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2022-05-06ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signaturesMimi Zohar1-2/+24
IMA may verify a file's integrity against a "good" value stored in the 'security.ima' xattr or as an appended signature, based on policy. When the "good value" is stored in the xattr, the xattr may contain a file hash or signature. In either case, the "good" value is preceded by a header. The first byte of the xattr header indicates the type of data - hash, signature - stored in the xattr. To support storing fs-verity signatures in the 'security.ima' xattr requires further differentiating the fs-verity signature from the existing IMA signature. In addition the signatures stored in 'security.ima' xattr, need to be disambiguated. Instead of directly signing the fs-verity digest, a new signature format version 3 is defined as the hash of the ima_file_id structure, which identifies the type of signature and the digest. The IMA policy defines "which" files are to be measured, verified, and/or audited. For those files being verified, the policy rules indicate "how" the file should be verified. For example to require a file be signed, the appraise policy rule must include the 'appraise_type' option. appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3] where 'imasig' is the original or signature format v2 (default), where 'modsig' is an appended signature, where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3. The policy rule must also indicate the type of digest, if not the IMA default, by first specifying the digest type: digest_type:= [verity] The following policy rule requires fsverity signatures. The rule may be constrained, for example based on a fsuuid or LSM label. appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity appraise_type=sigv3 Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-05-05ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement listMimi Zohar1-0/+1
Permit fsverity's file digest (a hash of struct fsverity_descriptor) to be included in the IMA measurement list, based on the new measurement policy rule 'digest_type=verity' option. To differentiate between a regular IMA file hash from an fsverity's file digest, use the new d-ngv2 format field included in the ima-ngv2 template. The following policy rule requires fsverity file digests and specifies the new 'ima-ngv2' template, which contains the new 'd-ngv2' field. The policy rule may be constrained, for example based on a fsuuid or LSM label. measure func=FILE_CHECK digest_type=verity template=ima-ngv2 Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-03-22Merge tag 'integrity-v5.18' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+12
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar: "Except for extending the 'encrypted' key type to support user provided data, the rest is code cleanup, __setup() usage bug fix, and a trivial change" * tag 'integrity-v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: MAINTAINERS: add missing security/integrity/platform_certs EVM: fix the evm= __setup handler return value KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data ima: define ima_max_digest_data struct without a flexible array variable ima: rename IMA_ACTION_FLAGS to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS ima: Return error code obtained from securityfs functions MAINTAINERS: add missing "security/integrity" directory ima: Fix trivial typos in the comments
2022-03-08integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is trueEric Snowberg1-0/+5
With the introduction of uefi_check_trust_mok_keys, it signifies the end- user wants to trust the machine keyring as trusted keys. If they have chosen to trust the machine keyring, load the qualifying keys into it during boot, then link it to the secondary keyring . If the user has not chosen to trust the machine keyring, it will be empty and not linked to the secondary keyring. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-03-08integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machineEric Snowberg1-1/+11
Many UEFI Linux distributions boot using shim. The UEFI shim provides what is called Machine Owner Keys (MOK). Shim uses both the UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys to validate the next step in the boot chain. The MOK facility can be used to import user generated keys. These keys can be used to sign an end-users development kernel build. When Linux boots, both UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys get loaded in the Linux .platform keyring. Define a new Linux keyring called machine. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys and not the remaining keys in the platform keyring. This new machine keyring will be used in follow on patches. Unlike keys in the platform keyring, keys contained in the machine keyring will be trusted within the kernel if the end-user has chosen to do so. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-02-15ima: define ima_max_digest_data struct without a flexible array variableMimi Zohar1-0/+10
To support larger hash digests in the 'iint' cache, instead of defining the 'digest' field as the maximum digest size, the 'digest' field was defined as a flexible array variable. The "ima_digest_data" struct was wrapped inside a local structure with the maximum digest size. But before adding the record to the iint cache, memory for the exact digest size was dynamically allocated. The original reason for defining the 'digest' field as a flexible array variable is still valid for the 'iint' cache use case. Instead of wrapping the 'ima_digest_data' struct in a local structure define 'ima_max_digest_data' struct. Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2022-02-15ima: rename IMA_ACTION_FLAGS to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGSMimi Zohar1-2/+2
Simple policy rule options, such as fowner, uid, or euid, can be checked immediately, while other policy rule options, such as requiring a file signature, need to be deferred. The 'flags' field in the integrity_iint_cache struct contains the policy action', 'subaction', and non action/subaction. action: measure/measured, appraise/appraised, (collect)/collected, audit/audited subaction: appraise status for each hook (e.g. file, mmap, bprm, read, creds) non action/subaction: deferred policy rule options and state Rename the IMA_ACTION_FLAGS to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS. Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-11-20crypto: sha - split sha.h into sha1.h and sha2.hEric Biggers1-1/+1
Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2, and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3. This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA versions, and usage of it should be phased out. Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and <crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both. This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-07-17integrity: Add errno field in audit messageLakshmi Ramasubramanian1-0/+13
Error code is not included in the audit messages logged by the integrity subsystem. Define a new function integrity_audit_message() that takes error code in the "errno" parameter. Add "errno" field in the audit messages logged by the integrity subsystem and set the value passed in the "errno" parameter. [ 6.303048] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506281.627:2): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=kernel op=measuring_key cause=ENOMEM comm="swapper/0" name=".builtin_trusted_keys" res=0 errno=-12 [ 7.987647] audit: type=1802 audit(1592506283.312:9): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=policy_update cause=completed comm="systemd" res=1 errno=0 [ 8.019432] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506283.344:10): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=measuring_kexec_cmdline cause=hashing_error comm="systemd" name="kexec-cmdline" res=0 errno=-22 Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-06-16ima: Replace zero-length array with flexible-arrayGustavo A. R. Silva1-2/+2
There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2]. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member [2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
2020-02-28integrity: Remove duplicate pr_fmt definitionsTushar Sugandhi1-0/+6
The #define for formatting log messages, pr_fmt, is duplicated in the files under security/integrity. This change moves the definition to security/integrity/integrity.h and removes the duplicate definitions in the other files under security/integrity. With this change, the messages in the following files will be prefixed with 'integrity'. security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c security/integrity/iint.c e.g. "integrity: Error adding keys to platform keyring %s\n" And the messages in the following file will be prefixed with 'ima'. security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c e.g. "ima: Allocating IMA blacklist keyring.\n" For the rest of the files under security/integrity, there will be no change in the message format. Suggested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-11-12ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsigNayna Jain1-0/+1
Asymmetric private keys are used to sign multiple files. The kernel currently supports checking against blacklisted keys. However, if the public key is blacklisted, any file signed by the blacklisted key will automatically fail signature verification. Blacklisting the public key is not fine enough granularity, as we might want to only blacklist a particular file. This patch adds support for checking against the blacklisted hash of the file, without the appended signature, based on the IMA policy. It defines a new policy option "appraise_flag=check_blacklist". In addition to the blacklisted binary hashes stored in the firmware "dbx" variable, the Linux kernel may be configured to load blacklisted binary hashes onto the .blacklist keyring as well. The following example shows how to blacklist a specific kernel module hash. $ sha256sum kernel/kheaders.ko 77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3 kernel/kheaders.ko $ grep BLACKLIST .config CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING=y CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="blacklist-hash-list" $ cat certs/blacklist-hash-list "bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3" Update the IMA custom measurement and appraisal policy rules (/etc/ima-policy): measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig After building, installing, and rebooting the kernel: 545660333 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist: bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3 measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'kheaders': Permission denied 10 0c9834db5a0182c1fb0cdc5d3adcf11a11fd83dd ima-sig sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40 2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0-rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko 10 82aad2bcc3fa8ed94762356b5c14838f3bcfa6a0 ima-modsig sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40 2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko sha256:77fa889b3 5a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3 3082029a06092a864886f70d010702a082028b30820287020101310d300b0609608648 016503040201300b06092a864886f70d01070131820264.... 10 25b72217cc1152b44b134ce2cd68f12dfb71acb3 ima-buf sha256:8b58427fedcf8f4b20bc8dc007f2e232bf7285d7b93a66476321f9c2a3aa132 b blacklisted-hash 77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3 Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> [zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated patch description] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-8-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
2019-08-06ima: Implement support for module-style appended signaturesThiago Jung Bauermann1-0/+19
Implement the appraise_type=imasig|modsig option, allowing IMA to read and verify modsig signatures. In case a file has both an xattr signature and an appended modsig, IMA will only use the appended signature if the key used by the xattr signature isn't present in the IMA or platform keyring. Because modsig verification needs to convert from an integrity keyring id to the keyring itself, add an integrity_keyring_from_id() function in digsig.c so that integrity_modsig_verify() can use it. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-08-06ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signaturesThiago Jung Bauermann1-0/+1
Introduce the modsig keyword to the IMA policy syntax to specify that a given hook should expect the file to have the IMA signature appended to it. Here is how it can be used in a rule: appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig With this rule, IMA will accept either a signature stored in the extended attribute or an appended signature. For now, the rule above will behave exactly the same as if appraise_type=imasig was specified. The actual modsig implementation will be introduced separately. Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-07-11Revert "Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-4/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs" This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus effectively commits 7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION") 2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL") that the merge brought in). It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of in-kernel X.509 certificates [2]. The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in order to not impact the rest of the merge window. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-09Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+6
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: "Bug fixes, code clean up, and new features: - IMA policy rules can be defined in terms of LSM labels, making the IMA policy dependent on LSM policy label changes, in particular LSM label deletions. The new environment, in which IMA-appraisal is being used, frequently updates the LSM policy and permits LSM label deletions. - Prevent an mmap'ed shared file opened for write from also being mmap'ed execute. In the long term, making this and other similar changes at the VFS layer would be preferable. - The IMA per policy rule template format support is needed for a couple of new/proposed features (eg. kexec boot command line measurement, appended signatures, and VFS provided file hashes). - Other than the "boot-aggregate" record in the IMA measuremeent list, all other measurements are of file data. Measuring and storing the kexec boot command line in the IMA measurement list is the first buffer based measurement included in the measurement list" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args IMA: Define a new template field buf IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments IMA: support for per policy rule template formats integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data ima: use the lsm policy update notifier LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers x86/ima: fix the Kconfig dependency for IMA_ARCH_POLICY ima: Make arch_policy_entry static ima: prevent a file already mmap'ed write to be mmap'ed execute x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too
2019-07-09Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells: "This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be based on an internal ACL by the following means: - Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask. Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings. ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain tags/namespaces. Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus acquiring use of possessor permits. - Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed" * tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
2019-07-01integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattrThiago Jung Bauermann1-0/+6
Even though struct evm_ima_xattr_data includes a fixed-size array to hold a SHA1 digest, most of the code ignores the array and uses the struct to mean "type indicator followed by data of unspecified size" and tracks the real size of what the struct represents in a separate length variable. The only exception to that is the EVM code, which correctly uses the definition of struct evm_ima_xattr_data. So make this explicit in the code by removing the length specification from the array in struct evm_ima_xattr_data. Also, change the name of the element from digest to data since in most places the array doesn't hold a digest. A separate struct evm_xattr is introduced, with the original definition of evm_ima_xattr_data to be used in the places that actually expect that definition, specifically the EVM HMAC code. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-28keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACLDavid Howells1-2/+4
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a greater range of subjects to represented. ============ WHY DO THIS? ============ The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of which should be grouped together. For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a key: (1) Changing a key's ownership. (2) Changing a key's security information. (3) Setting a keyring's restriction. And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime: (4) Setting an expiry time. (5) Revoking a key. and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache: (6) Invalidating a key. Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with controlling access to that key. Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however, be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is probably okay. As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers: (1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search. (2) Permitting keyrings to be joined. (3) Invalidation. But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really need to be controlled separately. Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks. =============== WHAT IS CHANGED =============== The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions: (1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring. (2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked. The SEARCH permission is split to create: (1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found. (2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring. (3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated. The WRITE permission is also split to create: (1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be added, removed and replaced in a keyring. (2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator. (3) REVOKE - see above. Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as: (*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key (*) Owner - permitted to the key owner (*) Group - permitted to the key group (*) Everyone - permitted to everyone Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to everyone else. Further subjects may be made available by later patches. The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now: VIEW Can view the key metadata READ Can read the key content WRITE Can update/modify the key content SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting LINK Can make a link to the key SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry INVAL Can invalidate REVOKE Can revoke JOIN Can join this keyring CLEAR Can clear this keyring The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated. The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set, or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token. The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL. The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE. The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an existing keyring. The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually created keyrings only. ====================== BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY ====================== To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be returned. It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero. SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned on if a keyring is being altered. The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs. It will make the following mappings: (1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH (2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR (3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set (4) CLEAR -> WRITE Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR. ======= TESTING ======= This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests: (1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the key. (2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-05treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441Thomas Gleixner1-6/+1
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation version 2 of the license extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-18integrity: Remove references to module keyringThiago Jung Bauermann1-3/+2
From what I can tell, it has never been used. Mimi: This was introduced prior to Rusty's decision to use appended signatures for kernel modules. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-12-13integrity: Load certs to the platform keyringNayna Jain1-0/+20
The patch refactors integrity_load_x509(), making it a wrapper for a new function named integrity_add_key(). This patch also defines a new function named integrity_load_cert() for loading the platform keys. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2018-12-13integrity: Define a trusted platform keyringNayna Jain1-1/+2
On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. In such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel image. It is further possible that the kernel image is signed with third party keys which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable. The kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage. In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the necessary separation of trust, the kernel needs an additional keyring to store platform keys. This patch creates the new keyring called ".platform" to isolate keys provided by platform from keys by kernel. These keys are used to facilitate signature verification during kexec. Since the scope of this keyring is only the platform/firmware keys, it cannot be updated from userspace. This keyring can be enabled by setting CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2018-07-18ima: Do not audit if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT is not setStefan Berger1-0/+15
If Integrity is not auditing, IMA shouldn't audit, either. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-17integrity: Add an integrity directory in securityfsMatthew Garrett1-0/+2
We want to add additional evm control nodes, and it'd be preferable not to clutter up the securityfs root directory any further. Create a new integrity directory, move the ima directory into it, create an evm directory for the evm attribute and add compatibility symlinks. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-03-25integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGSThiago Jung Bauermann1-1/+0
This macro isn't used anymore since commit 0d73a55208e9 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock"), so remove it. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-03-23ima: fail signature verification based on policyMimi Zohar1-0/+1
This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in environments which are unwilling to accept the risk of trusting the signature verification and want to always fail safe, but are for example using a pre-built kernel. This patch defines a new builtin policy named "fail_securely", which can be specified on the boot command line as an argument to "ima_policy=". Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-23IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policyMatthew Garrett1-2/+7
The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started. This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same credentials that it did previously. After this patch, an IMA policy rule along the lines of: measure func=CREDS_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t will trigger if a process is executed and runs as unconfined_t, ignoring the context of the parent process. This is in contrast to: measure func=BPRM_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t which will trigger if the process that calls exec() is already executing in unconfined_t, ignoring the context that the child process executes into. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Changelog: - initialize ima_creds_status
2017-12-18ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actionsMimi Zohar1-10/+13
The builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy, which is specified on the boot command line, can be replaced with a custom policy, normally early in the boot process. Custom policies can be more restrictive in some ways, like requiring file signatures, but can be less restrictive in other ways, like not appraising mutable files. With a less restrictive policy in place, files in the builtin policy might not be hashed and labeled with a security.ima hash. On reboot, files which should be labeled in the ima_appraise_tcb are not labeled, possibly preventing the system from booting properly. To resolve this problem, this patch extends the existing IMA policy actions "measure", "dont_measure", "appraise", "dont_appraise", and "audit" with "hash" and "dont_hash". The new "hash" action will write the file hash as security.ima, but without requiring the file to be appraised as well. For example, the builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy includes the rule, "appraise fowner=0". Adding the "hash fowner=0" rule to a custom policy, will cause the needed file hashes to be calculated and written as security.ima xattrs. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-12-12ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lockDmitry Kasatkin1-5/+13
Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took the iint->mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock, i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant iint->mutex was eliminated. Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex. More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file. As a result, when IMA attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take the i_rwsem again. To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces iint->mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take the iint->mutex by introducing additional atomic iint->attr_flags to indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take the iint->mutex first and then the i_rwsem. Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr() hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint->flags on close or on open. Atomic flags are following: * IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown, chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to clear iint->flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions again. * IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to clear iint->flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise. * IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated. It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed. * IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file security.ima must not update to file has on file close. * IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy. Fixes: Commit 6552321831dc ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in the VFS inode instead") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-12-12EVM: Add support for portable signature formatMatthew Garrett1-0/+2
The EVM signature includes the inode number and (optionally) the filesystem UUID, making it impractical to ship EVM signatures in packages. This patch adds a new portable format intended to allow distributions to include EVM signatures. It is identical to the existing format but hardcodes the inode and generation numbers to 0 and does not include the filesystem UUID even if the kernel is configured to do so. Removing the inode means that the metadata and signature from one file could be copied to another file without invalidating it. This is avoided by ensuring that an IMA xattr is present during EVM validation. Portable signatures are intended to be immutable - ie, they will never be transformed into HMACs. Based on earlier work by Dmitry Kasatkin and Mikhail Kurinnoi. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Cc: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-11-08integrity: use kernel_read_file_from_path() to read x509 certsChristoph Hellwig1-2/+0
The CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 and CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 options permit loading x509 signed certificates onto the trusted keyrings without verifying the x509 certificate file's signature. This patch replaces the call to the integrity_read_file() specific function with the common kernel_read_file_from_path() function. To avoid verifying the file signature, this patch defines READING_X509_CERTFICATE. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-21integrity: Small code improvementsThiago Jung Bauermann1-3/+4
These changes are too small to warrant their own patches: The keyid and sig_size members of struct signature_v2_hdr are in BE format, so use a type that makes this assumption explicit. Also, use beXX_to_cpu instead of __beXX_to_cpu to read them. Change integrity_kernel_read to take a void * buffer instead of char * buffer, so that callers don't have to use a cast if they provide a buffer that isn't a char *. Add missing #endif comment in ima.h pointing out which macro it refers to. Add missing fall through comment in ima_appraise.c. Constify mask_tokens and func_tokens arrays. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-06-30integrity: add measured_pcrs field to integrity cacheEric Richter1-0/+1
To keep track of which measurements have been extended to which PCRs, this patch defines a new integrity_iint_cache field named measured_pcrs. This field is a bitmask of the PCRs measured. Each bit corresponds to a PCR index. For example, bit 10 corresponds to PCR 10. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-05-01ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattrMimi Zohar1-0/+1
Changing file metadata (eg. uid, guid) could result in having to re-appraise a file's integrity, but does not change the "new file" status nor the security.ima xattr. The IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO and IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED flags are policy rule specific. This patch only resets these flags, not the IMA_NEW_FILE or IMA_DIGSIG flags. With this patch, changing the file timestamp will not remove the file signature on new files. Reported-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
2016-03-04Merge tag 'keys-next-20160303' of ↵James Morris1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
2016-03-04X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enumDavid Howells1-1/+1
Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of enum. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-02-21ima: remove firmware and module specific cached status infoMimi Zohar1-12/+4
Each time a file is read by the kernel, the file should be re-measured and the file signature re-appraised, based on policy. As there is no need to preserve the status information, this patch replaces the firmware and module specific cache status with a generic one named read_file. This change simplifies adding support for other files read by the kernel. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-21ima: define a new hook to measure and appraise a file already in memoryMimi Zohar1-2/+5
This patch defines a new IMA hook ima_post_read_file() for measuring and appraising files read by the kernel. The caller loads the file into memory before calling this function, which calculates the hash followed by the normal IMA policy based processing. Changelog v5: - fail ima_post_read_file() if either file or buf is NULL v3: - rename ima_hash_and_process_file() to ima_post_read_file() v1: - split patch Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2015-12-15evm: load an x509 certificate from the kernelDmitry Kasatkin1-0/+8
This patch defines a configuration option and the evm_load_x509() hook to load an X509 certificate onto the EVM trusted kernel keyring. Changes in v4: * Patch description updated Changes in v3: * Removed EVM_X509_PATH definition. CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH is used directly. Changes in v2: * default key patch changed to /etc/keys Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-11-23integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyringDmitry Kasatkin1-3/+2
Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring. This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring(). Changes in v3: * Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing keyring instead of using __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper. * Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Changes in v2: * Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option * Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar) Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-05-21integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameterDmitry Kasatkin1-1/+1
This patch adds validity checks for 'path' parameter and makes it const. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-12-15Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-4/+15
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security layer updates from James Morris: "In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack, SELinux, and integrity code. The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT, which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures. Support for reading keys from rootfs before init is call is also added" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits) selinux: Remove security_ops extern security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack() VFS: refactor vfs_read() ima: require signature based appraisal integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file() Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields() ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields() ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero ima: added error messages to template-related functions ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines ima: no need to allocate entry for comment ima: report policy load status ima: use path names cache ...
2014-11-18ima: load x509 certificate from the kernelDmitry Kasatkin1-0/+8
Define configuration option to load X509 certificate into the IMA trusted kernel keyring. It implements ima_load_x509() hook to load X509 certificate into the .ima trusted kernel keyring from the root filesystem. Changes in v3: * use ima_policy_flag in ima_get_action() ima_load_x509 temporarily clears ima_policy_flag to disable appraisal to load key. Use it to skip appraisal rules. * Key directory path changed to /etc/keys (Mimi) * Expand IMA_LOAD_X509 Kconfig help Changes in v2: * added '__init' * use ima_policy_flag to disable appraisal to load keys Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-11-18integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernelDmitry Kasatkin1-0/+2
Provide the function to load x509 certificates from the kernel into the integrity kernel keyring. Changes in v2: * configuration option removed * function declared as '__init' Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-11-18integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()Dmitry Kasatkin1-0/+4
This patch defines a new function called integrity_read_file() to read file from the kernel into a buffer. Subsequent patches will read a file containing the public keys and load them onto the IMA keyring. This patch moves and renames ima_kernel_read(), the non-security checking version of kernel_read(), to integrity_kernel_read(). Changes in v3: * Patch descriptions improved (Mimi) * Add missing cast (kbuild test robot) Changes in v2: * configuration option removed * function declared as '__init' Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-28ima: check xattr value length and type in the ima_inode_setxattr()Dmitry Kasatkin1-0/+1
ima_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. Function does not check the length so that following command can be used to produce kernel oops: setfattr -n security.ima FOO. This patch fixes it. Changes in v3: * for stable reverted "allow setting hash only in fix or log mode" It will be a separate patch. Changes in v2: * testing validity of xattr type * allow setting hash only in fix or log mode (Mimi) [ 261.562522] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 261.564109] IP: [<ffffffff812af272>] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a [ 261.564109] PGD 3112f067 PUD 42965067 PMD 0 [ 261.564109] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 261.564109] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc evdev serio_raw i2c_piix4 button fuse [ 261.564109] CPU: 0 PID: 3299 Comm: setxattr Not tainted 3.16.0-kds+ #2924 [ 261.564109] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 261.564109] task: ffff8800428c2430 ti: ffff880042be0000 task.ti: ffff880042be0000 [ 261.564109] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812af272>] [<ffffffff812af272>] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a [ 261.564109] RSP: 0018:ffff880042be3d50 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 261.564109] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000015 [ 261.564109] RDX: 0000001500000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800375cc600 [ 261.564109] RBP: ffff880042be3d68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004d6256 [ 261.564109] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88002149ba00 [ 261.564109] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 261.564109] FS: 00007f6c1e219740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 261.564109] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 261.564109] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000003b35a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 261.564109] Stack: [ 261.564109] ffff88002149ba00 ffff880042be3df8 0000000000000000 ffff880042be3d98 [ 261.564109] ffffffff812a101b ffff88002149ba00 ffff880042be3df8 0000000000000000 [ 261.564109] 0000000000000000 ffff880042be3de0 ffffffff8116d08a ffff880042be3dc8 [ 261.564109] Call Trace: [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff812a101b>] security_inode_setxattr+0x48/0x6a [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff8116d08a>] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x9f [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff8116d1e0>] setxattr+0x122/0x16c [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff811687e8>] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45 [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff8114d011>] ? __sb_start_write+0x10f/0x143 [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff811687e8>] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45 [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff811687c0>] ? __mnt_want_write+0x48/0x4f [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff8116d3e6>] SyS_setxattr+0x6e/0xb0 [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff81529da9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 261.564109] Code: 48 89 f7 48 c7 c6 58 36 81 81 53 31 db e8 73 27 04 00 85 c0 75 28 bf 15 00 00 00 e8 8a a5 d9 ff 84 c0 75 05 83 cb ff eb 15 31 f6 <41> 80 7d 00 03 49 8b 7c 24 68 40 0f 94 c6 e8 e1 f9 ff ff 89 d8 [ 261.564109] RIP [<ffffffff812af272>] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a [ 261.564109] RSP <ffff880042be3d50> [ 261.564109] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 261.599998] ---[ end trace 39a89a3fc267e652 ]--- Reported-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-07integrity: add missing '__init' keyword for integrity_init_keyring()Dmitry Kasatkin1-1/+1
integrity_init_keyring() is used only from kernel '__init' functions. Add it there as well. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-07ima: check ima_policy_flag in the ima_file_free() hookDmitry Kasatkin1-3/+0
This patch completes the switching to the 'ima_policy_flag' variable in the checks at the beginning of IMA functions, starting with the commit a756024e. Checking 'iint_initialized' is completely unnecessary, because S_IMA flag is unset if iint was not allocated. At the same time the integrity cache is allocated with SLAB_PANIC and the kernel will panic if the allocation fails during kernel initialization. So on a running system iint_initialized is always true and can be removed. Changes in v3: * not limiting test to IMA_APPRAISE (spotted by Roberto Sassu) Changes in v2: * 'iint_initialized' removal patch merged to this patch (requested by Mimi) Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Acked-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
2014-09-09integrity: remove declaration of non-existing functionsDmitry Kasatkin1-1/+0
Commit f381c27 "integrity: move ima inode integrity data management" (re)moved few functions but left their declarations in header files. This patch removes them and also removes duplicated declaration of integrity_iint_find(). Commit c7de7ad "ima: remove unused cleanup functions". This patch removes these definitions as well. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-11-26 09:48:32 +0300