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path: root/security/tomoyo/mount.c
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2012-10-12consitify do_mount() argumentsAl Viro1-2/+3
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-03-01TOMOYO: Fix mount flags checking order.Tetsuo Handa1-18/+20
Userspace can pass in arbitrary combinations of MS_* flags to mount(). If both MS_BIND and one of MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE are passed, device name which should be checked for MS_BIND was not checked because MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE had higher priority than MS_BIND. If both one of MS_BIND/MS_MOVE and MS_REMOUNT are passed, device name which should not be checked for MS_REMOUNT was checked because MS_BIND/MS_MOVE had higher priority than MS_REMOUNT. Fix these bugs by changing priority to MS_REMOUNT -> MS_BIND -> MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE -> MS_MOVE as with do_mount() does. Also, unconditionally return -EINVAL if more than one of MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE is passed so that TOMOYO will not generate inaccurate audit logs, for commit 7a2e8a8f "VFS: Sanity check mount flags passed to change_mnt_propagation()" clarified that these flags must be exclusively passed. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2011-07-14TOMOYO: Update kernel-doc.Tetsuo Handa1-5/+5
Update comments for scripts/kernel-doc and fix some of errors reported by scripts/checkpatch.pl . Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-07-11TOMOYO: Enable conditional ACL.Tetsuo Handa1-1/+7
Enable conditional ACL by passing object's pointers. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-06-30Merge branch 'linus' into nextJames Morris1-1/+1
2011-06-29TOMOYO: Add auditing interface.Tetsuo Handa1-22/+4
Add /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit interface. This interface generates audit logs in the form of domain policy so that /usr/sbin/tomoyo-auditd can reuse audit logs for appending to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy interface. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-06-29TOMOYO: Use struct for passing ACL line.Tetsuo Handa1-53/+0
Use structure for passing ACL line, in preparation for supporting policy namespace and conditional parameters. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-06-29TOMOYO: Cleanup part 3.Tetsuo Handa1-6/+25
Use common structure for ACL with "struct list_head" + "atomic_t". Use array/struct where possible. Remove is_group from "struct tomoyo_name_union"/"struct tomoyo_number_union". Pass "struct file"->private_data rather than "struct file". Update some of comments. Bring tomoyo_same_acl_head() from common.h to domain.c . Bring tomoyo_invalid()/tomoyo_valid() from common.h to util.c . Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-06-29TOMOYO: Cleanup part 2.Tetsuo Handa1-42/+37
Update (or temporarily remove) comments. Remove or replace some of #define lines. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-06-29TOMOYO: Cleanup part 1.Tetsuo Handa1-3/+2
In order to synchronize with TOMOYO 1.8's syntax, (1) Remove special handling for allow_read/write permission. (2) Replace deny_rewrite/allow_rewrite permission with allow_append permission. (3) Remove file_pattern keyword. (4) Remove allow_read permission from exception policy. (5) Allow creating domains in enforcing mode without calling supervisor. (6) Add permission check for opening directory for reading. (7) Add permission check for stat() operation. (8) Make "cat < /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain" behave as if "cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain". Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-06-14TOMOYO: Fix oops in tomoyo_mount_acl().Tetsuo Handa1-1/+1
In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, kern_path() was called without checking dev_name != NULL. As a result, an unprivileged user can trigger oops by issuing mount(NULL, "/", "ext3", 0, NULL) request. Fix this by checking dev_name != NULL before calling kern_path(dev_name). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-04-20TOMOYO: Fix refcount leak in tomoyo_mount_acl().Tetsuo Handa1-0/+1
In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, reference to device file (e.g. /dev/sda1) was leaking. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02TOMOYO: Use pathname specified by policy rather than execve()Tetsuo Handa1-1/+1
Commit c9e69318 "TOMOYO: Allow wildcard for execute permission." changed execute permission and domainname to accept wildcards. But tomoyo_find_next_domain() was using pathname passed to execve() rather than pathname specified by the execute permission. As a result, processes were not able to transit to domains which contain wildcards in their domainnames. This patch passes pathname specified by the execute permission back to tomoyo_find_next_domain() so that processes can transit to domains which contain wildcards in their domainnames. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02TOMOYO: Rename symbols.Tetsuo Handa1-5/+5
Use shorter name in order to make it easier to fit 80 columns limit. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02TOMOYO: Loosen parameter check for mount operation.Tetsuo Handa1-91/+33
If invalid combination of mount flags are given, it will be rejected later. Thus, no need for TOMOYO to reject invalid combination of mount flags. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02TOMOYO: Rename symbols.Tetsuo Handa1-5/+5
Use shorter name in order to make it easier to fix 80 columns limit. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02TOMOYO: Use callback for permission check.Tetsuo Handa1-21/+52
We can use callback function since parameters are passed via "const struct tomoyo_request_info". Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02TOMOYO: Pass parameters via structure.Tetsuo Handa1-0/+6
To make it possible to use callback function, pass parameters via "struct tomoyo_request_info". Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02TOMOYO: Use callback for updating entries.Tetsuo Handa1-25/+18
Use common "struct list_head" + "bool" + "u8" structure and use common code for elements using that structure. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02TOMOYO: Update profile structure.Tetsuo Handa1-1/+2
This patch allows users to change access control mode for per-operation basis. This feature comes from non LSM version of TOMOYO which is designed for permitting users to use SELinux and TOMOYO at the same time. SELinux does not care filename in a directory whereas TOMOYO does. Change of filename can change how the file is used. For example, renaming index.txt to .htaccess will change how the file is used. Thus, letting SELinux to enforce read()/write()/mmap() etc. restriction and letting TOMOYO to enforce rename() restriction is an example usage of this feature. What is unfortunate for me is that currently LSM does not allow users to use SELinux and LSM version of TOMOYO at the same time... Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02TOMOYO: Support longer pathname.Tetsuo Handa1-53/+2
Allow pathnames longer than 4000 bytes. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02TOMOYO: Add interactive enforcing mode.Tetsuo Handa1-14/+10
Since the behavior of the system is restricted by policy, we may need to update policy when you update packages. We need to update policy in the following cases. * The pathname of files has changed. * The dependency of files has changed. * The access permissions required has increased. The ideal way to update policy is to rebuild from the scratch using learning mode. But it is not desirable to change from enforcing mode to other mode if the system has once entered in production state. Suppose MAC could support per-application enforcing mode, the MAC becomes useless if an application that is not running in enforcing mode was cracked. For example, the whole system becomes vulnerable if only HTTP server application is running in learning mode to rebuild policy for the application. So, in TOMOYO Linux, updating policy is done while the system is running in enforcing mode. This patch implements "interactive enforcing mode" which allows administrators to judge whether to accept policy violation in enforcing mode or not. A demo movie is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9q1Jo25LPA . Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02TOMOYO: Add mount restriction.Tetsuo Handa1-0/+366
mount(2) has three string and one numeric parameters. Split mount restriction code from security/tomoyo/file.c . Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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