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[ Upstream commit a5cd1ab7ab679d252a6d2f483eee7d45ebf2040c ]
Remove inappropriate use of ntohs() and assign the
port value directly.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit e5bfad3d7acc5702f32aafeb388362994f4d7bd0 upstream.
inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is
called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4.
Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use
GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem
transaction to complete.
Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3675f052b43ba51b99b85b073c7070e083f3e6fb upstream.
There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds():
If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be
acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other
->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that
something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it):
- task A: create task B with fork()
- task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS
- task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some
conditions
- task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library
- task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH
- task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute
- task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which
destroys the ptrace relationship)
Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in
bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5663884caab1 ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
[ Upstream commit 3f4287e7d98a2954f20bf96c567fdffcd2b63eb9 ]
In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement
on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL:
if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases.
But on lines 3931 and 3932, skb is used:
ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur when skb is NULL.
To fix these possible bugs, an if statement is added to check skb.
These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5b841bfab695e3b8ae793172a9ff7990f99cc3e2 ]
Function smack_key_permission() only issues smack requests for the
following operations:
- KEY_NEED_READ (issues MAY_READ)
- KEY_NEED_WRITE (issues MAY_WRITE)
- KEY_NEED_LINK (issues MAY_WRITE)
- KEY_NEED_SETATTR (issues MAY_WRITE)
A blank smack request is issued in all other cases, resulting in
smack access being granted if there is any rule defined between
subject and object, or denied with -EACCES otherwise.
Request MAY_READ access for KEY_NEED_SEARCH and KEY_NEED_VIEW.
Fix the logic in the unlikely case when both MAY_READ and
MAY_WRITE are needed. Validate access permission field for valid
contents.
Signed-off-by: Zoran Markovic <zmarkovic@sierrawireless.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 129a99890936766f4b69b9da7ed88366313a9210 ]
A socket which has sk_family set to PF_INET6 is able to receive not
only IPv6 but also IPv4 traffic (IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses).
Prior to this patch, the smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6() could have been
called for socket buffers containing IPv4 packets, in result such
traffic was allowed.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7b4e88434c4e7982fb053c49657e1c8bbb8692d9 ]
Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode
/proc clean-up in commit 1bbc55131e59bd099fdc568d3aa0b42634dbd188
resulted in smack_task_to_inode() being called before smack_d_instantiate.
This resulted in the smk_inode value being ignored, even while present
for files in /proc/self. Marking the inode as instant here fixes that.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 57e7ba04d422c3d41c8426380303ec9b7533ded9 upstream.
security_inode_getsecurity() provides the text string value
of a security attribute. It does not provide a "secctx".
The code in xattr_getsecurity() that calls security_inode_getsecurity()
and then calls security_release_secctx() happened to work because
SElinux and Smack treat the attribute and the secctx the same way.
It fails for cap_inode_getsecurity(), because that module has no
secctx that ever needs releasing. It turns out that Smack is the
one that's doing things wrong by not allocating memory when instructed
to do so by the "alloc" parameter.
The fix is simple enough. Change the security_release_secctx() to
kfree() because it isn't a secctx being returned by
security_inode_getsecurity(). Change Smack to allocate the string when
told to do so.
Note: this also fixes memory leaks for LSMs which implement
inode_getsecurity but not release_secctx, such as capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs xattr updates from Al Viro:
"xattr stuff from Andreas
This completes the switch to xattr_handler ->get()/->set() from
->getxattr/->setxattr/->removexattr"
* 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
vfs: Remove {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations
xattr: Stop calling {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations
vfs: Check for the IOP_XATTR flag in listxattr
xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpers
libfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for empty directory handling
vfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for bad-inode handling
vfs: Add IOP_XATTR inode operations flag
vfs: Move xattr_resolve_name to the front of fs/xattr.c
ecryptfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
sockfs: Get rid of getxattr iop
sockfs: getxattr: Fail with -EOPNOTSUPP for invalid attribute names
kernfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
hfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
jffs2: Remove jffs2_{get,set,remove}xattr macros
xattr: Remove unnecessary NULL attribute name check
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Right now, various places in the kernel check for the existence of
getxattr, setxattr, and removexattr inode operations and directly call
those operations. Switch to helper functions and test for the IOP_XATTR
flag instead.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Under a strict subject/object security policy delivering a
signal or delivering network IPC could be considered either
a write or an append operation. The original choice to make
both write operations leads to an issue where IPC delivery
is desired under policy, but delivery of signals is not.
This patch provides the option of making signal delivery
an append operation, allowing Smack rules that deny signal
delivery while allowing IPC. This was requested for Tizen.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- TPM core and driver updates/fixes
- IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO)
- Lots of Apparmor fixes
- Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change
syscall #"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits)
apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling
tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family)
tpm: Factor out common startup code
tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset
tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check
tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction
tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt
tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies
apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated
apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
apparmor: do not expose kernel stack
apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked
apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present
apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed
apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification
apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task
apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next
apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile
apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read
apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds
...
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into next
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into next
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This makes it possible to route the error to the appropriate
labelling engine. CALIPSO is far less verbose than CIPSO
when encountering a bogus packet, so there is no need for a
CALIPSO error handler.
Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP
access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be
consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match
smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run
with the label supplied in the xattr.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Security labels from unprivileged mounts cannot be trusted.
Ideally for these mounts we would assign the objects in the
filesystem the same label as the inode for the backing device
passed to mount. Unfortunately it's currently impossible to
determine which inode this is from the LSM mount hooks, so we
settle for the label of the process doing the mount.
This label is assigned to s_root, and also to smk_default to
ensure that new inodes receive this label. The transmute property
is also set on s_root to make this behavior more explicit, even
though it is technically not necessary.
If a filesystem has existing security labels, access to inodes is
permitted if the label is the same as smk_root, otherwise access
is denied. The SMACK64EXEC xattr is completely ignored.
Explicit setting of security labels continues to require
CAP_MAC_ADMIN in init_user_ns.
Altogether, this ensures that filesystem objects are not
accessible to subjects which cannot already access the backing
store, that MAC is not violated for any objects in the fileystem
which are already labeled, and that a user cannot use an
unprivileged mount to gain elevated MAC privileges.
sysfs, tmpfs, and ramfs are already mountable from user
namespaces and support security labels. We can't rule out the
possibility that these filesystems may already be used in mounts
from user namespaces with security lables set from the init
namespace, so failing to trust lables in these filesystems may
introduce regressions. It is safe to trust labels from these
filesystems, since the unprivileged user does not control the
backing store and thus cannot supply security labels, so an
explicit exception is made to trust labels from these
filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Kill with signal number 0 is commonly used for checking PID existence.
Smack treated such cases like any other kills, although no signal is
actually delivered when sig == 0.
Checking permissions when sig == 0 didn't prevent an unprivileged caller
from learning whether PID exists or not. When it existed, kernel returned
EPERM, when it didn't - ESRCH. The only effect of policy check in such
case is noise in audit logs.
This change lets Smack silently ignore kill() invocations with sig == 0.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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smack ->d_instantiate() uses ->setxattr(), so to be able to call it before
we'd hashed the new dentry and attached it to inode, we need ->setxattr()
instances getting the inode as an explicit argument rather than obtaining
it from dentry.
Similar change for ->getxattr() had been done in commit ce23e64. Unlike
->getxattr() (which is used by both selinux and smack instances of
->d_instantiate()) ->setxattr() is used only by smack one and unfortunately
it got missed back then.
Reported-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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... and neither can ever be NULL
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Before this commit, removing the access property of
a file, aka, the extended attribute security.SMACK64
was not effictive until the cache had been cleaned.
This patch fixes that problem.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Prior to the 4.2 kernel there no no harm in providing
a security module hook that does nothing, as the default
hook would get called if the module did not supply one.
With the list based infrastructure an empty hook adds
overhead. This patch removes the three Smack hooks that
don't actually do anything.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
(EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.
- Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.
- Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.
- Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
KEYS: refcount bug fix
ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
IMA: policy can be updated zero times
selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
selinux: export validatetrans decisions
gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
...
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into next
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Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we
can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that
we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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Smack security handler for sendmsg() syscall
is vulnerable to type confusion issue what
can allow to privilege escalation into root
or cause denial of service.
A malicious attacker can create socket of one
type for example AF_UNIX and pass is into
sendmsg() function ensuring that this is
AF_INET socket.
Remedy
Do not trust user supplied data.
Proposed fix below.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Fruba <m.fruba@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Add a nfs_listxattr operation. Move the call to security_inode_listsecurity
from list operation of the "security.*" xattr handler to nfs_listxattr.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The existing file receive hook checks for access on
the file inode even for UDS. This is not right, as
the inode is not used by Smack to make access checks
for sockets. This change checks for an appropriate
access relationship between the receiving (current)
process and the socket. If the process can't write
to the socket's send label or the socket's receive
label can't write to the process fail.
This will allow the legitimate cases, where the
socket sender and socket receiver can freely communicate.
Only strangly set socket labels should cause a problem.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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This feature introduces new kernel interface:
- <smack_fs>/relabel-self - for setting transition labels list
This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism.
List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if
label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add
labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without
CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset.
Changes in v2:
* use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write
* added missing description in security/Smack.txt
Changes in v3:
* squashed into one commit
Changes in v4:
* switch from global list to per-task list
* since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself
there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on it
Changes in v5:
* change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap
multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which
replace the previous list upon write
Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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This fix writes the task label when
smack_d_instantiate is called, before the
label of the superblock was written on the
pipe's inode.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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This change has two goals:
- delay the setting of 'smack_enabled' until
it will be really effective
- ensure that smackfs is valid only if 'smack_enabled'
is set (it is already the case in smack_netfilter.c)
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Fixes the following sparse warning:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:55:1: warning: symbol 'smk_ipv6_port_list'
was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The changes for mounting binary filesystems was allied
improperly, with the list of tokens being in an ifdef that
it shouldn't have been. Fix that, and a couple style issues
that were bothering me.
Reported-by: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The kbuild test robot reported a couple of these,
and the third showed up by inspection. Making the
symbols static is proper.
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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IPv6 appears to be (finally) coming of age with the
influx of autonomous devices. In support of this, add
the ability to associate a Smack label with IPv6 addresses.
This patch also cleans up some of the conditional
compilation associated with the introduction of
secmark processing. It's now more obvious which bit
of code goes with which feature.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Add support for setting smack mount labels(using smackfsdef, smackfsroot,
smackfshat, smackfsfloor, smackfstransmute) for filesystems with binary
mount data like NFS.
To achieve this, implement sb_parse_opts_str and sb_set_mnt_opts security
operations in smack LSM similar to SELinux.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Trivedi <t.vivek@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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This patch makes the following functions to use ERR_PTR() and related
macros to pass the appropriate error code through returned pointers:
smk_parse_smack()
smk_import_entry()
smk_fetch()
It also makes all the other functions that use them to handle the
error cases properly. This ways correct error codes from places
where they happened can be propagated to the user space if necessary.
Doing this it fixes a bug in onlycap and unconfined files
handling. Previously their content was cleared on any error from
smk_import_entry/smk_parse_smack, be it EINVAL (as originally intended)
or ENOMEM. Right now it only reacts on EINVAL passing other codes
properly to userspace.
Comments have been updated accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
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The dmabuf fd can be shared between processes via unix domain
socket. The file of dmabuf fd is came from anon_inode. The inode
has no set and get xattr operations, so it can not be shared
between processes with smack. This patch fixes just to ignore
private inode including anon_inode for smack_file_receive.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
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Instead of using a vector of security operations
with explicit, special case stacking of the capability
and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and
yama hooks included as appropriate.
The security_operations structure is no longer required.
Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that
allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for
list management while retaining typing. Each module
supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead
of a sparsely populated security_operations structure.
The description includes the element that gets put on
the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual
element allocation.
The method for registering security modules is changed to
reflect the information available. The method for removing
a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.
It should be generic now, however if there are potential
race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs
to be addressed by the calling module.
The security hooks are called from the lists and the first
failure is returned.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Add a list header for each security hook. They aren't used until
later in the patch series. They are grouped together in a structure
so that there doesn't need to be an external address for each.
Macro-ize the initialization of the security_operations
for each security module in anticipation of changing out
the security_operations structure.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull fourth vfs update from Al Viro:
"d_inode() annotations from David Howells (sat in for-next since before
the beginning of merge window) + four assorted fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
RCU pathwalk breakage when running into a symlink overmounting something
fix I_DIO_WAKEUP definition
direct-io: only inc/dec inode->i_dio_count for file systems
fs/9p: fix readdir()
VFS: assorted d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/inode.c helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/cachefiles: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs library helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotations
VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: net/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: net/unix: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: kernel/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: audit: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: Fix up some ->d_inode accesses in the chelsio driver
VFS: Cachefiles should perform fs modifications on the top layer only
VFS: AF_UNIX sockets should call mknod on the top layer only
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most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights for this window:
- improved AVC hashing for SELinux by John Brooks and Stephen Smalley
- addition of an unconfined label to Smack
- Smack documentation update
- TPM driver updates"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
lsm: copy comm before calling audit_log to avoid race in string printing
tomoyo: Do not generate empty policy files
tomoyo: Use if_changed when generating builtin-policy.h
tomoyo: Use bin2c to generate builtin-policy.h
selinux: increase avtab max buckets
selinux: Use a better hash function for avtab
selinux: convert avtab hash table to flex_array
selinux: reconcile security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid() and mls_import_netlbl_cat()
selinux: remove unnecessary pointer reassignment
Smack: Updates for Smack documentation
tpm/st33zp24/spi: Add missing device table for spi phy.
tpm/st33zp24: Add proper wait for ordinal duration in case of irq mode
smack: Fix gcc warning from unused smack_syslog_lock mutex in smackfs.c
Smack: Allow an unconfined label in bringup mode
Smack: getting the Smack security context of keys
Smack: Assign smack_known_web as default smk_in label for kernel thread's socket
tpm/tpm_infineon: Use struct dev_pm_ops for power management
MAINTAINERS: Add Jason as designated reviewer for TPM
tpm: Update KConfig text to include TPM2.0 FIFO chips
tpm/st33zp24/dts/st33zp24-spi: Add dts documentation for st33zp24 spi phy
...
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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I have vehemently opposed adding a "permissive" mode to Smack
for the simple reasons that it would be subject to massive abuse
and that developers refuse to turn it off come product release.
I still believe that this is true, and still refuse to add a
general "permissive mode". So don't ask again.
Bumjin Im suggested an approach that addresses most of the concerns,
and I have implemented it here. I still believe that we'd be better
off without this sort of thing, but it looks like this minimizes the
abuse potential.
Firstly, you have to configure Smack Bringup Mode. That allows
for "release" software to be ammune from abuse. Second, only one
label gets to be "permissive" at a time. You can use it for
debugging, but that's about it.
A label written to smackfs/unconfined is treated specially.
If either the subject or object label of an access check
matches the "unconfined" label, and the access would not
have been allowed otherwise an audit record and a console
message are generated. The audit record "request" string is
marked with either "(US)" or "(UO)", to indicate that the
request was granted because of an unconfined label. The
fact that an inode was accessed by an unconfined label is
remembered, and subsequent accesses to that "impure"
object are noted in the log. The impurity is not stored in
the filesystem, so a file mislabled as a side effect of
using an unconfined label may still cause concern after
a reboot.
So, it's there, it's dangerous, but so many application
developers seem incapable of living without it I have
given in. I've tried to make it as safe as I can, but
in the end it's still a chain saw.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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With this commit, the LSM Smack implements the LSM
side part of the system call keyctl with the action
code KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY.
It is now possible to get the context of, for example,
the user session key using the command "keyctl security @s".
The original patch has been modified for merge.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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This change fixes the bug associated with sockets owned by kernel threads. These
sockets, created usually by network devices' drivers tasks, received smk_in
label from the task that created them - the "floor" label in the most cases. The
result was that they were not able to receive data packets because of missing
smack rules. The main reason of the access deny is that the socket smk_in label
is placed as the object during smk check, kernel thread's capabilities are
omitted.
Signed-off-by: Marcin Lis <m.lis@samsung.com>
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