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2023-08-30Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-freeZhengping Jiang1-0/+5
[ Upstream commit f752a0b334bb95fe9b42ecb511e0864e2768046f ] Fix potential use-after-free in l2cap_le_command_rej. Signed-off-by: Zhengping Jiang <jiangzp@google.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-14Bluetooth: L2CAP: Add missing checks for invalid DCIDSungwoo Kim1-0/+9
[ Upstream commit 75767213f3d9b97f63694d02260b6a49a2271876 ] When receiving a connect response we should make sure that the DCID is within the valid range and that we don't already have another channel allocated for the same DCID. Missing checks may violate the specification (BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.4 | Vol 3, Part A, Page 1046). Fixes: 40624183c202 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Add missing checks for invalid LE DCID") Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam@sung-woo.kim> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-14Bluetooth: Fix l2cap_disconnect_req deadlockYing Hsu1-0/+4
[ Upstream commit 02c5ea5246a44d6ffde0fddebfc1d56188052976 ] L2CAP assumes that the locks conn->chan_lock and chan->lock are acquired in the order conn->chan_lock, chan->lock to avoid potential deadlock. For example, l2sock_shutdown acquires these locks in the order: mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock) l2cap_chan_lock(chan) However, l2cap_disconnect_req acquires chan->lock in l2cap_get_chan_by_scid first and then acquires conn->chan_lock before calling l2cap_chan_del. This means that these locks are acquired in unexpected order, which leads to potential deadlock: l2cap_chan_lock(c) mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock) This patch releases chan->lock before acquiring the conn_chan_lock to avoid the potential deadlock. Fixes: a2a9339e1c9d ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_disconnect_{req,rsp}") Signed-off-by: Ying Hsu <yinghsu@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-05-30Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix "bad unlock balance" in l2cap_disconnect_rspMin Li1-1/+0
[ Upstream commit 25e97f7b1866e6b8503be349eeea44bb52d661ce ] conn->chan_lock isn't acquired before l2cap_get_chan_by_scid, if l2cap_get_chan_by_scid returns NULL, then 'bad unlock balance' is triggered. Reported-by: syzbot+9519d6b5b79cf7787cf3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000894f5f05f95e9f4d@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Min Li <lm0963hack@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-04-20Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_disconnect_{req,rsp}Luiz Augusto von Dentz1-18/+6
commit a2a9339e1c9deb7e1e079e12e27a0265aea8421a upstream. Similar to commit d0be8347c623 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free caused by l2cap_chan_put"), just use l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero to prevent referencing a channel that is about to be destroyed. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Min Li <lm0963hack@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-03-11Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix potential user-after-freeLuiz Augusto von Dentz1-24/+0
[ Upstream commit df5703348813235874d851934e957c3723d71644 ] This fixes all instances of which requires to allocate a buffer calling alloc_skb which may release the chan lock and reacquire later which makes it possible that the chan is disconnected in the meantime. Fixes: a6a5568c03c4 ("Bluetooth: Lock the L2CAP channel when sending") Reported-by: Alexander Coffin <alex.coffin@matician.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-01-18Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix u8 overflowSungwoo Kim1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit bcd70260ef56e0aee8a4fc6cd214a419900b0765 ] By keep sending L2CAP_CONF_REQ packets, chan->num_conf_rsp increases multiple times and eventually it will wrap around the maximum number (i.e., 255). This patch prevents this by adding a boundary check with L2CAP_MAX_CONF_RSP Btmon log: Bluetooth monitor ver 5.64 = Note: Linux version 6.1.0-rc2 (x86_64) 0.264594 = Note: Bluetooth subsystem version 2.22 0.264636 @ MGMT Open: btmon (privileged) version 1.22 {0x0001} 0.272191 = New Index: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (Primary,Virtual,hci0) [hci0] 13.877604 @ RAW Open: 9496 (privileged) version 2.22 {0x0002} 13.890741 = Open Index: 00:00:00:00:00:00 [hci0] 13.900426 (...) > ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 1033 #32 [hci0] 14.273106 invalid packet size (12 != 1033) 08 00 01 00 02 01 04 00 01 10 ff ff ............ > ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 1547 #33 [hci0] 14.273561 invalid packet size (14 != 1547) 0a 00 01 00 04 01 06 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 ........@..... > ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 2061 #34 [hci0] 14.274390 invalid packet size (16 != 2061) 0c 00 01 00 04 01 08 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 ........@....... > ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 2061 #35 [hci0] 14.274932 invalid packet size (16 != 2061) 0c 00 01 00 04 01 08 00 40 00 00 00 07 00 03 00 ........@....... = bluetoothd: Bluetooth daemon 5.43 14.401828 > ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 1033 #36 [hci0] 14.275753 invalid packet size (12 != 1033) 08 00 01 00 04 01 04 00 40 00 00 00 ........@... Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam@sung-woo.kim> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-08Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix accepting connection request for invalid SPSMLuiz Augusto von Dentz1-0/+13
commit 711f8c3fb3db61897080468586b970c87c61d9e4 upstream. The Bluetooth spec states that the valid range for SPSM is from 0x0001-0x00ff so it is invalid to accept values outside of this range: BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.3 | Vol 3, Part A page 1059: Table 4.15: L2CAP_LE_CREDIT_BASED_CONNECTION_REQ SPSM ranges CVE: CVE-2022-42896 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Tamás Koczka <poprdi@google.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tedd Ho-Jeong An <tedd.an@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-25Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix l2cap_global_chan_by_psmLuiz Augusto von Dentz1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit f937b758a188d6fd328a81367087eddbb2fce50f ] l2cap_global_chan_by_psm shall not return fixed channels as they are not meant to be connected by (S)PSM. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tedd Ho-Jeong An <tedd.an@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-11-10Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix attempting to access uninitialized memoryLuiz Augusto von Dentz1-1/+2
commit b1a2cd50c0357f243b7435a732b4e62ba3157a2e upstream. On l2cap_parse_conf_req the variable efs is only initialized if remote_efs has been set. CVE: CVE-2022-42895 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Tamás Koczka <poprdi@google.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tedd Ho-Jeong An <tedd.an@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-10Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix use-after-free in l2cap_conn_del()Zhengchao Shao1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 0d0e2d032811280b927650ff3c15fe5020e82533 ] When l2cap_recv_frame() is invoked to receive data, and the cid is L2CAP_CID_A2MP, if the channel does not exist, it will create a channel. However, after a channel is created, the hold operation of the channel is not performed. In this case, the value of channel reference counting is 1. As a result, after hci_error_reset() is triggered, l2cap_conn_del() invokes the close hook function of A2MP to release the channel. Then l2cap_chan_unlock(chan) will trigger UAF issue. The process is as follows: Receive data: l2cap_data_channel() a2mp_channel_create() --->channel ref is 2 l2cap_chan_put() --->channel ref is 1 Triger event: hci_error_reset() hci_dev_do_close() ... l2cap_disconn_cfm() l2cap_conn_del() l2cap_chan_hold() --->channel ref is 2 l2cap_chan_del() --->channel ref is 1 a2mp_chan_close_cb() --->channel ref is 0, release channel l2cap_chan_unlock() --->UAF of channel The detailed Call Trace is as follows: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xa6/0x5e0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880160664b8 by task kworker/u11:1/7593 Workqueue: hci0 hci_error_reset Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x719 kasan_report+0xb1/0x1e0 kasan_check_range+0x140/0x190 __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xa6/0x5e0 l2cap_conn_del+0x404/0x7b0 l2cap_disconn_cfm+0x8c/0xc0 hci_conn_hash_flush+0x11f/0x260 hci_dev_close_sync+0x5f5/0x11f0 hci_dev_do_close+0x2d/0x70 hci_error_reset+0x9e/0x140 process_one_work+0x98a/0x1620 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 7593: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa9/0xd0 l2cap_chan_create+0x40/0x930 amp_mgr_create+0x96/0x990 a2mp_channel_create+0x7d/0x150 l2cap_recv_frame+0x51b8/0x9a70 l2cap_recv_acldata+0xaa3/0xc00 hci_rx_work+0x702/0x1220 process_one_work+0x98a/0x1620 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Freed by task 7593: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 ____kasan_slab_free+0x167/0x1c0 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x89/0x1c0 kfree+0xe2/0x580 l2cap_chan_put+0x22a/0x2d0 l2cap_conn_del+0x3fc/0x7b0 l2cap_disconn_cfm+0x8c/0xc0 hci_conn_hash_flush+0x11f/0x260 hci_dev_close_sync+0x5f5/0x11f0 hci_dev_do_close+0x2d/0x70 hci_error_reset+0x9e/0x140 process_one_work+0x98a/0x1620 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0 call_rcu+0x99/0x740 netlink_release+0xe6a/0x1cf0 __sock_release+0xcd/0x280 sock_close+0x18/0x20 __fput+0x27c/0xa90 task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23c/0x250 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x42/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Second to last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0 call_rcu+0x99/0x740 netlink_release+0xe6a/0x1cf0 __sock_release+0xcd/0x280 sock_close+0x18/0x20 __fput+0x27c/0xa90 task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23c/0x250 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x42/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Fixes: d0be8347c623 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free caused by l2cap_chan_put") Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-11-10Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free caused by l2cap_reassemble_sduMaxim Mikityanskiy1-7/+41
[ Upstream commit 3aff8aaca4e36dc8b17eaa011684881a80238966 ] Fix the race condition between the following two flows that run in parallel: 1. l2cap_reassemble_sdu -> chan->ops->recv (l2cap_sock_recv_cb) -> __sock_queue_rcv_skb. 2. bt_sock_recvmsg -> skb_recv_datagram, skb_free_datagram. An SKB can be queued by the first flow and immediately dequeued and freed by the second flow, therefore the callers of l2cap_reassemble_sdu can't use the SKB after that function returns. However, some places continue accessing struct l2cap_ctrl that resides in the SKB's CB for a short time after l2cap_reassemble_sdu returns, leading to a use-after-free condition (the stack trace is below, line numbers for kernel 5.19.8). Fix it by keeping a local copy of struct l2cap_ctrl. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2cap_rx_state_recv (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6906) bluetooth Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812025f2f0 by task kworker/u17:3/43169 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 4)) print_report.cold (mm/kasan/report.c:314 mm/kasan/report.c:429) ? l2cap_rx_state_recv (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6906) bluetooth kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:162 mm/kasan/report.c:493) ? l2cap_rx_state_recv (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6906) bluetooth l2cap_rx_state_recv (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6906) bluetooth l2cap_rx (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7236 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7271) bluetooth ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306) </TASK> Allocated by task 43169: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:39) __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:45 mm/kasan/common.c:436 mm/kasan/common.c:469) kmem_cache_alloc_node (mm/slab.h:750 mm/slub.c:3243 mm/slub.c:3293) __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:414) l2cap_recv_frag (./include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h:425 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8329) bluetooth l2cap_recv_acldata (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8442) bluetooth hci_rx_work (net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3642 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3832) bluetooth process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:2289) worker_thread (./include/linux/list.h:292 kernel/workqueue.c:2437) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:376) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306) Freed by task 27920: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:39) kasan_set_track (mm/kasan/common.c:45) kasan_set_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:372) ____kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:368 mm/kasan/common.c:328) slab_free_freelist_hook (mm/slub.c:1780) kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:3536 mm/slub.c:3553) skb_free_datagram (./include/net/sock.h:1578 ./include/net/sock.h:1639 net/core/datagram.c:323) bt_sock_recvmsg (net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:295) bluetooth l2cap_sock_recvmsg (net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1212) bluetooth sock_read_iter (net/socket.c:1087) new_sync_read (./include/linux/fs.h:2052 fs/read_write.c:401) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:482) ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:620) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/CAKErNvoqga1WcmoR3-0875esY6TVWFQDandbVZncSiuGPBQXLA@mail.gmail.com/T/#u Fixes: d2a7ac5d5d3a ("Bluetooth: Add the ERTM receive state machine") Fixes: 4b51dae96731 ("Bluetooth: Add streaming mode receive and incoming packet classifier") Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxtram95@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-10-26Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix user-after-freeLuiz Augusto von Dentz1-0/+7
[ Upstream commit 35fcbc4243aad7e7d020b7c1dfb14bb888b20a4f ] This uses l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() after calling __l2cap_get_chan_blah() to prevent the following trace: Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:static void l2cap_chan_destroy(struct kref *kref) Bluetooth: chan 0000000023c4974d Bluetooth: parent 00000000ae861c08 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_waiter_is_first kernel/locking/mutex.c:191 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:671 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0x278/0x400 kernel/locking/mutex.c:729 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888006a49b08 by task kworker/u3:2/389 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220622082716.478486-1-lee.jones@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam@sung-woo.kim> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-10-26Bluetooth: L2CAP: initialize delayed works at l2cap_chan_create()Tetsuo Handa1-4/+6
[ Upstream commit 2d2cb3066f2c90cd8ca540b36ba7a55e7f2406e0 ] syzbot is reporting cancel_delayed_work() without INIT_DELAYED_WORK() at l2cap_chan_del() [1], for CONF_NOT_COMPLETE flag (which meant to prevent l2cap_chan_del() from calling cancel_delayed_work()) is cleared by timer which fires before l2cap_chan_del() is called by closing file descriptor created by socket(AF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_STREAM, BTPROTO_L2CAP). l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd(L2CAP_CONF_REQ) and l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd(L2CAP_CONF_RSP) are calling l2cap_ertm_init(chan), and they call l2cap_chan_ready() (which clears CONF_NOT_COMPLETE flag) only when l2cap_ertm_init(chan) succeeded. l2cap_sock_init() does not call l2cap_ertm_init(chan), and it instead sets CONF_NOT_COMPLETE flag by calling l2cap_chan_set_defaults(). However, when connect() is requested, "command 0x0409 tx timeout" happens after 2 seconds from connect() request, and CONF_NOT_COMPLETE flag is cleared after 4 seconds from connect() request, for l2cap_conn_start() from l2cap_info_timeout() callback scheduled by schedule_delayed_work(&conn->info_timer, L2CAP_INFO_TIMEOUT); in l2cap_connect() is calling l2cap_chan_ready(). Fix this problem by initializing delayed works used by L2CAP_MODE_ERTM mode as soon as l2cap_chan_create() allocates a channel, like I did in commit be8597239379f0f5 ("Bluetooth: initialize skb_queue_head at l2cap_chan_create()"). Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=83672956c7aa6af698b3 [1] Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+83672956c7aa6af698b3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-09-05Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix build errors in some archsLuiz Augusto von Dentz1-5/+5
commit b840304fb46cdf7012722f456bce06f151b3e81b upstream. This attempts to fix the follow errors: In function 'memcmp', inlined from 'bacmp' at ./include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h:347:9, inlined from 'l2cap_global_chan_by_psm' at net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:2003:15: ./include/linux/fortify-string.h:44:33: error: '__builtin_memcmp' specified bound 6 exceeds source size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overread] 44 | #define __underlying_memcmp __builtin_memcmp | ^ ./include/linux/fortify-string.h:420:16: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcmp' 420 | return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In function 'memcmp', inlined from 'bacmp' at ./include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h:347:9, inlined from 'l2cap_global_chan_by_psm' at net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:2004:15: ./include/linux/fortify-string.h:44:33: error: '__builtin_memcmp' specified bound 6 exceeds source size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overread] 44 | #define __underlying_memcmp __builtin_memcmp | ^ ./include/linux/fortify-string.h:420:16: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcmp' 420 | return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Fixes: 332f1795ca20 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix l2cap_global_chan_by_psm regression") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Cc: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-25Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix l2cap_global_chan_by_psm regressionLuiz Augusto von Dentz1-7/+6
commit 332f1795ca202489c665a75e62e18ff6284de077 upstream. The patch d0be8347c623: "Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free caused by l2cap_chan_put" from Jul 21, 2022, leads to the following Smatch static checker warning: net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1977 l2cap_global_chan_by_psm() error: we previously assumed 'c' could be null (see line 1996) Fixes: d0be8347c623 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free caused by l2cap_chan_put") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-11Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free caused by l2cap_chan_putLuiz Augusto von Dentz1-13/+48
commit d0be8347c623e0ac4202a1d4e0373882821f56b0 upstream. This fixes the following trace which is caused by hci_rx_work starting up *after* the final channel reference has been put() during sock_close() but *before* the references to the channel have been destroyed, so instead the code now rely on kref_get_unless_zero/l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero to prevent referencing a channel that is about to be destroyed. refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refcount_dec_and_test+0x20/0xd0 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc114f5bf18 by task kworker/u17:14/705 CPU: 4 PID: 705 Comm: kworker/u17:14 Tainted: G S W 4.14.234-00003-g1fb6d0bd49a4-dirty #28 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM sm8150 Flame DVT (DT) Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x378 show_stack+0x20/0x2c dump_stack+0x124/0x148 print_address_description+0x80/0x2e8 __kasan_report+0x168/0x188 kasan_report+0x10/0x18 __asan_load4+0x84/0x8c refcount_dec_and_test+0x20/0xd0 l2cap_chan_put+0x48/0x12c l2cap_recv_frame+0x4770/0x6550 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x44c/0x7a4 hci_acldata_packet+0x100/0x188 hci_rx_work+0x178/0x23c process_one_work+0x35c/0x95c worker_thread+0x4cc/0x960 kthread+0x1a8/0x1c4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Tested-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-05-22Bluetooth: initialize skb_queue_head at l2cap_chan_create()Tetsuo Handa1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit be8597239379f0f53c9710dd6ab551bbf535bec6 ] syzbot is hitting "INFO: trying to register non-static key." message [1], for "struct l2cap_chan"->tx_q.lock spinlock is not yet initialized when l2cap_chan_del() is called due to e.g. timeout. Since "struct l2cap_chan"->lock mutex is initialized at l2cap_chan_create() immediately after "struct l2cap_chan" is allocated using kzalloc(), let's as well initialize "struct l2cap_chan"->{tx_q,srej_q}.lock spinlocks there. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fadfba6a911f6bf71842 Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+fadfba6a911f6bf71842@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-05-22Bluetooth: Set CONF_NOT_COMPLETE as l2cap_chan defaultArchie Pusaka1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 3a9d54b1947ecea8eea9a902c0b7eb58a98add8a ] Currently l2cap_chan_set_defaults() reset chan->conf_state to zero. However, there is a flag CONF_NOT_COMPLETE which is set when creating the l2cap_chan. It is suggested that the flag should be cleared when l2cap_chan is ready, but when l2cap_chan_set_defaults() is called, l2cap_chan is not yet ready. Therefore, we must set this flag as the default. Example crash call trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0xc4/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:56 panic+0x1c6/0x38b kernel/panic.c:117 __warn+0x170/0x1b9 kernel/panic.c:471 warn_slowpath_fmt+0xc7/0xf8 kernel/panic.c:494 debug_print_object+0x175/0x193 lib/debugobjects.c:260 debug_object_assert_init+0x171/0x1bf lib/debugobjects.c:614 debug_timer_assert_init kernel/time/timer.c:629 [inline] debug_assert_init kernel/time/timer.c:677 [inline] del_timer+0x7c/0x179 kernel/time/timer.c:1034 try_to_grab_pending+0x81/0x2e5 kernel/workqueue.c:1230 cancel_delayed_work+0x7c/0x1c4 kernel/workqueue.c:2929 l2cap_clear_timer+0x1e/0x41 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h:834 l2cap_chan_del+0x2d8/0x37e net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:640 l2cap_chan_close+0x532/0x5d8 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:756 l2cap_sock_shutdown+0x806/0x969 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1174 l2cap_sock_release+0x64/0x14d net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1217 __sock_release+0xda/0x217 net/socket.c:580 sock_close+0x1b/0x1f net/socket.c:1039 __fput+0x322/0x55c fs/file_table.c:208 ____fput+0x17/0x19 fs/file_table.c:244 task_work_run+0x19b/0x1d3 kernel/task_work.c:115 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:21 [inline] do_exit+0xe4c/0x204a kernel/exit.c:766 do_group_exit+0x291/0x291 kernel/exit.c:891 get_signal+0x749/0x1093 kernel/signal.c:2396 do_signal+0xa5/0xcdb arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:737 exit_to_usermode_loop arch/x86/entry/common.c:243 [inline] prepare_exit_to_usermode+0xed/0x235 arch/x86/entry/common.c:277 syscall_return_slowpath+0x3a7/0x3b3 arch/x86/entry/common.c:348 int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0xa3 Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka <apusaka@chromium.org> Reported-by: syzbot+338f014a98367a08a114@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Alain Michaud <alainm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-10-17Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix calling sk_filter on non-socket based channelLuiz Augusto von Dentz1-3/+4
commit f19425641cb2572a33cb074d5e30283720bd4d22 upstream. Only sockets will have the chan->data set to an actual sk, channels like A2MP would have its own data which would likely cause a crash when calling sk_filter, in order to fix this a new callback has been introduced so channels can implement their own filtering if necessary. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-01Bluetooth: L2CAP: handle l2cap config request during open stateHoward Chung1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit 96298f640104e4cd9a913a6e50b0b981829b94ff ] According to Core Spec Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part A 6.1.5, the incoming L2CAP_ConfigReq should be handled during OPEN state. The section below shows the btmon trace when running L2CAP/COS/CFD/BV-12-C before and after this change. === Before === ... > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #22 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 #23 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #24 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #25 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #26 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #27 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 .. < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #28 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #29 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 #30 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6 Source CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 #31 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 91 02 11 11 ...... < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 14 #32 L2CAP: Command Reject (0x01) ident 3 len 6 Reason: Invalid CID in request (0x0002) Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #33 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 ... === After === ... > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #22 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 #23 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #24 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #25 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #26 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #27 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 .. < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #28 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #29 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 #30 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6 Source CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 #31 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 91 02 11 11 ..... < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #32 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #33 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #34 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #35 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 ... Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <howardchung@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-10-01Bluetooth: Fix refcount use-after-free issueManish Mandlik1-11/+15
[ Upstream commit 6c08fc896b60893c5d673764b0668015d76df462 ] There is no lock preventing both l2cap_sock_release() and chan->ops->close() from running at the same time. If we consider Thread A running l2cap_chan_timeout() and Thread B running l2cap_sock_release(), expected behavior is: A::l2cap_chan_timeout()->l2cap_chan_close()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() A::l2cap_chan_timeout()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill() B::l2cap_sock_release()->sock_orphan() B::l2cap_sock_release()->l2cap_sock_kill() where, sock_orphan() clears "sk->sk_socket" and l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() marks socket as SOCK_ZAPPED. In l2cap_sock_kill(), there is an "if-statement" that checks if both sock_orphan() and sock_teardown() has been run i.e. sk->sk_socket is NULL and socket is marked as SOCK_ZAPPED. Socket is killed if the condition is satisfied. In the race condition, following occurs: A::l2cap_chan_timeout()->l2cap_chan_close()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() B::l2cap_sock_release()->sock_orphan() B::l2cap_sock_release()->l2cap_sock_kill() A::l2cap_chan_timeout()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill() In this scenario, "if-statement" is true in both B::l2cap_sock_kill() and A::l2cap_sock_kill() and we hit "refcount: underflow; use-after-free" bug. Similar condition occurs at other places where teardown/sock_kill is happening: l2cap_disconnect_rsp()->l2cap_chan_del()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_disconnect_rsp()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill() l2cap_conn_del()->l2cap_chan_del()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_conn_del()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill() l2cap_disconnect_req()->l2cap_chan_del()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_disconnect_req()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill() l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen()->l2cap_chan_close()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen()->l2cap_sock_kill() Protect teardown/sock_kill and orphan/sock_kill by adding hold_lock on l2cap channel to ensure that the socket is killed only after marked as zapped and orphan. Signed-off-by: Manish Mandlik <mmandlik@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-01-09Bluetooth: delete a stray unlockDan Carpenter1-3/+1
commit df66499a1fab340c167250a5743931dc50d5f0fa upstream. We used to take a lock in amp_physical_cfm() but then we moved it to the caller function. Unfortunately the unlock on this error path was overlooked so it leads to a double unlock. Fixes: a514b17fab51 ("Bluetooth: Refactor locking in amp_physical_cfm") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-20Bluetooth: L2CAP: Detect if remote is not able to use the whole MPSLuiz Augusto von Dentz1-0/+10
[ Upstream commit a5c3021bb62b970713550db3f7fd08aa70665d7e ] If the remote is not able to fully utilize the MPS choosen recalculate the credits based on the actual amount it is sending that way it can still send packets of MTU size without credits dropping to 0. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-10-01Revert "Bluetooth: validate BLE connection interval updates"Marcel Holtmann1-8/+1
[ Upstream commit 68d19d7d995759b96169da5aac313363f92a9075 ] This reverts commit c49a8682fc5d298d44e8d911f4fa14690ea9485e. There are devices which require low connection intervals for usable operation including keyboards and mice. Forcing a static connection interval for these types of devices has an impact in latency and causes a regression. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-07-26Bluetooth: validate BLE connection interval updatescsonsino1-1/+8
[ Upstream commit c49a8682fc5d298d44e8d911f4fa14690ea9485e ] Problem: The Linux Bluetooth stack yields complete control over the BLE connection interval to the remote device. The Linux Bluetooth stack provides access to the BLE connection interval min and max values through /sys/kernel/debug/bluetooth/hci0/ conn_min_interval and /sys/kernel/debug/bluetooth/hci0/conn_max_interval. These values are used for initial BLE connections, but the remote device has the ability to request a connection parameter update. In the event that the remote side requests to change the connection interval, the Linux kernel currently only validates that the desired value is within the acceptable range in the Bluetooth specification (6 - 3200, corresponding to 7.5ms - 4000ms). There is currently no validation that the desired value requested by the remote device is within the min/max limits specified in the conn_min_interval/conn_max_interval configurations. This essentially leads to Linux yielding complete control over the connection interval to the remote device. The proposed patch adds a verification step to the connection parameter update mechanism, ensuring that the desired value is within the min/max bounds of the current connection. If the desired value is outside of the current connection min/max values, then the connection parameter update request is rejected and the negative response is returned to the remote device. Recall that the initial connection is established using the local conn_min_interval/conn_max_interval values, so this allows the Linux administrator to retain control over the BLE connection interval. The one downside that I see is that the current default Linux values for conn_min_interval and conn_max_interval typically correspond to 30ms and 50ms respectively. If this change were accepted, then it is feasible that some devices would no longer be able to negotiate to their desired connection interval values. This might be remedied by setting the default Linux conn_min_interval and conn_max_interval values to the widest supported range (6 - 3200 / 7.5ms - 4000ms). This could lead to the same behavior as the current implementation, where the remote device could request to change the connection interval value to any value that is permitted by the Bluetooth specification, and Linux would accept the desired value. Signed-off-by: Carey Sonsino <csonsino@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-07-26Bluetooth: Check state in l2cap_disconnect_rspMatias Karhumaa1-0/+6
[ Upstream commit 28261da8a26f4915aa257d12d506c6ba179d961f ] Because of both sides doing L2CAP disconnection at the same time, it was possible to receive L2CAP Disconnection Response with CID that was already freed. That caused problems if CID was already reused and L2CAP Connection Request with same CID was sent out. Before this patch kernel deleted channel context regardless of the state of the channel. Example where leftover Disconnection Response (frame #402) causes local device to delete L2CAP channel which was not yet connected. This in turn confuses remote device's stack because same CID is re-used without properly disconnecting. Btmon capture before patch: ** snip ** > ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 8 #394 [hci1] 10.748949 Channel: 65 len 4 [PSM 3 mode 0] {chan 2} RFCOMM: Disconnect (DISC) (0x43) Address: 0x03 cr 1 dlci 0x00 Control: 0x53 poll/final 1 Length: 0 FCS: 0xfd < ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 8 #395 [hci1] 10.749062 Channel: 65 len 4 [PSM 3 mode 0] {chan 2} RFCOMM: Unnumbered Ack (UA) (0x63) Address: 0x03 cr 1 dlci 0x00 Control: 0x73 poll/final 1 Length: 0 FCS: 0xd7 < ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #396 [hci1] 10.749073 L2CAP: Disconnection Request (0x06) ident 17 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Source CID: 65 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #397 [hci1] 10.752391 Num handles: 1 Handle: 43 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #398 [hci1] 10.753394 Num handles: 1 Handle: 43 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #399 [hci1] 10.756499 L2CAP: Disconnection Request (0x06) ident 26 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #400 [hci1] 10.756548 L2CAP: Disconnection Response (0x07) ident 26 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #401 [hci1] 10.757459 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 18 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 > ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #402 [hci1] 10.759148 L2CAP: Disconnection Response (0x07) ident 17 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Source CID: 65 = bluetoothd: 00:1E:AB:4C:56:54: error updating services: Input/o.. 10.759447 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #403 [hci1] 10.759386 Num handles: 1 Handle: 43 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #404 [hci1] 10.760397 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 27 len 4 PSM: 3 (0x0003) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 16 #405 [hci1] 10.760441 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 27 len 8 Destination CID: 65 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 27 #406 [hci1] 10.760449 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 19 len 19 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 1013 Option: Retransmission and Flow Control (0x04) [mandatory] Mode: Basic (0x00) TX window size: 0 Max transmit: 0 Retransmission timeout: 0 Monitor timeout: 0 Maximum PDU size: 0 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #407 [hci1] 10.761399 Num handles: 1 Handle: 43 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #408 [hci1] 10.762942 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 18 len 8 Destination CID: 66 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) *snip* Similar case after the patch: *snip* > ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 8 #22702 [hci0] 1664.411056 Channel: 65 len 4 [PSM 3 mode 0] {chan 3} RFCOMM: Disconnect (DISC) (0x43) Address: 0x03 cr 1 dlci 0x00 Control: 0x53 poll/final 1 Length: 0 FCS: 0xfd < ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 8 #22703 [hci0] 1664.411136 Channel: 65 len 4 [PSM 3 mode 0] {chan 3} RFCOMM: Unnumbered Ack (UA) (0x63) Address: 0x03 cr 1 dlci 0x00 Control: 0x73 poll/final 1 Length: 0 FCS: 0xd7 < ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #22704 [hci0] 1664.411143 L2CAP: Disconnection Request (0x06) ident 11 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Source CID: 65 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Pac.. (0x13) plen 5 #22705 [hci0] 1664.414009 Num handles: 1 Handle: 43 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Pac.. (0x13) plen 5 #22706 [hci0] 1664.415007 Num handles: 1 Handle: 43 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #22707 [hci0] 1664.418674 L2CAP: Disconnection Request (0x06) ident 17 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #22708 [hci0] 1664.418762 L2CAP: Disconnection Response (0x07) ident 17 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #22709 [hci0] 1664.421073 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 12 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 > ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #22710 [hci0] 1664.421371 L2CAP: Disconnection Response (0x07) ident 11 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Source CID: 65 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Pac.. (0x13) plen 5 #22711 [hci0] 1664.424082 Num handles: 1 Handle: 43 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Pac.. (0x13) plen 5 #22712 [hci0] 1664.425040 Num handles: 1 Handle: 43 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #22713 [hci0] 1664.426103 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 18 len 4 PSM: 3 (0x0003) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 16 #22714 [hci0] 1664.426186 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 18 len 8 Destination CID: 66 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 43 flags 0x00 dlen 27 #22715 [hci0] 1664.426196 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 13 len 19 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 1013 Option: Retransmission and Flow Control (0x04) [mandatory] Mode: Basic (0x00) TX window size: 0 Max transmit: 0 Retransmission timeout: 0 Monitor timeout: 0 Maximum PDU size: 0 > ACL Data RX: Handle 43 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #22716 [hci0] 1664.428804 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 12 len 8 Destination CID: 66 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) *snip* Fix is to check that channel is in state BT_DISCONN before deleting the channel. This bug was found while fuzzing Bluez's OBEX implementation using Synopsys Defensics. Reported-by: Matti Kamunen <matti.kamunen@synopsys.com> Reported-by: Ari Timonen <ari.timonen@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Matias Karhumaa <matias.karhumaa@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-07-10Bluetooth: Fix faulty expression for minimum encryption key size checkMatias Karhumaa1-1/+1
commit eca94432934fe5f141d084f2e36ee2c0e614cc04 upstream. Fix minimum encryption key size check so that HCI_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE is also allowed as stated in the comment. This bug caused connection problems with devices having maximum encryption key size of 7 octets (56-bit). Fixes: 693cd8ce3f88 ("Bluetooth: Fix regression with minimum encryption key size alignment") Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203997 Signed-off-by: Matias Karhumaa <matias.karhumaa@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-25Bluetooth: Fix regression with minimum encryption key size alignmentMarcel Holtmann1-5/+28
commit 693cd8ce3f882524a5d06f7800dd8492411877b3 upstream. When trying to align the minimum encryption key size requirement for Bluetooth connections, it turns out doing this in a central location in the HCI connection handling code is not possible. Original Bluetooth version up to 2.0 used a security model where the L2CAP service would enforce authentication and encryption. Starting with Bluetooth 2.1 and Secure Simple Pairing that model has changed into that the connection initiator is responsible for providing an encrypted ACL link before any L2CAP communication can happen. Now connecting Bluetooth 2.1 or later devices with Bluetooth 2.0 and before devices are causing a regression. The encryption key size check needs to be moved out of the HCI connection handling into the L2CAP channel setup. To achieve this, the current check inside hci_conn_security() has been moved into l2cap_check_enc_key_size() helper function and then called from four decisions point inside L2CAP to cover all combinations of Secure Simple Pairing enabled devices and device using legacy pairing and legacy service security model. Fixes: d5bb334a8e17 ("Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections") Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203643 Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-03Bluetooth: Verify that l2cap_get_conf_opt provides large enough bufferMarcel Holtmann1-0/+6
commit 7c9cbd0b5e38a1672fcd137894ace3b042dfbf69 upstream. The function l2cap_get_conf_opt will return L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE + opt->len as length value. The opt->len however is in control over the remote user and can be used by an attacker to gain access beyond the bounds of the actual packet. To prevent any potential leak of heap memory, it is enough to check that the resulting len calculation after calling l2cap_get_conf_opt is not below zero. A well formed packet will always return >= 0 here and will end with the length value being zero after the last option has been parsed. In case of malformed packets messing with the opt->len field the length value will become negative. If that is the case, then just abort and ignore the option. In case an attacker uses a too short opt->len value, then garbage will be parsed, but that is protected by the unknown option handling and also the option parameter size checks. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-03Bluetooth: Check L2CAP option sizes returned from l2cap_get_conf_optMarcel Holtmann1-31/+46
commit af3d5d1c87664a4f150fcf3534c6567cb19909b0 upstream. When doing option parsing for standard type values of 1, 2 or 4 octets, the value is converted directly into a variable instead of a pointer. To avoid being tricked into being a pointer, check that for these option types that sizes actually match. In L2CAP every option is fixed size and thus it is prudent anyway to ensure that the remote side sends us the right option size along with option paramters. If the option size is not matching the option type, then that option is silently ignored. It is a protocol violation and instead of trying to give the remote attacker any further hints just pretend that option is not present and proceed with the default values. Implementation following the specification and its qualification procedures will always use the correct size and thus not being impacted here. To keep the code readable and consistent accross all options, a few cosmetic changes were also required. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-13treewide: kmalloc() -> kmalloc_array()Kees Cook1-1/+1
The kmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kmalloc_array(). This patch replaces cases of: kmalloc(a * b, gfp) with: kmalloc_array(a * b, gfp) as well as handling cases of: kmalloc(a * b * c, gfp) with: kmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp) as it's slightly less ugly than: kmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp) This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like: kmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp) though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion. Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were dropped, since they're redundant. The tools/ directory was manually excluded, since it has its own implementation of kmalloc(). The Coccinelle script used for this was: // Fix redundant parens around sizeof(). @@ type TYPE; expression THING, E; @@ ( kmalloc( - (sizeof(TYPE)) * E + sizeof(TYPE) * E , ...) | kmalloc( - (sizeof(THING)) * E + sizeof(THING) * E , ...) ) // Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens. @@ expression COUNT; typedef u8; typedef __u8; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) ) // 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant. @@ type TYPE; expression THING; identifier COUNT_ID; constant COUNT_CONST; @@ ( - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) ) // 2-factor product, only identifiers. @@ identifier SIZE, COUNT; @@ - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - SIZE * COUNT + COUNT, SIZE , ...) // 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with // redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING; identifier STRIDE, COUNT; type TYPE; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING1, THING2; identifier COUNT; type TYPE1, TYPE2; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed. @@ identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT; @@ ( kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) ) // Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products, // when they're not all constants... @@ expression E1, E2, E3; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * (E3) + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - E1 * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) ) // And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants, // keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument. @@ expression THING, E1, E2; type TYPE; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2, ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * E2 + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * E2 + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * (E2) + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - E1 * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) ) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-04-03Bluetooth: Fix connection if directed advertising and privacy is usedSzymon Janc1-1/+1
Local random address needs to be updated before creating connection if RPA from LE Direct Advertising Report was resolved in host. Otherwise remote device might ignore connection request due to address mismatch. This was affecting following qualification test cases: GAP/CONN/SCEP/BV-03-C, GAP/CONN/GCEP/BV-05-C, GAP/CONN/DCEP/BV-05-C Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #11350 [hci0] 84680.231216 Address: 56:BC:E8:24:11:68 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11351 [hci0] 84680.246022 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #11352 [hci0] 84680.246417 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11353 [hci0] 84680.248854 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11354 [hci0] 84680.249466 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11355 [hci0] 84680.253222 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #11356 [hci0] 84680.458387 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:D6:76:8C:DF:82 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) RSSI: -74 dBm (0xb6) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11357 [hci0] 84680.458737 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11358 [hci0] 84680.469982 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #11359 [hci0] 84680.470444 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #11360 [hci0] 84680.474971 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) plen 0 #11361 [hci0] 84682.545385 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11362 [hci0] 84682.551014 LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #11363 [hci0] 84682.551074 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Unknown Connection Identifier (0x02) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Public (0x00) Peer address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (OUI 00-00-00) Connection interval: 0.00 msec (0x0000) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 0 msec (0x0000) Master clock accuracy: 0x00 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #210 [hci0] 667.152459 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #211 [hci0] 667.153613 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #212 [hci0] 667.153704 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #213 [hci0] 667.154584 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #214 [hci0] 667.182619 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) RSSI: -70 dBm (0xba) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #215 [hci0] 667.182704 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #216 [hci0] 667.183599 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #217 [hci0] 667.183645 Address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #218 [hci0] 667.184590 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #219 [hci0] 667.184613 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #220 [hci0] 667.186558 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #221 [hci0] 667.485824 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Master clock accuracy: 0x07 @ MGMT Event: Device Connected (0x000b) plen 13 {0x0002} [hci0] 667.485996 LE Address: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Flags: 0x00000000 Data length: 0 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2018-01-04Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.Ben Seri1-9/+11
In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without initialization: struct l2cap_conf_efs efs; In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the memcpy call that will write to the efs variable: ... case L2CAP_CONF_EFS: if (olen == sizeof(efs)) memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen); ... The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built: l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs); So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the attacker (16 bytes). This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410 Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-09-10Bluetooth: Properly check L2CAP config option output buffer lengthBen Seri1-37/+43
Validate the output buffer length for L2CAP config requests and responses to avoid overflowing the stack buffer used for building the option blocks. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-06-16networking: make skb_put & friends return void pointersJohannes Berg1-7/+7
It seems like a historic accident that these return unsigned char *, and in many places that means casts are required, more often than not. Make these functions (skb_put, __skb_put and pskb_put) return void * and remove all the casts across the tree, adding a (u8 *) cast only where the unsigned char pointer was used directly, all done with the following spatch: @@ expression SKB, LEN; typedef u8; identifier fn = { skb_put, __skb_put }; @@ - *(fn(SKB, LEN)) + *(u8 *)fn(SKB, LEN) @@ expression E, SKB, LEN; identifier fn = { skb_put, __skb_put }; type T; @@ - E = ((T *)(fn(SKB, LEN))) + E = fn(SKB, LEN) which actually doesn't cover pskb_put since there are only three users overall. A handful of stragglers were converted manually, notably a macro in drivers/isdn/i4l/isdn_bsdcomp.c and, oddly enough, one of the many instances in net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c. In the former file, I also had to fix one whitespace problem spatch introduced. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-16networking: introduce and use skb_put_data()Johannes Berg1-2/+2
A common pattern with skb_put() is to just want to memcpy() some data into the new space, introduce skb_put_data() for this. An spatch similar to the one for skb_put_zero() converts many of the places using it: @@ identifier p, p2; expression len, skb, data; type t, t2; @@ ( -p = skb_put(skb, len); +p = skb_put_data(skb, data, len); | -p = (t)skb_put(skb, len); +p = skb_put_data(skb, data, len); ) ( p2 = (t2)p; -memcpy(p2, data, len); | -memcpy(p, data, len); ) @@ type t, t2; identifier p, p2; expression skb, data; @@ t *p; ... ( -p = skb_put(skb, sizeof(t)); +p = skb_put_data(skb, data, sizeof(t)); | -p = (t *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(t)); +p = skb_put_data(skb, data, sizeof(t)); ) ( p2 = (t2)p; -memcpy(p2, data, sizeof(*p)); | -memcpy(p, data, sizeof(*p)); ) @@ expression skb, len, data; @@ -memcpy(skb_put(skb, len), data, len); +skb_put_data(skb, data, len); (again, manually post-processed to retain some comments) Reviewed-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-12Bluetooth: L2CAP: Add l2cap_le_flowctl_sendLuiz Augusto von Dentz1-8/+19
Consolidate code sending data to LE CoC channels and adds proper accounting of packets sent, the remaining credits and how many packets are queued. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Acked-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2017-04-12Bluetooth: L2CAP: Don't return -EAGAIN if out of creditsLuiz Augusto von Dentz1-3/+0
Just keep queueing them into TX queue since the caller might just have to do the same and there is no impact in adding another packet to the TX queue even if there aren't any credits to transmit them. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Acked-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2017-01-14locking/atomic, kref: Add kref_read()Peter Zijlstra1-2/+2
Since we need to change the implementation, stop exposing internals. Provide kref_read() to read the current reference count; typically used for debug messages. Kills two anti-patterns: atomic_read(&kref->refcount) kref->refcount.counter Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-12-05[iov_iter] new primitives - copy_from_iter_full() and friendsAl Viro1-3/+3
copy_from_iter_full(), copy_from_iter_full_nocache() and csum_and_copy_from_iter_full() - counterparts of copy_from_iter() et.al., advancing iterator only in case of successful full copy and returning whether it had been successful or not. Convert some obvious users. *NOTE* - do not blindly assume that something is a good candidate for those unless you are sure that not advancing iov_iter in failure case is the right thing in this case. Anything that does short read/short write kind of stuff (or is in a loop, etc.) is unlikely to be a good one. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-11-23Bluetooth: Fix using the correct source address typeJohan Hedberg1-1/+1
The hci_get_route() API is used to look up local HCI devices, however so far it has been incapable of dealing with anything else than the public address of HCI devices. This completely breaks with LE-only HCI devices that do not come with a public address, but use a static random address instead. This patch exteds the hci_get_route() API with a src_type parameter that's used for comparing with the right address of each HCI device. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2016-08-24Bluetooth: split sk_filter in l2cap_sock_recv_cbDaniel Borkmann1-0/+8
During an audit for sk_filter(), we found that rx_busy_skb handling in l2cap_sock_recv_cb() and l2cap_sock_recvmsg() looks not quite as intended. The assumption from commit e328140fdacb ("Bluetooth: Use event-driven approach for handling ERTM receive buffer") is that errors returned from sock_queue_rcv_skb() are due to receive buffer shortage. However, nothing should prevent doing a setsockopt() with SO_ATTACH_FILTER on the socket, that could drop some of the incoming skbs when handled in sock_queue_rcv_skb(). In that case sock_queue_rcv_skb() will return with -EPERM, propagated from sk_filter() and if in L2CAP_MODE_ERTM mode, wrong assumption was that we failed due to receive buffer being full. From that point onwards, due to the to-be-dropped skb being held in rx_busy_skb, we cannot make any forward progress as rx_busy_skb is never cleared from l2cap_sock_recvmsg(), due to the filter drop verdict over and over coming from sk_filter(). Meanwhile, in l2cap_sock_recv_cb() all new incoming skbs are being dropped due to rx_busy_skb being occupied. Instead, just use __sock_queue_rcv_skb() where an error really tells that there's a receive buffer issue. Split the sk_filter() and enable it for non-segmented modes at queuing time since at this point in time the skb has already been through the ERTM state machine and it has been acked, so dropping is not allowed. Instead, for ERTM and streaming mode, call sk_filter() in l2cap_data_rcv() so the packet can be dropped before the state machine sees it. Fixes: e328140fdacb ("Bluetooth: Use event-driven approach for handling ERTM receive buffer") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2016-07-09Bluetooth: Rename HCI_BREDR into HCI_PRIMARYMarcel Holtmann1-1/+1
The HCI_BREDR naming is confusing since it actually stands for Primary Bluetooth Controller. Which is a term that has been used in the latest standard. However from a legacy point of view there only really have been Basic Rate (BR) and Enhanced Data Rate (EDR). Recent versions of Bluetooth introduced Low Energy (LE) and made this terminology a little bit confused since Dual Mode Controllers include BR/EDR and LE. To simplify this the name HCI_PRIMARY stands for the Primary Controller which can be a single mode or dual mode controller. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2016-01-29Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix auto-allocating LE PSM valuesJohan Hedberg1-2/+12
The LE dynamic PSM range is different from BR/EDR (0x0080 - 0x00ff) and doesn't have requirements relating to parity, so separate checks are needed. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2015-11-19Bluetooth: remove unneeded variable in l2cap_stream_rxPrasanna Karthik1-3/+1
Remove unneeded variable used to store return value. Error reported by coccicheck. Signed-off-by: Prasanna Karthik <mkarthi3@visteon.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2015-11-19Bluetooth: Fix specifying role for LE connectionsJohan Hedberg1-8/+7
The hci_connect_le_scan() is (as the name implies) a master/central role API, so it makes no sense in passing a role parameter to it. At the same time this patch also fixes the direct advertising support for LE L2CAP sockets where we now call the more appropriate hci_le_connect() API if slave/peripheral role is desired. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2015-11-05Bluetooth: L2CAP: Add missing checks for invalid LE DCIDJohan Hedberg1-1/+8
When receiving a connect response we should make sure that the DCID is within the valid range and that we don't already have another channel allocated for the same DCID. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2015-11-05Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix checked range when allocating new CIDJohan Hedberg1-1/+1
The 'dyn_end' value is also a valid CID so it should be included in the range of values checked. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2015-11-05Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix returning correct LE CoC response codesJohan Hedberg1-1/+8
The core spec defines specific response codes for situations when the received CID is incorrect. Add the defines for these and return them as appropriate from the LE Connect Request handler function. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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