summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/net
AgeCommit message (Collapse)AuthorFilesLines
2016-02-27unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_structHannes Frederic Sowa3-6/+13
commit 415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6 upstream. The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should be credited. To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds. Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets") Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-02-27unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix socketswilly tarreau2-8/+30
commit 712f4aad406bb1ed67f3f98d04c044191f0ff593 upstream. It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them to keep the process' fd count low. This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit. Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+) Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [carnil: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-02-27sctp: translate network order to host order when users get a hmacidXin Long1-2/+7
commit 7a84bd46647ff181eb2659fdc99590e6f16e501d upstream. Commit ed5a377d87dc ("sctp: translate host order to network order when setting a hmacid") corrected the hmacid byte-order when setting a hmacid. but the same issue also exists on getting a hmacid. We fix it by changing hmacids to host order when users get them with getsockopt. Fixes: Commit ed5a377d87dc ("sctp: translate host order to network order when setting a hmacid") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-02-27rfkill: fix rfkill_fop_read wait_event usageJohannes Berg1-12/+4
commit 6736fde9672ff6717ac576e9bba2fd5f3dfec822 upstream. The code within wait_event_interruptible() is called with !TASK_RUNNING, so mustn't call any functions that can sleep, like mutex_lock(). Since we re-check the list_empty() in a loop after the wait, it's safe to simply use list_empty() without locking. This bug has existed forever, but was only discovered now because all userspace implementations, including the default 'rfkill' tool, use poll() or select() to get a readable fd before attempting to read. Fixes: c64fb01627e24 ("rfkill: create useful userspace interface") Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-02-27sctp: allow setting SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY by the applicationMarcelo Ricardo Leitner1-0/+1
commit 27f7ed2b11d42ab6d796e96533c2076ec220affc upstream. This patch extends commit b93d6471748d ("sctp: implement the sender side for SACK-IMMEDIATELY extension") as it didn't white list SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY on sctp_msghdr_parse(), causing it to be understood as an invalid flag and returning -EINVAL to the application. Note that the actual handling of the flag is already there in sctp_datamsg_from_user(). https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7053#section-7 Fixes: b93d6471748d ("sctp: implement the sender side for SACK-IMMEDIATELY extension") Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: drop the second hunk as we don't have SCTP_SNDINFO cmsg support] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-02-27af_unix: fix struct pid memory leakEric Dumazet1-0/+1
commit fa0dc04df259ba2df3ce1920e9690c7842f8fa4b upstream. Dmitry reported a struct pid leak detected by a syzkaller program. Bug happens in unix_stream_recvmsg() when we break the loop when a signal is pending, without properly releasing scm. Fixes: b3ca9b02b007 ("net: fix multithreaded signal handling in unix recv routines") Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: cookie is *sicob->scm, not scm] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-02-13sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout eventKarl Heiss1-15/+19
commit 635682a14427d241bab7bbdeebb48a7d7b91638e upstream. A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with the listening socket but released with the new association socket. The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening socket lock. Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called. BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0] ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30 RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48 RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0 R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0) Stack: ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000 <d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00 <d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 ... With lockdep debugging: ===================================== [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ] ------------------------------------- CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at: [<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp] but there are no more locks to release! other info that might help us debug this: 2 locks held by CslRx/12087: #0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0 #1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp] Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event critical section. Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Net namespaces are not used - Keep using sctp_bh_{,un}lock_sock() - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-02-13ipv6: tcp: add rcu locking in tcp_v6_send_synack()Eric Dumazet1-0/+2
commit 3e4006f0b86a5ae5eb0e8215f9a9e1db24506977 upstream. When first SYNACK is sent, we already hold rcu_read_lock(), but this is not true if a SYNACK is retransmitted, as a timer (soft) interrupt does not hold rcu_read_lock() Fixes: 45f6fad84cc30 ("ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt") Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23udp: properly support MSG_PEEK with truncated buffersEric Dumazet2-4/+8
commit 197c949e7798fbf28cfadc69d9ca0c2abbf93191 upstream. Backport of this upstream commit into stable kernels : 89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking") exposed a bug in udp stack vs MSG_PEEK support, when user provides a buffer smaller than skb payload. In this case, skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg->msg_iov); returns -EFAULT. This bug does not happen in upstream kernels since Al Viro did a great job to replace this into : skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg); This variant is safe vs short buffers. For the time being, instead reverting Herbert Xu patch and add back skb->ip_summed invalid changes, simply store the result of udp_lib_checksum_complete() so that we avoid computing the checksum a second time, and avoid the problematic skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec() call. This patch can be applied on recent kernels as it avoids a double checksumming, then backported to stable kernels as a bug fix. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23Revert "net: add length argument to skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec"Ben Hutchings6-12/+6
This reverts commit 127500d724f8c43f452610c9080444eedb5eaa6c. That fixed the problem of buffer over-reads introduced by backporting commit 89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking"), but resulted in incorrect checksumming for short reads. It will be replaced with a complete fix. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23net: possible use after free in dst_releaseFrancesco Ruggeri1-1/+2
commit 07a5d38453599052aff0877b16bb9c1585f08609 upstream. dst_release should not access dst->flags after decrementing __refcnt to 0. The dst_entry may be in dst_busy_list and dst_gc_task may dst_destroy it before dst_release gets a chance to access dst->flags. Fixes: d69bbf88c8d0 ("net: fix a race in dst_release()") Fixes: 27b75c95f10d ("net: avoid RCU for NOCACHE dst") Signed-off-by: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@arista.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23net/core: revert "net: fix __netdev_update_features return.." and add commentNikolay Aleksandrov1-1/+4
commit 17b85d29e82cc3c874a497a8bc5764d6a2b043e2 upstream. This reverts commit 00ee59271777 ("net: fix __netdev_update_features return on ndo_set_features failure") and adds a comment explaining why it's okay to return a value other than 0 upon error. Some drivers might actually change flags and return an error so it's better to fire a spurious notification rather than miss these. CC: Michał Mirosław <mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23ipv6/addrlabel: fix ip6addrlbl_get()Andrey Ryabinin1-1/+1
commit e459dfeeb64008b2d23bdf600f03b3605dbb8152 upstream. ip6addrlbl_get() has never worked. If ip6addrlbl_hold() succeeded, ip6addrlbl_get() will exit with '-ESRCH'. If ip6addrlbl_hold() failed, ip6addrlbl_get() will use about to be free ip6addrlbl_entry pointer. Fix this by inverting ip6addrlbl_hold() check. Fixes: 2a8cc6c89039 ("[IPV6] ADDRCONF: Support RFC3484 configurable address selection policy table.") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23rfkill: copy the name into the rfkill structJohannes Berg1-3/+3
commit b7bb110008607a915298bf0f47d25886ecb94477 upstream. Some users of rfkill, like NFC and cfg80211, use a dynamic name when allocating rfkill, in those cases dev_name(). Therefore, the pointer passed to rfkill_alloc() might not be valid forever, I specifically found the case that the rfkill name was quite obviously an invalid pointer (or at least garbage) when the wiphy had been renamed. Fix this by making a copy of the rfkill name in rfkill_alloc(). Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23ipv6: sctp: fix lockdep splat in sctp_v6_get_dst()Eric Dumazet1-2/+1
commit 69ce6487dcd364245a3d26322fc8f4ffd1e8d947 upstream. While cooking the sctp np->opt rcu fixes, I forgot to move one rcu_read_unlock() after the added rcu_dereference() in sctp_v6_get_dst() This gave lockdep warnings reported by Dave Jones. Fixes: c836a8ba9386 ("ipv6: sctp: add rcu protection around np->opt") Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23sctp: start t5 timer only when peer rwnd is 0 and local state is ↵lucien2-1/+3
SHUTDOWN_PENDING commit 8a0d19c5ed417c78d03f4e0fa7215e58c40896d8 upstream. when A sends a data to B, then A close() and enter into SHUTDOWN_PENDING state, if B neither claim his rwnd is 0 nor send SACK for this data, A will keep retransmitting this data until t5 timeout, Max.Retrans times can't work anymore, which is bad. if B's rwnd is not 0, it should send abort after Max.Retrans times, only when B's rwnd == 0 and A's retransmitting beyonds Max.Retrans times, A will start t5 timer, which is also commit f8d960524328 ("sctp: Enforce retransmission limit during shutdown") means, but it lacks the condition peer rwnd == 0. so fix it by adding a bit (zero_window_announced) in peer to record if the last rwnd is 0. If it was, zero_window_announced will be set. and use this bit to decide if start t5 timer when local.state is SHUTDOWN_PENDING. Fixes: commit f8d960524328 ("sctp: Enforce retransmission limit during shutdown") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: change sack_needed to bitfield as done earlier upstream] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30af_unix: fix a fatal race with bit fieldsEric Dumazet1-6/+6
commit 60bc851ae59bfe99be6ee89d6bc50008c85ec75d upstream. Using bit fields is dangerous on ppc64/sparc64, as the compiler [1] uses 64bit instructions to manipulate them. If the 64bit word includes any atomic_t or spinlock_t, we can lose critical concurrent changes. This is happening in af_unix, where unix_sk(sk)->gc_candidate/ gc_maybe_cycle/lock share the same 64bit word. This leads to fatal deadlock, as one/several cpus spin forever on a spinlock that will never be available again. A safer way would be to use a long to store flags. This way we are sure compiler/arch wont do bad things. As we own unix_gc_lock spinlock when clearing or setting bits, we can use the non atomic __set_bit()/__clear_bit(). recursion_level can share the same 64bit location with the spinlock, as it is set only with this spinlock held. [1] bug fixed in gcc-4.8.0 : http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=52080 Reported-by: Ambrose Feinstein <ambrose@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30af_unix: Revert 'lock_interruptible' in stream receive codeRainer Weikusat1-10/+3
[ Upstream commit 3822b5c2fc62e3de8a0f33806ff279fb7df92432 ] With b3ca9b02b00704053a38bfe4c31dbbb9c13595d0, the AF_UNIX SOCK_STREAM receive code was changed from using mutex_lock(&u->readlock) to mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock) to prevent signals from being delayed for an indefinite time if a thread sleeping on the mutex happened to be selected for handling the signal. But this was never a problem with the stream receive code (as opposed to its datagram counterpart) as that never went to sleep waiting for new messages with the mutex held and thus, wouldn't cause secondary readers to block on the mutex waiting for the sleeping primary reader. As the interruptible locking makes the code more complicated in exchange for no benefit, change it back to using mutex_lock. Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind().David S. Miller1-0/+3
[ Upstream commit 5233252fce714053f0151680933571a2da9cbfb4 ] Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argumentHannes Frederic Sowa5-0/+15
[ Upstream commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 ] 郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by using a simple program: int socket_fd; struct sockaddr_in addr; addr.sin_port = 0; addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; addr.sin_family = 10; socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000); connect(socket_fd , &addr,16); AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly, thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and store a zero in the protocol fields. This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which is NULL for raw sockets. kernel: Call Trace: kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70 kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110 kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200 kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89 I found no particular commit which introduced this problem. CVE: CVE-2015-8543 Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: open-code U8_MAX] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30ipv6: sctp: clone options to avoid use after freeEric Dumazet1-0/+8
[ Upstream commit 9470e24f35ab81574da54e69df90c1eb4a96b43f ] SCTP is lacking proper np->opt cloning at accept() time. TCP and DCCP use ipv6_dup_options() helper, do the same in SCTP. We might later factorize this code in a common helper to avoid future mistakes. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30sctp: update the netstamp_needed counter when copying socketsMarcelo Ricardo Leitner1-0/+3
[ Upstream commit 01ce63c90170283a9855d1db4fe81934dddce648 ] Dmitry Vyukov reported that SCTP was triggering a WARN on socket destroy related to disabling sock timestamp. When SCTP accepts an association or peel one off, it copies sock flags but forgot to call net_enable_timestamp() if a packet timestamping flag was copied, leading to extra calls to net_disable_timestamp() whenever such clones were closed. The fix is to call net_enable_timestamp() whenever we copy a sock with that flag on, like tcp does. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: SK_FLAGS_TIMESTAMP is newly defined] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30ipv6: sctp: implement sctp_v6_destroy_sock()Eric Dumazet1-1/+8
[ Upstream commit 602dd62dfbda3e63a2d6a3cbde953ebe82bf5087 ] Dmitry Vyukov reported a memory leak using IPV6 SCTP sockets. We need to call inet6_destroy_sock() to properly release inet6 specific fields. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->optEric Dumazet10-58/+96
[ Upstream commit 45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39 ] This patch addresses multiple problems : UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating use-after-free. Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options()) This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Drop changes to l2tp - Fix an additional use of np->opt in tcp_v6_send_synack() - Fold in commit 43264e0bd963 ("ipv6: remove unnecessary codes in tcp_ipv6.c") - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30dccp: remove unnecessary codes in ipv6.cRongQing.Li1-16/+5
commit 0979e465c5ab205b63a1c1820fe833f396a120f0 upstream. opt always equals np->opts, so it is meaningless to define opt, and check if opt does not equal np->opts and then try to free opt. Signed-off-by: RongQing.Li <roy.qing.li@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30ipv6: distinguish frag queues by device for multicast and link-local packetsMichal Kubeček2-6/+14
[ Upstream commit 264640fc2c5f4f913db5c73fa3eb1ead2c45e9d7 ] If a fragmented multicast packet is received on an ethernet device which has an active macvlan on top of it, each fragment is duplicated and received both on the underlying device and the macvlan. If some fragments for macvlan are processed before the whole packet for the underlying device is reassembled, the "overlapping fragments" test in ip6_frag_queue() discards the whole fragment queue. To resolve this, add device ifindex to the search key and require it to match reassembling multicast packets and packets to link-local addresses. Note: similar patch has been already submitted by Yoshifuji Hideaki in http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/220979/ but got lost and forgotten for some reason. Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30net: ipmr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table destructionNikolay Aleksandrov1-7/+8
[ Upstream commit 0e615e9601a15efeeb8942cf7cd4dadba0c8c5a7 ] When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example: unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192): comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff .S.4.....S.4.... ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<ffffffff815c1b9e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [<ffffffff811ea6e0>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300 [<ffffffff815931cb>] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910 [<ffffffff8153d575>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0 [<ffffffff8153e490>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0 [<ffffffff81564e13>] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90 [<ffffffff814d1e14>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 [<ffffffff814d0b51>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0 [<ffffffff815cdbf6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30net, scm: fix PaX detected msg_controllen overflow in scm_detach_fdsDaniel Borkmann1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 6900317f5eff0a7070c5936e5383f589e0de7a09 ] David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin: (Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.) [ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314 cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr; [ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7 [ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...] [ 1002.296153] ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8 [ 1002.296162] ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8 [ 1002.296169] ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60 [ 1002.296176] Call Trace: [ 1002.296190] [<ffffffff818129ba>] dump_stack+0x45/0x57 [ 1002.296200] [<ffffffff8121f838>] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60 [ 1002.296209] [<ffffffff816a979e>] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300 [ 1002.296220] [<ffffffff81791899>] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930 [ 1002.296228] [<ffffffff81791c9f>] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60 [ 1002.296236] [<ffffffff8178dc00>] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50 [ 1002.296243] [<ffffffff8168fac7>] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60 [ 1002.296248] [<ffffffff81691522>] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0 [ 1002.296257] [<ffffffff81693496>] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80 [ 1002.296263] [<ffffffff816934fc>] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40 [ 1002.296271] [<ffffffff8181a3ab>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85 Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets. In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)), where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the control buffer. When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4 bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg->msg_controllen will overflow in scm_detach_fds(): int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/o tail-padding err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level); if (!err) err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type); if (!err) err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len); if (!err) { cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding msg->msg_control += cmlen; msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen; <--- iff no tail-padding space here ... } ... wrap-around F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the receiver passed in msg->msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes. In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries as well. In practice, passing msg->msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg->msg_controllen is being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg->msg_controllen elsewhere. Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253). Going over the code, it seems like msg->msg_controllen is not being read after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good! Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg()) and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller, and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control - old msg_control pointer into msg->msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen in the example). Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7ad24a ("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory overflow"). RFC3542, section 20.2. says: The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an application may or may not include padding at the end of last ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation may set MSG_CTRUNC. Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do the same as in 1ac70e7ad24a to avoid an overflow. Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?), thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by David and HacKurx). No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree). Reported-by: David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz> Reported-by: HacKurx <hackurx@gmail.com> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30tcp: initialize tp->copied_seq in case of cross SYN connectionEric Dumazet1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 142a2e7ece8d8ac0e818eb2c91f99ca894730e2a ] Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller) generated program that triggers the WARNING at net/ipv4/tcp.c:1729 in tcp_recvmsg() : WARN_ON(tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt && !(flags & (MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC))); His program is specifically attempting a Cross SYN TCP exchange, that we support (for the pleasure of hackers ?), but it looks we lack proper tcp->copied_seq initialization. Thanks again Dmitry for your report and testings. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30snmp: Remove duplicate OUTMCAST stat incrementNeil Horman1-2/+0
[ Upstream commit 41033f029e393a64e81966cbe34d66c6cf8a2e7e ] the OUTMCAST stat is double incremented, getting bumped once in the mcast code itself, and again in the common ip output path. Remove the mcast bump, as its not needed Validated by the reporter, with good results Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reported-by: Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com> CC: Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com> CC: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30ipv4: igmp: Allow removing groups from a removed interfaceAndrew Lunn1-2/+3
commit 4eba7bb1d72d9bde67d810d09bf62dc207b63c5c upstream. When a multicast group is joined on a socket, a struct ip_mc_socklist is appended to the sockets mc_list containing information about the joined group. If the interface is hot unplugged, this entry becomes stale. Prior to commit 52ad353a5344f ("igmp: fix the problem when mc leave group") it was possible to remove the stale entry by performing a IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP, passing either the old ifindex or ip address on the interface. However, this fix enforces that the interface must still exist. Thus with time, the number of stale entries grows, until sysctl_igmp_max_memberships is reached and then it is not possible to join and more groups. The previous patch fixes an issue where a IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP is performed without specifying the interface, either by ifindex or ip address. However here we do supply one of these. So loosen the restriction on device existence to only apply when the interface has not been specified. This then restores the ability to clean up the stale entries. Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Fixes: 52ad353a5344f "(igmp: fix the problem when mc leave group") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socketQuentin Casasnovas2-7/+3
commit 8c7188b23474cca017b3ef354c4a58456f68303a upstream. Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create(). Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if you're interested. I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer with this patch, whereas I could without. Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937: 74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection") Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queueRainer Weikusat1-19/+164
commit 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c upstream. Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes: An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a wait queue with epoll. Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring that no blocked writer sleeps forever. Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets") Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30net: ip6mr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table destructionNikolay Aleksandrov1-7/+8
commit 4c6980462f32b4f282c5d8e5f7ea8070e2937725 upstream. Similar to ipv4, when destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory. Make sure that everything is cleaned up on netns destruction. Fixes: 8229efdaef1e ("netns: ip6mr: enable namespace support in ipv6 multicast forwarding code") CC: Benjamin Thery <benjamin.thery@bull.net> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30ip6mr: call del_timer_sync() in ip6mr_free_table()WANG Cong1-1/+1
commit 7ba0c47c34a1ea5bc7a24ca67309996cce0569b5 upstream. We need to wait for the flying timers, since we are going to free the mrtable right after it. Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30mac80211: mesh: fix call_rcu() usageJohannes Berg1-4/+4
commit c2e703a55245bfff3db53b1f7cbe59f1ee8a4339 upstream. When using call_rcu(), the called function may be delayed quite significantly, and without a matching rcu_barrier() there's no way to be sure it has finished. Therefore, global state that could be gone/freed/reused should never be touched in the callback. Fix this in mesh by moving the atomic_dec() into the caller; that's not really a problem since we already unlinked the path and it will be destroyed anyway. This fixes a crash Jouni observed when running certain tests in a certain order, in which the mesh interface was torn down, the memory reused for a function pointer (work struct) and running that then crashed since the pointer had been decremented by 1, resulting in an invalid instruction byte stream. Fixes: eb2b9311fd00 ("mac80211: mesh path table implementation") Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30net: fix __netdev_update_features return on ndo_set_features failureNikolay Aleksandrov1-1/+1
commit 00ee5927177792a6e139d50b6b7564d35705556a upstream. If ndo_set_features fails __netdev_update_features() will return -1 but this is wrong because it is expected to return 0 if no features were changed (see netdev_update_features()), which will cause a netdev notifier to be called without any actual changes. Fix this by returning 0 if ndo_set_features fails. Fixes: 6cb6a27c45ce ("net: Call netdev_features_change() from netdev_update_features()") CC: Michał Mirosław <mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-12-30sctp: translate host order to network order when setting a hmacidlucien1-2/+2
commit ed5a377d87dc4c87fb3e1f7f698cba38cd893103 upstream. now sctp auth cannot work well when setting a hmacid manually, which is caused by that we didn't use the network order for hmacid, so fix it by adding the transformation in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs. even we set hmacid with the network order in userspace, it still can't work, because of this condition in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(): if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX) return -EOPNOTSUPP; so this wasn't working before and thus it won't break compatibility. Fixes: 65b07e5d0d09 ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-11-27ipmr: fix possible race resulting from improper usage of IP_INC_STATS_BH() ↵Ani Sinha1-2/+2
in preemptible context. [ Upstream commit 44f49dd8b5a606870a1f21101522a0f9c4414784 ] Fixes the following kernel BUG : BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: bash/2758 caller is __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x15 CPU: 0 PID: 2758 Comm: bash Tainted: P O 3.18.19 #2 ffffffff8170eaca ffff880110d1b788 ffffffff81482b2a 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880110d1b7b8 ffffffff812010ae ffff880007cab800 ffff88001a060800 ffff88013a899108 ffff880108b84240 ffff880110d1b7c8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81482b2a>] dump_stack+0x52/0x80 [<ffffffff812010ae>] check_preemption_disabled+0xce/0xe1 [<ffffffff812010d4>] __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x15 [<ffffffff81419d60>] ipmr_queue_xmit+0x647/0x70c [<ffffffff8141a154>] ip_mr_forward+0x32f/0x34e [<ffffffff8141af76>] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0xe03/0x108c [<ffffffff810553fc>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x42 [<ffffffff810e6974>] ? pollwake+0x4d/0x51 [<ffffffff81058ac0>] ? default_wake_function+0x0/0xf [<ffffffff810553fc>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x42 [<ffffffff810613d9>] ? __wake_up_common+0x45/0x77 [<ffffffff81486ea9>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1d/0x32 [<ffffffff810618bc>] ? __wake_up_sync_key+0x4a/0x53 [<ffffffff8139a519>] ? sock_def_readable+0x71/0x75 [<ffffffff813dd226>] do_ip_setsockopt+0x9d/0xb55 [<ffffffff81429818>] ? unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0x3f/0x41 [<ffffffff813963fe>] ? sock_sendmsg+0x6d/0x86 [<ffffffff813959d4>] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x12/0x5d [<ffffffff8139650a>] ? SyS_sendto+0xf3/0x11b [<ffffffff810d5738>] ? new_sync_read+0x82/0xaa [<ffffffff813ddd19>] compat_ip_setsockopt+0x3b/0x99 [<ffffffff813fb24a>] compat_raw_setsockopt+0x11/0x32 [<ffffffff81399052>] compat_sock_common_setsockopt+0x18/0x1f [<ffffffff813c4d05>] compat_SyS_setsockopt+0x1a9/0x1cf [<ffffffff813c4149>] compat_SyS_socketcall+0x180/0x1e3 [<ffffffff81488ea1>] cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1e Signed-off-by: Ani Sinha <ani@arista.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: ipmr doesn't implement IPSTATS_MIB_OUTOCTETS] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-11-27RDS-TCP: Recover correctly from pskb_pull()/pksb_trim() failure in ↵Sowmini Varadhan1-2/+9
rds_tcp_data_recv [ Upstream commit 8ce675ff39b9958d1c10f86cf58e357efaafc856 ] Either of pskb_pull() or pskb_trim() may fail under low memory conditions. If rds_tcp_data_recv() ignores such failures, the application will receive corrupted data because the skb has not been correctly carved to the RDS datagram size. Avoid this by handling pskb_pull/pskb_trim failure in the same manner as the skb_clone failure: bail out of rds_tcp_data_recv(), and retry via the deferred call to rds_send_worker() that gets set up on ENOMEM from rds_tcp_read_sock() Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-11-27irda: precedence bug in irlmp_seq_hb_idx()Dan Carpenter1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 50010c20597d14667eff0fdb628309986f195230 ] This is decrementing the pointer, instead of the value stored in the pointer. KASan detects it as an out of bounds reference. Reported-by: "Berry Cheng 程君(成淼)" <chengmiao.cj@alibaba-inc.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-11-27net: fix a race in dst_release()Eric Dumazet1-1/+1
commit d69bbf88c8d0b367cf3e3a052f6daadf630ee566 upstream. Only cpu seeing dst refcount going to 0 can safely dereference dst->flags. Otherwise an other cpu might already have freed the dst. Fixes: 27b75c95f10d ("net: avoid RCU for NOCACHE dst") Reported-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-11-27ipv6: fix tunnel error handlingMichal Kubeček1-1/+11
commit ebac62fe3d24c0ce22dd83afa7b07d1a2aaef44d upstream. Both tunnel6_protocol and tunnel46_protocol share the same error handler, tunnel6_err(), which traverses through tunnel6_handlers list. For ipip6 tunnels, we need to traverse tunnel46_handlers as we do e.g. in tunnel46_rcv(). Current code can generate an ICMPv6 error message with an IPv4 packet embedded in it. Fixes: 73d605d1abbd ("[IPSEC]: changing API of xfrm6_tunnel_register") Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-11-27packet: fix match_fanout_group()Eric Dumazet1-3/+3
commit 161642e24fee40fba2c5bc2ceacc00d118a22d65 upstream. Recent TCP listener patches exposed a prior af_packet bug : match_fanout_group() blindly assumes it is always safe to cast sk to a packet socket to compare fanout with af_packet_priv But SYNACK packets can be sent while attached to request_sock, which are smaller than a "struct sock". We can read non existent memory and crash. Fixes: c0de08d04215 ("af_packet: don't emit packet on orig fanout group") Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Cc: Eric Leblond <eric@regit.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-11-27mac80211: fix driver RSSI event calculationsJohannes Berg1-1/+1
commit 8ec6d97871f37e4743678ea4a455bd59580aa0f4 upstream. The ifmgd->ave_beacon_signal value cannot be taken as is for comparisons, it must be divided by since it's represented like that for better accuracy of the EWMA calculations. This would lead to invalid driver RSSI events. Fix the used value. Fixes: 615f7b9bb1f8 ("mac80211: add driver RSSI threshold events") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-11-17ethtool: Use kcalloc instead of kmalloc for ethtool_get_stringsJoe Perches1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 077cb37fcf6f00a45f375161200b5ee0cd4e937b ] It seems that kernel memory can leak into userspace by a kmalloc, ethtool_get_strings, then copy_to_user sequence. Avoid this by using kcalloc to zero fill the copied buffer. Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Acked-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-11-17skbuff: Fix skb checksum partial check.Pravin B Shelar1-4/+5
[ Upstream commit 31b33dfb0a144469dd805514c9e63f4993729a48 ] Earlier patch 6ae459bda tried to detect void ckecksum partial skb by comparing pull length to checksum offset. But it does not work for all cases since checksum-offset depends on updates to skb->data. Following patch fixes it by validating checksum start offset after skb-data pointer is updated. Negative value of checksum offset start means there is no need to checksum. Fixes: 6ae459bda ("skbuff: Fix skb checksum flag on skb pull") Reported-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@odin.com> Signed-off-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-11-17net: add length argument to skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovecSabrina Dubroca6-6/+12
Without this length argument, we can read past the end of the iovec in memcpy_toiovec because we have no way of knowing the total length of the iovec's buffers. This is needed for stable kernels where 89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking") has been backported but that don't have the ioviter conversion, which is almost all the stable trees <= 3.18. This also fixes a kernel crash for NFS servers when the client uses -onfsvers=3,proto=udp to mount the export. Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context in include/linux/skbuff.h] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-10-13Revert "sctp: Fix race between OOTB responce and route removal"Ben Hutchings1-3/+1
This reverts commit 117b8a10fe0c434d9043267efd51f3ba3f3d359a, which was commit 29c4afc4e98f4dc0ea9df22c631841f9c220b944 upstream. The bug it fixes upstream clearly doesn't exist in 3.2. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-10-13ipv6: update ip6_rt_last_gc every time GC is runMichal Kubeček2-4/+6
commit 49a18d86f66d33a20144ecb5a34bba0d1856b260 upstream. As pointed out by Eric Dumazet, net->ipv6.ip6_rt_last_gc should hold the last time garbage collector was run so that we should update it whenever fib6_run_gc() calls fib6_clean_all(), not only if we got there from ip6_dst_gc(). Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2025-10-01 17:55:21 +0300