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commit 4856bfd230985e43e84c26473c91028ff0a533bd upstream.
There are several scenarios in which mac80211 can call drv_wake_tx_queue
after ieee80211_restart_hw has been called and has not yet completed.
Driver private structs are considered uninitialized until mac80211 has
uploaded the vifs, stations and keys again, so using private tx queue
data during that time is not safe.
The driver can also not rely on drv_reconfig_complete to figure out when
it is safe to accept drv_wake_tx_queue calls again, because it is only
called after all tx queues are woken again.
To fix this, bail out early in drv_wake_tx_queue if local->in_reconfig
is set.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 997dd96471641e147cb2c33ad54284000d0f5e35 ]
Currently, IPv6 defragmentation code drops non-last fragments that
are smaller than 1280 bytes: see
commit 0ed4229b08c1 ("ipv6: defrag: drop non-last frags smaller than min mtu")
This behavior is not specified in IPv6 RFCs and appears to break
compatibility with some IPv6 implemenations, as reported here:
https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg543846.html
This patch re-uses common IP defragmentation queueing and reassembly
code in IP6 defragmentation in nf_conntrack, removing the 1280 byte
restriction.
Signed-off-by: Peter Oskolkov <posk@google.com>
Reported-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d4289fcc9b16b89619ee1c54f829e05e56de8b9a ]
Currently, IPv6 defragmentation code drops non-last fragments that
are smaller than 1280 bytes: see
commit 0ed4229b08c1 ("ipv6: defrag: drop non-last frags smaller than min mtu")
This behavior is not specified in IPv6 RFCs and appears to break
compatibility with some IPv6 implemenations, as reported here:
https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg543846.html
This patch re-uses common IP defragmentation queueing and reassembly
code in IPv6, removing the 1280 byte restriction.
v2: change handling of overlaps to match that of upstream.
Signed-off-by: Peter Oskolkov <posk@google.com>
Reported-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c23f35d19db3b36ffb9e04b08f1d91565d15f84f ]
This is a refactoring patch: without changing runtime behavior,
it moves rbtree-related code from IPv4-specific files/functions
into .h/.c defrag files shared with IPv6 defragmentation code.
v2: make handling of overlapping packets match upstream.
Signed-off-by: Peter Oskolkov <posk@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4976e3c683f328bc6f2edef555a4ffee6524486f ]
The logic in cake_select_tin() was getting a bit hairy, and it turns out we
can simplify it quite a bit. This also allows us to get rid of one of the
two diffserv parsing functions, which has the added benefit that
already-zeroed DSCP fields won't get re-written.
Suggested-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c87b4ecdbe8db27867a7b7f840291cd843406bd7 ]
There is not actually any guarantee that the IP headers are valid before we
access the DSCP bits of the packets. Fix this using the same approach taken
in sch_dsmark.
Reported-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <kevin@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b2100cc56fca8c51d28aa42a9f1fbcb2cf351996 ]
We shouldn't be using skb->protocol directly as that will miss cases with
hardware-accelerated VLAN tags. Use the helper instead to get the right
protocol number.
Reported-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <kevin@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9c69a13205151c0d801de9f9d83a818e6e8f60ec ]
When __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() is called, rt->from is RCU dereferenced, but is
never checked for null - rt6_flush_exceptions() may have removed the entry.
[ 1913.989004] RIP: 0010:ip6_rt_cache_alloc+0x13/0x170
[ 1914.209410] Call Trace:
[ 1914.214798] <IRQ>
[ 1914.219226] __ip6_rt_update_pmtu+0xb0/0x190
[ 1914.228649] ip6_tnl_xmit+0x2c2/0x970 [ip6_tunnel]
[ 1914.239223] ? ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim+0x32/0x1a0 [ip6_tunnel]
[ 1914.252489] ? __gre6_xmit+0x148/0x530 [ip6_gre]
[ 1914.262678] ip6gre_tunnel_xmit+0x17e/0x3c7 [ip6_gre]
[ 1914.273831] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x8d/0x1f0
[ 1914.283061] sch_direct_xmit+0xfa/0x230
[ 1914.291521] __qdisc_run+0x154/0x4b0
[ 1914.299407] net_tx_action+0x10e/0x1f0
[ 1914.307678] __do_softirq+0xca/0x297
[ 1914.315567] irq_exit+0x96/0xa0
[ 1914.322494] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x68/0x130
[ 1914.332683] apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
[ 1914.341721] </IRQ>
Fixes: a68886a69180 ("net/ipv6: Make from in rt6_info rcu protected")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c543cb4a5f07e09237ec0fc2c60c9f131b2c79ad ]
fib_compute_spec_dst() needs to be called under rcu protection.
syzbot reported :
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.1.0-rc4+ #165 Not tainted
include/linux/inetdevice.h:220 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by swapper/0/0:
#0: 0000000051b67925 ((&n->timer)){+.-.}, at: lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:170 [inline]
#0: 0000000051b67925 ((&n->timer)){+.-.}, at: call_timer_fn+0xda/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1315
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc4+ #165
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5162
__in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:220 [inline]
fib_compute_spec_dst+0xbbd/0x1030 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:294
spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:245 [inline]
__ip_options_compile+0x15a7/0x1a10 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:343
ipv4_link_failure+0x172/0x400 net/ipv4/route.c:1195
dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:427 [inline]
arp_error_report+0xd1/0x1c0 net/ipv4/arp.c:297
neigh_invalidate+0x24b/0x570 net/core/neighbour.c:995
neigh_timer_handler+0xc35/0xf30 net/core/neighbour.c:1081
call_timer_fn+0x190/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1325
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1362 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1681 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1649 [inline]
run_timer_softirq+0x652/0x1700 kernel/time/timer.c:1694
__do_softirq+0x266/0x95a kernel/softirq.c:293
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:374 [inline]
irq_exit+0x180/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:414
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x14a/0x570 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:807
Fixes: ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ed0de45a1008991fdaa27a0152befcb74d126a8b ]
Recompile IP options since IPCB may not be valid anymore when
ipv4_link_failure is called from arp_error_report.
Refer to the commit 3da1ed7ac398 ("net: avoid use IPCB in cipso_v4_error")
and the commit before that (9ef6b42ad6fd) for a similar issue.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d1841533e54876f152a30ac398a34f47ad6590b1 ]
When binding multiple services with specific type 1Ki, 2Ki..,
this leads to some entries in the name table of publications
missing when listed out via 'tipc name show'.
The problem is at identify zero last_type conditional provided
via netlink. The first is initial 'type' when starting name table
dummping. The second is continuously with zero type (node state
service type). Then, lookup function failure to finding node state
service type in next iteration.
To solve this, adding more conditional to marked as dirty type and
lookup correct service type for the next iteration instead of select
the first service as initial 'type' zero.
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le <hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 50ce163a72d817a99e8974222dcf2886d5deb1ae ]
For some reason, tcp_grow_window() correctly tests if enough room
is present before attempting to increase tp->rcv_ssthresh,
but does not prevent it to grow past tcp_space()
This is causing hard to debug issues, like failing
the (__tcp_select_window(sk) >= tp->rcv_wnd) test
in __tcp_ack_snd_check(), causing ACK delays and possibly
slow flows.
Depending on tcp_rmem[2], MTU, skb->len/skb->truesize ratio,
we can see the problem happening on "netperf -t TCP_RR -- -r 2000,2000"
after about 60 round trips, when the active side no longer sends
immediate acks.
This bug predates git history.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 988dc4a9a3b66be75b30405a5494faf0dc7cffb6 ]
gue tunnels run iptunnel_pull_offloads on received skbs. This can
determine a possible use-after-free accessing guehdr pointer since
the packet will be 'uncloned' running pskb_expand_head if it is a
cloned gso skb (e.g if the packet has been sent though a veth device)
Fixes: a09a4c8dd1ec ("tunnels: Remove encapsulation offloads on decap")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d85e8be2a5a02869f815dd0ac2d743deb4cd7957 ]
skb_reorder_vlan_header() should move XDP meta data with ethernet header
if XDP meta data exists.
Fixes: de8f3a83b0a0 ("bpf: add meta pointer for direct access")
Signed-off-by: Yuya Kusakabe <yuya.kusakabe@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takeru Hayasaka <taketarou2@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Takeru Hayasaka <taketarou2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Toshiaki Makita <makita.toshiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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br_multicast_start_querier
[ Upstream commit c5b493ce192bd7a4e7bd073b5685aad121eeef82 ]
br_multicast_start_querier() walks over the port list but it can be
called from a timer with only multicast_lock held which doesn't protect
the port list, so use RCU to walk over it.
Fixes: c83b8fab06fc ("bridge: Restart queries when last querier expires")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3b2e2904deb314cc77a2192f506f2fd44e3d10d0 ]
When the commit below was introduced it changed two visible things:
- the skb was no longer passed through the protocol handlers with the
original device
- the skb was passed up the stack with skb->dev = bridge
The first change broke af_packet sockets on bridge ports. For example we
use them for hostapd which listens for ETH_P_PAE packets on the ports.
We discussed two possible fixes:
- create a clone and pass it through NF_HOOK(), act on the original skb
based on the result
- somehow signal to the caller from the okfn() that it was called,
meaning the skb is ok to be passed, which this patch is trying to
implement via returning 1 from the bridge link-local okfn()
Note that we rely on the fact that NF_QUEUE/STOLEN would return 0 and
drop/error would return < 0 thus the okfn() is called only when the
return was 1, so we signal to the caller that it was called by preserving
the return value from nf_hook().
Fixes: 8626c56c8279 ("bridge: fix potential use-after-free when hook returns QUEUE or STOLEN verdict")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 899537b73557aafbdd11050b501cf54b4f5c45af ]
arg is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/atm/lec.c:715 lec_mcast_attach() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev_lec' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing arg before using it to index dev_lec.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8065a779f17e94536a1c4dcee4f9d88011672f97 ]
When a netdev appears through hot plug then gets enslaved by a failover
master that is already up and running, the slave will be opened
right away after getting enslaved. Today there's a race that userspace
(udev) may fail to rename the slave if the kernel (net_failover)
opens the slave earlier than when the userspace rename happens.
Unlike bond or team, the primary slave of failover can't be renamed by
userspace ahead of time, since the kernel initiated auto-enslavement is
unable to, or rather, is never meant to be synchronized with the rename
request from userspace.
As the failover slave interfaces are not designed to be operated
directly by userspace apps: IP configuration, filter rules with
regard to network traffic passing and etc., should all be done on master
interface. In general, userspace apps only care about the
name of master interface, while slave names are less important as long
as admin users can see reliable names that may carry
other information describing the netdev. For e.g., they can infer that
"ens3nsby" is a standby slave of "ens3", while for a
name like "eth0" they can't tell which master it belongs to.
Historically the name of IFF_UP interface can't be changed because
there might be admin script or management software that is already
relying on such behavior and assumes that the slave name can't be
changed once UP. But failover is special: with the in-kernel
auto-enslavement mechanism, the userspace expectation for device
enumeration and bring-up order is already broken. Previously initramfs
and various userspace config tools were modified to bypass failover
slaves because of auto-enslavement and duplicate MAC address. Similarly,
in case that users care about seeing reliable slave name, the new type
of failover slaves needs to be taken care of specifically in userspace
anyway.
It's less risky to lift up the rename restriction on failover slave
which is already UP. Although it's possible this change may potentially
break userspace component (most likely configuration scripts or
management software) that assumes slave name can't be changed while
UP, it's relatively a limited and controllable set among all userspace
components, which can be fixed specifically to listen for the rename
events on failover slaves. Userspace component interacting with slaves
is expected to be changed to operate on failover master interface
instead, as the failover slave is dynamic in nature which may come and
go at any point. The goal is to make the role of failover slaves less
relevant, and userspace components should only deal with failover master
in the long run.
Fixes: 30c8bd5aa8b2 ("net: Introduce generic failover module")
Signed-off-by: Si-Wei Liu <si-wei.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Sridhar Samudrala <sridhar.samudrala@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 930c9f9125c85b5134b3e711bc252ecc094708e3 ]
rxrpc_disconnect_client_call() reads the call's connection ID protocol
value (call->cid) as part of that function's variable declarations. This
is bad because it's not inside the locked section and so may race with
someone granting use of the channel to the call.
This manifests as an assertion failure (see below) where the call in the
presumed channel (0 because call->cid wasn't set when we read it) doesn't
match the call attached to the channel we were actually granted (if 1, 2 or
3).
Fix this by moving the read and dependent calculations inside of the
channel_lock section. Also, only set the channel number and pointer
variables if cid is not zero (ie. unset).
This problem can be induced by injecting an occasional error in
rxrpc_wait_for_channel() before the call to schedule().
Make two further changes also:
(1) Add a trace for wait failure in rxrpc_connect_call().
(2) Drop channel_lock before BUG'ing in the case of the assertion failure.
The failure causes a trace akin to the following:
rxrpc: Assertion failed - 18446612685268945920(0xffff8880beab8c00) == 18446612685268621312(0xffff8880bea69800) is false
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/rxrpc/conn_client.c:824!
...
RIP: 0010:rxrpc_disconnect_client_call+0x2bf/0x99d
...
Call Trace:
rxrpc_connect_call+0x902/0x9b3
? wake_up_q+0x54/0x54
rxrpc_new_client_call+0x3a0/0x751
? rxrpc_kernel_begin_call+0x141/0x1bc
? afs_alloc_call+0x1b5/0x1b5
rxrpc_kernel_begin_call+0x141/0x1bc
afs_make_call+0x20c/0x525
? afs_alloc_call+0x1b5/0x1b5
? __lock_is_held+0x40/0x71
? lockdep_init_map+0xaf/0x193
? lockdep_init_map+0xaf/0x193
? __lock_is_held+0x40/0x71
? yfs_fs_fetch_data+0x33b/0x34a
yfs_fs_fetch_data+0x33b/0x34a
afs_fetch_data+0xdc/0x3b7
afs_read_dir+0x52d/0x97f
afs_dir_iterate+0xa0/0x661
? iterate_dir+0x63/0x141
iterate_dir+0xa2/0x141
ksys_getdents64+0x9f/0x11b
? filldir+0x111/0x111
? do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x1a0
__x64_sys_getdents64+0x16/0x19
do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: 45025bceef17 ("rxrpc: Improve management and caching of client connection objects")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6377f787aeb945cae7abbb6474798de129e1f3ac ]
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pde_subdir_find+0x12d/0x150 fs/proc/generic.c:71
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881f41fe5b0 by task syz-executor.0/2806
CPU: 0 PID: 2806 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
pde_subdir_find+0x12d/0x150 fs/proc/generic.c:71
remove_proc_entry+0xe8/0x420 fs/proc/generic.c:667
atalk_proc_exit+0x18/0x820 [appletalk]
atalk_exit+0xf/0x5a [appletalk]
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x3dc/0x5e0 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fb2de6b9c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000200001c0
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb2de6ba6bc
R13: 00000000004bccaa R14: 00000000006f6bc8 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Allocated by task 2806:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:444 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2739 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2747 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0xcf/0x250 mm/slub.c:2752
kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:730 [inline]
__proc_create+0x30f/0xa20 fs/proc/generic.c:408
proc_mkdir_data+0x47/0x190 fs/proc/generic.c:469
0xffffffffc10c01bb
0xffffffffc10c0166
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 2806:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0xa6/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:3002
pde_put+0x6e/0x80 fs/proc/generic.c:647
remove_proc_entry+0x1d3/0x420 fs/proc/generic.c:684
0xffffffffc10c031c
0xffffffffc10c0166
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881f41fe500
which belongs to the cache proc_dir_entry of size 256
The buggy address is located 176 bytes inside of
256-byte region [ffff8881f41fe500, ffff8881f41fe600)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007d07f80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6e69a00 index:0x0
flags: 0x2fffc0000000200(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8881f6e69a00
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881f41fe480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881f41fe500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881f41fe580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881f41fe600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881f41fe680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
It should check the return value of atalk_proc_init fails,
otherwise atalk_exit will trgger use-after-free in pde_subdir_find
while unload the module.This patch fix error cleanup path of atalk_init
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit efcc9bcaf77c07df01371a7c34e50424c291f3ac ]
Fix a possible NULL pointer dereference in ip6erspan_set_version checking
nlattr data pointer
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 7549 Comm: syz-executor432 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc6-next-20190218
#37
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:ip6erspan_set_version+0x5c/0x350 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:1726
Code: 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 9f 02 00 00 49 8d bc 24 b0 00 00 00 c6 43
54 01 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f
85 9a 02 00 00 4d 8b ac 24 b0 00 00 00 4d 85 ed 0f
RSP: 0018:ffff888089ed7168 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880869d6e58 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000016 RSI: ffffffff862736b4 RDI: 00000000000000b0
RBP: ffff888089ed7180 R08: 1ffff11010d3adcb R09: ffff8880869d6e58
R10: ffffed1010d3add5 R11: ffff8880869d6eaf R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffff8931f8c0 R14: ffffffff862825d0 R15: ffff8880869d6e58
FS: 0000000000b3d880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000184 CR3: 0000000092cc5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ip6erspan_newlink+0x66/0x7b0 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:2210
__rtnl_newlink+0x107b/0x16c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3176
rtnl_newlink+0x69/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3234
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x465/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5192
netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2485
rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5210
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x536/0x720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x8ae/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1925
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x130 net/socket.c:631
___sys_sendmsg+0x806/0x930 net/socket.c:2136
__sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2174
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2183 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2181 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2181
do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x440159
Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7
48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fffa69156e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440159
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020001340 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 0000000000000011 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004019e0
R13: 0000000000401a70 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 09f8a7d13b4faaa1 ]---
RIP: 0010:ip6erspan_set_version+0x5c/0x350 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:1726
Code: 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 9f 02 00 00 49 8d bc 24 b0 00 00 00 c6 43
54 01 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f
85 9a 02 00 00 4d 8b ac 24 b0 00 00 00 4d 85 ed 0f
RSP: 0018:ffff888089ed7168 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880869d6e58 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000016 RSI: ffffffff862736b4 RDI: 00000000000000b0
RBP: ffff888089ed7180 R08: 1ffff11010d3adcb R09: ffff8880869d6e58
R10: ffffed1010d3add5 R11: ffff8880869d6eaf R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffff8931f8c0 R14: ffffffff862825d0 R15: ffff8880869d6e58
FS: 0000000000b3d880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000184 CR3: 0000000092cc5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Fixes: 4974d5f678ab ("net: ip6_gre: initialize erspan_ver just for erspan tunnels")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+30191cf1057abd3064af@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Rose <gvrose8192@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f75a2804da391571563c4b6b29e7797787332673 ]
xfrm_state_put() moves struct xfrm_state to the GC list
and schedules the GC work to clean it up. On net exit call
path, xfrm_state_flush() is called to clean up and
xfrm_flush_gc() is called to wait for the GC work to complete
before exit.
However, this doesn't work because one of the ->destructor(),
ipcomp_destroy(), schedules the same GC work again inside
the GC work. It is hard to wait for such a nested async
callback. This is also why syzbot still reports the following
warning:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 33 at net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c:351 xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit+0x2cb/0x500 net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c:351
...
ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xb0/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:153
cleanup_net+0x51d/0xb10 net/core/net_namespace.c:551
process_one_work+0xd0c/0x1ce0 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x143/0x14a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x357/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:246
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
In fact, it is perfectly fine to bypass GC and destroy xfrm_state
synchronously on net exit call path, because it is in process context
and doesn't need a work struct to do any blocking work.
This patch introduces xfrm_state_put_sync() which simply bypasses
GC, and lets its callers to decide whether to use this synchronous
version. On net exit path, xfrm_state_fini() and
xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit() use it. And, as ipcomp_destroy() itself is
blocking, it can use xfrm_state_put_sync() directly too.
Also rename xfrm_state_gc_destroy() to ___xfrm_state_destroy() to
reflect this change.
Fixes: b48c05ab5d32 ("xfrm: Fix warning in xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit.")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e9aebef558e3ed673934@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ea010070d0a7497253d5a6f919f6dd107450b31a ]
redundant copy_from_user in rds_sendmsg system call expose rds
to issue where rds_rdma_extra_size walk the rds iovec and and
calculate the number pf pages (sgs) it need to add to the tail of
rds message and later rds_cmsg_rdma_args copy the rds iovec again
and re calculate the same number and get different result causing
WARN_ON in rds_message_alloc_sgs.
fix this by doing the copy_from_user only once per rds_sendmsg
system call.
When issue occur the below dump is seen:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 19789 at net/rds/message.c:316 rds_message_alloc_sgs+0x10c/0x160 net/rds/message.c:316
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 19789 Comm: syz-executor827 Not tainted 4.19.0-next-20181030+ #101
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x244/0x39d lib/dump_stack.c:113
panic+0x2ad/0x55c kernel/panic.c:188
__warn.cold.8+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:540
report_bug+0x254/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:186
fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline]
do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:271
do_invalid_op+0x36/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:290
invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:969
RIP: 0010:rds_message_alloc_sgs+0x10c/0x160 net/rds/message.c:316
Code: c0 74 04 3c 03 7e 6c 44 01 ab 78 01 00 00 e8 2b 9e 35 fa 4c 89 e0 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 e8 14 9e 35 fa <0f> 0b 31 ff 44 89 ee e8 18 9f 35 fa 45 85 ed 75 1b e8 fe 9d 35 fa
RSP: 0018:ffff8801c51b7460 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffff8801bc412080 RBX: ffff8801d7bf4040 RCX: ffffffff8749c9e6
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8749ca5c RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: ffff8801c51b7490 R08: ffff8801bc412080 R09: ffffed003b5c5b67
R10: ffffed003b5c5b67 R11: ffff8801dae2db3b R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000007165c R14: 000000000007165c R15: 0000000000000005
rds_cmsg_rdma_args+0x82d/0x1510 net/rds/rdma.c:623
rds_cmsg_send net/rds/send.c:971 [inline]
rds_sendmsg+0x19a2/0x3180 net/rds/send.c:1273
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:632
___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2117
__sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x280 net/socket.c:2155
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2162
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x44a859
Code: e8 dc e6 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 6b cb fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f1d4710ada8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dcc28 RCX: 000000000044a859
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020001600 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006dcc20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 00000000006dcc2c
R13: 646e732f7665642f R14: 00007f1d4710b9c0 R15: 00000000006dcd2c
Kernel Offset: disabled
Rebooting in 86400 seconds..
Reported-by: syzbot+26de17458aeda9d305d8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: shamir rabinovitch <shamir.rabinovitch@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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routine
[ Upstream commit b7f1a16d29b2e28d3dcbb070511bd703e306281b ]
When device is unregistered, flowtable flush routine is called
by notifier_call(nf_tables_flowtable_event). and exit callback of
nftables pernet_operation(nf_tables_exit_net) also has flowtable flush
routine. but when network namespace is destroyed, both notifier_call
and pernet_operation are called. hence flowtable flush routine in
pernet_operation is unnecessary.
test commands:
%ip netns add vm1
%ip netns exec vm1 nft add table ip filter
%ip netns exec vm1 nft add flowtable ip filter w \
{ hook ingress priority 0\; devices = { lo }\; }
%ip netns del vm1
splat looks like:
[ 265.187019] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 87 at net/netfilter/core.c:309 nf_hook_entry_head+0xc7/0xf0
[ 265.187112] Modules linked in: nf_flow_table_ipv4 nf_flow_table nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables
[ 265.187390] CPU: 0 PID: 87 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3+ #5
[ 265.187453] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
[ 265.187514] RIP: 0010:nf_hook_entry_head+0xc7/0xf0
[ 265.187546] Code: 8d 81 68 03 00 00 5b c3 89 d0 83 fa 04 48 8d 84 c7 e8 11 00 00 76 81 0f 0b 31 c0 e9 78 ff ff ff 0f 0b 48 83 c4 08 31 c0 5b c3 <0f> 0b 31 c0 e9 65 ff ff ff 0f 0b 31 c0 e9 5c ff ff ff 48 89 0c 24
[ 265.187573] RSP: 0018:ffff88011546f098 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 265.187624] RAX: ffffffff8d90e135 RBX: 1ffff10022a8de1c RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 265.187645] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffff880116298040
[ 265.187645] RBP: ffff88010ea4c1a8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 265.187645] R10: ffff88011546f1d8 R11: ffffed0022c532c1 R12: ffff88010ea4c1d0
[ 265.187645] R13: 0000000000000005 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88010ea4c1c4
[ 265.187645] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011b200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 265.187645] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 265.187645] CR2: 00007fdfb8d00000 CR3: 0000000057a16000 CR4: 00000000001006f0
[ 265.187645] Call Trace:
[ 265.187645] __nf_unregister_net_hook+0xca/0x5d0
[ 265.187645] ? nf_hook_entries_free.part.3+0x80/0x80
[ 265.187645] ? save_trace+0x300/0x300
[ 265.187645] nf_unregister_net_hooks+0x2e/0x40
[ 265.187645] nf_tables_exit_net+0x479/0x1340 [nf_tables]
[ 265.187645] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0
[ 265.187645] ? nf_tables_abort+0x30/0x30 [nf_tables]
[ 265.187645] ? inet_frag_destroy_rcu+0xd0/0xd0
[ 265.187645] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x93/0x210
[ 265.187645] ? __bpf_trace_preemptirq_template+0x10/0x10
[ 265.187645] ? inet_frag_destroy_rcu+0xd0/0xd0
[ 265.187645] ? inet_frag_destroy_rcu+0xd0/0xd0
[ 265.187645] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x17f/0x740
[ 265.187645] ? wait_for_completion+0x710/0x710
[ 265.187645] ? bucket_table_free+0xb2/0x1f0
[ 265.187645] ? nested_table_free+0x130/0x130
[ 265.187645] ? __lock_is_held+0xb4/0x140
[ 265.187645] ops_exit_list.isra.10+0x94/0x140
[ 265.187645] cleanup_net+0x45b/0x900
[ ... ]
This WARNING means that hook unregisteration is failed because
all flowtables hooks are already unregistered by notifier_call.
Network namespace exit routine guarantees that all devices will be
unregistered first. then, other exit callbacks of pernet_operations
are called. so that removing flowtable flush routine in exit callback of
pernet_operation(nf_tables_exit_net) doesn't make flowtable leak.
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 30d65e0804d58a03d1a8ea4e12c6fc07ed08218b ]
Fix crash caused by NULL pointer dereference when debugfs functions
le_max_key_read, le_max_key_size_write, le_min_key_size_read or
le_min_key_size_write and Bluetooth adapter was powered off.
Fix is to move max_key_size and min_key_size from smp_dev to hci_dev.
At the same time they were renamed to le_max_key_size and
le_min_key_size.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000002e8
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#24] SMP PTI
CPU: 2 PID: 6255 Comm: cat Tainted: G D OE 4.18.9-200.fc28.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: LENOVO 4286CTO/4286CTO, BIOS 8DET76WW (1.46 ) 06/21/2018
RIP: 0010:le_max_key_size_read+0x45/0xb0 [bluetooth]
Code: 00 00 00 48 83 ec 10 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 31 c0 48 8b 87 c8 00 00 00 48 8d 7c 24 04 48 8b 80 48 0a 00 00 <48> 8b 80 e8 02 00 00 0f b6 48 52 e8 fb b6 b3 ed be 04 00 00 00 48
RSP: 0018:ffffab23c3ff3df0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0b4ca2e000 RCX: ffffab23c3ff3f08
RDX: ffffffffc0ddb033 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffab23c3ff3df4
RBP: 0000000000020000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffab23c3ff3ed8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffab23c3ff3f08
R13: 00007f0b4ca2e000 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: ffffab23c3ff3f08
FS: 00007f0b4ca0f540(0000) GS:ffff91bd5e280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000002e8 CR3: 00000000629fa006 CR4: 00000000000606e0
Call Trace:
full_proxy_read+0x53/0x80
__vfs_read+0x36/0x180
vfs_read+0x8a/0x140
ksys_read+0x4f/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Signed-off-by: Matias Karhumaa <matias.karhumaa@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0d704967f4a49cc2212350b3e4a8231f8b4283ed ]
cgroup v2 path field is PATH_MAX which is too large, this is placing too
much pressure on memory allocation for people with many rules doing
cgroup v1 classid matching, side effects of this are bug reports like:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200639
This patch registers a new revision that shrinks the cgroup path to 512
bytes, which is the same approach we follow in similar extensions that
have a path field.
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2803cf4379ed252894f046cb8812a48db35294e3 ]
v9fs_dir_readdir() could deadloop if a struct was sent with a size set
to -2
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536134432-11997-1-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=88021
Signed-off-by: Gertjan Halkes <gertjan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 89259088c1b7fecb43e8e245dc931909132a4e03 upstream
syzbot was able to trigger the WARN in cttimeout_default_get() by
passing UDPLITE as l4protocol. Alias UDPLITE to UDP, both use
same timeout values.
Furthermore, also fetch GRE timeouts. GRE is a bit more complicated,
as it still can be a module and its netns_proto_gre struct layout isn't
visible outside of the gre module. Can't move timeouts around, it
appears conntrack sysctl unregister assumes net_generic() returns
nf_proto_net, so we get crash. Expose layout of netns_proto_gre instead.
A followup nf-next patch could make gre tracker be built-in as well
if needed, its not that large.
Last, make the WARN() mention the missing protocol value in case
anything else is missing.
Reported-by: syzbot+2fae8fa157dd92618cae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 8866df9264a3 ("netfilter: nfnetlink_cttimeout: pass default timeout policy to obj_to_nlattr")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 8866df9264a34e675b4ee8a151db819b87cce2d3 upstream
Otherwise, we hit a NULL pointer deference since handlers always assume
default timeout policy is passed.
netlink: 24 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process `syz-executor2'.
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 9575 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.19.0+ #312
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:icmp_timeout_obj_to_nlattr+0x77/0x170 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmp.c:297
Fixes: c779e849608a ("netfilter: conntrack: remove get_timeout() indirection")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9a5a90d167b0e5fe3d47af16b68fd09ce64085cd ]
__netif_receive_skb_list_ptype() leaves skb->next poisoned before passing
it to pt_prev->func handler, what may produce (in certain cases, e.g. DSA
setup) crashes like:
[ 88.606777] CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000e, epc == 80687078, ra == 8052cc7c
[ 88.618666] Oops[#1]:
[ 88.621196] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.1.0-rc2-dlink-00206-g4192a172-dirty #1473
[ 88.630885] $ 0 : 00000000 10000400 00000002 864d7850
[ 88.636709] $ 4 : 87c0ddf0 864d7800 87c0ddf0 00000000
[ 88.642526] $ 8 : 00000000 49600000 00000001 00000001
[ 88.648342] $12 : 00000000 c288617b dadbee27 25d17c41
[ 88.654159] $16 : 87c0ddf0 85cff080 80790000 fffffffd
[ 88.659975] $20 : 80797b20 ffffffff 00000001 864d7800
[ 88.665793] $24 : 00000000 8011e658
[ 88.671609] $28 : 80790000 87c0dbc0 87cabf00 8052cc7c
[ 88.677427] Hi : 00000003
[ 88.680622] Lo : 7b5b4220
[ 88.683840] epc : 80687078 vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1c/0x1a0
[ 88.690532] ra : 8052cc7c dev_hard_start_xmit+0xac/0x188
[ 88.696734] Status: 10000404 IEp
[ 88.700422] Cause : 50000008 (ExcCode 02)
[ 88.704874] BadVA : 0000000e
[ 88.708069] PrId : 0001a120 (MIPS interAptiv (multi))
[ 88.713005] Modules linked in:
[ 88.716407] Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=(ptrval), task=(ptrval), tls=00000000)
[ 88.725219] Stack : 85f61c28 00000000 0000000e 80780000 87c0ddf0 85cff080 80790000 8052cc7c
[ 88.734529] 87cabf00 00000000 00000001 85f5fb40 807b0000 864d7850 87cabf00 807d0000
[ 88.743839] 864d7800 8655f600 00000000 85cff080 87c1c000 0000006a 00000000 8052d96c
[ 88.753149] 807a0000 8057adb8 87c0dcc8 87c0dc50 85cfff08 00000558 87cabf00 85f58c50
[ 88.762460] 00000002 85f58c00 864d7800 80543308 fffffff4 00000001 85f58c00 864d7800
[ 88.771770] ...
[ 88.774483] Call Trace:
[ 88.777199] [<80687078>] vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1c/0x1a0
[ 88.783504] [<8052cc7c>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xac/0x188
[ 88.789326] [<8052d96c>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x6e8/0x7d4
[ 88.794955] [<805a8640>] ip_finish_output2+0x238/0x4d0
[ 88.800677] [<805ab6a0>] ip_output+0xc8/0x140
[ 88.805526] [<805a68f4>] ip_forward+0x364/0x560
[ 88.810567] [<805a4ff8>] ip_rcv+0x48/0xe4
[ 88.815030] [<80528d44>] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x44/0x58
[ 88.821635] [<8067f220>] dsa_switch_rcv+0x108/0x1ac
[ 88.827067] [<80528f80>] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x228/0x26c
[ 88.833951] [<8052ed84>] netif_receive_skb_list+0x1d4/0x394
[ 88.840160] [<80355a88>] lunar_rx_poll+0x38c/0x828
[ 88.845496] [<8052fa78>] net_rx_action+0x14c/0x3cc
[ 88.850835] [<806ad300>] __do_softirq+0x178/0x338
[ 88.856077] [<8012a2d4>] irq_exit+0xbc/0x100
[ 88.860846] [<802f8b70>] plat_irq_dispatch+0xc0/0x144
[ 88.866477] [<80105974>] handle_int+0x14c/0x158
[ 88.871516] [<806acfb0>] r4k_wait+0x30/0x40
[ 88.876462] Code: afb10014 8c8200a0 00803025 <9443000c> 94a20468 00000000 10620042 00a08025 9605046a
[ 88.887332]
[ 88.888982] ---[ end trace eb863d007da11cf1 ]---
[ 88.894122] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 88.901202] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---
Fix this by pulling skb off the sublist and zeroing skb->next pointer
before calling ptype callback.
Fixes: 88eb1944e18c ("net: core: propagate SKB lists through packet_type lookup")
Reviewed-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@dlink.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2a3cabae4536edbcb21d344e7aa8be7a584d2afb ]
erspan_v6 tunnels run __iptunnel_pull_header on received skbs to remove
erspan header. This can determine a possible use-after-free accessing
pkt_md pointer in ip6erspan_rcv since the packet will be 'uncloned'
running pskb_expand_head if it is a cloned gso skb (e.g if the packet has
been sent though a veth device). Fix it resetting pkt_md pointer after
__iptunnel_pull_header
Fixes: 1d7e2ed22f8d ("net: erspan: refactor existing erspan code")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 492b67e28ee5f2a2522fb72e3d3bcb990e461514 ]
erspan tunnels run __iptunnel_pull_header on received skbs to remove
gre and erspan headers. This can determine a possible use-after-free
accessing pkt_md pointer in erspan_rcv since the packet will be 'uncloned'
running pskb_expand_head if it is a cloned gso skb (e.g if the packet has
been sent though a veth device). Fix it resetting pkt_md pointer after
__iptunnel_pull_header
Fixes: 1d7e2ed22f8d ("net: erspan: refactor existing erspan code")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8c83f2df9c6578ea4c5b940d8238ad8a41b87e9e ]
Configuration check to accept source route IP options should be made on
the incoming netdevice when the skb->dev is an l3mdev master. The route
lookup for the source route next hop also needs the incoming netdev.
v2->v3:
- Simplify by passing the original netdevice down the stack (per David
Ahern).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b506bc975f60f06e13e74adb35e708a23dc4e87c ]
When tcp_sk_init() failed in inet_ctl_sock_create(),
'net->ipv4.tcp_congestion_control' will be left
uninitialized, but tcp_sk_exit() hasn't check for
that.
This patch add checking on 'net->ipv4.tcp_congestion_control'
in tcp_sk_exit() to prevent NULL-ptr dereference.
Fixes: 6670e1524477 ("tcp: Namespace-ify sysctl_tcp_default_congestion_control")
Signed-off-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit aecfde23108b8e637d9f5c5e523b24fb97035dc3 ]
RFC8257 §3.5 explicitly states that "A DCTCP sender MUST react to
loss episodes in the same way as conventional TCP".
Currently, Linux DCTCP performs no cwnd reduction when losses
are encountered. Optionally, the dctcp_clamp_alpha_on_loss resets
alpha to its maximal value if a RTO happens. This behavior
is sub-optimal for at least two reasons: i) it ignores losses
triggering fast retransmissions; and ii) it causes unnecessary large
cwnd reduction in the future if the loss was isolated as it resets
the historical term of DCTCP's alpha EWMA to its maximal value (i.e.,
denoting a total congestion). The second reason has an especially
noticeable effect when using DCTCP in high BDP environments, where
alpha normally stays at low values.
This patch replace the clamping of alpha by setting ssthresh to
half of cwnd for both fast retransmissions and RTOs, at most once
per RTT. Consequently, the dctcp_clamp_alpha_on_loss module parameter
has been removed.
The table below shows experimental results where we measured the
drop probability of a PIE AQM (not applying ECN marks) at a
bottleneck in the presence of a single TCP flow with either the
alpha-clamping option enabled or the cwnd halving proposed by this
patch. Results using reno or cubic are given for comparison.
| Link | RTT | Drop
TCP CC | speed | base+AQM | probability
==================|=========|==========|============
CUBIC | 40Mbps | 7+20ms | 0.21%
RENO | | | 0.19%
DCTCP-CLAMP-ALPHA | | | 25.80%
DCTCP-HALVE-CWND | | | 0.22%
------------------|---------|----------|------------
CUBIC | 100Mbps | 7+20ms | 0.03%
RENO | | | 0.02%
DCTCP-CLAMP-ALPHA | | | 23.30%
DCTCP-HALVE-CWND | | | 0.04%
------------------|---------|----------|------------
CUBIC | 800Mbps | 1+1ms | 0.04%
RENO | | | 0.05%
DCTCP-CLAMP-ALPHA | | | 18.70%
DCTCP-HALVE-CWND | | | 0.06%
We see that, without halving its cwnd for all source of losses,
DCTCP drives the AQM to large drop probabilities in order to keep
the queue length under control (i.e., it repeatedly faces RTOs).
Instead, if DCTCP reacts to all source of losses, it can then be
controlled by the AQM using similar drop levels than cubic or reno.
Signed-off-by: Koen De Schepper <koen.de_schepper@nokia-bell-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Olivier Tilmans <olivier.tilmans@nokia-bell-labs.com>
Cc: Bob Briscoe <research@bobbriscoe.net>
Cc: Lawrence Brakmo <brakmo@fb.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <borkmann@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Shewmaker <agshew@gmail.com>
Cc: Glenn Judd <glenn.judd@morganstanley.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 09279e615c81ce55e04835970601ae286e3facbe ]
Syzbot report a kernel-infoleak:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
Call Trace:
_copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:174 [inline]
sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs net/sctp/socket.c:5911 [inline]
sctp_getsockopt+0x1668e/0x17f70 net/sctp/socket.c:7562
...
Uninit was stored to memory at:
sctp_transport_init net/sctp/transport.c:61 [inline]
sctp_transport_new+0x16d/0x9a0 net/sctp/transport.c:115
sctp_assoc_add_peer+0x532/0x1f70 net/sctp/associola.c:637
sctp_process_param net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:2548 [inline]
sctp_process_init+0x1a1b/0x3ed0 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:2361
...
Bytes 8-15 of 16 are uninitialized
It was caused by that th _pad field (the 8-15 bytes) of a v4 addr (saved in
struct sockaddr_in) wasn't initialized, but directly copied to user memory
in sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs().
So fix it by calling memset(addr->v4.sin_zero, 0, 8) to initialize _pad of
sockaddr_in before copying it to user memory in sctp_v4_addr_to_user(), as
sctp_v6_addr_to_user() does.
Reported-by: syzbot+86b5c7c236a22616a72f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f28cd2af22a0c134e4aa1c64a70f70d815d473fb ]
The flow action buffer can be resized if it's not big enough to contain
all the requested flow actions. However, this resize doesn't take into
account the new requested size, the buffer is only increased by a factor
of 2x. This might be not enough to contain the new data, causing a
buffer overflow, for example:
[ 42.044472] =============================================================================
[ 42.045608] BUG kmalloc-96 (Not tainted): Redzone overwritten
[ 42.046415] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ 42.047715] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 42.047716] INFO: 0x8bf2c4a5-0x720c0928. First byte 0x0 instead of 0xcc
[ 42.048677] INFO: Slab 0xbc6d2040 objects=29 used=18 fp=0xdc07dec4 flags=0x2808101
[ 42.049743] INFO: Object 0xd53a3464 @offset=2528 fp=0xccdcdebb
[ 42.050747] Redzone 76f1b237: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........
[ 42.051839] Object d53a3464: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 0c 00 00 00 6c 00 00 00 kkkkkkkk....l...
[ 42.053015] Object f49a30cc: 6c 00 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 78 a3 15 f6 l...........x...
[ 42.054203] Object acfe4220: 20 00 02 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...............
[ 42.055370] Object 21024e91: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
[ 42.056541] Object 070e04c3: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
[ 42.057797] Object 948a777a: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
[ 42.059061] Redzone 8bf2c4a5: 00 00 00 00 ....
[ 42.060189] Padding a681b46e: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
Fix by making sure the new buffer is properly resized to contain all the
requested data.
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1813244
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@ovn.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0db6f8befc32c68bb13d7ffbb2e563c79e913e13 ]
It returned always NULL, thus it was never possible to get the filter.
Example:
$ ip link add foo type dummy
$ ip link add bar type dummy
$ tc qdisc add dev foo clsact
$ tc filter add dev foo protocol all pref 1 ingress handle 1234 \
matchall action mirred ingress mirror dev bar
Before the patch:
$ tc filter get dev foo protocol all pref 1 ingress handle 1234 matchall
Error: Specified filter handle not found.
We have an error talking to the kernel
After:
$ tc filter get dev foo protocol all pref 1 ingress handle 1234 matchall
filter ingress protocol all pref 1 matchall chain 0 handle 0x4d2
not_in_hw
action order 1: mirred (Ingress Mirror to device bar) pipe
index 1 ref 1 bind 1
CC: Yotam Gigi <yotamg@mellanox.com>
CC: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Fixes: fd62d9f5c575 ("net/sched: matchall: Fix configuration race")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fae2708174ae95d98d19f194e03d6e8f688ae195 ]
the control path of 'sample' action does not validate the value of 'rate'
provided by the user, but then it uses it as divisor in the traffic path.
Validate it in tcf_sample_init(), and return -EINVAL with a proper extack
message in case that value is zero, to fix a splat with the script below:
# tc f a dev test0 egress matchall action sample rate 0 group 1 index 2
# tc -s a s action sample
total acts 1
action order 0: sample rate 1/0 group 1 pipe
index 2 ref 1 bind 1 installed 19 sec used 19 sec
Action statistics:
Sent 0 bytes 0 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0)
backlog 0b 0p requeues 0
# ping 192.0.2.1 -I test0 -c1 -q
divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 6192 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.1.0-rc2.diag2+ #591
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:tcf_sample_act+0x9e/0x1e0 [act_sample]
Code: 6a f1 85 c0 74 0d 80 3d 83 1a 00 00 00 0f 84 9c 00 00 00 4d 85 e4 0f 84 85 00 00 00 e8 9b d7 9c f1 44 8b 8b e0 00 00 00 31 d2 <41> f7 f1 85 d2 75 70 f6 85 83 00 00 00 10 48 8b 45 10 8b 88 08 01
RSP: 0018:ffffae320190ba30 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000b0677d21 RBX: ffff8af1ed9ec000 RCX: 0000000059a9fe49
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000c7e33b7 RDI: ffff8af23daa0af0
RBP: ffff8af1ee11b200 R08: 0000000074fcaf7e R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000050 R11: ffffffffb3088680 R12: ffff8af232307f80
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: ffff8af1ed9ec000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fe9c6d2f740(0000) GS:ffff8af23da80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fff6772f000 CR3: 00000000746a2004 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
tcf_action_exec+0x7c/0x1c0
tcf_classify+0x57/0x160
__dev_queue_xmit+0x3dc/0xd10
ip_finish_output2+0x257/0x6d0
ip_output+0x75/0x280
ip_send_skb+0x15/0x40
raw_sendmsg+0xae3/0x1410
sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
__sys_sendto+0x10e/0x140
__x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x60/0x210
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[...]
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Add a TDC selftest to document that 'rate' is now being validated.
Reported-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Fixes: 5c5670fae430 ("net/sched: Introduce sample tc action")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Yotam Gigi <yotam.gi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit cb66ddd156203daefb8d71158036b27b0e2caf63 ]
When it is to cleanup net namespace, rds_tcp_exit_net() will call
rds_tcp_kill_sock(), if t_sock is NULL, it will not call
rds_conn_destroy(), rds_conn_path_destroy() and rds_tcp_conn_free() to free
connection, and the worker cp_conn_w is not stopped, afterwards the net is freed in
net_drop_ns(); While cp_conn_w rds_connect_worker() will call rds_tcp_conn_path_connect()
and reference 'net' which has already been freed.
In rds_tcp_conn_path_connect(), rds_tcp_set_callbacks() will set t_sock = sock before
sock->ops->connect, but if connect() is failed, it will call
rds_tcp_restore_callbacks() and set t_sock = NULL, if connect is always
failed, rds_connect_worker() will try to reconnect all the time, so
rds_tcp_kill_sock() will never to cancel worker cp_conn_w and free the
connections.
Therefore, the condition !tc->t_sock is not needed if it is going to do
cleanup_net->rds_tcp_exit_net->rds_tcp_kill_sock, because tc->t_sock is always
NULL, and there is on other path to cancel cp_conn_w and free
connection. So this patch is to fix this.
rds_tcp_kill_sock():
...
if (net != c_net || !tc->t_sock)
...
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28
net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8003496a4684 by task kworker/u8:4/3721
CPU: 3 PID: 3721 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted 5.1.0 #11
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: krdsd rds_connect_worker
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3c0 arch/arm64/kernel/time.c:53
show_stack+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:152
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x120/0x188 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x68/0x278 mm/kasan/report.c:253
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x21c/0x348 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x30/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:429
inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
__sock_create+0x4f8/0x770 net/socket.c:1276
sock_create_kern+0x50/0x68 net/socket.c:1322
rds_tcp_conn_path_connect+0x2b4/0x690 net/rds/tcp_connect.c:114
rds_connect_worker+0x108/0x1d0 net/rds/threads.c:175
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
Allocated by task 687:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0x180 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:444 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2705 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2713 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x14c/0x388 mm/slub.c:2718
kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:697 [inline]
net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:384 [inline]
copy_net_ns+0xc4/0x2d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:424
create_new_namespaces+0x300/0x658 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xa0/0x198 kernel/nsproxy.c:206
ksys_unshare+0x340/0x628 kernel/fork.c:2577
__do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2645 [inline]
__se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2643 [inline]
__arm64_sys_unshare+0x38/0x58 kernel/fork.c:2643
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:47 [inline]
el0_svc_common+0x168/0x390 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:83
el0_svc_handler+0x60/0xd0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
el0_svc+0x8/0xc arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:960
Freed by task 264:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x220 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1370 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1397 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2952 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0xb8/0x3a8 mm/slub.c:2968
net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:400 [inline]
net_drop_ns.part.6+0x78/0x90 net/core/net_namespace.c:407
net_drop_ns net/core/net_namespace.c:406 [inline]
cleanup_net+0x53c/0x6d8 net/core/net_namespace.c:569
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8003496a3f80
which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 7872
The buggy address is located 1796 bytes inside of
7872-byte region [ffff8003496a3f80, ffff8003496a5e40)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffff7e000d25a800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff80036ce4b000
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0xffffe0000008100(slab|head)
raw: 0ffffe0000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff80036ce4b000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8003496a4580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8003496a4680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8003496a4700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 467fa15356ac("RDS-TCP: Support multiple RDS-TCP listen endpoints, one per netns.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92 ]
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 0ab03f353d3613ea49d1f924faf98559003670a8 ]
Currently we may merge incorrectly a received GSO packet
or a packet with frag_list into a packet sitting in the
gro_hash list. skb_segment() may crash case because
the assumptions on the skb layout are not met.
The correct behaviour would be to flush the packet in the
gro_hash list and send the received GSO packet directly
afterwards. Commit d61d072e87c8e ("net-gro: avoid reorders")
sets NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush in this case, but this is not
checked before merging. This patch makes sure to check this
flag and to not merge in that case.
Fixes: d61d072e87c8e ("net-gro: avoid reorders")
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 3d8830266ffc28c16032b859e38a0252e014b631 ]
NULL or ZERO_SIZE_PTR will be returned for zero sized memory
request, and derefencing them will lead to a segfault
so it is unnecessory to call vzalloc for zero sized memory
request and not call functions which maybe derefence the
NULL allocated memory
this also fixes a possible memory leak if phy_ethtool_get_stats
returns error, memory should be freed before exit
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Reviewed-by: Wang Li <wangli39@baidu.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 3c446e6f96997f2a95bf0037ef463802162d2323 ]
When kcm is loaded while many processes try to create a KCM socket, a
crash occurs:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000000e
IP: mutex_lock+0x27/0x40 kernel/locking/mutex.c:240
PGD 8000000016ef2067 P4D 8000000016ef2067 PUD 3d6e9067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 7005 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 4.12.14-396-default #1 SLE15-SP1 (unreleased)
RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x27/0x40 kernel/locking/mutex.c:240
RSP: 0018:ffff88000d487a00 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000e RCX: 1ffff100082b0719
...
CR2: 000000000000000e CR3: 000000004b1bc003 CR4: 0000000000060ef0
Call Trace:
kcm_create+0x600/0xbf0 [kcm]
__sock_create+0x324/0x750 net/socket.c:1272
...
This is due to race between sock_create and unfinished
register_pernet_device. kcm_create tries to do "net_generic(net,
kcm_net_id)". but kcm_net_id is not initialized yet.
So switch the order of the two to close the race.
This can be reproduced with mutiple processes doing socket(PF_KCM, ...)
and one process doing module removal.
Fixes: ab7ac4eb9832 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module")
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit bb9bd814ebf04f579be466ba61fc922625508807 ]
ipip6 tunnels run iptunnel_pull_header on received skbs. This can
determine the following use-after-free accessing iph pointer since
the packet will be 'uncloned' running pskb_expand_head if it is a
cloned gso skb (e.g if the packet has been sent though a veth device)
[ 706.369655] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ipip6_rcv+0x1678/0x16e0 [sit]
[ 706.449056] Read of size 1 at addr ffffe01b6bd855f5 by task ksoftirqd/1/=
[ 706.669494] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant m400 Server/ProLiant m400 Server, BIOS U02 08/19/2016
[ 706.771839] Call trace:
[ 706.801159] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2f8
[ 706.845079] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 706.884833] dump_stack+0xe0/0x11c
[ 706.925629] print_address_description+0x68/0x260
[ 706.982070] kasan_report+0x178/0x340
[ 707.025995] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x30/0x40
[ 707.083481] ipip6_rcv+0x1678/0x16e0 [sit]
[ 707.132623] tunnel64_rcv+0xd4/0x200 [tunnel4]
[ 707.185940] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x3b8/0x988
[ 707.241338] ip_local_deliver+0x144/0x470
[ 707.289436] ip_rcv_finish+0x43c/0x14b0
[ 707.335447] ip_rcv+0x628/0x1138
[ 707.374151] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1670/0x2600
[ 707.432680] __netif_receive_skb+0x28/0x190
[ 707.482859] process_backlog+0x1d0/0x610
[ 707.529913] net_rx_action+0x37c/0xf68
[ 707.574882] __do_softirq+0x288/0x1018
[ 707.619852] run_ksoftirqd+0x70/0xa8
[ 707.662734] smpboot_thread_fn+0x3a4/0x9e8
[ 707.711875] kthread+0x2c8/0x350
[ 707.750583] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[ 707.811302] Allocated by task 16982:
[ 707.854182] kasan_kmalloc.part.1+0x40/0x108
[ 707.905405] kasan_kmalloc+0xb4/0xc8
[ 707.948291] kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x20
[ 707.994309] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x158/0x5e0
[ 708.053902] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.8+0x54/0xe0
[ 708.108280] __alloc_skb+0xd8/0x400
[ 708.150139] sk_stream_alloc_skb+0xa4/0x638
[ 708.200346] tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x818/0x2b90
[ 708.251581] tcp_sendmsg+0x40/0x60
[ 708.292376] inet_sendmsg+0xf0/0x520
[ 708.335259] sock_sendmsg+0xac/0xf8
[ 708.377096] sock_write_iter+0x1c0/0x2c0
[ 708.424154] new_sync_write+0x358/0x4a8
[ 708.470162] __vfs_write+0xc4/0xf8
[ 708.510950] vfs_write+0x12c/0x3d0
[ 708.551739] ksys_write+0xcc/0x178
[ 708.592533] __arm64_sys_write+0x70/0xa0
[ 708.639593] el0_svc_handler+0x13c/0x298
[ 708.686646] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 708.739019] Freed by task 17:
[ 708.774597] __kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x228
[ 708.823736] kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18
[ 708.868703] kfree+0x100/0x3d8
[ 708.905320] skb_free_head+0x7c/0x98
[ 708.948204] skb_release_data+0x320/0x490
[ 708.996301] pskb_expand_head+0x60c/0x970
[ 709.044399] __iptunnel_pull_header+0x3b8/0x5d0
[ 709.098770] ipip6_rcv+0x41c/0x16e0 [sit]
[ 709.146873] tunnel64_rcv+0xd4/0x200 [tunnel4]
[ 709.200195] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x3b8/0x988
[ 709.255596] ip_local_deliver+0x144/0x470
[ 709.303692] ip_rcv_finish+0x43c/0x14b0
[ 709.349705] ip_rcv+0x628/0x1138
[ 709.388413] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1670/0x2600
[ 709.446943] __netif_receive_skb+0x28/0x190
[ 709.497120] process_backlog+0x1d0/0x610
[ 709.544169] net_rx_action+0x37c/0xf68
[ 709.589131] __do_softirq+0x288/0x1018
[ 709.651938] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffe01b6bd85580
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1024 of size 1024
[ 709.804356] The buggy address is located 117 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffffe01b6bd85580, ffffe01b6bd85980)
[ 709.946340] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 710.003824] page:ffff7ff806daf600 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffffe01c4001f600 index:0x0
[ 710.099914] flags: 0xfffff8000000100(slab)
[ 710.149059] raw: 0fffff8000000100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffffe01c4001f600
[ 710.242011] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000380038 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 710.334966] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Fix it resetting iph pointer after iptunnel_pull_header
Fixes: a09a4c8dd1ec ("tunnels: Remove encapsulation offloads on decap")
Tested-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ef0efcd3bd3fd0589732b67fb586ffd3c8705806 ]
At the beginning of ip6_fragment func, the prevhdr pointer is
obtained in the ip6_find_1stfragopt func.
However, all the pointers pointing into skb header may change
when calling skb_checksum_help func with
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL condition.
The prevhdr pointe will be dangling if it is not reloaded after
calling __skb_linearize func in skb_checksum_help func.
Here, I add a variable, nexthdr_offset, to evaluate the offset,
which does not changes even after calling __skb_linearize func.
Fixes: 405c92f7a541 ("ipv6: add defensive check for CHECKSUM_PARTIAL skbs in ip_fragment")
Signed-off-by: Junwei Hu <hujunwei4@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Wenhao Zhang <zhangwenhao8@huawei.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+e8ce541d095e486074fc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Zhiqiang Liu <liuzhiqiang26@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit b2e54b09a3d29c4db883b920274ca8dca4d9f04d ]
The device type for ip6 tunnels is set to
ARPHRD_TUNNEL6. However, the ip4ip6_err function
is expecting the device type of the tunnel to be
ARPHRD_TUNNEL. Since the device types do not
match, the function exits and the ICMP error
packet is not sent to the originating host. Note
that the device type for IPv4 tunnels is set to
ARPHRD_TUNNEL.
Fix is to expect a tunnel device type of
ARPHRD_TUNNEL6 instead. Now the tunnel device
type matches and the ICMP error packet is sent
to the originating host.
Signed-off-by: Sheena Mira-ato <sheena.mira-ato@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 8e2f311a68494a6677c1724bdcb10bada21af37c ]
Following command:
iptables -D FORWARD -m physdev ...
causes connectivity loss in some setups.
Reason is that iptables userspace will probe kernel for the module revision
of the physdev patch, and physdev has an artificial dependency on
br_netfilter (xt_physdev use makes no sense unless a br_netfilter module
is loaded).
This causes the "phydev" module to be loaded, which in turn enables the
"call-iptables" infrastructure.
bridged packets might then get dropped by the iptables ruleset.
The better fix would be to change the "call-iptables" defaults to 0 and
enforce explicit setting to 1, but that breaks backwards compatibility.
This does the next best thing: add a request_module call to checkentry.
This was a stray '-D ... -m physdev' won't activate br_netfilter
anymore.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
__nf_conntrack_confirm
[ Upstream commit 13f5251fd17088170c18844534682d9cab5ff5aa ]
For bridge(br_flood) or broadcast/multicast packets, they could clone
skb with unconfirmed conntrack which break the rule that unconfirmed
skb->_nfct is never shared. With nfqueue running on my system, the race
can be easily reproduced with following warning calltrace:
[13257.707525] CPU: 0 PID: 12132 Comm: main Tainted: P W 4.4.60 #7744
[13257.707568] Hardware name: Qualcomm (Flattened Device Tree)
[13257.714700] [<c021f6dc>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c021bce8>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[13257.720253] [<c021bce8>] (show_stack) from [<c0449e10>] (dump_stack+0x94/0xa8)
[13257.728240] [<c0449e10>] (dump_stack) from [<c022a7e0>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x94/0xb0)
[13257.735268] [<c022a7e0>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c022a898>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24)
[13257.743519] [<c022a898>] (warn_slowpath_null) from [<c06ee450>] (__nf_conntrack_confirm+0xa8/0x618)
[13257.752284] [<c06ee450>] (__nf_conntrack_confirm) from [<c0772670>] (ipv4_confirm+0xb8/0xfc)
[13257.761049] [<c0772670>] (ipv4_confirm) from [<c06e7a60>] (nf_iterate+0x48/0xa8)
[13257.769725] [<c06e7a60>] (nf_iterate) from [<c06e7af0>] (nf_hook_slow+0x30/0xb0)
[13257.777108] [<c06e7af0>] (nf_hook_slow) from [<c07f20b4>] (br_nf_post_routing+0x274/0x31c)
[13257.784486] [<c07f20b4>] (br_nf_post_routing) from [<c06e7a60>] (nf_iterate+0x48/0xa8)
[13257.792556] [<c06e7a60>] (nf_iterate) from [<c06e7af0>] (nf_hook_slow+0x30/0xb0)
[13257.800458] [<c06e7af0>] (nf_hook_slow) from [<c07e5580>] (br_forward_finish+0x94/0xa4)
[13257.808010] [<c07e5580>] (br_forward_finish) from [<c07f22ac>] (br_nf_forward_finish+0x150/0x1ac)
[13257.815736] [<c07f22ac>] (br_nf_forward_finish) from [<c06e8df0>] (nf_reinject+0x108/0x170)
[13257.824762] [<c06e8df0>] (nf_reinject) from [<c06ea854>] (nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x3d8/0x420)
[13257.832924] [<c06ea854>] (nfqnl_recv_verdict) from [<c06e940c>] (nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x158/0x248)
[13257.841256] [<c06e940c>] (nfnetlink_rcv_msg) from [<c06e5564>] (netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0xb0)
[13257.849762] [<c06e5564>] (netlink_rcv_skb) from [<c06e4ec8>] (netlink_unicast+0x148/0x23c)
[13257.858093] [<c06e4ec8>] (netlink_unicast) from [<c06e5364>] (netlink_sendmsg+0x2ec/0x368)
[13257.866348] [<c06e5364>] (netlink_sendmsg) from [<c069fb8c>] (sock_sendmsg+0x34/0x44)
[13257.874590] [<c069fb8c>] (sock_sendmsg) from [<c06a03dc>] (___sys_sendmsg+0x1ec/0x200)
[13257.882489] [<c06a03dc>] (___sys_sendmsg) from [<c06a11c8>] (__sys_sendmsg+0x3c/0x64)
[13257.890300] [<c06a11c8>] (__sys_sendmsg) from [<c0209b40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x34)
The original code just triggered the warning but do nothing. It will
caused the shared conntrack moves to the dying list and the packet be
droppped (nf_ct_resolve_clash returns NF_DROP for dying conntrack).
- Reproduce steps:
+----------------------------+
| br0(bridge) |
| |
+-+---------+---------+------+
| eth0| | eth1| | eth2|
| | | | | |
+--+--+ +--+--+ +---+-+
| | |
| | |
+--+-+ +-+--+ +--+-+
| PC1| | PC2| | PC3|
+----+ +----+ +----+
iptables -A FORWARD -m mark --mark 0x1000000/0x1000000 -j NFQUEUE --queue-num 100 --queue-bypass
ps: Our nfq userspace program will set mark on packets whose connection
has already been processed.
PC1 sends broadcast packets simulated by hping3:
hping3 --rand-source --udp 192.168.1.255 -i u100
- Broadcast racing flow chart is as follow:
br_handle_frame
BR_HOOK(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, NF_BR_PRE_ROUTING, br_handle_frame_finish)
// skb->_nfct (unconfirmed conntrack) is constructed at PRE_ROUTING stage
br_handle_frame_finish
// check if this packet is broadcast
br_flood_forward
br_flood
list_for_each_entry_rcu(p, &br->port_list, list) // iterate through each port
maybe_deliver
deliver_clone
skb = skb_clone(skb)
__br_forward
BR_HOOK(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, NF_BR_FORWARD,...)
// queue in our nfq and received by our userspace program
// goto __nf_conntrack_confirm with process context on CPU 1
br_pass_frame_up
BR_HOOK(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, NF_BR_LOCAL_IN,...)
// goto __nf_conntrack_confirm with softirq context on CPU 0
Because conntrack confirm can happen at both INPUT and POSTROUTING
stage. So with NFQUEUE running, skb->_nfct with the same unconfirmed
conntrack could race on different core.
This patch fixes a repeating kernel splat, now it is only displayed
once.
Signed-off-by: Chieh-Min Wang <chiehminw@synology.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit be0502a3f2e94211a8809a09ecbc3a017189b8fb ]
TCP resets cause instant transition from established to closed state
provided the reset is in-window. Endpoints that implement RFC 5961
require resets to match the next expected sequence number.
RST segments that are in-window (but that do not match RCV.NXT) are
ignored, and a "challenge ACK" is sent back.
Main problem for conntrack is that its a middlebox, i.e. whereas an end
host might have ACK'd SEQ (and would thus accept an RST with this
sequence number), conntrack might not have seen this ACK (yet).
Therefore we can't simply flag RSTs with non-exact match as invalid.
This updates RST processing as follows:
1. If the connection is in a state other than ESTABLISHED, nothing is
changed, RST is subject to normal in-window check.
2. If the RSTs sequence number either matches exactly RCV.NXT,
connection state moves to CLOSE.
3. The same applies if the RST sequence number aligns with a previous
packet in the same direction.
In all other cases, the connection remains in ESTABLISHED state.
If the normal-in-window check passes, the timeout will be lowered
to that of CLOSE.
If the peer sends a challenge ack, connection timeout will be reset.
If the challenge ACK triggers another RST (RST was valid after all),
this 2nd RST will match expected sequence and conntrack state changes to
CLOSE.
If no challenge ACK is received, the connection will time out after
CLOSE seconds (10 seconds by default), just like without this patch.
Packetdrill test case:
0.000 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3
0.000 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0
0.000 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0
0.000 listen(3, 1) = 0
0.100 < S 0:0(0) win 32792 <mss 1460,sackOK,nop,nop,nop,wscale 7>
0.100 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 win 64240 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 7>
0.200 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257
0.200 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4
// Receive a segment.
0.210 < P. 1:1001(1000) ack 1 win 46
0.210 > . 1:1(0) ack 1001
// Application writes 1000 bytes.
0.250 write(4, ..., 1000) = 1000
0.250 > P. 1:1001(1000) ack 1001
// First reset, old sequence. Conntrack (correctly) considers this
// invalid due to failed window validation (regardless of this patch).
0.260 < R 2:2(0) ack 1001 win 260
// 2nd reset, but too far ahead sequence. Same: correctly handled
// as invalid.
0.270 < R 99990001:99990001(0) ack 1001 win 260
// in-window, but not exact sequence.
// Current Linux kernels might reply with a challenge ack, and do not
// remove connection.
// Without this patch, conntrack state moves to CLOSE.
// With patch, timeout is lowered like CLOSE, but connection stays
// in ESTABLISHED state.
0.280 < R 1010:1010(0) ack 1001 win 260
// Expect challenge ACK
0.281 > . 1001:1001(0) ack 1001 win 501
// With or without this patch, RST will cause connection
// to move to CLOSE (sequence number matches)
// 0.282 < R 1001:1001(0) ack 1001 win 260
// ACK
0.300 < . 1001:1001(0) ack 1001 win 257
// more data could be exchanged here, connection
// is still established
// Client closes the connection.
0.610 < F. 1001:1001(0) ack 1001 win 260
0.650 > . 1001:1001(0) ack 1002
// Close the connection without reading outstanding data
0.700 close(4) = 0
// so one more reset. Will be deemed acceptable with patch as well:
// connection is already closing.
0.701 > R. 1001:1001(0) ack 1002 win 501
// End packetdrill test case.
With patch, this generates following conntrack events:
[NEW] 120 SYN_SENT src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5437 dport=80 [UNREPLIED]
[UPDATE] 60 SYN_RECV src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5437 dport=80
[UPDATE] 432000 ESTABLISHED src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5437 dport=80 [ASSURED]
[UPDATE] 120 FIN_WAIT src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5437 dport=80 [ASSURED]
[UPDATE] 60 CLOSE_WAIT src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5437 dport=80 [ASSURED]
[UPDATE] 10 CLOSE src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5437 dport=80 [ASSURED]
Without patch, first RST moves connection to close, whereas socket state
does not change until FIN is received.
[NEW] 120 SYN_SENT src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5141 dport=80 [UNREPLIED]
[UPDATE] 60 SYN_RECV src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5141 dport=80
[UPDATE] 432000 ESTABLISHED src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5141 dport=80 [ASSURED]
[UPDATE] 10 CLOSE src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5141 dport=80 [ASSURED]
Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
