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2014-04-14selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loadedPaul Moore1-9/+27
commit f64410ec665479d7b4b77b7519e814253ed0f686 upstream. This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes the problem below: "If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry() on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does: /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ isec->sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { if (opt_dentry) { isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...) rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry, isec->sclass, &sid); if (rc) goto out_unlock; isec->sid = sid; } } Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid() and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock. I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..." On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in /proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were accessed early in the boot), for example: # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }' system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax However, with this patch in place we see the expected result: # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }' system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-29SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()Steven Rostedt1-2/+18
commit 3dc91d4338d698ce77832985f9cb183d8eeaf6be upstream. While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit this bug: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20 Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006 task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>] [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000 RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54 R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0 Call Trace: security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30 __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0 inode_permission+0x18/0x50 link_path_walk+0x66/0x920 path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0 do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0 do_sys_open+0x146/0x240 SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff RIP selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 CR2: 0000000000000020 Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the dereference of it caused the oops. in selinux_inode_permission(): isec = inode->i_security; rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs files. I was not able to recreate this via normal files. But I'm not sure they are safe. It may just be that the race window is much harder to hit. What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted. As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock(). The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct. Now if the freeing of the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then there will be no issue here. (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the permission check). Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand. A real fix is to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers from the RCU callback. But that is a major job to do, and requires a lot of work. For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-08selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in ↵Paul Moore1-7/+36
selinux_ip_postroute() commit c0828e50485932b7e019df377a6b0a8d1ebd3080 upstream. Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-08selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packetsPaul Moore1-1/+1
commit 817eff718dca4e54d5721211ddde0914428fbb7c upstream. Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security labels. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-08selinux: selinux_setprocattr()->ptrace_parent() needs rcu_read_lock()Oleg Nesterov1-2/+2
commit c0c1439541f5305b57a83d599af32b74182933fe upstream. selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p), but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace, this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage" warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check(). And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable() doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access the ->parent. Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-08selinux: fix broken peer recv checkChad Hanson1-1/+3
commit 46d01d63221c3508421dd72ff9c879f61053cffc upstream. Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is ignored. Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-12-20selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()Paul Moore1-15/+53
commit 446b802437f285de68ffb8d6fac3c44c3cab5b04 upstream. In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock, not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that originally labeled the associated request_sock. See the inline comments for more explanation. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-12-20selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()Paul Moore1-2/+23
commit 47180068276a04ed31d24fe04c673138208b07a9 upstream. In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval socket represented by the request_sock struct. Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet. It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about information leaks. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-08-09posix_types.h: Cleanup stale __NFDBITS and related definitionsJosh Boyer1-1/+1
commit 8ded2bbc1845e19c771eb55209aab166ef011243 upstream. Recently, glibc made a change to suppress sign-conversion warnings in FD_SET (glibc commit ceb9e56b3d1). This uncovered an issue with the kernel's definition of __NFDBITS if applications #include <linux/types.h> after including <sys/select.h>. A build failure would be seen when passing the -Werror=sign-compare and -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 flags to gcc. It was suggested that the kernel should either match the glibc definition of __NFDBITS or remove that entirely. The current in-kernel uses of __NFDBITS can be replaced with BITS_PER_LONG, and there are no uses of the related __FDELT and __FDMASK defines. Given that, we'll continue the cleanup that was started with commit 8b3d1cda4f5f ("posix_types: Remove fd_set macros") and drop the remaining unused macros. Additionally, linux/time.h has similar macros defined that expand to nothing so we'll remove those at the same time. Reported-by: Jeff Law <law@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> [ .. and fix up whitespace as per akpm ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-04-03LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data unionEric Paris1-42/+63
After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm not going to shrink the data union. To do this I'm going to move anything larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared separately on the calling stack. Thus hot paths which don't need more than a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded structures. I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key struct and the struct path. We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of networking. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-04-03LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_dataEric Paris1-1/+70
Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a bigger space requirement. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-04-01get rid of pointless includes of ext2_fs.hAl Viro1-5/+4
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-03-30Merge branch 'x86-x32-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x32 support for x86-64 from Ingo Molnar: "This tree introduces the X32 binary format and execution mode for x86: 32-bit data space binaries using 64-bit instructions and 64-bit kernel syscalls. This allows applications whose working set fits into a 32 bits address space to make use of 64-bit instructions while using a 32-bit address space with shorter pointers, more compressed data structures, etc." Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/{Kconfig,vdso/vma.c} * 'x86-x32-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (71 commits) x32: Fix alignment fail in struct compat_siginfo x32: Fix stupid ia32/x32 inversion in the siginfo format x32: Add ptrace for x32 x32: Switch to a 64-bit clock_t x32: Provide separate is_ia32_task() and is_x32_task() predicates x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls x86/x32: Fix the binutils auto-detect x32: Warn and disable rather than error if binutils too old x32: Only clear TIF_X32 flag once x32: Make sure TS_COMPAT is cleared for x32 tasks fs: Remove missed ->fds_bits from cessation use of fd_set structs internally fs: Fix close_on_exec pointer in alloc_fdtable x32: Drop non-__vdso weak symbols from the x32 VDSO x32: Fix coding style violations in the x32 VDSO code x32: Add x32 VDSO support x32: Allow x32 to be configured x32: If configured, add x32 system calls to system call tables x32: Handle process creation x32: Signal-related system calls x86: Add #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT to <asm/sys_ia32.h> ...
2012-02-19Replace the fd_sets in struct fdtable with an array of unsigned longsDavid Howells1-1/+1
Replace the fd_sets in struct fdtable with an array of unsigned longs and then use the standard non-atomic bit operations rather than the FD_* macros. This: (1) Removes the abuses of struct fd_set: (a) Since we don't want to allocate a full fd_set the vast majority of the time, we actually, in effect, just allocate a just-big-enough array of unsigned longs and cast it to an fd_set type - so why bother with the fd_set at all? (b) Some places outside of the core fdtable handling code (such as SELinux) want to look inside the array of unsigned longs hidden inside the fd_set struct for more efficient iteration over the entire set. (2) Eliminates the use of FD_*() macros in the kernel completely. (3) Permits the __FD_*() macros to be deleted entirely where not exposed to userspace. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174954.23314.48147.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-02-14security: trim security.hAl Viro1-0/+2
Trim security.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-01-15Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-securityLinus Torvalds1-33/+11
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable() ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert() Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv(): - the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()") - a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add userspace configuration API") causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the issue.
2012-01-09Merge branch 'for-linus2' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-5/+5
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs * 'for-linus2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (165 commits) reiserfs: Properly display mount options in /proc/mounts vfs: prevent remount read-only if pending removes vfs: count unlinked inodes vfs: protect remounting superblock read-only vfs: keep list of mounts for each superblock vfs: switch ->show_options() to struct dentry * vfs: switch ->show_path() to struct dentry * vfs: switch ->show_devname() to struct dentry * vfs: switch ->show_stats to struct dentry * switch security_path_chmod() to struct path * vfs: prefer ->dentry->d_sb to ->mnt->mnt_sb vfs: trim includes a bit switch mnt_namespace ->root to struct mount vfs: take /proc/*/mounts and friends to fs/proc_namespace.c vfs: opencode mntget() mnt_set_mountpoint() vfs: spread struct mount - remaining argument of next_mnt() vfs: move fsnotify junk to struct mount vfs: move mnt_devname vfs: move mnt_list to struct mount vfs: switch pnode.h macros to struct mount * ...
2012-01-07vfs: prefer ->dentry->d_sb to ->mnt->mnt_sbAl Viro1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-06security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()Eric Paris1-19/+0
Once upon a time netlink was not sync and we had to get the effective capabilities from the skb that was being received. Today we instead get the capabilities from the current task. This has rendered the entire purpose of the hook moot as it is now functionally equivalent to the capable() call. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-06ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/statEric Paris1-1/+1
Reading /proc/pid/stat of another process checks if one has ptrace permissions on that process. If one does have permissions it outputs some data about the process which might have security and attack implications. If the current task does not have ptrace permissions the read still works, but those fields are filled with inocuous (0) values. Since this check and a subsequent denial is not a violation of the security policy we should not audit such denials. This can be quite useful to removing ptrace broadly across a system without flooding the logs when ps is run or something which harmlessly walks proc. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
2012-01-06capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirelyEric Paris1-13/+10
The capabilities framework is based around credentials, not necessarily the current task. Yet we still passed the current task down into LSMs from the security_capable() LSM hook as if it was a meaningful portion of the security decision. This patch removes the 'generic' passing of current and instead forces individual LSMs to use current explicitly if they think it is appropriate. In our case those LSMs are SELinux and AppArmor. I believe the AppArmor use of current is incorrect, but that is wholely unrelated to this patch. This patch does not change what AppArmor does, it just makes it clear in the AppArmor code that it is doing it. The SELinux code still uses current in it's audit message, which may also be wrong and needs further investigation. Again this is NOT a change, it may have always been wrong, this patch just makes it clear what is happening. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-06selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server codJames Morris1-4/+1
Fix several sparse warnings in the SELinux security server code. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-06selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink codeJames Morris1-1/+0
Fix sparse warnings in SELinux Netlink code. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-06selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfsJames Morris1-5/+0
Fixes several sparse warnings for selinuxfs.c Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-06selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount staticJames Morris1-1/+1
Sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-04get rid of open-coded S_ISREG(), etc.Al Viro1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-04switch ->mknod() to umode_tAl Viro1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-04switch ->create() to umode_tAl Viro1-1/+1
vfs_create() ignores everything outside of 16bit subset of its mode argument; switching it to umode_t is obviously equivalent and it's the only caller of the method Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-04switch vfs_mkdir() and ->mkdir() to umode_tAl Viro1-1/+1
vfs_mkdir() gets int, but immediately drops everything that might not fit into umode_t and that's the only caller of ->mkdir()... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2011-12-06inet_diag: Partly rename inet_ to sock_Pavel Emelyanov1-1/+1
The ultimate goal is to get the sock_diag module, that works in family+protocol terms. Currently this is suitable to do on the inet_diag basis, so rename parts of the code. It will be moved to sock_diag.c later. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-12-03ipv6: Add fragment reporting to ipv6_skip_exthdr().Jesse Gross1-1/+2
While parsing through IPv6 extension headers, fragment headers are skipped making them invisible to the caller. This reports the fragment offset of the last header in order to make it possible to determine whether the packet is fragmented and, if so whether it is a first or last fragment. Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com>
2011-11-23net: remove ipv6_addr_copy()Alexey Dobriyan1-3/+3
C assignment can handle struct in6_addr copying. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-11-01selinux: Add export.h to files using EXPORT_SYMBOL/THIS_MODULEPaul Gortmaker1-0/+1
The pervasive, but implicit presence of <linux/module.h> meant that things like this file would happily compile as-is. But with the desire to phase out the module.h being included everywhere, point this file at export.h which will give it THIS_MODULE and the EXPORT_SYMBOL variants. Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2011-09-10selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server codeJames Morris1-4/+1
Fix several sparse warnings in the SELinux security server code. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-09-10selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink codeJames Morris1-1/+0
Fix sparse warnings in SELinux Netlink code. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-09-10selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfsJames Morris1-5/+0
Fixes several sparse warnings for selinuxfs.c Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-09-10selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount staticJames Morris1-1/+1
Sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-08-02doc: Update the email address for Paul Moore in various source filesPaul Moore1-1/+1
My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is necessary. My new email address is employer independent so we don't have to worry about doing this again any time soon. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-07-27atomic: use <linux/atomic.h>Arun Sharma1-1/+1
This allows us to move duplicated code in <asm/atomic.h> (atomic_inc_not_zero() for now) to <linux/atomic.h> Signed-off-by: Arun Sharma <asharma@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-07-23Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (107 commits) vfs: use ERR_CAST for err-ptr tossing in lookup_instantiate_filp isofs: Remove global fs lock jffs2: fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() killing a directory fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() on ramfs et.al. mm/truncate.c: fix build for CONFIG_BLOCK not enabled fs:update the NOTE of the file_operations structure Remove dead code in dget_parent() AFS: Fix silly characters in a comment switch d_add_ci() to d_splice_alias() in "found negative" case as well simplify gfs2_lookup() jfs_lookup(): don't bother with . or .. get rid of useless dget_parent() in btrfs rename() and link() get rid of useless dget_parent() in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c fs: push i_mutex and filemap_write_and_wait down into ->fsync() handlers drivers: fix up various ->llseek() implementations fs: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA properly in all fs's that define their own llseek Ext4: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA generically Btrfs: implement our own ->llseek fs: add SEEK_HOLE and SEEK_DATA flags reiserfs: make reiserfs default to barrier=flush ... Fix up trivial conflicts in fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_super.c due to the new shrinker callout for the inode cache, that clashed with the xfs code to start the periodic workers later.
2011-07-23Merge branch 'ptrace' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/oleg/miscLinus Torvalds1-2/+2
* 'ptrace' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/oleg/misc: (39 commits) ptrace: do_wait(traced_leader_killed_by_mt_exec) can block forever ptrace: fix ptrace_signal() && STOP_DEQUEUED interaction connector: add an event for monitoring process tracers ptrace: dont send SIGSTOP on auto-attach if PT_SEIZED ptrace: mv send-SIGSTOP from do_fork() to ptrace_init_task() ptrace_init_task: initialize child->jobctl explicitly has_stopped_jobs: s/task_is_stopped/SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED/ ptrace: make former thread ID available via PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG after PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stop ptrace: wait_consider_task: s/same_thread_group/ptrace_reparented/ ptrace: kill real_parent_is_ptracer() in in favor of ptrace_reparented() ptrace: ptrace_reparented() should check same_thread_group() redefine thread_group_leader() as exit_signal >= 0 do not change dead_task->exit_signal kill task_detached() reparent_leader: check EXIT_DEAD instead of task_detached() make do_notify_parent() __must_check, update the callers __ptrace_detach: avoid task_detached(), check do_notify_parent() kill tracehook_notify_death() make do_notify_parent() return bool ptrace: s/tracehook_tracer_task()/ptrace_parent()/ ...
2011-07-20selinux: don't transliterate MAY_NOT_BLOCK to IPERM_FLAG_RCUAl Viro1-2/+2
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2011-07-20->permission() sanitizing: don't pass flags to ->inode_permission()Al Viro1-2/+3
pass that via mask instead. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2011-06-22ptrace: s/tracehook_tracer_task()/ptrace_parent()/Tejun Heo1-2/+2
tracehook.h is on the way out. Rename tracehook_tracer_task() to ptrace_parent() and move it from tracehook.h to ptrace.h. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
2011-06-09selinux: simplify and clean up inode_has_perm()Linus Torvalds1-10/+15
This is a rather hot function that is called with a potentially NULL "struct common_audit_data" pointer argument. And in that case it has to provide and initialize its own dummy common_audit_data structure. However, all the _common_ cases already pass it a real audit-data structure, so that uncommon NULL case not only creates a silly run-time test, more importantly it causes that function to have a big stack frame for the dummy variable that isn't even used in the common case! So get rid of that stupid run-time behavior, and make the (few) functions that currently call with a NULL pointer just call a new helper function instead (naturally called inode_has_perm_noapd(), since it has no adp argument). This makes the run-time test be a static code generation issue instead, and allows for a much denser stack since none of the common callers need the dummy structure. And a denser stack not only means less stack space usage, it means better cache behavior. So we have a win-win-win from this simplification: less code executed, smaller stack footprint, and better cache behavior. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-05-24Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into ↵James Morris1-37/+55
for-linus Conflicts: lib/flex_array.c security/selinux/avc.c security/selinux/hooks.c security/selinux/ss/policydb.c security/smack/smack_lsm.c Manually resolve conflicts. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-05-04Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux ↵James Morris1-1/+2
into for-linus
2011-04-29SELinux: pass last path component in may_createEric Paris1-1/+2
New inodes are created in a two stage process. We first will compute the label on a new inode in security_inode_create() and check if the operation is allowed. We will then actually re-compute that same label and apply it in security_inode_init_security(). The change to do new label calculations based in part on the last component of the path name only passed the path component information all the way down the security_inode_init_security hook. Down the security_inode_create hook the path information did not make it past may_create. Thus the two calculations came up differently and the permissions check might not actually be against the label that is created. Pass and use the same information in both places to harmonize the calculations and checks. Reported-by: Dominick Grift <domg472@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2011-04-29SELinux: introduce path_has_permEric Paris1-14/+30
We currently have inode_has_perm and dentry_has_perm. dentry_has_perm just calls inode_has_perm with additional audit data. But dentry_has_perm can take either a dentry or a path. Split those to make the code obvious and to fix the previous problem where I thought dentry_has_perm always had a valid dentry and mnt. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2011-04-28SELinux: pass last path component in may_createEric Paris1-1/+2
New inodes are created in a two stage process. We first will compute the label on a new inode in security_inode_create() and check if the operation is allowed. We will then actually re-compute that same label and apply it in security_inode_init_security(). The change to do new label calculations based in part on the last component of the path name only passed the path component information all the way down the security_inode_init_security hook. Down the security_inode_create hook the path information did not make it past may_create. Thus the two calculations came up differently and the permissions check might not actually be against the label that is created. Pass and use the same information in both places to harmonize the calculations and checks. Reported-by: Dominick Grift <domg472@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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