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31 hourssecurity/keys: fix missed RCU read section on lookupLinus Torvalds1-0/+1
commit 43a1e3744548e6fd85873e6fb43e293eb4010694 upstream. Nicholas Carlini reports that the keyring code calls assoc_array_find() in find_key_to_update() without holding the RCU read lock, while the assoc_array_gc() code really is designed around removing the node from the tree and then freeing it after an RCU grace-period. The regular key handling doesn't see this because holding the keyring semaphore hides any lifetime issues, but the persistent key handling uses a different model. Instead of extending the keyring locking, just do the simple RCU locking that the assoc_array was designed for. Reported-by: Nicholas Carlini <npc@anthropic.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
31 hourslsm: hold cred_guard_mutex for lsm_set_self_attr()Stephen Smalley1-1/+8
commit 4a9b16541ad3faf8bccb398532bf3f8b6bbf1188 upstream. Just as proc_pid_attr_write() already does before calling the LSM hook. This only matters for SELinux and AppArmor which check whether the process is being ptraced and if so, whether to allow the transition. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
11 daysima_fs: Correctly create securityfs files for unsupported hash algosDmitry Safonov1-4/+12
[ Upstream commit d7bd8cf0b348d3edae7bee33e74a32b21668b181 ] ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].crypto_id is initialized to HASH_ALGO__LAST if the TPM algorithm is not supported. However there are places relying on the algorithm to be valid because it is accessed by hash_algo_name[]. On 6.12.40 I observe the following read out-of-bounds in hash_algo_name: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff83e18138 by task swapper/0/1 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.40 #3 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x90 print_report+0xc4/0x580 ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x26/0x80 ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 ima_fs_init+0xa3/0x300 ima_init+0x7d/0xd0 init_ima+0x28/0x100 do_one_initcall+0xa6/0x3e0 kernel_init_freeable+0x455/0x740 kernel_init+0x24/0x1d0 ret_from_fork+0x38/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: hash_algo_name+0xb8/0x420 Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff83e18000: 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 ffffffff83e18080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffffffff83e18100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 05 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff83e18180: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 ffffffff83e18200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 ================================================================== Seems like the TPM chip supports sha3_256, which isn't yet in tpm_algorithms: tpm tpm0: TPM with unsupported bank algorithm 0x0027 That's TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 == 0x0027 from "Trusted Platform Module 2.0 Library Part 2: Structures", page 51 [1]. See also the related U-Boot algorithms update [2]. Thus solve the problem by creating a file name with "_tpm_alg_<ID>" postfix if the crypto algorithm isn't initialized. This is how it looks on the test machine (patch ported to v6.12 release): # ls -1 /sys/kernel/security/ima/ ascii_runtime_measurements ascii_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27 ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1 ascii_runtime_measurements_sha256 binary_runtime_measurements binary_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27 binary_runtime_measurements_sha1 binary_runtime_measurements_sha256 policy runtime_measurements_count violations [1]: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-2.0-Library-Part-2-Version-184_pub.pdf [2]: https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2024-July/558835.html Fixes: 9fa8e7625008 ("ima: add crypto agility support for template-hash algorithm") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Cc: Enrico Bravi <enrico.bravi@polito.it> Cc: Silvia Sisinni <silvia.sisinni@polito.it> Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Tested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Link: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/14 Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
11 daysima: check return value of crypto_shash_final() in boot aggregateDaniel Hodges1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 870819434c8dfcc3158033b66e7851b81bb17e21 ] The return value of crypto_shash_final() is not checked in ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(). If the hash finalization fails, the function returns success and a corrupted boot aggregate digest could be used for IMA measurements. Capture the return value and propagate any error to the caller. Fixes: 76bb28f6126f ("ima: use new crypto_shash API instead of old crypto_hash") Signed-off-by: Daniel Hodges <hodgesd@meta.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-05-14selinux: allow multiple opens of /sys/fs/selinux/policyStephen Smalley1-23/+4
commit a02cd6805562305f936e807da83e253b719dd965 upstream. Currently there can only be a single open of /sys/fs/selinux/policy at any time. This allows any process to block any other process from reading the kernel policy. The original motivation seems to have been a mix of preventing an inconsistent view of the policy size and preventing userspace from allocating kernel memory without bound, but this is arguably equally bad. Eliminate the policy_opened flag and shrink the critical section that the policy mutex is held. While we are making changes here, drop a couple of extraneous BUG_ONs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20100726193414.19538.64028.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com/ Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-05-14selinux: prune /sys/fs/selinux/userStephen Smalley3-190/+5
commit ad1ac3d740cc6b858a99ab9c45c8c0574be7d1d3 upstream. Remove the previously deprecated /sys/fs/selinux/user interface aside from a residual stub for userspace compatibility. Commit d7b6918e22c7 ("selinux: Deprecate /sys/fs/selinux/user") started the deprecation process for /sys/fs/selinux/user: The selinuxfs "user" node allows userspace to request a list of security contexts that can be reached for a given SELinux user from a given starting context. This was used by libselinux when various login-style programs requested contexts for users, but libselinux stopped using it in 2020. Kernel support will be removed no sooner than Dec 2025. A pr_warn() message has been in place since Linux v6.13, and a 5 second sleep was introduced since Linux v6.17 to help make it more noticeable. We are now past the stated deadline of Dec 2025, so remove the underlying functionality and replace it with a stub that returns a '0\0' buffer to avoid breaking userspace. This also avoids a local DoS from logspam and an uninterruptible sleep delay. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-05-14selinux: prune /sys/fs/selinux/disableStephen Smalley1-29/+7
commit 19cfa0099024bb9cd40f6d950caa7f47ff8e77f6 upstream. Commit f22f9aaf6c3d ("selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality") removed the underlying SELinux runtime disable functionality but left everything else intact and started logging an error message to warn any residual users. Prune it to just log an error message once and to return count (i.e. all bytes written successfully) to avoid breaking userspace. This also fixes a local DoS from logspam. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-05-14selinux: prune /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprotStephen Smalley1-40/+7
commit 644132a48f4e28a1d949d162160869286f3e75de upstream. commit a7e4676e8e2cb ("selinux: remove the 'checkreqprot' functionality") removed the ability to modify the checkreqprot setting but left everything except the updating of the checkreqprot value intact. Aside from unnecessary processing, this could produce a local DoS from log spam and incorrectly calls selinux_ima_measure_state() on each write even though no state has changed. Prune it to just log an error message once and return count (i.e. all bytes written successfully) so that userspace never breaks. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-05-14selinux: shrink critical section in sel_write_load()Stephen Smalley1-10/+8
commit 868f31e4061eca8c3cd607d79d954d5e54f204aa upstream. Currently sel_write_load() takes the policy mutex earlier than necessary. Move the taking of the mutex later. This avoids holding it unnecessarily across the vmalloc() and copy_from_user() of the policy data. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-05-14selinux: don't reserve xattr slot when we won't fill itDavid Windsor1-1/+2
commit 1e5a8eed7821e7a43a31b4c1b3675a91be6bc6f6 upstream. Move lsm_get_xattr_slot() below the SBLABEL_MNT check so we don't leave a NULL-named slot in the array when returning -EOPNOTSUPP; filesystem initxattrs() callbacks stop iterating at the first NULL ->name, silently dropping xattrs installed by later LSMs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-05-14selinux: use sk blob accessor in socket permission helpersZongyao Chen1-2/+2
commit 032e70aff025d7c519af9ab791cd084380619263 upstream. SELinux socket state lives in the composite LSM socket blob. sock_has_perm() and nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms() currently dereference sk->sk_security directly, which assumes the SELinux socket blob is at offset zero. In stacked configurations that assumption does not hold. If another LSM allocates socket blob storage before SELinux, these helpers may read the wrong blob and feed invalid SID and class values into AVC checks. Use selinux_sock() instead of accessing sk->sk_security directly. Fixes: d1d991efaf34 ("selinux: Add netlink xperm support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.13+ Signed-off-by: Zongyao Chen <ZongYao.Chen@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-05-14selinux: fix avdcache auditingStephen Smalley2-21/+14
commit f92d542577db878acfd21cc18dab23d03023b217 upstream. The per-task avdcache was incorrectly saving and reusing the audited vector computed by avc_audit_required() rather than recomputing based on the currently requested permissions and distinguishing the denied versus allowed cases. As a result, some permission checks were not being audited, e.g. directory write checks after a previously cached directory search check. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: dde3a5d0f4dce ("selinux: move avdcache to per-task security struct") Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> [PM: line wrap tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-05-07apparmor: use target task's context in apparmor_getprocattr()Cengiz Can1-9/+7
commit 4afc61702bdcc3b9b519749ef966cf762a6e7051 upstream. apparmor_getprocattr() incorrectly calls task_ctx(current) instead of task_ctx(task) when retrieving prev and exec attributes, returning the caller's labels rather than the target's. Fix by passing task to task_ctx(). The issue can be reproduced when a process with an onexec transition (e.g., configured by a container runtime) is inspected via /proc/<pid>/attr/apparmor/exec. The reader's own value is returned instead of the target's. Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Fixes: 3b529a7600d8 ("apparmor: move task domain change info to task security") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Co-developed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-05-07selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checksPaul Moore2-64/+189
commit 82544d36b1729153c8aeb179e84750f0c085d3b1 upstream. The existing SELinux security model for overlayfs is to allow access if the current task is able to access the top level file (the "user" file) and the mounter's credentials are sufficient to access the lower level file (the "backing" file). Unfortunately, the current code does not properly enforce these access controls for both mmap() and mprotect() operations on overlayfs filesystems. This patch makes use of the newly created security_mmap_backing_file() LSM hook to provide the missing backing file enforcement for mmap() operations, and leverages the backing file API and new LSM blob to provide the necessary information to properly enforce the mprotect() access controls. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-05-07lsm: add backing_file LSM hooksPaul Moore3-0/+112
commit 6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987 upstream. Stacked filesystems such as overlayfs do not currently provide the necessary mechanisms for LSMs to properly enforce access controls on the mmap() and mprotect() operations. In order to resolve this gap, a LSM security blob is being added to the backing_file struct and the following new LSM hooks are being created: security_backing_file_alloc() security_backing_file_free() security_mmap_backing_file() The first two hooks are to manage the lifecycle of the LSM security blob in the backing_file struct, while the third provides a new mmap() access control point for the underlying backing file. It is also expected that LSMs will likely want to update their security_file_mprotect() callback to address issues with their mprotect() controls, but that does not require a change to the security_file_mprotect() LSM hook. There are a three other small changes to support these new LSM hooks: * Pass the user file associated with a backing file down to alloc_empty_backing_file() so it can be included in the security_backing_file_alloc() hook. * Add getter and setter functions for the backing_file struct LSM blob as the backing_file struct remains private to fs/file_table.c. * Constify the file struct field in the LSM common_audit_data struct to better support LSMs that need to pass a const file struct pointer into the common LSM audit code. Thanks to Arnd Bergmann for identifying the missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() and supplying a fixup. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-05-07apparmor: Fix string overrun due to missing terminationDaniel J Blueman1-3/+5
commit 828bf7929bedcb79b560b5b4e44f22abee07d31b upstream. When booting Ubuntu 26.04 with Linux 7.0-rc4 on an ARM64 Qualcomm Snapdragon X1 we see a string buffer overrun: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_match (security/apparmor/match.c:535) Read of size 1 at addr ffff0008901cc000 by task snap-update-ns/2120 CPU: 5 UID: 60578 PID: 2120 Comm: snap-update-ns Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4+ #22 PREEMPTLAZY Hardware name: LENOVO 83ED/LNVNB161216, BIOS NHCN60WW 09/11/2025 Call trace: show_stack (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:501) (C) dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:597) __asan_report_load1_noabort (mm/kasan/report_generic.c:378) aa_dfa_match (security/apparmor/match.c:535) match_mnt_path_str (security/apparmor/mount.c:244 security/apparmor/mount.c:336) match_mnt (security/apparmor/mount.c:371) aa_bind_mount (security/apparmor/mount.c:447 (discriminator 4)) apparmor_sb_mount (security/apparmor/lsm.c:719 (discriminator 1)) security_sb_mount (security/security.c:1062 (discriminator 31)) path_mount (fs/namespace.c:4101) __arm64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:4172 fs/namespace.c:4361 fs/namespace.c:4338 fs/namespace.c:4338) invoke_syscall.constprop.0 (arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49) el0_svc_common.constprop.0 (./include/linux/thread_info.h:142 (discriminator 2) arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:140 (discriminator 2)) do_el0_svc (arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:152) el0_svc (arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:80 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:725) el0t_64_sync_handler (arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:744) el0t_64_sync (arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:596) Allocated by task 2120: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58) kasan_save_track (./arch/arm64/include/asm/current.h:19 mm/kasan/common.c:70 mm/kasan/common.c:79) kasan_save_alloc_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:571) __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:419) __kmalloc_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:263 mm/slub.c:5260 mm/slub.c:5272) aa_get_buffer (security/apparmor/lsm.c:2201) aa_bind_mount (security/apparmor/mount.c:442) apparmor_sb_mount (security/apparmor/lsm.c:719 (discriminator 1)) security_sb_mount (security/security.c:1062 (discriminator 31)) path_mount (fs/namespace.c:4101) __arm64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:4172 fs/namespace.c:4361 fs/namespace.c:4338 fs/namespace.c:4338) invoke_syscall.constprop.0 (arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49) el0_svc_common.constprop.0 (./include/linux/thread_info.h:142 (discriminator 2) arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:140 (discriminator 2)) do_el0_svc (arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:152) el0_svc (arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:80 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:725) el0t_64_sync_handler (arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:744) el0t_64_sync (arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:596) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0008901ca000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-06-8k of size 8192 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8192-byte region [ffff0008901ca000, ffff0008901cc000) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9101c8 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:-1 pincount:0 flags: 0x8000000000000040(head|zone=2) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 8000000000000040 ffff000800016c40 fffffdffe2d14e10 ffff000800015c70 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000800010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 8000000000000040 ffff000800016c40 fffffdffe2d14e10 ffff000800015c70 head: 0000000000000000 0000000800010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 8000000000000003 fffffdffe2407201 fffffdffffffffff 00000000ffffffff head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff0008901cbf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff0008901cbf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff0008901cc000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff0008901cc080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff0008901cc100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc This was introduced by previous incorrect conversion from strcpy(). Fix it by adding the missing terminator. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel J Blueman <daniel@quora.org> Fixes: 93d4dbdc8da0 ("apparmor: Replace deprecated strcpy in d_namespace_path") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-05-07landlock: Allow TSYNC with LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF and fd=-1Mickaël Salaün1-5/+9
commit e75e38055b9df5eafd663c6db00e634f534dc426 upstream. LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC does not allow LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF with ruleset_fd=-1, preventing a multithreaded process from atomically propagating subdomain log muting to all threads without creating a domain layer. Relax the fd=-1 condition to accept TSYNC alongside LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF, and update the documentation accordingly. Add flag validation tests for all TSYNC combinations with ruleset_fd=-1, and audit tests verifying both transition directions: muting via TSYNC (logged to not logged) and override via TSYNC (not logged to logged). Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 42fc7e6543f6 ("landlock: Multithreading support for landlock_restrict_self()") Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260407164107.2012589-2-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-05-07landlock: Fix LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF inheritance across fork()Mickaël Salaün1-4/+2
commit 874c8f83826c95c62c21d9edfe9ef43e5c346724 upstream. hook_cred_transfer() only copies the Landlock security blob when the source credential has a domain. This is inconsistent with landlock_restrict_self() which can set LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF on a credential without creating a domain (via the ruleset_fd=-1 path): the field is committed but not preserved across fork() because the child's prepare_creds() calls hook_cred_transfer() which skips the copy when domain is NULL. This breaks the documented use case where a process mutes subdomain logs before forking sandboxed children: the children lose the muting and their domains produce unexpected audit records. Fix this by unconditionally copying the Landlock credential blob. Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ead9079f7569 ("landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF") Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260407164107.2012589-1-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-26Merge tag 'landlock-7.0-rc6' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-26/+78
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux Pull Landlock fixes from Mickaël Salaün: "This mainly fixes Landlock TSYNC issues related to interrupts and unexpected task exit. Other fixes touch documentation and sample, and a new test extends coverage" * tag 'landlock-7.0-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: landlock: Expand restrict flags example for ABI version 8 selftests/landlock: Test tsync interruption and cancellation paths landlock: Clean up interrupted thread logic in TSYNC landlock: Serialize TSYNC thread restriction samples/landlock: Bump ABI version to 8 landlock: Improve TSYNC types landlock: Fully release unused TSYNC work entries landlock: Fix formatting
2026-03-20xen/privcmd: add boot control for restricted usage in domUJuergen Gross1-0/+1
When running in an unprivileged domU under Xen, the privcmd driver is restricted to allow only hypercalls against a target domain, for which the current domU is acting as a device model. Add a boot parameter "unrestricted" to allow all hypercalls (the hypervisor will still refuse destructive hypercalls affecting other guests). Make this new parameter effective only in case the domU wasn't started using secure boot, as otherwise hypercalls targeting the domU itself might result in violating the secure boot functionality. This is achieved by adding another lockdown reason, which can be tested to not being set when applying the "unrestricted" option. This is part of XSA-482 Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> --- V2: - new patch
2026-03-10landlock: Clean up interrupted thread logic in TSYNCYihan Ding1-7/+13
In landlock_restrict_sibling_threads(), when the calling thread is interrupted while waiting for sibling threads to prepare, it executes a recovery path. Previously, this path included a wait_for_completion() call on all_prepared to prevent a Use-After-Free of the local shared_ctx. However, this wait is redundant. Exiting the main do-while loop already leads to a bottom cleanup section that unconditionally waits for all_finished. Therefore, replacing the wait with a simple break is safe, prevents UAF, and correctly unblocks the remaining task_works. Clean up the error path by breaking the loop and updating the surrounding comments to accurately reflect the state machine. Suggested-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yihan Ding <dingyihan@uniontech.com> Tested-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260306021651.744723-3-dingyihan@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2026-03-10landlock: Serialize TSYNC thread restrictionYihan Ding1-1/+11
syzbot found a deadlock in landlock_restrict_sibling_threads(). When multiple threads concurrently call landlock_restrict_self() with sibling thread restriction enabled, they can deadlock by mutually queueing task_works on each other and then blocking in kernel space (waiting for the other to finish). Fix this by serializing the TSYNC operations within the same process using the exec_update_lock. This prevents concurrent invocations from deadlocking. We use down_write_trylock() and restart the syscall if the lock cannot be acquired immediately. This ensures that if a thread fails to get the lock, it will return to userspace, allowing it to process any pending TSYNC task_works from the lock holder, and then transparently restart the syscall. Fixes: 42fc7e6543f6 ("landlock: Multithreading support for landlock_restrict_self()") Reported-by: syzbot+7ea2f5e9dfd468201817@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7ea2f5e9dfd468201817 Suggested-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org> Tested-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yihan Ding <dingyihan@uniontech.com> Tested-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260306021651.744723-2-dingyihan@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2026-03-10apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing itJohn Johansen7-101/+153
AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode can aand does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and accessing it through the fs. While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private. Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct place which is during inode eviction. Fixes: c961ee5f21b20 ("apparmor: convert from securityfs to apparmorfs for policy ns files") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-03-10apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereferenceJohn Johansen4-57/+93
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation: because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile, for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and freed memory is accessed. The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile destruction race, resulting in the use after free. Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata are put. Fixes: 5d5182cae401 ("apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-03-10apparmor: fix differential encoding verificationJohn Johansen2-4/+20
Differential encoding allows loops to be created if it is abused. To prevent this the unpack should verify that a diff-encode chain terminates. Unfortunately the differential encode verification had two bugs. 1. it conflated states that had gone through check and already been marked, with states that were currently being checked and marked. This means that loops in the current chain being verified are treated as a chain that has already been verified. 2. the order bailout on already checked states compared current chain check iterators j,k instead of using the outer loop iterator i. Meaning a step backwards in states in the current chain verification was being mistaken for moving to an already verified state. Move to a double mark scheme where already verified states get a different mark, than the current chain being kept. This enables us to also drop the backwards verification check that was the cause of the second error as any already verified state is already marked. Fixes: 031dcc8f4e84 ("apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-03-10apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy managementJohn Johansen3-9/+43
An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the privileged process to write to the interface. This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for a local privilege escalation. The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able to load policy to different policy namespaces. Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check. Fixes: b7fd2c0340eac ("apparmor: add per policy ns .load, .replace, .remove interface files") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-03-10apparmor: Fix double free of ns_name in aa_replace_profiles()John Johansen1-0/+1
if ns_name is NULL after 1071 error = aa_unpack(udata, &lh, &ns_name); and if ent->ns_name contains an ns_name in 1089 } else if (ent->ns_name) { then ns_name is assigned the ent->ns_name 1095 ns_name = ent->ns_name; however ent->ns_name is freed at 1262 aa_load_ent_free(ent); and then again when freeing ns_name at 1270 kfree(ns_name); Fix this by NULLing out ent->ns_name after it is transferred to ns_name Fixes: 145a0ef21c8e9 ("apparmor: fix blob compression when ns is forced on a policy load ") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-03-10apparmor: fix missing bounds check on DEFAULT table in verify_dfa()Massimiliano Pellizzer1-2/+3
The verify_dfa() function only checks DEFAULT_TABLE bounds when the state is not differentially encoded. When the verification loop traverses the differential encoding chain, it reads k = DEFAULT_TABLE[j] and uses k as an array index without validation. A malformed DFA with DEFAULT_TABLE[j] >= state_count, therefore, causes both out-of-bounds reads and writes. [ 57.179855] ================================================================== [ 57.180549] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.180904] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888100eadec4 by task su/993 [ 57.181554] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 993 Comm: su Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 57.181558] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 57.181563] Call Trace: [ 57.181572] <TASK> [ 57.181577] dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80 [ 57.181596] print_report+0xc8/0x270 [ 57.181605] ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181608] kasan_report+0x118/0x150 [ 57.181620] ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181623] verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181627] aa_dfa_unpack+0x1610/0x1740 [ 57.181629] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1d0/0x470 [ 57.181640] unpack_pdb+0x86d/0x46b0 [ 57.181647] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181653] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181656] ? aa_unpack_nameX+0x1a8/0x300 [ 57.181659] aa_unpack+0x20b0/0x4c30 [ 57.181662] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181664] ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x33/0x700 [ 57.181681] ? kasan_save_track+0x4f/0x80 [ 57.181683] ? kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 [ 57.181686] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 [ 57.181688] ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780 [ 57.181693] ? aa_simple_write_to_buffer+0x54/0x130 [ 57.181697] ? policy_update+0x154/0x330 [ 57.181704] aa_replace_profiles+0x15a/0x1dd0 [ 57.181707] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181710] ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780 [ 57.181712] ? aa_loaddata_alloc+0x77/0x140 [ 57.181715] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181717] ? _copy_from_user+0x2a/0x70 [ 57.181730] policy_update+0x17a/0x330 [ 57.181733] profile_replace+0x153/0x1a0 [ 57.181735] ? rw_verify_area+0x93/0x2d0 [ 57.181740] vfs_write+0x235/0xab0 [ 57.181745] ksys_write+0xb0/0x170 [ 57.181748] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660 [ 57.181762] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 57.181765] RIP: 0033:0x7f6192792eb2 Remove the MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE condition to validate all DEFAULT_TABLE entries unconditionally. Fixes: 031dcc8f4e84 ("apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-03-10apparmor: fix side-effect bug in match_char() macro usageMassimiliano Pellizzer1-10/+20
The match_char() macro evaluates its character parameter multiple times when traversing differential encoding chains. When invoked with *str++, the string pointer advances on each iteration of the inner do-while loop, causing the DFA to check different characters at each iteration and therefore skip input characters. This results in out-of-bounds reads when the pointer advances past the input buffer boundary. [ 94.984676] ================================================================== [ 94.985301] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.985655] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888100342000 by task file/976 [ 94.986319] CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 976 Comm: file Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 94.986322] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 94.986329] Call Trace: [ 94.986341] <TASK> [ 94.986347] dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80 [ 94.986374] print_report+0xc8/0x270 [ 94.986384] ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986388] kasan_report+0x118/0x150 [ 94.986401] ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986405] aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986408] __aa_path_perm+0x131/0x400 [ 94.986418] aa_path_perm+0x219/0x2f0 [ 94.986424] apparmor_file_open+0x345/0x570 [ 94.986431] security_file_open+0x5c/0x140 [ 94.986442] do_dentry_open+0x2f6/0x1120 [ 94.986450] vfs_open+0x38/0x2b0 [ 94.986453] ? may_open+0x1e2/0x2b0 [ 94.986466] path_openat+0x231b/0x2b30 [ 94.986469] ? __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130 [ 94.986477] do_file_open+0x19d/0x360 [ 94.986487] do_sys_openat2+0x98/0x100 [ 94.986491] __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130 [ 94.986499] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660 [ 94.986515] ? count_memcg_events+0x15f/0x3c0 [ 94.986526] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986540] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1639/0x1ef0 [ 94.986551] ? vma_start_read+0xf0/0x320 [ 94.986558] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986561] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986563] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0xe0 [ 94.986572] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986574] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x9/0xb0 [ 94.986587] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986588] ? irqentry_exit+0x3c/0x590 [ 94.986595] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 94.986597] RIP: 0033:0x7fda4a79c3ea Fix by extracting the character value before invoking match_char, ensuring single evaluation per outer loop. Fixes: 074c1cd798cb ("apparmor: dfa move character match into a macro") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-03-10apparmor: fix: limit the number of levels of policy namespacesJohn Johansen2-0/+4
Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource. Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e8 ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-03-10apparmor: replace recursive profile removal with iterative approachMassimiliano Pellizzer1-3/+27
The profile removal code uses recursion when removing nested profiles, which can lead to kernel stack exhaustion and system crashes. Reproducer: $ pf='a'; for ((i=0; i<1024; i++)); do echo -e "profile $pf { \n }" | apparmor_parser -K -a; pf="$pf//x"; done $ echo -n a > /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.remove Replace the recursive __aa_profile_list_release() approach with an iterative approach in __remove_profile(). The function repeatedly finds and removes leaf profiles until the entire subtree is removed, maintaining the same removal semantic without recursion. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-03-10apparmor: fix memory leak in verify_headerMassimiliano Pellizzer1-1/+0
The function sets `*ns = NULL` on every call, leaking the namespace string allocated in previous iterations when multiple profiles are unpacked. This also breaks namespace consistency checking since *ns is always NULL when the comparison is made. Remove the incorrect assignment. The caller (aa_unpack) initializes *ns to NULL once before the loop, which is sufficient. Fixes: dd51c8485763 ("apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-03-10apparmor: validate DFA start states are in bounds in unpack_pdbMassimiliano Pellizzer1-1/+11
Start states are read from untrusted data and used as indexes into the DFA state tables. The aa_dfa_next() function call in unpack_pdb() will access dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE][start], and if the start state exceeds the number of states in the DFA, this results in an out-of-bound read. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_next+0x2a1/0x360 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811956fb90 by task su/1097 ... Reject policies with out-of-bounds start states during unpacking to prevent the issue. Fixes: ad5ff3db53c6 ("AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-03-04landlock: Improve TSYNC typesMickaël Salaün1-5/+8
Constify pointers when it makes sense. Consistently use size_t for loops, especially to match works->size type. Add new lines to improve readability. Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260217122341.2359582-2-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2026-03-04landlock: Fully release unused TSYNC work entriesMickaël Salaün1-6/+41
If task_work_add() failed, ctx->task is put but the tsync_works struct is not reset to its previous state. The first consequence is that the kernel allocates memory for dying threads, which could lead to user-accounted memory exhaustion (not very useful nor specific to this case). The second consequence is that task_work_cancel(), called by cancel_tsync_works(), can dereference a NULL task pointer. Fix this issues by keeping a consistent works->size wrt the added task work. This is done in a new tsync_works_trim() helper which also cleans up the shared_ctx and work fields. As a safeguard, add a pointer check to cancel_tsync_works() and update tsync_works_release() accordingly. Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260217122341.2359582-1-mic@digikod.net [mic: Replace memset() with compound literal] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2026-03-04landlock: Fix formattingMickaël Salaün2-7/+5
Auto-format with clang-format -i security/landlock/*.[ch] Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Fixes: 69050f8d6d07 ("treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types") Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260303173632.88040-1-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2026-02-22Convert remaining multi-line kmalloc_obj/flex GFP_KERNEL usesKees Cook3-9/+8
Conversion performed via this Coccinelle script: // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only // Options: --include-headers-for-types --all-includes --include-headers --keep-comments virtual patch @gfp depends on patch && !(file in "tools") && !(file in "samples")@ identifier ALLOC = {kmalloc_obj,kmalloc_objs,kmalloc_flex, kzalloc_obj,kzalloc_objs,kzalloc_flex, kvmalloc_obj,kvmalloc_objs,kvmalloc_flex, kvzalloc_obj,kvzalloc_objs,kvzalloc_flex}; @@ ALLOC(... - , GFP_KERNEL ) $ make coccicheck MODE=patch COCCI=gfp.cocci Build and boot tested x86_64 with Fedora 42's GCC and Clang: Linux version 6.19.0+ (user@host) (gcc (GCC) 15.2.1 20260123 (Red Hat 15.2.1-7), GNU ld version 2.44-12.fc42) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC 1970-01-01 Linux version 6.19.0+ (user@host) (clang version 20.1.8 (Fedora 20.1.8-4.fc42), LLD 20.1.8) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC 1970-01-01 Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2026-02-22Convert more 'alloc_obj' cases to default GFP_KERNEL argumentsLinus Torvalds4-8/+4
This converts some of the visually simpler cases that have been split over multiple lines. I only did the ones that are easy to verify the resulting diff by having just that final GFP_KERNEL argument on the next line. Somebody should probably do a proper coccinelle script for this, but for me the trivial script actually resulted in an assertion failure in the middle of the script. I probably had made it a bit _too_ trivial. So after fighting that far a while I decided to just do some of the syntactically simpler cases with variations of the previous 'sed' scripts. The more syntactically complex multi-line cases would mostly really want whitespace cleanup anyway. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2026-02-22Convert 'alloc_flex' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argumentLinus Torvalds4-4/+4
This is the exact same thing as the 'alloc_obj()' version, only much smaller because there are a lot fewer users of the *alloc_flex() interface. As with alloc_obj() version, this was done entirely with mindless brute force, using the same script, except using 'flex' in the pattern rather than 'objs*'. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2026-02-22Convert 'alloc_obj' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argumentLinus Torvalds36-87/+87
This was done entirely with mindless brute force, using git grep -l '\<k[vmz]*alloc_objs*(.*, GFP_KERNEL)' | xargs sed -i 's/\(alloc_objs*(.*\), GFP_KERNEL)/\1)/' to convert the new alloc_obj() users that had a simple GFP_KERNEL argument to just drop that argument. Note that due to the extreme simplicity of the scripting, any slightly more complex cases spread over multiple lines would not be triggered: they definitely exist, but this covers the vast bulk of the cases, and the resulting diff is also then easier to check automatically. For the same reason the 'flex' versions will be done as a separate conversion. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2026-02-21treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar typesKees Cook59-168/+166
This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union object instances: Single allocations: kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...) are replaced with: kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...) Array allocations: kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...) are replaced with: kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...) Flex array allocations: kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...) are replaced with: kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...) (where TYPE may also be *VAR) The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning "TYPE *". Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
2026-02-21Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2026-02-18' of ↵Linus Torvalds21-240/+687
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor Pull AppArmor updates from John Johansen: "Features: - add .kunitconfig - audit execpath in userns mediation - add support loading per permission tagging Cleanups: - remove unused percpu critical sections in buffer management - document the buffer hold, add an overflow guard - split xxx_in_ns into its two separate semantic use cases - remove apply_modes_to_perms from label_match - refactor/cleanup cred helper fns. - guard against free attachment/data routines being called with NULL - drop in_atomic flag in common_mmap, common_file_perm, and cleanup - make str table more generic and be able to have multiple entries - Replace deprecated strcpy with memcpy in gen_symlink_name - Replace deprecated strcpy in d_namespace_path - Replace sprintf/strcpy with scnprintf/strscpy in aa_policy_init - replace sprintf with snprintf in aa_new_learning_profile Bug Fixes: - fix cast in format string DEBUG statement - fix make aa_labelmatch return consistent - fix fmt string type error in process_strs_entry - fix kernel-doc comments for inview - fix invalid deref of rawdata when export_binary is unset - avoid per-cpu hold underflow in aa_get_buffer - fix fast path cache check for unix sockets - fix rlimit for posix cpu timers - fix label and profile debug macros - move check for aa_null file to cover all cases - return -ENOMEM in unpack_perms_table upon alloc failure - fix boolean argument in apparmor_mmap_file - Fix & Optimize table creation from possibly unaligned memory - Allow apparmor to handle unaligned dfa tables - fix NULL deref in aa_sock_file_perm - fix NULL pointer dereference in __unix_needs_revalidation - fix signedness bug in unpack_tags()" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2026-02-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (34 commits) apparmor: fix signedness bug in unpack_tags() apparmor: fix cast in format string DEBUG statement apparmor: fix aa_label to return state from compount and component match apparmor: fix fmt string type error in process_strs_entry apparmor: fix kernel-doc comments for inview apparmor: fix invalid deref of rawdata when export_binary is unset apparmor: add .kunitconfig apparmor: cleanup remove unused percpu critical sections in buffer management apparmor: document the buffer hold, add an overflow guard apparmor: avoid per-cpu hold underflow in aa_get_buffer apparmor: split xxx_in_ns into its two separate semantic use cases apparmor: make label_match return a consistent value apparmor: remove apply_modes_to_perms from label_match apparmor: fix fast path cache check for unix sockets apparmor: fix rlimit for posix cpu timers apparmor: refactor/cleanup cred helper fns. apparmor: fix label and profile debug macros apparmor: move check for aa_null file to cover all cases apparmor: guard against free routines being called with a NULL apparmor: return -ENOMEM in unpack_perms_table upon alloc failure ...
2026-02-19Merge tag 'mm-stable-2026-02-18-19-48' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull more MM updates from Andrew Morton: - "mm/vmscan: fix demotion targets checks in reclaim/demotion" fixes a couple of issues in the demotion code - pages were failed demotion and were finding themselves demoted into disallowed nodes (Bing Jiao) - "Remove XA_ZERO from error recovery of dup_mmap()" fixes a rare mapledtree race and performs a number of cleanups (Liam Howlett) - "mm: add bitmap VMA flag helpers and convert all mmap_prepare to use them" implements a lot of cleanups following on from the conversion of the VMA flags into a bitmap (Lorenzo Stoakes) - "support batch checking of references and unmapping for large folios" implements batching to greatly improve the performance of reclaiming clean file-backed large folios (Baolin Wang) - "selftests/mm: add memory failure selftests" does as claimed (Miaohe Lin) * tag 'mm-stable-2026-02-18-19-48' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (36 commits) mm/page_alloc: clear page->private in free_pages_prepare() selftests/mm: add memory failure dirty pagecache test selftests/mm: add memory failure clean pagecache test selftests/mm: add memory failure anonymous page test mm: rmap: support batched unmapping for file large folios arm64: mm: implement the architecture-specific clear_flush_young_ptes() arm64: mm: support batch clearing of the young flag for large folios arm64: mm: factor out the address and ptep alignment into a new helper mm: rmap: support batched checks of the references for large folios tools/testing/vma: add VMA userland tests for VMA flag functions tools/testing/vma: separate out vma_internal.h into logical headers tools/testing/vma: separate VMA userland tests into separate files mm: make vm_area_desc utilise vma_flags_t only mm: update all remaining mmap_prepare users to use vma_flags_t mm: update shmem_[kernel]_file_*() functions to use vma_flags_t mm: update secretmem to use VMA flags on mmap_prepare mm: update hugetlbfs to use VMA flags on mmap_prepare mm: add basic VMA flag operation helper functions tools: bitmap: add missing bitmap_[subset(), andnot()] mm: add mk_vma_flags() bitmap flag macro helper ...
2026-02-18apparmor: fix signedness bug in unpack_tags()Massimiliano Pellizzer1-1/+1
Smatch static checker warning: security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:966 unpack_pdb() warn: unsigned 'unpack_tags(e, &pdb->tags, info)' is never less than zero. unpack_tags() is declared with return type size_t (unsigned) but returns negative errno values on failure. The caller in unpack_pdb() tests the return with `< 0`, which is always false for an unsigned type, making error handling dead code. Malformed tag data would be silently accepted instead of causing a load failure. Change return type of unpack_tags() from size_t to int to match the functions's actual semantic. Fixes: 3d28e2397af7 ("apparmor: add support loading per permission tagging") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <mpellizzer.dev@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-02-18Merge tag 'sysctl-7.00-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-21/+16
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sysctl/sysctl Pull sysctl updates from Joel Granados: - Remove macros from proc handler converters Replace the proc converter macros with "regular" functions. Though it is more verbose than the macro version, it helps when debugging and better aligns with coding-style.rst. - General cleanup Remove superfluous ctl_table forward declarations. Const qualify the memory_allocation_profiling_sysctl and loadpin_sysctl_table arrays. Add missing kernel doc to proc_dointvec_conv. - Testing This series was run through sysctl selftests/kunit test suite in x86_64. And went into linux-next after rc4, giving it a good 3 weeks of testing * tag 'sysctl-7.00-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sysctl/sysctl: sysctl: replace SYSCTL_INT_CONV_CUSTOM macro with functions sysctl: Replace unidirectional INT converter macros with functions sysctl: Add kernel doc to proc_douintvec_conv sysctl: Replace UINT converter macros with functions sysctl: Add CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL guards for converter macros sysctl: clarify proc_douintvec_minmax doc sysctl: Return -ENOSYS from proc_douintvec_conv when CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL=n sysctl: Remove unused ctl_table forward declarations loadpin: Implement custom proc_handler for enforce alloc_tag: move memory_allocation_profiling_sysctls into .rodata sysctl: Add missing kernel-doc for proc_dointvec_conv
2026-02-14Merge tag 'caps-pr-20260213' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-0/+309
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux Pull capabilities updates from Serge Hallyn: - add KUnit tests for some core capabilities helpers - avoid emitting IPC audit messages when there's not actually a permission being denied * tag 'caps-pr-20260213' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux: ipc: don't audit capability check in ipc_permissions() security: Add KUnit tests for kuid_root_in_ns and vfsuid_root_in_currentns
2026-02-13mm: update shmem_[kernel]_file_*() functions to use vma_flags_tLorenzo Stoakes1-1/+1
In order to be able to use only vma_flags_t in vm_area_desc we must adjust shmem file setup functions to operate in terms of vma_flags_t rather than vm_flags_t. This patch makes this change and updates all callers to use the new functions. No functional changes intended. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: comment fixes, per Baolin] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/736febd280eb484d79cef5cf55b8a6f79ad832d2.1769097829.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org> Cc: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Cc: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Cc: Yury Norov <ynorov@nvidia.com> Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Cc: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2026-02-12Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2026-02-12-10-48' of ↵Linus Torvalds9-0/+43
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton: - "ocfs2: give ocfs2 the ability to reclaim suballocator free bg" saves disk space by teaching ocfs2 to reclaim suballocator block group space (Heming Zhao) - "Add ARRAY_END(), and use it to fix off-by-one bugs" adds the ARRAY_END() macro and uses it in various places (Alejandro Colomar) - "vmcoreinfo: support VMCOREINFO_BYTES larger than PAGE_SIZE" makes the vmcore code future-safe, if VMCOREINFO_BYTES ever exceeds the page size (Pnina Feder) - "kallsyms: Prevent invalid access when showing module buildid" cleans up kallsyms code related to module buildid and fixes an invalid access crash when printing backtraces (Petr Mladek) - "Address page fault in ima_restore_measurement_list()" fixes a kexec-related crash that can occur when booting the second-stage kernel on x86 (Harshit Mogalapalli) - "kho: ABI headers and Documentation updates" updates the kexec handover ABI documentation (Mike Rapoport) - "Align atomic storage" adds the __aligned attribute to atomic_t and atomic64_t definitions to get natural alignment of both types on csky, m68k, microblaze, nios2, openrisc and sh (Finn Thain) - "kho: clean up page initialization logic" simplifies the page initialization logic in kho_restore_page() (Pratyush Yadav) - "Unload linux/kernel.h" moves several things out of kernel.h and into more appropriate places (Yury Norov) - "don't abuse task_struct.group_leader" removes the usage of ->group_leader when it is "obviously unnecessary" (Oleg Nesterov) - "list private v2 & luo flb" adds some infrastructure improvements to the live update orchestrator (Pasha Tatashin) * tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2026-02-12-10-48' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (107 commits) watchdog/hardlockup: simplify perf event probe and remove per-cpu dependency procfs: fix missing RCU protection when reading real_parent in do_task_stat() watchdog/softlockup: fix sample ring index wrap in need_counting_irqs() kcsan, compiler_types: avoid duplicate type issues in BPF Type Format kho: fix doc for kho_restore_pages() tests/liveupdate: add in-kernel liveupdate test liveupdate: luo_flb: introduce File-Lifecycle-Bound global state liveupdate: luo_file: Use private list list: add kunit test for private list primitives list: add primitives for private list manipulations delayacct: fix uapi timespec64 definition panic: add panic_force_cpu= parameter to redirect panic to a specific CPU netclassid: use thread_group_leader(p) in update_classid_task() RDMA/umem: don't abuse current->group_leader drm/pan*: don't abuse current->group_leader drm/amd: kill the outdated "Only the pthreads threading model is supported" checks drm/amdgpu: don't abuse current->group_leader android/binder: use same_thread_group(proc->tsk, current) in binder_mmap() android/binder: don't abuse current->group_leader kho: skip memoryless NUMA nodes when reserving scratch areas ...
2026-02-12Merge tag 'landlock-7.0-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds18-377/+960
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün: - extend Landlock to enforce restrictions on a whole process, similarly to the seccomp's TSYNC flag - refactor data structures to simplify code and improve performance - add documentation to cover missing parts * tag 'landlock-7.0-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: mailmap: Add entry for Mickaël Salaün landlock: Transpose the layer masks data structure landlock: Add access_mask_subset() helper selftests/landlock: Add filesystem access benchmark landlock: Document audit blocker field format landlock: Add errata documentation section landlock: Add backwards compatibility for restrict flags landlock: Refactor TCP socket type check landlock: Minor reword of docs for TCP access rights landlock: Document LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC selftests/landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC tests landlock: Multithreading support for landlock_restrict_self()
2026-02-12Merge tag 'integrity-v7.0' of ↵Linus Torvalds4-28/+30
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: "Just two bug fixes: IMA's detecting scripts (bprm_creds_for_exec), and calculating the EVM HMAC" * tag 'integrity-v7.0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: evm: Use ordered xattrs list to calculate HMAC in evm_init_hmac() ima: Fix stack-out-of-bounds in is_bprm_creds_for_exec()
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2026-06-03 02:11:29 +0300