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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull checkpoint-restore updates from Christian Brauner:
"This enables unprivileged checkpoint/restore of processes.
Given that this work has been going on for quite some time the first
sentence in this summary is hopefully more exciting than the actual
final code changes required. Unprivileged checkpoint/restore has seen
a frequent increase in interest over the last two years and has thus
been one of the main topics for the combined containers &
checkpoint/restore microconference since at least 2018 (cf. [1]).
Here are just the three most frequent use-cases that were brought forward:
- The JVM developers are integrating checkpoint/restore into a Java
VM to significantly decrease the startup time.
- In high-performance computing environment a resource manager will
typically be distributing jobs where users are always running as
non-root. Long-running and "large" processes with significant
startup times are supposed to be checkpointed and restored with
CRIU.
- Container migration as a non-root user.
In all of these scenarios it is either desirable or required to run
without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The userspace implementation of
checkpoint/restore CRIU already has the pull request for supporting
unprivileged checkpoint/restore up (cf. [2]).
To enable unprivileged checkpoint/restore a new dedicated capability
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is introduced. This solution has last been
discussed in 2019 in a talk by Google at Linux Plumbers (cf. [1]
"Update on Task Migration at Google Using CRIU") with Adrian and
Nicolas providing the implementation now over the last months. In
essence, this allows the CRIU binary to be installed with the
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE vfs capability set thereby enabling
unprivileged users to restore processes.
To make this possible the following permissions are altered:
- Selecting a specific PID via clone3() set_tid relaxed from userns
CAP_SYS_ADMIN to CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
- Selecting a specific PID via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid relaxed
from userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
- Accessing /proc/pid/map_files relaxed from init userns
CAP_SYS_ADMIN to init userns CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
- Changing /proc/self/exe from userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to userns
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
Of these four changes the /proc/self/exe change deserves a few words
because the reasoning behind even restricting /proc/self/exe changes
in the first place is just full of historical quirks and tracking this
down was a questionable version of fun that I'd like to spare others.
In short, it is trivial to change /proc/self/exe as an unprivileged
user, i.e. without userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN right now. Either via ptrace()
or by simply intercepting the elf loader in userspace during exec.
Nicolas was nice enough to even provide a POC for the latter (cf. [3])
to illustrate this fact.
The original patchset which introduced PR_SET_MM_MAP had no
permissions around changing the exe link. They too argued that it is
trivial to spoof the exe link already which is true. The argument
brought up against this was that the Tomoyo LSM uses the exe link in
tomoyo_manager() to detect whether the calling process is a policy
manager. This caused changing the exe links to be guarded by userns
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
All in all this rather seems like a "better guard it with something
rather than nothing" argument which imho doesn't qualify as a great
security policy. Again, because spoofing the exe link is possible for
the calling process so even if this were security relevant it was
broken back then and would be broken today. So technically, dropping
all permissions around changing the exe link would probably be
possible and would send a clearer message to any userspace that relies
on /proc/self/exe for security reasons that they should stop doing
this but for now we're only relaxing the exe link permissions from
userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to userns CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
There's a final uapi change in here. Changing the exe link used to
accidently return EINVAL when the caller lacked the necessary
permissions instead of the more correct EPERM. This pr contains a
commit fixing this. I assume that userspace won't notice or care and
if they do I will revert this commit. But since we are changing the
permissions anyway it seems like a good opportunity to try this fix.
With these changes merged unprivileged checkpoint/restore will be
possible and has already been tested by various users"
[1] LPC 2018
1. "Task Migration at Google Using CRIU"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI_1cuhoDgA&t=12095
2. "Securely Migrating Untrusted Workloads with CRIU"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI_1cuhoDgA&t=14400
LPC 2019
1. "CRIU and the PID dance"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LN2CUgp8deo&list=PLVsQ_xZBEyN30ZA3Pc9MZMFzdjwyz26dO&index=9&t=2m48s
2. "Update on Task Migration at Google Using CRIU"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LN2CUgp8deo&list=PLVsQ_xZBEyN30ZA3Pc9MZMFzdjwyz26dO&index=9&t=1h2m8s
[2] https://github.com/checkpoint-restore/criu/pull/1155
[3] https://github.com/nviennot/run_as_exe
* tag 'cap-checkpoint-restore-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
selftests: add clone3() CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE test
prctl: exe link permission error changed from -EINVAL to -EPERM
prctl: Allow local CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to change /proc/self/exe
proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
pid_namespace: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for ns_last_pid
pid: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for set_tid
capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Beyond the usual smattering of bug fixes, we've got three small
improvements worth highlighting:
- improved SELinux policy symbol table performance due to a reworking
of the insert and search functions
- allow reading of SELinux labels before the policy is loaded,
allowing for some more "exotic" initramfs approaches
- improved checking an error reporting about process
class/permissions during SELinux policy load"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: complete the inlining of hashtab functions
selinux: prepare for inlining of hashtab functions
selinux: specialize symtab insert and search functions
selinux: Fix spelling mistakes in the comments
selinux: fixed a checkpatch warning with the sizeof macro
selinux: log error messages on required process class / permissions
scripts/selinux/mdp: fix initial SID handling
selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded
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This patch introduces CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, a new capability facilitating
checkpoint/restore for non-root users.
Over the last years, The CRIU (Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace) team has
been asked numerous times if it is possible to checkpoint/restore a
process as non-root. The answer usually was: 'almost'.
The main blocker to restore a process as non-root was to control the PID
of the restored process. This feature available via the clone3 system
call, or via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid is unfortunately guarded by
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
In the past two years, requests for non-root checkpoint/restore have
increased due to the following use cases:
* Checkpoint/Restore in an HPC environment in combination with a
resource manager distributing jobs where users are always running as
non-root. There is a desire to provide a way to checkpoint and
restore long running jobs.
* Container migration as non-root
* We have been in contact with JVM developers who are integrating
CRIU into a Java VM to decrease the startup time. These
checkpoint/restore applications are not meant to be running with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
We have seen the following workarounds:
* Use a setuid wrapper around CRIU:
See https://github.com/FredHutch/slurm-examples/blob/master/checkpointer/lib/checkpointer/checkpointer-suid.c
* Use a setuid helper that writes to ns_last_pid.
Unfortunately, this helper delegation technique is impossible to use
with clone3, and is thus prone to races.
See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Cycle through PIDs with fork() until the desired PID is reached:
This has been demonstrated to work with cycling rates of 100,000 PIDs/s
See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Patch out the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check from the kernel
* Run the desired application in a new user and PID namespace to provide
a local CAP_SYS_ADMIN for controlling PIDs. This technique has limited
use in typical container environments (e.g., Kubernetes) as /proc is
typically protected with read-only layers (e.g., /proc/sys) for
hardening purposes. Read-only layers prevent additional /proc mounts
(due to proc's SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE property), making the use of new
PID namespaces limited as certain applications need access to /proc
matching their PID namespace.
The introduced capability allows to:
* Control PIDs when the current user is CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable
for the corresponding PID namespace via ns_last_pid/clone3.
* Open files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace, useful for
recovering files that are unreachable via the file system such as
deleted files, or memfd files.
See corresponding selftest for an example with clone3().
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-2-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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Move (most of) the definitions of hashtab_search() and hashtab_insert()
to the header file. In combination with the previous patch, this avoids
calling the callbacks indirectly by function pointers and allows for
better optimization, leading to a drastic performance improvement of
these operations.
With this patch, I measured a speed up in the following areas (measured
on x86_64 F32 VM with 4 CPUs):
1. Policy load (`load_policy`) - takes ~150 ms instead of ~230 ms.
2. `chcon -R unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c381,c519 /tmp/linux-src`
where /tmp/linux-src is an extracted linux-5.7 source tarball -
takes ~522 ms instead of ~576 ms. This is because of many
symtab_search() calls in string_to_context_struct() when there are
many categories specified in the context.
3. `stress-ng --msg 1 --msg-ops 10000000` - takes 12.41 s instead of
13.95 s (consumes 18.6 s of kernel CPU time instead of 21.6 s).
This is thanks to security_transition_sid() being ~43% faster after
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Refactor searching and inserting into hashtabs to pave the way for
converting hashtab_search() and hashtab_insert() to inline functions in
the next patch. This will avoid indirect calls and allow the compiler to
better optimize individual callers, leading to a significant performance
improvement.
In order to avoid the indirect calls, the key hashing and comparison
callbacks need to be extracted from the hashtab struct and passed
directly to hashtab_search()/_insert() by the callers so that the
callback address is always known at compile time. The kernel's
rhashtable library (<linux/rhashtable*.h>) does the same thing.
This of course makes the hashtab functions slightly easier to misuse by
passing a wrong callback set, but unfortunately there is no better way
to implement a hash table that is both generic and efficient in C. This
patch tries to somewhat mitigate this by only calling the hashtab
functions in the same file where the corresponding callbacks are
defined (wrapping them into more specialized functions as needed).
Note that this patch doesn't bring any benefit without also moving the
definitions of hashtab_search() and -_insert() to the header file, which
is done in a follow-up patch for easier review of the hashtab.c changes
in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This encapsulates symtab a little better and will help with further
refactoring later.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Fix spelling mistakes in the comments
quering==>querying
Signed-off-by: lihao <fly.lihao@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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`sizeof buf` changed to `sizeof(buf)`
Signed-off-by: Ethan Edwards <ethancarteredwards@gmail.com>
[PM: rewrote the subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In general SELinux no longer treats undefined object classes or permissions
in the policy as a fatal error, instead handling them in accordance with
handle_unknown. However, the process class and process transition and
dyntransition permissions are still required to be defined due to
dependencies on these definitions for default labeling behaviors,
role and range transitions in older policy versions that lack an explicit
class field, and role allow checking. Log error messages in these cases
since otherwise the policy load will fail silently with no indication
to the user as to the underlying cause. While here, fix the checking for
process transition / dyntransition so that omitting either permission is
handled as an error; both are needed in order to ensure that role allow
checking is consistently applied.
Reported-by: bauen1 <j2468h@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow
labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows
querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded.
One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this
patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be
able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID,
on first boot, at initrd time.[1]
Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be
able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply
them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the
second part of this process; this commit enables the first part.
[1] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Three small patches to fix problems in the SELinux code, all found via
clang.
Two patches fix potential double-free conditions and one fixes an
undefined return value"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200621' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix undefined return of cond_evaluate_expr
selinux: fix a double free in cond_read_node()/cond_read_list()
selinux: fix double free
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clang static analysis reports an undefined return
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c:79:2: warning: Undefined or garbage value returned to caller [core.uninitialized.UndefReturn]
return s[0];
^~~~~~~~~~~
static int cond_evaluate_expr( ...
{
u32 i;
int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH];
for (i = 0; i < expr->len; i++)
...
return s[0];
When expr->len is 0, the loop which sets s[0] never runs.
So return -1 if the loop never runs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Clang static analysis reports this double free error
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c:139:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
kfree(node->expr.nodes);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
When cond_read_node fails, it calls cond_node_destroy which frees the
node but does not poison the entry in the node list. So when it
returns to its caller cond_read_list, cond_read_list deletes the
partial list. The latest entry in the list will be deleted twice.
So instead of freeing the node in cond_read_node, let list freeing in
code_read_list handle the freeing the problem node along with all of the
earlier nodes.
Because cond_read_node no longer does any error handling, the goto's
the error case are redundant. Instead just return the error code.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 60abd3181db2 ("selinux: convert cond_list to array")
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull notification queue from David Howells:
"This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
changing their attributes.
Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47
Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.
[ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
this one works first ]
LSM hooks are included:
- A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
"watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux & Smack]
- A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]
I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
hooks.
WHY
===
Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
cache changes.
However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
need to poll.
DESIGN DECISIONS
================
- The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:
pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);
The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&co from accessing
the pipe.
[?] Should this be done some other way? I'd rather not use up a new
O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
instead?
The pipe is then configured::
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);
Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().
- It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
holding pipe->mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
auditing.
- sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
pipes because of the pipe->mutex issue and also because they
sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.
- The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
to update the queue pointers.
- Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
they can be of varying size.
This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
sources.
- Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.
- Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
- and only those that are watching for it.
- When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
message at an appropriate point later.
- The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
to it, using one of:
keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);
where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
a tag between 0 and 255.
- Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.
Things I want to avoid:
- Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).
- Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
inaccessible inside a container.
- Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.
TESTING AND MANPAGES
====================
- The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
the main manpages repository instead.
If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
all be checked off to make sure they happened.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch
- A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"
* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
pipe: Add notification lossage handling
pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
Add sample notification program
watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
pipe: Add general notification queue support
pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
uapi: General notification queue definitions
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Clang's static analysis tool reports these double free memory errors.
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2987:4: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
kfree(bnames[i]);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2990:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
kfree(bvalues);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
So improve the security_get_bools error handling by freeing these variables
and setting their return pointers to NULL and the return len to 0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
"Last cycle for the Nth time I ran into bugs and quality of
implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily be
fixed because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been digging
into exec and cleanup up what I can.
I don't think I have exec sorted out enough to fix the issues I
started with but I have made some headway this cycle with 4 sets of
changes.
- promised cleanups after introducing exec_update_mutex
- trivial cleanups for exec
- control flow simplifications
- remove the recomputation of bprm->cred
The net result is code that is a bit easier to understand and work
with and a decrease in the number of lines of code (if you don't count
the added tests)"
* 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (24 commits)
exec: Compute file based creds only once
exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear
binfmt_elf_fdpic: fix execfd build regression
selftests/exec: Add binfmt_script regression test
exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler
exec: Generic execfd support
exec/binfmt_script: Don't modify bprm->buf and then return -ENOEXEC
exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler
exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binprm unconditionally
exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds
exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds
exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids
exec: Set the point of no return sooner
exec: Move handling of the point of no return to the top level
exec: Run sync_mm_rss before taking exec_update_mutex
exec: Fix spelling of search_binary_handler in a comment
exec: Move the comment from above de_thread to above unshare_sighand
exec: Rename flush_old_exec begin_new_exec
exec: Move most of setup_new_exec into flush_old_exec
exec: In setup_new_exec cache current in the local variable me
...
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Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Allow setting bluetooth L2CAP modes via socket option, from Luiz
Augusto von Dentz.
2) Add GSO partial support to igc, from Sasha Neftin.
3) Several cleanups and improvements to r8169 from Heiner Kallweit.
4) Add IF_OPER_TESTING link state and use it when ethtool triggers a
device self-test. From Andrew Lunn.
5) Start moving away from custom driver versions, use the globally
defined kernel version instead, from Leon Romanovsky.
6) Support GRO vis gro_cells in DSA layer, from Alexander Lobakin.
7) Allow hard IRQ deferral during NAPI, from Eric Dumazet.
8) Add sriov and vf support to hinic, from Luo bin.
9) Support Media Redundancy Protocol (MRP) in the bridging code, from
Horatiu Vultur.
10) Support netmap in the nft_nat code, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
11) Allow UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP in the ipsec code, from Sabrina
Dubroca. Also add ipv6 support for espintcp.
12) Lots of ReST conversions of the networking documentation, from Mauro
Carvalho Chehab.
13) Support configuration of ethtool rxnfc flows in bcmgenet driver,
from Doug Berger.
14) Allow to dump cgroup id and filter by it in inet_diag code, from
Dmitry Yakunin.
15) Add infrastructure to export netlink attribute policies to
userspace, from Johannes Berg.
16) Several optimizations to sch_fq scheduler, from Eric Dumazet.
17) Fallback to the default qdisc if qdisc init fails because otherwise
a packet scheduler init failure will make a device inoperative. From
Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
18) Several RISCV bpf jit optimizations, from Luke Nelson.
19) Correct the return type of the ->ndo_start_xmit() method in several
drivers, it's netdev_tx_t but many drivers were using
'int'. From Yunjian Wang.
20) Add an ethtool interface for PHY master/slave config, from Oleksij
Rempel.
21) Add BPF iterators, from Yonghang Song.
22) Add cable test infrastructure, including ethool interfaces, from
Andrew Lunn. Marvell PHY driver is the first to support this
facility.
23) Remove zero-length arrays all over, from Gustavo A. R. Silva.
24) Calculate and maintain an explicit frame size in XDP, from Jesper
Dangaard Brouer.
25) Add CAP_BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
26) Support terse dumps in the packet scheduler, from Vlad Buslov.
27) Support XDP_TX bulking in dpaa2 driver, from Ioana Ciornei.
28) Add devm_register_netdev(), from Bartosz Golaszewski.
29) Minimize qdisc resets, from Cong Wang.
30) Get rid of kernel_getsockopt and kernel_setsockopt in order to
eliminate set_fs/get_fs calls. From Christoph Hellwig.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2517 commits)
selftests: net: ip_defrag: ignore EPERM
net_failover: fixed rollback in net_failover_open()
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_aead refcnt leak in tipc_crypto_rcv"
Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_node refcnt leak in tipc_rcv"
vmxnet3: allow rx flow hash ops only when rss is enabled
hinic: add set_channels ethtool_ops support
selftests/bpf: Add a default $(CXX) value
tools/bpf: Don't use $(COMPILE.c)
bpf, selftests: Use bpf_probe_read_kernel
s390/bpf: Use bcr 0,%0 as tail call nop filler
s390/bpf: Maintain 8-byte stack alignment
selftests/bpf: Fix verifier test
selftests/bpf: Fix sample_cnt shared between two threads
bpf, selftests: Adapt cls_redirect to call csum_level helper
bpf: Add csum_level helper for fixing up csum levels
bpf: Fix up bpf_skb_adjust_room helper's skb csum setting
sfc: add missing annotation for efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf()
crypto/chtls: IPv6 support for inline TLS
Crypto/chcr: Fixes a coccinile check error
Crypto/chcr: Fixes compilations warnings
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"The highlights:
- A number of improvements to various SELinux internal data
structures to help improve performance. We move the role
transitions into a hash table. In the content structure we shift
from hashing the content string (aka SELinux label) to the
structure itself, when it is valid. This last change not only
offers a speedup, but it helps us simplify the code some as well.
- Add a new SELinux policy version which allows for a more space
efficient way of storing the filename transitions in the binary
policy. Given the default Fedora SELinux policy with the unconfined
module enabled, this change drops the policy size from ~7.6MB to
~3.3MB. The kernel policy load time dropped as well.
- Some fixes to the error handling code in the policy parser to
properly return error codes when things go wrong"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: netlabel: Remove unused inline function
selinux: do not allocate hashtabs dynamically
selinux: fix return value on error in policydb_read()
selinux: simplify range_write()
selinux: fix error return code in policydb_read()
selinux: don't produce incorrect filename_trans_count
selinux: implement new format of filename transitions
selinux: move context hashing under sidtab
selinux: hash context structure directly
selinux: store role transitions in a hash table
selinux: drop unnecessary smp_load_acquire() call
selinux: fix warning Comparison to bool
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|
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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|
Today security_bprm_set_creds has several implementations:
apparmor_bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds,
smack_bprm_set_creds, and tomoyo_bprm_set_creds.
Except for cap_bprm_set_creds they all test bprm->called_set_creds and
return immediately if it is true. The function cap_bprm_set_creds
ignores bprm->calld_sed_creds entirely.
Create a new LSM hook security_bprm_creds_for_exec that is called just
before prepare_binprm in __do_execve_file, resulting in a LSM hook
that is called exactly once for the entire of exec. Modify the bits
of security_bprm_set_creds that only want to be called once per exec
into security_bprm_creds_for_exec, leaving only cap_bprm_set_creds
behind.
Remove bprm->called_set_creds all of it's former users have been moved
to security_bprm_creds_for_exec.
Add or upate comments a appropriate to bring them up to date and
to reflect this change.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87v9kszrzh.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # For the LSM and Smack bits
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Implement the watch_key security hook to make sure that a key grants the
caller View permission in order to set a watch on a key.
For the moment, the watch_devices security hook is left unimplemented as
it's not obvious what the object should be since the queue is global and
didn't previously exist.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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Since the meaning of combining the KEY_NEED_* constants is undefined, make
it so that you can't do that by turning them into an enum.
The enum is also given some extra values to represent special
circumstances, such as:
(1) The '0' value is reserved and causes a warning to trap the parameter
being unset.
(2) The key is to be unlinked and we require no permissions on it, only
the keyring, (this replaces the KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK flag).
(3) An override due to CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
(4) An override due to an instantiation token being present.
(5) The permissions check is being deferred to later key_permission()
calls.
The extra values give the opportunity for LSMs to audit these situations.
[Note: This really needs overhauling so that lookup_user_key() tells
key_task_permission() and the LSM what operation is being done and leaves
it to those functions to decide how to map that onto the available
permits. However, I don't really want to make these change in the middle
of the notifications patchset.]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
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Split BPF operations that are allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN into
combination of CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN.
For backward compatibility include them in CAP_SYS_ADMIN as well.
The end result provides simple safety model for applications that use BPF:
- to load tracing program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{KPROBE, TRACEPOINT, PERF_EVENT, RAW_TRACEPOINT, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON
- to load networking program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{SCHED_CLS, XDP, SK_SKB, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN
There are few exceptions from this rule:
- bpf_trace_printk() is allowed in networking programs, but it's using
tracing mechanism, hence this helper needs additional CAP_PERFMON
if networking program is using this helper.
- BPF_F_ZERO_SEED flag for hash/lru map is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only
to discourage production use.
- BPF HW offload is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
- bpf_probe_write_user() is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only.
CAPs are not checked at attach/detach time with two exceptions:
- loading BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB is allowed for unprivileged users,
hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at attach time.
- flow_dissector detach doesn't check prog FD at detach,
hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at detach time.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to iterate BPF objects (progs, maps, links) via get_next_id
command and convert them to file descriptor via GET_FD_BY_ID command.
This restriction guarantees that mutliple tasks with CAP_BPF are not able to
affect each other. That leads to clean isolation of tasks. For example:
task A with CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN loads and attaches a firewall via bpf_link.
task B with the same capabilities cannot detach that firewall unless
task A explicitly passed link FD to task B via scm_rights or bpffs.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN can still detach/unload everything.
Two networking user apps with CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_NET_ADMIN can
accidentely mess with each other programs and maps.
Two networking user apps with CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_BPF cannot affect each other.
CAP_NET_ADMIN + CAP_BPF allows networking programs access only packet data.
Such networking progs cannot access arbitrary kernel memory or leak pointers.
bpftool, bpftrace, bcc tools binaries should NOT be installed with
CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON, since unpriv users will be able to read kernel secrets.
But users with these two permissions will be able to use these tracing tools.
CAP_PERFMON is least secure, since it allows kprobes and kernel memory access.
CAP_NET_ADMIN can stop network traffic via iproute2.
CAP_BPF is the safest from security point of view and harmless on its own.
Having CAP_BPF and/or CAP_NET_ADMIN is not enough to write into arbitrary map
and if that map is used by firewall-like bpf prog.
CAP_BPF allows many bpf prog_load commands in parallel. The verifier
may consume large amount of memory and significantly slow down the system.
Existing unprivileged BPF operations are not affected.
In particular unprivileged users are allowed to load socket_filter and cg_skb
program types and to create array, hash, prog_array, map-in-map map types.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
|
|
Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2020-05-14
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Merged tag 'perf-for-bpf-2020-05-06' from tip tree that includes CAP_PERFMON.
2) support for narrow loads in bpf_sock_addr progs and additional
helpers in cg-skb progs, from Andrey.
3) bpf benchmark runner, from Andrii.
4) arm and riscv JIT optimizations, from Luke.
5) bpf iterator infrastructure, from Yonghong.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
There's no callers in-tree.
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip into bpf-next
CAP_PERFMON for BPF
|
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It is simpler to allocate them statically in the corresponding
structure, avoiding unnecessary kmalloc() calls and pointer
dereferencing.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: manual merging required in policydb.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
The value of rc is still zero from the last assignment when the error
path is taken. Fix it by setting it to -ENOMEM before the
hashtab_create() call.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: e67b2ec9f617 ("selinux: store role transitions in a hash table")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
No need to traverse the hashtab to count its elements, hashtab already
tracks it for us.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Fix to return negative error code -ENOMEM from the kvcalloc() error
handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.
Fixes: acdf52d97f82 ("selinux: convert to kvmalloc")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two more SELinux patches to fix problems in the v5.7-rcX releases.
Wei Yongjun's patch fixes a return code in an error path, and my patch
fixes a problem where we were not correctly applying access controls
to all of the netlink messages in the netlink_send LSM hook"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200430' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()
selinux: fix error return code in cond_read_list()
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|
Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink
messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to
SELinux access control. Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected
the first message in the sk_buff.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Fix to return negative error code -ENOMEM from the error handling
case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.
Fixes: 60abd3181db2 ("selinux: convert cond_list to array")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
I thought I fixed the counting in filename_trans_read_helper() to count
the compat rule count correctly in the final version, but it's still
wrong. To really count the same thing as in the compat path, we'd need
to add up the cardinalities of stype bitmaps of all datums.
Since the kernel currently doesn't implement an ebitmap_cardinality()
function (and computing the proper count would just waste CPU cycles
anyway), just document that we use the field only in case of the old
format and stop updating it in filename_trans_read_helper().
Fixes: 430059024389 ("selinux: implement new format of filename transitions")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux into perf/core
Pull perf/core fixes and improvements from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
kernel + tools/perf:
Alexey Budankov:
- Introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space.
callchains:
Adrian Hunter:
- Allow using Intel PT to synthesize callchains for regular events.
Kan Liang:
- Stitch LBR records from multiple samples to get deeper backtraces,
there are caveats, see the csets for details.
perf script:
Andreas Gerstmayr:
- Add flamegraph.py script
BPF:
Jiri Olsa:
- Synthesize bpf_trampoline/dispatcher ksymbol events.
perf stat:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
- Honour --timeout for forked workloads.
Stephane Eranian:
- Force error in fallback on :k events, to avoid counting nothing when
the user asks for kernel events but is not allowed to.
perf bench:
Ian Rogers:
- Add event synthesis benchmark.
tools api fs:
Stephane Eranian:
- Make xxx__mountpoint() more scalable
libtraceevent:
He Zhe:
- Handle return value of asprintf.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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|
Implement a new, more space-efficient way of storing filename
transitions in the binary policy. The internal structures have already
been converted to this new representation; this patch just implements
reading/writing an equivalent represntation from/to the binary policy.
This new format reduces the size of Fedora policy from 7.6 MB to only
3.3 MB (with policy optimization enabled in both cases). With the
unconfined module disabled, the size is reduced from 3.3 MB to 2.4 MB.
The time to load policy into kernel is also shorter with the new format.
On Fedora Rawhide x86_64 it dropped from 157 ms to 106 ms; without the
unconfined module from 115 ms to 105 ms.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Now that context hash computation no longer depends on policydb, we can
simplify things by moving the context hashing completely under sidtab.
The hash is still cached in sidtab entries, but not for the in-flight
context structures.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
Always hashing the string representation is inefficient. Just hash the
contents of the structure directly (using jhash). If the context is
invalid (str & len are set), then hash the string as before, otherwise
hash the structured data.
Since the context hashing function is now faster (about 10 times), this
patch decreases the overhead of security_transition_sid(), which is
called from many hooks.
The jhash function seemed as a good choice, since it is used as the
default hashing algorithm in rhashtable.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
[PM: fixed some spelling errors in the comments pointed out by JVS]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
Currently, they are stored in a linked list, which adds significant
overhead to security_transition_sid(). On Fedora, with 428 role
transitions in policy, converting this list to a hash table cuts down
its run time by about 50%. This was measured by running 'stress-ng --msg
1 --msg-ops 100000' under perf with and without this patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small SELinux fix to ensure we cleanup properly on an error
condition"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200416' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: free str on error in str_read()
|
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Introduce the CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system
performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON
can assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for
performance monitoring and observability subsystems.
CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance
monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that
is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access
to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON
capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure.
Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for
performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e:
2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that
states that a process or program be granted only those privileges
(e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function,
and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and
observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted,
multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute
environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to
mass users of a system, and securely unblocks applicability and scalability
of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root
and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.
CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance
monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN
credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1]
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel
developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system
performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations
is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance
of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues
following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs
in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development
process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring
and observability operations.
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5590d543-82c6-490a-6544-08e6a5517db0@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
In commit 66f8e2f03c02 ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table") the
corresponding load is moved under the spin lock, so there is no race
possible and we can read the count directly. The smp_store_release() is
still needed to avoid racing with the lock-free readers.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
In [see "Fixes:"] I missed the fact that str_read() may give back an
allocated pointer even if it returns an error, causing a potential
memory leak in filename_trans_read_one(). Fix this by making the
function free the allocated string whenever it returns a non-zero value,
which also makes its behavior more obvious and prevents repeating the
same mistake in the future.
Reported-by: coverity-bot <keescook+coverity-bot@chromium.org>
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1461665 ("Resource leaks")
Fixes: c3a276111ea2 ("selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
fix below warnings reported by coccicheck
security/selinux/ss/mls.c:539:39-43: WARNING: Comparison to bool
security/selinux/ss/services.c:1815:46-50: WARNING: Comparison to bool
security/selinux/ss/services.c:1827:46-50: WARNING: Comparison to bool
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zou Wei <zou_wei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx
Pull SPDX updates from Greg KH:
"Here are three SPDX patches for 5.7-rc1.
One fixes up the SPDX tag for a single driver, while the other two go
through the tree and add SPDX tags for all of the .gitignore files as
needed.
Nothing too complex, but you will get a merge conflict with your
current tree, that should be trivial to handle (one file modified by
two things, one file deleted.)
All three of these have been in linux-next for a while, with no
reported issues other than the merge conflict"
* tag 'spdx-5.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx:
ASoC: MT6660: make spdxcheck.py happy
.gitignore: add SPDX License Identifier
.gitignore: remove too obvious comments
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got twenty SELinux patches for the v5.7 merge window, the
highlights are below:
- Deprecate setting /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot to 1.
This flag was originally created to deal with legacy userspace and
the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag. We changed the default from
1 to 0 back in Linux v4.4 and now we are taking the next step of
deprecating it, at some point in the future we will take the final
step of rejecting 1.
- Allow kernfs symlinks to inherit the SELinux label of the parent
directory. In order to preserve backwards compatibility this is
protected by the genfs_seclabel_symlinks SELinux policy capability.
- Optimize how we store filename transitions in the kernel, resulting
in some significant improvements to policy load times.
- Do a better job calculating our internal hash table sizes which
resulted in additional policy load improvements and likely general
SELinux performance improvements as well.
- Remove the unused initial SIDs (labels) and improve how we handle
initial SIDs.
- Enable per-file labeling for the bpf filesystem.
- Ensure that we properly label NFS v4.2 filesystems to avoid a
temporary unlabeled condition.
- Add some missing XFS quota command types to the SELinux quota
access controls.
- Fix a problem where we were not updating the seq_file position
index correctly in selinuxfs.
- We consolidate some duplicated code into helper functions.
- A number of list to array conversions.
- Update Stephen Smalley's email address in MAINTAINERS"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200330' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: clean up indentation issue with assignment statement
NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode
MAINTAINERS: Update my email address
selinux: avtab_init() and cond_policydb_init() return void
selinux: clean up error path in policydb_init()
selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling
selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizes
selinux: Add xfs quota command types
selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions
selinux: factor out loop body from filename_trans_read()
security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs
selinux: generalize evaluate_cond_node()
selinux: convert cond_expr to array
selinux: convert cond_av_list to array
selinux: convert cond_list to array
selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position index
selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context
selinux: simplify evaluate_cond_node()
Documentation,selinux: deprecate setting checkreqprot to 1
selinux: move status variables out of selinux_ss
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The assignment of e->type_names is indented one level too deep,
clean this up by removing the extraneous tab.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add SPDX License Identifier to all .gitignore files.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The avtab_init() and cond_policydb_init() functions always return
zero so mark them as returning void and update the callers not to
check for a return value.
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Commit e0ac568de1fa ("selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizes")
moved symtab initialization out of policydb_init(), but left the cleanup
of symtabs from the error path. This patch fixes the oversight.
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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