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2026-03-04smack: /smack/doi: accept previously used valuesKonstantin Andreev1-26/+45
[ Upstream commit 33d589ed60ae433b483761987b85e0d24e54584e ] Writing to /smack/doi a value that has ever been written there in the past disables networking for non-ambient labels. E.g. # cat /smack/doi 3 # netlabelctl -p cipso list Configured CIPSO mappings (1) DOI value : 3 mapping type : PASS_THROUGH # netlabelctl -p map list Configured NetLabel domain mappings (3) domain: "_" (IPv4) protocol: UNLABELED domain: DEFAULT (IPv4) protocol: CIPSO, DOI = 3 domain: DEFAULT (IPv6) protocol: UNLABELED # cat /smack/ambient _ # cat /proc/$$/attr/smack/current _ # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.964 ms # echo foo >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.956 ms unknown option 86 # echo 4 >/smack/doi # echo 3 >/smack/doi !> [ 214.050395] smk_cipso_doi:691 cipso add rc = -17 # echo 3 >/smack/doi !> [ 249.402261] smk_cipso_doi:678 remove rc = -2 !> [ 249.402261] smk_cipso_doi:691 cipso add rc = -17 # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 !!> ping: 10.1.95.12: Address family for hostname not supported # echo _ >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.617 ms This happens because Smack keeps decommissioned DOIs, fails to re-add them, and consequently refuses to add the “default” domain map: # netlabelctl -p cipso list Configured CIPSO mappings (2) DOI value : 3 mapping type : PASS_THROUGH DOI value : 4 mapping type : PASS_THROUGH # netlabelctl -p map list Configured NetLabel domain mappings (2) domain: "_" (IPv4) protocol: UNLABELED !> (no ipv4 map for default domain here) domain: DEFAULT (IPv6) protocol: UNLABELED Fix by clearing decommissioned DOI definitions and serializing concurrent DOI updates with a new lock. Also: - allow /smack/doi to live unconfigured, since adding a map (netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add) may fail. CIPSO_V4_DOI_UNKNOWN(0) indicates the unconfigured DOI - add new DOI before removing the old default map, so the old map remains if the add fails (2008-02-04, Casey Schaufler) Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-03-04smack: /smack/doi must be > 0Konstantin Andreev1-5/+7
[ Upstream commit 19c013e1551bf51e1493da1270841d60e4fd3f15 ] /smack/doi allows writing and keeping negative doi values. Correct values are 0 < doi <= (max 32-bit positive integer) (2008-02-04, Casey Schaufler) Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-01-11smack: fix bug: unprivileged task can create labelsKonstantin Andreev1-14/+27
[ Upstream commit c147e13ea7fe9f118f8c9ba5e96cbd644b00d6b3 ] If an unprivileged task is allowed to relabel itself (/smack/relabel-self is not empty), it can freely create new labels by writing their names into own /proc/PID/attr/smack/current This occurs because do_setattr() imports the provided label in advance, before checking "relabel-self" list. This change ensures that the "relabel-self" list is checked before importing the label. Fixes: 38416e53936e ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-04smack: recognize ipv4 CIPSO w/o categoriesKonstantin Andreev1-0/+4
[ Upstream commit a158a937d864d0034fea14913c1f09c6d5f574b8 ] If SMACK label has CIPSO representation w/o categories, e.g.: | # cat /smack/cipso2 | foo 10 | @ 250/2 | ... then SMACK does not recognize such CIPSO in input ipv4 packets and substitues '*' label instead. Audit records may look like | lsm=SMACK fn=smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb action=denied | subject="*" object="_" requested=w pid=0 comm="swapper/1" ... This happens in two steps: 1) security/smack/smackfs.c`smk_set_cipso does not clear NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT from (struct smack_known *)skp->smk_netlabel.flags on assigning CIPSO w/o categories: | rcu_assign_pointer(skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat, ncats.attr.mls.cat); | skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = ncats.attr.mls.lvl; 2) security/smack/smack_lsm.c`smack_from_secattr can not match skp->smk_netlabel with input packet's struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap because sap->flags have not NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT (what is correct) but skp->smk_netlabel.flags have (what is incorrect): | if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) { | if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags & | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) | found = 1; | break; | } This commit sets/clears NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT in skp->smk_netlabel.flags according to the presense of CIPSO categories. The update of smk_netlabel is not atomic, so input packets processing still may be incorrect during short time while update proceeds. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-04-10smack: dont compile ipv6 code unless ipv6 is configuredKonstantin Andreev2-1/+15
[ Upstream commit bfcf4004bcbce2cb674b4e8dbd31ce0891766bac ] I want to be sure that ipv6-specific code is not compiled in kernel binaries if ipv6 is not configured. [1] was getting rid of "unused variable" warning, but, with that, it also mandated compilation of a handful ipv6- specific functions in ipv4-only kernel configurations: smk_ipv6_localhost, smack_ipv6host_label, smk_ipv6_check. Their compiled bodies are likely to be removed by compiler from the resulting binary, but, to be on the safe side, I remove them from the compiler view. [1] Fixes: 00720f0e7f28 ("smack: avoid unused 'sip' variable warning") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-10-17selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hookScott Mayhew1-2/+2
commit 76a0e79bc84f466999fa501fce5bf7a07641b8a7 upstream. Marek Gresko reports that the root user on an NFS client is able to change the security labels on files on an NFS filesystem that is exported with root squashing enabled. The end of the kerneldoc comment for __vfs_setxattr_noperm() states: * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it * is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate * permission checks. nfsd_setattr() does do permissions checking via fh_verify() and nfsd_permission(), but those don't do all the same permissions checks that are done by security_inode_setxattr() and its related LSM hooks do. Since nfsd_setattr() is the only consumer of security_inode_setsecctx(), simplest solution appears to be to replace the call to __vfs_setxattr_noperm() with a call to __vfs_setxattr_locked(). This fixes the above issue and has the added benefit of causing nfsd to recall conflicting delegations on a file when a client tries to change its security label. Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Marek Gresko <marek.gresko@protonmail.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218809 Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> [Shivani: Modified to apply on v5.15.y-v6.1.y] Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal <shivani.agarwal@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-10-17smackfs: Use rcu_assign_pointer() to ensure safe assignment in smk_set_cipsoJiawei Ye1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 2749749afa071f8a0e405605de9da615e771a7ce ] In the `smk_set_cipso` function, the `skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat` field is directly assigned to a new value without using the appropriate RCU pointer assignment functions. According to RCU usage rules, this is illegal and can lead to unpredictable behavior, including data inconsistencies and impossible-to-diagnose memory corruption issues. This possible bug was identified using a static analysis tool developed by myself, specifically designed to detect RCU-related issues. To address this, the assignment is now done using rcu_assign_pointer(), which ensures that the pointer assignment is done safely, with the necessary memory barriers and synchronization. This change prevents potential RCU dereference issues by ensuring that the `cat` field is safely updated while still adhering to RCU's requirements. Fixes: 0817534ff9ea ("smackfs: Fix use-after-free in netlbl_catmap_walk()") Signed-off-by: Jiawei Ye <jiawei.ye@foxmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12smack: unix sockets: fix accept()ed socket labelKonstantin Andreev1-3/+9
[ Upstream commit e86cac0acdb1a74f608bacefe702f2034133a047 ] When a process accept()s connection from a unix socket (either stream or seqpacket) it gets the socket with the label of the connecting process. For example, if a connecting process has a label 'foo', the accept()ed socket will also have 'in' and 'out' labels 'foo', regardless of the label of the listener process. This is because kernel creates unix child sockets in the context of the connecting process. I do not see any obvious way for the listener to abuse alien labels coming with the new socket, but, to be on the safe side, it's better fix new socket labels. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-08smack: tcp: ipv4, fix incorrect labelingCasey Schaufler1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 2fe209d0ad2e2729f7e22b9b31a86cc3ff0db550 ] Currently, Smack mirrors the label of incoming tcp/ipv4 connections: when a label 'foo' connects to a label 'bar' with tcp/ipv4, 'foo' always gets 'foo' in returned ipv4 packets. So, 1) returned packets are incorrectly labeled ('foo' instead of 'bar') 2) 'bar' can write to 'foo' without being authorized to write. Here is a scenario how to see this: * Take two machines, let's call them C and S, with active Smack in the default state (no settings, no rules, no labeled hosts, only builtin labels) * At S, add Smack rule 'foo bar w' (labels 'foo' and 'bar' are instantiated at S at this moment) * At S, at label 'bar', launch a program that listens for incoming tcp/ipv4 connections * From C, at label 'foo', connect to the listener at S. (label 'foo' is instantiated at C at this moment) Connection succeedes and works. * Send some data in both directions. * Collect network traffic of this connection. All packets in both directions are labeled with the CIPSO of the label 'foo'. Hence, label 'bar' writes to 'foo' without being authorized, and even without ever being known at C. If anybody cares: exactly the same happens with DCCP. This behavior 1st manifested in release 2.6.29.4 (see Fixes below) and it looks unintentional. At least, no explanation was provided. I changed returned packes label into the 'bar', to bring it into line with the Smack documentation claims. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-07-11ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical sectionGUO Zihua1-1/+3
commit 9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34 upstream. A panic happens in ima_match_policy: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen. The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: | Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next| ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). | | entry->action | ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-04-03smack: Handle SMACK64TRANSMUTE in smack_inode_setsecurity()Roberto Sassu1-0/+9
[ Upstream commit ac02f007d64eb2769d0bde742aac4d7a5fc6e8a5 ] If the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr is provided, and the inode is a directory, update the in-memory inode flags by setting SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5c6d1125f8db ("Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories") # v2.6.38.x Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-04-03smack: Set SMACK64TRANSMUTE only for dirs in smack_inode_setxattr()Roberto Sassu1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit 9c82169208dde516510aaba6bbd8b13976690c5d ] Since the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr makes sense only for directories, enforce this restriction in smack_inode_setxattr(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5c6d1125f8db ("Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories") # v2.6.38.x Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-01lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hookAlfred Piccioni1-0/+1
commit f1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003 upstream. Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*). However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits 32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file permissions. This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back - "/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */". This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed to support this hook. Reviewing the three places where we are currently using security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any change. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"") Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni <alpic@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> [PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-10-06smack: Retrieve transmuting information in smack_inode_getsecurity()Roberto Sassu1-4/+18
[ Upstream commit 3a3d8fce31a49363cc31880dce5e3b0617c9c38b ] Enhance smack_inode_getsecurity() to retrieve the value for SMACK64TRANSMUTE from the inode security blob, similarly to SMACK64. This helps to display accurate values in the situation where the security labels come from mount options and not from xattrs. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-10-06smack: Record transmuting in smk_transmutedRoberto Sassu2-12/+30
[ Upstream commit 2c085f3a8f23c9b444e8b99d93c15d7ce870fc4e ] smack_dentry_create_files_as() determines whether transmuting should occur based on the label of the parent directory the new inode will be added to, and not the label of the directory where it is created. This helps for example to do transmuting on overlayfs, since the latter first creates the inode in the working directory, and then moves it to the correct destination. However, despite smack_dentry_create_files_as() provides the correct label, smack_inode_init_security() does not know from passed information whether or not transmuting occurred. Without this information, smack_inode_init_security() cannot set SMK_INODE_CHANGED in smk_flags, which will result in the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr not being set in smack_d_instantiate(). Thus, add the smk_transmuted field to the task_smack structure, and set it in smack_dentry_create_files_as() to smk_task if transmuting occurred. If smk_task is equal to smk_transmuted in smack_inode_init_security(), act as if transmuting was successful but without taking the label from the parent directory (the inode label was already set correctly from the current credentials in smack_inode_alloc_security()). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-09-13smackfs: Prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()Dan Carpenter1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 3ad49d37cf5759c3b8b68d02e3563f633d9c1aee ] There is a upper bound to "catlen" but no lower bound to prevent negatives. I don't see that this necessarily causes a problem but we may as well be safe. Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-09-13vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb ↵David Howells1-0/+51
sharing [ Upstream commit d80a8f1b58c2bc8d7c6bfb65401ea4f7ec8cddc2 ] When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters aren't set in the fs_context struct prior to sget_fc() being called, leading to failure to match existing superblocks. This bug leads to messages like the following appearing in dmesg when fscache is enabled: NFS: Cache volume key already in use (nfs,4.2,2,108,106a8c0,1,,,,100000,100000,2ee,3a98,1d4c,3a98,1) Fix this by adding a new LSM hook to load fc->security for submount creation. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962680944.3334508.6610023900349142034.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962729225.3357250.14350728846471527137.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165970659095.2812394.6868894171102318796.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166133579016.3678898.6283195019480567275.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/217595.1662033775@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5 Fixes: 9bc61ab18b1d ("vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it.") Fixes: 779df6a5480f ("NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode") Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Message-Id: <20230808-master-v9-1-e0ecde888221@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-10-07Merge tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfsLinus Torvalds1-1/+1
Pull vfs constification updates from Al Viro: "whack-a-mole: constifying struct path *" * tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: ecryptfs: constify path spufs: constify path nd_jump_link(): constify path audit_init_parent(): constify path __io_setxattr(): constify path do_proc_readlink(): constify path overlayfs: constify path fs/notify: constify path may_linkat(): constify path do_sys_name_to_handle(): constify path ->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...
2022-10-04Merge tag 'Smack-for-6.1' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-nextLinus Torvalds2-12/+17
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler: "Two minor code clean-ups: one removes constants left over from the old mount API, while the other gets rid of an unneeded variable. The other change fixes a flaw in handling IPv6 labeling" * tag 'Smack-for-6.1' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next: smack: cleanup obsolete mount option flags smack: lsm: remove the unneeded result variable SMACK: Add sk_clone_security LSM hook
2022-09-27smack: cleanup obsolete mount option flagsXiu Jianfeng1-9/+0
These mount option flags are obsolete since commit 12085b14a444 ("smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts"), remove them. Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2022-09-27smack: lsm: remove the unneeded result variableXu Panda1-3/+1
Return the value smk_ptrace_rule_check() directly instead of storing it in another redundant variable. Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Xu Panda <xu.panda@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2022-09-27SMACK: Add sk_clone_security LSM hookLontke Michael1-0/+16
Using smk_of_current() during sk_alloc_security hook leads in rare cases to a faulty initialization of the security context of the created socket. By adding the LSM hook sk_clone_security to SMACK this initialization fault is corrected by copying the security context of the old socket pointer to the newly cloned one. Co-authored-by: Martin Ostertag: <martin.ostertag@elektrobit.com> Signed-off-by: Lontke Michael <michael.lontke@elektrobit.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2022-09-02->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...Al Viro1-1/+1
cast of ->d_name.name to char * is completely wrong - nothing is allowed to modify its contents. Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2022-08-26Smack: Provide read control for io_uring_cmdCasey Schaufler1-0/+32
Limit io_uring "cmd" options to files for which the caller has Smack read access. There may be cases where the cmd option may be closer to a write access than a read, but there is no way to make that determination. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd") Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-08-01smack: Remove the redundant lsm_inode_allocXiu Jianfeng1-7/+0
It's not possible for inode->i_security to be NULL here because every inode will call inode_init_always and then lsm_inode_alloc to alloc memory for inode->security, this is what LSM infrastructure management do, so remove this redundant code. Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2022-08-01smack: Replace kzalloc + strncpy with kstrndupGONG, Ruiqi1-5/+2
Simplify the code by using kstrndup instead of kzalloc and strncpy in smk_parse_smack(), which meanwhile remove strncpy as [1] suggests. [1]: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/90 Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2022-06-05Merge tag 'pull-18-rc1-work.mount' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull mount handling updates from Al Viro: "Cleanups (and one fix) around struct mount handling. The fix is usermode_driver.c one - once you've done kern_mount(), you must kern_unmount(); simple mntput() will end up with a leak. Several failure exits in there messed up that way... In practice you won't hit those particular failure exits without fault injection, though" * tag 'pull-18-rc1-work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: move mount-related externs from fs.h to mount.h blob_to_mnt(): kern_unmount() is needed to undo kern_mount() m->mnt_root->d_inode->i_sb is a weird way to spell m->mnt_sb... linux/mount.h: trim includes uninline may_mount() and don't opencode it in fspick(2)/fsopen(2)
2022-05-23smack: Remove redundant assignmentsMichal Orzel1-1/+0
Get rid of redundant assignments which end up in values not being read either because they are overwritten or the function ends. Reported by clang-tidy [deadcode.DeadStores] Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michalorzel.eng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2022-05-20move mount-related externs from fs.h to mount.hAl Viro1-0/+1
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2022-03-01Fix incorrect type in assignment of ipv6 port for auditCasey Schaufler1-1/+1
Remove inappropriate use of ntohs() and assign the port value directly. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-11-23lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -> security_current_getsecid_subj()Paul Moore2-21/+4
The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the current task is referenced. Fix this by removing the task_struct argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the current task. While we are changing the hook declaration we also rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the current task and not an arbitrary task on the system. Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-11-02Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+46
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Add LSM/SELinux/Smack controls and auditing for io-uring. As usual, the individual commit descriptions have more detail, but we were basically missing two things which we're adding here: + establishment of a proper audit context so that auditing of io-uring ops works similarly to how it does for syscalls (with some io-uring additions because io-uring ops are *not* syscalls) + additional LSM hooks to enable access control points for some of the more unusual io-uring features, e.g. credential overrides. The additional audit callouts and LSM hooks were done in conjunction with the io-uring folks, based on conversations and RFC patches earlier in the year. - Fixup the binder credential handling so that the proper credentials are used in the LSM hooks; the commit description and the code comment which is removed in these patches are helpful to understand the background and why this is the proper fix. - Enable SELinux genfscon policy support for securityfs, allowing improved SELinux filesystem labeling for other subsystems which make use of securityfs, e.g. IMA. * tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security() selinux: fix a sock regression in selinux_ip_postroute_compat() binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks binder: use euid from cred instead of using task LSM: Avoid warnings about potentially unused hook variables selinux: fix all of the W=1 build warnings selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooks selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDs selinux: remove unneeded ipv6 hook wrappers selinux: remove the SELinux lockdown implementation selinux: enable genfscon labeling for securityfs Smack: Brutalist io_uring support selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure() audit: add filtering for io_uring records audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls
2021-11-02Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.16' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-nextLinus Torvalds3-44/+34
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler: "Multiple corrections to smackfs: - a change for overlayfs support that corrects the initial attributes on created files - code clean-up for netlabel processing - several fixes in smackfs for a variety of reasons - Errors reported by W=1 have been addressed All told, nothing challenging" * tag 'Smack-for-5.16' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next: smackfs: use netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del() for deleting cipso_v4_doi smackfs: use __GFP_NOFAIL for smk_cipso_doi() Smack: fix W=1 build warnings smack: remove duplicated hook function Smack:- Use overlay inode label in smack_inode_copy_up() smack: Guard smack_ipv6_lock definition within a SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING block smackfs: Fix use-after-free in netlbl_catmap_walk()
2021-10-22smackfs: use netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del() for deleting cipso_v4_doiTetsuo Handa1-1/+1
syzbot is reporting UAF at cipso_v4_doi_search() [1], for smk_cipso_doi() is calling kfree() without removing from the cipso_v4_doi_list list after netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add() returned an error. We need to use netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del() in order to remove from the list and wait for RCU grace period before kfree(). Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=93dba5b91f0fed312cbd [1] Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+93dba5b91f0fed312cbd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Fixes: 6c2e8ac0953fccdd ("netlabel: Update kernel configuration API") Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-10-22smackfs: use __GFP_NOFAIL for smk_cipso_doi()Tetsuo Handa1-3/+1
syzbot is reporting kernel panic at smk_cipso_doi() due to memory allocation fault injection [1]. The reason for need to use panic() was not explained. But since no fix was proposed for 18 months, for now let's use __GFP_NOFAIL for utilizing syzbot resource on other bugs. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=89731ccb6fec15ce1c22 [1] Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+89731ccb6fec15ce1c22@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-10-14Smack: fix W=1 build warningsCasey Schaufler1-12/+18
A couple of functions had malformed comment blocks. Namespace parameters were added without updating the comment blocks. These are all repaired in the Smack code, so "% make W=1 security/smack" is warning free. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-10-12smack: remove duplicated hook functionFlorian Westphal1-23/+3
ipv4 and ipv6 hook functions are identical, remove one. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-09-28Smack:- Use overlay inode label in smack_inode_copy_up()Vishal Goel1-1/+1
Currently in "smack_inode_copy_up()" function, process label is changed with the label on parent inode. Due to which, process is assigned directory label and whatever file or directory created by the process are also getting directory label which is wrong label. Changes has been done to use label of overlay inode instead of parent inode. Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-09-24smack: Guard smack_ipv6_lock definition within a SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING blockSebastian Andrzej Siewior1-3/+6
The mutex smack_ipv6_lock is only used with the SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING block but its definition is outside of the block. This leads to a defined-but-not-used warning on PREEMPT_RT. Moving smack_ipv6_lock down to the block where it is used where it used raises the question why is smk_ipv6_port_list read if nothing is added to it. Turns out, only smk_ipv6_port_check() is using it outside of an ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING block. However two of three caller invoke smk_ipv6_port_check() from a ifdef block and only one is using __is_defined() macro which requires the function and smk_ipv6_port_list to be around. Put the lock and list inside an ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING block to avoid the warning regarding unused mutex. Extend the ifdef-block to also cover smk_ipv6_port_check(). Make smack_socket_connect() use ifdef instead of __is_defined() to avoid complains about missing function. Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-09-23selinux,smack: fix subjective/objective credential use mixupsPaul Moore1-2/+2
Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is not safe to access another task's subjective credentials and doing so can cause a number of problems. Further, while looking into the problem, I realized that Smack was suffering from a similar problem brought about by a similar commit 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials"). This patch addresses this problem by restoring the use of the task's objective credentials in those cases where the task is other than the current executing task. Not only does this resolve the problem reported by Jann, it is arguably the correct thing to do in these cases. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials") Fixes: 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-09-20Smack: Brutalist io_uring supportCasey Schaufler1-0/+46
Add Smack privilege checks for io_uring. Use CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE for the override_creds case and CAP_MAC_ADMIN for creating a polling thread. These choices are based on conjecture regarding the intent of the surrounding code. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: make the smack_uring_* funcs static, remove debug code] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-09-16smackfs: Fix use-after-free in netlbl_catmap_walk()Pawan Gupta1-1/+4
Syzkaller reported use-after-free bug as described in [1]. The bug is triggered when smk_set_cipso() tries to free stale category bitmaps while there are concurrent reader(s) using the same bitmaps. Wait for RCU grace period to finish before freeing the category bitmaps in smk_set_cipso(). This makes sure that there are no more readers using the stale bitmaps and freeing them should be safe. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/000000000000a814c505ca657a4e@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+3f91de0b813cc3d19a80@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-07-20smack: mark 'smack_enabled' global variable as __initdataAustin Kim2-2/+2
Mark 'smack_enabled' as __initdata since it is only used during initialization code. Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-07-20Smack: Fix wrong semantics in smk_access_entry()Tianjia Zhang1-9/+8
In the smk_access_entry() function, if no matching rule is found in the rust_list, a negative error code will be used to perform bit operations with the MAY_ enumeration value. This is semantically wrong. This patch fixes this issue. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-06-08Smack: fix doc warningChenXiaoSong1-1/+4
Fix gcc W=1 warning: security/smack/smack_access.c:342: warning: Function parameter or member 'ad' not described in 'smack_log' security/smack/smack_access.c:403: warning: Function parameter or member 'skp' not described in 'smk_insert_entry' security/smack/smack_access.c:487: warning: Function parameter or member 'level' not described in 'smk_netlbl_mls' security/smack/smack_access.c:487: warning: Function parameter or member 'len' not described in 'smk_netlbl_mls' Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-05-18Revert "Smack: Handle io_uring kernel thread privileges"Jens Axboe1-3/+2
This reverts commit 942cb357ae7d9249088e3687ee6a00ed2745a0c7. The io_uring PF_IO_WORKER threads no longer have PF_KTHREAD set, so no need to special case them for credential checks. Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-05-10smackfs: restrict bytes count in smk_set_cipso()Tetsuo Handa1-0/+2
Oops, I failed to update subject line. From 07571157c91b98ce1a4aa70967531e64b78e8346 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 22:25:06 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smk_set_cipso() Commit 7ef4c19d245f3dc2 ("smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions") missed that count > SMK_CIPSOMAX check applies to only format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT case. Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+77c53db50c9fff774e8e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-05-10security/smack/: fix misspellings using codespell toolXiong Zhenwu1-1/+1
A typo is found out by codespell tool in 383th line of smackfs.c: $ codespell ./security/smack/ ./smackfs.c:383: numer ==> number Fix a typo found by codespell. Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-05-02Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-26/+15
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris: "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün. Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing. From Mickaël's cover letter: "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves. Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD Pledge/Unveil. In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features. This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing, init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]" The cover letter and v34 posting is here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/ See also: https://landlock.io/ This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several years" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2] * tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features landlock: Add user and kernel documentation samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example selftests/landlock: Add user space tests landlock: Add syscall implementations arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls fs,security: Add sb_delete hook landlock: Support filesystem access-control LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock landlock: Add ptrace restrictions landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials landlock: Add ruleset and domain management landlock: Add object management
2021-04-22LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblockCasey Schaufler2-26/+15
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2026-04-29 10:34:04 +0300