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2014-08-14inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_countEric Dumazet1-2/+0
[ Upstream commit 73f156a6e8c1074ac6327e0abd1169e95eb66463 ] Ideally, we would need to generate IP ID using a per destination IP generator. linux kernels used inet_peer cache for this purpose, but this had a huge cost on servers disabling MTU discovery. 1) each inet_peer struct consumes 192 bytes 2) inetpeer cache uses a binary tree of inet_peer structs, with a nominal size of ~66000 elements under load. 3) lookups in this tree are hitting a lot of cache lines, as tree depth is about 20. 4) If server deals with many tcp flows, we have a high probability of not finding the inet_peer, allocating a fresh one, inserting it in the tree with same initial ip_id_count, (cf secure_ip_id()) 5) We garbage collect inet_peer aggressively. IP ID generation do not have to be 'perfect' Goal is trying to avoid duplicates in a short period of time, so that reassembly units have a chance to complete reassembly of fragments belonging to one message before receiving other fragments with a recycled ID. We simply use an array of generators, and a Jenkin hash using the dst IP as a key. ipv6_select_ident() is put back into net/ipv6/ip6_output.c where it belongs (it is only used from this file) secure_ip_id() and secure_ipv6_id() no longer are needed. Rename ip_select_ident_more() to ip_select_ident_segs() to avoid unnecessary decrement/increment of the number of segments. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-10-14net: net_secret should not depend on TCPEric Dumazet1-1/+0
[ Upstream commit 9a3bab6b05383f1e4c3716b3615500c51285959e ] A host might need net_secret[] and never open a single socket. Problem added in commit aebda156a570782 ("net: defer net_secret[] initialization") Based on prior patch from Hannes Frederic Sowa. Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@strressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-04-29net: defer net_secret[] initializationEric Dumazet1-0/+1
Instead of feeding net_secret[] at boot time, defer the init at the point first socket is created. This permits some platforms to use better entropy sources than the ones available at boot time. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-10-21tcp: add const qualifiers where possibleEric Dumazet1-1/+1
Adding const qualifiers to pointers can ease code review, and spot some bugs. It might allow compiler to optimize code further. For example, is it legal to temporary write a null cksum into tcphdr in tcp_md5_hash_header() ? I am afraid a sniffer could catch the temporary null value... Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-07net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.David S. Miller1-0/+20
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>