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2024-07-06Merge tag 'integrity-v6.10-fix' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+1
ssh://ra.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity fix from Mimi Zohar: "A single bug fix to properly remove all of the securityfs IMA measurement lists" * tag 'integrity-v6.10-fix' of ssh://ra.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: fix wrong zero-assignment during securityfs dentry remove
2024-06-13ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical sectionGUO Zihua2-7/+10
A panic happens in ima_match_policy: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen. The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: | Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next| ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). | | entry->action | ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-06-03ima: fix wrong zero-assignment during securityfs dentry removeEnrico Bravi1-2/+1
In case of error during ima_fs_init() all the dentry already created are removed. {ascii, binary}_securityfs_measurement_lists are freed calling for each array the remove_securityfs_measurement_lists(). This function, at the end, assigns to zero the securityfs_measurement_list_count. This causes during the second call of remove_securityfs_measurement_lists() to leave the dentry of the array pending, not removing them correctly, because the securityfs_measurement_list_count is already zero. Move the securityfs_measurement_list_count = 0 after the two remove_securityfs_measurement_lists() calls to correctly remove all the dentry already allocated. Fixes: 9fa8e7625008 ("ima: add crypto agility support for template-hash algorithm") Signed-off-by: Enrico Bravi <enrico.bravi@polito.it> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2024-04-12ima: add crypto agility support for template-hash algorithmEnrico Bravi4-18/+132
The template hash showed by the ascii_runtime_measurements and binary_runtime_measurements is the one calculated using sha1 and there is no possibility to change this value, despite the fact that the template hash is calculated using the hash algorithms corresponding to all the PCR banks configured in the TPM. Add the support to retrieve the ima log with the template data hash calculated with a specific hash algorithm. Add a new file in the securityfs ima directory for each hash algo configured in a PCR bank of the TPM. Each new file has the name with the following structure: {binary, ascii}_runtime_measurements_<hash_algo_name> Legacy files are kept, to avoid breaking existing applications, but as symbolic links which point to {binary, ascii}_runtime_measurements_sha1 files. These two files are created even if a TPM chip is not detected or the sha1 bank is not configured in the TPM. As example, in the case a TPM chip is present and sha256 is the only configured PCR bank, the listing of the securityfs ima directory is the following: lr--r--r-- [...] ascii_runtime_measurements -> ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1 -r--r----- [...] ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1 -r--r----- [...] ascii_runtime_measurements_sha256 lr--r--r-- [...] binary_runtime_measurements -> binary_runtime_measurements_sha1 -r--r----- [...] binary_runtime_measurements_sha1 -r--r----- [...] binary_runtime_measurements_sha256 --w------- [...] policy -r--r----- [...] runtime_measurements_count -r--r----- [...] violations Signed-off-by: Enrico Bravi <enrico.bravi@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Silvia Sisinni <silvia.sisinni@polito.it> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2024-04-10ima: re-evaluate file integrity on file metadata changeStefan Berger1-1/+13
Force a file's integrity to be re-evaluated on file metadata change by resetting both the IMA and EVM status flags. Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2024-04-10ima: Move file-change detection variables into new structureStefan Berger4-13/+10
Move all the variables used for file change detection into a structure that can be used by IMA and EVM. Implement an inline function for storing the identification of an inode and one for detecting changes to an inode based on this new structure. Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2024-04-10ima: Rename backing_inode to real_inodeStefan Berger1-8/+10
Rename the backing_inode variable to real_inode since it gets its value from real_inode(). Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2024-04-08integrity: Avoid -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warningsGustavo A. R. Silva5-11/+21
-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end is coming in GCC-14, and we are getting ready to enable it globally. There is currently an object (`hdr)` in `struct ima_max_digest_data` that contains a flexible structure (`struct ima_digest_data`): struct ima_max_digest_data { struct ima_digest_data hdr; u8 digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE]; } __packed; So, in order to avoid ending up with a flexible-array member in the middle of a struct, we use the `__struct_group()` helper to separate the flexible array from the rest of the members in the flexible structure: struct ima_digest_data { __struct_group(ima_digest_data_hdr, hdr, __packed, ... the rest of the members ); u8 digest[]; } __packed; And similarly for `struct evm_ima_xattr_data`. With the change described above, we can now declare an object of the type of the tagged `struct ima_digest_data_hdr`, without embedding the flexible array in the middle of another struct: struct ima_max_digest_data { struct ima_digest_data_hdr hdr; u8 digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE]; } __packed; And similarly for `struct evm_digest` and `struct evm_xattr`. We also use `container_of()` whenever we need to retrieve a pointer to the flexible structure. So, with these changes, fix the following warnings: security/integrity/evm/evm.h:64:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end] security/integrity/evm/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end] security/integrity/evm/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end] security/integrity/ima/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end] security/integrity/ima/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end] security/integrity/integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end] security/integrity/integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end] security/integrity/platform_certs/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end] security/integrity/platform_certs/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end] Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/202 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2024-04-08ima: define an init_module critical data recordMimi Zohar1-0/+7
The init_module syscall loads an ELF image into kernel space without measuring the buffer containing the ELF image. To close this kernel module integrity gap, define a new critical-data record which includes the hash of the ELF image. Instead of including the buffer data in the IMA measurement list, include the hash of the buffer data to avoid large IMA measurement list records. The buffer data hash would be the same value as the finit_module syscall file hash. To enable measuring the init_module buffer and other critical data from boot, define "ima_policy=critical_data" on the boot command line. Since builtin policies are not persistent, a custom IMA policy must include the rule as well: measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=modules To verify the template data hash value, first convert the buffer data hash to binary: grep "init_module" \ /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | \ tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sum Reported-by: Ken Goldman <kgold@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2024-04-08ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.nameStefan Berger2-7/+26
->d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed; there are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (->d_lock on dentry, ->d_lock on its parent, ->i_rwsem exclusive on the parent's inode, rename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable snapshot of the name instead. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240202182732.GE2087318@ZenIV/ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2024-02-16ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSMRoberto Sassu8-63/+308
Make the 'ima' LSM independent from the 'integrity' LSM by introducing IMA own integrity metadata (ima_iint_cache structure, with IMA-specific fields from the integrity_iint_cache structure), and by managing it directly from the 'ima' LSM. Create ima_iint.c and introduce the same integrity metadata management functions found in iint.c (renamed with ima_). However, instead of putting metadata in an rbtree, reserve space from IMA in the inode security blob for a pointer, and introduce the ima_inode_set_iint()/ima_inode_get_iint() primitives to store/retrieve that pointer. This improves search time from logarithmic to constant. Consequently, don't include the inode pointer as field in the ima_iint_cache structure, since the association with the inode is clear. Since the inode field is missing in ima_iint_cache, pass the extra inode parameter to ima_get_verity_digest(). Prefer storing the pointer instead of the entire ima_iint_cache structure, to avoid too much memory pressure. Use the same mechanism as before, a cache named ima_iint_cache (renamed from iint_cache), to quickly allocate a new ima_iint_cache structure when requested by the IMA policy. Create the new ima_iint_cache in ima_iintcache_init(), called by init_ima_lsm(), during the initialization of the 'ima' LSM. And, register ima_inode_free_security() to free the ima_iint_cache structure, if exists. Replace integrity_iint_cache with ima_iint_cache in various places of the IMA code. Also, replace integrity_inode_get() and integrity_iint_find(), respectively with ima_inode_get() and ima_iint_find(). Finally, move the remaining IMA-specific flags to security/integrity/ima/ima.h, since they are now unnecessary in the common integrity layer. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-16evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSMRoberto Sassu1-1/+1
Define a new structure for EVM-specific metadata, called evm_iint_cache, and embed it in the inode security blob. Introduce evm_iint_inode() to retrieve metadata, and register evm_inode_alloc_security() for the inode_alloc_security LSM hook, to initialize the structure (before splitting metadata, this task was done by iint_init_always()). Keep the non-NULL checks after calling evm_iint_inode() except in evm_inode_alloc_security(), to take into account inodes for which security_inode_alloc() was not called. When using shared metadata, obtaining a NULL pointer from integrity_iint_find() meant that the file wasn't in the IMA policy. Now, because IMA and EVM use disjoint metadata, the EVM status has to be stored for every inode regardless of the IMA policy. Given that from now on EVM relies on its own metadata, remove the iint parameter from evm_verifyxattr(). Also, directly retrieve the iint in evm_verify_hmac(), called by both evm_verifyxattr() and evm_verify_current_integrity(), since now there is no performance penalty in retrieving EVM metadata (constant time). Replicate the management of the IMA_NEW_FILE flag, by introducing evm_post_path_mknod() and evm_file_release() to respectively set and clear the newly introduced flag EVM_NEW_FILE, at the same time IMA does. Like for IMA, select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when EVM is enabled, to ensure that files are marked as new. Unlike ima_post_path_mknod(), evm_post_path_mknod() cannot check if a file must be appraised. Thus, it marks all affected files. Also, it does not clear EVM_NEW_FILE depending on i_version, but that is not a problem because IMA_NEW_FILE is always cleared when set in ima_check_last_writer(). Move the EVM-specific flag EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG to security/integrity/evm/evm.h, since that definition is now unnecessary in the common integrity layer. Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, and consequently decrement by one the number of xattrs to allocate in security_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-16ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructureRoberto Sassu3-9/+35
A few additional IMA hooks are needed to reset the cached appraisal status, causing the file's integrity to be re-evaluated on next access. Register these IMA-appraisal only functions separately from the rest of IMA functions, as appraisal is a separate feature not necessarily enabled in the kernel configuration. Reuse the same approach as for other IMA functions, move hardcoded calls from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure. Declare the functions as static and register them as hook implementations in init_ima_appraise_lsm(), called by init_ima_lsm(). Also move the inline function ima_inode_remove_acl() from the public ima.h header to ima_appraise.c. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-16ima: Move to LSM infrastructureRoberto Sassu3-21/+64
Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like 'integrity'). Having IMA before EVM in the Makefile is sufficient to preserve the relative order of the new 'ima' LSM in respect to the upcoming 'evm' LSM, and thus the order of IMA and EVM function calls as when they were hardcoded. Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(), which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm(). Select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, to ensure that the path-based LSM hook path_post_mknod is always available and ima_post_path_mknod() is always executed to mark files as new, as before the move. A slight difference is that IMA and EVM functions registered for the inode_post_setattr, inode_post_removexattr, path_post_mknod, inode_post_create_tmpfile, inode_post_set_acl and inode_post_remove_acl won't be executed for private inodes. Since those inodes are supposed to be fs-internal, they should not be of interest to IMA or EVM. The S_PRIVATE flag is used for anonymous inodes, hugetlbfs, reiserfs xattrs, XFS scrub and kernel-internal tmpfs files. Conditionally register ima_post_key_create_or_update() if CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Also, conditionally register ima_kernel_module_request() if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Finally, add the LSM_ID_IMA case in lsm_list_modules_test.c. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-16integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMARoberto Sassu1-0/+33
In preparation for removing the 'integrity' LSM, move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA, and rename it to ima_kernel_module_request(). Rewrite the function documentation, to explain better what the problem is. Compile it conditionally if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled, and call it from security.c (removed afterwards with the move of IMA to the LSM infrastructure). Adding this hook cannot be avoided, since IMA has no control on the flags passed to crypto_alloc_sig() in public_key_verify_signature(), and thus cannot pass CRYPTO_NOLOAD, which solved the problem for EVM hashing with commit e2861fa71641 ("evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailable"). EVM alone does not need to implement this hook, first because there is no mutex to deadlock, and second because even if it had it, there should be a recursive call. However, since verification from EVM can be initiated only by setting inode metadata, deadlock would occur if modprobe would do the same while loading a kernel module (which is unlikely). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-16ima: Align ima_post_read_file() definition with LSM infrastructureRoberto Sassu1-1/+1
Change ima_post_read_file() definition, by making "void *buf" a "char *buf", so that it can be registered as implementation of the post_read_file hook. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-16ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() definition with LSM infrastructureRoberto Sassu1-1/+2
Change ima_inode_removexattr() definition, so that it can be registered as implementation of the inode_removexattr hook. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-16ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructureRoberto Sassu1-2/+3
Change ima_inode_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered as implementation of the inode_setxattr hook. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-16ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() definition with LSM infrastructureRoberto Sassu1-2/+4
Change ima_file_mprotect() definition, so that it can be registered as implementation of the file_mprotect hook. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-16ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with LSM infrastructureRoberto Sassu1-1/+2
Change ima_inode_post_setattr() definition, so that it can be registered as implementation of the inode_post_setattr hook (to be introduced). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-10Merge tag 'integrity-v6.8' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-5/+5
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: - Add a new IMA/EVM maintainer and reviewer - Disable EVM on overlayfs The EVM HMAC and the original file signatures contain filesystem specific metadata (e.g. i_ino, i_generation and s_uuid), preventing the security.evm xattr from directly being copied up to the overlay. Further before calculating and writing out the overlay file's EVM HMAC, EVM must first verify the existing backing file's 'security.evm' value. For now until a solution is developed, disable EVM on overlayfs. - One bug fix and two cleanups * tag 'integrity-v6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: overlay: disable EVM evm: add support to disable EVM on unsupported filesystems evm: don't copy up 'security.evm' xattr MAINTAINERS: Add Eric Snowberg as a reviewer to IMA MAINTAINERS: Add Roberto Sassu as co-maintainer to IMA and EVM KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep ima: Remove EXPERIMENTAL from Kconfig ima: Reword IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
2024-01-09Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2024-01-09-10-33' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton: "Quite a lot of kexec work this time around. Many singleton patches in many places. The notable patch series are: - nilfs2 folio conversion from Matthew Wilcox in 'nilfs2: Folio conversions for file paths'. - Additional nilfs2 folio conversion from Ryusuke Konishi in 'nilfs2: Folio conversions for directory paths'. - IA64 remnant removal in Heiko Carstens's 'Remove unused code after IA-64 removal'. - Arnd Bergmann has enabled the -Wmissing-prototypes warning everywhere in 'Treewide: enable -Wmissing-prototypes'. This had some followup fixes: - Nathan Chancellor has cleaned up the hexagon build in the series 'hexagon: Fix up instances of -Wmissing-prototypes'. - Nathan also addressed some s390 warnings in 's390: A couple of fixes for -Wmissing-prototypes'. - Arnd Bergmann addresses the same warnings for MIPS in his series 'mips: address -Wmissing-prototypes warnings'. - Baoquan He has made kexec_file operate in a top-down-fitting manner similar to kexec_load in the series 'kexec_file: Load kernel at top of system RAM if required' - Baoquan He has also added the self-explanatory 'kexec_file: print out debugging message if required'. - Some checkstack maintenance work from Tiezhu Yang in the series 'Modify some code about checkstack'. - Douglas Anderson has disentangled the watchdog code's logging when multiple reports are occurring simultaneously. The series is 'watchdog: Better handling of concurrent lockups'. - Yuntao Wang has contributed some maintenance work on the crash code in 'crash: Some cleanups and fixes'" * tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2024-01-09-10-33' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (157 commits) crash_core: fix and simplify the logic of crash_exclude_mem_range() x86/crash: use SZ_1M macro instead of hardcoded value x86/crash: remove the unused image parameter from prepare_elf_headers() kdump: remove redundant DEFAULT_CRASH_KERNEL_LOW_SIZE scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh: strip unexpected CR from lines watchdog: if panicking and we dumped everything, don't re-enable dumping watchdog/hardlockup: use printk_cpu_sync_get_irqsave() to serialize reporting watchdog/softlockup: use printk_cpu_sync_get_irqsave() to serialize reporting watchdog/hardlockup: adopt softlockup logic avoiding double-dumps kexec_core: fix the assignment to kimage->control_page x86/kexec: fix incorrect end address passed to kernel_ident_mapping_init() lib/trace_readwrite.c:: replace asm-generic/io with linux/io nilfs2: cpfile: fix some kernel-doc warnings stacktrace: fix kernel-doc typo scripts/checkstack.pl: fix no space expression between sp and offset x86/kexec: fix incorrect argument passed to kexec_dprintk() x86/kexec: use pr_err() instead of kexec_dprintk() when an error occurs nilfs2: add missing set_freezable() for freezable kthread kernel: relay: remove relay_file_splice_read dead code, doesn't work docs: submit-checklist: remove all of "make namespacecheck" ...
2024-01-09mm, treewide: rename MAX_ORDER to MAX_PAGE_ORDERKirill A. Shutemov1-1/+1
commit 23baf831a32c ("mm, treewide: redefine MAX_ORDER sanely") has changed the definition of MAX_ORDER to be inclusive. This has caused issues with code that was not yet upstream and depended on the previous definition. To draw attention to the altered meaning of the define, rename MAX_ORDER to MAX_PAGE_ORDER. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231228144704.14033-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-12-21kexec_file: print out debugging message if requiredBaoquan He1-2/+2
Then when specifying '-d' for kexec_file_load interface, loaded locations of kernel/initrd/cmdline etc can be printed out to help debug. Here replace pr_debug() with the newly added kexec_dprintk() in kexec_file loading related codes. And also print out type/start/head of kimage and flags to help debug. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231213055747.61826-3-bhe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Conor Dooley <conor@kernel.org> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-11-27ima: Remove EXPERIMENTAL from KconfigEric Snowberg1-1/+1
Remove the EXPERIMENTAL from the IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY Kconfig now that digitalSignature usage enforcement is set. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230508220708.2888510-4-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-11-27ima: Reword IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARYEric Snowberg1-5/+5
When the machine keyring is enabled, it may be used as a trust source for the .ima keyring. Add a reference to this in IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-11-02Merge tag 'integrity-v6.7' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-1/+20
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: "Four integrity changes: two IMA-overlay updates, an integrity Kconfig cleanup, and a secondary keyring update" * tag 'integrity-v6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: detect changes to the backing overlay file certs: Only allow certs signed by keys on the builtin keyring integrity: fix indentation of config attributes ima: annotate iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positive warnings
2023-10-31ima: detect changes to the backing overlay fileMimi Zohar2-1/+20
Commit 18b44bc5a672 ("ovl: Always reevaluate the file signature for IMA") forced signature re-evaulation on every file access. Instead of always re-evaluating the file's integrity, detect a change to the backing file, by comparing the cached file metadata with the backing file's metadata. Verifying just the i_version has not changed is insufficient. In addition save and compare the i_ino and s_dev as well. Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Tested-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Tested-by: Raul E Rangel <rrangel@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-10-31Merge tag 'hardening-v6.7-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-3/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull hardening updates from Kees Cook: "One of the more voluminous set of changes is for adding the new __counted_by annotation[1] to gain run-time bounds checking of dynamically sized arrays with UBSan. - Add LKDTM test for stuck CPUs (Mark Rutland) - Improve LKDTM selftest behavior under UBSan (Ricardo Cañuelo) - Refactor more 1-element arrays into flexible arrays (Gustavo A. R. Silva) - Analyze and replace strlcpy and strncpy uses (Justin Stitt, Azeem Shaikh) - Convert group_info.usage to refcount_t (Elena Reshetova) - Add __counted_by annotations (Kees Cook, Gustavo A. R. Silva) - Add Kconfig fragment for basic hardening options (Kees Cook, Lukas Bulwahn) - Fix randstruct GCC plugin performance mode to stay in groups (Kees Cook) - Fix strtomem() compile-time check for small sources (Kees Cook)" * tag 'hardening-v6.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (56 commits) hwmon: (acpi_power_meter) replace open-coded kmemdup_nul reset: Annotate struct reset_control_array with __counted_by kexec: Annotate struct crash_mem with __counted_by virtio_console: Annotate struct port_buffer with __counted_by ima: Add __counted_by for struct modsig and use struct_size() MAINTAINERS: Include stackleak paths in hardening entry string: Adjust strtomem() logic to allow for smaller sources hardening: x86: drop reference to removed config AMD_IOMMU_V2 randstruct: Fix gcc-plugin performance mode to stay in group mailbox: zynqmp: Annotate struct zynqmp_ipi_pdata with __counted_by drivers: thermal: tsens: Annotate struct tsens_priv with __counted_by irqchip/imx-intmux: Annotate struct intmux_data with __counted_by KVM: Annotate struct kvm_irq_routing_table with __counted_by virt: acrn: Annotate struct vm_memory_region_batch with __counted_by hwmon: Annotate struct gsc_hwmon_platform_data with __counted_by sparc: Annotate struct cpuinfo_tree with __counted_by isdn: kcapi: replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy_pad isdn: replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy NFS/flexfiles: Annotate struct nfs4_ff_layout_segment with __counted_by nfs41: Annotate struct nfs4_file_layout_dsaddr with __counted_by ...
2023-10-20ima: Add __counted_by for struct modsig and use struct_size()Gustavo A. R. Silva1-3/+3
Prepare for the coming implementation by GCC and Clang of the __counted_by attribute. Flexible array members annotated with __counted_by can have their accesses bounds-checked at run-time via CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS (for array indexing) and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE (for strcpy/memcpy-family functions). Also, relocate `hdr->raw_pkcs7_len = sig_len;` so that the __counted_by annotation has effect, and flex-array member `raw_pkcs7` can be properly bounds-checked at run-time. While there, use struct_size() helper, instead of the open-coded version, to calculate the size for the allocation of the whole flexible structure, including of course, the flexible-array member. This code was found with the help of Coccinelle, and audited and fixed manually. Signed-off-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZSRaDcJNARUUWUwS@work Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2023-09-27ima: rework CONFIG_IMA dependency blockArnd Bergmann1-12/+6
Changing the direct dependencies of IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING and IMA_LOAD_X509 caused them to no longer depend on IMA, but a a configuration without IMA results in link failures: arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: security/integrity/iint.o: in function `integrity_load_keys': iint.c:(.init.text+0xd8): undefined reference to `ima_load_x509' aarch64-linux-ld: security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.o: in function `asymmetric_verify': digsig_asymmetric.c:(.text+0x104): undefined reference to `ima_blacklist_keyring' Adding explicit dependencies on IMA would fix this, but a more reliable way to do this is to enclose the entire Kconfig file in an 'if IMA' block. This also allows removing the existing direct dependencies. Fixes: be210c6d3597f ("ima: Finish deprecation of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-09-27ima: Finish deprecation of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING KconfigOleksandr Tymoshenko1-2/+2
The removal of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING made IMA_LOAD_X509 and IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING unavailable because the latter two depend on the former. Since IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING was deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING use it as a dependency for the two Kconfigs affected by the deprecation. Fixes: 5087fd9e80e5 ("ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig") Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tymoshenko <ovt@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-08-30Merge tag 'integrity-v6.6' of ↵Linus Torvalds5-30/+16
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar: - With commit 099f26f22f58 ("integrity: machine keyring CA configuration") certificates may be loaded onto the IMA keyring, directly or indirectly signed by keys on either the "builtin" or the "machine" keyrings. With the ability for the system/machine owner to sign the IMA policy itself without needing to recompile the kernel, update the IMA architecture specific policy rules to require the IMA policy itself be signed. [ As commit 099f26f22f58 was upstreamed in linux-6.4, updating the IMA architecture specific policy now to require signed IMA policies may break userspace expectations. ] - IMA only checked the file data hash was not on the system blacklist keyring for files with an appended signature (e.g. kernel modules, Power kernel image). Check all file data hashes regardless of how it was signed - Code cleanup, and a kernel-doc update * tag 'integrity-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: kexec_lock: Replace kexec_mutex() by kexec_lock() in two comments ima: require signed IMA policy when UEFI secure boot is enabled integrity: Always reference the blacklist keyring with appraisal ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig
2023-08-29Merge tag 'tpmdd-v6.6' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen: - Restrict linking of keys to .ima and .evm keyrings based on digitalSignature attribute in the certificate - PowerVM: load machine owner keys into the .machine [1] keyring - PowerVM: load module signing keys into the secondary trusted keyring (keys blessed by the vendor) - tpm_tis_spi: half-duplex transfer mode - tpm_tis: retry corrupted transfers - Apply revocation list (.mokx) to an all system keyrings (e.g. .machine keyring) Link: https://blogs.oracle.com/linux/post/the-machine-keyring [1] * tag 'tpmdd-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: certs: Reference revocation list for all keyrings tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer: Use module_platform_driver macro to simplify the code tpm: remove redundant variable len tpm_tis: Resend command to recover from data transfer errors tpm_tis: Use responseRetry to recover from data transfer errors tpm_tis: Move CRC check to generic send routine tpm_tis_spi: Add hardware wait polling KEYS: Replace all non-returning strlcpy with strscpy integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabled integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring integrity: Enforce digitalSignature usage in the ima and evm keyrings KEYS: DigitalSignature link restriction tpm_tis: Revert "tpm_tis: Disable interrupts on ThinkPad T490s"
2023-08-18integrity: Annotate struct ima_rule_opt_list with __counted_byKees Cook1-2/+2
Prepare for the coming implementation by GCC and Clang of the __counted_by attribute. Flexible array members annotated with __counted_by can have their accesses bounds-checked at run-time checking via CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS (for array indexing) and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE (for strcpy/memcpy-family functions). As found with Coccinelle[1], add __counted_by for struct ima_rule_opt_list. Additionally, since the element count member must be set before accessing the annotated flexible array member, move its initialization earlier. [1] https://github.com/kees/kernel-tools/blob/trunk/coccinelle/examples/counted_by.cocci Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230817210327.never.598-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2023-08-17integrity: Enforce digitalSignature usage in the ima and evm keyringsEric Snowberg1-1/+2
After being vouched for by a system keyring, only allow keys into the .ima and .evm keyrings that have the digitalSignature usage field set. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/41dffdaeb7eb7840f7e38bc691fbda836635c9f9.camel@linux.ibm.com Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Acked-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2023-08-07kexec_lock: Replace kexec_mutex() by kexec_lock() in two commentsWenyu Liu1-1/+1
kexec_mutex is replaced by an atomic variable in 05c6257433b (panic, kexec: make __crash_kexec() NMI safe). But there are still two comments that referenced kexec_mutex, replace them by kexec_lock. Signed-off-by: Wenyu Liu <liuwenyu7@huawei.com> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-08-01ima: require signed IMA policy when UEFI secure boot is enabledCoiby Xu1-0/+3
With commit 099f26f22f58 ("integrity: machine keyring CA configuration"), users are able to add custom IMA CA keys via MOK. This allows users to sign their own IMA polices without recompiling the kernel. For the sake of security, mandate signed IMA policy when UEFI secure boot is enabled. Note this change may affect existing users/tests i.e users won't be able to load an unsigned IMA policy when the IMA architecture specific policy is configured and UEFI secure boot is enabled. Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-08-01integrity: Always reference the blacklist keyring with appraisalEric Snowberg2-17/+12
Commit 273df864cf746 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig") introduced an appraise_flag option for referencing the blacklist keyring. Any matching binary found on this keyring fails signature validation. This flag only works with module appended signatures. An important part of a PKI infrastructure is to have the ability to do revocation at a later time should a vulnerability be found. Expand the revocation flag usage to all appraisal functions. The flag is now enabled by default. Setting the flag with an IMA policy has been deprecated. Without a revocation capability like this in place, only authenticity can be maintained. With this change, integrity can now be achieved with digital signature based IMA appraisal. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-08-01ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING KconfigNayna Jain1-12/+0
Time to remove "IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING". Fixes: f4dc37785e9b ("integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring") # v4.5+ Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-06-28Merge tag 'integrity-v6.5' of ↵Linus Torvalds4-8/+19
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar: "An i_version change, one bug fix, and three kernel doc fixes: - instead of IMA detecting file change by directly accesssing i_version, it now calls vfs_getattr_nosec(). - fix a race condition when inserting a new node in the iint rb-tree" * tag 'integrity-v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: Fix build warnings evm: Fix build warnings evm: Complete description of evm_inode_setattr() integrity: Fix possible multiple allocation in integrity_inode_get() IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_version
2023-06-14fsverity: rework fsverity_get_digest() againEric Biggers1-19/+12
Address several issues with the calling convention and documentation of fsverity_get_digest(): - Make it provide the hash algorithm as either a FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_* value or HASH_ALGO_* value, at the caller's choice, rather than only a HASH_ALGO_* value as it did before. This allows callers to work with the fsverity native algorithm numbers if they want to. HASH_ALGO_* is what IMA uses, but other users (e.g. overlayfs) should use FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_* to match fsverity-utils and the fsverity UAPI. - Make it return the digest size so that it doesn't need to be looked up separately. Use the return value for this, since 0 works nicely for the "file doesn't have fsverity enabled" case. This also makes it clear that no other errors are possible. - Rename the 'digest' parameter to 'raw_digest' and clearly document that it is only useful in combination with the algorithm ID. This hopefully clears up a point of confusion. - Export it to modules, since overlayfs will need it for checking the fsverity digests of lowerdata files (https://lore.kernel.org/r/dd294a44e8f401e6b5140029d8355f88748cd8fd.1686565330.git.alexl@redhat.com). Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> # for the IMA piece Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230612190047.59755-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-06-06ima: Fix build warningsRoberto Sassu2-1/+5
Fix build warnings (function parameters description) for ima_collect_modsig(), ima_match_policy() and ima_parse_add_rule(). Fixes: 15588227e086 ("ima: Collect modsig") # v5.4+ Fixes: 2fe5d6def167 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension") # v5.14+ Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9 ("integrity: IMA policy") # v3.2+ Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-05-24IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_versionJeff Layton2-7/+14
IMA currently accesses the i_version out of the inode directly when it does a measurement. This is fine for most simple filesystems, but can be problematic with more complex setups (e.g. overlayfs). Make IMA instead call vfs_getattr_nosec to get this info. This allows the filesystem to determine whether and how to report the i_version, and should allow IMA to work properly with a broader class of filesystems in the future. Reported-and-Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-04-29Merge tag 'integrity-v6.4' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity update from Mimi Zohar: "Just one one bug fix. Other integrity changes are being upstreamed via the tpm and lsm trees" * tag 'integrity-v6.4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: IMA: allow/fix UML builds
2023-04-06mm, treewide: redefine MAX_ORDER sanelyKirill A. Shutemov1-1/+1
MAX_ORDER currently defined as number of orders page allocator supports: user can ask buddy allocator for page order between 0 and MAX_ORDER-1. This definition is counter-intuitive and lead to number of bugs all over the kernel. Change the definition of MAX_ORDER to be inclusive: the range of orders user can ask from buddy allocator is 0..MAX_ORDER now. [kirill@shutemov.name: fix min() warning] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230315153800.32wib3n5rickolvh@box [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix another min_t warning] [kirill@shutemov.name: fixups per Zi Yan] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230316232144.b7ic4cif4kjiabws@box.shutemov.name [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix underlining in docs] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202303191025.VRCTk6mP-lkp@intel.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230315113133.11326-11-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [powerpc] Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-16IMA: allow/fix UML buildsRandy Dunlap1-1/+1
UML supports HAS_IOMEM since 0bbadafdc49d (um: allow disabling NO_IOMEM). Current IMA build on UML fails on allmodconfig (with TCG_TPM=m): ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.o: in function `ima_add_template_entry': ima_queue.c:(.text+0x2d9): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_extend' ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_init.o: in function `ima_init': ima_init.c:(.init.text+0x43f): undefined reference to `tpm_default_chip' ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.o: in function `ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm': ima_crypto.c:(.text+0x1044): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_read' ld: ima_crypto.c:(.text+0x10d8): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_read' Modify the IMA Kconfig entry so that it selects TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM is set, regardless of the UML Kconfig setting. This updates TCG_TPM from =m to =y and fixes the linker errors. Fixes: f4a0391dfa91 ("ima: fix Kconfig dependencies") Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.14+ Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-02-22Merge tag 'integrity-v6.3' of ↵Linus Torvalds5-12/+42
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity update from Mimi Zohar: "One doc and one code cleanup, and two bug fixes" * tag 'integrity-v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook ima: Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook evm: call dump_security_xattr() in all cases to remove code duplication ima: fix ima_delete_rules() kernel-doc warning ima: return IMA digest value only when IMA_COLLECTED flag is set ima: fix error handling logic when file measurement failed
2023-01-31ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hookRoberto Sassu5-6/+32
Commit 98de59bfe4b2f ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper") caused ima_file_mmap() to receive the protections requested by the application and not those applied by the kernel. After restoring the original MMAP_CHECK behavior, existing attestation servers might be broken due to not being ready to handle new entries (previously missing) in the IMA measurement list. Restore the original correct MMAP_CHECK behavior, instead of keeping the current buggy one and introducing a new hook with the correct behavior. Otherwise, there would have been the risk of IMA users not noticing the problem at all, as they would actively have to update the IMA policy, to switch to the correct behavior. Also, introduce the new MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook to keep the current behavior, so that IMA users could easily fix a broken attestation server, although this approach is discouraged due to potentially missing measurements. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-01-31ima: Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hookRoberto Sassu1-2/+5
Commit 98de59bfe4b2f ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper") moved the code to update prot, to be the actual protections applied to the kernel, to a new helper called mmap_prot(). However, while without the helper ima_file_mmap() was getting the updated prot, with the helper ima_file_mmap() gets the original prot, which contains the protections requested by the application. A possible consequence of this change is that, if an application calls mmap() with only PROT_READ, and the kernel applies PROT_EXEC in addition, that application would have access to executable memory without having this event recorded in the IMA measurement list. This situation would occur for example if the application, before mmap(), calls the personality() system call with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument. Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with those of the mmap_file LSM hook, so that IMA can receive both the requested prot and the final prot. Since the requested protections are stored in a new variable, and the final protections are stored in the existing variable, this effectively restores the original behavior of the MMAP_CHECK hook. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 98de59bfe4b2 ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>