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commit c7ac8679bec9397afe8918f788cbcef88c38da54 upstream.
The message size allocated for rtnl ifinfo dumps was limited to
a single page. This is not enough for additional interface info
available with devices that support SR-IOV and caused a bug in
which VF info would not be displayed if more than approximately
40 VFs were created per interface.
Implement a new function pointer for the rtnl_register service that will
calculate the amount of data required for the ifinfo dump and allocate
enough data to satisfy the request.
Signed-off-by: Greg Rose <gregory.v.rose@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c6567ed1402c55e19b012e66a8398baec2a726f3 upstream.
This patch ensures that we free the rpc_task after the cleanup callbacks
are done in order to avoid a deadlock problem that can be triggered if
the callback needs to wait for another workqueue item to complete.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b9b5ef188e5a2222cfc16ef62a4703080750b451 upstream.
We need to cancel the hci_power_on work in order to avoid it run when we
try to free the hdev.
[ 1434.201149] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1434.204998] WARNING: at lib/debugobjects.c:261 debug_print_object+0x8e/0xb0()
[ 1434.208324] ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: work_struct hint: hci
_power_on+0x0/0x90
[ 1434.210386] Pid: 8564, comm: trinity-child25 Tainted: G W 3.7.0-rc5-next-
20121112-sasha-00018-g2f4ce0e #127
[ 1434.210760] Call Trace:
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819f3d6e>] ? debug_print_object+0x8e/0xb0
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8110b887>] warn_slowpath_common+0x87/0xb0
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8110b911>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x41/0x50
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819f3d6e>] debug_print_object+0x8e/0xb0
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8376b750>] ? hci_dev_open+0x310/0x310
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff83bf94e5>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x55/0xa0
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819f3ee5>] __debug_check_no_obj_freed+0xa5/0x230
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff83785db0>] ? bt_host_release+0x10/0x20
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819f4d15>] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x15/0x20
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8125eee7>] kfree+0x227/0x330
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff83785db0>] bt_host_release+0x10/0x20
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff81e539e5>] device_release+0x65/0xc0
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819d3975>] kobject_cleanup+0x145/0x190
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819d39cd>] kobject_release+0xd/0x10
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff819d33cc>] kobject_put+0x4c/0x60
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff81e548b2>] put_device+0x12/0x20
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8376a334>] hci_free_dev+0x24/0x30
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff82fd8fe1>] vhci_release+0x31/0x60
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8127be12>] __fput+0x122/0x250
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff811cab0d>] ? rcu_user_exit+0x9d/0xd0
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8127bf49>] ____fput+0x9/0x10
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff81133402>] task_work_run+0xb2/0xf0
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff8106cfa7>] do_notify_resume+0x77/0xa0
[ 1434.210760] [<ffffffff83bfb0ea>] int_signal+0x12/0x17
[ 1434.210760] ---[ end trace a6d57fefbc8a8cc7 ]---
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 354e4aa391ed50a4d827ff6fc11e0667d0859b25 ]
RFC 5961 5.2 [Blind Data Injection Attack].[Mitigation]
All TCP stacks MAY implement the following mitigation. TCP stacks
that implement this mitigation MUST add an additional input check to
any incoming segment. The ACK value is considered acceptable only if
it is in the range of ((SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) <= SEG.ACK <=
SND.NXT). All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the
above condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back.
Move tcp_send_challenge_ack() before tcp_ack() to avoid a forward
declaration.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bd090dfc634ddd711a5fbd0cadc6e0ab4977bcaf ]
We added support for RFC 5961 in latest kernels but TCP fails
to perform exhaustive check of ACK sequence.
We can update our view of peer tsval from a frame that is
later discarded by tcp_ack()
This makes timestamps enabled sessions vulnerable to injection of
a high tsval : peers start an ACK storm, since the victim
sends a dupack each time it receives an ACK from the other peer.
As tcp_validate_incoming() is called before tcp_ack(), we should
not peform tcp_replace_ts_recent() from it, and let callers do it
at the right time.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Cc: H.K. Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Cc: Romain Francoise <romain@orebokech.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e371589917011efe6ff8c7dfb4e9e81934ac5855 ]
Followup of commit 0c24604b68fc (tcp: implement RFC 5961 4.2)
As reported by Vijay Subramanian, we should send a challenge ACK
instead of a dup ack if a SYN flag is set on a packet received out of
window.
This permits the ratelimiting to work as intended, and to increase
correct SNMP counters.
Suggested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com>
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0c24604b68fc7810d429d6c3657b6f148270e528 ]
Implement the RFC 5691 mitigation against Blind
Reset attack using SYN bit.
Section 4.2 of RFC 5961 advises to send a Challenge ACK and drop
incoming packet, instead of resetting the session.
Add a new SNMP counter to count number of challenge acks sent
in response to SYN packets.
(netstat -s | grep TCPSYNChallenge)
Remove obsolete TCPAbortOnSyn, since we no longer abort a TCP session
because of a SYN flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 282f23c6ee343126156dd41218b22ece96d747e3 ]
Implement the RFC 5691 mitigation against Blind
Reset attack using RST bit.
Idea is to validate incoming RST sequence,
to match RCV.NXT value, instead of previouly accepted
window : (RCV.NXT <= SEG.SEQ < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND)
If sequence is in window but not an exact match, send
a "challenge ACK", so that the other part can resend an
RST with the appropriate sequence.
Add a new sysctl, tcp_challenge_ack_limit, to limit
number of challenge ACK sent per second.
Add a new SNMP counter to count number of challenge acks sent.
(netstat -s | grep TCPChallengeACK)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d2fe85da52e89b8012ffad010ef352a964725d5f ]
Fixed integer overflow in function htb_dequeue
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hasko <hasko.stevo@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6e51fe7572590d8d86e93b547fab6693d305fd0d ]
Consider the following program, that sets the second argument to the
sendto() syscall incorrectly:
#include <string.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main(void)
{
int fd;
struct sockaddr_in sa;
fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 132 /*IPPROTO_SCTP*/);
if (fd < 0)
return 1;
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
sa.sin_port = htons(11111);
sendto(fd, NULL, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa));
return 0;
}
We get -ENOMEM:
$ strace -e sendto ./demo
sendto(3, NULL, 1, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(11111), sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 16) = -1 ENOMEM (Cannot allocate memory)
Propagate the error code from sctp_user_addto_chunk(), so that we will
tell user space what actually went wrong:
$ strace -e sendto ./demo
sendto(3, NULL, 1, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(11111), sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 16) = -1 EFAULT (Bad address)
Noticed while running Trinity (the syscall fuzzer).
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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fails
[ Upstream commit be364c8c0f17a3dd42707b5a090b318028538eb9 ]
Trinity (the syscall fuzzer) discovered a memory leak in SCTP,
reproducible e.g. with the sendto() syscall by passing invalid
user space pointer in the second argument:
#include <string.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main(void)
{
int fd;
struct sockaddr_in sa;
fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 132 /*IPPROTO_SCTP*/);
if (fd < 0)
return 1;
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
sa.sin_port = htons(11111);
sendto(fd, NULL, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa));
return 0;
}
As far as I can tell, the leak has been around since ~2003.
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Stable-3.0 commit 42ab5316 (ipv4: fix redirect handling) was
backport of mainline commit 9cc20b26 from 3.2-rc3 where hh
member of struct dst_entry was already gone.
However, in 3.0 we still have it and we have to clean it as
well, otherwise it keeps pointing to the cleaned up (and
unusable) hh_cache entry and packets cannot be sent out.
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 81b401100c01d2357031e874689f89bd788d13cd upstream.
Set in the rx_ifindex to pass the correct interface index in the case of a
message timeout detection. Usually the rx_ifindex value is set at receive
time. But when no CAN frame has been received the RX_TIMEOUT notification
did not contain a valid value.
Reported-by: Andre Naujoks <nautsch2@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b78a4932f5fb11fadf41e69c606a33fa6787574c upstream.
The check whether the IBSS is active and can be removed should be
performed before deinitializing the fields used for the check/search.
Otherwise, the configured BSS will not be found and removed properly.
To make it more clear for the future, rename sdata->u.ibss to the
local pointer ifibss which is used within the checks.
This behaviour was introduced by
f3209bea110cade12e2b133da8b8499689cb0e2e
("mac80211: fix IBSS teardown race")
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <siwu@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de>
Cc: Ignacy Gawedzki <i@lri.fr>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 38fe36a248ec3228f8e6507955d7ceb0432d2000 upstream.
ICMP tuples have id in src and type/code in dst.
So comparing src.u.all with dst.u.all will always fail here
and ip_xfrm_me_harder() is called for every ICMP packet,
even if there was no NAT.
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weber <ulrich.weber@sophos.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 64f509ce71b08d037998e93dd51180c19b2f464c upstream.
Clients should not send such packets. By accepting them, we open
up a hole by wich ephemeral ports can be discovered in an off-path
attack.
See: "Reflection scan: an Off-Path Attack on TCP" by Jan Wrobel,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2074
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4a70bbfaef0361d27272629d1a250a937edcafe4 upstream.
We spare nothing by not validating the sequence number of dataless
ACK packets and enabling it makes harder off-path attacks.
See: "Reflection scan: an Off-Path Attack on TCP" by Jan Wrobel,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2074
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit baefa31db2f2b13a05d1b81bdf2d20d487f58b0a ]
In commit c445477d74ab3779 which adds aRFS to the kernel, the CPU
selected for RFS is not set correctly when CPU is changing.
This is causing OOO packets and probably other issues.
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a652208e0b52c190e57f2a075ffb5e897fe31c3b ]
Check (ha->addr == dev->dev_addr) is always true because dev_addr_init()
sets this. Correct the check to behave properly on addr removal.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d4596bad2a713fcd0def492b1960e6d899d5baa8 ]
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0c9f79be295c99ac7e4b569ca493d75fdcc19e4e ]
(1<<optname) is undefined behavior in C with a negative optname or
optname larger than 31. In those cases the result of the shift is
not necessarily zero (e.g., on x86).
This patch simplifies the code with a switch statement on optname.
It also allows the compiler to generate better code (e.g., using a
64-bit mask).
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 43c771a1963ab461a2f194e3c97fded1d5fe262f upstream.
When in world roaming mode, allow 40 MHz to be used
on channels 12 and 13 so that an AP that is, e.g.,
using HT40+ on channel 9 (in the UK) can be used.
Reported-by: Eddie Chapman <eddie@ehuk.net>
Tested-by: Eddie Chapman <eddie@ehuk.net>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 60713a0ca7fd6651b951cc1b4dbd528d1fc0281b ]
As documented in RFC4861 (Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6) 7.2.6.,
unsolicited neighbour advertisements should be sent to the all-nodes
multicast address.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 789336360e0a2aeb9750c16ab704a02cbe035e9e ]
When creating an L2TPv3 Ethernet session, if register_netdev() should fail for
any reason (for example, automatic naming for "l2tpeth%d" interfaces hits the
32k-interface limit), the netdev is freed in the error path. However, the
l2tp_eth_sess structure's dev pointer is left uncleared, and this results in
l2tp_eth_delete() then attempting to unregister the same netdev later in the
session teardown. This results in an oops.
To avoid this, clear the session dev pointer in the error path.
Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8f363b77ee4fbf7c3bbcf5ec2c5ca482d396d664 ]
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 14edd87dc67311556f1254a8f29cf4dd6cb5b7d1 ]
Commit a02e4b7dae4551(Demark default hoplimit as zero) only changes the
hoplimit checking condition and default value in ip6_dst_hoplimit, not
zeros all hoplimit default value.
Keep the zeroing ip6_template_metrics[RTAX_HOPLIMIT - 1] to force it as
const, cause as a37e6e344910(net: force dst_default_metrics to const
section)
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <roy.qing.li@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a3374c42aa5f7237e87ff3b0622018636b0c847e ]
tcp_ioctl() tries to take into account if tcp socket received a FIN
to report correct number bytes in receive queue.
But its flaky because if the application ate the last skb,
we return 1 instead of 0.
Correct way to detect that FIN was received is to test SOCK_DONE.
Reported-by: Elliot Hughes <enh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6d772ac5578f711d1ce7b03535d1c95bffb21dff ]
On some suspend/resume operations involving wimax device, we have
noticed some intermittent memory corruptions in netlink code.
Stéphane Marchesin tracked this corruption in netlink_update_listeners()
and suggested a patch.
It appears netlink_release() should use kfree_rcu() instead of kfree()
for the listeners structure as it may be used by other cpus using RCU
protection.
netlink_release() must set to NULL the listeners pointer when
it is about to be freed.
Also have to protect netlink_update_listeners() and
netlink_has_listeners() if listeners is NULL.
Add a nl_deref_protected() lockdep helper to properly document which
locks protects us.
Reported-by: Jonathan Kliegman <kliegs@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Stéphane Marchesin <marcheu@google.com>
Cc: Sam Leffler <sleffler@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f6e80abeab928b7c47cc1fbf53df13b4398a2bec ]
Bug introduced by commit edfee0339e681a784ebacec7e8c2dc97dc6d2839
(sctp: check src addr when processing SACK to update transport state)
Signed-off-by: Zijie Pan <zijie.pan@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit badecb001a310408d3473b1fc2ed5aefd0bc92a9 upstream.
The 'ssid' field of the cfg80211_ibss_params is a u8 pointer and
its length is likely to be less than IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN most
of the time.
This patch fixes the ssid copy in ieee80211_ibss_join() by using
the SSID length to prevent it from reading beyond the string.
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <ordex@autistici.org>
[rewrapped commit message, small rewording]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4a4f1a5808c8bb0b72a4f6e5904c53fb8c9cd966 upstream.
Due to pskb_may_pull() checking the skb length, all
non-management frames are checked on input whether
their 802.11 header is fully present. Also add that
check for management frames and remove a check that
is now duplicate. This prevents accessing skb data
beyond the frame end.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f7fbf70ee9db6da6033ae50d100e017ac1f26555 upstream.
Per IEEE Std. 802.11-2012, Sec 8.2.4.4.1, the sequence Control field is
not present in control frames. We noticed this problem when processing
Block Ack Requests.
Signed-off-by: Javier Cardona <javier@cozybit.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Lopez <jlopex@cozybit.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7dd111e8ee10cc6816669eabcad3334447673236 upstream.
The mesh header can have address extension by a 4th
or a 5th and 6th address, but never both. Drop such
frames in 802.11 -> 802.3 conversion along with any
frames that have the wrong extension.
Reviewed-by: Javier Cardona <javier@cozybit.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c4a9fafc77a5318f5ed26c509bbcddf03e18c201 upstream.
No driver initializes chan->max_antenna_gain to something sensible, and
the only place where it is being used right now is inside ath9k. This
leads to ath9k potentially using less tx power than it can use, which can
decrease performance/range in some rare cases.
Rather than going through every single driver, this patch initializes
chan->orig_mag in wiphy_register(), ignoring whatever value the driver
left in there. If a driver for some reason wishes to limit it independent
from regulatory rulesets, it can do so internally.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4045f72bcf3c293c7c5932ef001742d8bb5ded76 upstream.
This patch fix corruption which can manifest itself by following crash
when switching on rfkill switch with rt2x00 driver:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=615362
Pointer key->u.ccmp.tfm of group key get corrupted in:
ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify():
/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
because rt2x00 always set RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED, even if key is not TKIP.
We already check type of the key in different path in
ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify() function, so adding additional
check here is reasonable.
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4bc1e68ed6a8b59be8a79eb719be515a55c7bc68 upstream.
The call to xprt_disconnect_done() that is triggered by a successful
connection reset will trigger another automatic wakeup of all tasks
on the xprt->pending rpc_wait_queue. In particular it will cause an
early wake up of the task that called xprt_connect().
All we really want to do here is clear all the socket-specific state
flags, so we split that functionality out of xs_sock_mark_closed()
into a helper that can be called by xs_abort_connection()
Reported-by: Chris Perl <chris.perl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Tested-by: Chris Perl <chris.perl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b9d2bb2ee537424a7f855e1f93eed44eb9ee0854 upstream.
This reverts commit 55420c24a0d4d1fce70ca713f84aa00b6b74a70e.
Now that we clear the connected flag when entering TCP_CLOSE_WAIT,
the deadlock described in this commit is no longer possible.
Instead, the resulting call to xs_tcp_shutdown() can interfere
with pending reconnection attempts.
Reported-by: Chris Perl <chris.perl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Tested-by: Chris Perl <chris.perl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d0bea455dd48da1ecbd04fedf00eb89437455fdc upstream.
This is needed to ensure that we call xprt_connect() upon the next
call to call_connect().
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Tested-by: Chris Perl <chris.perl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f878b657ce8e7d3673afe48110ec208a29e38c4a upstream.
Chris Perl reports that we're seeing races between the wakeup call in
xs_error_report and the connect attempts. Basically, Chris has shown
that in certain circumstances, the call to xs_error_report causes the
rpc_task that is responsible for reconnecting to wake up early, thus
triggering a disconnect and retry.
Since the sk->sk_error_report() calls in the socket layer are always
followed by a tcp_done() in the cases where we care about waking up
the rpc_tasks, just let the state_change callbacks take responsibility
for those wake ups.
Reported-by: Chris Perl <chris.perl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Tested-by: Chris Perl <chris.perl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4c67525849e0b7f4bd4fab2487ec9e43ea52ef29 ]
After commit e2446eaa ("tcp_v4_send_reset: binding oif to iif in no
sock case").. tcp resets are always lost, when routing is asymmetric.
Yes, backing out that patch will result in misrouting of resets for
dead connections which used interface binding when were alive, but we
actually cannot do anything here. What's died that's died and correct
handling normal unbound connections is obviously a priority.
Comment to comment:
> This has few benefits:
> 1. tcp_v6_send_reset already did that.
It was done to route resets for IPv6 link local addresses. It was a
mistake to do so for global addresses. The patch fixes this as well.
Actually, the problem appears to be even more serious than guaranteed
loss of resets. As reported by Sergey Soloviev <sol@eqv.ru>, those
misrouted resets create a lot of arp traffic and huge amount of
unresolved arp entires putting down to knees NAT firewalls which use
asymmetric routing.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5175a5e76bbdf20a614fb47ce7a38f0f39e70226 ]
This is the revised patch for fixing rds-ping spinlock recursion
according to Venkat's suggestions.
RDS ping/pong over TCP feature has been broken for years(2.6.39 to
3.6.0) since we have to set TCP cork and call kernel_sendmsg() between
ping/pong which both need to lock "struct sock *sk". However, this
lock has already been hold before rds_tcp_data_ready() callback is
triggerred. As a result, we always facing spinlock resursion which
would resulting in system panic.
Given that RDS ping is only used to test the connectivity and not for
serious performance measurements, we can queue the pong transmit to
rds_wq as a delayed response.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
CC: Venkat Venkatsubra <venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e1f165032c8bade3a6bdf546f8faf61fda4dd01c ]
The retry loop in neigh_resolve_output() and neigh_connected_output()
call dev_hard_header() with out reseting the skb to network_header.
This causes the retry to fail with skb_under_panic. The fix is to
reset the network_header within the retry loop.
Signed-off-by: Ramesh Nagappa <ramesh.nagappa@ericsson.com>
Reviewed-by: Shawn Lu <shawn.lu@ericsson.com>
Reviewed-by: Robert Coulson <robert.coulson@ericsson.com>
Reviewed-by: Billie Alsup <billie.alsup@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 212ba90696ab4884e2025b0b13726d67aadc2cd4 upstream.
The buffer size in read_flush() is too small for the longest possible values
for it. This can lead to a kernel stack corruption:
[ 43.047329] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff833e64b4
[ 43.047329]
[ 43.049030] Pid: 6015, comm: trinity-child18 Tainted: G W 3.5.0-rc7-next-20120716-sasha #221
[ 43.050038] Call Trace:
[ 43.050435] [<ffffffff836c60c2>] panic+0xcd/0x1f4
[ 43.050931] [<ffffffff833e64b4>] ? read_flush.isra.7+0xe4/0x100
[ 43.051602] [<ffffffff810e94e6>] __stack_chk_fail+0x16/0x20
[ 43.052206] [<ffffffff833e64b4>] read_flush.isra.7+0xe4/0x100
[ 43.052951] [<ffffffff833e6500>] ? read_flush_pipefs+0x30/0x30
[ 43.053594] [<ffffffff833e652c>] read_flush_procfs+0x2c/0x30
[ 43.053596] [<ffffffff812b9a8c>] proc_reg_read+0x9c/0xd0
[ 43.053596] [<ffffffff812b99f0>] ? proc_reg_write+0xd0/0xd0
[ 43.053596] [<ffffffff81250d5b>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x4b/0x90
[ 43.053596] [<ffffffff81250fd6>] do_readv_writev+0xf6/0x1d0
[ 43.053596] [<ffffffff812510ee>] vfs_readv+0x3e/0x60
[ 43.053596] [<ffffffff812511b8>] sys_readv+0x48/0xb0
[ 43.053596] [<ffffffff8378167d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 82e6bfe2fbc4d48852114c4f979137cd5bf1d1a8 upstream.
Commit v2.6.19-rc1~1272^2~41 tells us that r->cost != 0 can happen when
a running state is saved to userspace and then reinstated from there.
Make sure that private xt_limit area is initialized with correct values.
Otherwise, random matchings due to use of uninitialized memory.
Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@inai.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7a909ac70f6b0823d9f23a43f19598d4b57ac901 upstream.
credit_cap can be set to credit, which avoids inlining user2credits
twice. Also, remove inline keyword and let compiler decide.
old:
684 192 0 876 36c net/netfilter/xt_limit.o
4927 344 32 5303 14b7 net/netfilter/xt_hashlimit.o
now:
668 192 0 860 35c net/netfilter/xt_limit.o
4793 344 32 5169 1431 net/netfilter/xt_hashlimit.o
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2614f86490122bf51eb7c12ec73927f1900f4e7d upstream.
In __nf_ct_expect_check, the function refresh_timer returns 1
if a matching expectation is found and its timer is successfully
refreshed. This results in nf_ct_expect_related returning 0.
Note that at this point:
- the passed expectation is not inserted in the expectation table
and its timer was not initialized, since we have refreshed one
matching/existing expectation.
- nf_ct_expect_alloc uses kmem_cache_alloc, so the expectation
timer is in some undefined state just after the allocation,
until it is appropriately initialized.
This can be a problem for the SIP helper during the expectation
addition:
...
if (nf_ct_expect_related(rtp_exp) == 0) {
if (nf_ct_expect_related(rtcp_exp) != 0)
nf_ct_unexpect_related(rtp_exp);
...
Note that nf_ct_expect_related(rtp_exp) may return 0 for the timer refresh
case that is detailed above. Then, if nf_ct_unexpect_related(rtcp_exp)
returns != 0, nf_ct_unexpect_related(rtp_exp) is called, which does:
spin_lock_bh(&nf_conntrack_lock);
if (del_timer(&exp->timeout)) {
nf_ct_unlink_expect(exp);
nf_ct_expect_put(exp);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_lock);
Note that del_timer always returns false if the timer has been
initialized. However, the timer was not initialized since setup_timer
was not called, therefore, the expectation timer remains in some
undefined state. If I'm not missing anything, this may lead to the
removal an unexistent expectation.
To fix this, the optimization that allows refreshing an expectation
is removed. Now nf_conntrack_expect_related looks more consistent
to me since it always add the expectation in case that it returns
success.
Thanks to Patrick McHardy for participating in the discussion of
this patch.
I think this may be the source of the problem described by:
http://marc.info/?l=netfilter-devel&m=134073514719421&w=2
Reported-by: Rafal Fitt <rafalf@aplusc.com.pl>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f22eb25cf5b1157b29ef88c793b71972efc47143 upstream.
Via-headers are parsed beginning at the first character after the Via-address.
When the address is translated first and its length decreases, the offset to
start parsing at is incorrect and header parameters might be missed.
Update the offset after translating the Via-address to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3f509c689a07a4aa989b426893d8491a7ffcc410 upstream.
We're hitting bug while trying to reinsert an already existing
expectation:
kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:895!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa0069563>] nf_ct_expect_related_report+0x4a0/0x57a [nf_conntrack]
[<ffffffff812d423a>] ? in4_pton+0x72/0x131
[<ffffffffa00ca69e>] ip_nat_sdp_media+0xeb/0x185 [nf_nat_sip]
[<ffffffffa00b5b9b>] set_expected_rtp_rtcp+0x32d/0x39b [nf_conntrack_sip]
[<ffffffffa00b5f15>] process_sdp+0x30c/0x3ec [nf_conntrack_sip]
[<ffffffff8103f1eb>] ? irq_exit+0x9a/0x9c
[<ffffffffa00ca738>] ? ip_nat_sdp_media+0x185/0x185 [nf_nat_sip]
We have to remove the RTP expectation if the RTCP expectation hits EBUSY
since we keep trying with other ports until we succeed.
Reported-by: Rafal Fitt <rafalf@aplusc.com.pl>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 07153c6ec074257ade76a461429b567cff2b3a1e upstream.
It was reported that the Linux kernel sometimes logs:
klogd: [2629147.402413] kernel BUG at net / netfilter /
nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c: 447!
klogd: [1072212.887368] kernel BUG at net / netfilter /
nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c: 392
ipv4_get_l4proto() in nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c and tcp_error() in
nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c should catch malformed packets, so the errors
at the indicated lines - TCP options parsing - should not happen.
However, tcp_error() relies on the "dataoff" offset to the TCP header,
calculated by ipv4_get_l4proto(). But ipv4_get_l4proto() does not check
bogus ihl values in IPv4 packets, which then can slip through tcp_error()
and get caught at the TCP options parsing routines.
The patch fixes ipv4_get_l4proto() by invalidating packets with bogus
ihl value.
The patch closes netfilter bugzilla id 771.
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5b423f6a40a0327f9d40bc8b97ce9be266f74368 upstream.
Existing code assumes that del_timer returns true for alive conntrack
entries. However, this is not true if reliable events are enabled.
In that case, del_timer may return true for entries that were
just inserted in the dying list. Note that packets / ctnetlink may
hold references to conntrack entries that were just inserted to such
list.
This patch fixes the issue by adding an independent timer for
event delivery. This increases the size of the ecache extension.
Still we can revisit this later and use variable size extensions
to allocate this area on demand.
Tested-by: Oliver Smith <olipro@8.c.9.b.0.7.4.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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