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2023-02-25uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user()Dave Hansen1-0/+4
commit 74e19ef0ff8061ef55957c3abd71614ef0f42f47 upstream. The results of "access_ok()" can be mis-speculated. The result is that you can end speculatively: if (access_ok(from, size)) // Right here even for bad from/size combinations. On first glance, it would be ideal to just add a speculation barrier to "access_ok()" so that its results can never be mis-speculated. But there are lots of system calls just doing access_ok() via "copy_to_user()" and friends (example: fstat() and friends). Those are generally not problematic because they do not _consume_ data from userspace other than the pointer. They are also very quick and common system calls that should not be needlessly slowed down. "copy_from_user()" on the other hand uses a user-controller pointer and is frequently followed up with code that might affect caches. Take something like this: if (!copy_from_user(&kernelvar, uptr, size)) do_something_with(kernelvar); If userspace passes in an evil 'uptr' that *actually* points to a kernel addresses, and then do_something_with() has cache (or other) side-effects, it could allow userspace to infer kernel data values. Add a barrier to the common copy_from_user() code to prevent mis-speculated values which happen after the copy. Also add a stub for architectures that do not define barrier_nospec(). This makes the macro usable in generic code. Since the barrier is now usable in generic code, the x86 #ifdef in the BPF code can also go away. Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> # BPF bits Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-21asm/rwonce: Don't pull <asm/barrier.h> into 'asm-generic/rwonce.h'Will Deacon1-0/+2
Now that 'smp_read_barrier_depends()' has gone the way of the Norwegian Blue, drop the inclusion of <asm/barrier.h> in 'asm-generic/rwonce.h'. This requires fixups to some architecture vdso headers which were previously relying on 'asm/barrier.h' coming in via 'linux/compiler.h'. Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2018-05-05seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch codeThomas Gleixner1-0/+2
The migitation control is simpler to implement in architecture code as it avoids the extra function call to check the mode. Aside of that having an explicit seccomp enabled mode in the architecture mitigations would require even more workarounds. Move it into architecture code and provide a weak function in the seccomp code. Remove the 'which' argument as this allows the architecture to decide which mitigations are relevant for seccomp. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-05-03nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current taskKees Cook1-2/+5
Adjust arch_prctl_get/set_spec_ctrl() to operate on tasks other than current. This is needed both for /proc/$pid/status queries and for seccomp (since thread-syncing can trigger seccomp in non-current threads). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-05-03prctl: Add speculation control prctlsThomas Gleixner1-0/+5
Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance impacting mitigations. PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with the following meaning: Bit Define Description 0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is disabled 2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is enabled If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature. If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation misfeature will fail. PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE. The common return values are: EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl() arguments are not 0 ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values: ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between architectures. Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2018-02-17nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependencyDan Williams1-0/+1
The nospec.h header expects the per-architecture header file <asm/barrier.h> to optionally define array_index_mask_nospec(). Include that dependency to prevent inadvertent fallback to the default array_index_mask_nospec() implementation. The default implementation may not provide a full mitigation on architectures that perform data value speculation. Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881605404.17395.1341935530792574707.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-02-17nospec: Allow index argument to have const-qualified typeRasmus Villemoes1-2/+1
The last expression in a statement expression need not be a bare variable, quoting gcc docs The last thing in the compound statement should be an expression followed by a semicolon; the value of this subexpression serves as the value of the entire construct. and we already use that in e.g. the min/max macros which end with a ternary expression. This way, we can allow index to have const-qualified type, which will in some cases avoid the need for introducing a local copy of index of non-const qualified type. That, in turn, can prevent readers not familiar with the internals of array_index_nospec from wondering about the seemingly redundant extra variable, and I think that's worthwhile considering how confusing the whole _nospec business is. The expression _i&_mask has type unsigned long (since that is the type of _mask, and the BUILD_BUG_ONs guarantee that _i will get promoted to that), so in order not to change the type of the whole expression, add a cast back to typeof(_i). Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881604837.17395.10812767547837568328.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-02-17nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check()Dan Williams1-21/+1
There are multiple problems with the dynamic sanity checking in array_index_nospec_mask_check(): * It causes unnecessary overhead in the 32-bit case since integer sized @index values will no longer cause the check to be compiled away like in the 64-bit case. * In the 32-bit case it may trigger with user controllable input when the expectation is that should only trigger during development of new kernel enabling. * The macro reuses the input parameter in multiple locations which is broken if someone passes an expression like 'index++' to array_index_nospec(). Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881604278.17395.6605847763178076520.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-02-15nospec: Move array_index_nospec() parameter checking into separate macroWill Deacon1-15/+21
For architectures providing their own implementation of array_index_mask_nospec() in asm/barrier.h, attempting to use WARN_ONCE() to complain about out-of-range parameters using WARN_ON() results in a mess of mutually-dependent include files. Rather than unpick the dependencies, simply have the core code in nospec.h perform the checking for us. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517840166-15399-1-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-01-30array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-referencesDan Williams1-0/+72
array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec() implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across multiple architectures (ARM, x86). Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation. Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414229.33451.18411580953862676575.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com