summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/net/can
AgeCommit message (Collapse)AuthorFilesLines
5 dayscan: j1939: make j1939_session_activate() fail if device is no longer registeredTetsuo Handa1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 5d5602236f5db19e8b337a2cd87a90ace5ea776d ] syzbot is still reporting unregister_netdevice: waiting for vcan0 to become free. Usage count = 2 even after commit 93a27b5891b8 ("can: j1939: add missing calls in NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler") was added. A debug printk() patch found that j1939_session_activate() can succeed even after j1939_cancel_active_session() from j1939_netdev_notify(NETDEV_UNREGISTER) has completed. Since j1939_cancel_active_session() is processed with the session list lock held, checking ndev->reg_state in j1939_session_activate() with the session list lock held can reliably close the race window. Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+881d65229ca4f9ae8c84@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=881d65229ca4f9ae8c84 Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b9653191-d479-4c8b-8536-1326d028db5c@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-02can: j1939: j1939_local_ecu_get(): undo increment when j1939_local_ecu_get() ↵Tetsuo Handa1-1/+4
fails [ Upstream commit 06e02da29f6f1a45fc07bd60c7eaf172dc21e334 ] Since j1939_sk_bind() and j1939_sk_release() call j1939_local_ecu_put() when J1939_SOCK_BOUND was already set, but the error handling path for j1939_sk_bind() will not set J1939_SOCK_BOUND when j1939_local_ecu_get() fails, j1939_local_ecu_get() needs to undo priv->ents[sa].nusers++ when j1939_local_ecu_get() returns an error. Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/e7f80046-4ff7-4ce2-8ad8-7c3c678a42c9@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-02can: j1939: j1939_sk_bind(): call j1939_priv_put() immediately when ↵Tetsuo Handa1-0/+3
j1939_local_ecu_get() failed [ Upstream commit f214744c8a27c3c1da6b538c232da22cd027530e ] Commit 25fe97cb7620 ("can: j1939: move j1939_priv_put() into sk_destruct callback") expects that a call to j1939_priv_put() can be unconditionally delayed until j1939_sk_sock_destruct() is called. But a refcount leak will happen when j1939_sk_bind() is called again after j1939_local_ecu_get() from previous j1939_sk_bind() call returned an error. We need to call j1939_priv_put() before j1939_sk_bind() returns an error. Fixes: 25fe97cb7620 ("can: j1939: move j1939_priv_put() into sk_destruct callback") Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4f49a1bc-a528-42ad-86c0-187268ab6535@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-04can: bcm: add missing rcu read protection for procfs contentOliver Hartkopp1-4/+9
commit dac5e6249159ac255dad9781793dbe5908ac9ddb upstream. When the procfs content is generated for a bcm_op which is in the process to be removed the procfs output might show unreliable data (UAF). As the removal of bcm_op's is already implemented with rcu handling this patch adds the missing rcu_read_lock() and makes sure the list entries are properly removed under rcu protection. Fixes: f1b4e32aca08 ("can: bcm: use call_rcu() instead of costly synchronize_rcu()") Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com> Suggested-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com> Tested-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250519125027.11900-2-socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # >= 5.4 Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-06-04can: bcm: add locking for bcm_op runtime updatesOliver Hartkopp1-21/+45
commit c2aba69d0c36a496ab4f2e81e9c2b271f2693fd7 upstream. The CAN broadcast manager (CAN BCM) can send a sequence of CAN frames via hrtimer. The content and also the length of the sequence can be changed resp reduced at runtime where the 'currframe' counter is then set to zero. Although this appeared to be a safe operation the updates of 'currframe' can be triggered from user space and hrtimer context in bcm_can_tx(). Anderson Nascimento created a proof of concept that triggered a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read access which can be prevented with a spin_lock_bh. At the rework of bcm_can_tx() the 'count' variable has been moved into the protected section as this variable can be modified from both contexts too. Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com> Tested-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250519125027.11900-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18can: gw: fix RCU/BH usage in cgw_create_job()Oliver Hartkopp1-59/+90
[ Upstream commit 511e64e13d8cc72853275832e3f372607466c18c ] As reported by Sebastian Andrzej Siewior the use of local_bh_disable() is only feasible in uni processor systems to update the modification rules. The usual use-case to update the modification rules is to update the data of the modifications but not the modification types (AND/OR/XOR/SET) or the checksum functions itself. To omit additional memory allocations to maintain fast modification switching times, the modification description space is doubled at gw-job creation time so that only the reference to the active modification description is changed under rcu protection. Rename cgw_job::mod to cf_mod and make it a RCU pointer. Allocate in cgw_create_job() and free it together with cgw_job in cgw_job_free_rcu(). Update all users to dereference cgw_job::cf_mod with a RCU accessor and if possible once. [bigeasy: Replace mod1/mod2 from the Oliver's original patch with dynamic allocation, use RCU annotation and accessor] Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20231031112349.y0aLoBrz@linutronix.de/ Fixes: dd895d7f21b2 ("can: cangw: introduce optional uid to reference created routing jobs") Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250429070555.cs-7b_eZ@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18can: gw: use call_rcu() instead of costly synchronize_rcu()Eric Dumazet1-6/+10
[ Upstream commit 181d4447905d551cc664f1e7e796b482c1eec992 ] Commit fb8696ab14ad ("can: gw: synchronize rcu operations before removing gw job entry") added three synchronize_rcu() calls to make sure one rcu grace period was observed before freeing a "struct cgw_job" (which are tiny objects). This should be converted to call_rcu() to avoid adding delays in device / network dismantles. Use the rcu_head that was already in struct cgw_job, not yet used. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220207190706.1499190-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Stable-dep-of: 511e64e13d8c ("can: gw: fix RCU/BH usage in cgw_create_job()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-04-10can: statistics: use atomic access in hot pathOliver Hartkopp3-31/+39
[ Upstream commit 80b5f90158d1364cbd80ad82852a757fc0692bf2 ] In can_send() and can_receive() CAN messages and CAN filter matches are counted to be visible in the CAN procfs files. KCSAN detected a data race within can_send() when two CAN frames have been generated by a timer event writing to the same CAN netdevice at the same time. Use atomic operations to access the statistics in the hot path to fix the KCSAN complaint. Reported-by: syzbot+78ce4489b812515d5e4d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/67cd717d.050a0220.e1a89.0006.GAE@google.com Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250310143353.3242-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-03-13can: j1939: j1939_sk_send_loop(): fix unable to send messages with data ↵Alexander Hölzl2-4/+5
length zero commit 44de577e61ed239db09f0da9d436866bef9b77dd upstream. The J1939 standard requires the transmission of messages of length 0. For example proprietary messages are specified with a data length of 0 to 1785. The transmission of such messages is not possible. Sending results in no error being returned but no corresponding can frame being generated. Enable the transmission of zero length J1939 messages. In order to facilitate this two changes are necessary: 1) If the transmission of a new message is requested from user space the message is segmented in j1939_sk_send_loop(). Let the segmentation take into account zero length messages, do not terminate immediately, queue the corresponding skb. 2) j1939_session_skb_get_by_offset() selects the next skb to transmit for a session. Take into account that there might be zero length skbs in the queue. Signed-off-by: Alexander Hölzl <alexander.hoelzl@gmx.net> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250205174651.103238-1-alexander.hoelzl@gmx.net Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [mkl: commit message rephrased] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-12-14net: af_can: do not leave a dangling sk pointer in can_create()Ignat Korchagin1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 811a7ca7320c062e15d0f5b171fe6ad8592d1434 ] On error can_create() frees the allocated sk object, but sock_init_data() has already attached it to the provided sock object. This will leave a dangling sk pointer in the sock object and may cause use-after-free later. Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com> Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014153808.51894-5-ignat@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-12-14can: j1939: j1939_session_new(): fix skb reference countingDmitry Antipov1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit a8c695005bfe6569acd73d777ca298ddddd66105 ] Since j1939_session_skb_queue() does an extra skb_get() for each new skb, do the same for the initial one in j1939_session_new() to avoid refcount underflow. Reported-by: syzbot+d4e8dc385d9258220c31@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d4e8dc385d9258220c31 Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru> Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241105094823.2403806-1-dmantipov@yandex.ru [mkl: clean up commit message] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-10-17can: bcm: Clear bo->bcm_proc_read after remove_proc_entry().Kuniyuki Iwashima1-1/+3
[ Upstream commit 94b0818fa63555a65f6ba107080659ea6bcca63e ] syzbot reported a warning in bcm_release(). [0] The blamed change fixed another warning that is triggered when connect() is issued again for a socket whose connect()ed device has been unregistered. However, if the socket is just close()d without the 2nd connect(), the remaining bo->bcm_proc_read triggers unnecessary remove_proc_entry() in bcm_release(). Let's clear bo->bcm_proc_read after remove_proc_entry() in bcm_notify(). [0] name '4986' WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5234 at fs/proc/generic.c:711 remove_proc_entry+0x2e7/0x5d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5234 Comm: syz-executor606 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5-syzkaller-00178-g5517ae241919 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024 RIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x2e7/0x5d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711 Code: ff eb 05 e8 cb 1e 5e ff 48 8b 5c 24 10 48 c7 c7 e0 f7 aa 8e e8 2a 38 8e 09 90 48 c7 c7 60 3a 1b 8c 48 89 de e8 da 42 20 ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 48 8b 44 24 18 48 c7 44 24 40 0e 36 e0 45 49 c7 04 07 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000345fa20 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 2a2d0aee2eb64600 RBX: ffff888032f1f548 RCX: ffff888029431e00 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc9000345fb08 R08: ffffffff8155b2f2 R09: 1ffff1101710519a R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed101710519b R12: ffff888011d38640 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fcfb52722f0 CR3: 000000000e734000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> bcm_release+0x250/0x880 net/can/bcm.c:1578 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline] sock_close+0xbc/0x240 net/socket.c:1421 __fput+0x24a/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422 task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:228 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline] do_exit+0xa2f/0x27f0 kernel/exit.c:882 do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1031 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1042 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1040 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1040 x64_sys_call+0x2634/0x2640 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fcfb51ee969 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7fcfb51ee93f. RSP: 002b:00007ffce0109ca8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fcfb51ee969 RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 00007fcfb526f3b0 R08: ffffffffffffffb8 R09: 0000555500000000 R10: 0000555500000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fcfb526f3b0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fcfb5271ee0 R15: 00007fcfb51bf160 </TASK> Fixes: 76fe372ccb81 ("can: bcm: Remove proc entry when dev is unregistered.") Reported-by: syzbot+0532ac7a06fb1a03187e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0532ac7a06fb1a03187e Tested-by: syzbot+0532ac7a06fb1a03187e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240905012237.79683-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-10-17can: j1939: use correct function name in commentZhang Changzhong1-4/+4
[ Upstream commit dc2ddcd136fe9b6196a7dd01f75f824beb02d43f ] The function j1939_cancel_all_active_sessions() was renamed to j1939_cancel_active_session() but name in comment wasn't updated. Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1724935703-44621-1-git-send-email-zhangchangzhong@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12can: bcm: Remove proc entry when dev is unregistered.Kuniyuki Iwashima1-0/+4
[ Upstream commit 76fe372ccb81b0c89b6cd2fec26e2f38c958be85 ] syzkaller reported a warning in bcm_connect() below. [0] The repro calls connect() to vxcan1, removes vxcan1, and calls connect() with ifindex == 0. Calling connect() for a BCM socket allocates a proc entry. Then, bcm_sk(sk)->bound is set to 1 to prevent further connect(). However, removing the bound device resets bcm_sk(sk)->bound to 0 in bcm_notify(). The 2nd connect() tries to allocate a proc entry with the same name and sets NULL to bcm_sk(sk)->bcm_proc_read, leaking the original proc entry. Since the proc entry is available only for connect()ed sockets, let's clean up the entry when the bound netdev is unregistered. [0]: proc_dir_entry 'can-bcm/2456' already registered WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 394 at fs/proc/generic.c:376 proc_register+0x645/0x8f0 fs/proc/generic.c:375 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 394 Comm: syz-executor403 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-g852e42cc2dd4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:proc_register+0x645/0x8f0 fs/proc/generic.c:375 Code: 00 00 00 00 00 48 85 ed 0f 85 97 02 00 00 4d 85 f6 0f 85 9f 02 00 00 48 c7 c7 9b cb cf 87 48 89 de 4c 89 fa e8 1c 6f eb fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 48 c7 c7 98 37 99 89 e8 cb 7e 22 05 bb 00 00 00 10 48 RSP: 0018:ffa0000000cd7c30 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 9e129be1950f0200 RBX: ff1100011b51582c RCX: ff1100011857cd80 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffd400000000000f R09: ff1100013e78cac0 R10: ffac800000cd7980 R11: ff1100013e12b1f0 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ff1100011a99a2ec FS: 00007fbd7086f740(0000) GS:ff1100013fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000200071c0 CR3: 0000000118556004 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> proc_create_net_single+0x144/0x210 fs/proc/proc_net.c:220 bcm_connect+0x472/0x840 net/can/bcm.c:1673 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2049 [inline] __sys_connect+0x5d2/0x690 net/socket.c:2066 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2076 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2073 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x8f/0x100 net/socket.c:2073 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7fbd708b0e5d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff8cd33f08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fbd708b0e5d RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000000040 R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff8cd34098 R13: 0000000000401280 R14: 0000000000406de8 R15: 00007fbd70ab9000 </TASK> remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'net/can-bcm', leaking at least '2456' Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240722192842.37421-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-07-05net: can: j1939: enhanced error handling for tightly received RTS messages ↵Oleksij Rempel1-2/+17
in xtp_rx_rts_session_new commit d3e2904f71ea0fe7eaff1d68a2b0363c888ea0fb upstream. This patch enhances error handling in scenarios with RTS (Request to Send) messages arriving closely. It replaces the less informative WARN_ON_ONCE backtraces with a new error handling method. This provides clearer error messages and allows for the early termination of problematic sessions. Previously, sessions were only released at the end of j1939_xtp_rx_rts(). Potentially this could be reproduced with something like: testj1939 -r vcan0:0x80 & while true; do # send first RTS cansend vcan0 18EC8090#1014000303002301; # send second RTS cansend vcan0 18EC8090#1014000303002301; # send abort cansend vcan0 18EC8090#ff00000000002301; done Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: syzbot+daa36413a5cedf799ae4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231117124959.961171-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-07-05net: can: j1939: recover socket queue on CAN bus error during BAM transmissionOleksij Rempel1-0/+2
commit 9ad1da14ab3bf23087ae45fe399d84a109ddb81a upstream. Addresses an issue where a CAN bus error during a BAM transmission could stall the socket queue, preventing further transmissions even after the bus error is resolved. The fix activates the next queued session after the error recovery, allowing communication to continue. Fixes: 9d71dd0c70099 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Alexander Hölzl <alexander.hoelzl@gmx.net> Tested-by: Alexander Hölzl <alexander.hoelzl@gmx.net> Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240528070648.1947203-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-07-05net: can: j1939: Initialize unused data in j1939_send_one()Shigeru Yoshida1-5/+1
commit b7cdf1dd5d2a2d8200efd98d1893684db48fe134 upstream. syzbot reported kernel-infoleak in raw_recvmsg() [1]. j1939_send_one() creates full frame including unused data, but it doesn't initialize it. This causes the kernel-infoleak issue. Fix this by initializing unused data. [1] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline] iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline] iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline] iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline] _copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185 copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:196 [inline] memcpy_to_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:4113 [inline] raw_recvmsg+0x2b8/0x9e0 net/can/raw.c:1008 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x340 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x18a/0x620 net/socket.c:2803 ___sys_recvmsg+0x223/0x840 net/socket.c:2845 do_recvmmsg+0x4fc/0xfd0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x397/0x490 net/socket.c:3034 x64_sys_call+0xf6c/0x3b50 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:300 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3804 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3845 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x613/0xc50 mm/slub.c:3888 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:577 __alloc_skb+0x35b/0x7a0 net/core/skbuff.c:668 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1313 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbf0 net/core/skbuff.c:6504 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa81/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2795 sock_alloc_send_skb include/net/sock.h:1842 [inline] j1939_sk_alloc_skb net/can/j1939/socket.c:878 [inline] j1939_sk_send_loop net/can/j1939/socket.c:1142 [inline] j1939_sk_sendmsg+0xc0a/0x2730 net/can/j1939/socket.c:1277 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x877/0xb60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2674 x64_sys_call+0xc4b/0x3b50 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Bytes 12-15 of 16 are uninitialized Memory access of size 16 starts at ffff888120969690 Data copied to user address 00000000200017c0 CPU: 1 PID: 5050 Comm: syz-executor198 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00031-g71b1543c83d6 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5681e40d297b30f5b513@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5681e40d297b30f5b513 Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240517035953.2617090-1-syoshida@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-02-23can: j1939: Fix UAF in j1939_sk_match_filter during setsockopt(SO_J1939_FILTER)Oleksij Rempel2-4/+19
commit efe7cf828039aedb297c1f9920b638fffee6aabc upstream. Lock jsk->sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...) modifies jsk->filters while receiving packets. Following trace was seen on affected system: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G W OE 6.5.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: print_report+0xd3/0x620 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0 j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939] ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939] j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can] can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150 ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0 __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0 process_backlog+0x107/0x260 __napi_poll+0x69/0x310 net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580 ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0 __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8 do_softirq+0x53/0x80 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70 netif_rx+0x16b/0x180 can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can] ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can] ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410 raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40 ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100 sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80 ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320 vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 ksys_write+0x143/0x170 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70 __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Allocated by task 348: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 349: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0 __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380 kfree+0x7a/0x120 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Fixes: 9d71dd0c70099 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231020133814.383996-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-02-23can: j1939: prevent deadlock by changing j1939_socks_lock to rwlockZiqi Zhao3-14/+14
commit 6cdedc18ba7b9dacc36466e27e3267d201948c8d upstream. The following 3 locks would race against each other, causing the deadlock situation in the Syzbot bug report: - j1939_socks_lock - active_session_list_lock - sk_session_queue_lock A reasonable fix is to change j1939_socks_lock to an rwlock, since in the rare situations where a write lock is required for the linked list that j1939_socks_lock is protecting, the code does not attempt to acquire any more locks. This would break the circular lock dependency, where, for example, the current thread already locks j1939_socks_lock and attempts to acquire sk_session_queue_lock, and at the same time, another thread attempts to acquire j1939_socks_lock while holding sk_session_queue_lock. NOTE: This patch along does not fix the unregister_netdevice bug reported by Syzbot; instead, it solves a deadlock situation to prepare for one or more further patches to actually fix the Syzbot bug, which appears to be a reference counting problem within the j1939 codebase. Reported-by: <syzbot+1591462f226d9cbf0564@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ziqi Zhao <astrajoan@yahoo.com> Reviewed-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230721162226.8639-1-astrajoan@yahoo.com [mkl: remove unrelated newline change] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-01-15can: raw: add support for SO_MARKMarc Kleine-Budde1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 0826e82b8a32e646b7b32ba8b68ba30812028e47 ] Add support for SO_MARK to the CAN_RAW protocol. This makes it possible to add traffic control filters based on the fwmark. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221210113653.170346-1-mkl@pengutronix.de Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Stable-dep-of: 7f6ca95d16b9 ("net: Implement missing getsockopt(SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW)") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-01-15can: raw: add support for SO_TXTIME/SCM_TXTIMEMarc Kleine-Budde1-1/+10
[ Upstream commit 51a0d5e51178fcd147c1b8fdab2ed16b561326db ] This patch calls into sock_cmsg_send() to parse the user supplied control information into a struct sockcm_cookie. Then assign the requested transmit time to the skb. This makes it possible to use the Earliest TXTIME First (ETF) packet scheduler with the CAN_RAW protocol. The user can send a CAN_RAW frame with a TXTIME and the kernel (with the ETF scheduler) will take care of sending it to the network interface. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220502091946.1916211-3-mkl@pengutronix.de Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Stable-dep-of: 7f6ca95d16b9 ("net: Implement missing getsockopt(SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW)") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-11-08can: isotp: isotp_sendmsg(): fix TX state detection and wait behaviorOliver Hartkopp1-11/+8
From: Lukas Magel <lukas.magel@posteo.net> [ Upstream commit d9c2ba65e651467de739324d978b04ed8729f483 ] With patch [1], isotp_poll was updated to also queue the poller in the so->wait queue, which is used for send state changes. Since the queue now also contains polling tasks that are not interested in sending, the queue fill state can no longer be used as an indication of send readiness. As a consequence, nonblocking writes can lead to a race and lock-up of the socket if there is a second task polling the socket in parallel. With this patch, isotp_sendmsg does not consult wq_has_sleepers but instead tries to atomically set so->tx.state and waits on so->wait if it is unable to do so. This behavior is in alignment with isotp_poll, which also checks so->tx.state to determine send readiness. V2: - Revert direct exit to goto err_event_drop [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230331125511.372783-1-michal.sojka@cvut.cz Reported-by: Maxime Jayat <maxime.jayat@mobile-devices.fr> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/11328958-453f-447f-9af8-3b5824dfb041@munic.io/ Signed-off-by: Lukas Magel <lukas.magel@posteo.net> Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Fixes: 79e19fa79cb5 ("can: isotp: isotp_ops: fix poll() to not report false EPOLLOUT events") Link: https://github.com/pylessard/python-udsoncan/issues/178#issuecomment-1743786590 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230827092205.7908-1-lukas.magel@posteo.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-11-08can: isotp: isotp_bind(): do not validate unused address informationOliver Hartkopp1-12/+17
commit b76b163f46b661499921a0049982764a6659bfe7 upstream With commit 2aa39889c463 ("can: isotp: isotp_bind(): return -EINVAL on incorrect CAN ID formatting") the bind() syscall returns -EINVAL when the given CAN ID needed to be sanitized. But in the case of an unconfirmed broadcast mode the rx CAN ID is not needed and may be uninitialized from the caller - which is ok. This patch makes sure the result of an inproper CAN ID format is only provided when the address information is needed. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220517145653.2556-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-11-08can: isotp: add local echo tx processing and tx without FCOliver Hartkopp1-144/+254
commit 4b7fe92c06901f4563af0e36d25223a5ab343782 upstream commit 9f39d36530e5678d092d53c5c2c60d82b4dcc169 upstream commit 051737439eaee5bdd03d3c2ef5510d54a478fd05 upstream Due to the existing patch order applied to isotp.c in the stable kernel the original order of depending patches the three original patches 4b7fe92c0690 ("can: isotp: add local echo tx processing for consecutive frames") 9f39d36530e5 ("can: isotp: add support for transmission without flow control") 051737439eae ("can: isotp: fix race between isotp_sendsmg() and isotp_release()") can not be split into different patches that can be applied in working steps to the stable tree. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-11-08can: isotp: handle wait_event_interruptible() return valuesOliver Hartkopp1-0/+4
commit 823b2e42720f96f277940c37ea438b7c5ead51a4 upstream When wait_event_interruptible() has been interrupted by a signal the tx.state value might not be ISOTP_IDLE. Force the state machines into idle state to inhibit the timer handlers to continue working. Fixes: 866337865f37 ("can: isotp: fix tx state handling for echo tx processing") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230112192347.1944-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-11-08can: isotp: check CAN address family in isotp_bind()Oliver Hartkopp1-0/+3
commit c6adf659a8ba85913e16a571d5a9bcd17d3d1234 upstream Add missing check to block non-AF_CAN binds. Syzbot created some code which matched the right sockaddr struct size but used AF_XDP (0x2C) instead of AF_CAN (0x1D) in the address family field: bind$xdp(r2, &(0x7f0000000540)={0x2c, 0x0, r4, 0x0, r2}, 0x10) ^^^^ This has no funtional impact but the userspace should be notified about the wrong address family field content. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=CrashLog&x=11ff9d8c480000 Reported-by: syzbot+5aed6c3aaba661f5b917@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230104201844.13168-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-11-08can: isotp: isotp_bind(): return -EINVAL on incorrect CAN ID formattingOliver Hartkopp1-0/+5
commit 2aa39889c463195a0dfe2aff9fad413139c32a4f upstream Commit 3ea566422cbd ("can: isotp: sanitize CAN ID checks in isotp_bind()") checks the given CAN ID address information by sanitizing the input values. This check (silently) removes obsolete bits by masking the given CAN IDs. Derek Will suggested to give a feedback to the application programmer when the 'sanitizing' was actually needed which means the programmer provided CAN ID content in a wrong format (e.g. SFF CAN IDs with a CAN ID > 0x7FF). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220515181633.76671-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Suggested-by: Derek Will <derekrobertwill@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-11-08can: isotp: set max PDU size to 64 kByteOliver Hartkopp1-2/+2
commit 9c0c191d82a1de964ac953a1df8b5744ec670b07 upstream The reason to extend the max PDU size from 4095 Byte (12 bit length value) to a 32 bit value (up to 4 GByte) was to be able to flash 64 kByte bootloaders with a single ISO-TP PDU. The max PDU size in the Linux kernel implementation was set to 8200 Bytes to be able to test the length information escape sequence. It turns out that the demand for 64 kByte PDUs is real so the value for MAX_MSG_LENGTH is set to 66000 to be able to potentially add some checksums to the 65.536 Byte block. Link: https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils/issues/347#issuecomment-1056142301 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220309120416.83514-3-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-30can: raw: add missing refcount for memory leak fixOliver Hartkopp1-9/+25
commit c275a176e4b69868576e543409927ae75e3a3288 upstream. Commit ee8b94c8510c ("can: raw: fix receiver memory leak") introduced a new reference to the CAN netdevice that has assigned CAN filters. But this new ro->dev reference did not maintain its own refcount which lead to another KASAN use-after-free splat found by Eric Dumazet. This patch ensures a proper refcount for the CAN nedevice. Fixes: ee8b94c8510c ("can: raw: fix receiver memory leak") Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230821144547.6658-3-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-30can: raw: fix lockdep issue in raw_release()Eric Dumazet1-2/+3
[ Upstream commit 11c9027c983e9e4b408ee5613b6504d24ebd85be ] syzbot complained about a lockdep issue [1] Since raw_bind() and raw_setsockopt() first get RTNL before locking the socket, we must adopt the same order in raw_release() [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc1-syzkaller-00192-g78adb4bcf99e #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.0/14110 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88804e4b6130 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] ffff88804e4b6130 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8e3df368 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: raw_bind+0xa7/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:434 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x181/0x1340 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 raw_release+0x1c6/0x9b0 net/can/raw.c:391 __sock_release+0xcd/0x290 net/socket.c:654 sock_close+0x1c/0x20 net/socket.c:1386 __fput+0x3fd/0xac0 fs/file_table.c:384 task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x210/0x240 kernel/entry/common.c:204 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:297 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726 lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3492 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 __sys_bind+0x1ec/0x220 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1801 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(sk_lock-AF_CAN); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(sk_lock-AF_CAN); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor.0/14110: stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 14110 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-syzkaller-00192-g78adb4bcf99e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/03/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x311/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726 lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3492 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 __sys_bind+0x1ec/0x220 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1801 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fd89007cb29 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fd890d2a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd89019bf80 RCX: 00007fd89007cb29 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fd8900c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd89019bf80 R15: 00007ffebf8124f8 </TASK> Fixes: ee8b94c8510c ("can: raw: fix receiver memory leak") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230720114438.172434-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-30can: raw: fix receiver memory leakZiyang Xuan1-33/+24
[ Upstream commit ee8b94c8510ce64afe0b87ef548d23e00915fb10 ] Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-27can: bcm: Fix UAF in bcm_proc_show()YueHaibing1-6/+6
commit 55c3b96074f3f9b0aee19bf93cd71af7516582bb upstream. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bcm_proc_show+0x969/0xa80 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888155846230 by task cat/7862 CPU: 1 PID: 7862 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00153-gc8746099c197 #230 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xd5/0x150 print_report+0xc1/0x5e0 kasan_report+0xba/0xf0 bcm_proc_show+0x969/0xa80 seq_read_iter+0x4f6/0x1260 seq_read+0x165/0x210 proc_reg_read+0x227/0x300 vfs_read+0x1d5/0x8d0 ksys_read+0x11e/0x240 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Allocated by task 7846: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x9e/0xa0 bcm_sendmsg+0x264b/0x44e0 sock_sendmsg+0xda/0x180 ____sys_sendmsg+0x735/0x920 ___sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x1b0 __sys_sendmsg+0xfa/0x1d0 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Freed by task 7846: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 ____kasan_slab_free+0x161/0x1c0 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x119/0x220 __kmem_cache_free+0xb4/0x2e0 rcu_core+0x809/0x1bd0 bcm_op is freed before procfs entry be removed in bcm_release(), this lead to bcm_proc_show() may read the freed bcm_op. Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230715092543.15548-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-05can: isotp: isotp_sendmsg(): fix return error fix on TX pathOliver Hartkopp1-2/+3
commit e38910c0072b541a91954682c8b074a93e57c09b upstream. With commit d674a8f123b4 ("can: isotp: isotp_sendmsg(): fix return error on FC timeout on TX path") the missing correct return value in the case of a protocol error was introduced. But the way the error value has been read and sent to the user space does not follow the common scheme to clear the error after reading which is provided by the sock_error() function. This leads to an error report at the following write() attempt although everything should be working. Fixes: d674a8f123b4 ("can: isotp: isotp_sendmsg(): fix return error on FC timeout on TX path") Reported-by: Carsten Schmidt <carsten.schmidt-achim@t-online.de> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230607072708.38809-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-06-14can: j1939: avoid possible use-after-free when j1939_can_rx_register failsFedor Pchelkin1-1/+3
commit 9f16eb106aa5fce15904625661312623ec783ed3 upstream. Syzkaller reports the following failure: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kref_put include/linux/kref.h:64 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in j1939_priv_put+0x25/0xa0 net/can/j1939/main.c:172 Write of size 4 at addr ffff888141c15058 by task swapper/3/0 CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 5.10.144-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x107/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x220 mm/kasan/report.c:385 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:545 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:562 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 [inline] check_memory_region+0x145/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:192 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:101 [inline] atomic_fetch_sub_release include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:220 [inline] __refcount_sub_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:272 [inline] __refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:315 [inline] refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:333 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:64 [inline] j1939_priv_put+0x25/0xa0 net/can/j1939/main.c:172 j1939_sk_sock_destruct+0x44/0x90 net/can/j1939/socket.c:374 __sk_destruct+0x4e/0x820 net/core/sock.c:1784 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2485 [inline] rcu_core+0xb35/0x1a30 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2726 __do_softirq+0x289/0x9a3 kernel/softirq.c:298 asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20 </IRQ> __run_on_irqstack arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:26 [inline] run_on_irqstack_cond arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:77 [inline] do_softirq_own_stack+0xaa/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c:77 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:393 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:423 [inline] irq_exit_rcu+0x136/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:435 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x4d/0x100 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1095 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:635 Allocated by task 1141: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc9/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:461 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline] j1939_priv_create net/can/j1939/main.c:131 [inline] j1939_netdev_start+0x111/0x860 net/can/j1939/main.c:268 j1939_sk_bind+0x8ea/0xd30 net/can/j1939/socket.c:485 __sys_bind+0x1f2/0x260 net/socket.c:1645 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1656 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1654 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1654 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 Freed by task 1141: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:56 kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:355 __kasan_slab_free+0x112/0x170 mm/kasan/common.c:422 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1542 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xad/0x190 mm/slub.c:1576 slab_free mm/slub.c:3149 [inline] kfree+0xd9/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4125 j1939_netdev_start+0x5ee/0x860 net/can/j1939/main.c:300 j1939_sk_bind+0x8ea/0xd30 net/can/j1939/socket.c:485 __sys_bind+0x1f2/0x260 net/socket.c:1645 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1656 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1654 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1654 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It can be caused by this scenario: CPU0 CPU1 j1939_sk_bind(socket0, ndev0, ...) j1939_netdev_start() j1939_sk_bind(socket1, ndev0, ...) j1939_netdev_start() mutex_lock(&j1939_netdev_lock) j1939_priv_set(ndev0, priv) mutex_unlock(&j1939_netdev_lock) if (priv_new) kref_get(&priv_new->rx_kref) return priv_new; /* inside j1939_sk_bind() */ jsk->priv = priv j1939_can_rx_register(priv) // fails j1939_priv_set(ndev, NULL) kfree(priv) j1939_sk_sock_destruct() j1939_priv_put() // <- uaf To avoid this, call j1939_can_rx_register() under j1939_netdev_lock so that a concurrent thread cannot process j1939_priv before j1939_can_rx_register() returns. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526171910.227615-3-pchelkin@ispras.ru Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-06-14can: j1939: change j1939_netdev_lock type to mutexFedor Pchelkin1-11/+11
commit cd9c790de2088b0d797dc4d244b4f174f9962554 upstream. It turns out access to j1939_can_rx_register() needs to be serialized, otherwise j1939_priv can be corrupted when parallel threads call j1939_netdev_start() and j1939_can_rx_register() fails. This issue is thoroughly covered in other commit which serializes access to j1939_can_rx_register(). Change j1939_netdev_lock type to mutex so that we do not need to remove GFP_KERNEL from can_rx_register(). j1939_netdev_lock seems to be used in normal contexts where mutex usage is not prohibited. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Suggested-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526171910.227615-2-pchelkin@ispras.ru Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-06-14can: j1939: j1939_sk_send_loop_abort(): improved error queue handling in ↵Oleksij Rempel1-0/+5
J1939 Socket commit 2a84aea80e925ecba6349090559754f8e8eb68ef upstream. This patch addresses an issue within the j1939_sk_send_loop_abort() function in the j1939/socket.c file, specifically in the context of Transport Protocol (TP) sessions. Without this patch, when a TP session is initiated and a Clear To Send (CTS) frame is received from the remote side requesting one data packet, the kernel dispatches the first Data Transport (DT) frame and then waits for the next CTS. If the remote side doesn't respond with another CTS, the kernel aborts due to a timeout. This leads to the user-space receiving an EPOLLERR on the socket, and the socket becomes active. However, when trying to read the error queue from the socket with sock.recvmsg(, , socket.MSG_ERRQUEUE), it returns -EAGAIN, given that the socket is non-blocking. This situation results in an infinite loop: the user-space repeatedly calls epoll(), epoll() returns the socket file descriptor with EPOLLERR, but the socket then blocks on the recv() of ERRQUEUE. This patch introduces an additional check for the J1939_SOCK_ERRQUEUE flag within the j1939_sk_send_loop_abort() function. If the flag is set, it indicates that the application has subscribed to receive error queue messages. In such cases, the kernel can communicate the current transfer state via the error queue. This allows for the function to return early, preventing the unnecessary setting of the socket into an error state, and breaking the infinite loop. It is crucial to note that a socket error is only needed if the application isn't using the error queue, as, without it, the application wouldn't be aware of transfer issues. Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: David Jander <david@protonic.nl> Tested-by: David Jander <david@protonic.nl> Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526081946.715190-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-05-24can: isotp: recvmsg(): allow MSG_CMSG_COMPAT flagOliver Hartkopp1-1/+1
commit db2773d65b02aed319a93efdfb958087771d4e19 upstream. The control message provided by isotp support MSG_CMSG_COMPAT but blocked recvmsg() syscalls that have set this flag, i.e. on 32bit user space on 64 bit kernels. Link: https://github.com/hartkopp/can-isotp/issues/59 Cc: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Suggested-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Fixes: 42bf50a1795a ("can: isotp: support MSG_TRUNC flag when reading from socket") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20230505110308.81087-2-mkl@pengutronix.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-05-24can: j1939: recvmsg(): allow MSG_CMSG_COMPAT flagOliver Hartkopp1-1/+1
commit 1db080cbdbab28752bbb1c86d64daf96253a5da1 upstream. The control message provided by J1939 support MSG_CMSG_COMPAT but blocked recvmsg() syscalls that have set this flag, i.e. on 32bit user space on 64 bit kernels. Link: https://github.com/hartkopp/can-isotp/issues/59 Cc: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Suggested-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20230505110308.81087-3-mkl@pengutronix.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-04-13can: isotp: isotp_ops: fix poll() to not report false EPOLLOUT eventsMichal Sojka1-1/+16
commit 79e19fa79cb5d5f1b3bf3e3ae24989ccb93c7b7b upstream. When using select()/poll()/epoll() with a non-blocking ISOTP socket to wait for when non-blocking write is possible, a false EPOLLOUT event is sometimes returned. This can happen at least after sending a message which must be split to multiple CAN frames. The reason is that isotp_sendmsg() returns -EAGAIN when tx.state is not equal to ISOTP_IDLE and this behavior is not reflected in datagram_poll(), which is used in isotp_ops. This is fixed by introducing ISOTP-specific poll function, which suppresses the EPOLLOUT events in that case. v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230302092812.320643-1-michal.sojka@cvut.cz v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230224010659.48420-1-michal.sojka@cvut.cz https://lore.kernel.org/all/b53a04a2-ba1f-3858-84c1-d3eb3301ae15@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Michal Sojka <michal.sojka@cvut.cz> Reported-by: Jakub Jira <jirajak2@fel.cvut.cz> Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Fixes: e057dd3fc20f ("can: add ISO 15765-2:2016 transport protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230331125511.372783-1-michal.sojka@cvut.cz Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-04-13can: j1939: j1939_tp_tx_dat_new(): fix out-of-bounds memory accessOleksij Rempel1-1/+4
commit b45193cb4df556fe6251b285a5ce44046dd36b4a upstream. In the j1939_tp_tx_dat_new() function, an out-of-bounds memory access could occur during the memcpy() operation if the size of skb->cb is larger than the size of struct j1939_sk_buff_cb. This is because the memcpy() operation uses the size of skb->cb, leading to a read beyond the struct j1939_sk_buff_cb. Updated the memcpy() operation to use the size of struct j1939_sk_buff_cb instead of the size of skb->cb. This ensures that the memcpy() operation only reads the memory within the bounds of struct j1939_sk_buff_cb, preventing out-of-bounds memory access. Additionally, add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to check that the size of skb->cb is greater than or equal to the size of struct j1939_sk_buff_cb. This ensures that the skb->cb buffer is large enough to hold the j1939_sk_buff_cb structure. Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: Shuangpeng Bai <sjb7183@psu.edu> Tested-by: Shuangpeng Bai <sjb7183@psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller/c/G_LL-C3plRs/m/-8xCi6dCAgAJ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230404073128.3173900-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [mkl: rephrase commit message] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-04-05can: j1939: prevent deadlock by moving j1939_sk_errqueue()Oleksij Rempel1-2/+6
commit d1366b283d94ac4537a4b3a1e8668da4df7ce7e9 upstream. This commit addresses a deadlock situation that can occur in certain scenarios, such as when running data TP/ETP transfer and subscribing to the error queue while receiving a net down event. The deadlock involves locks in the following order: 3 j1939_session_list_lock -> active_session_list_lock j1939_session_activate ... j1939_sk_queue_activate_next -> sk_session_queue_lock ... j1939_xtp_rx_eoma_one 2 j1939_sk_queue_drop_all -> sk_session_queue_lock ... j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown -> j1939_socks_lock j1939_netdev_notify 1 j1939_sk_errqueue -> j1939_socks_lock __j1939_session_cancel -> active_session_list_lock j1939_tp_rxtimer CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&priv->active_session_list_lock); lock(&jsk->sk_session_queue_lock); lock(&priv->active_session_list_lock); lock(&priv->j1939_socks_lock); The solution implemented in this commit is to move the j1939_sk_errqueue() call out of the active_session_list_lock context, thus preventing the deadlock situation. Reported-by: syzbot+ee1cd780f69483a8616b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 5b9272e93f2e ("can: j1939: extend UAPI to notify about RX status") Co-developed-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230324130141.2132787-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-04-05can: bcm: bcm_tx_setup(): fix KMSAN uninit-value in vfs_writeIvan Orlov1-6/+10
[ Upstream commit 2b4c99f7d9a57ecd644eda9b1fb0a1072414959f ] Syzkaller reported the following issue: ===================================================== BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600 aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline] aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600 io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019 __do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline] __se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:766 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3452 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x71f/0xce0 mm/slub.c:3491 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:967 [inline] __kmalloc+0x11d/0x3b0 mm/slab_common.c:981 kmalloc_array include/linux/slab.h:636 [inline] bcm_tx_setup+0x80e/0x29d0 net/can/bcm.c:930 bcm_sendmsg+0x3a2/0xce0 net/can/bcm.c:1351 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline] sock_write_iter+0x495/0x5e0 net/socket.c:1108 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2189 [inline] aio_write+0x63a/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600 io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019 __do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline] __se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd CPU: 1 PID: 5034 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc6-syzkaller-80422-geda666ff2276 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/12/2023 ===================================================== We can follow the call chain and find that 'bcm_tx_setup' function calls 'memcpy_from_msg' to copy some content to the newly allocated frame of 'op->frames'. After that the 'len' field of copied structure being compared with some constant value (64 or 8). However, if 'memcpy_from_msg' returns an error, we will compare some uninitialized memory. This triggers 'uninit-value' issue. This patch will add 'memcpy_from_msg' possible errors processing to avoid uninit-value issue. Tested via syzkaller Reported-by: syzbot+c9bfd85eca611ebf5db1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=47f897f8ad958bbde5790ebf389b5e7e0a345089 Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com> Fixes: 6f3b911d5f29b ("can: bcm: add support for CAN FD frames") Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230314120445.12407-1-ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-14can: j1939: do not wait 250 ms if the same addr was already claimedDevid Antonio Filoni1-0/+40
commit 4ae5e1e97c44f4654516c1d41591a462ed62fa7b upstream. The ISO 11783-5 standard, in "4.5.2 - Address claim requirements", states: d) No CF shall begin, or resume, transmission on the network until 250 ms after it has successfully claimed an address except when responding to a request for address-claimed. But "Figure 6" and "Figure 7" in "4.5.4.2 - Address-claim prioritization" show that the CF begins the transmission after 250 ms from the first AC (address-claimed) message even if it sends another AC message during that time window to resolve the address contention with another CF. As stated in "4.4.2.3 - Address-claimed message": In order to successfully claim an address, the CF sending an address claimed message shall not receive a contending claim from another CF for at least 250 ms. As stated in "4.4.3.2 - NAME management (NM) message": 1) A commanding CF can d) request that a CF with a specified NAME transmit the address- claimed message with its current NAME. 2) A target CF shall d) send an address-claimed message in response to a request for a matching NAME Taking the above arguments into account, the 250 ms wait is requested only during network initialization. Do not restart the timer on AC message if both the NAME and the address match and so if the address has already been claimed (timer has expired) or the AC message has been sent to resolve the contention with another CF (timer is still running). Signed-off-by: Devid Antonio Filoni <devid.filoni@egluetechnologies.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221125170418.34575-1-devid.filoni@egluetechnologies.com Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-09can: j1939: fix errant WARN_ON_ONCE in j1939_session_deactivateZiyang Xuan1-4/+0
[ Upstream commit d0553680f94c49bbe0e39eb50d033ba563b4212d ] The conclusion "j1939_session_deactivate() should be called with a session ref-count of at least 2" is incorrect. In some concurrent scenarios, j1939_session_deactivate can be called with the session ref-count less than 2. But there is not any problem because it will check the session active state before session putting in j1939_session_deactivate_locked(). Here is the concurrent scenario of the problem reported by syzbot and my reproduction log. cpu0 cpu1 j1939_xtp_rx_eoma j1939_xtp_rx_abort_one j1939_session_get_by_addr [kref == 2] j1939_session_get_by_addr [kref == 3] j1939_session_deactivate [kref == 2] j1939_session_put [kref == 1] j1939_session_completed j1939_session_deactivate WARN_ON_ONCE(kref < 2) ===================================================== WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 21 at net/can/j1939/transport.c:1088 j1939_session_deactivate+0x5f/0x70 CPU: 1 PID: 21 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc7+ #32 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:j1939_session_deactivate+0x5f/0x70 Call Trace: j1939_session_deactivate_activate_next+0x11/0x28 j1939_xtp_rx_eoma+0x12a/0x180 j1939_tp_recv+0x4a2/0x510 j1939_can_recv+0x226/0x380 can_rcv_filter+0xf8/0x220 can_receive+0x102/0x220 ? process_backlog+0xf0/0x2c0 can_rcv+0x53/0xf0 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x67/0x90 ? process_backlog+0x97/0x2c0 __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x80 Fixes: 0c71437dd50d ("can: j1939: j1939_session_deactivate(): clarify lifetime of session object") Reported-by: syzbot+9981a614060dcee6eeca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210906094200.95868-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14can: af_can: fix NULL pointer dereference in can_rcv_filterOliver Hartkopp1-2/+2
commit 0acc442309a0a1b01bcdaa135e56e6398a49439c upstream. Analogue to commit 8aa59e355949 ("can: af_can: fix NULL pointer dereference in can_rx_register()") we need to check for a missing initialization of ml_priv in the receive path of CAN frames. Since commit 4e096a18867a ("net: introduce CAN specific pointer in the struct net_device") the check for dev->type to be ARPHRD_CAN is not sufficient anymore since bonding or tun netdevices claim to be CAN devices but do not initialize ml_priv accordingly. Fixes: 4e096a18867a ("net: introduce CAN specific pointer in the struct net_device") Reported-by: syzbot+2d7f58292cb5b29eb5ad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221206201259.3028-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-16can: j1939: j1939_send_one(): fix missing CAN header initializationOliver Hartkopp1-0/+3
commit 3eb3d283e8579a22b81dd2ac3987b77465b2a22f upstream. The read access to struct canxl_frame::len inside of a j1939 created skbuff revealed a missing initialization of reserved and later filled elements in struct can_frame. This patch initializes the 8 byte CAN header with zero. Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Cc: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20221104052235.GA6474@pengutronix.de Reported-by: syzbot+d168ec0caca4697e03b1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221104075000.105414-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-16can: af_can: fix NULL pointer dereference in can_rx_register()Zhengchao Shao1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 8aa59e355949442c408408c2d836e561794c40a1 ] It causes NULL pointer dereference when testing as following: (a) use syscall(__NR_socket, 0x10ul, 3ul, 0) to create netlink socket. (b) use syscall(__NR_sendmsg, ...) to create bond link device and vxcan link device, and bind vxcan device to bond device (can also use ifenslave command to bind vxcan device to bond device). (c) use syscall(__NR_socket, 0x1dul, 3ul, 1) to create CAN socket. (d) use syscall(__NR_bind, ...) to bind the bond device to CAN socket. The bond device invokes the can-raw protocol registration interface to receive CAN packets. However, ml_priv is not allocated to the dev, dev_rcv_lists is assigned to NULL in can_rx_register(). In this case, it will occur the NULL pointer dereference issue. The following is the stack information: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 PGD 122a4067 P4D 122a4067 PUD 1223c067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP RIP: 0010:can_rx_register+0x12d/0x1e0 Call Trace: <TASK> raw_enable_filters+0x8d/0x120 raw_enable_allfilters+0x3b/0x130 raw_bind+0x118/0x4f0 __sys_bind+0x163/0x1a0 __x64_sys_bind+0x1e/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd </TASK> Fixes: 4e096a18867a ("net: introduce CAN specific pointer in the struct net_device") Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221028085650.170470-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-11-03can: j1939: transport: j1939_session_skb_drop_old(): ↵Yang Yingliang1-1/+3
spin_unlock_irqrestore() before kfree_skb() commit c3c06c61890da80494bb196f75d89b791adda87f upstream. It is not allowed to call kfree_skb() from hardware interrupt context or with interrupts being disabled. The skb is unlinked from the queue, so it can be freed after spin_unlock_irqrestore(). Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221027091237.2290111-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [mkl: adjust subject] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-10-26can: bcm: check the result of can_send() in bcm_can_tx()Ziyang Xuan1-3/+4
[ Upstream commit 3fd7bfd28cfd68ae80a2fe92ea1615722cc2ee6e ] If can_send() fail, it should not update frames_abs counter in bcm_can_tx(). Add the result check for can_send() in bcm_can_tx(). Suggested-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Suggested-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/9851878e74d6d37aee2f1ee76d68361a46f89458.1663206163.git.william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-08-25can: j1939: j1939_sk_queue_activate_next_locked(): replace WARN_ON_ONCE with ↵Fedor Pchelkin1-1/+4
netdev_warn_once() commit 8ef49f7f8244424adcf4a546dba4cbbeb0b09c09 upstream. We should warn user-space that it is doing something wrong when trying to activate sessions with identical parameters but WARN_ON_ONCE macro can not be used here as it serves a different purpose. So it would be good to replace it with netdev_warn_once() message. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220729143655.1108297-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru [mkl: fix indention] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2026-01-24 12:23:46 +0300