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2020-01-30Merge tag 'linux-kselftest-5.6-rc1-kunit' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-0/+627
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest Pull Kselftest kunit updates from Shuah Khan: "This kunit update consists of: - Support for building kunit as a module from Alan Maguire - AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack from Mike Salvatore" * tag 'linux-kselftest-5.6-rc1-kunit' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest: kunit: building kunit as a module breaks allmodconfig kunit: update documentation to describe module-based build kunit: allow kunit to be loaded as a module kunit: remove timeout dependence on sysctl_hung_task_timeout_seconds kunit: allow kunit tests to be loaded as a module kunit: hide unexported try-catch interface in try-catch-impl.h kunit: move string-stream.h to lib/kunit apparmor: add AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack
2020-01-29Merge branch 'work.openat2' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull openat2 support from Al Viro: "This is the openat2() series from Aleksa Sarai. I'm afraid that the rest of namei stuff will have to wait - it got zero review the last time I'd posted #work.namei, and there had been a leak in the posted series I'd caught only last weekend. I was going to repost it on Monday, but the window opened and the odds of getting any review during that... Oh, well. Anyway, openat2 part should be ready; that _did_ get sane amount of review and public testing, so here it comes" From Aleksa's description of the series: "For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags are present[1]. This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to being added to openat(2). Furthermore, the need for some sort of control over VFS's path resolution (to avoid malicious paths resulting in inadvertent breakouts) has been a very long-standing desire of many userspace applications. This patchset is a revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[3] patchset (which was a variant of David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[4] which was a spin-off of the Capsicum project[5]) with a few additions and changes made based on the previous discussion within [6] as well as others I felt were useful. In line with the conclusions of the original discussion of AT_NO_JUMPS, the flag has been split up into separate flags. However, instead of being an openat(2) flag it is provided through a new syscall openat2(2) which provides several other improvements to the openat(2) interface (see the patch description for more details). The following new LOOKUP_* flags are added: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: Blocks all mountpoint crossings (upwards, downwards, or through absolute links). Absolute pathnames alone in openat(2) do not trigger this. Magic-link traversal which implies a vfsmount jump is also blocked (though magic-link jumps on the same vfsmount are permitted). LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: Blocks resolution through /proc/$pid/fd-style links. This is done by blocking the usage of nd_jump_link() during resolution in a filesystem. The term "magic-links" is used to match with the only reference to these links in Documentation/, but I'm happy to change the name. It should be noted that this is different to the scope of ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW in that it applies to all path components. However, you can do openat2(NO_FOLLOW|NO_MAGICLINKS) on a magic-link and it will *not* fail (assuming that no parent component was a magic-link), and you will have an fd for the magic-link. In order to correctly detect magic-links, the introduction of a new LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED state flag was required. LOOKUP_BENEATH: Disallows escapes to outside the starting dirfd's tree, using techniques such as ".." or absolute links. Absolute paths in openat(2) are also disallowed. Conceptually this flag is to ensure you "stay below" a certain point in the filesystem tree -- but this requires some additional to protect against various races that would allow escape using "..". Currently LOOKUP_BENEATH implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, because it can trivially beam you around the filesystem (breaking the protection). In future, there might be similar safety checks done as in LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, but that requires more discussion. In addition, two new flags are added that expand on the above ideas: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: Does what it says on the tin. No symlink resolution is allowed at all, including magic-links. Just as with LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS this can still be used with NOFOLLOW to open an fd for the symlink as long as no parent path had a symlink component. LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: This is an extension of LOOKUP_BENEATH that, rather than blocking attempts to move past the root, forces all such movements to be scoped to the starting point. This provides chroot(2)-like protection but without the cost of a chroot(2) for each filesystem operation, as well as being safe against race attacks that chroot(2) is not. If a race is detected (as with LOOKUP_BENEATH) then an error is generated, and similar to LOOKUP_BENEATH it is not permitted to cross magic-links with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT. The primary need for this is from container runtimes, which currently need to do symlink scoping in userspace[7] when opening paths in a potentially malicious container. There is a long list of CVEs that could have bene mitigated by having RESOLVE_THIS_ROOT (such as CVE-2017-1002101, CVE-2017-1002102, CVE-2018-15664, and CVE-2019-5736, just to name a few). In order to make all of the above more usable, I'm working on libpathrs[8] which is a C-friendly library for safe path resolution. It features a userspace-emulated backend if the kernel doesn't support openat2(2). Hopefully we can get userspace to switch to using it, and thus get openat2(2) support for free once it's ready. Future work would include implementing things like RESOLVE_NO_AUTOMOUNT and possibly a RESOLVE_NO_REMOTE (to allow programs to be sure they don't hit DoSes though stale NFS handles)" * 'work.openat2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: Documentation: path-lookup: include new LOOKUP flags selftests: add openat2(2) selftests open: introduce openat2(2) syscall namei: LOOKUP_{IN_ROOT,BENEATH}: permit limited ".." resolution namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like scoped resolution namei: LOOKUP_BENEATH: O_BENEATH-like scoped resolution namei: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: block mountpoint crossing namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution namei: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: block symlink resolution namei: allow set_root() to produce errors namei: allow nd_jump_link() to produce errors nsfs: clean-up ns_get_path() signature to return int namei: only return -ECHILD from follow_dotdot_rcu()
2020-01-29Merge branch 'for-v5.6' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+0
git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem update from James Morris: "Just one minor fix this time" * 'for-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security: remove EARLY_LSM_COUNT which never used
2020-01-29Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds12-38/+506
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar: "Two new features - measuring certificates and querying IMA for a file hash - and three bug fixes: - Measuring certificates is like the rest of IMA, based on policy, but requires loading a custom policy. Certificates loaded onto a keyring, for example during early boot, before a custom policy has been loaded, are queued and only processed after loading the custom policy. - IMA calculates and caches files hashes. Other kernel subsystems, and possibly kernel modules, are interested in accessing these cached file hashes. The bug fixes prevent classifying a file short read (e.g. shutdown) as an invalid file signature, add a missing blank when displaying the securityfs policy rules containing LSM labels, and, lastly, fix the handling of the IMA policy information for unknown LSM labels" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: IMA: Defined delayed workqueue to free the queued keys IMA: Call workqueue functions to measure queued keys IMA: Define workqueue for early boot key measurements IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings string ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given file ima: Add a space after printing LSM rules for readability IMA: fix measuring asymmetric keys Kconfig IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys KEYS: Call the IMA hook to measure keys IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure keys IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys IMA: Check IMA policy flag ima: avoid appraise error for hash calc interrupt
2020-01-29Merge tag 'tomoyo-pr-20200128' of git://git.osdn.net/gitroot/tomoyo/tomoyo-test1Linus Torvalds1-7/+4
Pull tomoyo update from Tetsuo Handa: "One 'int' -> 'atomic_t' conversion patch to suppress KCSAN's warning" * tag 'tomoyo-pr-20200128' of git://git.osdn.net/gitroot/tomoyo/tomoyo-test1: tomoyo: Use atomic_t for statistics counter
2020-01-29Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-nextLinus Torvalds1-1/+4
Pull networking updates from David Miller: 1) Add WireGuard 2) Add HE and TWT support to ath11k driver, from John Crispin. 3) Add ESP in TCP encapsulation support, from Sabrina Dubroca. 4) Add variable window congestion control to TIPC, from Jon Maloy. 5) Add BCM84881 PHY driver, from Russell King. 6) Start adding netlink support for ethtool operations, from Michal Kubecek. 7) Add XDP drop and TX action support to ena driver, from Sameeh Jubran. 8) Add new ipv4 route notifications so that mlxsw driver does not have to handle identical routes itself. From Ido Schimmel. 9) Add BPF dynamic program extensions, from Alexei Starovoitov. 10) Support RX and TX timestamping in igc, from Vinicius Costa Gomes. 11) Add support for macsec HW offloading, from Antoine Tenart. 12) Add initial support for MPTCP protocol, from Christoph Paasch, Matthieu Baerts, Florian Westphal, Peter Krystad, and many others. 13) Add Octeontx2 PF support, from Sunil Goutham, Geetha sowjanya, Linu Cherian, and others. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1469 commits) net: phy: add default ARCH_BCM_IPROC for MDIO_BCM_IPROC udp: segment looped gso packets correctly netem: change mailing list qed: FW 8.42.2.0 debug features qed: rt init valid initialization changed qed: Debug feature: ilt and mdump qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Add fw overlay feature qed: FW 8.42.2.0 HSI changes qed: FW 8.42.2.0 iscsi/fcoe changes qed: Add abstraction for different hsi values per chip qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Additional ll2 type qed: Use dmae to write to widebus registers in fw_funcs qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Parser offsets modified qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Queue Manager changes qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Expose new registers and change windows qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Internal ram offsets modifications MAINTAINERS: Add entry for Marvell OcteonTX2 Physical Function driver Documentation: net: octeontx2: Add RVU HW and drivers overview octeontx2-pf: ethtool RSS config support octeontx2-pf: Add basic ethtool support ...
2020-01-28Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200127' of ↵Linus Torvalds25-554/+1010
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull SELinux update from Paul Moore: "This is one of the bigger SELinux pull requests in recent years with 28 patches. Everything is passing our test suite and the highlights are below: - Mark CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE as deprecated. We're some time away from actually attempting to remove this in the kernel, but the only distro we know that still uses it (Fedora) is working on moving away from this so we want to at least let people know we are planning to remove it. - Reorder the SELinux hooks to help prevent bad things when SELinux is disabled at runtime. The proper fix is to remove the CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE functionality (see above) and just take care of it at boot time (e.g. "selinux=0"). - Add SELinux controls for the kernel lockdown functionality, introducing a new SELinux class/permissions: "lockdown { integrity confidentiality }". - Add a SELinux control for move_mount(2) that reuses the "file { mounton }" permission. - Improvements to the SELinux security label data store lookup functions to speed up translations between our internal label representations and the visible string labels (both directions). - Revisit a previous fix related to SELinux inode auditing and permission caching and do it correctly this time. - Fix the SELinux access decision cache to cleanup properly on error. In some extreme cases this could limit the cache size and result in a decrease in performance. - Enable SELinux per-file labeling for binderfs. - The SELinux initialized and disabled flags were wrapped with accessors to ensure they are accessed correctly. - Mark several key SELinux structures with __randomize_layout. - Changes to the LSM build configuration to only build security/lsm_audit.c when needed. - Changes to the SELinux build configuration to only build the IB object cache when CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND is enabled. - Move a number of single-caller functions into their callers. - Documentation fixes (/selinux -> /sys/fs/selinux). - A handful of cleanup patches that aren't worth mentioning on their own, the individual descriptions have plenty of detail" * tag 'selinux-pr-20200127' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (28 commits) selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall selinux: do not allocate ancillary buffer on first load selinux: remove redundant allocation and helper functions selinux: remove redundant selinux_nlmsg_perm selinux: fix wrong buffer types in policydb.c selinux: reorder hooks to make runtime disable less broken selinux: treat atomic flags more carefully selinux: make default_noexec read-only after init selinux: move ibpkeys code under CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND. selinux: remove redundant msg_msg_alloc_security Documentation,selinux: fix references to old selinuxfs mount point selinux: deprecate disabling SELinux and runtime selinux: allow per-file labelling for binderfs selinuxfs: use scnprintf to get real length for inode selinux: remove set but not used variable 'sidtab' selinux: ensure the policy has been loaded before reading the sidtab stats selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update() selinux: randomize layout of key structures selinux: clean up selinux_enabled/disabled/enforcing_boot selinux: remove unnecessary selinux cred request ...
2020-01-27security: remove EARLY_LSM_COUNT which never usedAlex Shi1-1/+0
This macro is never used from it was introduced in commit e6b1db98cf4d5 ("security: Support early LSMs"), better to remove it. Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2020-01-23IMA: Defined delayed workqueue to free the queued keysLakshmi Ramasubramanian3-6/+48
Keys queued for measurement should be freed if a custom IMA policy was not loaded. Otherwise, the keys will remain queued forever consuming kernel memory. This patch defines a delayed workqueue to handle the above scenario. The workqueue handler is setup to execute 5 minutes after IMA initialization is completed. If a custom IMA policy is loaded before the workqueue handler is scheduled to execute, the workqueue task is cancelled and any queued keys are processed for measurement. But if a custom policy was not loaded then the queued keys are just freed when the delayed workqueue handler is run. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> # sleeping function called from invalid context Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> # redefinition of ima_init_key_queue() function. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-01-23IMA: Call workqueue functions to measure queued keysLakshmi Ramasubramanian2-0/+11
Measuring keys requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded. Keys should be queued for measurement if a custom IMA policy is not yet loaded. Keys queued for measurement, if any, should be processed when a custom policy is loaded. This patch updates the IMA hook function ima_post_key_create_or_update() to queue the key if a custom IMA policy has not yet been loaded. And, ima_update_policy() function, which is called when a custom IMA policy is loaded, is updated to process queued keys. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-01-23IMA: Define workqueue for early boot key measurementsLakshmi Ramasubramanian4-0/+166
Measuring keys requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded. Keys created or updated before a custom IMA policy is loaded should be queued and will be processed after a custom policy is loaded. This patch defines a workqueue for queuing keys when a custom IMA policy has not yet been loaded. An intermediate Kconfig boolean option namely IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS is used to declare the workqueue functions. A flag namely ima_process_keys is used to check if the key should be queued or should be processed immediately. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-01-22IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings stringLakshmi Ramasubramanian1-8/+30
ima_match_keyring() is called while holding rcu read lock. Since this function executes in atomic context, it should not call any function that can sleep (such as kstrdup()). This patch pre-allocates a buffer to hold the keyrings string read from the IMA policy and uses that to match the given keyring. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Fixes: e9085e0ad38a ("IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-01-22ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixesJanne Karhunen1-18/+26
Keep the ima policy rules around from the beginning even if they appear invalid at the time of loading, as they may become active after an lsm policy load. However, loading a custom IMA policy with unknown LSM labels is only safe after we have transitioned from the "built-in" policy rules to a custom IMA policy. Patch also fixes the rule re-use during the lsm policy reload and makes some prints a bit more human readable. Changelog: v4: - Do not allow the initial policy load refer to non-existing lsm rules. v3: - Fix too wide policy rule matching for non-initialized LSMs v2: - Fix log prints Fixes: b16942455193 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier") Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Konsta Karsisto <konsta.karsisto@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-01-22ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given fileFlorent Revest1-0/+49
This allows other parts of the kernel (perhaps a stacked LSM allowing system monitoring, eg. the proposed KRSI LSM [1]) to retrieve the hash of a given file from IMA if it's present in the iint cache. It's true that the existence of the hash means that it's also in the audit logs or in /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements, but it can be difficult to pull that information out for every subsequent exec. This is especially true if a given host has been up for a long time and the file was first measured a long time ago. It should be kept in mind that this function gives access to cached entries which can be removed, for instance on security_inode_free(). This is based on Peter Moody's patch: https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/mailman/message/33036180/ [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/9/10/393 Signed-off-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-01-22ima: Add a space after printing LSM rules for readabilityClay Chang1-0/+1
When reading ima_policy from securityfs, there is a missing space between output string of LSM rules and the remaining rules. Signed-off-by: Clay Chang <clayc@hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-01-20selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscallStephen Smalley1-0/+10
commit 2db154b3ea8e ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around") introduced a new move_mount(2) system call and a corresponding new LSM security_move_mount hook but did not implement this hook for any existing LSM. This creates a regression for SELinux with respect to consistent checking of mounts; the existing selinux_mount hook checks mounton permission to the mount point path. Provide a SELinux hook implementation for move_mount that applies this same check for consistency. In the future we may wish to add a new move_mount filesystem permission and check as well, but this addresses the immediate regression. Fixes: 2db154b3ea8e ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around") Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-17selinux: do not allocate ancillary buffer on first loadOndrej Mosnacek1-15/+13
In security_load_policy(), we can defer allocating the newpolicydb ancillary array to after checking state->initialized, thereby avoiding the pointless allocation when loading policy the first time. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> [PM: merged portions by hand] Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-16selinux: remove redundant allocation and helper functionsPaul Moore1-58/+36
This patch removes the inode, file, and superblock security blob allocation functions and moves the associated code into the respective LSM hooks. This patch also removes the inode_doinit() function as it was a trivial wrapper around inode_doinit_with_dentry() and called from one location in the code. Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-16selinux: remove redundant selinux_nlmsg_permHuaisheng Ye1-39/+34
selinux_nlmsg_perm is used for only by selinux_netlink_send. Remove the redundant function to simplify the code. Fix a typo by suggestion from Stephen. Signed-off-by: Huaisheng Ye <yehs1@lenovo.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-16selinux: fix wrong buffer types in policydb.cOndrej Mosnacek1-2/+2
Two places used u32 where there should have been __le32. Fixes sparse warnings: CHECK [...]/security/selinux/ss/services.c [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype] [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24: expected unsigned int [...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24: got restricted __le32 [usertype] Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-15net: bridge: vlan: add rtm definitions and dump supportNikolay Aleksandrov1-1/+4
This patch adds vlan rtm definitions: - NEWVLAN: to be used for creating vlans, setting options and notifications - DELVLAN: to be used for deleting vlans - GETVLAN: used for dumping vlan information Dumping vlans which can span multiple messages is added now with basic information (vid and flags). We use nlmsg_parse() to validate the header length in order to be able to extend the message with filtering attributes later. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-01-11kunit: building kunit as a module breaks allmodconfigAlan Maguire1-1/+1
kunit tests that do not support module build should depend on KUNIT=y rather than just KUNIT in Kconfig, otherwise they will trigger compilation errors for "make allmodconfig" builds. Fixes: 9fe124bf1b77 ("kunit: allow kunit to be loaded as a module") Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-01-10selinux: reorder hooks to make runtime disable less brokenOndrej Mosnacek1-31/+70
Commit b1d9e6b0646d ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks") switched the LSM infrastructure to use per-hook lists, which meant that removing the hooks for a given module was no longer atomic. Even though the commit clearly documents that modules implementing runtime revmoval of hooks (only SELinux attempts this madness) need to take special precautions to avoid race conditions, SELinux has never addressed this. By inserting an artificial delay between the loop iterations of security_delete_hooks() (I used 100 ms), booting to a state where SELinux is enabled, but policy is not yet loaded, and running these commands: while true; do ping -c 1 <some IP>; done & echo -n 1 >/sys/fs/selinux/disable kill %1 wait ...I was able to trigger NULL pointer dereferences in various places. I also have a report of someone getting panics on a stock RHEL-8 kernel after setting SELINUX=disabled in /etc/selinux/config and rebooting (without adding "selinux=0" to kernel command-line). Reordering the SELinux hooks such that those that allocate structures are removed last seems to prevent these panics. It is very much possible that this doesn't make the runtime disable completely race-free, but at least it makes the operation much less fragile. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b1d9e6b0646d ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-10selinux: treat atomic flags more carefullyOndrej Mosnacek3-31/+61
The disabled/enforcing/initialized flags are all accessed concurrently by threads so use the appropriate accessors that ensure atomicity and document that it is expected. Use smp_load/acquire...() helpers (with memory barriers) for the initialized flag, since it gates access to the rest of the state structures. Note that the disabled flag is currently not used for anything other than avoiding double disable, but it will be used for bailing out of hooks once security_delete_hooks() is removed. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-10selinux: make default_noexec read-only after initStephen Smalley1-1/+1
SELinux checks whether VM_EXEC is set in the VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS during initialization and saves the result in default_noexec for use in its mmap and mprotect hook function implementations to decide whether to apply EXECMEM, EXECHEAP, EXECSTACK, and EXECMOD checks. Mark default_noexec as ro_after_init to prevent later clearing it and thereby disabling these checks. It is only set legitimately from init code. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-10selinux: move ibpkeys code under CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND.Ravi Kumar Siddojigari2-2/+15
Move cache based pkey sid retrieval code which was added with commit "409dcf31" under CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND. As its going to alloc a new cache which impacts low RAM devices which was enabled by default. Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar Siddojigari <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org> [PM: checkpatch.pl cleanups, fixed capitalization in the description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-10selinux: remove redundant msg_msg_alloc_securityHuaisheng Ye1-11/+6
selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security only calls msg_msg_alloc_security but do nothing else. And also msg_msg_alloc_security is just used by the former. Remove the redundant function to simplify the code. Signed-off-by: Huaisheng Ye <yehs1@lenovo.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-10apparmor: add AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpackMike Salvatore3-0/+627
Add KUnit tests to test AppArmor unpacking of userspace policies. AppArmor uses a serialized binary format for loading policies. To find policy format documentation see Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/apparmor.rst. In order to write the tests against the policy unpacking code, some static functions needed to be exposed for testing purposes. One of the goals of this patch is to establish a pattern for which testing these kinds of functions should be done in the future. Signed-off-by: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Salvatore <mike.salvatore@canonical.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-01-09IMA: fix measuring asymmetric keys KconfigLakshmi Ramasubramanian2-1/+7
As a result of the asymmetric public keys subtype Kconfig option being defined as tristate, with the existing IMA Makefile, ima_asymmetric_keys.c could be built as a kernel module. To prevent this from happening, this patch defines and uses an intermediate Kconfig boolean option named IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Suggested-by: James.Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> # ima_asymmetric_keys.c is built as a kernel module. Fixes: 88e70da170e8 ("IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure keys") Fixes: cb1aa3823c92 ("KEYS: Call the IMA hook to measure keys") [zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated patch description] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-01-07Documentation,selinux: fix references to old selinuxfs mount pointStephen Smalley1-3/+4
selinuxfs was originally mounted on /selinux, and various docs and kconfig help texts referred to nodes under it. In Linux 3.0, /sys/fs/selinux was introduced as the preferred mount point for selinuxfs. Fix all the old references to /selinux/ to /sys/fs/selinux/. While we are there, update the description of the selinux boot parameter to reflect the fact that the default value is always 1 since commit be6ec88f41ba94 ("selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE") and drop discussion of runtime disable since it is deprecated. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-07selinux: deprecate disabling SELinux and runtimePaul Moore2-0/+10
Deprecate the CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE functionality. The code was originally developed to make it easier for Linux distributions to support architectures where adding parameters to the kernel command line was difficult. Unfortunately, supporting runtime disable meant we had to make some security trade-offs when it came to the LSM hooks, as documented in the Kconfig help text: NOTE: selecting this option will disable the '__ro_after_init' kernel hardening feature for security hooks. Please consider using the selinux=0 boot parameter instead of enabling this option. Fortunately it looks as if that the original motivation for the runtime disable functionality is gone, and Fedora/RHEL appears to be the only major distribution enabling this capability at build time so we are now taking steps to remove it entirely from the kernel. The first step is to mark the functionality as deprecated and print an error when it is used (what this patch is doing). As Fedora/RHEL makes progress in transitioning the distribution away from runtime disable, we will introduce follow-up patches over several kernel releases which will block for increasing periods of time when the runtime disable is used. Finally we will remove the option entirely once we believe all users have moved to the kernel cmdline approach. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-07selinux: allow per-file labelling for binderfsHridya Valsaraju1-0/+1
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for binderfs. This is required to have separate permissions to allow access to binder, hwbinder and vndbinder devices which are relocating to binderfs. Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> Signed-off-by: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-07selinuxfs: use scnprintf to get real length for inodeliuyang341-2/+2
The return value of snprintf maybe over the size of TMPBUFLEN, use scnprintf instead in sel_read_class and sel_read_perm. Signed-off-by: liuyang34 <liuyang34@xiaomi.com> [PM: cleaned up the description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-01-05Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2020-01-04' of ↵Linus Torvalds5-47/+55
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor Pull apparmor fixes from John Johansen: - performance regression: only get a label reference if the fast path check fails - fix aa_xattrs_match() may sleep while holding a RCU lock - fix bind mounts aborting with -ENOMEM * tag 'apparmor-pr-2020-01-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: apparmor: fix aa_xattrs_match() may sleep while holding a RCU lock apparmor: only get a label reference if the fast path check fails apparmor: fix bind mounts aborting with -ENOMEM
2020-01-05apparmor: fix aa_xattrs_match() may sleep while holding a RCU lockJohn Johansen3-42/+46
aa_xattrs_match() is unfortunately calling vfs_getxattr_alloc() from a context protected by an rcu_read_lock. This can not be done as vfs_getxattr_alloc() may sleep regardles of the gfp_t value being passed to it. Fix this by breaking the rcu_read_lock on the policy search when the xattr match feature is requested and restarting the search if a policy changes occur. Fixes: 8e51f9087f40 ("apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value") Reported-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-01-02apparmor: only get a label reference if the fast path check failsJohn Johansen1-4/+8
The common fast path check can be done under rcu_read_lock() and doesn't need a reference count on the label. Only take a reference count if entering the slow path. Fixes reported hackbench regression - sha1 79e178a57dae ("Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2019-12-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor") hackbench -l (256000/#grp) -g #grp 128 groups 19.679 ±0.90% - previous sha1 01d1dff64662 ("Merge tag 's390-5.5-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux") hackbench -l (256000/#grp) -g #grp 128 groups 3.1689 ±3.04% Reported-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org> Tested-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org> Tested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Fixes: bce4e7e9c45e ("apparmor: reduce rcu_read_lock scope for aa_file_perm mediation") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-01-02apparmor: fix bind mounts aborting with -ENOMEMPatrick Steinhardt1-1/+1
With commit df323337e507 ("apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches, 2019-05-03"), AppArmor code was converted to use memory pools. In that conversion, a bug snuck into the code that polices bind mounts that causes all bind mounts to fail with -ENOMEM, as we erroneously error out if `aa_get_buffer` returns a pointer instead of erroring out when it does _not_ return a valid pointer. Fix the issue by correctly checking for valid pointers returned by `aa_get_buffer` to fix bind mounts with AppArmor. Fixes: df323337e507 ("apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches") Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-01-02tomoyo: Use atomic_t for statistics counterTetsuo Handa1-7/+4
syzbot is reporting that there is a race at tomoyo_stat_update() [1]. Although it is acceptable to fail to track exact number of times policy was updated, convert to atomic_t because this is not a hot path. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a4d7b973972eeed410596e6604580e0133b0fc04 Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+efea72d4a0a1d03596cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
2019-12-31Merge tag 'tomoyo-fixes-for-5.5' of ↵Linus Torvalds5-44/+27
git://git.osdn.net/gitroot/tomoyo/tomoyo-test1 Pull tomoyo fixes from Tetsuo Handa: "Two bug fixes: - Suppress RCU warning at list_for_each_entry_rcu() - Don't use fancy names on sockets" * tag 'tomoyo-fixes-for-5.5' of git://git.osdn.net/gitroot/tomoyo/tomoyo-test1: tomoyo: Suppress RCU warning at list_for_each_entry_rcu(). tomoyo: Don't use nifty names on sockets.
2019-12-24selinux: remove set but not used variable 'sidtab'YueHaibing1-8/+0
security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_port_sid: security/selinux/ss/services.c:2346:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_ib_endport_sid: security/selinux/ss/services.c:2435:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_netif_sid: security/selinux/ss/services.c:2480:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_fs_use: security/selinux/ss/services.c:2831:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] Since commit 66f8e2f03c02 ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table") 'sidtab' is not used any more, so remove it. Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-24selinux: ensure the policy has been loaded before reading the sidtab statsPaul Moore1-0/+6
Check to make sure we have loaded a policy before we query the sidtab's hash stats. Failure to do so could result in a kernel panic/oops due to a dereferenced NULL pointer. Fixes: 66f8e2f03c02 ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-21selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update()Jaihind Yadav1-1/+1
In AVC update we don't call avc_node_kill() when avc_xperms_populate() fails, resulting in the avc->avc_cache.active_nodes counter having a false value. In last patch this changes was missed , so correcting it. Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls") Signed-off-by: Jaihind Yadav <jaihindyadav@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar Siddojigari <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org> [PM: merge fuzz, minor description cleanup] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-19selinux: randomize layout of key structuresStephen Smalley4-4/+4
Randomize the layout of key selinux data structures. Initially this is applied to the selinux_state, selinux_ss, policydb, and task_security_struct data structures. NB To test/use this mechanism, one must install the necessary build-time dependencies, e.g. gcc-plugin-devel on Fedora, and enable CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT in the kernel configuration. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [PM: double semi-colon fixed] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-19selinux: clean up selinux_enabled/disabled/enforcing_bootStephen Smalley7-18/+17
Rename selinux_enabled to selinux_enabled_boot to make it clear that it only reflects whether SELinux was enabled at boot. Replace the references to it in the MAC_STATUS audit log in sel_write_enforce() with hardcoded "1" values because this code is only reachable if SELinux is enabled and does not change its value, and update the corresponding MAC_STATUS audit log in sel_write_disable(). Stop clearing selinux_enabled in selinux_disable() since it is not used outside of initialization code that runs before selinux_disable() can be reached. Mark both selinux_enabled_boot and selinux_enforcing_boot as __initdata since they are only used in initialization code. Wrap the disabled field in the struct selinux_state with CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE since it is only used for runtime disable. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-19Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-20191219' of git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmddLinus Torvalds5-12/+4
Pull tpm fixes from Jarkko Sakkinen: "Bunch of fixes for rc3" * tag 'tpmdd-next-20191219' of git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd: tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee: add shutdown call back tpm: selftest: cleanup after unseal with wrong auth/policy test tpm: selftest: add test covering async mode tpm: fix invalid locking in NONBLOCKING mode security: keys: trusted: fix lost handle flush tpm_tis: reserve chip for duration of tpm_tis_core_init KEYS: asymmetric: return ENOMEM if akcipher_request_alloc() fails KEYS: remove CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT
2019-12-17security: keys: trusted: fix lost handle flushJames Bottomley1-0/+1
The original code, before it was moved into security/keys/trusted-keys had a flush after the blob unseal. Without that flush, the volatile handles increase in the TPM until it becomes unusable and the system either has to be rebooted or the TPM volatile area manually flushed. Fix by adding back the lost flush, which we now have to export because of the relocation of the trusted key code may cause the consumer to be modular. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code") Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-12-16tomoyo: Suppress RCU warning at list_for_each_entry_rcu().Tetsuo Handa4-13/+26
John Garry has reported that allmodconfig kernel on arm64 causes flood of "RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!" warning. I don't know what change caused this warning, but this warning is safe because TOMOYO uses SRCU lock instead. Let's suppress this warning by explicitly telling that the caller is holding SRCU lock. Reported-and-tested-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
2019-12-13KEYS: remove CONFIG_KEYS_COMPATEric Biggers4-12/+3
KEYS_COMPAT now always takes the value of COMPAT && KEYS. But the security/keys/ directory is only compiled if KEYS is enabled, so in practice KEYS_COMPAT is the same as COMPAT. Therefore, remove the unnecessary KEYS_COMPAT and just use COMPAT directly. (Also remove an outdated comment from compat.c.) Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-12-12IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policyLakshmi Ramasubramanian1-1/+28
Read "keyrings=" option, if specified in the IMA policy, and store in the list of IMA rules when the configured IMA policy is read. This patch defines a new policy token enum namely Opt_keyrings and an option flag IMA_KEYRINGS for reading "keyrings=" option from the IMA policy. Updated ima_parse_rule() to parse "keyrings=" option in the policy. Updated ima_policy_show() to display "keyrings=" option. The following example illustrates how key measurement can be verified. Sample "key" measurement rule in the IMA policy: measure func=KEY_CHECK uid=0 keyrings=.ima|.evm template=ima-buf Display "key" measurement in the IMA measurement list: cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements 10 faf3...e702 ima-buf sha256:27c915b8ddb9fae7214cf0a8a7043cc3eeeaa7539bcb136f8427067b5f6c3b7b .ima 308202863082...4aee Verify "key" measurement data for a key added to ".ima" keyring: cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | grep -m 1 "\.ima" | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p |tee ima-cert.der | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f 1 The output of the above command should match the template hash of the first "key" measurement entry in the IMA measurement list for the key added to ".ima" keyring. The file namely "ima-cert.der" generated by the above command should be a valid x509 certificate (in DER format) and should match the one that was used to import the key to the ".ima" keyring. The certificate file can be verified using openssl tool. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-12-12IMA: Add support to limit measuring keysLakshmi Ramasubramanian6-17/+82
Limit measuring keys to those keys being loaded onto a given set of keyrings only and when the user id (uid) matches if uid is specified in the policy. This patch defines a new IMA policy option namely "keyrings=" that can be used to specify a set of keyrings. If this option is specified in the policy for "measure func=KEY_CHECK" then only the keys loaded onto a keyring given in the "keyrings=" option are measured. If uid is specified in the policy then the key is measured only if the current user id matches the one specified in the policy. Added a new parameter namely "keyring" (name of the keyring) to process_buffer_measurement(). The keyring name is passed to ima_get_action() to determine the required action. ima_match_rules() is updated to check keyring in the policy, if specified, for KEY_CHECK function. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>