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commit 5925a0555bdaf0b396a84318cbc21ba085f6c0d3 upstream.
sk_dst_cache has __rcu annotation, so we need a cast to avoid
following sparse error :
include/net/sock.h:1774:19: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces)
include/net/sock.h:1774:19: expected struct dst_entry [noderef] <asn:4>*__ret
include/net/sock.h:1774:19: got struct dst_entry *dst
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Fixes: 7f502361531e ("ipv4: irq safe sk_dst_[re]set() and ipv4_sk_update_pmtu() fix")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit bdbbb8527b6f6a358dbcb70dac247034d665b8e4 ]
In commit be9f4a44e7d41 ("ipv4: tcp: remove per net tcp_sock")
I tried to address contention on a socket lock, but the solution
I chose was horrible :
commit 3a7c384ffd57e ("ipv4: tcp: unicast_sock should not land outside
of TCP stack") addressed a selinux regression.
commit 0980e56e506b ("ipv4: tcp: set unicast_sock uc_ttl to -1")
took care of another regression.
commit b5ec8eeac46 ("ipv4: fix ip_send_skb()") fixed another regression.
commit 811230cd85 ("tcp: ipv4: initialize unicast_sock sk_pacing_rate")
was another shot in the dark.
Really, just use a proper socket per cpu, and remove the skb_orphan()
call, to re-enable flow control.
This solves a serious problem with FQ packet scheduler when used in
hostile environments, as we do not want to allocate a flow structure
for every RST packet sent in response to a spoofed packet.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit df4d92549f23e1c037e83323aff58a21b3de7fe0 ]
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 9de7922bc709eee2f609cd01d98aaedc4cf5ea74 upstream.
Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit b69040d8e39f20d5215a03502a8e8b4c6ab78395 upstream.
When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->
... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!
The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.
Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():
While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54b1
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.
Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.
Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit 5188cd44c55db3e92cd9e77a40b5baa7ed4340f7 ]
UFO is now disabled on all drivers that work with virtio net headers,
but userland may try to send UFO/IPv6 packets anyway. Instead of
sending with ID=0, we should select identifiers on their behalf (as we
used to).
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: 916e4cf46d02 ("ipv6: reuse ip6_frag_id from ip6_ufo_append_data")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Upstream commit a5fe8e7695dc3f547e955ad2b662e3e72969e506 (regulatory:
add NUL to alpha2) contained a hunk that was supposed to be applied to
struct ieee80211_reg_rule. However in stable 3.12 (3.12.31 in
particular), it ended up in struct regulatory_request. Fix that now.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Eliad Peller <eliadx.peller@intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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[ Upstream commit bdf6fa52f01b941d4a80372d56de465bdbbd1d23 ]
Currently association restarts do not take into consideration the
state of the socket. When a restart happens, the current assocation
simply transitions into established state. This creates a condition
where a remote system, through a the restart procedure, may create a
local association that is no way reachable by user. The conditions
to trigger this are as follows:
1) Remote does not acknoledge some data causing data to remain
outstanding.
2) Local application calls close() on the socket. Since data
is still outstanding, the association is placed in SHUTDOWN_PENDING
state. However, the socket is closed.
3) The remote tries to create a new association, triggering a restart
on the local system. The association moves from SHUTDOWN_PENDING
to ESTABLISHED. At this point, it is no longer reachable by
any socket on the local system.
This patch addresses the above situation by moving the newly ESTABLISHED
association into SHUTDOWN-SENT state and bundling a SHUTDOWN after
the COOKIE-ACK chunk. This way, the restarted associate immidiately
enters the shutdown procedure and forces the termination of the
unreachable association.
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit b8c203b2d2fc961bafd53b41d5396bbcdec55998 ]
Currently we genarate a queueing route if we have matching policies
but can not resolve the states and the sysctl xfrm_larval_drop is
disabled. Here we assume that dst_output() is called to kill the
queued packets. Unfortunately this assumption is not true in all
cases, so it is possible that these packets leave the system unwanted.
We fix this by generating queueing routes only from the
route lookup functions, here we can guarantee a call to
dst_output() afterwards.
Fixes: a0073fe18e71 ("xfrm: Add a state resolution packet queue")
Reported-by: Konstantinos Kolelis <k.kolelis@sirrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit f92ee61982d6da15a9e49664ecd6405a15a2ee56 ]
Currently we genarate a blackhole route route whenever we have
matching policies but can not resolve the states. Here we assume
that dst_output() is called to kill the balckholed packets.
Unfortunately this assumption is not true in all cases, so
it is possible that these packets leave the system unwanted.
We fix this by generating blackhole routes only from the
route lookup functions, here we can guarantee a call to
dst_output() afterwards.
Fixes: 2774c131b1d ("xfrm: Handle blackhole route creation via afinfo.")
Reported-by: Konstantinos Kolelis <k.kolelis@sirrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit 4fab9071950c2021d846e18351e0f46a1cffd67b ]
Make sure we use the correct address-family-specific function for
handling MTU reductions from within tcp_release_cb().
Previously AF_INET6 sockets were incorrectly always using the IPv6
code path when sometimes they were handling IPv4 traffic and thus had
an IPv4 dst.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Fixes: 563d34d057862 ("tcp: dont drop MTU reduction indications")
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit a5fe8e7695dc3f547e955ad2b662e3e72969e506 upstream.
alpha2 is defined as 2-chars array, but is used in multiple
places as string (e.g. with nla_put_string calls), which
might leak kernel data.
Solve it by simply adding an extra char for the NULL
terminator, making such operations safe.
Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliadx.peller@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 448cd2e248732326632957e52ea9c44729affcb2 upstream.
In case of beacon_loss with IEEE80211_HW_CONNECTION_MONITOR
device, mac80211 probes the ap (and disconnects on timeout)
but ignores the ack.
If we already got an ack, there's no reason to continue
disconnecting. this can help devices that supports
IEEE80211_HW_CONNECTION_MONITOR only partially (e.g. take
care of keep alives, but does not probe the ap.
In case the device wants to disconnect without probing,
it can just call ieee80211_connection_loss.
Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliadx.peller@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit 04ca6973f7c1a0d8537f2d9906a0cf8e69886d75 ]
In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and
Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to
infer whether two machines are exchanging packets.
With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we
changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this
side-channel technique.
This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers
for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after
an idle period.
Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most
once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not
increase collision probability.
This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can
rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine.
We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash
on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be
used to infer information for other protocols.
For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr.
If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict.
21:57:11.008086 IP (...)
A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64
21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...)
target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64
21:57:12.013133 IP (...)
A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64
21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...)
target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64
21:57:13.016580 IP (...)
A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64
21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...)
target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64
[1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu>
Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit 73f156a6e8c1074ac6327e0abd1169e95eb66463 ]
Ideally, we would need to generate IP ID using a per destination IP
generator.
linux kernels used inet_peer cache for this purpose, but this had a huge
cost on servers disabling MTU discovery.
1) each inet_peer struct consumes 192 bytes
2) inetpeer cache uses a binary tree of inet_peer structs,
with a nominal size of ~66000 elements under load.
3) lookups in this tree are hitting a lot of cache lines, as tree depth
is about 20.
4) If server deals with many tcp flows, we have a high probability of
not finding the inet_peer, allocating a fresh one, inserting it in
the tree with same initial ip_id_count, (cf secure_ip_id())
5) We garbage collect inet_peer aggressively.
IP ID generation do not have to be 'perfect'
Goal is trying to avoid duplicates in a short period of time,
so that reassembly units have a chance to complete reassembly of
fragments belonging to one message before receiving other fragments
with a recycled ID.
We simply use an array of generators, and a Jenkin hash using the dst IP
as a key.
ipv6_select_ident() is put back into net/ipv6/ip6_output.c where it
belongs (it is only used from this file)
secure_ip_id() and secure_ipv6_id() no longer are needed.
Rename ip_select_ident_more() to ip_select_ident_segs() to avoid
unnecessary decrement/increment of the number of segments.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit 7f502361531e9eecb396cf99bdc9e9a59f7ebd7f ]
We have two different ways to handle changes to sk->sk_dst
First way (used by TCP) assumes socket lock is owned by caller, and use
no extra lock : __sk_dst_set() & __sk_dst_reset()
Another way (used by UDP) uses sk_dst_lock because socket lock is not
always taken. Note that sk_dst_lock is not softirq safe.
These ways are not inter changeable for a given socket type.
ipv4_sk_update_pmtu(), added in linux-3.8, added a race, as it used
the socket lock as synchronization, but users might be UDP sockets.
Instead of converting sk_dst_lock to a softirq safe version, use xchg()
as we did for sk_rx_dst in commit e47eb5dfb296b ("udp: ipv4: do not use
sk_dst_lock from softirq context")
In a follow up patch, we probably can remove sk_dst_lock, as it is
only used in IPv6.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Fixes: 9cb3a50c5f63e ("ipv4: Invalidate the socket cached route on pmtu events if possible")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit f88649721268999bdff09777847080a52004f691 ]
When IP route cache had been removed in linux-3.6, we broke assumption
that dst entries were all freed after rcu grace period. DST_NOCACHE
dst were supposed to be freed from dst_release(). But it appears
we want to keep such dst around, either in UDP sockets or tunnels.
In sk_dst_get() we need to make sure dst refcount is not 0
before incrementing it, or else we might end up freeing a dst
twice.
DST_NOCACHE set on a dst does not mean this dst can not be attached
to a socket or a tunnel.
Then, before actual freeing, we need to observe a rcu grace period
to make sure all other cpus can catch the fact the dst is no longer
usable.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dormando <dormando@rydia.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit 39c36094d78c39e038c1e499b2364e13bce36f54 ]
I noticed we were sending wrong IPv4 ID in TCP flows when MTU discovery
is disabled.
Note how GSO/TSO packets do not have monotonically incrementing ID.
06:37:41.575531 IP (id 14227, proto: TCP (6), length: 4396)
06:37:41.575534 IP (id 14272, proto: TCP (6), length: 65212)
06:37:41.575544 IP (id 14312, proto: TCP (6), length: 57972)
06:37:41.575678 IP (id 14317, proto: TCP (6), length: 7292)
06:37:41.575683 IP (id 14361, proto: TCP (6), length: 63764)
It appears I introduced this bug in linux-3.1.
inet_getid() must return the old value of peer->ip_id_count,
not the new one.
Lets revert this part, and remove the prevention of
a null identification field in IPv6 Fragment Extension Header,
which is dubious and not even done properly.
Fixes: 87c48fa3b463 ("ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit a3b299da869d6e78cf42ae0b1b41797bcb8c5e4b ]
sk_net_capable - The common case, operations that are safe in a network namespace.
sk_capable - Operations that are not known to be safe in a network namespace
sk_ns_capable - The general case for special cases.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit 2c4a336e0a3e203fab6aa8d8f7bb70a0ad968a6b ]
Right now the core vsock module is the owner of the proto family. This
means there's nothing preventing the transport module from unloading if
there are open sockets, which results in a panic. Fix that by allowing
the transport to be the owner, which will refcount it properly.
Includes version bump to 1.0.1.0-k
Passes checkpatch this time, I swear...
Acked-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit b14878ccb7fac0242db82720b784ab62c467c0dc ]
Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch
auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect:
Oops[#1]:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1
task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80
[<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4
[<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c
[<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8
[<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214
[<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630
[<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24
[<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440
[<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564
[<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c
[<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210
[<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac
[<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0
[<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4
[<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48
[<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148
[<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398
Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0
03e00008 00000000
---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that
ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs()
when endpoint is being created.
After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1,
the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during
reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init()
via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk,
the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process
all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that
net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through,
but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus,
dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint
initialization phase.
The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value
during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is
being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate
from the very first days.
Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit 30f78d8ebf7f514801e71b88a10c948275168518 ]
Francois reported that setting big mtu on loopback device could prevent
tcp sessions making progress.
We do not support (yet ?) IPv6 Jumbograms and cook corrupted packets.
We must limit the IPv6 MTU to (65535 + 40) bytes in theory.
Tested:
ifconfig lo mtu 70000
netperf -H ::1
Before patch : Throughput : 0.05 Mbits
After patch : Throughput : 35484 Mbits
Reported-by: Francois WELLENREITER <f.wellenreiter@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 223b02d923ecd7c84cf9780bb3686f455d279279 upstream.
"len" contains sizeof(nf_ct_ext) and size of extensions. In a worst
case it can contain all extensions. Bellow you can find sizes for all
types of extensions. Their sum is definitely bigger than 256.
nf_ct_ext_types[0]->len = 24
nf_ct_ext_types[1]->len = 32
nf_ct_ext_types[2]->len = 24
nf_ct_ext_types[3]->len = 32
nf_ct_ext_types[4]->len = 152
nf_ct_ext_types[5]->len = 2
nf_ct_ext_types[6]->len = 16
nf_ct_ext_types[7]->len = 8
I have seen "len" up to 280 and my host has crashes w/o this patch.
The right way to fix this problem is reducing the size of the ecache
extension (4) and Florian is going to do this, but these changes will
be quite large to be appropriate for a stable tree.
Fixes: 5b423f6a40a0 (netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix racy timer handling with reliable)
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit 632623153196bf183a69686ed9c07eee98ff1bf8 ]
While it is true that getnstimeofday() uses about 40 cycles if TSC
is available, it can use 1600 cycles if hpet is the clocksource.
Switch to get_jiffies_64(), as this is more than enough, and
go back to 60 seconds periods.
Fixes: 8c27bd75f04f ("tcp: syncookies: reduce cookie lifetime to 128 seconds")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit c3f9b01849ef3bc69024990092b9f42e20df7797 ]
Lars Persson reported following deadlock :
-000 |M:0x0:0x802B6AF8(asm) <-- arch_spin_lock
-001 |tcp_v4_rcv(skb = 0x8BD527A0) <-- sk = 0x8BE6B2A0
-002 |ip_local_deliver_finish(skb = 0x8BD527A0)
-003 |__netif_receive_skb_core(skb = 0x8BD527A0, ?)
-004 |netif_receive_skb(skb = 0x8BD527A0)
-005 |elk_poll(napi = 0x8C770500, budget = 64)
-006 |net_rx_action(?)
-007 |__do_softirq()
-008 |do_softirq()
-009 |local_bh_enable()
-010 |tcp_rcv_established(sk = 0x8BE6B2A0, skb = 0x87D3A9E0, th = 0x814EBE14, ?)
-011 |tcp_v4_do_rcv(sk = 0x8BE6B2A0, skb = 0x87D3A9E0)
-012 |tcp_delack_timer_handler(sk = 0x8BE6B2A0)
-013 |tcp_release_cb(sk = 0x8BE6B2A0)
-014 |release_sock(sk = 0x8BE6B2A0)
-015 |tcp_sendmsg(?, sk = 0x8BE6B2A0, ?, ?)
-016 |sock_sendmsg(sock = 0x8518C4C0, msg = 0x87D8DAA8, size = 4096)
-017 |kernel_sendmsg(?, ?, ?, ?, size = 4096)
-018 |smb_send_kvec()
-019 |smb_send_rqst(server = 0x87C4D400, rqst = 0x87D8DBA0)
-020 |cifs_call_async()
-021 |cifs_async_writev(wdata = 0x87FD6580)
-022 |cifs_writepages(mapping = 0x852096E4, wbc = 0x87D8DC88)
-023 |__writeback_single_inode(inode = 0x852095D0, wbc = 0x87D8DC88)
-024 |writeback_sb_inodes(sb = 0x87D6D800, wb = 0x87E4A9C0, work = 0x87D8DD88)
-025 |__writeback_inodes_wb(wb = 0x87E4A9C0, work = 0x87D8DD88)
-026 |wb_writeback(wb = 0x87E4A9C0, work = 0x87D8DD88)
-027 |wb_do_writeback(wb = 0x87E4A9C0, force_wait = 0)
-028 |bdi_writeback_workfn(work = 0x87E4A9CC)
-029 |process_one_work(worker = 0x8B045880, work = 0x87E4A9CC)
-030 |worker_thread(__worker = 0x8B045880)
-031 |kthread(_create = 0x87CADD90)
-032 |ret_from_kernel_thread(asm)
Bug occurs because __tcp_checksum_complete_user() enables BH, assuming
it is running from softirq context.
Lars trace involved a NIC without RX checksum support but other points
are problematic as well, like the prequeue stuff.
Problem is triggered by a timer, that found socket being owned by user.
tcp_release_cb() should call tcp_write_timer_handler() or
tcp_delack_timer_handler() in the appropriate context :
BH disabled and socket lock held, but 'owned' field cleared,
as if they were running from timer handlers.
Fixes: 6f458dfb4092 ("tcp: improve latencies of timer triggered events")
Reported-by: Lars Persson <lars.persson@axis.com>
Tested-by: Lars Persson <lars.persson@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 8c27bd75f04fb9cb70c69c3cfe24f4e6d8e15906 upstream.
We currently accept cookies that were created less than 4 minutes ago
(ie, cookies with counter delta 0-3). Combined with the 8 mss table
values, this yields 32 possible values (out of 2**32) that will be valid.
Reducing the lifetime to < 2 minutes halves the guessing chance while
still providing a large enough period.
While at it, get rid of jiffies value -- they overflow too quickly on
32 bit platforms.
getnstimeofday is used to create a counter that increments every 64s.
perf shows getnstimeofday cost is negible compared to sha_transform;
normal tcp initial sequence number generation uses getnstimeofday, too.
Reported-by: Jakob Lell <jakob@jakoblell.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit f5ddcbbb40aa0ba7fbfe22355d287603dbeeaaac ]
This patch fixes two bugs in fastopen :
1) The tcp_sendmsg(..., @size) argument was ignored.
Code was relying on user not fooling the kernel with iovec mismatches
2) When MTU is about 64KB, tcp_send_syn_data() attempts order-5
allocations, which are likely to fail when memory gets fragmented.
Fixes: 783237e8daf13 ("net-tcp: Fast Open client - sending SYN-data")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Tested-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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[ Upstream commit 6aafeef03b9d9ecf255f3a80ed85ee070260e1ae ]
Pushing original fragments through causes several problems. For example
for matching, frags may not be matched correctly. Take following
example:
<example>
On HOSTA do:
ip6tables -I INPUT -p icmpv6 -j DROP
ip6tables -I INPUT -p icmpv6 -m icmp6 --icmpv6-type 128 -j ACCEPT
and on HOSTB you do:
ping6 HOSTA -s2000 (MTU is 1500)
Incoming echo requests will be filtered out on HOSTA. This issue does
not occur with smaller packets than MTU (where fragmentation does not happen)
</example>
As was discussed previously, the only correct solution seems to be to use
reassembled skb instead of separete frags. Doing this has positive side
effects in reducing sk_buff by one pointer (nfct_reasm) and also the reams
dances in ipvs and conntrack can be removed.
Future plan is to remove net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
entirely and use code in net/ipv6/reassembly.c instead.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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functions
[ Upstream commit 85fbaa75037d0b6b786ff18658ddf0b4014ce2a4 ]
Commit bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69 ("inet: prevent leakage
of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls") conditionally updated
addr_len if the msg_name is written to. The recv_error and rxpmtu
functions relied on the recvmsg functions to set up addr_len before.
As this does not happen any more we have to pass addr_len to those
functions as well and set it to the size of the corresponding sockaddr
length.
This broke traceroute and such.
Fixes: bceaa90240b6 ("inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls")
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Reported-by: Tom Labanowski
Cc: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 01ba16d6ec85a1ec4669c75513a76b61ec53ee50 ]
On receiving a packet too big icmp error we update the expire value by
calling rt6_update_expires. This function uses dst_set_expires which is
implemented that it can only reduce the expiration value of the dst entry.
If we insert new routing non-expiry information into the ipv6 fib where
we already have a matching rt6_info we only clear the RTF_EXPIRES flag
in rt6i_flags and leave the dst.expires value as is.
When new mtu information arrives for that cached dst_entry we again
call dst_set_expires. This time it won't update the dst.expire value
because we left the dst.expire value intact from the last update. So
dst_set_expires won't touch dst.expires.
Fix this by resetting dst.expires when clearing the RTF_EXPIRE flag.
dst_set_expires checks for a zero expiration and updates the
dst.expires.
In the past this (not updating dst.expires) was necessary because
dst.expire was placed in a union with the dst_entry *from reference
and rt6_clean_expires did assign NULL to it. This split happend in
ecd9883724b78cc72ed92c98bcb1a46c764fff21 ("ipv6: fix race condition
regarding dst->expires and dst->from").
Reported-by: Steinar H. Gunderson <sgunderson@bigfoot.com>
Reported-by: Valentijn Sessink <valentyn@blub.net>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Valentijn Sessink <valentyn@blub.net>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This has no other impact than a cosmetic one.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Make sure rt6i_gateway contains nexthop information in
all routes returned from lookup or when routes are directly
attached to skb for generated ICMP packets.
The effect of this patch should be a faster version of
rt6_nexthop() and the consideration of local addresses as
nexthop.
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In v3.9 6fd6ce2056de2709 ("ipv6: Do not depend on rt->n in
ip6_finish_output2()." changed the behaviour of ip6_finish_output2()
such that the recently introduced rt6_nexthop() is used
instead of an assigned neighbor.
As rt6_nexthop() prefers rt6i_gateway only for gatewayed
routes this causes a problem for users like IPVS, xt_TEE and
RAW(hdrincl) if they want to use different address for routing
compared to the destination address.
Another case is when redirect can create RTF_DYNAMIC
route without RTF_GATEWAY flag, we ignore the rt6i_gateway
in rt6_nexthop().
Fix the above problems by considering the rt6i_gateway if
present, so that traffic routed to address on local subnet is
not wrongly diverted to the destination address.
Thanks to Simon Horman and Phil Oester for spotting the
problematic commit.
Thanks to Hannes Frederic Sowa for his review and help in testing.
Reported-by: Phil Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Reported-by: Mark Brooks <mark@loadbalancer.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When CONFIG_NETLABEL is disabled, the cipso_v4_validate() function could loop
forever in the main loop if opt[opt_iter +1] == 0, this will causing a kernel
crash in an SMP system, since the CPU executing this function will
stall /not respond to IPIs.
This problem can be reproduced by running the IP Stack Integrity Checker
(http://isic.sourceforge.net) using the following command on a Linux machine
connected to DUT:
"icmpsic -s rand -d <DUT IP address> -r 123456"
wait (1-2 min)
Signed-off-by: Seif Mazareeb <seif@marvell.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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dst->xfrm is conditionally defined. Provide accessor funtion that
is always available.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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on x86 system with net.core.bpf_jit_enable = 1
sudo tcpdump -i eth1 'tcp port 22'
causes the warning:
[ 56.766097] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 56.766097]
[ 56.780146] CPU0
[ 56.786807] ----
[ 56.793188] lock(&(&vb->lock)->rlock);
[ 56.799593] <Interrupt>
[ 56.805889] lock(&(&vb->lock)->rlock);
[ 56.812266]
[ 56.812266] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 56.812266]
[ 56.830670] 1 lock held by ksoftirqd/1/13:
[ 56.836838] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8118f44c>] vm_unmap_aliases+0x8c/0x380
[ 56.849757]
[ 56.849757] stack backtrace:
[ 56.862194] CPU: 1 PID: 13 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 3.12.0-rc3+ #45
[ 56.868721] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P8Z77 WS, BIOS 3007 07/26/2012
[ 56.882004] ffffffff821944c0 ffff88080bbdb8c8 ffffffff8175a145 0000000000000007
[ 56.895630] ffff88080bbd5f40 ffff88080bbdb928 ffffffff81755b14 0000000000000001
[ 56.909313] ffff880800000001 ffff880800000000 ffffffff8101178f 0000000000000001
[ 56.923006] Call Trace:
[ 56.929532] [<ffffffff8175a145>] dump_stack+0x55/0x76
[ 56.936067] [<ffffffff81755b14>] print_usage_bug+0x1f7/0x208
[ 56.942445] [<ffffffff8101178f>] ? save_stack_trace+0x2f/0x50
[ 56.948932] [<ffffffff810cc0a0>] ? check_usage_backwards+0x150/0x150
[ 56.955470] [<ffffffff810ccb52>] mark_lock+0x282/0x2c0
[ 56.961945] [<ffffffff810ccfed>] __lock_acquire+0x45d/0x1d50
[ 56.968474] [<ffffffff810cce6e>] ? __lock_acquire+0x2de/0x1d50
[ 56.975140] [<ffffffff81393bf5>] ? cpumask_next_and+0x55/0x90
[ 56.981942] [<ffffffff810cef72>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1d0
[ 56.988745] [<ffffffff8118f52a>] ? vm_unmap_aliases+0x16a/0x380
[ 56.995619] [<ffffffff817628f1>] _raw_spin_lock+0x41/0x50
[ 57.002493] [<ffffffff8118f52a>] ? vm_unmap_aliases+0x16a/0x380
[ 57.009447] [<ffffffff8118f52a>] vm_unmap_aliases+0x16a/0x380
[ 57.016477] [<ffffffff8118f44c>] ? vm_unmap_aliases+0x8c/0x380
[ 57.023607] [<ffffffff810436b0>] change_page_attr_set_clr+0xc0/0x460
[ 57.030818] [<ffffffff810cfb8d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 57.037896] [<ffffffff811a8330>] ? kmem_cache_free+0xb0/0x2b0
[ 57.044789] [<ffffffff811b59c3>] ? free_object_rcu+0x93/0xa0
[ 57.051720] [<ffffffff81043d9f>] set_memory_rw+0x2f/0x40
[ 57.058727] [<ffffffff8104e17c>] bpf_jit_free+0x2c/0x40
[ 57.065577] [<ffffffff81642cba>] sk_filter_release_rcu+0x1a/0x30
[ 57.072338] [<ffffffff811108e2>] rcu_process_callbacks+0x202/0x7c0
[ 57.078962] [<ffffffff81057f17>] __do_softirq+0xf7/0x3f0
[ 57.085373] [<ffffffff81058245>] run_ksoftirqd+0x35/0x70
cannot reuse jited filter memory, since it's readonly,
so use original bpf insns memory to hold work_struct
defer kfree of sk_filter until jit completed freeing
tested on x86_64 and i386
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Pablo Neira Ayuso says:
====================
The following patchset contains Netfilter/IPVS fixes for your net
tree, they are:
* Fix BUG_ON splat due to malformed TCP packets seen by synproxy, from
Patrick McHardy.
* Fix possible weight overflow in lblc and lblcr schedulers due to
32-bits arithmetics, from Simon Kirby.
* Fix possible memory access race in the lblc and lblcr schedulers,
introduced when it was converted to use RCU, two patches from
Julian Anastasov.
* Fix hard dependency on CPU 0 when reading per-cpu stats in the
rate estimator, from Julian Anastasov.
* Fix race that may lead to object use after release, when invoking
ipvsadm -C && ipvsadm -R, introduced when adding RCU, from Julian
Anastasov.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Use of RCU api makes vxlan code easier to understand. It also
fixes bug due to missing ACCESS_ONCE() on sk_user_data dereference.
In rare case without ACCESS_ONCE() compiler might omit vs on
sk_user_data dereference.
Compiler can use vs as alias for sk->sk_user_data, resulting in
multiple sk_user_data dereference in rcu read context which
could change.
CC: Jesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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TCP packets hitting the SYN proxy through the SYNPROXY target are not
validated by TCP conntrack. When th->doff is below 5, an underflow happens
when calculating the options length, causing skb_header_pointer() to
return NULL and triggering the BUG_ON().
Handle this case gracefully by checking for NULL instead of using BUG_ON().
Reported-by: Martin Topholm <mph@one.com>
Tested-by: Martin Topholm <mph@one.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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A host might need net_secret[] and never open a single socket.
Problem added in commit aebda156a570782
("net: defer net_secret[] initialization")
Based on prior patch from Hannes Frederic Sowa.
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@strressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There is currently serialization network namespaces exiting and
network devices exiting as the final part of netdev_run_todo does not
happen under the rtnl_lock. This is compounded by the fact that the
only list of devices unregistering in netdev_run_todo is local to the
netdev_run_todo.
This lack of serialization in extreme cases results in network devices
unregistering in netdev_run_todo after the loopback device of their
network namespace has been freed (making dst_ifdown unsafe), and after
the their network namespace has exited (making the NETDEV_UNREGISTER,
and NETDEV_UNREGISTER_FINAL callbacks unsafe).
Add the missing serialization by a per network namespace count of how
many network devices are unregistering and having a wait queue that is
woken up whenever the count is decreased. The count and wait queue
allow default_device_exit_batch to wait until all of the unregistration
activity for a network namespace has finished before proceeding to
unregister the loopback device and then allowing the network namespace
to exit.
Only a single global wait queue is used because there is a single global
lock, and there is a single waiter, per network namespace wait queues
would be a waste of resources.
The per network namespace count of unregistering devices gives a
progress guarantee because the number of network devices unregistering
in an exiting network namespace must ultimately drop to zero (assuming
network device unregistration completes).
The basic logic remains the same as in v1. This patch is now half
comment and half rtnl_lock_unregistering an expanded version of
wait_event performs no extra work in the common case where no network
devices are unregistering when we get to default_device_exit_batch.
Reported-by: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When a router is doing DNAT for 6to4/6rd packets the latest
anti-spoofing commit 218774dc ("ipv6: add anti-spoofing checks for
6to4 and 6rd") will drop them because the IPv6 address embedded does
not match the IPv4 destination. This patch will allow them to pass by
testing if we have an address that matches on 6to4/6rd interface. I
have been hit by this problem using Fedora and IPV6TO4_IPV4ADDR.
Also, log the dropped packets (with rate limit).
Signed-off-by: Catalin(ux) M. BOIE <catab@embedromix.ro>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/linville/wireless into for-davem
Also fixed-up a badly indented closing brace...
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bluetooth/bluetooth
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MRP doesn't implement the periodictimer in 802.1Q, so it never retries
if packets get lost. I ran into this problem when MRP sent a MVRP
JoinIn before the interface was fully up. The JoinIn was lost, MRP
didn't retry, and MVRP registration failed.
Tested against Juniper QFabric switches
Signed-off-by: Noel Burton-Krahn <noel@burton-krahn.com>
Acked-by: David Ward <david.ward@ll.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If local fragmentation is allowed, then ip_select_ident() and
ip_select_ident_more() need to generate unique IDs to ensure
correct defragmentation on the peer.
For example, if IPsec (tunnel mode) has to encrypt large skbs
that have local_df bit set, then all IP fragments that belonged
to different ESP datagrams would have used the same identificator.
If one of these IP fragments would get lost or reordered, then
peer could possibly stitch together wrong IP fragments that did
not belong to the same datagram. This would lead to a packet loss
or data corruption.
Signed-off-by: Ansis Atteka <aatteka@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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commit 578bc3ef1e473a ("ipvs: reorganize dest trash") added
IP_VS_DEST_STATE_REMOVING flag and RCU callback named
ip_vs_dest_wait_readers() to keep dests and services after
removal for at least a RCU grace period. But we have the
following corner cases:
- we can not reuse the same dest if its service is removed
while IP_VS_DEST_STATE_REMOVING is still set because another dest
removal in the first grace period can not extend this period.
It can happen when ipvsadm -C && ipvsadm -R is used.
- dest->svc can be replaced but ip_vs_in_stats() and
ip_vs_out_stats() have no explicit read memory barriers
when accessing dest->svc. It can happen that dest->svc
was just freed (replaced) while we use it to update
the stats.
We solve the problems as follows:
- IP_VS_DEST_STATE_REMOVING is removed and we ensure a fixed
idle period for the dest (IP_VS_DEST_TRASH_PERIOD). idle_start
will remember when for first time after deletion we noticed
dest->refcnt=0. Later, the connections can grab a reference
while in RCU grace period but if refcnt becomes 0 we can
safely free the dest and its svc.
- dest->svc becomes RCU pointer. As result, we add explicit
RCU locking in ip_vs_in_stats() and ip_vs_out_stats().
- __ip_vs_unbind_svc is renamed to __ip_vs_svc_put(), it
now can free the service immediately or after a RCU grace
period. dest->svc is not set to NULL anymore.
As result, unlinked dests and their services are
freed always after IP_VS_DEST_TRASH_PERIOD period, unused
services are freed after a RCU grace period.
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
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Schedulers such as lblc and lblcr require the weight to be as high as the
maximum number of active connections. In commit b552f7e3a9524abcbcdf
("ipvs: unify the formula to estimate the overhead of processing
connections"), the consideration of inactconns and activeconns was cleaned
up to always count activeconns as 256 times more important than inactconns.
In cases where 3000 or more connections are expected, a weight of 3000 *
256 * 3000 connections overflows the 32-bit signed result used to determine
if rescheduling is required.
On amd64, this merely changes the multiply and comparison instructions to
64-bit. On x86, a 64-bit result is already present from imull, so only
a few more comparison instructions are emitted.
Signed-off-by: Simon Kirby <sim@hostway.ca>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
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This makes it more convenient to check for rfkill (no need to check for
dev->rfkill before calling rfkill_blocked()) and also avoids potential
races if the RFKILL state needs to be checked from within the rfkill
callback.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
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Pablo Neira Ayuso says:
====================
The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for you net tree,
mostly targeted to ipset, they are:
* Fix ICMPv6 NAT due to wrong comparison, code instead of type, from
Phil Oester.
* Fix RCU race in conntrack extensions release path, from Michal Kubecek.
* Fix missing inversion in the userspace ipset test command match if
the nomatch option is specified, from Jozsef Kadlecsik.
* Skip layer 4 protocol matching in ipset in case of IPv6 fragments,
also from Jozsef Kadlecsik.
* Fix sequence adjustment in nfnetlink_queue due to using the netlink
skb instead of the network skb, from Gao feng.
* Make sure we cannot swap of sets with different layer 3 family in
ipset, from Jozsef Kadlecsik.
* Fix possible bogus matching in ipset if hash sets with net elements
are used, from Oliver Smith.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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