cr4 but this AP does not -- very unlikely - * but be warned! The same applies to the pse feature - * if not equally supported. --macro - * - * NOTE! We have to correct for the fact that we're - * not yet offset PAGE_OFFSET.. + * Specifically, cr4 exists if and only if CPUID exists, + * which in turn exists if and only if EFLAGS.ID exists. */ -#define cr4_bits pa(mmu_cr4_features) - movl cr4_bits,%edx - andl %edx,%edx - jz 6f - movl %cr4,%eax # Turn on paging options (PSE,PAE,..) - orl %edx,%eax + movl $X86_EFLAGS_ID,%ecx + pushl %ecx + popfl + pushfl + popl %eax + pushl $0 + popfl + pushfl + popl %edx + xorl %edx,%eax + testl %ecx,%eax + jz 6f # No ID flag = no CPUID = no CR4 + + movl pa(mmu_cr4_features),%eax movl %eax,%cr4 testb $X86_CR4_PAE, %al # check if PAE is enabled -- cgit v1.2.3 From 73201dbec64aebf6b0dca855b523f437972dc7bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2012 15:02:34 -0700 Subject: x86, suspend: On wakeup always initialize cr4 and EFER We already have a flag word to indicate the existence of MISC_ENABLES, so use the same flag word to indicate existence of cr4 and EFER, and always restore them if they exist. That way if something passes a nonzero value when the value *should* be zero, we will still initialize it. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348529239-17943-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c | 15 ++++++++++----- arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakeup.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakeup_asm.S | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c index 1b8e5a03d942..11676cf65aee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c @@ -43,17 +43,22 @@ int acpi_suspend_lowlevel(void) header->video_mode = saved_video_mode; + header->pmode_behavior = 0; + #ifndef CONFIG_64BIT store_gdt((struct desc_ptr *)&header->pmode_gdt); - if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_EFER, &header->pmode_efer_low, - &header->pmode_efer_high)) - header->pmode_efer_low = header->pmode_efer_high = 0; + if (!rdmsr_safe(MSR_EFER, + &header->pmode_efer_low, + &header->pmode_efer_high)) + header->pmode_behavior |= (1 << WAKEUP_BEHAVIOR_RESTORE_EFER); #endif /* !CONFIG_64BIT */ header->pmode_cr0 = read_cr0(); - header->pmode_cr4 = read_cr4_safe(); - header->pmode_behavior = 0; + if (__this_cpu_read(cpu_info.cpuid_level) >= 0) { + header->pmode_cr4 = read_cr4(); + header->pmode_behavior |= (1 << WAKEUP_BEHAVIOR_RESTORE_CR4); + } if (!rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, &header->pmode_misc_en_low, &header->pmode_misc_en_high)) diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakeup.h b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakeup.h index 9317e0042f24..7dd86a419f5d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakeup.h +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakeup.h @@ -36,5 +36,7 @@ extern struct wakeup_header wakeup_header; /* Wakeup behavior bits */ #define WAKEUP_BEHAVIOR_RESTORE_MISC_ENABLE 0 +#define WAKEUP_BEHAVIOR_RESTORE_CR4 1 +#define WAKEUP_BEHAVIOR_RESTORE_EFER 2 #endif /* ARCH_X86_KERNEL_ACPI_RM_WAKEUP_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakeup_asm.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakeup_asm.S index 8905166b0bbb..e56479e58053 100644 --- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakeup_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakeup_asm.S @@ -74,9 +74,18 @@ ENTRY(wakeup_start) lidtl wakeup_idt - /* Clear the EFLAGS */ - pushl $0 + /* Clear the EFLAGS but remember if we have EFLAGS.ID */ + movl $X86_EFLAGS_ID, %ecx + pushl %ecx popfl + pushfl + popl %edi + pushl $0 + popfl + pushfl + popl %edx + xorl %edx, %edi + andl %ecx, %edi /* %edi is zero iff CPUID & %cr4 are missing */ /* Check header signature... */ movl signature, %eax @@ -93,8 +102,8 @@ ENTRY(wakeup_start) /* Restore MISC_ENABLE before entering protected mode, in case BIOS decided to clear XD_DISABLE during S3. */ - movl pmode_behavior, %eax - btl $WAKEUP_BEHAVIOR_RESTORE_MISC_ENABLE, %eax + movl pmode_behavior, %edi + btl $WAKEUP_BEHAVIOR_RESTORE_MISC_ENABLE, %edi jnc 1f movl pmode_misc_en, %eax @@ -110,15 +119,15 @@ ENTRY(wakeup_start) movl pmode_cr3, %eax movl %eax, %cr3 - movl pmode_cr4, %ecx - jecxz 1f - movl %ecx, %cr4 + btl $WAKEUP_BEHAVIOR_RESTORE_CR4, %edi + jz 1f + movl pmode_cr4, %eax + movl %eax, %cr4 1: + btl $WAKEUP_BEHAVIOR_RESTORE_EFER, %edi + jz 1f movl pmode_efer, %eax movl pmode_efer + 4, %edx - movl %eax, %ecx - orl %edx, %ecx - jz 1f movl $MSR_EFER, %ecx wrmsr 1: -- cgit v1.2.3 From b2cc2a074de75671bbed5e2dda67a9252ef353ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2012 18:02:28 -0700 Subject: x86, smep, smap: Make the switching functions one-way There is no fundamental reason why we should switch SMEP and SMAP on during early cpu initialization just to switch them off again. Now with %eflags and %cr4 forced to be initialized to a clean state, we only need the one-way enable. Also, make the functions inline to make them (somewhat) harder to abuse. This does mean that SMEP and SMAP do not get initialized anywhere near as early. Even using early_param() instead of __setup() doesn't give us control early enough to do this during the early cpu initialization phase. This seems reasonable to me, because SMEP and SMAP should not matter until we have userspace to protect ourselves from, but it does potentially make it possible for a bug involving a "leak of permissions to userspace" to get uncaught. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 44aec5d4dfaf..fefd9b7e93e1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -259,48 +259,36 @@ static inline void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } #endif -static int disable_smep __cpuinitdata; static __init int setup_disable_smep(char *arg) { - disable_smep = 1; + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMEP); return 1; } __setup("nosmep", setup_disable_smep); -static __cpuinit void setup_smep(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +static __always_inline void setup_smep(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) { - if (unlikely(disable_smep)) { - setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMEP); - clear_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMEP); - } else - set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMEP); - } + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) + set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMEP); } -static int disable_smap __cpuinitdata; static __init int setup_disable_smap(char *arg) { - disable_smap = 1; + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMAP); return 1; } __setup("nosmap", setup_disable_smap); -static __cpuinit void setup_smap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +static __always_inline void setup_smap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMAP)) { - if (unlikely(disable_smap)) { - setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMAP); - clear_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMAP); - } else { - set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMAP); - /* - * Don't use clac() here since alternatives - * haven't run yet... - */ - asm volatile(__stringify(__ASM_CLAC) ::: "memory"); - } - } + unsigned long eflags; + + /* This should have been cleared long ago */ + raw_local_save_flags(eflags); + BUG_ON(eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC); + + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMAP)) + set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMAP); } /* @@ -737,9 +725,6 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->cpu_index = 0; filter_cpuid_features(c, false); - setup_smep(c); - setup_smap(c); - if (this_cpu->c_bsp_init) this_cpu->c_bsp_init(c); } @@ -824,8 +809,6 @@ static void __cpuinit generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->phys_proc_id = c->initial_apicid; } - setup_smep(c); - get_model_name(c); /* Default name */ detect_nopl(c); @@ -890,6 +873,10 @@ static void __cpuinit identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* Disable the PN if appropriate */ squash_the_stupid_serial_number(c); + /* Set up SMEP/SMAP */ + setup_smep(c); + setup_smap(c); + /* * The vendor-specific functions might have changed features. * Now we do "generic changes." -- cgit v1.2.3