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10 daysselinux: avoid sk_socket dereference in selinux_sctp_bind_connect()Tristan Madani1-9/+10
[ Upstream commit 56acfeb10019e200ab6787d01f8d7cbe0f01526f ] selinux_sctp_bind_connect() dereferences sk->sk_socket to pass a struct socket * to selinux_socket_bind() and selinux_socket_connect_helper(). However, when the hook is invoked from the ASCONF softirq path (sctp_process_asconf), there is no file reference guaranteeing that sk->sk_socket is non-NULL. The setsockopt callers (bindx, connectx, set_primary, sendmsg connect) hold a file reference and are not affected. Both selinux_socket_bind() and selinux_socket_connect_helper() immediately resolve sock->sk, never using the struct socket * for anything else. Refactor the inner logic into helpers that take a struct sock * directly so that selinux_sctp_bind_connect() never needs to touch sk->sk_socket at all. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d452930fd3b9 ("selinux: Add SCTP support") Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
10 dayslsm: infrastructure management of the sock securityCasey Schaufler9-119/+151
[ Upstream commit 2aff9d20d50ac45dd13a013ef5231f4fb8912356 ] Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Stable-dep-of: 56acfeb10019 ("selinux: avoid sk_socket dereference in selinux_sctp_bind_connect()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
10 dayslsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook()Ondrej Mosnacek1-205/+280
[ Upstream commit 260017f31a8c3879be5f9048a46f382b06c1923a ] Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Stable-dep-of: 56acfeb10019 ("selinux: avoid sk_socket dereference in selinux_sctp_bind_connect()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
10 daysbpf: Reject BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE creation if BPF LSM is uninitializedMatt Bobrowski1-0/+3
[ Upstream commit a6f0643e4f63cfaa0d5d4a69de4f132eac4b8fe4 ] When CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y is set, BPF inode storage maps (BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) are compiled into the kernel. However, if the BPF LSM is not explicitly enabled at boot time (e.g. omitted from the "lsm=" boot parameter), lsm_prepare() is never executed for the BPF LSM. Consequently, the BPF inode security blob offset (bpf_lsm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode) is never initialized and remains at its default compiled size of 8 bytes instead of being updated to a valid offset past the reserved struct rcu_head (typically 16 bytes or more). When a privileged user creates and updates a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE map, bpf_inode() evaluates inode->i_security + 8. This erroneously aliases the struct rcu_head.func callback pointer at the beginning of the inode->i_security blob. During subsequent map element cleanup or inode destruction, writing NULL to owner_storage clears the queued RCU callback pointer. When rcu_do_batch() later executes the queued callback, it attempts an instruction fetch at address 0x0, triggering an immediate kernel panic. Fix this by introducing a global bpf_lsm_initialized boolean flag marked with __ro_after_init. Set this flag to true inside bpf_lsm_init() when the LSM framework successfully registers the BPF LSM. Gate map allocation in inode_storage_map_alloc() on this flag, returning -EOPNOTSUPP if the BPF LSM is in turn uninitialized. This fail-fast approach prevents userspace from allocating inode storage maps when the supporting BPF LSM infrastructure is absent, avoiding zombie map states. Fixes: 8ea636848aca ("bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes") Reported-by: oxsignal <awo@kakao.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com> Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260628201103.3624525-1-mattbobrowski@google.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
10 daysselinux: do not cancel a policy conversion that never startedBryam Vargas1-1/+3
commit e5c0235a3c4e9eb047a16cd02323fe4ecf2f570e upstream. sel_write_load() calls selinux_policy_cancel() when sel_make_policy_nodes() fails, and that helper dereferences the outgoing policy to cancel its sidtab conversion. On the first policy load there is no outgoing policy: security_load_policy() returns early for that case, before it converts anything, and state->policy is still NULL. A first load that fails while building the selinuxfs tree therefore takes a NULL dereference in selinux_policy_cancel(), reached from a write(2) to /sys/fs/selinux/load. Skip the cancel when there is no old policy, mirroring the check security_load_policy() already makes before it converts. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
10 daysselinux: reject a class permission count below its inherited commonBryam Vargas1-0/+12
commit 9a82dcd98b6e6e11cfd162410967951f12152528 upstream. security_get_permissions() maps an inherited common's permissions into an array sized by the class's own permissions.nprim, but class_read() takes that nprim verbatim from the policy image and never checks that it covers the common. A class that inherits a common of N permissions while declaring a smaller nprim is accepted, and on load the common's permissions are written past the class-sized array -- an out-of-bounds heap write. Reject a class whose permission count is below its inherited common's. Well-formed policies, where the class count already includes the inherited permissions, are unaffected. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
10 daysselinux: require every boolean value to be definedBryam Vargas1-0/+19
commit a93d37a09b863810653f93d371fb197457d59deb upstream. p_bools.nprim comes from the policy image independently of how many booleans follow it, and cond_index_bool() fills bool_val_to_struct[] at value - 1, so a count larger than the values present leaves NULL entries. Every user of that array then walks it by index and dereferences each entry: cond_evaluate_expr() on the access-vector path, security_get_bools() and security_get_bool_value() behind selinuxfs, and security_set_bools(). A sparse class value is absorbed by policydb_class_isvalid() and its siblings; booleans have no such predicate, and no consumer that could use one. Reject a boolean value that no boolean defines, once, where the array is built. Conforming policies define every boolean they declare and are unaffected. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
14 daysima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()Lincoln Wallace1-2/+7
commit 5ff232d31106f45ac87c3b64e1d35a0667777797 upstream. The digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t: if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >= iint->ima_hash->length) sizeof() yields size_t, so the usual arithmetic conversions promote the whole left-hand side to unsigned 64-bit before the subtraction runs. For a truncated xattr this underflows instead of going negative: a 1-byte IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG xattr (xattr_len == 1, hash_start == 1) turns "1 - 1 - 1" into SIZE_MAX, which is trivially >= ima_hash->length. The check then passes and the following memcmp() reads iint->ima_hash->length bytes starting past the end of the buffer vfs_getxattr_alloc() allocated for it. Nothing upstream clamps xattr_len back into a safe range first: ima_get_hash_algo() only special-cases xattr_len < 2 to pick a default algorithm, and evm_verifyxattr() returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN rather than failing when no HMAC key is loaded, so a truncated security.ima value reaches the length check as-is. Rewrite the comparison so every operand stays a signed int and no implicit conversion to size_t can occur. Fixes: 3ea7a56067e6 ("ima: provide hash algo info in the xattr") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lincoln Wallace <locnnil0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
14 dayskeys: make keyring key-chunk byte order agree with keyring_diff_objects()Michael Bommarito1-2/+3
[ Upstream commit 58565eef0f8d861aae92abfb7658458d661cee17 ] keyring_get_key_chunk() loads description bytes into the index chunk low address first, while keyring_diff_objects() numbers the first differing bit from the low end and folds the absolute byte index into the level without removing the inline-prefix offset the level already carries. The two disagree on byte order and bit position, so the array can be told two keys first differ at a bit that does not differ in the chunk the walker uses, letting crafted descriptions collide into one node. Load the chunk in the order keyring_diff_objects() assumes and drop the inline-prefix length when folding the byte index into the level. This only changes the in-memory ordering used to place keys within a keyring; add, search and read of non-colliding keys are unaffected. Fixes: f771fde82051 ("keys: Simplify key description management") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260719161505.2423935-3-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
14 dayskeys: fix out-of-bounds read in keyring_get_key_chunk()Michael Bommarito1-4/+5
[ Upstream commit 63918731f9ae25b5deb022f118e941e6dddfcef4 ] For description-level chunks keyring_get_key_chunk() advances the read pointer by level * sizeof(long) past the inline prefix but only bounds-checks the prefix, so a long enough key description is read past its kmemdup(desc, desc_len + 1) allocation. Compute the full byte offset and bounds-check the description against it before reading. The walk only reaches a description-level chunk when two keys collide through the hash, x, type and domain_tag chunks, so this is reached from an unprivileged add_key(2) with a crafted pair of same-type keys whose index hashes collide; KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds read. Fixes: f771fde82051 ("keys: Simplify key description management") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260719161505.2423935-2-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-07-24apparmor: fix label can not be immediately before a declarationJohn Johansen1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit 1ed40bd525c00d22af666016af9aef7167f8085f ] Fix error reported by kernel test robot security/apparmor/policy.c:1381:2: error: a label can only be part of a statement and a declaration is not a statement All errors (new ones prefixed by >>): security/apparmor/policy.c: In function 'aa_replace_profiles': >> security/apparmor/policy.c:1381:2: error: a label can only be part of a statement and a declaration is not a statement ssize_t udata_sz = udata->size; ^~~~~ Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202606150525.npax8WiH-lkp@intel.com/ Fixes: 7b42f95813dc9 ("apparmor: fix potential UAF in aa_replace_profiles") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-07-24apparmor: put secmark label after secid lookupZygmunt Krynicki1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 340372688bb87da45ff8d4e2f82ccfd1b64c65ff ] apparmor_secmark_init() parses a configured secmark label to obtain its secid. aa_label_strn_parse() returns a refcounted label, but the success path kept that reference after copying the secid. Fixes: ab9f2115081a ("apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy") Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki <me@zygoon.pl> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-07-24apparmor: aa_getprocattr free procattr leak on format failureZygmunt Krynicki1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit fea23bf73f0cae8ccb1d0684e4a3003874771f41 ] aa_getprocattr() allocates the output string before rendering the label into it. If the second aa_label_snxprint() call fails, the function returned without freeing that allocation. Free and clear the output pointer on the uncommon formatting failure path before dropping the namespace reference. Fixes: 76a1d263aba3 ("apparmor: switch getprocattr to using label_print fns()") Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <code@thicks.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki <me@zygoon.pl> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-07-24apparmor: fix potential UAF in aa_replace_profilesMaxime Bélair1-1/+4
[ Upstream commit 7b42f95813dc9ceb6bda35afcf914630909a19f9 ] The function aa_replace_profiles was accessing udata->size after calling aa_put_loaddata(udata), causing a potential UAF. Fixed this by saving the size to a local variable before dropping the reference. Fixes: 5ac8c355ae001 ("apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform") Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-07-24apparmor: grab ns lock and refresh when looking up changehat child profilesRyan Lee1-2/+31
[ Upstream commit 32e92764d6f8d251c1bca62be33793287b453a81 ] There was a race condition involving change_hat and profile replacement in which replacement of the parent profile during a changehat operation could result in the list of children becoming empty and the changehat operation failing. To prevent this: - grab the namespace lock until we've built the hat transition, and - use aa_get_newest_profile to avoid using stale profile objects. Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2139664 Fixes: 89dbf1962aa63 ("apparmor: move change_hat mediation to using labels") Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-07-24apparmor: aa_label_alloc use aa_label_free on alloc failureZygmunt Krynicki1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 654fe7505dc6889724d4094fa64f89991afabfc3 ] aa_label_alloc() allocates a secid before allocating or taking the label proxy. If the later proxy step fails, the error path only freed the label memory, leaking any resources initialized by aa_label_init(). Use aa_label_free() on the failure path so partially initialized labels release their secid and other label resources before the backing memory is freed. Fixes: f1bd904175e81 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels") Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki <me@zygoon.pl> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-07-24apparmor: check label build before no_new_privs testRuoyu Wang1-10/+15
[ Upstream commit a58cafd38b46fb1a2220e2fbbcfe291ea75fa147 ] aa_change_profile() builds a replacement label with fn_label_build_in_scope() before the no_new_privs subset check. The build helper can fail and return NULL or an ERR_PTR, but the result was passed to aa_label_is_unconfined_subset() before the existing IS_ERR_OR_NULL() check. Reuse the existing target-label build failure handling immediately after the build. This preserves the current audit handling while preventing the subset helper from dereferencing an invalid label. Fixes: e00b02bb6ac2a ("apparmor: move change_profile mediation to using labels") Signed-off-by: Ruoyu Wang <ruoyuw560@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-07-24KEYS: Use acquire when reading state in keyring searchGui-Dong Han1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit c1201b37f666f6466ab1fd3a381c2b7a4b7e9fee ] The negative-key race fix added release/acquire ordering for key use. Publish payload before state; read state before payload. keyring_search_iterator() still uses READ_ONCE() before match callbacks. An asymmetric match callback calls asymmetric_key_ids(), which reads key->payload.data[asym_key_ids]. Use key_read_state() there to complete that ordering. Fixes: 363b02dab09b ("KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key") Signed-off-by: Gui-Dong Han <hanguidong02@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529033406.20673-1-hanguidong02@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-07-24evm: terminate and bound the evm_xattrs read bufferPengpeng Hou1-5/+11
[ Upstream commit 11143a19f5b8dc8f414deab87571134f9f447313 ] evm_read_xattrs() allocates size + 1 bytes, fills them from the list of enabled xattrs, and then passes strlen(temp) to simple_read_from_buffer(). When no configured xattrs are enabled, the fill loop stores nothing and temp[0] remains uninitialized, so strlen() reads beyond initialized memory. Explicitly terminate the buffer after allocation, use snprintf() for each formatted line, and pass the accumulated length, without risk of truncation, to simple_read_from_buffer(). Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs") Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-07-24apparmor: mediate the implicit connect of TCP fast open sendmsgBryam Vargas1-1/+15
[ Upstream commit 4d587cd8a72155089a627130bbd4716ec0856e21 ] sendmsg()/sendto() with MSG_FASTOPEN is a combination of connect(2) and write(2): it opens the connection in the SYN. apparmor_socket_sendmsg() only checks AA_MAY_SEND, so a profile that grants send but denies connect lets a confined task open an outbound TCP/MPTCP connection that connect(2) would have refused, bypassing connect mediation. Mediate the implicit connect when MSG_FASTOPEN is set and a destination is supplied. Add it to apparmor_socket_sendmsg() (not the shared aa_sock_msg_perm() helper, which recvmsg also uses) and call aa_sk_perm() directly, mirroring the selinux and tomoyo fixes. sk_is_tcp() does not cover MPTCP fast open, so the SOCK_STREAM/IPPROTO_MPTCP arm is explicit. Fixes: cf60af03ca4e ("net-tcp: Fast Open client - sendmsg(MSG_FASTOPEN)") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> [ expanded sk_is_tcp() (absent in 5.15) into its equivalent sk_is_inet() && SOCK_STREAM && (IPPROTO_TCP || IPPROTO_MPTCP) check ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-07-24apparmor: fix use-after-free in rawdata dedup loopRuslan Valiyev2-2/+25
[ Upstream commit 6f060496d03e4dc560a40f73770bd08335cb7a27 ] aa_replace_profiles() walks ns->rawdata_list to dedup the incoming policy blob against entries already attached to existing profiles. Per the kernel-doc on struct aa_loaddata, list membership does not hold a reference: profiles hold pcount, and when the last pcount drops, do_ploaddata_rmfs() is queued on a workqueue that takes ns->lock and removes the entry. Between dropping the last pcount and the workqueue running, an entry remains on the list with pcount == 0. aa_get_profile_loaddata() is an unconditional kref_get() on pcount, so when the dedup loop hits such an entry, refcount hardening reports refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. inside aa_replace_profiles(), and the poisoned counter then trips "saturated" and "underflow" warnings on the subsequent uses of the same loaddata. Before commit a0b7091c4de4 ("apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference") the dedup path used a get_unless_zero-style helper on a single counter, so the existing "if (tmp)" guard was meaningful. The split-refcount refactor introduced aa_get_profile_loaddata(), which has plain kref_get() semantics, and the guard quietly became a no-op. Introduce aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(), matching the existing _not0 convention used by aa_get_profile_not0(), and use it for the rawdata_list dedup lookup so dying entries are skipped. Reproduced on x86_64 with v7.1-rc5 in QEMU+KVM running Ubuntu 24.04 + stress-ng 0.17.06: stress-ng --apparmor 1 --klog-check --timeout 60s Without this patch the three refcount_t warnings fire within a few seconds. With it the same 60 s run is clean. Coverage is a smoke-test only; a longer soak with CONFIG_KASAN, CONFIG_KCSAN and CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING would be welcome from anyone with the cycles. Fixes: a0b7091c4de4 ("apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference") Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221513 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ruslan Valiyev <linuxoid@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-07-04keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate pathsShaomin Chen3-8/+51
commit fd15b457a86939c38aa12116adabd8ff686c5e51 upstream. A: request_key() B: KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV ================ ========================= create auth key store rka in auth key wait for helper get auth key load rka from auth key copy user payload sleep on #PF helper completed detach and free rka destroy auth key wake up use rka->target_key **USE-AFTER-FREE** Give request_key_auth payloads a refcount. Take a payload reference while authkey->sem stabilizes the payload and revocation state. Hold that reference across the instantiate and reject paths. Drop the auth key owning reference from revoke and destroy. [jarkko: Replaced the first two paragraphs of text with an actual concurrency scenario.] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Fixes: b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys") Reported-by: Shaomin Chen <eeesssooo020@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260519144403.436694-1-eeesssooo020@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Shaomin Chen <eeesssooo020@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-07-04KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()Jarkko Sakkinen1-1/+8
commit cb481e59ea6cae3b7796ac1d7a22b6b24c3f3c0b upstream. The length for the internal output buffer is calculated incorrectly, which can result overflow when a too small buffer is provided. Fix the bug by allocating internal output with the size of the maximum length of the cryptographic primitive instead of caller provided size. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20260531024914.3712130-1-jarkko@kernel.org/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+ Fixes: 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]") Reported-by: Alessandro Groppo <ale.grpp@gmail.com> Tested-by: Alessandro Groppo <ale.grpp@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-06-19apparmor: validate default DFA states are in boundsBen Hutchings1-12/+15
Some backports of commit 9063d7e2615f ("apparmor: validate DFA start states are in bounds in unpack_pdb") limited the bounds checks on DFA start states to the case where the start state was explicit in the policy. However, the default DFA start state (DFA_START = 1) could also be out-of-bounds. Move these checks out of the else-branches so that they are applied regardless of how the start state was initialised. Fixes: 5487871b2b56 ("apparmor: validate DFA start states are in bounds in unpack_pdb") Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <benh@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-06-19selinux: enable genfscon labeling for securityfsChristian Göttsche1-1/+2
commit 8a764ef1bd43fb2bb4ff3290746e5c820a3a9716 upstream. Add support for genfscon per-file labeling of securityfs files. This allows for separate labels and thereby access control for different files. For example a genfscon statement genfscon securityfs /integrity/ima/policy \ system_u:object_r:ima_policy_t:s0 will set a private label to the IMA policy file and thus allow to control the ability to set the IMA policy. Setting labels directly with setxattr(2), e.g. by chcon(1) or setfiles(8), is still not supported. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: line width fixes in the commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Liem <liem16213@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-06-19use less confusing names for iov_iter direction initializersAl Viro1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit de4eda9de2d957ef2d6a8365a01e26a435e958cb ] READ/WRITE proved to be actively confusing - the meanings are "data destination, as used with read(2)" and "data source, as used with write(2)", but people keep interpreting those as "we read data from it" and "we write data to it", i.e. exactly the wrong way. Call them ITER_DEST and ITER_SOURCE - at least that is harder to misinterpret... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Stable-dep-of: a4f0b001782b ("vsock/virtio: reset connection on receiving queue overflow") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-06-01ima: check return value of crypto_shash_final() in boot aggregateDaniel Hodges1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 870819434c8dfcc3158033b66e7851b81bb17e21 ] The return value of crypto_shash_final() is not checked in ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(). If the hash finalization fails, the function returns success and a corrupted boot aggregate digest could be used for IMA measurements. Capture the return value and propagate any error to the caller. Fixes: 76bb28f6126f ("ima: use new crypto_shash API instead of old crypto_hash") Signed-off-by: Daniel Hodges <hodgesd@meta.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing itJohn Johansen7-101/+152
commit 8e135b8aee5a06c52a4347a5a6d51223c6f36ba3 upstream. Backport for conflicts introdued by - conversion from sha1 to sha256 introduced in e44a4dc4b36c ("apparmor: switch SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH from sha1 to sha256 ") - adding of conditioanl that nests the conflicting code inside an if condition d61c57fde819 ("apparmor: make export of raw binary profile to userspace optional") AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode can and does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and accessing it through the fs. While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private. Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct place which is during inode eviction. Fixes: c961ee5f21b20 ("apparmor: convert from securityfs to apparmorfs for policy ns files") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereferenceJohn Johansen4-57/+94
commit a0b7091c4de45a7325c8780e6934a894f92ac86b upstream. Backport for conflicts introdued by d61c57fde819 ("apparmor: make export of raw binary profile to userspace optional") which nests the conflicting code inside an if condition There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation: because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile, for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and freed memory is accessed. The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile destruction race, resulting in the use after free. Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata are put. Fixes: 5d5182cae401 ("apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix differential encoding verificationJohn Johansen2-4/+20
commit 39440b137546a3aa383cfdabc605fb73811b6093 upstream. Differential encoding allows loops to be created if it is abused. To prevent this the unpack should verify that a diff-encode chain terminates. Unfortunately the differential encode verification had two bugs. 1. it conflated states that had gone through check and already been marked, with states that were currently being checked and marked. This means that loops in the current chain being verified are treated as a chain that has already been verified. 2. the order bailout on already checked states compared current chain check iterators j,k instead of using the outer loop iterator i. Meaning a step backwards in states in the current chain verification was being mistaken for moving to an already verified state. Move to a double mark scheme where already verified states get a different mark, than the current chain being kept. This enables us to also drop the backwards verification check that was the cause of the second error as any already verified state is already marked. Fixes: 031dcc8f4e84 ("apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy managementJohn Johansen3-11/+52
commit 6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425 upstream. Backport for api changes introduced in - 90c436a64a6e ("apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.") - 92de220a7f33 ("apparmor: update policy capable checks to use a label") An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the privileged process to write to the interface. This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for a local privilege escalation. The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able to load policy to different policy namespaces. Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check. Fixes: b7fd2c0340eac ("apparmor: add per policy ns .load, .replace, .remove interface files") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: Fix double free of ns_name in aa_replace_profiles()John Johansen1-0/+1
commit 5df0c44e8f5f619d3beb871207aded7c78414502 upstream. if ns_name is NULL after 1071 error = aa_unpack(udata, &lh, &ns_name); and if ent->ns_name contains an ns_name in 1089 } else if (ent->ns_name) { then ns_name is assigned the ent->ns_name 1095 ns_name = ent->ns_name; however ent->ns_name is freed at 1262 aa_load_ent_free(ent); and then again when freeing ns_name at 1270 kfree(ns_name); Fix this by NULLing out ent->ns_name after it is transferred to ns_name Fixes: 145a0ef21c8e9 ("apparmor: fix blob compression when ns is forced on a policy load ") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix missing bounds check on DEFAULT table in verify_dfa()Massimiliano Pellizzer1-2/+3
commit d352873bbefa7eb39995239d0b44ccdf8aaa79a4 upstream. The verify_dfa() function only checks DEFAULT_TABLE bounds when the state is not differentially encoded. When the verification loop traverses the differential encoding chain, it reads k = DEFAULT_TABLE[j] and uses k as an array index without validation. A malformed DFA with DEFAULT_TABLE[j] >= state_count, therefore, causes both out-of-bounds reads and writes. [ 57.179855] ================================================================== [ 57.180549] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.180904] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888100eadec4 by task su/993 [ 57.181554] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 993 Comm: su Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 57.181558] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 57.181563] Call Trace: [ 57.181572] <TASK> [ 57.181577] dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80 [ 57.181596] print_report+0xc8/0x270 [ 57.181605] ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181608] kasan_report+0x118/0x150 [ 57.181620] ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181623] verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181627] aa_dfa_unpack+0x1610/0x1740 [ 57.181629] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1d0/0x470 [ 57.181640] unpack_pdb+0x86d/0x46b0 [ 57.181647] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181653] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181656] ? aa_unpack_nameX+0x1a8/0x300 [ 57.181659] aa_unpack+0x20b0/0x4c30 [ 57.181662] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181664] ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x33/0x700 [ 57.181681] ? kasan_save_track+0x4f/0x80 [ 57.181683] ? kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 [ 57.181686] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 [ 57.181688] ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780 [ 57.181693] ? aa_simple_write_to_buffer+0x54/0x130 [ 57.181697] ? policy_update+0x154/0x330 [ 57.181704] aa_replace_profiles+0x15a/0x1dd0 [ 57.181707] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181710] ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780 [ 57.181712] ? aa_loaddata_alloc+0x77/0x140 [ 57.181715] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181717] ? _copy_from_user+0x2a/0x70 [ 57.181730] policy_update+0x17a/0x330 [ 57.181733] profile_replace+0x153/0x1a0 [ 57.181735] ? rw_verify_area+0x93/0x2d0 [ 57.181740] vfs_write+0x235/0xab0 [ 57.181745] ksys_write+0xb0/0x170 [ 57.181748] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660 [ 57.181762] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 57.181765] RIP: 0033:0x7f6192792eb2 Remove the MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE condition to validate all DEFAULT_TABLE entries unconditionally. Fixes: 031dcc8f4e84 ("apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix side-effect bug in match_char() macro usageMassimiliano Pellizzer1-10/+20
commit 8756b68edae37ff546c02091989a4ceab3f20abd upstream. The match_char() macro evaluates its character parameter multiple times when traversing differential encoding chains. When invoked with *str++, the string pointer advances on each iteration of the inner do-while loop, causing the DFA to check different characters at each iteration and therefore skip input characters. This results in out-of-bounds reads when the pointer advances past the input buffer boundary. [ 94.984676] ================================================================== [ 94.985301] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.985655] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888100342000 by task file/976 [ 94.986319] CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 976 Comm: file Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 94.986322] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 94.986329] Call Trace: [ 94.986341] <TASK> [ 94.986347] dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80 [ 94.986374] print_report+0xc8/0x270 [ 94.986384] ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986388] kasan_report+0x118/0x150 [ 94.986401] ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986405] aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986408] __aa_path_perm+0x131/0x400 [ 94.986418] aa_path_perm+0x219/0x2f0 [ 94.986424] apparmor_file_open+0x345/0x570 [ 94.986431] security_file_open+0x5c/0x140 [ 94.986442] do_dentry_open+0x2f6/0x1120 [ 94.986450] vfs_open+0x38/0x2b0 [ 94.986453] ? may_open+0x1e2/0x2b0 [ 94.986466] path_openat+0x231b/0x2b30 [ 94.986469] ? __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130 [ 94.986477] do_file_open+0x19d/0x360 [ 94.986487] do_sys_openat2+0x98/0x100 [ 94.986491] __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130 [ 94.986499] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660 [ 94.986515] ? count_memcg_events+0x15f/0x3c0 [ 94.986526] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986540] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1639/0x1ef0 [ 94.986551] ? vma_start_read+0xf0/0x320 [ 94.986558] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986561] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986563] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0xe0 [ 94.986572] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986574] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x9/0xb0 [ 94.986587] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986588] ? irqentry_exit+0x3c/0x590 [ 94.986595] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 94.986597] RIP: 0033:0x7fda4a79c3ea Fix by extracting the character value before invoking match_char, ensuring single evaluation per outer loop. Fixes: 074c1cd798cb ("apparmor: dfa move character match into a macro") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix: limit the number of levels of policy namespacesJohn Johansen2-0/+4
commit 306039414932c80f8420695a24d4fe10c84ccfb2 upstream. Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource. Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e8 ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: replace recursive profile removal with iterative approachMassimiliano Pellizzer1-3/+27
commit ab09264660f9de5d05d1ef4e225aa447c63a8747 upstream. The profile removal code uses recursion when removing nested profiles, which can lead to kernel stack exhaustion and system crashes. Reproducer: $ pf='a'; for ((i=0; i<1024; i++)); do echo -e "profile $pf { \n }" | apparmor_parser -K -a; pf="$pf//x"; done $ echo -n a > /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.remove Replace the recursive __aa_profile_list_release() approach with an iterative approach in __remove_profile(). The function repeatedly finds and removes leaf profiles until the entire subtree is removed, maintaining the same removal semantic without recursion. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix memory leak in verify_headerMassimiliano Pellizzer1-1/+0
commit e38c55d9f834e5b848bfed0f5c586aaf45acb825 upstream. The function sets `*ns = NULL` on every call, leaking the namespace string allocated in previous iterations when multiple profiles are unpacked. This also breaks namespace consistency checking since *ns is always NULL when the comparison is made. Remove the incorrect assignment. The caller (aa_unpack) initializes *ns to NULL once before the loop, which is sufficient. Fixes: dd51c8485763 ("apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: validate DFA start states are in bounds in unpack_pdbMassimiliano Pellizzer1-2/+19
commit 9063d7e2615f4a7ab321de6b520e23d370e58816 upstream. Backport for conflicts caused by ad596ea74e74 ("apparmor: group dfa policydb unpacking") - rearrange and consolidated the unpack. b11e51dd7094 ("apparmor: test: make static symbols visible during kunit testing") - rename function and make it visible to kunit tests Start states are read from untrusted data and used as indexes into the DFA state tables. The aa_dfa_next() function call in unpack_pdb() will access dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE][start], and if the start state exceeds the number of states in the DFA, this results in an out-of-bound read. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_next+0x2a1/0x360 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811956fb90 by task su/1097 ... Reject policies with out-of-bounds start states during unpacking to prevent the issue. Fixes: ad5ff3db53c6 ("AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18xen/privcmd: add boot control for restricted usage in domUJuergen Gross1-0/+1
commit 1613462be621ad5103ec338a7b0ca0746ec4e5f1 upstream. When running in an unprivileged domU under Xen, the privcmd driver is restricted to allow only hypercalls against a target domain, for which the current domU is acting as a device model. Add a boot parameter "unrestricted" to allow all hypercalls (the hypervisor will still refuse destructive hypercalls affecting other guests). Make this new parameter effective only in case the domU wasn't started using secure boot, as otherwise hypercalls targeting the domU itself might result in violating the secure boot functionality. This is achieved by adding another lockdown reason, which can be tested to not being set when applying the "unrestricted" option. This is part of XSA-482 Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-04apparmor: fix invalid deref of rawdata when export_binary is unsetGeorgia Garcia1-0/+9
[ Upstream commit df9ac55abd18628bd8cff687ea043660532a3654 ] If the export_binary parameter is disabled on runtime, profiles that were loaded before that will still have their rawdata stored in apparmorfs, with a symbolic link to the rawdata on the policy directory. When one of those profiles are replaced, the rawdata is set to NULL, but when trying to resolve the symbolic links to rawdata for that profile, it will try to dereference profile->rawdata->name when profile->rawdata is now NULL causing an oops. Fix it by checking if rawdata is set. [ 168.653080] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000088 [ 168.657420] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 168.660619] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 168.663613] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 168.665450] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 168.667836] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1729 Comm: ls Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7+ #3 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 168.672308] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 168.679327] RIP: 0010:rawdata_get_link_base.isra.0+0x23/0x330 [ 168.682768] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 48 89 55 d0 48 85 ff 0f 84 e3 01 00 00 <48> 83 3c 25 88 00 00 00 00 0f 84 d4 01 00 00 49 89 f6 49 89 cc e8 [ 168.689818] RSP: 0018:ffffcdcb8200fb80 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 168.690871] RAX: ffffffffaee74ec0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb0120158 [ 168.692251] RDX: ffffcdcb8200fbe0 RSI: ffff88c187c9fa80 RDI: ffff88c186c98a80 [ 168.693593] RBP: ffffcdcb8200fbc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 168.694941] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88c186c98a80 [ 168.696289] R13: 00007fff005aaa20 R14: 0000000000000080 R15: ffff88c188f4fce0 [ 168.697637] FS: 0000790e81c58280(0000) GS:ffff88c20a957000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 168.699227] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 168.700349] CR2: 0000000000000088 CR3: 000000012fd3e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 [ 168.701696] Call Trace: [ 168.702325] <TASK> [ 168.702995] rawdata_get_link_data+0x1c/0x30 [ 168.704145] vfs_readlink+0xd4/0x160 [ 168.705152] do_readlinkat+0x114/0x180 [ 168.706214] __x64_sys_readlink+0x1e/0x30 [ 168.708653] x64_sys_call+0x1d77/0x26b0 [ 168.709525] do_syscall_64+0x81/0x500 [ 168.710348] ? do_statx+0x72/0xb0 [ 168.711109] ? putname+0x3e/0x80 [ 168.711845] ? __x64_sys_statx+0xb7/0x100 [ 168.712711] ? x64_sys_call+0x10fc/0x26b0 [ 168.713577] ? do_syscall_64+0xbf/0x500 [ 168.714412] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1d2/0x8d0 [ 168.715404] ? irqentry_exit+0xb2/0x740 [ 168.716359] ? exc_page_fault+0x90/0x1b0 [ 168.717307] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: 1180b4c757aab ("apparmor: fix dangling symlinks to policy rawdata after replacement") Signed-off-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-03-04apparmor: fix rlimit for posix cpu timersJohn Johansen1-0/+5
[ Upstream commit 6ca56813f4a589f536adceb42882855d91fb1125 ] Posix cpu timers requires an additional step beyond setting the rlimit. Refactor the code so its clear when what code is setting the limit and conditionally update the posix cpu timers when appropriate. Fixes: baa73d9e478ff ("posix-timers: Make them configurable") Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-03-04apparmor: fix NULL sock in aa_sock_file_permJohn Johansen1-2/+4
[ Upstream commit 00b67657535dfea56e84d11492f5c0f61d0af297 ] Deal with the potential that sock and sock-sk can be NULL during socket setup or teardown. This could lead to an oops. The fix for NULL pointer dereference in __unix_needs_revalidation shows this is at least possible for af_unix sockets. While the fix for af_unix sockets applies for newer mediation this is still the fall back path for older af_unix mediation and other sockets, so ensure it is covered. Fixes: 56974a6fcfef6 ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation") Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-03-04smack: /smack/doi: accept previously used valuesKonstantin Andreev1-26/+45
[ Upstream commit 33d589ed60ae433b483761987b85e0d24e54584e ] Writing to /smack/doi a value that has ever been written there in the past disables networking for non-ambient labels. E.g. # cat /smack/doi 3 # netlabelctl -p cipso list Configured CIPSO mappings (1) DOI value : 3 mapping type : PASS_THROUGH # netlabelctl -p map list Configured NetLabel domain mappings (3) domain: "_" (IPv4) protocol: UNLABELED domain: DEFAULT (IPv4) protocol: CIPSO, DOI = 3 domain: DEFAULT (IPv6) protocol: UNLABELED # cat /smack/ambient _ # cat /proc/$$/attr/smack/current _ # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.964 ms # echo foo >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.956 ms unknown option 86 # echo 4 >/smack/doi # echo 3 >/smack/doi !> [ 214.050395] smk_cipso_doi:691 cipso add rc = -17 # echo 3 >/smack/doi !> [ 249.402261] smk_cipso_doi:678 remove rc = -2 !> [ 249.402261] smk_cipso_doi:691 cipso add rc = -17 # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 !!> ping: 10.1.95.12: Address family for hostname not supported # echo _ >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.617 ms This happens because Smack keeps decommissioned DOIs, fails to re-add them, and consequently refuses to add the “default” domain map: # netlabelctl -p cipso list Configured CIPSO mappings (2) DOI value : 3 mapping type : PASS_THROUGH DOI value : 4 mapping type : PASS_THROUGH # netlabelctl -p map list Configured NetLabel domain mappings (2) domain: "_" (IPv4) protocol: UNLABELED !> (no ipv4 map for default domain here) domain: DEFAULT (IPv6) protocol: UNLABELED Fix by clearing decommissioned DOI definitions and serializing concurrent DOI updates with a new lock. Also: - allow /smack/doi to live unconfigured, since adding a map (netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add) may fail. CIPSO_V4_DOI_UNKNOWN(0) indicates the unconfigured DOI - add new DOI before removing the old default map, so the old map remains if the add fails (2008-02-04, Casey Schaufler) Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-03-04smack: /smack/doi must be > 0Konstantin Andreev1-5/+7
[ Upstream commit 19c013e1551bf51e1493da1270841d60e4fd3f15 ] /smack/doi allows writing and keeping negative doi values. Correct values are 0 < doi <= (max 32-bit positive integer) (2008-02-04, Casey Schaufler) Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-01-19KEYS: trusted: Fix a memory leak in tpm2_load_cmdJarkko Sakkinen1-2/+4
commit 62cd5d480b9762ce70d720a81fa5b373052ae05f upstream. 'tpm2_load_cmd' allocates a tempoary blob indirectly via 'tpm2_key_decode' but it is not freed in the failure paths. Address this by wrapping the blob into with a cleanup helper. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-01-19ima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match()Zhao Yipeng1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 738c9738e690f5cea24a3ad6fd2d9a323cf614f6 ] In ima_match_rules(), if ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT due to the rule being NULL, the function incorrectly skips the 'if (!rc)' check and sets 'result = true'. The LSM rule is considered a match, causing extra files to be measured by IMA. This issue can be reproduced in the following scenario: After unloading the SELinux policy module via 'semodule -d', if an IMA measurement is triggered before ima_lsm_rules is updated, in ima_match_rules(), the first call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ESTALE. This causes the code to enter the 'if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized)' block, perform ima_lsm_copy_rule() and retry. In ima_lsm_copy_rule(), since the SELinux module has been removed, the rule becomes NULL, and the second call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT. This bypasses the 'if (!rc)' check and results in a false match. Call trace: selinux_audit_rule_match+0x310/0x3b8 security_audit_rule_match+0x60/0xa0 ima_match_rules+0x2e4/0x4a0 ima_match_policy+0x9c/0x1e8 ima_get_action+0x48/0x60 process_measurement+0xf8/0xa98 ima_bprm_check+0x98/0xd8 security_bprm_check+0x5c/0x78 search_binary_handler+0x6c/0x318 exec_binprm+0x58/0x1b8 bprm_execve+0xb8/0x130 do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1a8/0x258 __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x68 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x44/0x200 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0 Fix this by changing 'if (!rc)' to 'if (rc <= 0)' to ensure that error codes like -ENOENT do not bypass the check and accidentally result in a successful match. Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9d ("integrity: IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Zhao Yipeng <zhaoyipeng5@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-01-19smack: fix bug: unprivileged task can create labelsKonstantin Andreev1-14/+27
[ Upstream commit c147e13ea7fe9f118f8c9ba5e96cbd644b00d6b3 ] If an unprivileged task is allowed to relabel itself (/smack/relabel-self is not empty), it can freely create new labels by writing their names into own /proc/PID/attr/smack/current This occurs because do_setattr() imports the provided label in advance, before checking "relabel-self" list. This change ensures that the "relabel-self" list is checked before importing the label. Fixes: 38416e53936e ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-19KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant timeEric Biggers1-3/+4
commit eed0e3d305530066b4fc5370107cff8ef1a0d229 upstream. To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant time. Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq(). [For the Fixes commit I used the commit that introduced the memcmp(). It predates the introduction of crypto_memneq(), but it was still a bug at the time even though a helper function didn't exist yet.] Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-28securityfs: don't pin dentries twice, once is enough...Al Viro1-2/+0
[ Upstream commit 27cd1bf1240d482e4f02ca4f9812e748f3106e4f ] incidentally, securityfs_recursive_remove() is broken without that - it leaks dentries, since simple_recursive_removal() does not expect anything of that sort. It could be worked around by dput() in remove_one() callback, but it's easier to just drop that double-get stuff. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-28apparmor: ensure WB_HISTORY_SIZE value is a power of 2Ryan Lee2-1/+3
[ Upstream commit 6c055e62560b958354625604293652753d82bcae ] WB_HISTORY_SIZE was defined to be a value not a power of 2, despite a comment in the declaration of struct match_workbuf stating it is and a modular arithmetic usage in the inc_wb_pos macro assuming that it is. Bump WB_HISTORY_SIZE's value up to 32 and add a BUILD_BUG_ON_NOT_POWER_OF_2 line to ensure that any future changes to the value of WB_HISTORY_SIZE respect this requirement. Fixes: 136db994852a ("apparmor: increase left match history buffer size") Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2026-09-02 08:22:54 +0300