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5 daysima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match()Zhao Yipeng1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 738c9738e690f5cea24a3ad6fd2d9a323cf614f6 ] In ima_match_rules(), if ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT due to the rule being NULL, the function incorrectly skips the 'if (!rc)' check and sets 'result = true'. The LSM rule is considered a match, causing extra files to be measured by IMA. This issue can be reproduced in the following scenario: After unloading the SELinux policy module via 'semodule -d', if an IMA measurement is triggered before ima_lsm_rules is updated, in ima_match_rules(), the first call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ESTALE. This causes the code to enter the 'if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized)' block, perform ima_lsm_copy_rule() and retry. In ima_lsm_copy_rule(), since the SELinux module has been removed, the rule becomes NULL, and the second call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT. This bypasses the 'if (!rc)' check and results in a false match. Call trace: selinux_audit_rule_match+0x310/0x3b8 security_audit_rule_match+0x60/0xa0 ima_match_rules+0x2e4/0x4a0 ima_match_policy+0x9c/0x1e8 ima_get_action+0x48/0x60 process_measurement+0xf8/0xa98 ima_bprm_check+0x98/0xd8 security_bprm_check+0x5c/0x78 search_binary_handler+0x6c/0x318 exec_binprm+0x58/0x1b8 bprm_execve+0xb8/0x130 do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1a8/0x258 __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x68 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x44/0x200 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0 Fix this by changing 'if (!rc)' to 'if (rc <= 0)' to ensure that error codes like -ENOENT do not bypass the check and accidentally result in a successful match. Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9d ("integrity: IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Zhao Yipeng <zhaoyipeng5@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-03-13ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.nameStefan Berger2-7/+26
commit be84f32bb2c981ca670922e047cdde1488b233de upstream. ->d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed; there are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (->d_lock on dentry, ->d_lock on its parent, ->i_rwsem exclusive on the parent's inode, rename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable snapshot of the name instead. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240202182732.GE2087318@ZenIV/ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> [ Samasth: bp to fix CVE-2024-39494; Minor conflict resolved due to code context change ] Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-07-18ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical sectionGUO Zihua2-7/+10
commit 9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34 upstream. A panic happens in ima_match_policy: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen. The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: | Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next| ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). | | entry->action | ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-25ima: fix deadlock when traversing "ima_default_rules".liqiong1-9/+20
commit eb0782bbdfd0d7c4786216659277c3fd585afc0e upstream. The current IMA ruleset is identified by the variable "ima_rules" that default to "&ima_default_rules". When loading a custom policy for the first time, the variable is updated to "&ima_policy_rules" instead. That update isn't RCU-safe, and deadlocks are possible. Indeed, some functions like ima_match_policy() may loop indefinitely when traversing "ima_default_rules" with list_for_each_entry_rcu(). When iterating over the default ruleset back to head, if the list head is "ima_default_rules", and "ima_rules" have been updated to "&ima_policy_rules", the loop condition (&entry->list != ima_rules) stays always true, traversing won't terminate, causing a soft lockup and RCU stalls. Introduce a temporary value for "ima_rules" when iterating over the ruleset to avoid the deadlocks. Signed-off-by: liqiong <liqiong@nfschina.com> Reviewed-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr> Fixes: 38d859f991f3 ("IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> (Fix sparse: incompatible types in comparison expression.) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-11-28ima: detect changes to the backing overlay fileMimi Zohar2-1/+20
commit b836c4d29f2744200b2af41e14bf50758dddc818 upstream. Commit 18b44bc5a672 ("ovl: Always reevaluate the file signature for IMA") forced signature re-evaulation on every file access. Instead of always re-evaluating the file's integrity, detect a change to the backing file, by comparing the cached file metadata with the backing file's metadata. Verifying just the i_version has not changed is insufficient. In addition save and compare the i_ino and s_dev as well. Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Tested-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Tested-by: Raul E Rangel <rrangel@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-10-10ima: rework CONFIG_IMA dependency blockArnd Bergmann1-11/+6
[ Upstream commit 91e326563ee34509c35267808a4b1b3ea3db62a8 ] Changing the direct dependencies of IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING and IMA_LOAD_X509 caused them to no longer depend on IMA, but a a configuration without IMA results in link failures: arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: security/integrity/iint.o: in function `integrity_load_keys': iint.c:(.init.text+0xd8): undefined reference to `ima_load_x509' aarch64-linux-ld: security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.o: in function `asymmetric_verify': digsig_asymmetric.c:(.text+0x104): undefined reference to `ima_blacklist_keyring' Adding explicit dependencies on IMA would fix this, but a more reliable way to do this is to enclose the entire Kconfig file in an 'if IMA' block. This also allows removing the existing direct dependencies. Fixes: be210c6d3597f ("ima: Finish deprecation of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-10-10ima: Finish deprecation of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING KconfigOleksandr Tymoshenko1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit be210c6d3597faf330cb9af33b9f1591d7b2a983 ] The removal of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING made IMA_LOAD_X509 and IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING unavailable because the latter two depend on the former. Since IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING was deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING use it as a dependency for the two Kconfigs affected by the deprecation. Fixes: 5087fd9e80e5 ("ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig") Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tymoshenko <ovt@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-09-19ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING KconfigNayna Jain1-12/+0
[ Upstream commit 5087fd9e80e539d2163accd045b73da64de7de95 ] Time to remove "IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING". Fixes: f4dc37785e9b ("integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring") # v4.5+ Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-26IMA: allow/fix UML buildsRandy Dunlap1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 644f17412f5acf01a19af9d04a921937a2bc86c6 ] UML supports HAS_IOMEM since 0bbadafdc49d (um: allow disabling NO_IOMEM). Current IMA build on UML fails on allmodconfig (with TCG_TPM=m): ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.o: in function `ima_add_template_entry': ima_queue.c:(.text+0x2d9): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_extend' ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_init.o: in function `ima_init': ima_init.c:(.init.text+0x43f): undefined reference to `tpm_default_chip' ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.o: in function `ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm': ima_crypto.c:(.text+0x1044): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_read' ld: ima_crypto.c:(.text+0x10d8): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_read' Modify the IMA Kconfig entry so that it selects TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM is set, regardless of the UML Kconfig setting. This updates TCG_TPM from =m to =y and fixes the linker errors. Fixes: f4a0391dfa91 ("ima: fix Kconfig dependencies") Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.14+ Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-27ima: Fix build warningsRoberto Sassu2-1/+5
[ Upstream commit 95526d13038c2bbddd567a4d8e39fac42484e182 ] Fix build warnings (function parameters description) for ima_collect_modsig(), ima_match_policy() and ima_parse_add_rule(). Fixes: 15588227e086 ("ima: Collect modsig") # v5.4+ Fixes: 2fe5d6def167 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension") # v5.14+ Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9 ("integrity: IMA policy") # v3.2+ Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-03-11ima: Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hookRoberto Sassu1-2/+5
commit 4971c268b85e1c7a734a61622fc0813c86e2362e upstream. Commit 98de59bfe4b2f ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper") moved the code to update prot, to be the actual protections applied to the kernel, to a new helper called mmap_prot(). However, while without the helper ima_file_mmap() was getting the updated prot, with the helper ima_file_mmap() gets the original prot, which contains the protections requested by the application. A possible consequence of this change is that, if an application calls mmap() with only PROT_READ, and the kernel applies PROT_EXEC in addition, that application would have access to executable memory without having this event recorded in the IMA measurement list. This situation would occur for example if the application, before mmap(), calls the personality() system call with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument. Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with those of the mmap_file LSM hook, so that IMA can receive both the requested prot and the final prot. Since the requested protections are stored in a new variable, and the final protections are stored in the existing variable, this effectively restores the original behavior of the MMAP_CHECK hook. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 98de59bfe4b2 ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-01-14ima: Fix a potential NULL pointer access in ima_restore_measurement_listHuaxin Lu1-1/+4
commit 11220db412edae8dba58853238f53258268bdb88 upstream. In restore_template_fmt, when kstrdup fails, a non-NULL value will still be returned, which causes a NULL pointer access in template_desc_init_fields. Fixes: c7d09367702e ("ima: support restoring multiple template formats") Cc: stable@kernel.org Co-developed-by: Jiaming Li <lijiaming30@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jiaming Li <lijiaming30@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu <luhuaxin1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-01-14ima: Simplify ima_lsm_copy_ruleGUO Zihua1-7/+3
[ Upstream commit d57378d3aa4d864d9e590482602068af1b20c0c5 ] Currently ima_lsm_copy_rule() set the arg_p field of the source rule to NULL, so that the source rule could be freed afterward. It does not make sense for this behavior to be inside a "copy" function. So move it outside and let the caller handle this field. ima_lsm_copy_rule() now produce a shallow copy of the original entry including args_p field. Meaning only the lsm.rule and the rule itself should be freed for the original rule. Thus, instead of calling ima_lsm_free_rule() which frees lsm.rule as well as args_p field, free the lsm.rule directly. Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-01-14ima: Fix misuse of dereference of pointer in template_desc_init_fields()Xiu Jianfeng1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 25369175ce84813dd99d6604e710dc2491f68523 ] The input parameter @fields is type of struct ima_template_field ***, so when allocates array memory for @fields, the size of element should be sizeof(**field) instead of sizeof(*field). Actually the original code would not cause any runtime error, but it's better to make it logically right. Fixes: adf53a778a0a ("ima: new templates management mechanism") Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-01-14ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()GUO Zihua1-9/+32
[ Upstream commit c7423dbdbc9ecef7fff5239d144cad4b9887f4de ] IMA relies on the blocking LSM policy notifier callback to update the LSM based IMA policy rules. When SELinux update its policies, IMA would be notified and starts updating all its lsm rules one-by-one. During this time, -ESTALE would be returned by ima_filter_rule_match() if it is called with a LSM rule that has not yet been updated. In ima_match_rules(), -ESTALE is not handled, and the LSM rule is considered a match, causing extra files to be measured by IMA. Fix it by re-initializing a temporary rule if -ESTALE is returned by ima_filter_rule_match(). The origin rule in the rule list would be updated by the LSM policy notifier callback. Fixes: b16942455193 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier") Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-01-14ima: Fix fall-through warnings for ClangGustavo A. R. Silva2-0/+3
[ Upstream commit 28073eb09c5aa29e879490edb88cfd3e7073821e ] In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix multiple warnings by explicitly adding multiple break statements instead of just letting the code fall through to the next case. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Stable-dep-of: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-07-29lockdown: Fix kexec lockdown bypass with ima policyEric Snowberg1-0/+4
commit 543ce63b664e2c2f9533d089a4664b559c3e6b5b upstream. The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot. This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through securityfs. If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param, lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot. To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to the kernel command line; then: $ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown $ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \ /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy $ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown is enabled. This fixes CVE-2022-21505. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 29d3c1c8dfe7 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down") Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-21ima: Fix potential memory leak in ima_init_crypto()Jianglei Nie1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 067d2521874135267e681c19d42761c601d503d6 ] On failure to allocate the SHA1 tfm, IMA fails to initialize and exits without freeing the ima_algo_array. Add the missing kfree() for ima_algo_array to avoid the potential memory leak. Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie <niejianglei2021@163.com> Fixes: 6d94809af6b0 ("ima: Allocate and initialize tfm for each PCR bank") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-07-21ima: Fix a potential integer overflow in ima_appraise_measurementHuaxin Lu1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit d2ee2cfc4aa85ff6a2a3b198a3a524ec54e3d999 ] When the ima-modsig is enabled, the rc passed to evm_verifyxattr() may be negative, which may cause the integer overflow problem. Fixes: 39b07096364a ("ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures") Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu <luhuaxin1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-09ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig optionGUO Zihua1-8/+6
commit 891163adf180bc369b2f11c9dfce6d2758d2a5bd upstream. The original 'ima' measurement list template contains a hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname, limited to 255 characters. Other measurement list templates permit both larger hashes and longer pathnames. When the "ima" template is configured as the default, a new measurement list template (ima_template=) must be specified before specifying a larger hash algorithm (ima_hash=) on the boot command line. To avoid this boot command line ordering issue, remove the legacy "ima" template configuration option, allowing it to still be specified on the boot command line. The root cause of this issue is that during the processing of ima_hash, we would try to check whether the hash algorithm is compatible with the template. If the template is not set at the moment we do the check, we check the algorithm against the configured default template. If the default template is "ima", then we reject any hash algorithm other than sha1 and md5. For example, if the compiled default template is "ima", and the default algorithm is sha1 (which is the current default). In the cmdline, we put in "ima_hash=sha256 ima_template=ima-ng". The expected behavior would be that ima starts with ima-ng as the template and sha256 as the hash algorithm. However, during the processing of "ima_hash=", "ima_template=" has not been processed yet, and hash_setup would check the configured hash algorithm against the compiled default: ima, and reject sha256. So at the end, the hash algorithm that is actually used will be sha1. With template "ima" removed from the configured default, we ensure that the default tempalte would at least be "ima-ng" which allows for basically any hash algorithm. This change would not break the algorithm compatibility checks for IMA. Fixes: 4286587dccd43 ("ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template") Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-02-16ima: Do not print policy rule with inactive LSM labelsStefan Berger1-0/+8
commit 89677197ae709eb1ab3646952c44f6a171c9e74c upstream. Before printing a policy rule scan for inactive LSM labels in the policy rule. Inactive LSM labels are identified by args_p != NULL and rule == NULL. Fixes: 483ec26eed42 ("ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes") Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+ Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> [zohar@linux.ibm.com: Updated "Fixes" tag] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-02-16ima: Allow template selection with ima_template[_fmt]= after ima_hash=Roberto Sassu1-3/+7
commit bb8e52e4906f148c2faf6656b5106cf7233e9301 upstream. Commit c2426d2ad5027 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt") introduced an additional check on the ima_template variable to avoid multiple template selection. Unfortunately, ima_template could be also set by the setup function of the ima_hash= parameter, when it calls ima_template_desc_current(). This causes attempts to choose a new template with ima_template= or with ima_template_fmt=, after ima_hash=, to be ignored. Achieve the goal of the commit mentioned with the new static variable template_setup_done, so that template selection requests after ima_hash= are not ignored. Finally, call ima_init_template_list(), if not already done, to initialize the list of templates before lookup_template_desc() is called. Reported-by: Guo Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c2426d2ad5027 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-02-16ima: Remove ima_policy file before directoryStefan Berger1-1/+1
commit f7333b9572d0559e00352a926c92f29f061b4569 upstream. The removal of ima_dir currently fails since ima_policy still exists, so remove the ima_policy file before removing the directory. Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9 ("integrity: IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15IMA: remove the dependency on CRYPTO_MD5THOBY Simon1-1/+0
commit 8510505d55e194d3f6c9644c9f9d12c4f6b0395a upstream. MD5 is a weak digest algorithm that shouldn't be used for cryptographic operation. It hinders the efficiency of a patch set that aims to limit the digests allowed for the extended file attribute namely security.ima. MD5 is no longer a requirement for IMA, nor should it be used there. The sole place where we still use the MD5 algorithm inside IMA is setting the ima_hash algorithm to MD5, if the user supplies 'ima_hash=md5' parameter on the command line. With commit ab60368ab6a4 ("ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm"), setting "ima_hash=md5" fails gracefully when CRYPTO_MD5 is not set: ima: Can not allocate md5 (reason: -2) ima: Allocating md5 failed, going to use default hash algorithm sha256 Remove the CRYPTO_MD5 dependency for IMA. Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr> Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> [zohar@linux.ibm.com: include commit number in patch description for stable.] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.17 Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15IMA: remove -Wmissing-prototypes warningAustin Kim1-1/+1
commit a32ad90426a9c8eb3915eed26e08ce133bd9e0da upstream. With W=1 build, the compiler throws warning message as below: security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c:24:12: warning: no previous prototype for ‘ima_mok_init’ [-Wmissing-prototypes] __init int ima_mok_init(void) Silence the warning by adding static keyword to ima_mok_init(). Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com> Fixes: 41c89b64d718 ("IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-05-14ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR valueLi Huafei1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 7990ccafaa37dc6d8bb095d4d7cd997e8903fd10 ] In ima_restore_measurement_list(), hdr[HDR_PCR].data is pointing to a buffer of type u8, which contains the dumped 32-bit pcr value. Currently, only the least significant byte is used to restore the pcr value. We should convert hdr[HDR_PCR].data to a pointer of type u32 before fetching the value to restore the correct pcr value. Fixes: 47fdee60b47f ("ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers") Signed-off-by: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusionDavid Howells1-3/+2
[ Upstream commit 4993e1f9479a4161fd7d93e2b8b30b438f00cb0f ] KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(), as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update() uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag. KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash from it. Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass this to keyring_alloc(). We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag manually. Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed. Fixes: 734114f8782f ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring") Reported-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04ima: Free IMA measurement buffer after kexec syscallLakshmi Ramasubramanian1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit f31e3386a4e92ba6eda7328cb508462956c94c64 ] IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call, in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. This buffer is not freed before completing the kexec system call resulting in memory leak. Add ima_buffer field in "struct kimage" to store the virtual address of the buffer allocated for the IMA measurement list. Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() function. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Fixes: 7b8589cc29e7 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04ima: Free IMA measurement buffer on errorLakshmi Ramasubramanian1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 6d14c6517885fa68524238787420511b87d671df ] IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call, in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. In error code paths this memory is not freed resulting in memory leak. Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in the error code paths in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Fixes: 7b8589cc29e7 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-12-30ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the flyRoberto Sassu1-15/+5
commit 207cdd565dfc95a0a5185263a567817b7ebf5467 upstream. Commit a408e4a86b36b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read permissions") already introduced a second open to measure a file when the original file descriptor does not allow it. However, it didn't remove the existing method of changing the mode of the original file descriptor, which is still necessary if the current process does not have enough privileges to open a new one. Changing the mode isn't really an option, as the filesystem might need to do preliminary steps to make the read possible. Thus, this patch removes the code and keeps the second open as the only option to measure a file when it is unreadable with the original file descriptor. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.20.x: 0014cc04e8ec0 ima: Set file->f_mode Fixes: 2fe5d6def1672 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-30ima: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array memberGustavo A. R. Silva1-1/+1
There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2]. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.9-rc1/process/deprecated.html#zero-length-and-one-element-arrays Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
2020-10-16Merge tag 'integrity-v5.10' of ↵Linus Torvalds5-64/+143
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: "Continuing IMA policy rule cleanup and validation in particular for measuring keys, adding/removing/updating informational and error messages (e.g. "ima_appraise" boot command line option), and other bug fixes (e.g. minimal data size validation before use, return code and NULL pointer checking)" * tag 'integrity-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ima_file_hash evm: Check size of security.evm before using it ima: Remove semicolon at the end of ima_get_binary_runtime_size() ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update() ima: Use kmemdup rather than kmalloc+memcpy integrity: include keyring name for unknown key request ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise integrity: invalid kernel parameters feedback ima: add check for enforced appraise option integrity: Use current_uid() in integrity_audit_message() ima: Fail rule parsing when asymmetric key measurement isn't supportable ima: Pre-parse the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule
2020-10-05fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial readsKees Cook1-1/+2
To perform partial reads, callers of kernel_read_file*() must have a non-NULL file_size argument and a preallocated buffer. The new "offset" argument can then be used to seek to specific locations in the file to fill the buffer to, at most, "buf_size" per call. Where possible, the LSM hooks can report whether a full file has been read or not so that the contents can be reasoned about. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-14-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-05IMA: Add support for file reads without contentsScott Branden1-6/+16
When the kernel_read_file LSM hook is called with contents=false, IMA can appraise the file directly, without requiring a filled buffer. When such a buffer is available, though, IMA can continue to use it instead of forcing a double read here. Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706232309.12010-10-scott.branden@broadcom.com/ Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-13-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-05LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hookKees Cook1-1/+9
As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls. For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents, it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all existing LSMs to retain existing behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-05firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data()Kees Cook1-10/+10
Now that security_post_load_data() is wired up, use it instead of the NULL file argument style of security_post_read_file(), and update the security_kernel_load_data() call to indicate that a security_kernel_post_load_data() call is expected. Wire up the IMA check to match earlier logic. Perhaps a generalized change to ima_post_load_data() might look something like this: return process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, kernel_load_data_id_str(load_id), read_idmap[load_id] ?: FILE_CHECK, 0, NULL); Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-10-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-05LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hookKees Cook1-1/+23
There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data(). Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in a subsequent patch.) Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false (which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook once the buffer is loaded. With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads (e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen in subsequent patches. Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-05fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argumentKees Cook1-1/+1
In preparation for adding partial read support, add an optional output argument to kernel_read_file*() that reports the file size so callers can reason more easily about their reading progress. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-8-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-05fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_tKees Cook1-1/+1
In preparation for further refactoring of kernel_read_file*(), rename the "max_size" argument to the more accurate "buf_size", and correct its type to size_t. Add kerndoc to explain the specifics of how the arguments will be used. Note that with buf_size now size_t, it can no longer be negative (and was never called with a negative value). Adjust callers to use it as a "maximum size" when *buf is NULL. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-7-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-05fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argumentKees Cook1-2/+4
In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant "size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than INT_MAX.) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-6-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-05fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include fileScott Branden3-0/+3
Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface. Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-05fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enumKees Cook2-5/+3
FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how" should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs. Fixes: a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer") Fixes: fd90bc559bfb ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)") Fixes: 4f0496d8ffa3 ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-2-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-09-17ima: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ima_file_hashKP Singh1-0/+10
ima_file_hash can be called when there is no iint->ima_hash available even though the inode exists in the integrity cache. It is fairly common for a file to not have a hash. (e.g. an mknodat, prior to the file being closed). Another example where this can happen (suggested by Jann Horn): Process A does: while(1) { unlink("/tmp/imafoo"); fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0700); if (fd == -1) { perror("open"); continue; } write(fd, "A", 1); close(fd); } and Process B does: while (1) { int fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) continue; char *mapping = mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); if (mapping != MAP_FAILED) munmap(mapping, 0x1000); close(fd); } Due to the race to get the iint->mutex between ima_file_hash and process_measurement iint->ima_hash could still be NULL. Fixes: 6beea7afcc72 ("ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given file") Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-15ima: Remove semicolon at the end of ima_get_binary_runtime_size()Roberto Sassu1-1/+1
This patch removes the unnecessary semicolon at the end of ima_get_binary_runtime_size(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d158847ae89a2 ("ima: maintain memory size needed for serializing the measurement list") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-15ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update()Roberto Sassu1-0/+2
Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3323eec921efd ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-15ima: Use kmemdup rather than kmalloc+memcpyAlex Dewar1-5/+4
Issue identified with Coccinelle. Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-10ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraiseBruno Meneguele1-9/+16
Only emit an unknown/invalid message when setting the IMA appraise mode to anything other than "enforce", when secureboot is enabled. Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com> [zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-09integrity: invalid kernel parameters feedbackBruno Meneguele3-4/+13
Don't silently ignore unknown or invalid ima_{policy,appraise,hash} and evm kernel boot command line options. Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-09ima: add check for enforced appraise optionBruno Meneguele1-0/+2
The "enforce" string is allowed as an option for ima_appraise= kernel paramenter per kernel-paramenters.txt and should be considered on the parameter setup checking as a matter of completeness. Also it allows futher checking on the options being passed by the user. Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-01ima: Fail rule parsing when asymmetric key measurement isn't supportableTyler Hicks1-2/+4
Measuring keys is currently only supported for asymmetric keys. In the future, this might change. For now, the "func=KEY_CHECK" and "keyrings=" options are only appropriate when CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that these policy language constructs are supported. Fixes: 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy") Fixes: 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys") Suggested-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2026-01-24 16:52:36 +0300