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2017-11-11ipv6: accept 64k - 1 packet length in ip6_find_1stfragopt()Stefano Brivio1-4/+2
commit 3de33e1ba0506723ab25734e098cf280ecc34756 upstream. A packet length of exactly IPV6_MAXPLEN is allowed, we should refuse parsing options only if the size is 64KiB or more. While at it, remove one extra variable and one assignment which were also introduced by the commit that introduced the size check. Checking the sum 'offset + len' and only later adding 'len' to 'offset' doesn't provide any advantage over directly summing to 'offset' and checking it. Fixes: 6399f1fae4ec ("ipv6: avoid overflow of offset in ip6_find_1stfragopt") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-08-26ipv6: avoid overflow of offset in ip6_find_1stfragoptSabrina Dubroca1-2/+6
commit 6399f1fae4ec29fab5ec76070435555e256ca3a6 upstream. In some cases, offset can overflow and can cause an infinite loop in ip6_find_1stfragopt(). Make it unsigned int to prevent the overflow, and cap it at IPV6_MAXPLEN, since packets larger than that should be invalid. This problem has been here since before the beginning of git history. Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-07-18udp: avoid ufo handling on IP payload compression packetsAlexey Kodanev1-1/+1
commit 4b3b45edba9222e518a1ec72df841eba3609fe34 upstream. commit c146066ab802 ("ipv4: Don't use ufo handling on later transformed packets") and commit f89c56ce710a ("ipv6: Don't use ufo handling on later transformed packets") added a check that 'rt->dst.header_len' isn't zero in order to skip UFO, but it doesn't include IPcomp in transport mode where it equals zero. Packets, after payload compression, may not require further fragmentation, and if original length exceeds MTU, later compressed packets will be transmitted incorrectly. This can be reproduced with LTP udp_ipsec.sh test on veth device with enabled UFO, MTU is 1500 and UDP payload is 2000: * IPv4 case, offset is wrong + unnecessary fragmentation udp_ipsec.sh -p comp -m transport -s 2000 & tcpdump -ni ltp_ns_veth2 ... IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 45203, offset 0, flags [+], proto Compressed IP (108), length 49) 10.0.0.2 > 10.0.0.1: IPComp(cpi=0x1000) IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 45203, offset 1480, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 21) 10.0.0.2 > 10.0.0.1: ip-proto-17 * IPv6 case, sending small fragments udp_ipsec.sh -6 -p comp -m transport -s 2000 & tcpdump -ni ltp_ns_veth2 ... IP6 (flowlabel 0x6b9ba, hlim 64, next-header Compressed IP (108) payload length: 37) fd00::2 > fd00::1: IPComp(cpi=0x1000) IP6 (flowlabel 0x6b9ba, hlim 64, next-header Compressed IP (108) payload length: 21) fd00::2 > fd00::1: IPComp(cpi=0x1000) Fix it by checking 'rt->dst.xfrm' pointer to 'xfrm_state' struct, skip UFO if xfrm is set. So the new check will include both cases: IPcomp and IPsec. Fixes: c146066ab802 ("ipv4: Don't use ufo handling on later transformed packets") Fixes: f89c56ce710a ("ipv6: Don't use ufo handling on later transformed packets") Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-06-05ipv6: fix out of bound writes in __ip6_append_data()Eric Dumazet1-7/+8
commit 232cd35d0804cc241eb887bb8d4d9b3b9881c64a upstream. Andrey Konovalov and idaifish@gmail.com reported crashes caused by one skb shared_info being overwritten from __ip6_append_data() Andrey program lead to following state : copy -4200 datalen 2000 fraglen 2040 maxfraglen 2040 alloclen 2048 transhdrlen 0 offset 0 fraggap 6200 The skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb_prev, maxfraglen, data + transhdrlen, fraggap, 0); is overwriting skb->head and skb_shared_info Since we apparently detect this rare condition too late, move the code earlier to even avoid allocating skb and risking crashes. Once again, many thanks to Andrey and syzkaller team. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reported-by: <idaifish@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-06-05ipv6: Check ip6_find_1stfragopt() return value properly.David S. Miller1-4/+3
commit 7dd7eb9513bd02184d45f000ab69d78cb1fa1531 upstream. Do not use unsigned variables to see if it returns a negative error or not. Fixes: 2423496af35d ("ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options") Reported-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filenames, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-06-05ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header optionsCraig Gallek1-6/+12
commit 2423496af35d94a87156b063ea5cedffc10a70a1 upstream. The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller program. The reproducer is basically: int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP); send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE); send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0); The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path. The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data is read outside of it. This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects running out-of-bounds. [ 42.361487] ================================================================== [ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789 [ 42.366469] [ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41 [ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 42.368824] Call Trace: [ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b [ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290 [ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370 [ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0 [ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50 [ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110 [ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0 [ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30 [ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990 [ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690 [ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990 [ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730 [ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160 [ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330 [ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 [ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0 [ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0 [ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0 [ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930 [ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120 [ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290 [ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930 [ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540 [ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380 [ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310 [ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0 [ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0 [ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20 [ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 [ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260 [ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe [ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 [ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383 [ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383 [ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018 [ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad [ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00 [ 42.397257] [ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789: [ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380 [ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0 [ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580 [ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0 [ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0 [ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0 [ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0 [ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930 [ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190 [ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.403718] [ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794: [ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 [ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0 [ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0 [ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60 [ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0 [ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0 [ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40 [ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110 [ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580 [ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190 [ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.409513] [ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780 [ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of [ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980) [ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) [ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c [ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000 [ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 42.415604] [ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 42.418273] ^ [ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419882] ================================================================== Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filenames, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-02-23ipv6: Don't use ufo handling on later transformed packetsJakub Sitnicki1-1/+1
commit f89c56ce710afa65e1b2ead555b52c4807f34ff7 upstream. Similar to commit c146066ab802 ("ipv4: Don't use ufo handling on later transformed packets"), don't perform UFO on packets that will be IPsec transformed. To detect it we rely on the fact that headerlen in dst_entry is non-zero only for transformation bundles (xfrm_dst objects). Unwanted segmentation can be observed with a NETIF_F_UFO capable device, such as a dummy device: DEV=dum0 LEN=1493 ip li add $DEV type dummy ip addr add fc00::1/64 dev $DEV nodad ip link set $DEV up ip xfrm policy add dir out src fc00::1 dst fc00::2 \ tmpl src fc00::1 dst fc00::2 proto esp spi 1 ip xfrm state add src fc00::1 dst fc00::2 \ proto esp spi 1 enc 'aes' 0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b tcpdump -n -nn -i $DEV -t & socat /dev/zero,readbytes=$LEN udp6:[fc00::2]:$LEN tcpdump output before: IP6 fc00::1 > fc00::2: frag (0|1448) ESP(spi=0x00000001,seq=0x1), length 1448 IP6 fc00::1 > fc00::2: frag (1448|48) IP6 fc00::1 > fc00::2: ESP(spi=0x00000001,seq=0x2), length 88 ... and after: IP6 fc00::1 > fc00::2: frag (0|1448) ESP(spi=0x00000001,seq=0x1), length 1448 IP6 fc00::1 > fc00::2: frag (1448|80) Fixes: e89e9cf539a2 ("[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach") Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jkbs@redhat.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-05-01ipv6: Count in extension headers in skb->network_headerJakub Sitnicki1-5/+4
[ Upstream commit 3ba3458fb9c050718b95275a3310b74415e767e2 ] When sending a UDPv6 message longer than MTU, account for the length of fragmentable IPv6 extension headers in skb->network_header offset. Same as we do in alloc_new_skb path in __ip6_append_data(). This ensures that later on __ip6_make_skb() will make space in headroom for fragmentable extension headers: /* move skb->data to ip header from ext header */ if (skb->data < skb_network_header(skb)) __skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb)); Prevents a splat due to skb_under_panic: skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8143397b len:2126 put:14 \ head:ffff880005bacf50 data:ffff880005bacf4a tail:0x48 end:0xc0 dev:lo ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:104! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 160 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.6.0-rc2 #65 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff813eb7b9>] skb_push+0x79/0x80 [<ffffffff8143397b>] eth_header+0x2b/0x100 [<ffffffff8141e0d0>] neigh_resolve_output+0x210/0x310 [<ffffffff814eab77>] ip6_finish_output2+0x4a7/0x7c0 [<ffffffff814efe3a>] ip6_output+0x16a/0x280 [<ffffffff815440c1>] ip6_local_out+0xb1/0xf0 [<ffffffff814f1115>] ip6_send_skb+0x45/0xd0 [<ffffffff81518836>] udp_v6_send_skb+0x246/0x5d0 [<ffffffff8151985e>] udpv6_sendmsg+0xa6e/0x1090 [...] Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jkbs@redhat.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-05-10udp: only allow UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM socketsMichal Kubeček1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit acf8dd0a9d0b9e4cdb597c2f74802f79c699e802 ] If an over-MTU UDP datagram is sent through a SOCK_RAW socket to a UFO-capable device, ip_ufo_append_data() sets skb->ip_summed to CHECKSUM_PARTIAL unconditionally as all GSO code assumes transport layer checksum is to be computed on segmentation. However, in this case, skb->csum_start and skb->csum_offset are never set as raw socket transmit path bypasses udp_send_skb() where they are usually set. As a result, driver may access invalid memory when trying to calculate the checksum and store the result (as observed in virtio_net driver). Moreover, the very idea of modifying the userspace provided UDP header is IMHO against raw socket semantics (I wasn't able to find a document clearly stating this or the opposite, though). And while allowing CHECKSUM_NONE in the UFO case would be more efficient, it would be a bit too intrusive change just to handle a corner case like this. Therefore disallowing UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM seems to be the best option. Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-02-20ipv6: Remove all uses of LL_ALLOCATED_SPACEHerbert Xu1-2/+6
commit a7ae1992248e5cf9dc5bd35695ab846d27efe15f upstream. ipv6: Remove all uses of LL_ALLOCATED_SPACE The macro LL_ALLOCATED_SPACE was ill-conceived. It applies the alignment to the sum of needed_headroom and needed_tailroom. As the amount that is then reserved for head room is needed_headroom with alignment, this means that the tail room left may be too small. This patch replaces all uses of LL_ALLOCATED_SPACE in net/ipv6 with the macro LL_RESERVED_SPACE and direct reference to needed_tailroom. This also fixes the problem with needed_headroom changing between allocating the skb and reserving the head room. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-09-14ip: make IP identifiers less predictableEric Dumazet1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 04ca6973f7c1a0d8537f2d9906a0cf8e69886d75 ] In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to infer whether two machines are exchanging packets. With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this side-channel technique. This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after an idle period. Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not increase collision probability. This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine. We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be used to infer information for other protocols. For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr. If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict. 21:57:11.008086 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64 21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64 21:57:12.013133 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64 21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64 21:57:13.016580 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64 21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64 [1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu> Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-09-14inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_countEric Dumazet1-14/+9
[ Upstream commit 73f156a6e8c1074ac6327e0abd1169e95eb66463 ] Ideally, we would need to generate IP ID using a per destination IP generator. linux kernels used inet_peer cache for this purpose, but this had a huge cost on servers disabling MTU discovery. 1) each inet_peer struct consumes 192 bytes 2) inetpeer cache uses a binary tree of inet_peer structs, with a nominal size of ~66000 elements under load. 3) lookups in this tree are hitting a lot of cache lines, as tree depth is about 20. 4) If server deals with many tcp flows, we have a high probability of not finding the inet_peer, allocating a fresh one, inserting it in the tree with same initial ip_id_count, (cf secure_ip_id()) 5) We garbage collect inet_peer aggressively. IP ID generation do not have to be 'perfect' Goal is trying to avoid duplicates in a short period of time, so that reassembly units have a chance to complete reassembly of fragments belonging to one message before receiving other fragments with a recycled ID. We simply use an array of generators, and a Jenkin hash using the dst IP as a key. ipv6_select_ident() is put back into net/ipv6/ip6_output.c where it belongs (it is only used from this file) secure_ip_id() and secure_ipv6_id() no longer are needed. Rename ip_select_ident_more() to ip_select_ident_segs() to avoid unnecessary decrement/increment of the number of segments. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-08-06Revert "net: ip, ipv6: handle gso skbs in forwarding path"Ben Hutchings1-12/+1
This reverts commit caa5344994778a2b4725b2d75c74430f76925e4a, which was commit fe6cc55f3a9a053482a76f5a6b2257cee51b4663 upstream. In 3.2, the transport header length is not calculated in the forwarding path, so skb_gso_network_seglen() returns an incorrect result. We also have problems due to the local_df flag not being set correctly. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-07-11net: fix inet_getid() and ipv6_select_ident() bugsEric Dumazet1-8/+3
[ Upstream commit 39c36094d78c39e038c1e499b2364e13bce36f54 ] I noticed we were sending wrong IPv4 ID in TCP flows when MTU discovery is disabled. Note how GSO/TSO packets do not have monotonically incrementing ID. 06:37:41.575531 IP (id 14227, proto: TCP (6), length: 4396) 06:37:41.575534 IP (id 14272, proto: TCP (6), length: 65212) 06:37:41.575544 IP (id 14312, proto: TCP (6), length: 57972) 06:37:41.575678 IP (id 14317, proto: TCP (6), length: 7292) 06:37:41.575683 IP (id 14361, proto: TCP (6), length: 63764) It appears I introduced this bug in linux-3.1. inet_getid() must return the old value of peer->ip_id_count, not the new one. Lets revert this part, and remove the prevention of a null identification field in IPv6 Fragment Extension Header, which is dubious and not even done properly. Fixes: 87c48fa3b463 ("ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-04-30ipv6: some ipv6 statistic counters failed to disable bhHannes Frederic Sowa1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 43a43b6040165f7b40b5b489fe61a4cb7f8c4980 ] After commit c15b1ccadb323ea ("ipv6: move DAD and addrconf_verify processing to workqueue") some counters are now updated in process context and thus need to disable bh before doing so, otherwise deadlocks can happen on 32-bit archs. Fabio Estevam noticed this while while mounting a NFS volume on an ARM board. As a compensation for missing this I looked after the other *_STATS_BH and found three other calls which need updating: 1) icmp6_send: ip6_fragment -> icmpv6_send -> icmp6_send (error handling) 2) ip6_push_pending_frames: rawv6_sendmsg -> rawv6_push_pending_frames -> ... (only in case of icmp protocol with raw sockets in error handling) 3) ping6_v6_sendmsg (error handling) Fixes: c15b1ccadb323ea ("ipv6: move DAD and addrconf_verify processing to workqueue") Reported-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com> Tested-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-04-30ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu do not handle the mtu of the second fragment properlylucien1-8/+6
[ Upstream commit e367c2d03dba4c9bcafad24688fadb79dd95b218 ] In ip6_append_data_mtu(), when the xfrm mode is not tunnel(such as transport),the ipsec header need to be added in the first fragment, so the mtu will decrease to reserve space for it, then the second fragment come, the mtu should be turn back, as the commit 0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74 said. however, in the commit a493e60ac4bbe2e977e7129d6d8cbb0dd236be, it use *mtu = min(*mtu, ...) to change the mtu, which lead to the new mtu is alway equal with the first fragment's. and cannot turn back. when I test through ping6 -c1 -s5000 $ip (mtu=1280): ...frag (0|1232) ESP(spi=0x00002000,seq=0xb), length 1232 ...frag (1232|1216) ...frag (2448|1216) ...frag (3664|1216) ...frag (4880|164) which should be: ...frag (0|1232) ESP(spi=0x00001000,seq=0x1), length 1232 ...frag (1232|1232) ...frag (2464|1232) ...frag (3696|1232) ...frag (4928|116) so delete the min() when change back the mtu. Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Fixes: 75a493e60ac4bb ("ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu did not care about pmtudisc and frag_size") Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-04-09net: ip, ipv6: handle gso skbs in forwarding pathFlorian Westphal1-1/+12
commit fe6cc55f3a9a053482a76f5a6b2257cee51b4663 upstream. [ use zero netdev_feature mask to avoid backport of netif_skb_dev_features function ] Marcelo Ricardo Leitner reported problems when the forwarding link path has a lower mtu than the incoming one if the inbound interface supports GRO. Given: Host <mtu1500> R1 <mtu1200> R2 Host sends tcp stream which is routed via R1 and R2. R1 performs GRO. In this case, the kernel will fail to send ICMP fragmentation needed messages (or pkt too big for ipv6), as GSO packets currently bypass dstmtu checks in forward path. Instead, Linux tries to send out packets exceeding the mtu. When locking route MTU on Host (i.e., no ipv4 DF bit set), R1 does not fragment the packets when forwarding, and again tries to send out packets exceeding R1-R2 link mtu. This alters the forwarding dstmtu checks to take the individual gso segment lengths into account. For ipv6, we send out pkt too big error for gso if the individual segments are too big. For ipv4, we either send icmp fragmentation needed, or, if the DF bit is not set, perform software segmentation and let the output path create fragments when the packet is leaving the machine. It is not 100% correct as the error message will contain the headers of the GRO skb instead of the original/segmented one, but it seems to work fine in my (limited) tests. Eric Dumazet suggested to simply shrink mss via ->gso_size to avoid sofware segmentation. However it turns out that skb_segment() assumes skb nr_frags is related to mss size so we would BUG there. I don't want to mess with it considering Herbert and Eric disagree on what the correct behavior should be. Hannes Frederic Sowa notes that when we would shrink gso_size skb_segment would then also need to deal with the case where SKB_MAX_FRAGS would be exceeded. This uses sofware segmentation in the forward path when we hit ipv4 non-DF packets and the outgoing link mtu is too small. Its not perfect, but given the lack of bug reports wrt. GRO fwd being broken this is a rare case anyway. Also its not like this could not be improved later once the dust settles. Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reported-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-01-03ipv6: fix possible seqlock deadlock in ip6_finish_output2Hannes Frederic Sowa1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 7f88c6b23afbd31545c676dea77ba9593a1a14bf ] IPv6 stats are 64 bits and thus are protected with a seqlock. By not disabling bottom-half we could deadlock here if we don't disable bh and a softirq reentrantly updates the same mib. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2013-11-28inet: fix possible memory corruption with UDP_CORK and UFOHannes Frederic Sowa1-1/+1
[ This is a simplified -stable version of a set of upstream commits. ] This is a replacement patch only for stable which does fix the problems handled by the following two commits in -net: "ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9) "ip6_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (c547dbf55d5f8cf615ccc0e7265e98db27d3fb8b) Three frames are written on a corked udp socket for which the output netdevice has UFO enabled. If the first and third frame are smaller than the mtu and the second one is bigger, we enqueue the second frame with skb_append_datato_frags without initializing the gso fields. This leads to the third frame appended regulary and thus constructing an invalid skb. This fixes the problem by always using skb_append_datato_frags as soon as the first frag got enqueued to the skb without marking the packet as SKB_GSO_UDP. The problem with only two frames for ipv6 was fixed by "ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO" (2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47). Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2013-10-27ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFOHannes Frederic Sowa1-31/+22
[ Upstream commit 2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47 ] In the following scenario the socket is corked: If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions. In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb is available. This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set (instead of sutracting it again). Found with trinity. Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2013-08-03ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu did not care about pmtudisc and frag_sizeHannes Frederic Sowa1-6/+10
[ Upstream commit 75a493e60ac4bbe2e977e7129d6d8cbb0dd236be ] If the socket had an IPV6_MTU value set, ip6_append_data_mtu lost track of this when appending the second frame on a corked socket. This results in the following splat: [37598.993962] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [37598.994008] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2064! [37598.994008] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [37598.994008] Modules linked in: tcp_lp uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core videodev media vfat fat usb_storage fuse ebtable_nat xt_CHECKSUM bridge stp llc ipt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat +nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i cxgb3 mdio libcxgbi ib_iser rdma_cm ib_addr iw_cm ib_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi +scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm bnep iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_codec_conexant arc4 iwldvm mac80211 snd_hda_intel acpi_cpufreq mperf coretemp snd_hda_codec microcode cdc_wdm cdc_acm [37598.994008] snd_hwdep cdc_ether snd_seq snd_seq_device usbnet mii joydev btusb snd_pcm bluetooth i2c_i801 e1000e lpc_ich mfd_core ptp iwlwifi pps_core snd_page_alloc mei cfg80211 snd_timer thinkpad_acpi snd tpm_tis soundcore rfkill tpm tpm_bios vhost_net tun macvtap macvlan kvm_intel kvm uinput binfmt_misc +dm_crypt i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core wmi video [37598.994008] CPU 0 [37598.994008] Pid: 27320, comm: t2 Not tainted 3.9.6-200.fc18.x86_64 #1 LENOVO 27744PG/27744PG [37598.994008] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815443a5>] [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330 [37598.994008] RSP: 0018:ffff88003670da18 EFLAGS: 00010202 [37598.994008] RAX: ffff88018105c018 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00000000000006c0 [37598.994008] RDX: ffff88018105a6c0 RSI: ffff88018105a000 RDI: ffff8801e1b0aa00 [37598.994008] RBP: ffff88003670da78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88018105c040 [37598.994008] R10: ffff8801e1b0aa00 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000fff8 [37598.994008] R13: 00000000000004fc R14: 00000000ffff0504 R15: 0000000000000000 [37598.994008] FS: 00007f28eea59740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [37598.994008] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [37598.994008] CR2: 0000003d935789e0 CR3: 00000000365cb000 CR4: 00000000000407f0 [37598.994008] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [37598.994008] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [37598.994008] Process t2 (pid: 27320, threadinfo ffff88003670c000, task ffff88022c162ee0) [37598.994008] Stack: [37598.994008] ffff88022e098a00 ffff88020f973fc0 0000000000000008 00000000000004c8 [37598.994008] ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4 ffff88003670da78 ffff8801e1b0a200 [37598.994008] 0000000000000018 00000000000004c8 ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4 [37598.994008] Call Trace: [37598.994008] [<ffffffff815fc21f>] ip6_append_data+0xccf/0xfe0 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff8158d9f0>] ? ip_copy_metadata+0x1a0/0x1a0 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff81661f66>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x16/0x40 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff8161548d>] udpv6_sendmsg+0x1ed/0xc10 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2845>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff815c3693>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2973>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153a450>] sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff810135d1>] ? __switch_to+0x181/0x4a0 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153d97d>] sys_sendto+0x12d/0x180 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff810dfb64>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x94/0xf0 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff81020ed1>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x231/0x240 [37598.994008] [<ffffffff8166a7e7>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 [37598.994008] Code: fe 07 00 00 48 c7 c7 04 28 a6 81 89 45 a0 4c 89 4d b8 44 89 5d a8 e8 1b ac b1 ff 44 8b 5d a8 4c 8b 4d b8 8b 45 a0 e9 cf fe ff ff <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 48 [37598.994008] RIP [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330 [37598.994008] RSP <ffff88003670da18> [37599.007323] ---[ end trace d69f6a17f8ac8eee ]--- While there, also check if path mtu discovery is activated for this socket. The logic was adapted from ip6_append_data when first writing on the corked socket. This bug was introduced with commit 0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74 ("ipv6: fix incorrect ipsec fragment"). v2: a) Replace IPV6_PMTU_DISC_DO with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE. b) Don't pass ipv6_pinfo to ip6_append_data_mtu (suggestion by Gao feng, thanks!). c) Change mtu to unsigned int, else we get a warning about non-matching types because of the min()-macro type-check. Acked-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2013-08-03ipv6: ip6_sk_dst_check() must not assume ipv6 dstEric Dumazet1-1/+7
[ Upstream commit a963a37d384d71ad43b3e9e79d68d42fbe0901f3 ] It's possible to use AF_INET6 sockets and to connect to an IPv4 destination. After this, socket dst cache is a pointer to a rtable, not rt6_info. ip6_sk_dst_check() should check the socket dst cache is IPv6, or else various corruptions/crashes can happen. Dave Jones can reproduce immediate crash with trinity -q -l off -n -c sendmsg -c connect With help from Hannes Frederic Sowa Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2013-06-29ipv6: fix possible crashes in ip6_cork_release()Eric Dumazet1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 284041ef21fdf2e0d216ab6b787bc9072b4eb58a ] commit 0178b695fd6b4 ("ipv6: Copy cork options in ip6_append_data") added some code duplication and bad error recovery, leading to potential crash in ip6_cork_release() as kfree() could be called with garbage. use kzalloc() to make sure this wont happen. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2013-02-20ipv6: fix header length calculation in ip6_append_data()Romain KUNTZ1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 7efdba5bd9a2f3e2059beeb45c9fa55eefe1bced ] Commit 299b0767 (ipv6: Fix IPsec slowpath fragmentation problem) has introduced a error in the header length calculation that provokes corrupted packets when non-fragmentable extensions headers (Destination Option or Routing Header Type 2) are used. rt->rt6i_nfheader_len is the length of the non-fragmentable extension header, and it should be substracted to rt->dst.header_len, and not to exthdrlen, as it was done before commit 299b0767. This patch reverts to the original and correct behavior. It has been successfully tested with and without IPsec on packets that include non-fragmentable extensions headers. Signed-off-by: Romain Kuntz <r.kuntz@ipflavors.com> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2012-06-10ipv6: fix incorrect ipsec fragmentGao feng1-18/+50
[ Upstream commit 0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74 ] Since commit ad0081e43a "ipv6: Fragment locally generated tunnel-mode IPSec6 packets as needed" the fragment of packets is incorrect. because tunnel mode needs IPsec headers and trailer for all fragments, while on transport mode it is sufficient to add the headers to the first fragment and the trailer to the last. so modify mtu and maxfraglen base on ipsec mode and if fragment is first or last. with my test,it work well(every fragment's size is the mtu) and does not trigger slow fragment path. Changes from v1: though optimization, mtu_prev and maxfraglen_prev can be delete. replace xfrm mode codes with dst_entry's new frag DST_XFRM_TUNNEL. add fuction ip6_append_data_mtu to make codes clearer. Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2012-04-02ipv6: fix incorrent ipv6 ipsec packet fragmentGao feng1-5/+6
[ Upstream commit 1f85851e17b64cabd089a8a8839dddebc627948c ] Since commit 299b0767(ipv6: Fix IPsec slowpath fragmentation problem) In func ip6_append_data,after call skb_put(skb, fraglen + dst_exthdrlen) the skb->len contains dst_exthdrlen,and we don't reduce dst_exthdrlen at last This will make fraggap>0 in next "while cycle",and cause the size of skb incorrent Fix this by reserve headroom for dst_exthdrlen. Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2011-12-23net: introduce DST_NOPEER dst flagEric Dumazet1-1/+1
Chris Boot reported crashes occurring in ipv6_select_ident(). [ 461.457562] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812dde61>] [<ffffffff812dde61>] ipv6_select_ident+0x31/0xa7 [ 461.578229] Call Trace: [ 461.580742] <IRQ> [ 461.582870] [<ffffffff812efa7f>] ? udp6_ufo_fragment+0x124/0x1a2 [ 461.589054] [<ffffffff812dbfe0>] ? ipv6_gso_segment+0xc0/0x155 [ 461.595140] [<ffffffff812700c6>] ? skb_gso_segment+0x208/0x28b [ 461.601198] [<ffffffffa03f236b>] ? ipv6_confirm+0x146/0x15e [nf_conntrack_ipv6] [ 461.608786] [<ffffffff81291c4d>] ? nf_iterate+0x41/0x77 [ 461.614227] [<ffffffff81271d64>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x357/0x543 [ 461.620659] [<ffffffff81291cf6>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x73/0x111 [ 461.626440] [<ffffffffa0379745>] ? br_parse_ip_options+0x19a/0x19a [bridge] [ 461.633581] [<ffffffff812722ff>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0x3af/0x459 [ 461.639577] [<ffffffffa03747d2>] ? br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x72/0x76 [bridge] [ 461.646887] [<ffffffffa03791e3>] ? br_nf_post_routing+0x17d/0x18f [bridge] [ 461.653997] [<ffffffff81291c4d>] ? nf_iterate+0x41/0x77 [ 461.659473] [<ffffffffa0374760>] ? br_flood+0xfa/0xfa [bridge] [ 461.665485] [<ffffffff81291cf6>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x73/0x111 [ 461.671234] [<ffffffffa0374760>] ? br_flood+0xfa/0xfa [bridge] [ 461.677299] [<ffffffffa0379215>] ? nf_bridge_update_protocol+0x20/0x20 [bridge] [ 461.684891] [<ffffffffa03bb0e5>] ? nf_ct_zone+0xa/0x17 [nf_conntrack] [ 461.691520] [<ffffffffa0374760>] ? br_flood+0xfa/0xfa [bridge] [ 461.697572] [<ffffffffa0374812>] ? NF_HOOK.constprop.8+0x3c/0x56 [bridge] [ 461.704616] [<ffffffffa0379031>] ? nf_bridge_push_encap_header+0x1c/0x26 [bridge] [ 461.712329] [<ffffffffa037929f>] ? br_nf_forward_finish+0x8a/0x95 [bridge] [ 461.719490] [<ffffffffa037900a>] ? nf_bridge_pull_encap_header+0x1c/0x27 [bridge] [ 461.727223] [<ffffffffa0379974>] ? br_nf_forward_ip+0x1c0/0x1d4 [bridge] [ 461.734292] [<ffffffff81291c4d>] ? nf_iterate+0x41/0x77 [ 461.739758] [<ffffffffa03748cc>] ? __br_deliver+0xa0/0xa0 [bridge] [ 461.746203] [<ffffffff81291cf6>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x73/0x111 [ 461.751950] [<ffffffffa03748cc>] ? __br_deliver+0xa0/0xa0 [bridge] [ 461.758378] [<ffffffffa037533a>] ? NF_HOOK.constprop.4+0x56/0x56 [bridge] This is caused by bridge netfilter special dst_entry (fake_rtable), a special shared entry, where attaching an inetpeer makes no sense. Problem is present since commit 87c48fa3b46 (ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable) Introduce DST_NOPEER dst flag and make sure ipv6_select_ident() and __ip_select_ident() fallback to the 'no peer attached' handling. Reported-by: Chris Boot <bootc@bootc.net> Tested-by: Chris Boot <bootc@bootc.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-10-28ipv6: fix error propagation in ip6_ufo_append_data()Zheng Yan1-1/+1
We should return errcode from sock_alloc_send_skb() Signed-off-by: Zheng Yan <zheng.z.yan@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-10-27ipv6: tcp: fix TCLASS value in ACK messages sent from TIME_WAITEric Dumazet1-5/+2
commit 66b13d99d96a (ipv4: tcp: fix TOS value in ACK messages sent from TIME_WAIT) fixed IPv4 only. This part is for the IPv6 side, adding a tclass param to ip6_xmit() We alias tw_tclass and tw_tos, if socket family is INET6. [ if sockets is ipv4-mapped, only IP_TOS socket option is used to fill TOS field, TCLASS is not taken into account ] Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-10-19net: add skb frag size accessorsEric Dumazet1-2/+3
To ease skb->truesize sanitization, its better to be able to localize all references to skb frags size. Define accessors : skb_frag_size() to fetch frag size, and skb_frag_size_{set|add|sub}() to manipulate it. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-10-19ipv6: Fix IPsec slowpath fragmentation problemSteffen Klassert1-6/+12
ip6_append_data() builds packets based on the mtu from dst_mtu(rt->dst.path). On IPsec the effective mtu is lower because we need to add the protocol headers and trailers later when we do the IPsec transformations. So after the IPsec transformations the packet might be too big, which leads to a slowpath fragmentation then. This patch fixes this by building the packets based on the lower IPsec mtu from dst_mtu(&rt->dst) and adapts the exthdr handling to this. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-25net: ipv6: convert to SKB frag APIsIan Campbell1-3/+4
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> Cc: "Pekka Savola (ipv6)" <pekkas@netcore.fi> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03net: fix NULL dereferences in check_peer_redir()Eric Dumazet1-2/+11
Gergely Kalman reported crashes in check_peer_redir(). It appears commit f39925dbde778 (ipv4: Cache learned redirect information in inetpeer.) added a race, leading to possible NULL ptr dereference. Since we can now change dst neighbour, we should make sure a reader can safely use a neighbour. Add RCU protection to dst neighbour, and make sure check_peer_redir() can be called safely by different cpus in parallel. As neighbours are already freed after one RCU grace period, this patch should not add typical RCU penalty (cache cold effects) Many thanks to Gergely for providing a pretty report pointing to the bug. Reported-by: Gergely Kalman <synapse@hippy.csoma.elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-07-22ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictableEric Dumazet1-5/+31
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS attacks. Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide) This patch : 1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper 2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results 3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-07-18net: Abstract dst->neighbour accesses behind helpers.David S. Miller1-6/+10
dst_{get,set}_neighbour() Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-07-17net: Create and use new helper, neigh_output().David S. Miller1-7/+3
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-07-17ipv6: Use calculated 'neigh' instead of re-evaluating dst->neighbourDavid S. Miller1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-07-14net: Embed hh_cache inside of struct neighbour.David S. Miller1-5/+9
Now that there is a one-to-one correspondance between neighbour and hh_cache entries, we no longer need: 1) dynamic allocation 2) attachment to dst->hh 3) refcounting Initialization of the hh_cache entry is indicated by hh_len being non-zero, and such initialization is always done with the neighbour's lock held as a writer. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-07inet: Decrease overhead of on-stack inet_cork.David S. Miller1-16/+18
When we fast path datagram sends to avoid locking by putting the inet_cork on the stack we use up lots of space that isn't necessary. This is because inet_cork contains a "struct flowi" which isn't used in these code paths. Split inet_cork to two parts, "inet_cork" and "inet_cork_full". Only the latter of which has the "struct flowi" and is what is stored in inet_sock. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
2011-04-22inet: constify ip headers and in6_addrEric Dumazet1-4/+4
Add const qualifiers to structs iphdr, ipv6hdr and in6_addr pointers where possible, to make code intention more obvious. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-04-16ipv6: RTA_PREFSRC support for ipv6 route source address selectionDaniel Walter1-4/+4
[ipv6] Add support for RTA_PREFSRC This patch allows a user to select the preferred source address for a specific IPv6-Route. It can be set via a netlink message setting RTA_PREFSRC to a valid IPv6 address which must be up on the device the route will be bound to. Signed-off-by: Daniel Walter <dwalter@barracuda.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-03-31Fix common misspellingsLucas De Marchi1-1/+1
Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed. Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
2011-03-13ipv6: Convert to use flowi6 where applicable.David S. Miller1-45/+45
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-03-13net: Put flowi_* prefix on AF independent members of struct flowiDavid S. Miller1-5/+5
I intend to turn struct flowi into a union of AF specific flowi structs. There will be a common structure that each variant includes first, much like struct sock_common. This is the first step to move in that direction. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-03-03xfrm: Return dst directly from xfrm_lookup()David S. Miller1-8/+2
Instead of on the stack. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-03-02xfrm: Handle blackhole route creation via afinfo.David S. Miller1-22/+10
That way we don't have to potentially do this in every xfrm_lookup() caller. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-03-02ipv6: Normalize arguments to ip6_dst_blackhole().David S. Miller1-2/+2
Return a dst pointer which is potentitally error encoded. Don't pass original dst pointer by reference, pass a struct net instead of a socket, and elide the flow argument since it is unnecessary. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-03-02xfrm: Kill XFRM_LOOKUP_WAIT flag.David S. Miller1-2/+2
This can be determined from the flow flags instead. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-03-02ipv6: Change final dst lookup arg name to "can_sleep"David S. Miller1-6/+6
Since it indicates whether we are invoked from a sleepable context or not. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-03-02net: Add FLOWI_FLAG_CAN_SLEEP.David S. Miller1-0/+2
And set is in contexts where the route resolution can sleep. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2025-08-25 02:40:37 +0300