From b7fe54f6c2d437082dcbecfbd832f38edd9caaf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Balbir Singh Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2021 23:10:56 +1100 Subject: Documentation: Add L1D flushing Documentation Add documentation of l1d flushing, explain the need for the feature and how it can be used. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108121056.21940-6-sblbir@amazon.com --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 17 ++++++ Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 8 +++ 4 files changed, 95 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst (limited to 'Documentation') diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst index f12cda55538b..8cbc711cda93 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst @@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. multihit.rst special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst core-scheduling.rst + l1d_flush.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..210020bc3f56 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +L1D Flushing +============ + +With an increasing number of vulnerabilities being reported around data +leaks from the Level 1 Data cache (L1D) the kernel provides an opt-in +mechanism to flush the L1D cache on context switch. + +This mechanism can be used to address e.g. CVE-2020-0550. For applications +the mechanism keeps them safe from vulnerabilities, related to leaks +(snooping of) from the L1D cache. + + +Related CVEs +------------ +The following CVEs can be addressed by this +mechanism + + ============= ======================== ================== + CVE-2020-0550 Improper Data Forwarding OS related aspects + ============= ======================== ================== + +Usage Guidelines +---------------- + +Please see document: :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst +` for details. + +**NOTE**: The feature is disabled by default, applications need to +specifically opt into the feature to enable it. + +Mitigation +---------- + +When PR_SET_L1D_FLUSH is enabled for a task a flush of the L1D cache is +performed when the task is scheduled out and the incoming task belongs to a +different process and therefore to a different address space. + +If the underlying CPU supports L1D flushing in hardware, the hardware +mechanism is used, software fallback for the mitigation, is not supported. + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- + +The kernel command line allows to control the L1D flush mitigations at boot +time with the option "l1d_flush=". The valid arguments for this option are: + + ============ ============================================================= + on Enables the prctl interface, applications trying to use + the prctl() will fail with an error if l1d_flush is not + enabled + ============ ============================================================= + +By default the mechanism is disabled. + +Limitations +----------- + +The mechanism does not mitigate L1D data leaks between tasks belonging to +different processes which are concurrently executing on sibling threads of +a physical CPU core when SMT is enabled on the system. + +This can be addressed by controlled placement of processes on physical CPU +cores or by disabling SMT. See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation +document: :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst `. + +**NOTE** : The opt-in of a task for L1D flushing works only when the task's +affinity is limited to cores running in non-SMT mode. If a task which +requested L1D flushing is scheduled on a SMT-enabled core the kernel sends +a SIGBUS to the task. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index bdb22006f713..b105db25f7a5 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2421,6 +2421,23 @@ feature (tagged TLBs) on capable Intel chips. Default is 1 (enabled) + l1d_flush= [X86,INTEL] + Control mitigation for L1D based snooping vulnerability. + + Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU + internal buffers which can forward information to a + disclosure gadget under certain conditions. + + In vulnerable processors, the speculatively + forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel + attack, to access data to which the attacker does + not have direct access. + + This parameter controls the mitigation. The + options are: + + on - enable the interface for the mitigation + l1tf= [X86] Control mitigation of the L1TF vulnerability on affected CPUs diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst index 7ddd8f667459..5e8ed9eef9aa 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst @@ -106,3 +106,11 @@ Speculation misfeature controls * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0); + +- PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH: Flush L1D Cache on context switch out of the task + (works only when tasks run on non SMT cores) + + Invocations: + * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH, 0, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); -- cgit v1.2.3