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6 daysKEYS: trusted: Fix a memory leak in tpm2_load_cmdJarkko Sakkinen1-2/+4
commit 62cd5d480b9762ce70d720a81fa5b373052ae05f upstream. 'tpm2_load_cmd' allocates a tempoary blob indirectly via 'tpm2_key_decode' but it is not freed in the failure paths. Address this by wrapping the blob into with a cleanup helper. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-10-19KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant timeEric Biggers1-3/+4
commit eed0e3d305530066b4fc5370107cff8ef1a0d229 upstream. To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant time. Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq(). [For the Fixes commit I used the commit that introduced the memcmp(). It predates the introduction of crypto_memneq(), but it was still a bug at the time even though a helper function didn't exist yet.] Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-11-14security/keys: fix slab-out-of-bounds in key_task_permissionChen Ridong1-2/+5
[ Upstream commit 4a74da044ec9ec8679e6beccc4306b936b62873f ] KASAN reports an out of bounds read: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __kuid_val include/linux/uidgid.h:36 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in uid_eq include/linux/uidgid.h:63 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in key_task_permission+0x394/0x410 security/keys/permission.c:54 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88813c3ab618 by task stress-ng/4362 CPU: 2 PID: 4362 Comm: stress-ng Not tainted 5.10.0-14930-gafbffd6c3ede #15 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:82 [inline] dump_stack+0x107/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:123 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:400 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 mm/kasan/report.c:560 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 mm/kasan/report.c:585 __kuid_val include/linux/uidgid.h:36 [inline] uid_eq include/linux/uidgid.h:63 [inline] key_task_permission+0x394/0x410 security/keys/permission.c:54 search_nested_keyrings+0x90e/0xe90 security/keys/keyring.c:793 This issue was also reported by syzbot. It can be reproduced by following these steps(more details [1]): 1. Obtain more than 32 inputs that have similar hashes, which ends with the pattern '0xxxxxxxe6'. 2. Reboot and add the keys obtained in step 1. The reproducer demonstrates how this issue happened: 1. In the search_nested_keyrings function, when it iterates through the slots in a node(below tag ascend_to_node), if the slot pointer is meta and node->back_pointer != NULL(it means a root), it will proceed to descend_to_node. However, there is an exception. If node is the root, and one of the slots points to a shortcut, it will be treated as a keyring. 2. Whether the ptr is keyring decided by keyring_ptr_is_keyring function. However, KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE is 0x2UL, the same as ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SUBTYPE_MASK. 3. When 32 keys with the similar hashes are added to the tree, the ROOT has keys with hashes that are not similar (e.g. slot 0) and it splits NODE A without using a shortcut. When NODE A is filled with keys that all hashes are xxe6, the keys are similar, NODE A will split with a shortcut. Finally, it forms the tree as shown below, where slot 6 points to a shortcut. NODE A +------>+---+ ROOT | | 0 | xxe6 +---+ | +---+ xxxx | 0 | shortcut : : xxe6 +---+ | +---+ xxe6 : : | | | xxe6 +---+ | +---+ | 6 |---+ : : xxe6 +---+ +---+ xxe6 : : | f | xxe6 +---+ +---+ xxe6 | f | +---+ 4. As mentioned above, If a slot(slot 6) of the root points to a shortcut, it may be mistakenly transferred to a key*, leading to a read out-of-bounds read. To fix this issue, one should jump to descend_to_node if the ptr is a shortcut, regardless of whether the node is root or not. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/1cfa878e-8c7b-4570-8606-21daf5e13ce7@huaweicloud.com/ [jarkko: tweaked the commit message a bit to have an appropriate closes tag.] Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring") Reported-by: syzbot+5b415c07907a2990d1a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000cbb7860611f61147@google.com/T/ Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-08-19task_work: s/task_work_cancel()/task_work_cancel_func()/Frederic Weisbecker1-1/+1
commit 68cbd415dd4b9c5b9df69f0f091879e56bf5907a upstream. A proper task_work_cancel() API that actually cancels a callback and not *any* callback pointing to a given function is going to be needed for perf events event freeing. Do the appropriate rename to prepare for that. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240621091601.18227-2-frederic@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-25KEYS: trusted: Do not use WARN when encode failsJarkko Sakkinen1-1/+2
commit 050bf3c793a07f96bd1e2fd62e1447f731ed733b upstream. When asn1_encode_sequence() fails, WARN is not the correct solution. 1. asn1_encode_sequence() is not an internal function (located in lib/asn1_encode.c). 2. Location is known, which makes the stack trace useless. 3. Results a crash if panic_on_warn is set. It is also noteworthy that the use of WARN is undocumented, and it should be avoided unless there is a carefully considered rationale to use it. Replace WARN with pr_err, and print the return value instead, which is only useful piece of information. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-25KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak in tpm2_key_encode()Jarkko Sakkinen1-6/+18
commit ffcaa2172cc1a85ddb8b783de96d38ca8855e248 upstream. 'scratch' is never freed. Fix this by calling kfree() in the success, and in the error case. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # +v5.13 Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-17keys: Fix overwrite of key expiration on instantiationSilvio Gissi1-1/+2
commit 9da27fb65a14c18efd4473e2e82b76b53ba60252 upstream. The expiry time of a key is unconditionally overwritten during instantiation, defaulting to turn it permanent. This causes a problem for DNS resolution as the expiration set by user-space is overwritten to TIME64_MAX, disabling further DNS updates. Fix this by restoring the condition that key_set_expiry is only called when the pre-parser sets a specific expiry. Fixes: 39299bdd2546 ("keys, dns: Allow key types (eg. DNS) to be reclaimed immediately on expiry") Signed-off-by: Silvio Gissi <sifonsec@amazon.com> cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Hazem Mohamed Abuelfotoh <abuehaze@amazon.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-01-05keys, dns: Allow key types (eg. DNS) to be reclaimed immediately on expiryDavid Howells4-22/+37
[ Upstream commit 39299bdd2546688d92ed9db4948f6219ca1b9542 ] If a key has an expiration time, then when that time passes, the key is left around for a certain amount of time before being collected (5 mins by default) so that EKEYEXPIRED can be returned instead of ENOKEY. This is a problem for DNS keys because we want to redo the DNS lookup immediately at that point. Fix this by allowing key types to be marked such that keys of that type don't have this extra period, but are reclaimed as soon as they expire and turn this on for dns_resolver-type keys. To make this easier to handle, key->expiry is changed to be permanent if TIME64_MAX rather than 0. Furthermore, give such new-style negative DNS results a 1s default expiry if no other expiry time is set rather than allowing it to stick around indefinitely. This shouldn't be zero as ls will follow a failing stat call immediately with a second with AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW added. Fixes: 1a4240f4764a ("DNS: Separate out CIFS DNS Resolver code") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Markus Suvanto <markus.suvanto@gmail.com> cc: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com> cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-11-28KEYS: trusted: Rollback init_trusted() consistentlyJarkko Sakkinen1-10/+10
commit 31de287345f41bbfaec36a5c8cbdba035cf76442 upstream. Do bind neither static calls nor trusted_key_exit() before a successful init, in order to maintain a consistent state. In addition, depart the init_trusted() in the case of a real error (i.e. getting back something else than -ENODEV). Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/CAHk-=whOPoLaWM8S8GgoOPT7a2+nMH5h3TLKtn=R_3w4R1_Uvg@mail.gmail.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-10-20KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usageSumit Garg1-8/+5
[ Upstream commit 01bbafc63b65689cb179ca537971286bc27f3b74 ] Static calls invocations aren't well supported from module __init and __exit functions. Especially the static call from cleanup_trusted() led to a crash on x86 kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y. However, the usage of static call invocations for trusted_key_init() and trusted_key_exit() don't add any value from either a performance or security perspective. Hence switch to use indirect function calls instead. Note here that although it will fix the current crash report, ultimately the static call infrastructure should be fixed to either support its future usage from module __init and __exit functions or not. Reported-and-tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZRhKq6e5nF%2F4ZIV1@fedora/#t Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework") Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-10-20KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key materialAhmad Fatoum1-1/+34
[ Upstream commit fcd7c26901c83681532c6daac599e53d4df11738 ] The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG, but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also generate the random key material. However, both users and future backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources. Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter, that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use, maintaining the existing behavior. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E) Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: 01bbafc63b65 ("KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usage") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-09-19security: keys: perform capable check only on privileged operationsChristian Göttsche1-3/+8
[ Upstream commit 2d7f105edbb3b2be5ffa4d833abbf9b6965e9ce7 ] If the current task fails the check for the queried capability via `capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)` LSMs like SELinux generate a denial message. Issuing such denial messages unnecessarily can lead to a policy author granting more privileges to a subject than needed to silence them. Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks after the check whether the operation is actually privileged. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-27security: keys: Modify mismatched function nameJiapeng Chong1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 2a4152742025c5f21482e8cebc581702a0fa5b01 ] No functional modification involved. security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:203: warning: expecting prototype for tpm_buf_append_auth(). Prototype was for tpm2_buf_append_auth() instead. Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code") Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=5524 Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-27keys: Fix linking a duplicate key to a keyring's assoc_arrayPetr Pavlu1-11/+24
commit d55901522f96082a43b9842d34867363c0cdbac5 upstream. When making a DNS query inside the kernel using dns_query(), the request code can in rare cases end up creating a duplicate index key in the assoc_array of the destination keyring. It is eventually found by a BUG_ON() check in the assoc_array implementation and results in a crash. Example report: [2158499.700025] kernel BUG at ../lib/assoc_array.c:652! [2158499.700039] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [2158499.700065] CPU: 3 PID: 31985 Comm: kworker/3:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.3.18-150300.59.90-default #1 SLE15-SP3 [2158499.700096] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 [2158499.700351] Workqueue: cifsiod cifs_resolve_server [cifs] [2158499.700380] RIP: 0010:assoc_array_insert+0x85f/0xa40 [2158499.700401] Code: ff 74 2b 48 8b 3b 49 8b 45 18 4c 89 e6 48 83 e7 fe e8 95 ec 74 00 3b 45 88 7d db 85 c0 79 d4 0f 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b e8 41 f2 be ff <0f> 0b 0f 0b 81 7d 88 ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 eb 4c 8b ad 58 ff ff ff 0f [2158499.700448] RSP: 0018:ffffc0bd6187faf0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [2158499.700470] RAX: ffff9f1ea7da2fe8 RBX: ffff9f1ea7da2fc1 RCX: 0000000000000005 [2158499.700492] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000000 [2158499.700515] RBP: ffffc0bd6187fbb0 R08: ffff9f185faf1100 R09: 0000000000000000 [2158499.700538] R10: ffff9f1ea7da2cc0 R11: 000000005ed8cec8 R12: ffffc0bd6187fc28 [2158499.700561] R13: ffff9f15feb8d000 R14: ffff9f1ea7da2fc0 R15: ffff9f168dc0d740 [2158499.700585] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f185fac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [2158499.700610] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [2158499.700630] CR2: 00007fdd94fca238 CR3: 0000000809d8c006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [2158499.700702] Call Trace: [2158499.700741] ? key_alloc+0x447/0x4b0 [2158499.700768] ? __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0 [2158499.700790] __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0 [2158499.700814] request_key_and_link+0x2c7/0x730 [2158499.700847] ? dns_resolver_read+0x20/0x20 [dns_resolver] [2158499.700873] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [2158499.700898] request_key_tag+0x43/0xa0 [2158499.700926] dns_query+0x114/0x2ca [dns_resolver] [2158499.701127] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x194/0x310 [cifs] [2158499.701164] ? scnprintf+0x49/0x90 [2158499.701190] ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70 [2158499.701211] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 [2158499.701405] reconn_set_ipaddr_from_hostname+0x81/0x2a0 [cifs] [2158499.701603] cifs_resolve_server+0x4b/0xd0 [cifs] [2158499.701632] process_one_work+0x1f8/0x3e0 [2158499.701658] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3f0 [2158499.701682] ? process_one_work+0x3e0/0x3e0 [2158499.701703] kthread+0x10d/0x130 [2158499.701723] ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0 [2158499.701746] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 The situation occurs as follows: * Some kernel facility invokes dns_query() to resolve a hostname, for example, "abcdef". The function registers its global DNS resolver cache as current->cred.thread_keyring and passes the query to request_key_net() -> request_key_tag() -> request_key_and_link(). * Function request_key_and_link() creates a keyring_search_context object. Its match_data.cmp method gets set via a call to type->match_preparse() (resolves to dns_resolver_match_preparse()) to dns_resolver_cmp(). * Function request_key_and_link() continues and invokes search_process_keyrings_rcu() which returns that a given key was not found. The control is then passed to request_key_and_link() -> construct_alloc_key(). * Concurrently to that, a second task similarly makes a DNS query for "abcdef." and its result gets inserted into the DNS resolver cache. * Back on the first task, function construct_alloc_key() first runs __key_link_begin() to determine an assoc_array_edit operation to insert a new key. Index keys in the array are compared exactly as-is, using keyring_compare_object(). The operation finds that "abcdef" is not yet present in the destination keyring. * Function construct_alloc_key() continues and checks if a given key is already present on some keyring by again calling search_process_keyrings_rcu(). This search is done using dns_resolver_cmp() and "abcdef" gets matched with now present key "abcdef.". * The found key is linked on the destination keyring by calling __key_link() and using the previously calculated assoc_array_edit operation. This inserts the "abcdef." key in the array but creates a duplicity because the same index key is already present. Fix the problem by postponing __key_link_begin() in construct_alloc_key() until an actual key which should be linked into the destination keyring is determined. [jarkko@kernel.org: added a fixes tag and cc to stable] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+ Fixes: df593ee23e05 ("keys: Hoist locking out of __key_link_begin()") Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joey Lee <jlee@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-03-30keys: Do not cache key in task struct if key is requested from kernel threadDavid Howells1-3/+6
[ Upstream commit 47f9e4c924025c5be87959d3335e66fcbb7f6b5c ] The key which gets cached in task structure from a kernel thread does not get invalidated even after expiry. Due to which, a new key request from kernel thread will be served with the cached key if it's present in task struct irrespective of the key validity. The change is to not cache key in task_struct when key requested from kernel thread so that kernel thread gets a valid key on every key request. The problem has been seen with the cifs module doing DNS lookups from a kernel thread and the results getting pinned by being attached to that kernel thread's cache - and thus not something that can be easily got rid of. The cache would ordinarily be cleared by notify-resume, but kernel threads don't do that. This isn't seen with AFS because AFS is doing request_key() within the kernel half of a user thread - which will do notify-resume. Fixes: 7743c48e54ee ("keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct") Signed-off-by: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com> cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAGypqWw951d=zYRbdgNR4snUDvJhWL=q3=WOyh7HhSJupjz2vA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-14KEYS: trusted: tpm2: Fix migratable logicDavid Safford1-2/+2
commit dda5384313a40ecbaafd8a9a80f47483255e4c4d upstream. When creating (sealing) a new trusted key, migratable trusted keys have the FIXED_TPM and FIXED_PARENT attributes set, and non-migratable keys don't. This is backwards, and also causes creation to fail when creating a migratable key under a migratable parent. (The TPM thinks you are trying to seal a non-migratable blob under a migratable parent.) The following simple patch fixes the logic, and has been tested for all four combinations of migratable and non-migratable trusted keys and parent storage keys. With this logic, you will get a proper failure if you try to create a non-migratable trusted key under a migratable parent storage key, and all other combinations work correctly. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: e5fb5d2c5a03 ("security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable") Signed-off-by: David Safford <david.safford@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08KEYS: trusted: Avoid calling null function trusted_key_exitDave Kleikamp1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit c5d1ed846e15090bc90dfdaafc07eac066e070bb ] If one loads and unloads the trusted module, trusted_key_exit can be NULL. Call it through static_call_cond() to avoid a kernel trap. Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework") Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-04-08KEYS: trusted: Fix trusted key backends when building as moduleAndreas Rammhold1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 969a26446bcd142faedfe8c6f41cd7668596c1fa ] Before this commit the kernel could end up with no trusted key sources even though both of the currently supported backends (TPM and TEE) were compiled as modules. This manifested in the trusted key type not being registered at all. When checking if a CONFIG_… preprocessor variable is defined we only test for the builtin (=y) case and not the module (=m) case. By using the IS_REACHABLE() macro we do test for both cases. Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework") Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Andreas Rammhold <andreas@rammhold.de> Tested-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-04-08KEYS: fix length validation in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()Eric Biggers1-3/+11
commit c51abd96837f600d8fd940b6ab8e2da578575504 upstream. In many cases, keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() is validating the user buffer lengths against the wrong algorithm properties. Fix it to check against the correct properties. Probably this wasn't noticed before because for all asymmetric keys of the "public_key" subtype, max_data_size == max_sig_size == max_enc_size == max_dec_size. However, this isn't necessarily true for the "asym_tpm" subtype (it should be, but it's not strictly validated). Of course, future key types could have different values as well. Fixes: 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-10-20ucounts: Move get_ucounts from cred_alloc_blank to key_change_session_keyringEric W. Biederman1-0/+8
Setting cred->ucounts in cred_alloc_blank does not make sense. The uid and user_ns are deliberately not set in cred_alloc_blank but instead the setting is delayed until key_change_session_keyring. So move dealing with ucounts into key_change_session_keyring as well. Unfortunately that movement of get_ucounts adds a new failure mode to key_change_session_keyring. I do not see anything stopping the parent process from calling setuid and changing the relevant part of it's cred while keyctl_session_to_parent is running making it fundamentally necessary to call get_ucounts in key_change_session_keyring. Which means that the new failure mode cannot be avoided. A failure of key_change_session_keyring results in a single threaded parent keeping it's existing credentials. Which results in the parent process not being able to access the session keyring and whichever keys are in the new keyring. Further get_ucounts is only expected to fail if the number of bits in the refernece count for the structure is too few. Since the code has no other way to report the failure of get_ucounts and because such failures are not expected to be common add a WARN_ONCE to report this problem to userspace. Between the WARN_ONCE and the parent process not having access to the keys in the new session keyring I expect any failure of get_ucounts will be noticed and reported and we can find another way to handle this condition. (Possibly by just making ucounts->count an atomic_long_t). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 905ae01c4ae2 ("Add a reference to ucounts for each cred") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7k0ias0uf.fsf_-_@disp2133 Tested-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-05-12trusted-keys: match tpm_get_ops on all return pathsBen Boeckel1-3/+3
The `tpm_get_ops` call at the beginning of the function is not paired with a `tpm_put_ops` on this return path. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-05-12KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak on object tdColin Ian King1-3/+5
Two error return paths are neglecting to free allocated object td, causing a memory leak. Fix this by returning via the error return path that securely kfree's td. Fixes clang scan-build warning: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c:496:10: warning: Potential memory leak [unix.Malloc] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5df16caada3f ("KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-04-26Merge tag 'queue' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/tpmddLinus Torvalds2-13/+16
Pull tpm fixes from James Bottomley: "Fix a regression in the TPM trusted keys caused by the generic rework to add ARM TEE based trusted keys. Without this fix, the TPM trusted key subsystem fails to add or load any keys" * tag 'queue' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/tpmdd: KEYS: trusted: fix TPM trusted keys for generic framework
2021-04-26Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.13' of ↵Linus Torvalds7-327/+1038
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen: "New features: - ARM TEE backend for kernel trusted keys to complete the existing TPM backend - ASN.1 format for TPM2 trusted keys to make them interact with the user space stack, such as OpenConnect VPN Other than that, a bunch of bug fixes" * tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: KEYS: trusted: Fix missing null return from kzalloc call char: tpm: fix error return code in tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_recv() MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys lib: Add ASN.1 encoder tpm: vtpm_proxy: Avoid reading host log when using a virtual device tpm: acpi: Check eventlog signature before using it tpm: efi: Use local variable for calculating final log size
2021-04-22KEYS: trusted: fix TPM trusted keys for generic frameworkJames Bottomley2-13/+16
The generic framework patch broke the current TPM trusted keys because it doesn't correctly remove the values consumed by the generic parser before passing them on to the implementation specific parser. Fix this by having the generic parser return the string minus the consumed tokens. Additionally, there may be no tokens left for the implementation specific parser, so make it handle the NULL case correctly and finally fix a TPM 1.2 specific check for no keyhandle. Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework") Tested-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
2021-04-22KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM reservation for seal/unsealJames Bottomley1-1/+1
The original patch 8c657a0590de ("KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations") was correct on the mailing list: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210128235621.127925-4-jarkko@kernel.org/ But somehow got rebased so that the tpm_try_get_ops() in tpm2_seal_trusted() got lost. This causes an imbalanced put of the TPM ops and causes oopses on TIS based hardware. This fix puts back the lost tpm_try_get_ops() Fixes: 8c657a0590de ("KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations") Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
2021-04-14KEYS: trusted: Fix missing null return from kzalloc callColin Ian King1-2/+4
The kzalloc call can return null with the GFP_KERNEL flag so add a null check and exit via a new error exit label. Use the same exit error label for another error path too. Addresses-Coverity: ("Dereference null return value") Fixes: 830027e2cb55 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-04-14KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted KeysSumit Garg3-0/+324
Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Refer to Documentation/staging/tee.rst for detailed information about TEE. Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-04-14KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys frameworkSumit Garg3-297/+424
Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device. Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this, which contains necessary functions of a backend. Also, define a module parameter in order to select a particular trust source in case a platform support multiple trust sources. In case its not specified then implementation itetrates through trust sources list starting with TPM and assign the first trust source as a backend which has initiazed successfully during iteration. Note that current implementation only supports a single trust source at runtime which is either selectable at compile time or during boot via aforementioned module parameter. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-04-14security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperableJames Bottomley1-15/+38
The current implementation appends a migratable flag to the end of a key, meaning the format isn't exactly interoperable because the using party needs to know to strip this extra byte. However, all other consumers of TPM sealed blobs expect the unseal to return exactly the key. Since TPM2 keys have a key property flag that corresponds to migratable, use that flag instead and make the actual key the only sealed quantity. This is secure because the key properties are bound to a hash in the private part, so if they're altered the key won't load. Backwards compatibility is implemented by detecting whether we're loading a new format key or not and correctly setting migratable from the last byte of old format keys. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-04-14security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobsJames Bottomley5-8/+221
Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format. The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine, openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you don't have to keep passing it in each time. This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so keys with passwords but no policy. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-04-14security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizationsJames Bottomley2-10/+32
In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1 hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys. so before keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new directly supplied password: keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator for which form is input. Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in 20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys. Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips") Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-02-24Merge tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of ↵Linus Torvalds7-18/+16
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull keyring updates from David Howells: "Here's a set of minor keyrings fixes/cleanups that I've collected from various people for the upcoming merge window. A couple of them might, in theory, be visible to userspace: - Make blacklist_vet_description() reject uppercase letters as they don't match the all-lowercase hex string generated for a blacklist search. This may want reconsideration in the future, but, currently, you can't add to the blacklist keyring from userspace and the only source of blacklist keys generates lowercase descriptions. - Fix blacklist_init() to use a new KEY_ALLOC_* flag to indicate that it wants KEY_FLAG_KEEP to be set rather than passing KEY_FLAG_KEEP into keyring_alloc() as KEY_FLAG_KEEP isn't a valid alloc flag. This isn't currently a problem as the blacklist keyring isn't currently writable by userspace. The rest of the patches are cleanups and I don't think they should have any visible effect" * tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: watch_queue: rectify kernel-doc for init_watch() certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion PKCS#7: Fix missing include certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue crypto: public_key: Remove redundant header file from public_key.h keys: remove trailing semicolon in macro definition crypto: pkcs7: Use match_string() helper to simplify the code PKCS#7: drop function from kernel-doc pkcs7_validate_trust_one encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.h KEYS: remove redundant memset security: keys: delete repeated words in comments KEYS: asymmetric: Fix kerneldoc security/keys: use kvfree_sensitive() watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queue keys: Remove outdated __user annotations security: keys: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
2021-02-16KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operationsJarkko Sakkinen1-4/+18
When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem, the operations were unwrapped from tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The ownership is only taken inside tpm_send(), but this is not sufficient, as in the key load TPM2_CC_LOAD, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL and TPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXT need to be done as a one single atom. Take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything with tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), and use tpm_transmit_cmd() to send TPM commands instead of tpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour. Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code") Reported-by: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Acked-by Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-02-16KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failingJarkko Sakkinen1-1/+1
Consider the following transcript: $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=helloworld keyhandle=80000000 migratable=1" @u add_key: Invalid argument The documentation has the following description: migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, default 1 (resealing allowed) The consequence is that "migratable=1" should succeed. Fix this by allowing this condition to pass instead of return -EINVAL. [*] Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-02-16KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()Jarkko Sakkinen1-3/+17
When tpm_get_random() was introduced, it defined the following API for the return value: 1. A positive value tells how many bytes of random data was generated. 2. A negative value on error. However, in the call sites the API was used incorrectly, i.e. as it would only return negative values and otherwise zero. Returning he positive read counts to the user space does not make any possible sense. Fix this by returning -EIO when tpm_get_random() returns a positive value. Fixes: 41ab999c80f1 ("tpm: Move tpm_get_random api into the TPM device driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-01-21certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusionDavid Howells1-0/+2
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(), as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update() uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag. KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash from it. Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass this to keyring_alloc(). We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag manually. Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed. Fixes: 734114f8782f ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring") Reported-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
2021-01-21KEYS: remove redundant memsetTom Rix1-2/+0
Reviewing use of memset in keyctl_pkey.c keyctl_pkey_params_get prologue code to set params up memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params)); params->encoding = "raw"; keyctl_pkey_query has the same prologue and calls keyctl_pkey_params_get. So remove the prologue. Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
2021-01-21security: keys: delete repeated words in commentsRandy Dunlap2-3/+3
Drop repeated words in comments. {to, will, the} Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
2021-01-21security/keys: use kvfree_sensitive()Denis Efremov1-6/+3
Use kvfree_sensitive() instead of open-coding it. Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
2021-01-21watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queueGabriel Krisman Bertazi1-4/+4
The merged API doesn't use a watch_queue device, but instead relies on pipes, so let the documentation reflect that. Fixes: f7e47677e39a ("watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility") Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
2021-01-21keys: Remove outdated __user annotationsJann Horn1-3/+3
When the semantics of the ->read() handlers were changed such that "buffer" is a kernel pointer, some __user annotations survived. Since they're wrong now, get rid of them. Fixes: d3ec10aa9581 ("KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
2021-01-21security: keys: Fix fall-through warnings for ClangGustavo A. R. Silva1-0/+1
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a warning by explicitly adding a break statement instead of letting the code fall through to the next case. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
2020-12-16Merge tag 'net-next-5.11' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski: "Core: - support "prefer busy polling" NAPI operation mode, where we defer softirq for some time expecting applications to periodically busy poll - AF_XDP: improve efficiency by more batching and hindering the adjacency cache prefetcher - af_packet: make packet_fanout.arr size configurable up to 64K - tcp: optimize TCP zero copy receive in presence of partial or unaligned reads making zero copy a performance win for much smaller messages - XDP: add bulk APIs for returning / freeing frames - sched: support fragmenting IP packets as they come out of conntrack - net: allow virtual netdevs to forward UDP L4 and fraglist GSO skbs BPF: - BPF switch from crude rlimit-based to memcg-based memory accounting - BPF type format information for kernel modules and related tracing enhancements - BPF implement task local storage for BPF LSM - allow the FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP tracing programs to use bpf_sk_storage Protocols: - mptcp: improve multiple xmit streams support, memory accounting and many smaller improvements - TLS: support CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher - seg6: add support for SRv6 End.DT4/DT6 behavior - sctp: Implement RFC 6951: UDP Encapsulation of SCTP - ppp_generic: add ability to bridge channels directly - bridge: Connectivity Fault Management (CFM) support as is defined in IEEE 802.1Q section 12.14. Drivers: - mlx5: make use of the new auxiliary bus to organize the driver internals - mlx5: more accurate port TX timestamping support - mlxsw: - improve the efficiency of offloaded next hop updates by using the new nexthop object API - support blackhole nexthops - support IEEE 802.1ad (Q-in-Q) bridging - rtw88: major bluetooth co-existance improvements - iwlwifi: support new 6 GHz frequency band - ath11k: Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS) - mt7915: dual band concurrent (DBDC) support - net: ipa: add basic support for IPA v4.5 Refactor: - a few pieces of in_interrupt() cleanup work from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior - phy: add support for shared interrupts; get rid of multiple driver APIs and have the drivers write a full IRQ handler, slight growth of driver code should be compensated by the simpler API which also allows shared IRQs - add common code for handling netdev per-cpu counters - move TX packet re-allocation from Ethernet switch tag drivers to a central place - improve efficiency and rename nla_strlcpy - number of W=1 warning cleanups as we now catch those in a patchwork build bot Old code removal: - wan: delete the DLCI / SDLA drivers - wimax: move to staging - wifi: remove old WDS wifi bridging support" * tag 'net-next-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1922 commits) net: hns3: fix expression that is currently always true net: fix proc_fs init handling in af_packet and tls nfc: pn533: convert comma to semicolon af_vsock: Assign the vsock transport considering the vsock address flags af_vsock: Set VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST flag on the receive path vsock_addr: Check for supported flag values vm_sockets: Add VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST vsock flag vm_sockets: Add flags field in the vsock address data structure net: Disable NETIF_F_HW_TLS_TX when HW_CSUM is disabled tcp: Add logic to check for SYN w/ data in tcp_simple_retransmit net: mscc: ocelot: install MAC addresses in .ndo_set_rx_mode from process context nfc: s3fwrn5: Release the nfc firmware net: vxget: clean up sparse warnings mlxsw: spectrum_router: Use eXtended mezzanine to offload IPv4 router mlxsw: spectrum: Set KVH XLT cache mode for Spectrum2/3 mlxsw: spectrum_router_xm: Introduce basic XM cache flushing mlxsw: reg: Add Router LPM Cache Enable Register mlxsw: reg: Add Router LPM Cache ML Delete Register mlxsw: spectrum_router_xm: Implement L-value tracking for M-index mlxsw: reg: Add XM Router M Table Register ...
2020-11-23keys: Provide the original description to the key preparserDavid Howells1-0/+2
Provide the proposed description (add key) or the original description (update/instantiate key) when preparsing a key so that the key type can validate it against the data. This is important for rxrpc server keys as we need to check that they have the right amount of key material present - and it's better to do that when the key is loaded rather than deep in trying to process a response packet. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
2020-11-20crypto: sha - split sha.h into sha1.h and sha2.hEric Biggers2-2/+2
Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2, and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3. This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA versions, and usage of it should be phased out. Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and <crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both. This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-18task_work: cleanup notification modesJens Axboe1-1/+1
A previous commit changed the notification mode from true/false to an int, allowing notify-no, notify-yes, or signal-notify. This was backwards compatible in the sense that any existing true/false user would translate to either 0 (on notification sent) or 1, the latter which mapped to TWA_RESUME. TWA_SIGNAL was assigned a value of 2. Clean this up properly, and define a proper enum for the notification mode. Now we have: - TWA_NONE. This is 0, same as before the original change, meaning no notification requested. - TWA_RESUME. This is 1, same as before the original change, meaning that we use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. - TWA_SIGNAL. This uses TIF_SIGPENDING/JOBCTL_TASK_WORK for the notification. Clean up all the callers, switching their 0/1/false/true to using the appropriate TWA_* mode for notifications. Fixes: e91b48162332 ("task_work: teach task_work_add() to do signal_wake_up()") Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-10-13Merge branch 'work.iov_iter' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-41/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull compat iovec cleanups from Al Viro: "Christoph's series around import_iovec() and compat variant thereof" * 'work.iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: security/keys: remove compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov mm: remove compat_process_vm_{readv,writev} fs: remove compat_sys_vmsplice fs: remove the compat readv/writev syscalls fs: remove various compat readv/writev helpers iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec iov_iter: refactor rw_copy_check_uvector and import_iovec iov_iter: move rw_copy_check_uvector() into lib/iov_iter.c compat.h: fix a spelling error in <linux/compat.h>
2020-10-03security/keys: remove compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iovChristoph Hellwig3-40/+3
Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native version of keyctl_instantiate_key_iov can be used for the compat case as well. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-03iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovecChristoph Hellwig1-3/+2
Use in compat_syscall to import either native or the compat iovecs, and remove the now superflous compat_import_iovec. This removes the need for special compat logic in most callers, and the remaining ones can still be simplified by using __import_iovec with a bool compat parameter. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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