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commit b04df3da1b5c6f6dc7cdccc37941740c078c4043 upstream.
nf_tables_chain_destroy can sleep, it can't be used from call_rcu
callbacks.
Moreover, nf_tables_rule_release() is only safe for error unwinding,
while transaction mutex is held and the to-be-desroyed rule was not
exposed to either dataplane or dumps, as it deactives+frees without
the required synchronize_rcu() in-between.
nft_rule_expr_deactivate() callbacks will change ->use counters
of other chains/sets, see e.g. nft_lookup .deactivate callback, these
must be serialized via transaction mutex.
Also add a few lockdep asserts to make this more explicit.
Calling synchronize_rcu() isn't ideal, but fixing this without is hard
and way more intrusive. As-is, we can get:
WARNING: .. net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:5515 nft_set_destroy+0x..
Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work
RIP: 0010:nft_set_destroy+0x3fe/0x5c0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x6b7/0xad0
process_one_work+0x64a/0xce0
worker_thread+0x613/0x10d0
In case the synchronize_rcu becomes an issue, we can explore alternatives.
One way would be to allocate nft_trans_rule objects + one nft_trans_chain
object, deactivate the rules + the chain and then defer the freeing to the
nft destroy workqueue. We'd still need to keep the synchronize_rcu path as
a fallback to handle -ENOMEM corner cases though.
Reported-by: syzbot+b26935466701e56cfdc2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/67478d92.050a0220.253251.0062.GAE@google.com/T/
Fixes: c03d278fdf35 ("netfilter: nf_tables: wait for rcu grace period on net_device removal")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c03d278fdf35e73dd0ec543b9b556876b9d9a8dc upstream.
8c873e219970 ("netfilter: core: free hooks with call_rcu") removed
synchronize_net() call when unregistering basechain hook, however,
net_device removal event handler for the NFPROTO_NETDEV was not updated
to wait for RCU grace period.
Note that 835b803377f5 ("netfilter: nf_tables_netdev: unregister hooks
on net_device removal") does not remove basechain rules on device
removal, I was hinted to remove rules on net_device removal later, see
5ebe0b0eec9d ("netfilter: nf_tables: destroy basechain and rules on
netdevice removal").
Although NETDEV_UNREGISTER event is guaranteed to be handled after
synchronize_net() call, this path needs to wait for rcu grace period via
rcu callback to release basechain hooks if netns is alive because an
ongoing netlink dump could be in progress (sockets hold a reference on
the netns).
Note that nf_tables_pre_exit_net() unregisters and releases basechain
hooks but it is possible to see NETDEV_UNREGISTER at a later stage in
the netns exit path, eg. veth peer device in another netns:
cleanup_net()
default_device_exit_batch()
unregister_netdevice_many_notify()
notifier_call_chain()
nf_tables_netdev_event()
__nft_release_basechain()
In this particular case, same rule of thumb applies: if netns is alive,
then wait for rcu grace period because netlink dump in the other netns
could be in progress. Otherwise, if the other netns is going away then
no netlink dump can be in progress and basechain hooks can be released
inmediately.
While at it, turn WARN_ON() into WARN_ON_ONCE() for the basechain
validation, which should not ever happen.
Fixes: 835b803377f5 ("netfilter: nf_tables_netdev: unregister hooks on net_device removal")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f1a69a940de58b16e8249dff26f74c8cc59b32be upstream.
sctp_sendmsg() re-uses associations and transports when possible by
doing a lookup based on the socket endpoint and the message destination
address, and then sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() sets the selected transport in
all the message chunks to be sent.
There's a possible race condition if another thread triggers the removal
of that selected transport, for instance, by explicitly unbinding an
address with setsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_REM), after the chunks have
been set up and before the message is sent. This can happen if the send
buffer is full, during the period when the sender thread temporarily
releases the socket lock in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf().
This causes the access to the transport data in
sctp_outq_select_transport(), when the association outqueue is flushed,
to result in a use-after-free read.
This change avoids this scenario by having sctp_transport_free() signal
the freeing of the transport, tagging it as "dead". In order to do this,
the patch restores the "dead" bit in struct sctp_transport, which was
removed in
commit 47faa1e4c50e ("sctp: remove the dead field of sctp_transport").
Then, in the scenario where the sender thread has released the socket
lock in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(), the bit is checked again after
re-acquiring the socket lock to detect the deletion. This is done while
holding a reference to the transport to prevent it from being freed in
the process.
If the transport was deleted while the socket lock was relinquished,
sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() will return -EAGAIN to let userspace retry the
send.
The bug was found by a private syzbot instance (see the error report [1]
and the C reproducer that triggers it [2]).
Link: https://people.igalia.com/rcn/kernel_logs/20250402__KASAN_slab-use-after-free_Read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport.txt [1]
Link: https://people.igalia.com/rcn/kernel_logs/20250402__KASAN_slab-use-after-free_Read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport__repro.c [2]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: df132eff4638 ("sctp: clear the transport of some out_chunk_list chunks in sctp_assoc_rm_peer")
Suggested-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Cañuelo Navarro <rcn@igalia.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250404-kasan_slab-use-after-free_read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport__20250404-v1-1-5ce4a0b78ef2@igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 83d85bb069152b790caad905fa53e6d50cd3734d ]
So it can be used for port range filter offloading.
Co-developed-by: Volodymyr Mytnyk <volodymyr.mytnyk@plvision.eu>
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Mytnyk <volodymyr.mytnyk@plvision.eu>
Signed-off-by: Maksym Glubokiy <maksym.glubokiy@plvision.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 3e5796862c69 ("flow_dissector: Fix handling of mixed port and port-range keys")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 482ad2a4ace2740ca0ff1cbc8f3c7f862f3ab507 ]
dev->nd_net can change, readers should either
use rcu_read_lock() or RTNL.
We currently use a generic helper, dev_net() with
no debugging support. We probably have many hidden bugs.
Add dev_net_rcu() helper for callers using rcu_read_lock()
protection.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250205155120.1676781-2-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: dd205fcc33d9 ("ipv4: use RCU protection in rt_is_expired()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2034d90ae41ae93e30d492ebcf1f06f97a9cfba6 ]
Make the net pointer stored in possible_net_t structure annotated as
an RCU pointer. Change the access helpers to treat it as such.
Introduce read_pnet_rcu() helper to allow caller to dereference
the net pointer under RCU read lock.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: dd205fcc33d9 ("ipv4: use RCU protection in rt_is_expired()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6d0ce46a93135d96b7fa075a94a88fe0da8e8773 ]
l3mdev_l3_out() can be called without RCU being held:
raw_sendmsg()
ip_push_pending_frames()
ip_send_skb()
ip_local_out()
__ip_local_out()
l3mdev_ip_out()
Add rcu_read_lock() / rcu_read_unlock() pair to avoid
a potential UAF.
Fixes: a8e3e1a9f020 ("net: l3mdev: Add hook to output path")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250207135841.1948589-7-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fd4f101edbd9f99567ab2adb1f2169579ede7c13 ]
Many (struct pernet_operations)->exit_batch() methods have
to acquire rtnl.
In presence of rtnl mutex pressure, this makes cleanup_net()
very slow.
This patch adds a new exit_batch_rtnl() method to reduce
number of rtnl acquisitions from cleanup_net().
exit_batch_rtnl() handlers are called while rtnl is locked,
and devices to be killed can be queued in a list provided
as their second argument.
A single unregister_netdevice_many() is called right
before rtnl is released.
exit_batch_rtnl() handlers are called before ->exit() and
->exit_batch() handlers.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240206144313.2050392-2-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 46841c7053e6 ("gtp: Use for_each_netdev_rcu() in gtp_genl_dump_pdp().")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3479c7549fb1dfa7a1db4efb7347c7b8ef50de4b ]
If the backlog of listen() is set to zero, sk_acceptq_is_full() allows
one connection to be made, but inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full() does not.
When the net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies is zero, inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full()
will cause an immediate drop before the sk_acceptq_is_full() check in
tcp_conn_request(), resulting in no connection can be made.
This patch tries to keep consistent with 64a146513f8f ("[NET]: Revert
incorrect accept queue backlog changes.").
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250102080258.53858-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/
Fixes: ef547f2ac16b ("tcp: remove max_qlen_log")
Signed-off-by: Zhongqiu Duan <dzq.aishenghu0@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250102171426.915276-1-dzq.aishenghu0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9a79c65f00e2b036e17af3a3a607d7d732b7affb ]
Since commit 099ecf59f05b ("net: annotate lockless accesses to
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog") decided to handle the sk_max_ack_backlog
locklessly, there is one more function mostly called in TCP/DCCP
cases. So this patch completes it:)
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240331090521.71965-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 3479c7549fb1 ("tcp/dccp: allow a connection when sk_max_ack_backlog is zero")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 542ed8145e6f9392e3d0a86a0e9027d2ffd183e4 ]
Access to genmask field in struct nft_set_ext results in unaligned
atomic read:
[ 72.130109] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff0000c2bb708c
[ 72.131036] Mem abort info:
[ 72.131213] ESR = 0x0000000096000021
[ 72.131446] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 72.132209] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 72.133216] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 72.134080] FSC = 0x21: alignment fault
[ 72.135593] Data abort info:
[ 72.137194] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000021, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 72.142351] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 72.145989] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 72.150115] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000237d27000
[ 72.154893] [ffff0000c2bb708c] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=180000023ffff403, pud=180000023f84b403, pmd=180000023f835403,
+pte=0068000102bb7707
[ 72.163021] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] SMP
[...]
[ 72.170041] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/7:0 Tainted: G E 6.13.0-rc3+ #2
[ 72.170509] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[ 72.170720] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-stable202302-for-qemu 03/01/2023
[ 72.171192] Workqueue: events_power_efficient nft_rhash_gc [nf_tables]
[ 72.171552] pstate: 21400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 72.171915] pc : nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables]
[ 72.172166] lr : nft_rhash_gc+0x128/0x2d8 [nf_tables]
[ 72.172546] sp : ffff800081f2bce0
[ 72.172724] x29: ffff800081f2bd40 x28: ffff0000c2bb708c x27: 0000000000000038
[ 72.173078] x26: ffff0000c6780ef0 x25: ffff0000c643df00 x24: ffff0000c6778f78
[ 72.173431] x23: 000000000000001a x22: ffff0000c4b1f000 x21: ffff0000c6780f78
[ 72.173782] x20: ffff0000c2bb70dc x19: ffff0000c2bb7080 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 72.174135] x17: ffff0000c0a4e1c0 x16: 0000000000003000 x15: 0000ac26d173b978
[ 72.174485] x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000030 x12: ffff0000c6780ef0
[ 72.174841] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff800081f2bcf8 x9 : ffff0000c3000000
[ 72.175193] x8 : 00000000000004be x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
[ 72.175544] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffff0000c3000010 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 72.175871] x2 : 0000000000003a98 x1 : ffff0000c2bb708c x0 : 0000000000000004
[ 72.176207] Call trace:
[ 72.176316] nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables] (P)
[ 72.176653] process_one_work+0x178/0x3d0
[ 72.176831] worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0
[ 72.176995] kthread+0xe8/0xf8
[ 72.177130] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 72.177289] Code: 54fff984 d503201f d2800080 91003261 (f820303f)
[ 72.177557] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Align struct nft_set_ext to word size to address this and
documentation it.
pahole reports that this increases the size of elements for rhash and
pipapo in 8 bytes on x86_64.
Fixes: 7ffc7481153b ("netfilter: nft_set_hash: skip duplicated elements pending gc run")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6daf14140129d30207ed6a0a69851fa6a3636bda ]
The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language
extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare
variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2],
introduced in C99:
struct foo {
int stuff;
struct boo array[];
};
By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning
in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which
will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being
inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on.
Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by
this change:
"Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator
may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of
zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1]
Lastly, fix checkpatch.pl warning
WARNING: __aligned(size) is preferred over __attribute__((aligned(size)))
in net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
[3] commit 76497732932f ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Stable-dep-of: 542ed8145e6f ("netfilter: nft_set_hash: unaligned atomic read on struct nft_set_ext")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a6d75ecee2bf828ac6a1b52724aba0a977e4eaf4 ]
It is unclear if net/lapb code is supposed to be ready for 8021q.
We can at least avoid crashes like the following :
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8aabe1f6 len:24 put:20 head:ffff88802824a400 data:ffff88802824a3fe tail:0x16 end:0x140 dev:nr0.2
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5508 Comm: dhcpcd Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00144-g66418447d27b #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024
RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216
Code: 0d 8d 48 c7 c6 2e 9e 29 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 1a 6f 37 02 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc90002ddf638 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 7a24750e538ff600
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000201 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff888034a86650 R08: ffffffff8174b13c R09: 1ffff920005bbe60
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520005bbe61 R12: 0000000000000140
R13: ffff88802824a400 R14: ffff88802824a3fe R15: 0000000000000016
FS: 00007f2a5990d740(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000110c2631fd CR3: 0000000029504000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636
nr_header+0x36/0x320 net/netrom/nr_dev.c:69
dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3148 [inline]
vlan_dev_hard_header+0x359/0x480 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:83
dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3148 [inline]
lapbeth_data_transmit+0x1f6/0x2a0 drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:257
lapb_data_transmit+0x91/0xb0 net/lapb/lapb_iface.c:447
lapb_transmit_buffer+0x168/0x1f0 net/lapb/lapb_out.c:149
lapb_establish_data_link+0x84/0xd0
lapb_device_event+0x4e0/0x670
notifier_call_chain+0x19f/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:93
__dev_notify_flags+0x207/0x400
dev_change_flags+0xf0/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:8922
devinet_ioctl+0xa4e/0x1aa0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1188
inet_ioctl+0x3d7/0x4f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1003
sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1227
sock_ioctl+0x626/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1346
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+fb99d1b0c0f81d94a5e2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/67506220.050a0220.17bd51.006c.GAE@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241204141031.4030267-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7d352ccf1e9935b5222ca84e8baeb07a0c8f94b9 ]
Currently in case of target hardware restart, we just reconfig and
re-enable the security keys and enable the network queues to start
data traffic back from where it was interrupted.
Many ath10k wifi chipsets have sequence numbers for the data
packets assigned by firmware and the mac sequence number will
restart from zero after target hardware restart leading to mismatch
in the sequence number expected by the remote peer vs the sequence
number of the frame sent by the target firmware.
This mismatch in sequence number will cause out-of-order packets
on the remote peer and all the frames sent by the device are dropped
until we reach the sequence number which was sent before we restarted
the target hardware
In order to fix this, we trigger a sta disconnect, in case of target
hw restart. After this there will be a fresh connection and thereby
avoiding the dropping of frames by remote peer.
The right fix would be to pull the entire data path into the host
which is not feasible or would need lots of complex changes and
will still be inefficient.
Tested on ath10k using WCN3990, QCA6174
Signed-off-by: Youghandhar Chintala <youghand@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308115325.5246-2-youghand@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Stable-dep-of: 07a6e3b78a65 ("wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: Fix response handling in iwl_mvm_send_recovery_cmd()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 56440d7ec28d60f8da3bfa09062b3368ff9b16db ]
While running net selftests with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y I saw
one lockdep splat [1].
genlmsg_mcast() uses for_each_net_rcu(), and must therefore hold RCU.
Instead of letting all callers guard genlmsg_multicast_allns()
with a rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() pair, do it in genlmsg_mcast().
This also means the @flags parameter is useless, we need to always use
GFP_ATOMIC.
[1]
[10882.424136] =============================
[10882.424166] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[10882.424309] 6.12.0-rc2-virtme #1156 Not tainted
[10882.424400] -----------------------------
[10882.424423] net/netlink/genetlink.c:1940 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
[10882.424469]
other info that might help us debug this:
[10882.424500]
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
[10882.424744] 2 locks held by ip/15677:
[10882.424791] #0: ffffffffb6b491b0 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219)
[10882.426334] #1: ffffffffb6b49248 (genl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:61 net/netlink/genetlink.c:57 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209)
[10882.426465]
stack backtrace:
[10882.426805] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 15677 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-virtme #1156
[10882.426919] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[10882.427046] Call Trace:
[10882.427131] <TASK>
[10882.427244] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
[10882.427335] lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822)
[10882.427387] genlmsg_multicast_allns (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1940 (discriminator 7) net/netlink/genetlink.c:1977 (discriminator 7))
[10882.427436] l2tp_tunnel_notify.constprop.0 (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:119) l2tp_netlink
[10882.427683] l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:253) l2tp_netlink
[10882.427748] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115)
[10882.427834] genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210)
[10882.427877] ? __pfx_l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create (net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:186) l2tp_netlink
[10882.427927] ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1201)
[10882.427959] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2551)
[10882.428069] genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1220)
[10882.428095] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1332 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357)
[10882.428140] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901)
[10882.428210] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:729 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:744 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2607 (discriminator 1))
Fixes: 33f72e6f0c67 ("l2tp : multicast notification to the registered listeners")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Cc: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241011171217.3166614-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit bddc0c411a45d3718ac535a070f349be8eca8d48 upstream.
The commit cb17ed29a7a5 ("mac80211: parse radiotap header when selecting Tx
queue") moved the code to validate the radiotap header from
ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit to ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap. This made is
possible to share more code with the new Tx queue selection code for
injected frames. But at the same time, it now required the call of
ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap at the beginning of functions which wanted to
handle the radiotap header. And this broke the rate parser for radiotap
header parser.
The radiotap parser for rates is operating most of the time only on the
data in the actual radiotap header. But for the 802.11a/b/g rates, it must
also know the selected band from the chandef information. But this
information is only written to the ieee80211_tx_info at the end of the
ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit - long after ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap was
already called. The info->band information was therefore always 0
(NL80211_BAND_2GHZ) when the parser code tried to access it.
For a 5GHz only device, injecting a frame with 802.11a rates would cause a
NULL pointer dereference because local->hw.wiphy->bands[NL80211_BAND_2GHZ]
would most likely have been NULL when the radiotap parser searched for the
correct rate index of the driver.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Fixes: cb17ed29a7a5 ("mac80211: parse radiotap header when selecting Tx queue")
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
[sven@narfation.org: added commit message]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210530133226.40587-1-sven@narfation.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 1dae9f1187189bc09ff6d25ca97ead711f7e26f9 upstream.
The kernel may crash when deleting a genetlink family if there are still
listeners for that family:
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
...
NIP [c000000000c080bc] netlink_update_socket_mc+0x3c/0xc0
LR [c000000000c0f764] __netlink_clear_multicast_users+0x74/0xc0
Call Trace:
__netlink_clear_multicast_users+0x74/0xc0
genl_unregister_family+0xd4/0x2d0
Change the unsafe loop on the list to a safe one, because inside the
loop there is an element removal from this list.
Fixes: b8273570f802 ("genetlink: fix netns vs. netlink table locking (2)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anastasia Kovaleva <a.kovaleva@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <d.bogdanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241003104431.12391-1-a.kovaleva@yadro.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 099ecf59f05b5f30f42ebac0ab8cb94f9b18c90c ]
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog can be read without any lock being held
at least in TCP/DCCP cases.
We need to use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to avoid load/store tearing
and/or potential KCSAN warnings.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 4d5c70e6155d ("sctp: ensure sk_state is set to CLOSED if hashing fails in sctp_listen_start")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 288efe8606b62d0753ba6722b36ef241877251fd ]
sk->sk_ack_backlog can be read without any lock being held.
We need to use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to avoid load/store tearing
and/or potential KCSAN warnings.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 4d5c70e6155d ("sctp: ensure sk_state is set to CLOSED if hashing fails in sctp_listen_start")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 3cb7cf1540ddff5473d6baeb530228d19bc97b8a ]
Most qdiscs maintain their backlog using qdisc_pkt_len(skb)
on the assumption it is invariant between the enqueue()
and dequeue() handlers.
Unfortunately syzbot can crash a host rather easily using
a TBF + SFQ combination, with an STAB on SFQ [1]
We can't support TCA_STAB on arbitrary level, this would
require to maintain per-qdisc storage.
[1]
[ 88.796496] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 88.798611] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 88.799014] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 88.799506] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 88.799829] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 88.800569] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 2053 Comm: b371744477 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-virtme #1117
[ 88.801107] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 88.801779] RIP: 0010:sfq_dequeue (net/sched/sch_sfq.c:272 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:499) sch_sfq
[ 88.802544] Code: 0f b7 50 12 48 8d 04 d5 00 00 00 00 48 89 d6 48 29 d0 48 8b 91 c0 01 00 00 48 c1 e0 03 48 01 c2 66 83 7a 1a 00 7e c0 48 8b 3a <4c> 8b 07 4c 89 02 49 89 50 08 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 48 c7 07 00
All code
========
0: 0f b7 50 12 movzwl 0x12(%rax),%edx
4: 48 8d 04 d5 00 00 00 lea 0x0(,%rdx,8),%rax
b: 00
c: 48 89 d6 mov %rdx,%rsi
f: 48 29 d0 sub %rdx,%rax
12: 48 8b 91 c0 01 00 00 mov 0x1c0(%rcx),%rdx
19: 48 c1 e0 03 shl $0x3,%rax
1d: 48 01 c2 add %rax,%rdx
20: 66 83 7a 1a 00 cmpw $0x0,0x1a(%rdx)
25: 7e c0 jle 0xffffffffffffffe7
27: 48 8b 3a mov (%rdx),%rdi
2a:* 4c 8b 07 mov (%rdi),%r8 <-- trapping instruction
2d: 4c 89 02 mov %r8,(%rdx)
30: 49 89 50 08 mov %rdx,0x8(%r8)
34: 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 movq $0x0,0x8(%rdi)
3b: 00
3c: 48 rex.W
3d: c7 .byte 0xc7
3e: 07 (bad)
...
Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
0: 4c 8b 07 mov (%rdi),%r8
3: 4c 89 02 mov %r8,(%rdx)
6: 49 89 50 08 mov %rdx,0x8(%r8)
a: 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 movq $0x0,0x8(%rdi)
11: 00
12: 48 rex.W
13: c7 .byte 0xc7
14: 07 (bad)
...
[ 88.803721] RSP: 0018:ffff9a1f892b7d58 EFLAGS: 00000206
[ 88.804032] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9a1f8420c800 RCX: ffff9a1f8420c800
[ 88.804560] RDX: ffff9a1f81bc1440 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 88.805056] RBP: ffffffffc04bb0e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00000000ff7f9a1f
[ 88.805473] R10: 000000000001001b R11: 0000000000009a1f R12: 0000000000000140
[ 88.806194] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9a1f886df400 R15: ffff9a1f886df4ac
[ 88.806734] FS: 00007f445601a740(0000) GS:ffff9a2e7fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 88.807225] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 88.807672] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000050cc46000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 88.808165] Call Trace:
[ 88.808459] <TASK>
[ 88.808710] ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434)
[ 88.809261] ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:715)
[ 88.809561] ? exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:26 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:87 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:147 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1489 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539)
[ 88.809806] ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623)
[ 88.810074] ? sfq_dequeue (net/sched/sch_sfq.c:272 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:499) sch_sfq
[ 88.810411] sfq_reset (net/sched/sch_sfq.c:525) sch_sfq
[ 88.810671] qdisc_reset (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2135 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2441 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3304 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3310 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036)
[ 88.810950] tbf_reset (./include/linux/timekeeping.h:169 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:334) sch_tbf
[ 88.811208] qdisc_reset (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2135 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2441 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3304 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3310 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036)
[ 88.811484] netif_set_real_num_tx_queues (./include/linux/spinlock.h:396 ./include/net/sch_generic.h:768 net/core/dev.c:2958)
[ 88.811870] __tun_detach (drivers/net/tun.c:590 drivers/net/tun.c:673)
[ 88.812271] tun_chr_close (drivers/net/tun.c:702 drivers/net/tun.c:3517)
[ 88.812505] __fput (fs/file_table.c:432 (discriminator 1))
[ 88.812735] task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:230)
[ 88.813016] do_exit (kernel/exit.c:940)
[ 88.813372] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:58 (discriminator 4))
[ 88.813639] ? handle_mm_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:97 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:155 ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:1022 ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:1045 ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:1052 mm/memory.c:5928 mm/memory.c:6088)
[ 88.813867] do_group_exit (kernel/exit.c:1070)
[ 88.814138] __x64_sys_exit_group (kernel/exit.c:1099)
[ 88.814490] x64_sys_call (??:?)
[ 88.814791] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1))
[ 88.815012] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[ 88.815495] RIP: 0033:0x7f44560f1975
Fixes: 175f9c1bba9b ("net_sched: Add size table for qdiscs")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241007184130.3960565-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c8770db2d54437a5f49417ae7b46f7de23d14db6 ]
We have some machines running stock Ubuntu 20.04.6 which is their 5.4.0-174-generic
kernel that are running ceph and recently hit a null ptr dereference in
tcp_rearm_rto(). Initially hitting it from the TLP path, but then later we also
saw it getting hit from the RACK case as well. Here are examples of the oops
messages we saw in each of those cases:
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.780353] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.787572] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.792971] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.798362] PGD 0 P4D 0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.801164] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.805091] CPU: 0 PID: 9180 Comm: msgr-worker-1 Tainted: G W 5.4.0-174-generic #193-Ubuntu
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.814996] Hardware name: Supermicro SMC 2x26 os-gen8 64C NVME-Y 256G/H12SSW-NTR, BIOS 2.5.V1.2U.NVMe.UEFI 05/09/2023
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.825952] RIP: 0010:tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.830656] Code: 87 ca 04 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 c3 49 8b bc 24 40 06 00 00 eb 8d 48 bb cf f7 53 e3 a5 9b c4 20 4c 89 ef e8 0c fe 0e 00 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c1 ef 03 48 89 f8 41 8b bc 24 80 04 00 00 48 f7 e3
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.849665] RSP: 0018:ffffb75d40003e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.855149] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 20c49ba5e353f7cf RCX: 0000000000000000
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.862542] RDX: 0000000062177c30 RSI: 000000000000231c RDI: ffff9874ad283a60
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.869933] RBP: ffffb75d40003e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff987605e20aa8
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.877318] R10: ffffb75d40003f00 R11: ffffb75d4460f740 R12: ffff9874ad283900
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.884710] R13: ffff9874ad283a60 R14: ffff9874ad283980 R15: ffff9874ad283d30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.892095] FS: 00007f1ef4a2e700(0000) GS:ffff987605e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.900438] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.906435] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000003e450ba003 CR4: 0000000000760ef0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.913822] PKRU: 55555554
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.916786] Call Trace:
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.919488]
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.921765] ? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.925859] ? __die+0x90/0xd9
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.929169] ? no_context+0x196/0x380
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.933088] ? ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4e0/0x4e0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.938216] ? ip6_sublist_rcv_finish+0x3d/0x50
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.943000] ? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x50/0x1a0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.947873] ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.952486] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x267/0x450
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.957104] ? ipv6_list_rcv+0x112/0x140
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.961279] ? __do_page_fault+0x58/0x90
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.965458] ? do_page_fault+0x2c/0xe0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.969465] ? page_fault+0x34/0x40
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.973217] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.977313] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.981408] tcp_send_loss_probe+0x10b/0x220
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.985937] tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1b4/0x240
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.990809] tcp_write_timer+0x9e/0xe0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.994814] ? tcp_write_timer_handler+0x240/0x240
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.999866] call_timer_fn+0x32/0x130
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.003782] __run_timers.part.0+0x180/0x280
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.008309] ? recalibrate_cpu_khz+0x10/0x10
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.012841] ? native_x2apic_icr_write+0x30/0x30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.017718] ? lapic_next_event+0x21/0x30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.021984] ? clockevents_program_event+0x8f/0xe0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.027035] run_timer_softirq+0x2a/0x50
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.031212] __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c1
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.035044] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.039480]
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.041840] do_softirq.part.0+0x46/0x50
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.046022] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x50/0x60
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.050460] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x1e/0x20
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.054817] nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x29e/0xbe0 [nf_conntrack]
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.060994] ? get_l4proto+0xe7/0x190 [nf_conntrack]
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.066220] nf_conntrack_in+0xe9/0x670 [nf_conntrack]
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.071618] ipv6_conntrack_local+0x14/0x20 [nf_conntrack]
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.077356] nf_hook_slow+0x45/0xb0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.081098] ip6_xmit+0x3f0/0x5d0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.084670] ? ipv6_anycast_cleanup+0x50/0x50
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.089282] ? __sk_dst_check+0x38/0x70
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.093381] ? inet6_csk_route_socket+0x13b/0x200
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.098346] inet6_csk_xmit+0xa7/0xf0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.102263] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x550/0xb30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.106701] tcp_write_xmit+0x3c6/0xc20
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.110792] ? __alloc_skb+0x98/0x1d0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.114708] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x37/0x100
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.119667] tcp_push+0xfd/0x100
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.123150] tcp_sendmsg_locked+0xc70/0xdd0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.127588] tcp_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.131245] inet6_sendmsg+0x43/0x70
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.135075] __sock_sendmsg+0x48/0x70
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.138994] ____sys_sendmsg+0x212/0x280
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.143172] ___sys_sendmsg+0x88/0xd0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.147098] ? __seccomp_filter+0x7e/0x6b0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.151446] ? __switch_to+0x39c/0x460
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.155453] ? __switch_to_asm+0x42/0x80
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.159636] ? __switch_to_asm+0x5a/0x80
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.163816] __sys_sendmsg+0x5c/0xa0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.167647] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1f/0x30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.171832] do_syscall_64+0x57/0x190
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.175748] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.181055] RIP: 0033:0x7f1ef692618d
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.184893] Code: 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 ca ee ff ff 8b 54 24 1c 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 2f 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 fe ee ff ff 48
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.203889] RSP: 002b:00007f1ef4a26aa0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.211708] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000084b RCX: 00007f1ef692618d
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.219091] RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 00007f1ef4a26b10 RDI: 0000000000000275
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.226475] RBP: 0000000000004000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000020
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.233859] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000000000000084b
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.241243] R13: 00007f1ef4a26b10 R14: 0000000000000275 R15: 000055592030f1e8
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.248628] Modules linked in: vrf bridge stp llc vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nls_iso8859_1 amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper wmi_bmof ipmi_ssif input_leds joydev rndis_host cdc_ether usbnet mii ast drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper i2c_algo_bit fb_sys_fops syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt ccp mac_hid ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler nft_ct sch_fq_codel nf_tables_set nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink ramoops reed_solomon efi_pstore drm ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid0 multipath linear mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core raid1 mlx5_core hid_generic pci_hyperv_intf crc32_pclmul tls usbhid ahci mlxfw bnxt_en libahci hid nvme i2c_piix4 nvme_core wmi
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.324334] CR2: 0000000000000020
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.327944] ---[ end trace 68a2b679d1cfb4f1 ]---
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.433435] RIP: 0010:tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.438137] Code: 87 ca 04 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 c3 49 8b bc 24 40 06 00 00 eb 8d 48 bb cf f7 53 e3 a5 9b c4 20 4c 89 ef e8 0c fe 0e 00 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c1 ef 03 48 89 f8 41 8b bc 24 80 04 00 00 48 f7 e3
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.457144] RSP: 0018:ffffb75d40003e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.462629] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 20c49ba5e353f7cf RCX: 0000000000000000
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.470012] RDX: 0000000062177c30 RSI: 000000000000231c RDI: ffff9874ad283a60
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.477396] RBP: ffffb75d40003e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff987605e20aa8
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.484779] R10: ffffb75d40003f00 R11: ffffb75d4460f740 R12: ffff9874ad283900
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.492164] R13: ffff9874ad283a60 R14: ffff9874ad283980 R15: ffff9874ad283d30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.499547] FS: 00007f1ef4a2e700(0000) GS:ffff987605e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.507886] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.513884] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000003e450ba003 CR4: 0000000000760ef0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.521267] PKRU: 55555554
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.524230] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.530885] Kernel Offset: 0x1b200000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
Jul 26 15:05:03 rx [11061396.660181] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal
exception in interrupt ]---
After we hit this we disabled TLP by setting tcp_early_retrans to 0 and then hit the crash in the RACK case:
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.265582] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.272719] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.278030] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.283343] PGD 0 P4D 0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.286057] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.289896] CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Tainted: G W 5.4.0-174-generic #193-Ubuntu
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.299107] Hardware name: Supermicro SMC 2x26 os-gen8 64C NVME-Y 256G/H12SSW-NTR, BIOS 2.5.V1.2U.NVMe.UEFI 05/09/2023
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.309970] RIP: 0010:tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.314584] Code: 87 ca 04 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 c3 49 8b bc 24 40 06 00 00 eb 8d 48 bb cf f7 53 e3 a5 9b c4 20 4c 89 ef e8 0c fe 0e 00 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c1 ef 03 48 89 f8 41 8b bc 24 80 04 00 00 48 f7 e3
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.333499] RSP: 0018:ffffb42600a50960 EFLAGS: 00010246
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.338895] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 20c49ba5e353f7cf RCX: 0000000000000000
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.346193] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff92d687ed8160
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.353489] RBP: ffffb42600a50978 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000cd896dcc
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.360786] R10: ffff92dc3404f400 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff92d687ed8000
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.368084] R13: ffff92d687ed8160 R14: 00000000cd896dcc R15: 00000000cd8fca81
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.375381] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93158ad40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.383632] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.389544] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000003e775ce006 CR4: 0000000000760ee0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.396839] PKRU: 55555554
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.399717] Call Trace:
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.402335]
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.404525] ? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.408532] ? __die+0x90/0xd9
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.411760] ? no_context+0x196/0x380
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.415599] ? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x50/0x1a0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.420392] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.424401] ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.428927] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x267/0x450
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.433450] ? __do_page_fault+0x58/0x90
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.437542] ? do_page_fault+0x2c/0xe0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.441470] ? page_fault+0x34/0x40
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.445134] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.449145] tcp_ack+0xa32/0xb30
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.452542] tcp_rcv_established+0x13c/0x670
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.456981] ? sk_filter_trim_cap+0x48/0x220
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.461419] tcp_v6_do_rcv+0xdb/0x450
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.465257] tcp_v6_rcv+0xc2b/0xd10
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.468918] ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd3/0x4e0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.473706] ip6_input_finish+0x15/0x20
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.477710] ip6_input+0xa2/0xb0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.481109] ? ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4e0/0x4e0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.486151] ip6_sublist_rcv_finish+0x3d/0x50
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.490679] ip6_sublist_rcv+0x1aa/0x250
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.494779] ? ip6_rcv_finish_core.isra.0+0xa0/0xa0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.499828] ipv6_list_rcv+0x112/0x140
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.503748] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1a4/0x250
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.509057] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1a1/0x2b0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.514538] gro_normal_list.part.0+0x1e/0x40
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.519068] napi_complete_done+0x91/0x130
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.523352] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x18e/0x610 [mlx5_core]
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.528481] net_rx_action+0x142/0x390
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.532398] __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c1
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.536142] irq_exit+0xae/0xb0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.539452] do_IRQ+0x5a/0xf0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.542590] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.546421]
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.548695] RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.553399] Code: 7b ff ff ff eb bd 90 90 90 90 90 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 36 2c 50 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 26 2c 50 00 fb f4 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 e8 dd 5e 61 ff 65
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.572309] RSP: 0018:ffffb42600177e70 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffc2
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.580040] RAX: ffffffff8ed08b20 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000000001
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.587337] RDX: 00000000f48eeca2 RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: 0000000000000082
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.594635] RBP: ffffb42600177e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000020f
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.601931] R10: 0000000000100000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.609229] R13: ffff93157deb5f00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.616530] ? __cpuidle_text_start+0x8/0x8
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.620886] ? default_idle+0x20/0x140
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.624804] arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.628545] default_idle_call+0x23/0x30
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.632640] do_idle+0x1fb/0x270
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.636035] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.640126] start_secondary+0x178/0x1d0
Aug 7 07:26:16 rx [1006006.644218] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
Aug 7 07:26:17 rx [1006006.648568] Modules linked in: vrf bridge stp llc vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nls_iso8859_1 nft_ct amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper wmi_bmof ipmi_ssif input_leds joydev rndis_host cdc_ether usbnet ast mii drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper i2c_algo_bit fb_sys_fops syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt ccp mac_hid ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler sch_fq_codel nf_tables_set nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink ramoops reed_solomon efi_pstore drm ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid0 multipath linear mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core raid1 hid_generic mlx5_core pci_hyperv_intf crc32_pclmul usbhid ahci tls mlxfw bnxt_en hid libahci nvme i2c_piix4 nvme_core wmi [last unloaded: cpuid]
Aug 7 07:26:17 rx [1006006.726180] CR2: 0000000000000020
Aug 7 07:26:17 rx [1006006.729718] ---[ end trace e0e2e37e4e612984 ]---
Prior to seeing the first crash and on other machines we also see the warning in
tcp_send_loss_probe() where packets_out is non-zero, but both transmit and retrans
queues are empty so we know the box is seeing some accounting issue in this area:
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: invalid inflight: 2 state 1 cwnd 68 mss 8988
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: WARNING: CPU: 16 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2605 tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Modules linked in: vrf bridge stp llc vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nls_iso8859_1 nft_ct amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper wmi_bmof ipmi_ssif joydev input_leds rndis_host cdc_ether usbnet mii ast drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_he>
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: CPU: 16 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/16 Not tainted 5.4.0-174-generic #193-Ubuntu
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Hardware name: Supermicro SMC 2x26 os-gen8 64C NVME-Y 256G/H12SSW-NTR, BIOS 2.5.V1.2U.NVMe.UEFI 05/09/2023
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RIP: 0010:tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Code: 08 26 01 00 75 e2 41 0f b6 54 24 12 41 8b 8c 24 c0 06 00 00 45 89 f0 48 c7 c7 e0 b4 20 a7 c6 05 8d 08 26 01 01 e8 4a c0 0f 00 <0f> 0b eb ba 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb7838088ce00 EFLAGS: 00010286
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9b84b5630430 RCX: 0000000000000006
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: ffff9b8e4621c8c0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RBP: ffffb7838088ce18 R08: 0000000000000927 R09: 0000000000000004
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9b84b5630000
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000231c R15: ffff9b84b5630430
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9b8e46200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: CR2: 000056238cec2380 CR3: 0000003e49ede005 CR4: 0000000000760ee0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: PKRU: 55555554
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Call Trace:
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: <IRQ>
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? __warn+0x98/0xe0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? report_bug+0xd1/0x100
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_error_trap+0x9b/0xc0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_invalid_op+0x3c/0x50
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? invalid_op+0x1e/0x30
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1b4/0x240
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer+0x9e/0xe0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_write_timer_handler+0x240/0x240
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: call_timer_fn+0x32/0x130
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: __run_timers.part.0+0x180/0x280
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? timerqueue_add+0x9b/0xb0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x3d/0x90
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_error_trap+0x9b/0xc0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? do_invalid_op+0x3c/0x50
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? invalid_op+0x1e/0x30
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_send_loss_probe+0x214/0x220
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1b4/0x240
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: tcp_write_timer+0x9e/0xe0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? tcp_write_timer_handler+0x240/0x240
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: call_timer_fn+0x32/0x130
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: __run_timers.part.0+0x180/0x280
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? timerqueue_add+0x9b/0xb0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x3d/0x90
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? recalibrate_cpu_khz+0x10/0x10
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? ktime_get+0x3e/0xa0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? native_x2apic_icr_write+0x30/0x30
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: run_timer_softirq+0x2a/0x50
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c1
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: irq_exit+0xae/0xb0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x7b/0x140
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: </IRQ>
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: Code: 7b ff ff ff eb bd 90 90 90 90 90 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 36 2c 50 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 26 2c 50 00 fb f4 <c3> 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 e8 dd 5e 61 ff 65
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb783801cfe70 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RAX: ffffffffa6908b20 RBX: 0000000000000010 RCX: 0000000000000001
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RDX: 000000006fc0c97e RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: 0000000000000082
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: RBP: ffffb783801cfe90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000225
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R10: 0000000000100000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000010
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: R13: ffff9b8e390b0000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? __cpuidle_text_start+0x8/0x8
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ? default_idle+0x20/0x140
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: default_idle_call+0x23/0x30
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: do_idle+0x1fb/0x270
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: start_secondary+0x178/0x1d0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
Jul 26 09:15:27 kernel: ---[ end trace e7ac822987e33be1 ]---
The NULL ptr deref is coming from tcp_rto_delta_us() attempting to pull an skb
off the head of the retransmit queue and then dereferencing that skb to get the
skb_mstamp_ns value via tcp_skb_timestamp_us(skb).
The crash is the same one that was reported a # of years ago here:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/86c0f836-9a7c-438b-d81a-839be45f1f58@gmail.com/T/#t
and the kernel we're running has the fix which was added to resolve this issue.
Unfortunately we've been unsuccessful so far in reproducing this problem in the
lab and do not have the luxury of pushing out a new kernel to try and test if
newer kernels resolve this issue at the moment. I realize this is a report
against both an Ubuntu kernel and also an older 5.4 kernel. I have reported this
issue to Ubuntu here: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/2077657
however I feel like since this issue has possibly cropped up again it makes
sense to build in some protection in this path (even on the latest kernel
versions) since the code in question just blindly assumes there's a valid skb
without testing if it's NULL b/f it looks at the timestamp.
Given we have seen crashes in this path before and now this case it seems like
we should protect ourselves for when packets_out accounting is incorrect.
While we should fix that root cause we should also just make sure the skb
is not NULL before dereferencing it. Also add a warn once here to capture
some information if/when the problem case is hit again.
Fixes: e1a10ef7fa87 ("tcp: introduce tcp_rto_delta_us() helper for xmit timer fix")
Signed-off-by: Josh Hunt <johunt@akamai.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit cb17ed29a7a5fea8c9bf70e8a05757d71650e025 ]
Already parse the radiotap header in ieee80211_monitor_select_queue.
In a subsequent commit this will allow us to add a radiotap flag that
influences the queue on which injected packets will be sent.
This also fixes the incomplete validation of the injected frame in
ieee80211_monitor_select_queue: currently an out of bounds memory
access may occur in in the called function ieee80211_select_queue_80211
if the 802.11 header is too small.
Note that in ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit the radiotap header is parsed
again, which is necessairy because ieee80211_monitor_select_queue is not
always called beforehand.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200723100153.31631-6-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Stable-dep-of: 9d301de12da6 ("wifi: mac80211: use two-phase skb reclamation in ieee80211_do_stop()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 0870b0d8b393dde53106678a1e2cec9dfa52f9b7 ]
Typically, busy-polling durations are below 100 usec.
When/if the busy-poller thread migrates to another cpu,
local_clock() can be off by +/-2msec or more for small
values of HZ, depending on the platform.
Use ktimer_get_ns() to ensure deterministic behavior,
which is the whole point of busy-polling.
Fixes: 060212928670 ("net: add low latency socket poll")
Fixes: 9a3c71aa8024 ("net: convert low latency sockets to sched_clock()")
Fixes: 37089834528b ("sched, net: Fixup busy_loop_us_clock()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Joe Damato <jdamato@fastly.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240827114916.223377-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 807067bf014d4a3ae2cc55bd3de16f22a01eb580 ]
syzkaller reported UAF in kcm_release(). [0]
The scenario is
1. Thread A builds a skb with MSG_MORE and sets kcm->seq_skb.
2. Thread A resumes building skb from kcm->seq_skb but is blocked
by sk_stream_wait_memory()
3. Thread B calls sendmsg() concurrently, finishes building kcm->seq_skb
and puts the skb to the write queue
4. Thread A faces an error and finally frees skb that is already in the
write queue
5. kcm_release() does double-free the skb in the write queue
When a thread is building a MSG_MORE skb, another thread must not touch it.
Let's add a per-sk mutex and serialise kcm_sendmsg().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2366 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:2385 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3175 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3181 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kcm_release+0x170/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1691
Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000ced0fc80 by task syz-executor329/6167
CPU: 1 PID: 6167 Comm: syz-executor329 Tainted: G B 6.8.0-rc5-syzkaller-g9abbc24128bc #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x1b8/0x1e4 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:291
show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:298
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd0/0x124 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x178/0x518 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0xd8/0x138 mm/kasan/report.c:601
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:381
__skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2366 [inline]
__skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:2385 [inline]
__skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3175 [inline]
__skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3181 [inline]
kcm_release+0x170/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1691
__sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
sock_close+0xa4/0x1e8 net/socket.c:1421
__fput+0x30c/0x738 fs/file_table.c:376
____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:404
task_work_run+0x230/0x2e0 kernel/task_work.c:180
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
do_exit+0x618/0x1f64 kernel/exit.c:871
do_group_exit+0x194/0x22c kernel/exit.c:1020
get_signal+0x1500/0x15ec kernel/signal.c:2893
do_signal+0x23c/0x3b44 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1249
do_notify_resume+0x74/0x1f4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:148
exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline]
el0_svc+0xac/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:713
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
Allocated by task 6166:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x70/0x84 mm/kasan/generic.c:626
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:314 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x74/0x8c mm/kasan/common.c:340
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3813 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x204/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:3903
__alloc_skb+0x19c/0x3d8 net/core/skbuff.c:641
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1296 [inline]
kcm_sendmsg+0x1d3c/0x2124 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:783
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0x220/0x2c0 net/socket.c:768
splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:889
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:941 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0xec/0x1d8 fs/splice.c:1164
splice_direct_to_actor+0x438/0xa0c fs/splice.c:1108
do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1207 [inline]
do_splice_direct+0x1e4/0x304 fs/splice.c:1233
do_sendfile+0x460/0xb3c fs/read_write.c:1295
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1362 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1348 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1348
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51
el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155
el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
Freed by task 6167:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x5c/0x74 mm/kasan/generic.c:640
poison_slab_object+0x124/0x18c mm/kasan/common.c:241
__kasan_slab_free+0x3c/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:257
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4299 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x15c/0x3d4 mm/slub.c:4363
kfree_skbmem+0x10c/0x19c
__kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1109 [inline]
kfree_skb_reason+0x240/0x6f4 net/core/skbuff.c:1144
kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1244 [inline]
kcm_release+0x104/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1685
__sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
sock_close+0xa4/0x1e8 net/socket.c:1421
__fput+0x30c/0x738 fs/file_table.c:376
____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:404
task_work_run+0x230/0x2e0 kernel/task_work.c:180
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
do_exit+0x618/0x1f64 kernel/exit.c:871
do_group_exit+0x194/0x22c kernel/exit.c:1020
get_signal+0x1500/0x15ec kernel/signal.c:2893
do_signal+0x23c/0x3b44 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1249
do_notify_resume+0x74/0x1f4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:148
exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline]
el0_svc+0xac/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:713
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000ced0fc80
which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 240
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
freed 240-byte region [ffff0000ced0fc80, ffff0000ced0fd70)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000d35f4ae4 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10ed0f
flags: 0x5ffc00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 05ffc00000000800 ffff0000c1cbf640 fffffdffc3423100 dead000000000004
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff0000ced0fb80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff0000ced0fc00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff0000ced0fc80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff0000ced0fd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc
ffff0000ced0fd80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: ab7ac4eb9832 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module")
Reported-by: syzbot+b72d86aa5df17ce74c60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b72d86aa5df17ce74c60
Tested-by: syzbot+b72d86aa5df17ce74c60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240815220437.69511-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 7395dfacfff65e9938ac0889dafa1ab01e987d15 upstream
Add a timestamp field at the beginning of the transaction, store it
in the nftables per-netns area.
Update set backend .insert, .deactivate and sync gc path to use the
timestamp, this avoids that an element expires while control plane
transaction is still unfinished.
.lookup and .update, which are used from packet path, still use the
current time to check if the element has expired. And .get path and dump
also since this runs lockless under rcu read size lock. Then, there is
async gc which also needs to check the current time since it runs
asynchronously from a workqueue.
[ NB: rbtree GC updates has been excluded because GC is asynchronous. ]
Fixes: c3e1b005ed1c ("netfilter: nf_tables: add set element timeout support")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3d3b2f57d4447e6e9f4096ad01d0e4129f7bc7e9 ]
Struct sctp_ep_common is included in both asoc and ep, but hlist_node
and hashent are only needed by ep after asoc_hashtable was dropped by
Commit b5eff7128366 ("sctp: drop the old assoc hashtable of sctp").
So it is better to move hlist_node and hashent from sctp_ep_common to
sctp_endpoint, and it saves some space for each asoc.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 9ab0faa7f9ff ("sctp: Fix null-ptr-deref in reuseport_add_sock().")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7931d32955e09d0a11b1fe0b6aac1bfa061c005c ]
register store validation for NFT_DATA_VALUE is conditional, however,
the datatype is always either NFT_DATA_VALUE or NFT_DATA_VERDICT. This
only requires a new helper function to infer the register type from the
set datatype so this conditional check can be removed. Otherwise,
pointer to chain object can be leaked through the registers.
Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 806a5198c05987b748b50f3d0c0cfb3d417381a4 ]
This removes the bogus check for max > hcon->le_conn_max_interval since
the later is just the initial maximum conn interval not the maximum the
stack could support which is really 3200=4000ms.
In order to pass GAP/CONN/CPUP/BV-05-C one shall probably enter values
of the following fields in IXIT that would cause hci_check_conn_params
to fail:
TSPX_conn_update_int_min
TSPX_conn_update_int_max
TSPX_conn_update_peripheral_latency
TSPX_conn_update_supervision_timeout
Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/847
Fixes: e4b019515f95 ("Bluetooth: Enforce validation on max value of connection interval")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 92f1655aa2b2294d0b49925f3b875a634bd3b59e upstream.
__dst_negative_advice() does not enforce proper RCU rules when
sk->dst_cache must be cleared, leading to possible UAF.
RCU rules are that we must first clear sk->sk_dst_cache,
then call dst_release(old_dst).
Note that sk_dst_reset(sk) is implementing this protocol correctly,
while __dst_negative_advice() uses the wrong order.
Given that ip6_negative_advice() has special logic
against RTF_CACHE, this means each of the three ->negative_advice()
existing methods must perform the sk_dst_reset() themselves.
Note the check against NULL dst is centralized in
__dst_negative_advice(), there is no need to duplicate
it in various callbacks.
Many thanks to Clement Lecigne for tracking this issue.
This old bug became visible after the blamed commit, using UDP sockets.
Fixes: a87cb3e48ee8 ("net: Facility to report route quality of connected sockets")
Reported-by: Clement Lecigne <clecigne@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: Clement Lecigne <clecigne@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240528114353.1794151-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[Lee: Stable backport]
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 58fbfecab965014b6e3cc956a76b4a96265a1add ]
The software GRO path for esp transport mode uses skb_mac_header_rebuild
prior to re-injecting the packet via the xfrm_napi_dev. This only
copies skb->mac_len bytes of header which may not be sufficient if the
packet contains 802.1Q tags or other VLAN tags. Worse copying only the
initial header will leave a packet marked as being VLAN tagged but
without the corresponding tag leading to mangling when it is later
untagged.
The VLAN tags are important when receiving the decrypted esp transport
mode packet after GRO processing to ensure it is received on the correct
interface.
Therefore record the full mac header length in xfrm*_transport_input for
later use in corresponding xfrm*_transport_finish to copy the entire mac
header when rebuilding the mac header for GRO. The skb->data pointer is
left pointing skb->mac_header bytes after the start of the mac header as
is expected by the network stack and network and transport header
offsets reset to this location.
Fixes: 7785bba299a8 ("esp: Add a software GRO codepath")
Signed-off-by: Paul Davey <paul.davey@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1971d13ffa84a551d29a81fdf5b5ec5be166ac83 ]
syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and
unix_state_lock().
One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another
is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket.
So, the splat is false-positive.
Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat.
Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue
is only applied to the old GC impl.
[0]:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------------------------------
kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140
unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline]
unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876
skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188
skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline]
__kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline]
kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252
kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline]
manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline]
unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749
unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981
do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline]
splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295
do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379
__do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline]
__do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline]
__se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
__unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(unix_gc_lock);
lock(&u->lock);
lock(unix_gc_lock);
lock(&u->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11:
#0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
#0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
#1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
#2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
__unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Fixes: 47d8ac011fe1 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 97af84a6bba2ab2b9c704c08e67de3b5ea551bb2 ]
When touching unix_sk(sk)->inflight, we are always under
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock).
Let's convert unix_sk(sk)->inflight to the normal unsigned long.
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123170856.41348-3-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 47d8ac011fe1 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7633c4da919ad51164acbf1aa322cc1a3ead6129 ]
Although ipv6_get_ifaddr walks inet6_addr_lst under the RCU lock, it
still means hlist_for_each_entry_rcu can return an item that got removed
from the list. The memory itself of such item is not freed thanks to RCU
but nothing guarantees the actual content of the memory is sane.
In particular, the reference count can be zero. This can happen if
ipv6_del_addr is called in parallel. ipv6_del_addr removes the entry
from inet6_addr_lst (hlist_del_init_rcu(&ifp->addr_lst)) and drops all
references (__in6_ifa_put(ifp) + in6_ifa_put(ifp)). With bad enough
timing, this can happen:
1. In ipv6_get_ifaddr, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu returns an entry.
2. Then, the whole ipv6_del_addr is executed for the given entry. The
reference count drops to zero and kfree_rcu is scheduled.
3. ipv6_get_ifaddr continues and tries to increments the reference count
(in6_ifa_hold).
4. The rcu is unlocked and the entry is freed.
5. The freed entry is returned.
Prevent increasing of the reference count in such case. The name
in6_ifa_hold_safe is chosen to mimic the existing fib6_info_hold_safe.
[ 41.506330] refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
[ 41.506760] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 595 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130
[ 41.507413] Modules linked in: veth bridge stp llc
[ 41.507821] CPU: 0 PID: 595 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2.main-00208-g49563be82afa #14
[ 41.508479] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
[ 41.509163] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130
[ 41.509586] Code: ad ff 90 0f 0b 90 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d c0 30 ad 01 00 75 a0 c6 05 b7 30 ad 01 01 90 48 c7 c7 38 cc 7a 8c e8 cc 18 ad ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d 98 30 ad 01 00 0f 85 75 ff ff ff
[ 41.510956] RSP: 0018:ffffbda3c026baf0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 41.511368] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e9c46914800 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 41.511910] RDX: ffff9e9c7ec29c00 RSI: ffff9e9c7ec1c900 RDI: ffff9e9c7ec1c900
[ 41.512445] RBP: ffff9e9c43660c9c R08: 0000000000009ffb R09: 00000000ffffdfff
[ 41.512998] R10: 00000000ffffdfff R11: ffffffff8ca58a40 R12: ffff9e9c4339a000
[ 41.513534] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9e9c438a0000 R15: ffffbda3c026bb48
[ 41.514086] FS: 00007fbc4cda1740(0000) GS:ffff9e9c7ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 41.514726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 41.515176] CR2: 000056233b337d88 CR3: 000000000376e006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
[ 41.515713] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 41.516252] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 41.516799] Call Trace:
[ 41.517037] <TASK>
[ 41.517249] ? __warn+0x7b/0x120
[ 41.517535] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130
[ 41.517923] ? report_bug+0x164/0x190
[ 41.518240] ? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70
[ 41.518541] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[ 41.520972] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 41.521325] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130
[ 41.521708] ipv6_get_ifaddr+0xda/0xe0
[ 41.522035] inet6_rtm_getaddr+0x342/0x3f0
[ 41.522376] ? __pfx_inet6_rtm_getaddr+0x10/0x10
[ 41.522758] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x334/0x3d0
[ 41.523102] ? netlink_unicast+0x30f/0x390
[ 41.523445] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
[ 41.523832] netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100
[ 41.524157] netlink_unicast+0x23b/0x390
[ 41.524484] netlink_sendmsg+0x1f2/0x440
[ 41.524826] __sys_sendto+0x1d8/0x1f0
[ 41.525145] __x64_sys_sendto+0x1f/0x30
[ 41.525467] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x1b0
[ 41.525794] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a
[ 41.526213] RIP: 0033:0x7fbc4cfcea9a
[ 41.526528] Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89
[ 41.527942] RSP: 002b:00007ffcf54012a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 41.528593] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcf5401368 RCX: 00007fbc4cfcea9a
[ 41.529173] RDX: 000000000000002c RSI: 00007fbc4b9d9bd0 RDI: 0000000000000005
[ 41.529786] RBP: 00007fbc4bafb040 R08: 00007ffcf54013e0 R09: 000000000000000c
[ 41.530375] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 41.530977] R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007fbc4ca85d1b
[ 41.531573] </TASK>
Fixes: 5c578aedcb21d ("IPv6: convert addrconf hash list to RCU")
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8ab821e36073a4a406c50ec83c9e8dc586c539e4.1712585809.git.jbenc@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d8a6213d70accb403b82924a1c229e733433a5ef ]
syzbot is able to trigger an uninit-value in geneve_xmit() [1]
Problem : While most ip tunnel helpers (like ip_tunnel_get_dsfield())
uses skb_protocol(skb, true), pskb_inet_may_pull() is only using
skb->protocol.
If anything else than ETH_P_IPV6 or ETH_P_IP is found in skb->protocol,
pskb_inet_may_pull() does nothing at all.
If a vlan tag was provided by the caller (af_packet in the syzbot case),
the network header might not point to the correct location, and skb
linear part could be smaller than expected.
Add skb_vlan_inet_prepare() to perform a complete mac validation.
Use this in geneve for the moment, I suspect we need to adopt this
more broadly.
v4 - Jakub reported v3 broke l2_tos_ttl_inherit.sh selftest
- Only call __vlan_get_protocol() for vlan types.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240404100035.3270a7d5@kernel.org/
v2,v3 - Addressed Sabrina comments on v1 and v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Zg1l9L2BNoZWZDZG@hog/
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:910 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_xmit+0x302d/0x5420 drivers/net/geneve.c:1030
geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:910 [inline]
geneve_xmit+0x302d/0x5420 drivers/net/geneve.c:1030
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4917 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3531 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa20 net/core/dev.c:3547
__dev_queue_xmit+0x348d/0x52c0 net/core/dev.c:4335
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3091 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x8bb0/0x9ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745
__sys_sendto+0x685/0x830 net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3804 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3845 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x613/0xc50 mm/slub.c:3888
kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:577
__alloc_skb+0x35b/0x7a0 net/core/skbuff.c:668
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1318 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbf0 net/core/skbuff.c:6504
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa81/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2795
packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2930 [inline]
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3024 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x722d/0x9ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745
__sys_sendto+0x685/0x830 net/socket.c:2191
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2199
do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
CPU: 0 PID: 5033 Comm: syz-executor346 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1-syzkaller-00005-g928a87efa423 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024
Fixes: d13f048dd40e ("net: geneve: modify IP header check in geneve6_xmit_skb and geneve_xmit_skb")
Reported-by: syzbot+9ee20ec1de7b3168db09@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/000000000000d19c3a06152f9ee4@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Phillip Potter <phil@philpotter.co.uk>
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Phillip Potter <phil@philpotter.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f989d546a2d5a9f001f6f8be49d98c10ab9b1897 ]
The Type I ERSPAN frame format is based on the barebones
IP + GRE(4-byte) encapsulation on top of the raw mirrored frame.
Both type I and II use 0x88BE as protocol type. Unlike type II
and III, no sequence number or key is required.
To creat a type I erspan tunnel device:
$ ip link add dev erspan11 type erspan \
local 172.16.1.100 remote 172.16.1.200 \
erspan_ver 0
Signed-off-by: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 17af420545a7 ("erspan: make sure erspan_base_hdr is present in skb->head")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 151c9c724d05d5b0dd8acd3e11cb69ef1f2dbada ]
We had various syzbot reports about tcp timers firing after
the corresponding netns has been dismantled.
Fortunately Josef Bacik could trigger the issue more often,
and could test a patch I wrote two years ago.
When TCP sockets are closed, we call inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers()
to 'stop' the timers.
inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers() can be called from any context,
including when socket lock is held.
This is the reason it uses sk_stop_timer(), aka del_timer().
This means that ongoing timers might finish much later.
For user sockets, this is fine because each running timer
holds a reference on the socket, and the user socket holds
a reference on the netns.
For kernel sockets, we risk that the netns is freed before
timer can complete, because kernel sockets do not hold
reference on the netns.
This patch adds inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync() function
that using sk_stop_timer_sync() to make sure all timers
are terminated before the kernel socket is released.
Modules using kernel sockets close them in their netns exit()
handler.
Also add sock_not_owned_by_me() helper to get LOCKDEP
support : inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync() must not be called
while socket lock is held.
It is very possible we can revert in the future commit
3a58f13a881e ("net: rds: acquire refcount on TCP sockets")
which attempted to solve the issue in rds only.
(net/smc/af_smc.c and net/mptcp/subflow.c have similar code)
We probably can remove the check_net() tests from
tcp_out_of_resources() and __tcp_close() in the future.
Reported-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240314210740.GA2823176@perftesting/
Fixes: 26abe14379f8 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.")
Fixes: 8a68173691f0 ("net: sk_clone_lock() should only do get_net() if the parent is not a kernel socket")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CANn89i+484ffqb93aQm1N-tjxxvb3WDKX0EbD7318RwRgsatjw@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322135732.1535772-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 77c3c95637526f1e4330cc9a4b2065f668c2c4fe ]
unlocked version of protocol level close, will be used by
MPTCP to allow decouple orphaning and subflow level close.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit c301f0981fdd3fd1ffac6836b423c4d7a8e0eb63 upstream.
The problem is in nft_byteorder_eval() where we are iterating through a
loop and writing to dst[0], dst[1], dst[2] and so on... On each
iteration we are writing 8 bytes. But dst[] is an array of u32 so each
element only has space for 4 bytes. That means that every iteration
overwrites part of the previous element.
I spotted this bug while reviewing commit caf3ef7468f7 ("netfilter:
nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval") which is a related
issue. I think that the reason we have not detected this bug in testing
is that most of time we only write one element.
Fixes: ce1e7989d989 ("netfilter: nft_byteorder: provide 64bit le/be conversion")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
[Ajay: Modified to apply on v5.4.y]
Signed-off-by: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4d322dce82a1d44f8c83f0f54f95dd1b8dcf46c9 ]
syzbot reported a lockdep splat [1].
Blamed commit hinted about the possible lockdep
violation, and code used unix_state_lock_nested()
in an attempt to silence lockdep.
It is not sufficient, because unix_state_lock_nested()
is already used from unix_state_double_lock().
We need to use a separate subclass.
This patch adds a distinct enumeration to make things
more explicit.
Also use swap() in unix_state_double_lock() as a clean up.
v2: add a missing inline keyword to unix_state_lock_nested()
[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00356-g8a696a29c690 #0 Not tainted
syz-executor.1/2542 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88808b5df9e8 (rlock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88808b5dfe70 (&u->lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xfc7/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2089
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&u->lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}:
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
_raw_spin_lock_nested+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:378
sk_diag_dump_icons net/unix/diag.c:87 [inline]
sk_diag_fill+0x6ea/0xfe0 net/unix/diag.c:157
sk_diag_dump net/unix/diag.c:196 [inline]
unix_diag_dump+0x3e9/0x630 net/unix/diag.c:220
netlink_dump+0x5c1/0xcd0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2264
__netlink_dump_start+0x5d7/0x780 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2370
netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:338 [inline]
unix_diag_handler_dump+0x1c3/0x8f0 net/unix/diag.c:319
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0xe3/0x400
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1df/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:280
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7e6/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
netlink_sendmsg+0xa37/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x39a/0x520 net/socket.c:1160
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2085 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
vfs_write+0xa74/0xca0 fs/read_write.c:590
ksys_write+0x1a0/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:643
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
-> #0 (rlock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{2:2}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x1909/0x5ab0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863
unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x15d9/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2112
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x592/0x890 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x730 net/socket.c:2724
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2753 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2750 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2750
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&u->lock/1);
lock(rlock-AF_UNIX);
lock(&u->lock/1);
lock(rlock-AF_UNIX);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor.1/2542:
#0: ffff88808b5dfe70 (&u->lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xfc7/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2089
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 2542 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00356-g8a696a29c690 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
check_noncircular+0x366/0x490 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x1909/0x5ab0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863
unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x15d9/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2112
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x592/0x890 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x730 net/socket.c:2724
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2753 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2750 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2750
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
RIP: 0033:0x7f26d887cda9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f26d95a60c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f26d89abf80 RCX: 00007f26d887cda9
RDX: 000000000000003e RSI: 00000000200bd000 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f26d88c947a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000008c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f26d89abf80 R15: 00007ffcfe081a68
Fixes: 2aac7a2cb0d9 ("unix_diag: Pending connections IDs NLA")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240130184235.1620738-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e3f9bed9bee261e3347131764e42aeedf1ffea61 ]
syzbot reported an uninit-value bug below. [0]
llc supports ETH_P_802_2 (0x0004) and used to support ETH_P_TR_802_2
(0x0011), and syzbot abused the latter to trigger the bug.
write$tun(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)={@val={0x0, 0x11}, @val, @mpls={[], @llc={@snap={0xaa, 0x1, ')', "90e5dd"}}}}, 0x16)
llc_conn_handler() initialises local variables {saddr,daddr}.mac
based on skb in llc_pdu_decode_sa()/llc_pdu_decode_da() and passes
them to __llc_lookup().
However, the initialisation is done only when skb->protocol is
htons(ETH_P_802_2), otherwise, __llc_lookup_established() and
__llc_lookup_listener() will read garbage.
The missing initialisation existed prior to commit 211ed865108e
("net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring").
It removed the part to kick out the token ring stuff but forgot to
close the door allowing ETH_P_TR_802_2 packets to sneak into llc_rcv().
Let's remove llc_tr_packet_type and complete the deprecation.
[0]:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90
__llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90
__llc_lookup net/llc/llc_conn.c:611 [inline]
llc_conn_handler+0x4bd/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:791
llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5527 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5641
netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5727 [inline]
netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5786
tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555
tun_get_user+0x53af/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
vfs_write+0x8ef/0x1490 fs/read_write.c:584
ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:637
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:649 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:646 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:646
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Local variable daddr created at:
llc_conn_handler+0x53/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:783
llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206
CPU: 1 PID: 5004 Comm: syz-executor994 Not tainted 6.6.0-syzkaller-14500-g1c41041124bd #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023
Fixes: 211ed865108e ("net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring")
Reported-by: syzbot+b5ad66046b913bc04c6f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b5ad66046b913bc04c6f
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119015515.61898-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d03376c185926098cb4d668d6458801eb785c0a5 ]
This reverts 19f8def031bfa50c579149b200bfeeb919727b27
"Bluetooth: Fix auth_complete_evt for legacy units" which seems to be
working around a bug on a broken controller rather then any limitation
imposed by the Bluetooth spec, in fact if there ws not possible to
re-auth the command shall fail not succeed.
Fixes: 19f8def031bf ("Bluetooth: Fix auth_complete_evt for legacy units")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit af6d10345ca76670c1b7c37799f0d5576ccef277 upstream.
In ip6_dst_gc() replace:
if (entries > gc_thresh)
With:
if (entries > ops->gc_thresh)
Sending Ipv6 packets in a loop via a raw socket triggers an issue where a
route is cloned by ip6_rt_cache_alloc() for each packet sent. This quickly
consumes the Ipv6 max_size threshold which defaults to 4096 resulting in
these warnings:
[1] 99.187805] dst_alloc: 7728 callbacks suppressed
[2] Route cache is full: consider increasing sysctl net.ipv6.route.max_size.
.
.
[300] Route cache is full: consider increasing sysctl net.ipv6.route.max_size.
When this happens the packet is dropped and sendto() gets a network is
unreachable error:
remaining pkt 200557 errno 101
remaining pkt 196462 errno 101
.
.
remaining pkt 126821 errno 101
Implement David Aherns suggestion to remove max_size check seeing that Ipv6
has a GC to manage memory usage. Ipv4 already does not check max_size.
Here are some memory comparisons for Ipv4 vs Ipv6 with the patch:
Test by running 5 instances of a program that sends UDP packets to a raw
socket 5000000 times. Compare Ipv4 and Ipv6 performance with a similar
program.
Ipv4:
Before test:
MemFree: 29427108 kB
Slab: 237612 kB
ip6_dst_cache 1912 2528 256 32 2 : tunables 0 0 0
xfrm_dst_cache 0 0 320 25 2 : tunables 0 0 0
ip_dst_cache 2881 3990 192 42 2 : tunables 0 0 0
During test:
MemFree: 29417608 kB
Slab: 247712 kB
ip6_dst_cache 1912 2528 256 32 2 : tunables 0 0 0
xfrm_dst_cache 0 0 320 25 2 : tunables 0 0 0
ip_dst_cache 44394 44394 192 42 2 : tunables 0 0 0
After test:
MemFree: 29422308 kB
Slab: 238104 kB
ip6_dst_cache 1912 2528 256 32 2 : tunables 0 0 0
xfrm_dst_cache 0 0 320 25 2 : tunables 0 0 0
ip_dst_cache 3048 4116 192 42 2 : tunables 0 0 0
Ipv6 with patch:
Errno 101 errors are not observed anymore with the patch.
Before test:
MemFree: 29422308 kB
Slab: 238104 kB
ip6_dst_cache 1912 2528 256 32 2 : tunables 0 0 0
xfrm_dst_cache 0 0 320 25 2 : tunables 0 0 0
ip_dst_cache 3048 4116 192 42 2 : tunables 0 0 0
During Test:
MemFree: 29431516 kB
Slab: 240940 kB
ip6_dst_cache 11980 12064 256 32 2 : tunables 0 0 0
xfrm_dst_cache 0 0 320 25 2 : tunables 0 0 0
ip_dst_cache 3048 4116 192 42 2 : tunables 0 0 0
After Test:
MemFree: 29441816 kB
Slab: 238132 kB
ip6_dst_cache 1902 2432 256 32 2 : tunables 0 0 0
xfrm_dst_cache 0 0 320 25 2 : tunables 0 0 0
ip_dst_cache 3048 4116 192 42 2 : tunables 0 0 0
Tested-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230112012532.311021-1-jmaxwell37@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4.x
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9cb7c013420f98fa6fd12fc6a5dc055170c108db upstream.
Reads and Writes to ip6_rt_gc_expire always have been racy,
as syzbot reported lately [1]
There is a possible risk of under-flow, leading
to unexpected high value passed to fib6_run_gc(),
although I have not observed this in the field.
Hosts hitting ip6_dst_gc() very hard are under pretty bad
state anyway.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ip6_dst_gc / ip6_dst_gc
read-write to 0xffff888102110744 of 4 bytes by task 13165 on cpu 1:
ip6_dst_gc+0x1f3/0x220 net/ipv6/route.c:3311
dst_alloc+0x9b/0x160 net/core/dst.c:86
ip6_dst_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:344 [inline]
icmp6_dst_alloc+0xb2/0x360 net/ipv6/route.c:3261
mld_sendpack+0x2b9/0x580 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1807
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2119 [inline]
mld_ifc_work+0x576/0x800 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2651
process_one_work+0x3d3/0x720 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x618/0xa70 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x1a9/0x1e0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
read-write to 0xffff888102110744 of 4 bytes by task 11607 on cpu 0:
ip6_dst_gc+0x1f3/0x220 net/ipv6/route.c:3311
dst_alloc+0x9b/0x160 net/core/dst.c:86
ip6_dst_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:344 [inline]
icmp6_dst_alloc+0xb2/0x360 net/ipv6/route.c:3261
mld_sendpack+0x2b9/0x580 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1807
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2119 [inline]
mld_ifc_work+0x576/0x800 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2651
process_one_work+0x3d3/0x720 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x618/0xa70 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x1a9/0x1e0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
value changed: 0x00000bb3 -> 0x00000ba9
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 11607 Comm: kworker/0:21 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-syzkaller-00037-g42e7a03d3bad-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220413181333.649424-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ 5.4: context adjustment in include/net/netns/ipv6.h ]
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4.x
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cf86a086a18095e33e0637cb78cda1fcf5280852 upstream.
percpu_counter_add() uses a default batch size which is quite big
on platforms with 256 cpus. (2*256 -> 512)
This means dst_entries_get_fast() can be off by +/- 2*(nr_cpus^2)
(131072 on servers with 256 cpus)
Reduce the batch size to something more reasonable, and
add logic to ip6_dst_gc() to call dst_entries_get_slow()
before calling the _very_ expensive fib6_run_gc() function.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4.x
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bd4a816752bab609dd6d65ae021387beb9e2ddbd ]
Lorenzo points out that we effectively clear all unknown
flags from PIO when copying them to userspace in the netlink
RTM_NEWPREFIX notification.
We could fix this one at a time as new flags are defined,
or in one fell swoop - I choose the latter.
We could either define 6 new reserved flags (reserved1..6) and handle
them individually (and rename them as new flags are defined), or we
could simply copy the entire unmodified byte over - I choose the latter.
This unfortunately requires some anonymous union/struct magic,
so we add a static assert on the struct size for a little extra safety.
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit e03781879a0d524ce3126678d50a80484a513c4b upstream.
The "NET_DM" generic netlink family notifies drop locations over the
"events" multicast group. This is problematic since by default generic
netlink allows non-root users to listen to these notifications.
Fix by adding a new field to the generic netlink multicast group
structure that when set prevents non-root users or root without the
'CAP_SYS_ADMIN' capability (in the user namespace owning the network
namespace) from joining the group. Set this field for the "events"
group. Use 'CAP_SYS_ADMIN' rather than 'CAP_NET_ADMIN' because of the
nature of the information that is shared over this group.
Note that the capability check in this case will always be performed
against the initial user namespace since the family is not netns aware
and only operates in the initial network namespace.
A new field is added to the structure rather than using the "flags"
field because the existing field uses uAPI flags and it is inappropriate
to add a new uAPI flag for an internal kernel check. In net-next we can
rework the "flags" field to use internal flags and fold the new field
into it. But for now, in order to reduce the amount of changes, add a
new field.
Since the information can only be consumed by root, mark the control
plane operations that start and stop the tracing as root-only using the
'GENL_ADMIN_PERM' flag.
Tested using [1].
Before:
# capsh -- -c ./dm_repo
# capsh --drop=cap_sys_admin -- -c ./dm_repo
After:
# capsh -- -c ./dm_repo
# capsh --drop=cap_sys_admin -- -c ./dm_repo
Failed to join "events" multicast group
[1]
$ cat dm.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <netlink/genl/ctrl.h>
#include <netlink/genl/genl.h>
#include <netlink/socket.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct nl_sock *sk;
int grp, err;
sk = nl_socket_alloc();
if (!sk) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate socket\n");
return -1;
}
err = genl_connect(sk);
if (err) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to connect socket\n");
return err;
}
grp = genl_ctrl_resolve_grp(sk, "NET_DM", "events");
if (grp < 0) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Failed to resolve \"events\" multicast group\n");
return grp;
}
err = nl_socket_add_memberships(sk, grp, NFNLGRP_NONE);
if (err) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to join \"events\" multicast group\n");
return err;
}
return 0;
}
$ gcc -I/usr/include/libnl3 -lnl-3 -lnl-genl-3 -o dm_repo dm.c
Fixes: 9a8afc8d3962 ("Network Drop Monitor: Adding drop monitor implementation & Netlink protocol")
Reported-by: "The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)" <security@ncsc.gov.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206213102.1824398-3-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is a partial backport of upstream commit 4d54cc32112d ("mptcp:
avoid lock_fast usage in accept path"). It is only a partial backport
because the patch in the link below was erroneously squash-merged into
upstream commit 4d54cc32112d ("mptcp: avoid lock_fast usage in accept
path"). Below is the original patch description from Florian Westphal:
"
genetlink sets NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV for its netlink socket so anyone can
subscribe to multicast messages.
rtnetlink doesn't allow this unconditionally, rtnetlink_bind() restricts
bind requests to CAP_NET_ADMIN for a few groups.
This allows to set GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM flag on genl mcast groups to
mandate CAP_NET_ADMIN.
This will be used by the upcoming mptcp netlink event facility which
exposes the token (mptcp connection identifier) to userspace.
"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/mptcp/20210213000001.379332-8-mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 179d9ba5559a756f4322583388b3213fe4e391b0 upstream.
The dormant flag need to be updated from the preparation phase,
otherwise, two consecutive requests to dorm a table in the same batch
might try to remove the same hooks twice, resulting in the following
warning:
hook not found, pf 3 num 0
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 334 at net/netfilter/core.c:480 __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x1eb/0x610 net/netfilter/core.c:480
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 334 Comm: kworker/u4:5 Not tainted 5.12.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:__nf_unregister_net_hook+0x1eb/0x610 net/netfilter/core.c:480
This patch is a partial revert of 0ce7cf4127f1 ("netfilter: nftables:
update table flags from the commit phase") to restore the previous
behaviour.
However, there is still another problem: A batch containing a series of
dorm-wakeup-dorm table and vice-versa also trigger the warning above
since hook unregistration happens from the preparation phase, while hook
registration occurs from the commit phase.
To fix this problem, this patch adds two internal flags to annotate the
original dormant flag status which are __NFT_TABLE_F_WAS_DORMANT and
__NFT_TABLE_F_WAS_AWAKEN, to restore it from the abort path.
The __NFT_TABLE_F_UPDATE bitmask allows to handle the dormant flag update
with one single transaction.
Reported-by: syzbot+7ad5cd1615f2d89c6e7e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 0ce7cf4127f1 ("netfilter: nftables: update table flags from the commit phase")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0ce7cf4127f14078ca598ba9700d813178a59409 upstream.
Do not update table flags from the preparation phase. Store the flags
update into the transaction, then update the flags from the commit
phase.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cf5000a7787cbc10341091d37245a42c119d26c5 upstream.
When more than 255 elements expired we're supposed to switch to a new gc
container structure.
This never happens: u8 type will wrap before reaching the boundary
and nft_trans_gc_space() always returns true.
This means we recycle the initial gc container structure and
lose track of the elements that came before.
While at it, don't deref 'gc' after we've passed it to call_rcu.
Fixes: 5f68718b34a5 ("netfilter: nf_tables: GC transaction API to avoid race with control plane")
Reported-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
