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commit 7bbc3d385bd813077acaf0e6fdb2a86a901f5382 upstream.
The commit
commit 7661809d493b426e979f39ab512e3adf41fbcc69
Author: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Wed Jul 14 09:45:49 2021 -0700
mm: don't allow oversized kvmalloc() calls
limits the max allocatable memory via kvmalloc() to MAX_INT. Apply the
same limit in ipset.
Reported-by: syzbot+3493b1873fb3ea827986@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+2b8443c35458a617c904@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+ee5cb15f4a0e85e0d54e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a9f5970767d11eadc805d5283f202612c7ba1f59 upstream.
up->corkflag field can be read or written without any lock.
Annotate accesses to avoid possible syzbot/KCSAN reports.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 35306eb23814444bd4021f8a1c3047d3cb0c8b2b ]
Jann Horn reported that SO_PEERCRED and SO_PEERGROUPS implementations
are racy, as af_unix can concurrently change sk_peer_pid and sk_peer_cred.
In order to fix this issue, this patch adds a new spinlock that needs
to be used whenever these fields are read or written.
Jann also pointed out that l2cap_sock_get_peer_pid_cb() is currently
reading sk->sk_peer_pid which makes no sense, as this field
is only possibly set by AF_UNIX sockets.
We will have to clean this in a separate patch.
This could be done by reverting b48596d1dc25 "Bluetooth: L2CAP: Add get_peer_pid callback"
or implementing what was truly expected.
Fixes: 109f6e39fa07 ("af_unix: Allow SO_PEERCRED to work across namespaces.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d5ef190693a7d76c5c192d108e8dec48307b46ee ]
Patch that refactored fl_walk() to use idr_for_each_entry_continue_ul()
also removed rcu protection of individual filters which causes following
use-after-free when filter is deleted concurrently. Fix fl_walk() to obtain
rcu read lock while iterating and taking the filter reference and temporary
release the lock while calling arg->fn() callback that can sleep.
KASAN trace:
[ 352.773640] ==================================================================
[ 352.775041] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower]
[ 352.776304] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881c8251480 by task tc/2987
[ 352.777862] CPU: 3 PID: 2987 Comm: tc Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2+ #2
[ 352.778980] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 352.781022] Call Trace:
[ 352.781573] dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x5a
[ 352.782332] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
[ 352.783400] ? fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower]
[ 352.784292] ? fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower]
[ 352.785138] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
[ 352.785851] ? fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower]
[ 352.786587] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0
[ 352.787337] fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower]
[ 352.788163] ? fl_put+0x10/0x10 [cls_flower]
[ 352.789007] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x220/0x220
[ 352.790102] tcf_chain_dump+0x231/0x450
[ 352.790878] ? tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty+0x170/0x170
[ 352.791833] ? __might_sleep+0x2e/0xc0
[ 352.792594] ? tfilter_notify+0x170/0x170
[ 352.793400] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x220/0x220
[ 352.794477] tc_dump_tfilter+0x385/0x4b0
[ 352.795262] ? tc_new_tfilter+0x1180/0x1180
[ 352.796103] ? __mod_node_page_state+0x1f/0xc0
[ 352.796974] ? __build_skb_around+0x10e/0x130
[ 352.797826] netlink_dump+0x2c0/0x560
[ 352.798563] ? netlink_getsockopt+0x430/0x430
[ 352.799433] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x220/0x220
[ 352.800542] __netlink_dump_start+0x356/0x440
[ 352.801397] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3ff/0x550
[ 352.802190] ? tc_new_tfilter+0x1180/0x1180
[ 352.802872] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 352.803668] ? tc_new_tfilter+0x1180/0x1180
[ 352.804344] ? _copy_from_iter_nocache+0x800/0x800
[ 352.805202] ? kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
[ 352.805900] netlink_rcv_skb+0xc6/0x1f0
[ 352.806587] ? rht_deferred_worker+0x6b0/0x6b0
[ 352.807455] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 352.808324] ? netlink_ack+0x4d0/0x4d0
[ 352.809086] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x62/0x3d0
[ 352.809951] netlink_unicast+0x353/0x480
[ 352.810744] ? netlink_attachskb+0x430/0x430
[ 352.811586] ? __alloc_skb+0xd7/0x200
[ 352.812349] netlink_sendmsg+0x396/0x680
[ 352.813132] ? netlink_unicast+0x480/0x480
[ 352.813952] ? __import_iovec+0x192/0x210
[ 352.814759] ? netlink_unicast+0x480/0x480
[ 352.815580] sock_sendmsg+0x6c/0x80
[ 352.816299] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3a5/0x3c0
[ 352.817096] ? kernel_sendmsg+0x30/0x30
[ 352.817873] ? __ia32_sys_recvmmsg+0x150/0x150
[ 352.818753] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x140
[ 352.819518] ? sendmsg_copy_msghdr+0x110/0x110
[ 352.820402] ? ___sys_recvmsg+0xf4/0x1a0
[ 352.821110] ? __copy_msghdr_from_user+0x260/0x260
[ 352.821934] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x81/0xd0
[ 352.822680] ? __handle_mm_fault+0xef3/0x1b20
[ 352.823549] ? rb_insert_color+0x2a/0x270
[ 352.824373] ? copy_page_range+0x16b0/0x16b0
[ 352.825209] ? perf_event_update_userpage+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ 352.826190] ? __fget_light+0xd9/0xf0
[ 352.826941] __sys_sendmsg+0xb3/0x130
[ 352.827613] ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x20/0x20
[ 352.828377] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2c5/0x8a0
[ 352.829184] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x52/0x60
[ 352.830001] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x32/0x160
[ 352.830845] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[ 352.831445] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 352.832331] RIP: 0033:0x7f7bee973c17
[ 352.833078] Code: 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
[ 352.836202] RSP: 002b:00007ffcbb368e28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[ 352.837524] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7bee973c17
[ 352.838715] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffcbb368e50 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 352.839838] RBP: 00007ffcbb36d090 R08: 00000000cea96d79 R09: 00007f7beea34a40
[ 352.841021] R10: 00000000004059bb R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000046563f
[ 352.842208] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffcbb36d088
[ 352.843784] Allocated by task 2960:
[ 352.844451] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[ 352.845173] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90
[ 352.845873] fl_change+0x282/0x22db [cls_flower]
[ 352.846696] tc_new_tfilter+0x6cf/0x1180
[ 352.847493] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x471/0x550
[ 352.848323] netlink_rcv_skb+0xc6/0x1f0
[ 352.849097] netlink_unicast+0x353/0x480
[ 352.849886] netlink_sendmsg+0x396/0x680
[ 352.850678] sock_sendmsg+0x6c/0x80
[ 352.851398] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3a5/0x3c0
[ 352.852202] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x140
[ 352.852967] __sys_sendmsg+0xb3/0x130
[ 352.853718] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[ 352.854457] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 352.855830] Freed by task 7:
[ 352.856421] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[ 352.857139] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
[ 352.857854] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
[ 352.858609] __kasan_slab_free+0xed/0x130
[ 352.859348] kfree+0xa7/0x3c0
[ 352.859951] process_one_work+0x44d/0x780
[ 352.860685] worker_thread+0x2e2/0x7e0
[ 352.861390] kthread+0x1f4/0x220
[ 352.862022] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 352.862955] Last potentially related work creation:
[ 352.863758] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[ 352.864378] kasan_record_aux_stack+0xab/0xc0
[ 352.865028] insert_work+0x30/0x160
[ 352.865617] __queue_work+0x351/0x670
[ 352.866261] rcu_work_rcufn+0x30/0x40
[ 352.866917] rcu_core+0x3b2/0xdb0
[ 352.867561] __do_softirq+0xf6/0x386
[ 352.868708] Second to last potentially related work creation:
[ 352.869779] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[ 352.870560] kasan_record_aux_stack+0xab/0xc0
[ 352.871426] call_rcu+0x5f/0x5c0
[ 352.872108] queue_rcu_work+0x44/0x50
[ 352.872855] __fl_put+0x17c/0x240 [cls_flower]
[ 352.873733] fl_delete+0xc7/0x100 [cls_flower]
[ 352.874607] tc_del_tfilter+0x510/0xb30
[ 352.886085] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x471/0x550
[ 352.886875] netlink_rcv_skb+0xc6/0x1f0
[ 352.887636] netlink_unicast+0x353/0x480
[ 352.888285] netlink_sendmsg+0x396/0x680
[ 352.888942] sock_sendmsg+0x6c/0x80
[ 352.889583] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3a5/0x3c0
[ 352.890311] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x140
[ 352.891019] __sys_sendmsg+0xb3/0x130
[ 352.891716] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[ 352.892395] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 352.893666] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881c8251000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
[ 352.895696] The buggy address is located 1152 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8881c8251000, ffff8881c8251800)
[ 352.897640] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 352.898492] page:00000000213bac35 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1c8250
[ 352.900110] head:00000000213bac35 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 352.901541] flags: 0x2ffff800010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
[ 352.902908] raw: 002ffff800010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888100042f00
[ 352.904391] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 352.905861] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 352.907323] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 352.908218] ffff8881c8251380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 352.909471] ffff8881c8251400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 352.910735] >ffff8881c8251480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 352.912012] ^
[ 352.912642] ffff8881c8251500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 352.913919] ffff8881c8251580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 352.915185] ==================================================================
Fixes: d39d714969cd ("idr: introduce idr_for_each_entry_continue_ul()")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 597aa16c782496bf74c5dc3b45ff472ade6cee64 ]
Multipath RTA_FLOW is embedded in nexthop. Dump it in fib_add_nexthop()
to get the length of rtnexthop correct.
Fixes: b0f60193632e ("ipv4: Refactor nexthop attributes in fib_dump_info")
Signed-off-by: Xiao Liang <shaw.leon@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f7e745f8e94492a8ac0b0a26e25f2b19d342918f ]
We should always check if skb_header_pointer's return is NULL before
using it, otherwise it may cause null-ptr-deref, as syzbot reported:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:sctp_rcv_ootb net/sctp/input.c:705 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sctp_rcv+0x1d84/0x3220 net/sctp/input.c:196
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
sctp6_rcv+0x38/0x60 net/sctp/ipv6.c:1109
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2e9/0x1ca0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:422
ip6_input_finish+0x62/0x170 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:463
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline]
ip6_input+0x9c/0xd0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:472
dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:76 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x28c/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:297
Fixes: 3acb50c18d8d ("sctp: delay as much as possible skb_linearize")
Reported-by: syzbot+581aff2ae6b860625116@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b9731062ce8afd35cf723bf3a8ad55d208f915a5 ]
The pointer here points directly into the frame, so the
access is potentially unaligned. Use get_unaligned_le16
to avoid that.
Fixes: 3f52b7e328c5 ("mac80211: mesh power save basics")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210920154009.3110ff75be0c.Ib6a2ff9e9cc9bc6fca50fce631ec1ce725cc926b@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 13cb6d826e0ac0d144b0d48191ff1a111d32f0c6 ]
Limit max values for vht mcs and nss in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap
routine in order to fix the following warning reported by syzbot:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 10717 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000186f3e8 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: 0000000000000618 RBX: ffff88804ef76500 RCX: ffffc900143a5000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff888f478e RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000100
R10: ffffffff888f46f9 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff8
R13: ffff88804ef7653c R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000004
FS: 00007fbf5718f700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2de23000 CR3: 000000006a671000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Call Trace:
ieee80211_monitor_select_queue+0xa6/0x250 net/mac80211/iface.c:740
netdev_core_pick_tx+0x169/0x2e0 net/core/dev.c:4089
__dev_queue_xmit+0x6f9/0x3710 net/core/dev.c:4165
__bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2114 [inline]
__bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2139 [inline]
__bpf_redirect+0x5ba/0xd20 net/core/filter.c:2162
____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2429 [inline]
bpf_clone_redirect+0x2ae/0x420 net/core/filter.c:2401
bpf_prog_eeb6f53a69e5c6a2+0x59/0x234
bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:717 [inline]
__bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:624 [inline]
bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:631 [inline]
bpf_test_run+0x381/0xa30 net/bpf/test_run.c:119
bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xb84/0x1ee0 net/bpf/test_run.c:663
bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3307 [inline]
__sys_bpf+0x2137/0x5df0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4605
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4691 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x4665f9
Reported-by: syzbot+0196ac871673f0c20f68@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 646e76bb5daf4 ("mac80211: parse VHT info in injected frames")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c26c3f02dcb38ab63b2f2534cb463d95ee81bb13.1632141760.git.lorenzo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fe94bac626d9c1c5bc98ab32707be8a9d7f8adba ]
In ieee80211_amsdu_aggregate() set a pointer frag_tail point to the
end of skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list, and use it to bind other skb in
the end of this function. But when execute ieee80211_amsdu_aggregate()
->ieee80211_amsdu_realloc_pad()->pskb_expand_head(), the address of
skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list will be changed. However, the
ieee80211_amsdu_aggregate() not update frag_tail after call
pskb_expand_head(). That will cause the second skb can't bind to the
head skb appropriately.So we update the address of frag_tail to fix it.
Fixes: 6e0456b54545 ("mac80211: add A-MSDU tx support")
Signed-off-by: Chih-Kang Chang <gary.chang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: Zong-Zhe Yang <kevin_yang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210830073240.12736-1-pkshih@realtek.com
[reword comment]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 69e73dbfda14fbfe748d3812da1244cce2928dcb ]
ip_vs_conn_tab_bits may be provided by the user through the
conn_tab_bits module parameter. If this value is greater than 31, or
less than 0, the shift operator used to derive tab_size causes undefined
behaviour.
Fix this checking ip_vs_conn_tab_bits value to be in the range specified
in ipvs Kconfig. If not, simply use default value.
Fixes: 6f7edb4881bf ("IPVS: Allow boot time change of hash size")
Reported-by: Yi Chen <yiche@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Claudi <aclaudi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 94513069eb549737bcfc3d988d6ed4da948a2de8 upstream.
When PN checking is done in mac80211, for fragmentation we need
to copy the PN to the RX struct so we can later use it to do a
comparison, since commit bf30ca922a0c ("mac80211: check defrag
PN against current frame").
Unfortunately, in that commit I used the 'hdr' variable without
it being necessarily valid, so use-after-free could occur if it
was necessary to reallocate (parts of) the frame.
Fix this by reloading the variable after the code that results
in the reallocations, if any.
This fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=214401.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bf30ca922a0c ("mac80211: check defrag PN against current frame")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210927115838.12b9ac6bb233.I1d066acd5408a662c3b6e828122cd314fcb28cdb@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e87b5052271e39d62337ade531992b7e5d8c2cfa ]
only increase fib6_sernum in net namespace after add fib6_info
successfully.
Signed-off-by: zhang kai <zhangkaiheb@126.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6c90731980655280ea07ce4b21eb97457bf86286 ]
Coverity stumbled over a missing error check in smc_clc_prfx_set():
*** CID 1475954: Error handling issues (CHECKED_RETURN)
/net/smc/smc_clc.c: 233 in smc_clc_prfx_set()
>>> CID 1475954: Error handling issues (CHECKED_RETURN)
>>> Calling "kernel_getsockname" without checking return value (as is done elsewhere 8 out of 10 times).
233 kernel_getsockname(clcsock, (struct sockaddr *)&addrs);
Add the return code check in smc_clc_prfx_set().
Fixes: c246d942eabc ("net/smc: restructure netinfo for CLC proposal msgs")
Reported-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit f997ea3b7afc108eb9761f321b57de2d089c7c48 upstream.
This ensures we don't leak the sysfs file if we failed to
allocate chan->vc_wq during probe.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210517083557.172-1-xieyongji@bytedance.com
Fixes: 86c8437383ac ("net/9p: Add sysfs mount_tag file for virtio 9P device")
Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ef6c8d6ccf0c1dccdda092ebe8782777cd7803c9 upstream.
When SCTP handles an INIT chunk, it calls for example:
sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init
sctp_verify_init
sctp_verify_param
sctp_process_init
sctp_process_param
handling of SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY
sctp_verify_init() wasn't doing proper size validation and neither the
later handling, allowing it to work over the chunk itself, possibly being
uninitialized memory.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b6ffe7671b24689c09faa5675dd58f93758a97ae upstream.
In one of the fallbacks that SCTP has for identifying an association for an
incoming packet, it looks for AddIp chunk (from ASCONF) and take a peek.
Thing is, at this stage nothing was validating that the chunk actually had
enough content for that, allowing the peek to happen over uninitialized
memory.
Similar check already exists in actual asconf handling in
sctp_verify_asconf().
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8a0ed250f911da31a2aef52101bc707846a800ff ]
The GRE tunnel device can pull existing outer headers in ipge_xmit.
This is a rare path, apparently unique to this device. The below
commit ensured that pulling does not move skb->data beyond csum_start.
But it has a false positive if ip_summed is not CHECKSUM_PARTIAL and
thus csum_start is irrelevant.
Refine to exclude this. At the same time simplify and strengthen the
test.
Simplify, by moving the check next to the offending pull, making it
more self documenting and removing an unnecessary branch from other
code paths.
Strengthen, by also ensuring that the transport header is correct and
therefore the inner headers will be after skb_reset_inner_headers.
The transport header is set to csum_start in skb_partial_csum_set.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/YS+h%2FtqCJJiQei+W@shredder/
Fixes: 1d011c4803c7 ("ip_gre: add validation for csum_start")
Reported-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@idosch.org>
Suggested-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.duyck@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck <alexanderduyck@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c7c5e6ff533fe1f9afef7d2fa46678987a1335a7 ]
syzbot found that forcing a big quantum attribute would crash hosts fast,
essentially using this:
tc qd replace dev eth0 root fq_codel quantum 4294967295
This is because fq_codel_dequeue() would have to loop
~2^31 times in :
if (flow->deficit <= 0) {
flow->deficit += q->quantum;
list_move_tail(&flow->flowchain, &q->old_flows);
goto begin;
}
SFQ max quantum is 2^19 (half a megabyte)
Lets adopt a max quantum of one megabyte for FQ_CODEL.
Fixes: 4b549a2ef4be ("fq_codel: Fair Queue Codel AQM")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 730affed24bffcd1eebd5903171960f5ff9f1f22 ]
Bug reported by KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-scope in inet6_ehashfn (net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c:40)
Call Trace:
(...)
inet6_ehashfn (net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c:40)
(...)
nf_sk_lookup_slow_v6 (net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv6.c:91
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv6.c:146)
It seems that this bug has already been fixed by Eric Dumazet in the
past in:
commit 78296c97ca1f ("netfilter: xt_socket: fix a stack corruption bug")
But a variant of the same issue has been introduced in
commit d64d80a2cde9 ("netfilter: x_tables: don't extract flow keys on early demuxed sks in socket match")
`daddr` and `saddr` potentially hold a reference to ipv6_var that is no
longer in scope when the call to `nf_socket_get_sock_v6` is made.
Fixes: d64d80a2cde9 ("netfilter: x_tables: don't extract flow keys on early demuxed sks in socket match")
Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Hesmans <benjamin.hesmans@tessares.net>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9aca491e0dccf8a9d84a5b478e5eee3c6ea7803b ]
This patch fixes kernel NULL pointer dereference when creating nexthop
which is bound with SRv6 decapsulation. In the creation of nexthop,
__seg6_end_dt_vrf_build is called. __seg6_end_dt_vrf_build expects
fc_lninfo in fib6_config is set correctly, but it isn't set in
nh_create_ipv6, which causes kernel crash.
Here is steps to reproduce kernel crash:
1. modprobe vrf
2. ip -6 nexthop add encap seg6local action End.DT4 vrftable 1 dev eth0
We got the following message:
[ 901.370336] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000ba0
[ 901.371658] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 901.372672] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 901.373672] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 901.374248] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 901.374944] CPU: 0 PID: 8593 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.14-051400-generic #202108310811-Ubuntu
[ 901.376404] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module_el8.2.0+320+13f867d7 04/01/2014
[ 901.377907] RIP: 0010:vrf_ifindex_lookup_by_table_id+0x19/0x90 [vrf]
[ 901.379182] Code: c1 e9 72 ff ff ff e8 96 49 01 c2 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 89 f5 41 54 53 8b 05 47 4c 00 00 <48> 8b 97 a0 0b 00 00 48 8b 1c c2 e8 57 27 53 c1 4c 8d a3 88 00 00
[ 901.382652] RSP: 0018:ffffbf2d02043590 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 901.383746] RAX: 000000000000000b RBX: ffff990808255e70 RCX: ffffbf2d02043aa8
[ 901.385436] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 901.386924] RBP: ffffbf2d020435b0 R08: 00000000000000c0 R09: ffff990808255e40
[ 901.388537] R10: ffffffff83b08c90 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 901.389937] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000000b
[ 901.391226] FS: 00007fe49381f740(0000) GS:ffff99087dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 901.392737] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 901.393803] CR2: 0000000000000ba0 CR3: 000000000e3e8003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 901.395122] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 901.396496] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 901.397833] PKRU: 55555554
[ 901.398578] Call Trace:
[ 901.399144] l3mdev_ifindex_lookup_by_table_id+0x3b/0x70
[ 901.400179] __seg6_end_dt_vrf_build+0x34/0xd0
[ 901.401067] seg6_end_dt4_build+0x16/0x20
[ 901.401904] seg6_local_build_state+0x271/0x430
[ 901.402797] lwtunnel_build_state+0x81/0x130
[ 901.403645] fib_nh_common_init+0x82/0x100
[ 901.404465] ? sock_def_readable+0x4b/0x80
[ 901.405285] fib6_nh_init+0x115/0x7c0
[ 901.406033] nh_create_ipv6.isra.0+0xe1/0x140
[ 901.406932] rtm_new_nexthop+0x3b7/0xeb0
[ 901.407828] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x152/0x3a0
[ 901.408663] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x130/0x130
[ 901.409535] netlink_rcv_skb+0x55/0x100
[ 901.410319] rtnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20
[ 901.411026] netlink_unicast+0x1a8/0x250
[ 901.411813] netlink_sendmsg+0x238/0x470
[ 901.412602] ? _copy_from_user+0x2b/0x60
[ 901.413394] sock_sendmsg+0x65/0x70
[ 901.414112] ____sys_sendmsg+0x218/0x290
[ 901.414929] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x5c/0x90
[ 901.415814] ___sys_sendmsg+0x81/0xc0
[ 901.416559] ? fsnotify_destroy_marks+0x27/0xf0
[ 901.417447] ? call_rcu+0xa4/0x230
[ 901.418153] ? kmem_cache_free+0x23f/0x410
[ 901.418972] ? dentry_free+0x37/0x70
[ 901.419705] ? mntput_no_expire+0x4c/0x260
[ 901.420574] __sys_sendmsg+0x62/0xb0
[ 901.421297] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1f/0x30
[ 901.422057] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0
[ 901.422756] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50
[ 901.423675] ? __x64_sys_close+0x12/0x40
[ 901.424462] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[ 901.425219] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x9/0x20
[ 901.426149] ? irqentry_exit+0x19/0x30
[ 901.426901] ? exc_page_fault+0x89/0x160
[ 901.427709] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30
[ 901.428536] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 901.429514] RIP: 0033:0x7fe493945747
[ 901.430248] Code: 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bb 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
[ 901.433549] RSP: 002b:00007ffe9932cf68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[ 901.434981] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe493945747
[ 901.436303] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe9932cfe0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 901.437607] RBP: 00000000613053f7 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffe9932d07c
[ 901.438990] R10: 000055f4a903a010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 901.440340] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000055f4a802b163 R15: 000055f4a8042020
[ 901.441630] Modules linked in: vrf nls_utf8 isofs nls_iso8859_1 dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common isst_if_mbox_msr isst_if_common nfit rapl input_leds joydev serio_raw qemu_fw_cfg mac_hid sch_fq_codel drm virtio_rng ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic zstd_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd virtio_net net_failover cryptd psmouse virtio_blk failover i2c_piix4 pata_acpi floppy
[ 901.450808] CR2: 0000000000000ba0
[ 901.451514] ---[ end trace c27b934b99ade304 ]---
[ 901.452403] RIP: 0010:vrf_ifindex_lookup_by_table_id+0x19/0x90 [vrf]
[ 901.453626] Code: c1 e9 72 ff ff ff e8 96 49 01 c2 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 89 f5 41 54 53 8b 05 47 4c 00 00 <48> 8b 97 a0 0b 00 00 48 8b 1c c2 e8 57 27 53 c1 4c 8d a3 88 00 00
[ 901.456910] RSP: 0018:ffffbf2d02043590 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 901.457912] RAX: 000000000000000b RBX: ffff990808255e70 RCX: ffffbf2d02043aa8
[ 901.459238] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 901.460552] RBP: ffffbf2d020435b0 R08: 00000000000000c0 R09: ffff990808255e40
[ 901.461882] R10: ffffffff83b08c90 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 901.463208] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000000b
[ 901.464529] FS: 00007fe49381f740(0000) GS:ffff99087dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 901.466058] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 901.467189] CR2: 0000000000000ba0 CR3: 000000000e3e8003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 901.468515] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 901.469858] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 901.471139] PKRU: 55555554
Signed-off-by: Ryoga Saito <contact@proelbtn.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 4f884f3962767877d7aabbc1ec124d2c307a4257 upstream.
Commit 10d3be569243 ("tcp-tso: do not split TSO packets at retransmit
time") may directly retrans a multiple segments TSO/GSO packet without
split, Since this commit, we can no longer assume that a retransmitted
packet is a single segment.
This patch fixes the tp->undo_retrans accounting in tcp_sacktag_one()
that use the actual segments(pcount) of the retransmitted packet.
Before that commit (10d3be569243), the assumption underlying the
tp->undo_retrans-- seems correct.
Fixes: 10d3be569243 ("tcp-tso: do not split TSO packets at retransmit time")
Signed-off-by: zhenggy <zhenggy@chinatelecom.cn>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6a52e73368038f47f6618623d75061dc263b26ae upstream.
DSA supports connecting to a phy-handle, and has a fallback to a non-OF
based method of connecting to an internal PHY on the switch's own MDIO
bus, if no phy-handle and no fixed-link nodes were present.
The -ENODEV error code from the first attempt (phylink_of_phy_connect)
is what triggers the second attempt (phylink_connect_phy).
However, when the first attempt returns a different error code than
-ENODEV, this results in an unbalance of calls to phylink_create and
phylink_destroy by the time we exit the function. The phylink instance
has leaked.
There are many other error codes that can be returned by
phylink_of_phy_connect. For example, phylink_validate returns -EINVAL.
So this is a practical issue too.
Fixes: aab9c4067d23 ("net: dsa: Plug in PHYLINK support")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210914134331.2303380-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 04f08eb44b5011493d77b602fdec29ff0f5c6cd5 upstream.
syzbot reported another data-race in af_unix [1]
Lets change __skb_insert() to use WRITE_ONCE() when changing
skb head qlen.
Also, change unix_dgram_poll() to use lockless version
of unix_recvq_full()
It is verry possible we can switch all/most unix_recvq_full()
to the lockless version, this will be done in a future kernel version.
[1] HEAD commit: 8596e589b787732c8346f0482919e83cc9362db1
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in skb_queue_tail / unix_dgram_poll
write to 0xffff88814eeb24e0 of 4 bytes by task 25815 on cpu 0:
__skb_insert include/linux/skbuff.h:1938 [inline]
__skb_queue_before include/linux/skbuff.h:2043 [inline]
__skb_queue_tail include/linux/skbuff.h:2076 [inline]
skb_queue_tail+0x80/0xa0 net/core/skbuff.c:3264
unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xff2/0x1600 net/unix/af_unix.c:1850
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:703 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:723 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2392
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2446 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2532
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2561 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2558 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2558
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff88814eeb24e0 of 4 bytes by task 25834 on cpu 1:
skb_queue_len include/linux/skbuff.h:1869 [inline]
unix_recvq_full net/unix/af_unix.c:194 [inline]
unix_dgram_poll+0x2bc/0x3e0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2777
sock_poll+0x23e/0x260 net/socket.c:1288
vfs_poll include/linux/poll.h:90 [inline]
ep_item_poll fs/eventpoll.c:846 [inline]
ep_send_events fs/eventpoll.c:1683 [inline]
ep_poll fs/eventpoll.c:1798 [inline]
do_epoll_wait+0x6ad/0xf00 fs/eventpoll.c:2226
__do_sys_epoll_wait fs/eventpoll.c:2238 [inline]
__se_sys_epoll_wait fs/eventpoll.c:2233 [inline]
__x64_sys_epoll_wait+0xf6/0x120 fs/eventpoll.c:2233
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x0000001b -> 0x00000001
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 25834 Comm: syz-executor.1 Tainted: G W 5.14.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Fixes: 86b18aaa2b5b ("skbuff: fix a data race in skb_queue_len()")
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f4bb62e64c88c93060c051195d3bbba804e56945 upstream.
In tipc_sk_enqueue() we use hardcoded 2 jiffies to extract
socket buffer from generic queue to particular socket.
The 2 jiffies is too short in case there are other high priority
tasks get CPU cycles for multiple jiffies update. As result, no
buffer could be enqueued to particular socket.
To solve this, we switch to use constant timeout 20msecs.
Then, the function will be expired between 2 jiffies (CONFIG_100HZ)
and 20 jiffies (CONFIG_1000HZ).
Fixes: c637c1035534 ("tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le <hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9b6ff7eb666415e1558f1ba8a742f5db6a9954de upstream.
The reference count leak issue may take place in an error handling
path. If both conditions of tunnel->version == L2TP_HDR_VER_3 and the
return value of l2tp_v3_ensure_opt_in_linear is nonzero, the function
would directly jump to label invalid, without decrementing the reference
count of the l2tp_session object session increased earlier by
l2tp_tunnel_get_session(). This may result in refcount leaks.
Fix this issue by decrease the reference count before jumping to the
label invalid.
Fixes: 4522a70db7aa ("l2tp: fix reading optional fields of L2TPv3")
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xin Xiong <xiongx18@fudan.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan <tanxin.ctf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d9ea761fdd197351890418acd462c51f241014a7 upstream.
Commit 2677d2067731 ("dccp: don't free ccid2_hc_tx_sock ...") fixed
a UAF but reintroduced CVE-2017-6074.
When the sock is cloned, two dccps_hc_tx_ccid will reference to the
same ccid. So one can free the ccid object twice from two socks after
cloning.
This issue was found by "Hadar Manor" as well and assigned with
CVE-2020-16119, which was fixed in Ubuntu's kernel. So here I port
the patch from Ubuntu to fix it.
The patch prevents cloned socks from referencing the same ccid.
Fixes: 2677d2067731410 ("dccp: don't free ccid2_hc_tx_sock ...")
Signed-off-by: Zhenpeng Lin <zplin@psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 550ac9c1aaaaf51fd42e20d461f0b1cdbd55b3d2 upstream.
syszbot triggers this warning, which looks something
we can easily prevent.
If we initialize priv->list_field in chnl_net_init(),
then always use list_del_init(), we can remove robust_list_del()
completely.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3233 at net/caif/chnl_net.c:67 robust_list_del net/caif/chnl_net.c:67 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3233 at net/caif/chnl_net.c:67 chnl_net_uninit+0xc9/0x2e0 net/caif/chnl_net.c:375
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3233 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:robust_list_del net/caif/chnl_net.c:67 [inline]
RIP: 0010:chnl_net_uninit+0xc9/0x2e0 net/caif/chnl_net.c:375
Code: 89 eb e8 3a a3 ba f8 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 bf 01 00 00 48 81 fb 00 14 4e 8d 48 8b 2b 75 d0 e8 17 a3 ba f8 <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d e9 0a a3 ba f8 4c 89 e3 e8 02 a3 ba f8 4c
RSP: 0018:ffffc90009067248 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000008780 RBX: ffffffff8d4e1400 RCX: ffffc9000fd34000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff88bb6e49 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffff88802cd9ee08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8d0e6647
R10: ffffffff88bb6dc2 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88803791ae08
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 00000000e600ffce R15: ffff888073ed3480
FS: 00007fed10fa0700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2c322000 CR3: 00000000164a6000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
register_netdevice+0xadf/0x1500 net/core/dev.c:10347
ipcaif_newlink+0x4c/0x260 net/caif/chnl_net.c:468
__rtnl_newlink+0x106d/0x1750 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3458
rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3506
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5572
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724
__sys_sendto+0x21c/0x320 net/socket.c:2036
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2048 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2044 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2044
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Fixes: cc36a070b590 ("net-caif: add CAIF netdevice")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cc19862ffe454a5b632ca202e5a51bfec9f89fd2 upstream.
syzbot reported an use-after-free crash:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tipc_recvmsg+0xf77/0xf90 net/tipc/socket.c:1979
Call Trace:
tipc_recvmsg+0xf77/0xf90 net/tipc/socket.c:1979
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:943 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:961 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:957
tipc_conn_rcv_from_sock+0x162/0x2f0 net/tipc/topsrv.c:398
tipc_conn_recv_work+0xeb/0x190 net/tipc/topsrv.c:421
process_one_work+0x98d/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:2276
worker_thread+0x658/0x11f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2422
As Hoang pointed out, it was caused by skb_cb->bytes_read still accessed
after calling tsk_advance_rx_queue() to free the skb in tipc_recvmsg().
This patch is to fix it by accessing skb_cb->bytes_read earlier than
calling tsk_advance_rx_queue().
Fixes: f4919ff59c28 ("tipc: keep the skb in rcv queue until the whole data is read")
Reported-by: syzbot+e6741b97d5552f97c24d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit efe487fce3061d94222c6501d7be3aa549b3dc78 ]
syzbot report an array-index-out-of-bounds in taprio_change
index 16 is out of range for type '__u16 [16]'
that's because mqprio->num_tc is lager than TC_MAX_QUEUE,so we check
the return value of netdev_set_num_tc.
Reported-by: syzbot+2b3e5fb6c7ef285a94f6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Haimin Zhang <tcs_kernel@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 733c99ee8be9a1410287cdbb943887365e83b2d6 ]
In netlbl_cipsov4_add_std() when 'doi_def->map.std' alloc
failed, we sometime observe panic:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:
...
RIP: 0010:cipso_v4_doi_free+0x3a/0x80
...
Call Trace:
netlbl_cipsov4_add_std+0xf4/0x8c0
netlbl_cipsov4_add+0x13f/0x1b0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x132/0x170
genl_rcv_msg+0x125/0x240
This is because in cipso_v4_doi_free() there is no check
on 'doi_def->map.std' when 'doi_def->type' equal 1, which
is possibe, since netlbl_cipsov4_add_std() haven't initialize
it before alloc 'doi_def->map.std'.
This patch just add the check to prevent panic happen for similar
cases.
Reported-by: Abaci <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Wang <yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5a4753446253a427c0ff1e433b9c4933e5af207c ]
The failure case here should be rare, but it's obviously wrong.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e3faa49bcecdfcc80e94dd75709d6acb1a5d89f6 ]
Since the original TFO server code was implemented in commit
168a8f58059a22feb9e9a2dcc1b8053dbbbc12ef ("tcp: TCP Fast Open Server -
main code path") the TFO server code has supported the sysctl bit flag
TFO_SERVER_COOKIE_NOT_REQD. Currently, when the TFO_SERVER_ENABLE and
TFO_SERVER_COOKIE_NOT_REQD sysctl bit flags are set, a server connection
will accept a SYN with N bytes of data (N > 0) that has no TFO cookie,
create a new fast open connection, process the incoming data in the SYN,
and make the connection ready for accepting. After accepting, the
connection is ready for read()/recvmsg() to read the N bytes of data in
the SYN, ready for write()/sendmsg() calls and data transmissions to
transmit data.
This commit changes an edge case in this feature by changing this
behavior to apply to (N >= 0) bytes of data in the SYN rather than only
(N > 0) bytes of data in the SYN. Now, a server will accept a data-less
SYN without a TFO cookie if TFO_SERVER_COOKIE_NOT_REQD is set.
Caveat! While this enables a new kind of TFO (data-less empty-cookie
SYN), some firewall rules setup may not work if they assume such packets
are not legit TFOs and will filter them.
Signed-off-by: Luke Hsiao <lukehsiao@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210816205105.2533289-1-luke.w.hsiao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit cafae4cd625502f65d1798659c1aa9b62d38cc56 ]
LE Enhanced Connection Complete contains the Local RPA used in the
connection which must be used when set otherwise there could problems
when pairing since the address used by the remote stack could be the
Local RPA:
BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 4, Part E
page 2396
'Resolvable Private Address being used by the local device for this
connection. This is only valid when the Own_Address_Type (from the
HCI_LE_Create_Connection, HCI_LE_Set_Advertising_Parameters,
HCI_LE_Set_Extended_Advertising_Parameters, or
HCI_LE_Extended_Create_Connection commands) is set to 0x02 or
0x03, and the Controller generated a resolvable private address for the
local device using a non-zero local IRK. For other Own_Address_Type
values, the Controller shall return all zeros.'
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 79f5962baea74ce1cd4e5949598944bff854b166 ]
The maximum MTU was set to 2304, which is the maximum MSDU size. While
this is valid for normal WLAN interfaces, it is too low for monitor
interfaces. A monitor interface may receive and inject MPDU frames, and
the maximum MPDU frame size is larger than 2304. The MPDU may also
contain an A-MSDU frame, in which case the size may be much larger than
the MTU limit. Since the maximum size of an A-MSDU depends on the PHY
mode of the transmitting STA, it is not possible to set an exact MTU
limit for a monitor interface. Now the maximum MTU for a monitor
interface is unrestricted.
Signed-off-by: Johan Almbladh <johan.almbladh@anyfinetworks.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210628123246.2070558-1-johan.almbladh@anyfinetworks.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 734bc5ff783115aa3164f4e9dd5967ae78e0a8ab ]
In a future patch, calls to bh_lock_sock in sco.c should be replaced
by lock_sock now that none of the functions are run in IRQ context.
However, doing so results in a circular locking dependency:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.14.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.2/14867 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88803e3c1120 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1613 [inline]
ffff88803e3c1120 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
sco_conn_del+0x12a/0x2a0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:191
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8d2dc7c8 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1497 [inline]
ffffffff8d2dc7c8 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
hci_conn_hash_flush+0xda/0x260 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1608
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:959 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x12a/0x10a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1104
hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1482 [inline]
hci_remote_features_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3263 [inline]
hci_event_packet+0x2f4d/0x7c50 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6240
hci_rx_work+0x4f8/0xd30 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:5122
process_one_work+0x98d/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:2276
worker_thread+0x658/0x11f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2422
kthread+0x3e5/0x4d0 kernel/kthread.c:319
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295
-> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:959 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x12a/0x10a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1104
sco_connect net/bluetooth/sco.c:245 [inline]
sco_sock_connect+0x227/0xa10 net/bluetooth/sco.c:601
__sys_connect_file+0x155/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1879
__sys_connect+0x161/0x190 net/socket.c:1896
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1906 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1903 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1903
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
-> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3051 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3174 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3789 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2a07/0x54a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5015
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5625 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5590
lock_sock_nested+0xca/0x120 net/core/sock.c:3170
lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1613 [inline]
sco_conn_del+0x12a/0x2a0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:191
sco_disconn_cfm+0x71/0xb0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1202
hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1500 [inline]
hci_conn_hash_flush+0x127/0x260 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1608
hci_dev_do_close+0x528/0x1130 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:1778
hci_unregister_dev+0x1c0/0x5a0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4015
vhci_release+0x70/0xe0 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:340
__fput+0x288/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280
task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline]
do_exit+0xbd4/0x2a60 kernel/exit.c:825
do_group_exit+0x125/0x310 kernel/exit.c:922
get_signal+0x47f/0x2160 kernel/signal.c:2808
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a9/0x1c40 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:865
handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x17d/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:209
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:302
ret_from_fork+0x15/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:288
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO --> &hdev->lock --> hci_cb_list_lock
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(hci_cb_list_lock);
lock(&hdev->lock);
lock(hci_cb_list_lock);
lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO);
*** DEADLOCK ***
The issue is that the lock hierarchy should go from &hdev->lock -->
hci_cb_list_lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO. For example,
one such call trace is:
hci_dev_do_close():
hci_dev_lock();
hci_conn_hash_flush():
hci_disconn_cfm():
mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
sco_disconn_cfm():
sco_conn_del():
lock_sock(sk);
However, in sco_sock_connect, we call lock_sock before calling
hci_dev_lock inside sco_connect, thus inverting the lock hierarchy.
We fix this by pulling the call to hci_dev_lock out from sco_connect.
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ba316be1b6a00db7126ed9a39f9bee434a508043 ]
struct sock.sk_timer should be used as a sock cleanup timer. However,
SCO uses it to implement sock timeouts.
This causes issues because struct sock.sk_timer's callback is run in
an IRQ context, and the timer callback function sco_sock_timeout takes
a spin lock on the socket. However, other functions such as
sco_conn_del and sco_conn_ready take the spin lock with interrupts
enabled.
This inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} lock usage could
lead to deadlocks as reported by Syzbot [1]:
CPU0
----
lock(slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO);
<Interrupt>
lock(slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO);
To fix this, we use delayed work to implement SCO sock timouts
instead. This allows us to avoid taking the spin lock on the socket in
an IRQ context, and corrects the misuse of struct sock.sk_timer.
As a note, cancel_delayed_work is used instead of
cancel_delayed_work_sync in sco_sock_set_timer and
sco_sock_clear_timer to avoid a deadlock. In the future, the call to
bh_lock_sock inside sco_sock_timeout should be changed to lock_sock to
synchronize with other functions using lock_sock. However, since
sco_sock_set_timer and sco_sock_clear_timer are sometimes called under
the locked socket (in sco_connect and __sco_sock_close),
cancel_delayed_work_sync might cause them to sleep until an
sco_sock_timeout that has started finishes running. But
sco_sock_timeout would also sleep until it can grab the lock_sock.
Using cancel_delayed_work is fine because sco_sock_timeout does not
change from run to run, hence there is no functional difference
between:
1. waiting for a timeout to finish running before scheduling another
timeout
2. scheduling another timeout while a timeout is running.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=9089d89de0502e120f234ca0fc8a703f7368b31e [1]
Reported-by: syzbot+2f6d7c28bb4bf7e82060@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+2f6d7c28bb4bf7e82060@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 92fe24a7db751b80925214ede43f8d2be792ea7b ]
Syzbot reported a corrupted list in kobject_add_internal [1]. This
happens when multiple HCI_EV_SYNC_CONN_COMPLETE event packets with
status 0 are sent for the same HCI connection. This causes us to
register the device more than once which corrupts the kset list.
As this is forbidden behavior, we add a check for whether we're
trying to process the same HCI_EV_SYNC_CONN_COMPLETE event multiple
times for one connection. If that's the case, the event is invalid, so
we report an error that the device is misbehaving, and ignore the
packet.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=66264bf2fd0476be7e6c [1]
Reported-by: syzbot+66264bf2fd0476be7e6c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+66264bf2fd0476be7e6c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 323e0cb473e2a8706ff162b6b4f4fa16023c9ba7 ]
Fix the following out-of-bounds warnings:
net/core/flow_dissector.c: In function '__skb_flow_dissect':
>> net/core/flow_dissector.c:1104:4: warning: 'memcpy' offset [24, 39] from the object at '<unknown>' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'saddr' with type 'struct in6_addr' at offset 8 [-Warray-bounds]
1104 | memcpy(&key_addrs->v6addrs, &iph->saddr,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1105 | sizeof(key_addrs->v6addrs));
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from include/linux/ipv6.h:5,
from net/core/flow_dissector.c:6:
include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h:133:18: note: subobject 'saddr' declared here
133 | struct in6_addr saddr;
| ^~~~~
>> net/core/flow_dissector.c:1059:4: warning: 'memcpy' offset [16, 19] from the object at '<unknown>' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'saddr' with type 'unsigned int' at offset 12 [-Warray-bounds]
1059 | memcpy(&key_addrs->v4addrs, &iph->saddr,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1060 | sizeof(key_addrs->v4addrs));
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from include/linux/ip.h:17,
from net/core/flow_dissector.c:5:
include/uapi/linux/ip.h:103:9: note: subobject 'saddr' declared here
103 | __be32 saddr;
| ^~~~~
The problem is that the original code is trying to copy data into a
couple of struct members adjacent to each other in a single call to
memcpy(). So, the compiler legitimately complains about it. As these
are just a couple of members, fix this by copying each one of them in
separate calls to memcpy().
This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds
and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines
on memcpy().
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/109
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/d5ae2e65-1f18-2577-246f-bada7eee6ccd@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6321c7acb82872ef6576c520b0e178eaad3a25c0 ]
Fix the following out-of-bounds warning:
In function 'ip_copy_addrs',
inlined from '__ip_queue_xmit' at net/ipv4/ip_output.c:517:2:
net/ipv4/ip_output.c:449:2: warning: 'memcpy' offset [40, 43] from the object at 'fl' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'saddr' with type 'unsigned int' at offset 36 [-Warray-bounds]
449 | memcpy(&iph->saddr, &fl4->saddr,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
450 | sizeof(fl4->saddr) + sizeof(fl4->daddr));
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The problem is that the original code is trying to copy data into a
couple of struct members adjacent to each other in a single call to
memcpy(). This causes a legitimate compiler warning because memcpy()
overruns the length of &iph->saddr and &fl4->saddr. As these are just
a couple of struct members, fix this by using direct assignments,
instead of memcpy().
This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds
and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines
on memcpy().
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/109
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/d5ae2e65-1f18-2577-246f-bada7eee6ccd@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fef773fc8110d8124c73a5e6610f89e52814637d ]
Yonghong Song report:
The bpf selftest tc_bpf failed with latest bpf-next.
The following is the command to run and the result:
$ ./test_progs -n 132
[ 40.947571] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel.
test_tc_bpf:PASS:test_tc_bpf__open_and_load 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf:PASS:bpf_tc_hook_create(BPF_TC_INGRESS) 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf:PASS:bpf_tc_hook_create invalid hook.attach_point 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:bpf_tc_attach 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:handle set 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:priority set 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:prog_id set 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:bpf_tc_attach replace mode 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:bpf_tc_query 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:handle set 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:priority set 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:prog_id set 0 nsec
libbpf: Kernel error message: Failed to send filter delete notification
test_tc_bpf_basic:FAIL:bpf_tc_detach unexpected error: -3 (errno 3)
test_tc_bpf:FAIL:test_tc_internal ingress unexpected error: -3 (errno 3)
The failure seems due to the commit
cfdf0d9ae75b ("rtnetlink: use nlmsg_notify() in rtnetlink_send()")
Deal with ESRCH error in nlmsg_notify() even the report variable is zero.
Reported-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Yajun Deng <yajun.deng@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210719051816.11762-1-yajun.deng@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f4919ff59c2828064b4156e3c3600a169909bcf4 ]
Currently, when userspace reads a datagram with a buffer that is
smaller than this datagram, the data will be truncated and only
part of it can be received by users. It doesn't seem right that
users don't know the datagram size and have to use a huge buffer
to read it to avoid the truncation.
This patch to fix it by keeping the skb in rcv queue until the
whole data is read by users. Only the last msg of the datagram
will be marked with MSG_EOR, just as TCP/SCTP does.
Note that this will work as above only when MSG_EOR is set in the
flags parameter of recvmsg(), so that it won't break any old user
applications.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c2dc3e5fad13aca5d7bdf4bcb52b1a1d707c8555 ]
We really should not call rpc_wake_up_queued_task_set_status() with
xprt->snd_task as an argument unless we are certain that is actually an
rpc_task.
Fixes: 0445f92c5d53 ("SUNRPC: Fix disconnection races")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 732b33d0dbf17e9483f0b50385bf606f724f50a2 upstream.
This patch addresses the following problems:
- priv can never be NULL, so this part of the check is useless
- if the loop ran through the whole list, priv->client is invalid and
it is more appropriate and sufficient to check for the end of
list_for_each_entry loop condition.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210727000709.225032-1-harshvardhan.jha@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Harshvardhan Jha <harshvardhan.jha@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This reverts commit abbcd61d091f69ec98013dc0ae9c992e152fc303.
Botched backport, dropping to reword for next release.
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 92548b0ee220e000d81c27ac9a80e0ede895a881 ]
The UDP length field should be in network order.
This removes the following sparse error:
net/ipv4/route.c:3173:27: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
net/ipv4/route.c:3173:27: expected restricted __be16 [usertype] len
net/ipv4/route.c:3173:27: got unsigned long
Fixes: 404eb77ea766 ("ipv4: support sport, dport and ip_proto in RTM_GETROUTE")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c66070125837900163b81a03063ddd657a7e9bfb ]
The reference counting issue happens in one exception handling path of
cbq_change_class(). When failing to get tcf_block, the function forgets
to decrease the refcount of "rtab" increased by qdisc_put_rtab(),
causing a refcount leak.
Fix this issue by jumping to "failure" label when get tcf_block failed.
Fixes: 6529eaba33f0 ("net: sched: introduce tcf block infractructure")
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1630252681-71588-1-git-send-email-xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 67d6d681e15b578c1725bad8ad079e05d1c48a8e ]
Even after commit 6457378fe796 ("ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in
fnhe_hashfun()"), an attacker can still use brute force to learn
some secrets from a victim linux host.
One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash
table bucket a random value.
Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions
could contain 6 items under attack.
After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items,
between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets.
This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table,
by 50% in average, we do not expect this to be a problem.
This patch is more complex than the prior one (IPv6 equivalent),
because IPv4 was reusing the oldest entry.
Since we need to be able to evict more than one entry per
update_or_create_fnhe() call, I had to replace
fnhe_oldest() with fnhe_remove_oldest().
Also note that we will queue extra kfree_rcu() calls under stress,
which hopefully wont be a too big issue.
Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Tested-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a00df2caffed3883c341d5685f830434312e4a43 ]
Even after commit 4785305c05b2 ("ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()"),
an attacker can still use brute force to learn some secrets from a victim
linux host.
One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash
table bucket a random value.
Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions
could contain 6 items under attack.
After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items,
between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets.
This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table,
we do not expect this to be a problem.
Following patch is dealing with the same issue in IPv4.
Fixes: 35732d01fe31 ("ipv6: introduce a hash table to store dst cache")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu>
Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f41a4b2b5eb7872109723dab8ae1603bdd9d9ec1 ]
Syzbot hit "task hung" bug in hci_req_sync(). The problem was in
unreasonable huge inquiry timeout passed from userspace.
Fix it by adding sanity check for timeout value to hci_inquiry().
Since hci_inquiry() is the only user of hci_req_sync() with user
controlled timeout value, it makes sense to check timeout value in
hci_inquiry() and don't touch hci_req_sync().
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+be2baed593ea56c6a84c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f50d2ff8f016b79a2ff4acd5943a1eda40c545d4 ]
ieee80211_amsdu_realloc_pad() fails to account for extra_tx_headroom,
the original reserved headroom might be eaten. Add the necessary
extra_tx_headroom.
Fixes: 6e0456b54545 ("mac80211: add A-MSDU tx support")
Signed-off-by: Chih-Kang Chang <gary.chang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210816085128.10931-2-pkshih@realtek.com
[fix indentation]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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