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The cgroup filesystem isn't ready for an LSM to
properly use extented attributes. This patch makes
files created in the cgroup filesystem usable by
a system running Smack and systemd.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Smack believes that many of the operatons that can
be performed on an open file descriptor are read operations.
The fstat and lseek system calls are examples.
An implication of this is that files shouldn't be open
if the task doesn't have read access even if it has
write access and the file is being opened write only.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Smack IPC policy requires that the sender have write access
to the receiver. UDS streams don't do per-packet checks. The
only check is done at connect time. The existing code checks
if the connecting process can write to the other, but not the
other way around. This change adds a check that the other end
can write to the connecting process.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schuafler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Sam Henderson points out that removing the SMACK64TRANSMUTE
attribute from a directory does not result in the directory
transmuting. This is because the inode flag indicating that
the directory is transmuting isn't cleared. The fix is a tad
less than trivial because smk_task and smk_mmap should have
been broken out, too.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The function `smack_inode_post_setxattr` is called each
time that a setxattr is done, for any value of name.
The kernel allow to put value==NULL when size==0
to set an empty attribute value. The systematic
call to smk_import_entry was causing the dereference
of a NULL pointer hence a KERNEL PANIC!
The problem can be produced easily by issuing the
command `setfattr -n user.data file` under bash prompt
when SMACK is active.
Moving the call to smk_import_entry as proposed by this
patch is correcting the behaviour because the function
smack_inode_post_setxattr is called for the SMACK's
attributes only if the function smack_inode_setxattr validated
the value and its size (what will not be the case when size==0).
It also has a benefical effect to not fill the smack hash
with garbage values coming from any extended attribute
write.
Change-Id: Iaf0039c2be9bccb6cee11c24a3b44d209101fe47
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
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1. In order to remove any SMACK extended attribute from a file, a user
should have CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability. But user without having this
capability is able to remove SMACK64MMAP security attribute.
2. While validating size and value of smack extended attribute in
smack_inode_setsecurity hook, wrong error code is returned.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Kumar <pamkaj.k2@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
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This allows to limit ptrace beyond the regular smack access rules.
It adds a smackfs/ptrace interface that allows smack to be configured
to require equal smack labels for PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH access.
See the changes in Documentation/security/Smack.txt below for details.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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The decision whether we can trace a process is made in the following
functions:
smack_ptrace_traceme()
smack_ptrace_access_check()
smack_bprm_set_creds() (in case the proces is traced)
This patch unifies all those decisions by introducing one function that
checks whether ptrace is allowed: smk_ptrace_rule_check().
This makes possible to actually trace with TRACEME where first the
TRACEME itself must be allowed and then exec() on a traced process.
Additional bugs fixed:
- The decision is made according to the mode parameter that is now correctly
translated from PTRACE_MODE_* to MAY_* instead of being treated 1:1.
PTRACE_MODE_READ requires MAY_READ.
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH requires MAY_READWRITE.
- Add a smack audit log in case of exec() refused by bprm_set_creds().
- Honor the PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT flag and don't put smack audit info
in case this flag is set.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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The order of subject/object is currently reversed in
smack_ptrace_traceme(). It is currently checked if the tracee has a
capability to trace tracer and according to this rule a decision is made
whether the tracer will be allowed to trace tracee.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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Fix a possible memory access fault when transmute is true and isp is NULL.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
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This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes
the problem below:
"If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy
load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry()
on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes
in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:
/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
if (opt_dentry) {
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
isec->sclass,
&sid);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
isec->sid = sid;
}
}
Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid()
and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock.
I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look
for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the
inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we
should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."
On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in
/proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were
accessed early in the boot), for example:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the
DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches
as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the
memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by
the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO).
Example:
# cat mmap_test.c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int rc;
void *mem;
mem = mmap(0x0, 4096,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
if (mem == MAP_FAILED)
return errno;
printf("mem = %p\n", mem);
munmap(mem, 4096);
return 0;
}
# gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c
# ./mmap_test
mem = (nil)
# ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero
type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc: denied { mmap_zero }
for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test"
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tclass=memprotect
This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a
user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as
the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next
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If keys are not enabled, EVM is not visible in the configuration menu.
It may be difficult to figure out what to do unless you really know.
Other subsystems as NFS, CIFS select keys automatically. This patch does
the same.
This patch also removes '(TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n)' dependency,
which is unnecessary. EVM does not depend on trusted keys, but on
encrypted keys. evm.h provides compile time dependency.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Memory allocation is unnecessary for empty files.
This patch calculates the hash without memory allocation.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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EVM does not use MD5 HMAC. Selection of CRYPTO_MD5 can be safely removed.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This is a small refactoring so ima_d_path() returns dentry name
if path reconstruction fails. It simplifies callers actions
and removes code duplication.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Between checkpatch changes (eg. sizeof) and inconsistencies between
Lindent and checkpatch, unfixed checkpatch errors make it difficult
to see new errors. This patch fixes them. Some lines with over 80 chars
remained unchanged to improve code readability.
The "extern" keyword is removed from internal evm.h to make it consistent
with internal ima.h.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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ima_inode_post_setattr() calls ima_must_appraise() to check if the
file needs to be appraised. If it does not then it removes security.ima
xattr. With original policy matching code it might happen that even
file needs to be appraised with FILE_CHECK hook, it might not be
for POST_SETATTR hook. 'security.ima' might be erronously removed.
This patch treats POST_SETATTR as special wildcard function and will
cause ima_must_appraise() to be true if any of the hooks rules matches.
security.ima will not be removed if any of the hooks would require
appraisal.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Convert printks to pr_<level>.
Add pr_fmt.
Remove embedded prefixes.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Before this change, to correctly calculate the template digest for the
'ima' template, the event name field (id: 'n') length was set to the fixed
size of 256 bytes.
This patch reduces the length of the event name field to the string
length incremented of one (to make room for the termination character '\0')
and handles the specific case of the digest calculation for the 'ima'
template directly in ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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With the new template mechanism introduced in IMA since kernel 3.13,
the format of data sent through the binary_runtime_measurements interface
is slightly changed. Now, for a generic measurement, the format of
template data (after the template name) is:
template_len | field1_len | field1 | ... | fieldN_len | fieldN
In addition, fields containing a string now include the '\0' termination
character.
Instead, the format for the 'ima' template should be:
SHA1 digest | event name length | event name
It must be noted that while in the IMA 3.13 code 'event name length' is
'IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1' (256 bytes), so that the template digest
is calculated correctly, and 'event name' contains '\0', in the pre 3.13
code 'event name length' is exactly the string length and 'event name'
does not contain the termination character.
The patch restores the behavior of the IMA code pre 3.13 for the 'ima'
template so that legacy userspace tools obtain a consistent behavior
when receiving data from the binary_runtime_measurements interface
regardless of which kernel version is used.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.3.13: 3ce1217 ima: define template fields library
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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When we pass task->comm to audit_log_untrustedstring(), we need to pass it
via get_task_comm() because task->comm can be changed to contain untrusted
string by other threads after audit_log_untrustedstring() confirmed that
task->comm does not contain untrusted string.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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A const char pointer allocates memory for a pointer as well as for
a string, This patch replaces a number of the const char pointers
throughout IMA, with a static const char array.
Suggested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Currently, cap_dentry_init_security returns 0 without actually
initializing the security label. This confuses its only caller
(nfs4_label_init_security) which expects an error in that situation, and
causes it to end up sending out junk onto the wire instead of simply
suppressing the label in the attributes sent.
When CONFIG_SECURITY is disabled, security_dentry_init_security returns
-EOPNOTSUPP. Have cap_dentry_init_security do the same.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Replace "file->f_dentry->d_inode" with the new file_inode() helper
function.
Signed-off-by: Libo Chen <clbchenlibo.chen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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sub-directories
The Makefiles in security/ uses a non-standard way to
specify sub-directories for building.
Fix it up so the normal (and documented) approach is used.
Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because
strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be
used.
Signed-off-by: Jingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Hello.
I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 .
[ 681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)
Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing
ebitmap_set_bit() call.
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>>From fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy
Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not
check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks
memory if hashtab_insert() returns error.
unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8):
comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5 W...kkk.
backtrace:
[<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360
[<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70
[<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500
[<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750
[<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0
[<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
However, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will
show below message and the boot sequence freezes.
systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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Conflicts:
security/selinux/hooks.c
Resolved using request struct.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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This patch removes the 'size_limit' argument from
ima_eventdigest_init_common(). Since the 'd' field will never include
the hash algorithm as prefix and the 'd-ng' will always have it, we can
use the hash algorithm to differentiate the two cases in the modified
function (it is equal to HASH_ALGO__LAST in the first case, the opposite
in the second).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Replace the '-1' value with HASH_ALGO__LAST in ima_eventdigest_init()
as the called function ima_eventdigest_init_common() expects an unsigned
char.
Fix commit:
4d7aeee ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Replace HASH_ALGO__LAST with HASH_ALGO_SHA1 as the initial value of
the hash algorithm so that the prefix 'sha1:' is added to violation
digests.
Fix commit:
4d7aeee ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.13.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Eric Paris politely points out:
Inside smack_file_receive() it seems like you are initting the audit
field with LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK. And then use
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path().
Seems like LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH would make more sense. (and depending
on how it's used fix a crash...)
He is correct. This puts things in order.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The mount restrictions imposed by Smack rely heavily on the
use of the filesystem "floor", which is the label that all
processes writing to the filesystem must have access to. It
turns out that while the "floor" notion is sound, it has yet
to be fully implemented and has never been used.
The sb_mount and sb_umount hooks only make sense if the
filesystem floor is used actively, and it isn't. They can
be reintroduced if a rational restriction comes up. Until
then, they get removed.
The sb_kern_mount hook is required for the option processing.
It is too permissive in the case of unprivileged mounts,
effectively bypassing the CAP_MAC_ADMIN restrictions if
any of the smack options are specified. Unprivileged mounts
are no longer allowed to set Smack filesystem options.
Additionally, the root and default values are set to the
label of the caller, in keeping with the policy that objects
get the label of their creator.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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smk_write_change_rule() is calling capable rather than
the more correct smack_privileged(). This allows for setting
rules in violation of the onlycap facility. This is the
simple repair.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The syslog control requires that the calling proccess
have the floor ("_") Smack label. Tizen does not run any
processes except for kernel helpers with the floor label.
This changes allows the admin to configure a specific
label for syslog. The default value is the star ("*")
label, effectively removing the restriction. The value
can be set using smackfs/syslog for anyone who wants
a more restrictive behavior.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().
And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.
Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.
Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels
because we don't want files with those labels getting created implicitly.
All setting of those labels should be done explicitly. The trouble is that
there is no check for these labels in the processing of SMACK64EXEC. That
is repaired.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().
And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.
Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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Remove duplicated include.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull SELinux fixes from James Morris.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in selinux_ip_postroute()
selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packets
selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()
selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()
selinux: fix possible memory leak
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This reverts commit 102aefdda4d8275ce7d7100bc16c88c74272b260.
Tom London reports that it causes sync() to hang on Fedora rawhide:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1033965
and Josh Boyer bisected it down to this commit. Reverting the commit in
the rawhide kernel fixes the problem.
Eric Paris root-caused it to incorrect subtype matching in that commit
breaking fuse, and has a tentative patch, but by now we're better off
retrying this in 3.14 rather than playing with it any more.
Reported-by: Tom London <selinux@gmail.com>
Bisected-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"
This reverts commit 102aefdda4d8275ce7d7100bc16c88c74272b260.
Explanation from Eric Paris:
SELinux policy can specify if it should use a filesystem's
xattrs or not. In current policy we have a specification that
fuse should not use xattrs but fuse.glusterfs should use
xattrs. This patch has a bug in which non-glusterfs
filesystems would match the rule saying fuse.glusterfs should
use xattrs. If both fuse and the particular filesystem in
question are not written to handle xattr calls during the mount
command, they will deadlock.
I have fixed the bug to do proper matching, however I believe a
revert is still the correct solution. The reason I believe
that is because the code still does not work. The s_subtype is
not set until after the SELinux hook which attempts to match on
the ".gluster" portion of the rule. So we cannot match on the
rule in question. The code is useless.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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into for-linus
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selinux_ip_postroute()
Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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