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2022-03-15x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturnPeter Zijlstra1-1/+1
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ksys_unshare()+0x36c: unreachable instruction 0000 0000000000067040 <ksys_unshare>: ... 0364 673a4: 4c 89 ef mov %r13,%rdi 0367 673a7: e8 00 00 00 00 call 673ac <ksys_unshare+0x36c> 673a8: R_X86_64_PLT32 __invalid_creds-0x4 036c 673ac: e9 28 ff ff ff jmp 672d9 <ksys_unshare+0x299> 0371 673b1: 41 bc f4 ff ff ff mov $0xfffffff4,%r12d 0377 673b7: e9 80 fd ff ff jmp 6713c <ksys_unshare+0xfc> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Yi9gOW9f1GGwwUD6@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2021-06-29Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace rlimit handling update from Eric Biederman: "This is the work mainly by Alexey Gladkov to limit rlimits to the rlimits of the user that created a user namespace, and to allow users to have stricter limits on the resources created within a user namespace." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: cred: add missing return error code when set_cred_ucounts() failed ucounts: Silence warning in dec_rlimit_ucounts ucounts: Set ucount_max to the largest positive value the type can hold kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting Add a reference to ucounts for each cred Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
2021-05-07kernel/cred.c: make init_groups staticRasmus Villemoes1-1/+0
init_groups is declared in both cred.h and init_task.h, but it is not actually referenced anywhere outside of cred.c where it is defined. So make it static and remove the declarations. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210310220102.2484201-1-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-30Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucountsAlexey Gladkov1-0/+2
The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous user_namespaces cannot be exceeded. To illustrate the impact of rlimits, let's say there is a program that does not fork. Some service-A wants to run this program as user X in multiple containers. Since the program never fork the service wants to set RLIMIT_NPROC=1. service-A \- program (uid=1000, container1, rlimit_nproc=1) \- program (uid=1000, container2, rlimit_nproc=1) The service-A sets RLIMIT_NPROC=1 and runs the program in container1. When the service-A tries to run a program with RLIMIT_NPROC=1 in container2 it fails since user X already has one running process. We cannot use existing inc_ucounts / dec_ucounts because they do not allow us to exceed the maximum for the counter. Some rlimits can be overlimited by root or if the user has the appropriate capability. Changelog v11: * Change inc_rlimit_ucounts() which now returns top value of ucounts. * Drop inc_rlimit_ucounts_and_test() because the return code of inc_rlimit_ucounts() can be checked. Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c5286a8aa16d2d698c222f7532f3d735c82bc6bc.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-04-30Add a reference to ucounts for each credAlexey Gladkov1-0/+2
For RLIMIT_NPROC and some other rlimits the user_struct that holds the global limit is kept alive for the lifetime of a process by keeping it in struct cred. Adding a pointer to ucounts in the struct cred will allow to track RLIMIT_NPROC not only for user in the system, but for user in the user_namespace. Updating ucounts may require memory allocation which may fail. So, we cannot change cred.ucounts in the commit_creds() because this function cannot fail and it should always return 0. For this reason, we modify cred.ucounts before calling the commit_creds(). Changelog v6: * Fix null-ptr-deref in is_ucounts_overlimit() detected by trinity. This error was caused by the fact that cred_alloc_blank() left the ucounts pointer empty. Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b37aaef28d8b9b0d757e07ba6dd27281bbe39259.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-03-22lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variantsPaul Moore1-1/+1
Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective credentials. This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds. void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook implementations and return the correct credentials. Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA) Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-02-26groups: use flexible-array member in struct group_infoHubert Jasudowicz1-1/+1
Replace zero-size array with flexible array member, as recommended by the docs. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/155995eed35c3c1bdcc56e69d8997c8e4c46740a.1611620846.git.hubert.jasudowicz@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Hubert Jasudowicz <hubert.jasudowicz@gmail.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Cc: Gao Xiang <xiang@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Cc: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-23Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+0
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Add LSM hooks, and SELinux access control hooks, for dnotify, fanotify, and inotify watches. This has been discussed with both the LSM and fs/notify folks and everybody is good with these new hooks. - The LSM stacking changes missed a few calls to current_security() in the SELinux code; we fix those and remove current_security() for good. - Improve our network object labeling cache so that we always return the object's label, even when under memory pressure. Previously we would return an error if we couldn't allocate a new cache entry, now we always return the label even if we can't create a new cache entry for it. - Convert the sidtab atomic_t counter to a normal u32 with READ/WRITE_ONCE() and memory barrier protection. - A few patches to policydb.c to clean things up (remove forward declarations, long lines, bad variable names, etc) * tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: lsm: remove current_security() selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob selinux: avoid atomic_t usage in sidtab fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications selinux: always return a secid from the network caches if we find one selinux: policydb - rename type_val_to_struct_array selinux: policydb - fix some checkpatch.pl warnings selinux: shuffle around policydb.c to get rid of forward declarations
2019-09-05lsm: remove current_security()Paul Moore1-1/+0
There are no remaining callers and it really is unsafe in the brave new world of LSM stacking. Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-07-24access: avoid the RCU grace period for the temporary subjective credentialsLinus Torvalds1-1/+7
It turns out that 'access()' (and 'faccessat()') can cause a lot of RCU work because it installs a temporary credential that gets allocated and freed for each system call. The allocation and freeing overhead is mostly benign, but because credentials can be accessed under the RCU read lock, the freeing involves a RCU grace period. Which is not a huge deal normally, but if you have a lot of access() calls, this causes a fair amount of seconday damage: instead of having a nice alloc/free patterns that hits in hot per-CPU slab caches, you have all those delayed free's, and on big machines with hundreds of cores, the RCU overhead can end up being enormous. But it turns out that all of this is entirely unnecessary. Exactly because access() only installs the credential as the thread-local subjective credential, the temporary cred pointer doesn't actually need to be RCU free'd at all. Once we're done using it, we can just free it synchronously and avoid all the RCU overhead. So add a 'non_rcu' flag to 'struct cred', which can be set by users that know they only use it in non-RCU context (there are other potential users for this). We can make it a union with the rcu freeing list head that we need for the RCU case, so this doesn't need any extra storage. Note that this also makes 'get_current_cred()' clear the new non_rcu flag, in case we have filesystems that take a long-term reference to the cred and then expect the RCU delayed freeing afterwards. It's not entirely clear that this is required, but it makes for clear semantics: the subjective cred remains non-RCU as long as you only access it synchronously using the thread-local accessors, but you _can_ use it as a generic cred if you want to. It is possible that we should just remove the whole RCU markings for ->cred entirely. Only ->real_cred is really supposed to be accessed through RCU, and the long-term cred copies that nfs uses might want to explicitly re-enable RCU freeing if required, rather than have get_current_cred() do it implicitly. But this is a "minimal semantic changes" change for the immediate problem. Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Glauber <jglauber@marvell.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Jayachandran Chandrasekharan Nair <jnair@marvell.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-24treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36Thomas Gleixner1-5/+1
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-10security: don't use RCU accessors for cred->session_keyringJann Horn1-1/+1
sparse complains that a bunch of places in kernel/cred.c access cred->session_keyring without the RCU helpers required by the __rcu annotation. cred->session_keyring is written in the following places: - prepare_kernel_cred() [in a new cred struct] - keyctl_session_to_parent() [in a new cred struct] - prepare_creds [in a new cred struct, via memcpy] - install_session_keyring_to_cred() - from install_session_keyring() on new creds - from join_session_keyring() on new creds [twice] - from umh_keys_init() - from call_usermodehelper_exec_async() on new creds All of these writes are before the creds are committed; therefore, cred->session_keyring doesn't need RCU protection. Remove the __rcu annotation and fix up all existing users that use __rcu. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-09SELinux: Remove unused selinux_is_enabledCasey Schaufler1-1/+0
There are no longer users of selinux_is_enabled(). Remove it. As selinux_is_enabled() is the only reason for include/linux/selinux.h remove that as well. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-12-19cred: allow get_cred() and put_cred() to be given NULL.NeilBrown1-5/+9
It is common practice for helpers like this to silently, accept a NULL pointer. get_rpccred() and put_rpccred() used by NFS act this way and using the same interface will ease the conversion for NFS, and simplify the resulting code. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
2018-12-19cred: add get_cred_rcu()NeilBrown1-0/+11
Sometimes we want to opportunistically get a ref to a cred in an rcu_read_lock protected section. get_task_cred() does this, and NFS does as similar thing with its own credential structures. To prepare for NFS converting to use 'struct cred' more uniformly, define get_cred_rcu(), and use it in get_task_cred(). Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
2018-12-19cred: add cred_fscmp() for comparing creds.NeilBrown1-0/+1
NFS needs to compare to credentials, to see if they can be treated the same w.r.t. filesystem access. Sometimes an ordering is needed when credentials are used as a key to an rbtree. NFS currently has its own private credential management from before 'struct cred' existed. To move it over to more consistent use of 'struct cred' we need a comparison function. This patch adds that function. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
2018-06-28cred: conditionally declare groups-related functionsOndrej Mosnáček1-5/+10
The groups-related functions declared in include/linux/cred.h are defined in kernel/groups.c, which is compiled only when CONFIG_MULTIUSER=y. Move all these function declarations under #ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER to help avoid accidental usage in contexts where CONFIG_MULTIUSER might be disabled. This patch also adds a fallback for groups_search(). Currently this function is only called from kernel/groups.c itself and security/keys/permissions.c, where the call is (by coincidence) optimized away in case CONFIG_MULTIUSER=n. However, the audit subsystem (which does not depend on CONFIG_MULTIUSER) calls this function in -next, so the fallback will be needed to avoid compilation errors or ugly workarounds. See also: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/6/20/670 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git/commit/?h=next&id=af85d1772e31fed34165a1b3decef340cf4080c0 Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-12-15kernel: make groups_sort calling a responsibility group_info allocatorsThiago Rafael Becker1-0/+1
In testing, we found that nfsd threads may call set_groups in parallel for the same entry cached in auth.unix.gid, racing in the call of groups_sort, corrupting the groups for that entry and leading to permission denials for the client. This patch: - Make groups_sort globally visible. - Move the call to groups_sort to the modifiers of group_info - Remove the call to groups_sort from set_groups Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171211151420.18655-1-thiago.becker@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Thiago Rafael Becker <thiago.becker@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-19Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook: "Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for randstruct plugin, including the task_struct. This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and comes in three patches, largest first: - mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout - mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the __randomize_layout section - mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come later) And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and s390 for me" * tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs task_struct: Allow randomized layout randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
2017-06-30randstruct: Mark various structs for randomizationKees Cook1-2/+2
This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists, workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling and will be covered in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-18doc: ReSTify credentials.txtKees Cook1-1/+1
This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare to remove <linux/cred.h> inclusion from <linux/sched.h>Ingo Molnar1-0/+1
Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h doing that for them. Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high, it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over 2,200 files ... Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar1-1/+1
<linux/sched/user.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/user.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/user.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-08cred: simpler, 1D supplementary groupsAlexey Dobriyan1-10/+1
Current supplementary groups code can massively overallocate memory and is implemented in a way so that access to individual gid is done via 2D array. If number of gids is <= 32, memory allocation is more or less tolerable (140/148 bytes). But if it is not, code allocates full page (!) regardless and, what's even more fun, doesn't reuse small 32-entry array. 2D array means dependent shifts, loads and LEAs without possibility to optimize them (gid is never known at compile time). All of the above is unnecessary. Switch to the usual trailing-zero-len-array scheme. Memory is allocated with kmalloc/vmalloc() and only as much as needed. Accesses become simpler (LEA 8(gi,idx,4) or even without displacement). Maximum number of gids is 65536 which translates to 256KB+8 bytes. I think kernel can handle such allocation. On my usual desktop system with whole 9 (nine) aux groups, struct group_info shrinks from 148 bytes to 44 bytes, yay! Nice side effects: - "gi->gid[i]" is shorter than "GROUP_AT(gi, i)", less typing, - fix little mess in net/ipv4/ping.c should have been using GROUP_AT macro but this point becomes moot, - aux group allocation is persistent and should be accounted as such. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160817201927.GA2096@p183.telecom.by Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23cred/userns: define current_user_ns() as a functionArnd Bergmann1-1/+4
The current_user_ns() macro currently returns &init_user_ns when user namespaces are disabled, and that causes several warnings when building with gcc-6.0 in code that compares the result of the macro to &init_user_ns itself: fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c: In function 'xfs_ioctl_setattr_check_projid': fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c:1249:22: error: self-comparison always evaluates to true [-Werror=tautological-compare] if (current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns) This is a legitimate warning in principle, but here it isn't really helpful, so I'm reprasing the definition in a way that shuts up the warning. Apparently gcc only warns when comparing identical literals, but it can figure out that the result of an inline function can be identical to a constant expression in order to optimize a condition yet not warn about the fact that the condition is known at compile time. This is exactly what we want here, and it looks reasonable because we generally prefer inline functions over macros anyway. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Yaowei Bai <baiyaowei@cmss.chinamobile.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-05capabilities: ambient capabilitiesAndy Lutomirski1-0/+8
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based on Christoph's patch. ===== The status quo ===== On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that they hold. Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP), inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify what capabilities can be in pE. Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI. If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it can remove capabilities from X. Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1]. If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP) and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2]. File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them. A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are: pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0) X is unchanged For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently (primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP are empty and fE is false. As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set, LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc. This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged program to change its security state in a way that persists cross execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped programs to be exploited for privilege escalation. ===== The problem ===== Capability inheritance is basically useless. If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated capabilities if you aren't root. On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems. If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with secure exec rules, breaking many things. This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use capabilities for anything useful. ===== The proposed change ===== This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA). pA does what most people expect pI to do. pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore, setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can re-add bits to pA afterwards. The capability evolution rules are changed: pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA) pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA' pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA') X is unchanged If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah! Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace) and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less impossible. Hallelujah! You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch. Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping privileges will still work. It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker *already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though -- setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so, and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more paranoid route. We can revisit this later. An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities (CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than it is with this patch. ===== Footnotes ===== [1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false. The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason. [2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask; it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who has tried to use file capabilities. [3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly discarded. Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2 Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality (from Christoph): /* * Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell * that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities. * * (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> * Released under: GPL v3 or later. * * * Compile using: * * gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng * * This program must have the following capabilities to run properly: * Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE * * A command to equip the binary with the right caps is: * * setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test * * * To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes: * * ./ambient_test /bin/bash * * * Verifying that it works: * * From the bash spawed by ambient_test run * * cat /proc/$$/status * * and have a look at the capabilities. */ #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <cap-ng.h> #include <sys/prctl.h> #include <linux/capability.h> /* * Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed * when the /usr/include files have these defined. */ #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4 static void set_ambient_cap(int cap) { int rc; capng_get_caps_process(); rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap); if (rc) { printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n"); exit(2); } capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS); /* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */ if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) { perror("Cannot set cap"); exit(1); } } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rc; set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW); set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN); set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE); printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n"); if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1)) perror("Cannot exec"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com> Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com> Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-16kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilitiesIulia Manda1-4/+19
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems, supporting multiple users is not necessary. This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled under CONFIG_EXPERT menu. When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case and processes always have all capabilities. The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid, setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups, getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset. Also, groups.c is compiled out completely. In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid adding two ifdef blocks. This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much. The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work. Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS. Bloat-o-meter output: add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-06groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checksEric W. Biederman1-0/+1
Today there are 3 instances of setgroups and due to an oversight their permission checking has diverged. Add a common function so that they may all share the same permission checking code. This corrects the current oversight in the current permission checks and adds a helper to avoid this in the future. A user namespace security fix will update this new helper, shortly. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-07-18nfsd: silence sparse warning about accessing credentialsJeff Layton1-0/+9
sparse says: fs/nfsd/auth.c:31:38: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) fs/nfsd/auth.c:31:38: expected struct cred const *cred fs/nfsd/auth.c:31:38: got struct cred const [noderef] <asn:4>*real_cred Add a new accessor for the ->real_cred and use that to fetch the pointer. Accessing current->real_cred directly is actually quite safe since we know that they can't go away so this is mostly a cosmetic fixup to silence sparse. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
2014-04-04kernel/groups.c: remove return value of set_groupsWang YanQing1-1/+1
After commit 6307f8fee295 ("security: remove dead hook task_setgroups"), set_groups will always return zero, so we could just remove return value of set_groups. This patch reduces code size, and simplfies code to use set_groups, because we don't need to check its return value any more. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove obsolete claims from set_groups() comment] Signed-off-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-01-09cred: Remove tgcred pointer from struct credMarc Dionne1-1/+0
Commit 3a50597de863 ("KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread") removed the definition of the thread_group_cred structure, but left a now unused pointer in struct cred. Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-18Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+0
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman: "While small this set of changes is very significant with respect to containers in general and user namespaces in particular. The user space interface is now complete. This set of changes adds support for unprivileged users to create user namespaces and as a user namespace root to create other namespaces. The tyranny of supporting suid root preventing unprivileged users from using cool new kernel features is broken. This set of changes completes the work on setns, adding support for the pid, user, mount namespaces. This set of changes includes a bunch of basic pid namespace cleanups/simplifications. Of particular significance is the rework of the pid namespace cleanup so it no longer requires sending out tendrils into all kinds of unexpected cleanup paths for operation. At least one case of broken error handling is fixed by this cleanup. The files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ have been converted from regular files to magic symlinks which prevents incorrect caching by the VFS, ensuring the files always refer to the namespace the process is currently using and ensuring that the ptrace_mayaccess permission checks are always applied. The files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ have been given stable inode numbers so it is now possible to see if different processes share the same namespaces. Through the David Miller's net tree are changes to relax many of the permission checks in the networking stack to allowing the user namespace root to usefully use the networking stack. Similar changes for the mount namespace and the pid namespace are coming through my tree. Two small changes to add user namespace support were commited here adn in David Miller's -net tree so that I could complete the work on the /proc/<pid>/ns/ files in this tree. Work remains to make it safe to build user namespaces and 9p, afs, ceph, cifs, coda, gfs2, ncpfs, nfs, nfsd, ocfs2, and xfs so the Kconfig guard remains in place preventing that user namespaces from being built when any of those filesystems are enabled. Future design work remains to allow root users outside of the initial user namespace to mount more than just /proc and /sys." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (38 commits) proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors. proc: Fix the namespace inode permission checks. proc: Generalize proc inode allocation userns: Allow unprivilged mounts of proc and sysfs userns: For /proc/self/{uid,gid}_map derive the lower userns from the struct file procfs: Print task uids and gids in the userns that opened the proc file userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace userns: Implent proc namespace operations userns: Kill task_user_ns userns: Make create_new_namespaces take a user_ns parameter userns: Allow unprivileged use of setns. userns: Allow unprivileged users to create new namespaces userns: Allow setting a userns mapping to your current uid. userns: Allow chown and setgid preservation userns: Allow unprivileged users to create user namespaces. userns: Ignore suid and sgid on binaries if the uid or gid can not be mapped userns: fix return value on mntns_install() failure vfs: Allow unprivileged manipulation of the mount namespace. vfs: Only support slave subtrees across different user namespaces vfs: Add a user namespace reference from struct mnt_namespace ...
2012-11-20userns: Kill task_user_nsEric W. Biederman1-2/+0
The task_user_ns function hides the fact that it is getting the user namespace from struct cred on the task. struct cred may go away as soon as the rcu lock is released. This leads to a race where we can dereference a stale user namespace pointer. To make it obvious a struct cred is involved kill task_user_ns. To kill the race modify the users of task_user_ns to only reference the user namespace while the rcu lock is held. Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-10-02KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-threadDavid Howells1-15/+2
Make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process, but still inherited from the parent thread to solve a problem with PAM and gdm. The problem is that join_session_keyring() will reject attempts to change the session keyring of a multithreaded program but gdm is now multithreaded before it gets to the point of starting PAM and running pam_keyinit to create the session keyring. See: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49211 The reason that join_session_keyring() will only change the session keyring under a single-threaded environment is that it's hard to alter the other thread's credentials to effect the change in a multi-threaded program. The problems are such as: (1) How to prevent two threads both running join_session_keyring() from racing. (2) Another thread's credentials may not be modified directly by this process. (3) The number of threads is uncertain whilst we're not holding the appropriate spinlock, making preallocation slightly tricky. (4) We could use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and key_replace_session_keyring() to get another thread to replace its keyring, but that means preallocating for each thread. A reasonable way around this is to make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process and just document that if you want a common session keyring, you must get it before you spawn any threads - which is the current situation anyway. Whilst we're at it, we can the process keyring behave in the same way. This means we can clean up some of the ickyness in the creds code. Basically, after this patch, the session, process and thread keyrings are about inheritance rules only and not about sharing changes of keyring. Reported-by: Mantas M. <grawity@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
2012-06-01cred: remove task_is_dead() from __task_cred() validationOleg Nesterov1-7/+3
Commit 8f92054e7ca1 ("CRED: Fix __task_cred()'s lockdep check and banner comment"): add the following validation condition: task->exit_state >= 0 to permit the access if the target task is dead and therefore unable to change its own credentials. OK, but afaics currently this can only help wait_task_zombie() which calls __task_cred() without rcu lock. Remove this validation and change wait_task_zombie() to use task_uid() instead. This means we do rcu_read_lock() only to shut up the lockdep, but we already do the same in, say, wait_task_stopped(). task_is_dead() should die, task->exit_state != 0 means that this task has passed exit_notify(), only do_wait-like code paths should use this. Unfortunately, we can't kill task_is_dead() right now, it has already acquired buggy users in drivers/staging. The fix already exists. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-05-03userns: Convert in_group_p and in_egroup_p to use kgid_tEric W. Biederman1-2/+2
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-05-03userns: Store uid and gid values in struct cred with kuid_t and kgid_t typesEric W. Biederman1-8/+8
cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed. The rest of the users of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make in one go and leave the change reviewable. If the user namespace is disabled and CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile and behave correctly. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-05-03userns: Convert group_info values from gid_t to kgid_t.Eric W. Biederman1-4/+5
As a first step to converting struct cred to be all kuid_t and kgid_t values convert the group values stored in group_info to always be kgid_t values. Unless user namespaces are used this change should have no effect. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-04-08cred: Refcount the user_ns pointed to by the cred.Eric W. Biederman1-1/+1
struct user_struct will shortly loose it's user_ns reference so make the cred user_ns reference a proper reference complete with reference counting. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-04-08cred: Add forward declaration of init_user_ns in all cases.Eric W. Biederman1-1/+1
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-01-06capabilities: remove task_ns_* functionsEric Paris1-2/+4
task_ in the front of a function, in the security subsystem anyway, means to me at least, that we are operating with that task as the subject of the security decision. In this case what it means is that we are using current as the subject but we use the task to get the right namespace. Who in the world would ever realize that's what task_ns_capability means just by the name? This patch eliminates the task_ns functions entirely and uses the has_ns_capability function instead. This means we explicitly open code the ns in question in the caller. I think it makes the caller a LOT more clear what is going on. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
2011-08-08cred: use 'const' in get_current_{user,groups}Linus Torvalds1-2/+2
Avoid annoying warnings from these functions ("discards qualifiers") because they assign 'current_cred()' to a non-const pointer. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-08-08CRED: Restore const to current_cred()David Howells1-1/+1
Commit 3295514841c2 ("fix rcu annotations noise in cred.h") accidentally dropped the const of current->cred inside current_cred() by the insertion of a cast to deal with an RCU annotation loss warning from sparce. Use an appropriate RCU wrapper instead so as not to lose the const. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-08-08fix rcu annotations noise in cred.hAl Viro1-5/+6
task->cred is declared as __rcu, and access to other tasks' ->cred is, indeed, protected. Access to current->cred does not need rcu_dereference() at all, since only the task itself can change its ->cred. sparse, of course, has no way of knowing that... Add force-cast in current_cred(), make current_fsuid() et.al. use it. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-07-27atomic: use <linux/atomic.h>Arun Sharma1-1/+1
This allows us to move duplicated code in <asm/atomic.h> (atomic_inc_not_zero() for now) to <linux/atomic.h> Signed-off-by: Arun Sharma <asharma@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-07-09rcu: treewide: Do not use rcu_read_lock_held when calling rcu_dereference_checkMichal Hocko1-1/+0
Since ca5ecddf (rcu: define __rcu address space modifier for sparse) rcu_dereference_check use rcu_read_lock_held as a part of condition automatically so callers do not have to do that as well. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2011-05-20Create Documentation/security/,Randy Dunlap1-1/+1
move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/ to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file> to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
2011-05-13Cache user_ns in struct credSerge E. Hallyn1-2/+8
If !CONFIG_USERNS, have current_user_ns() defined to (&init_user_ns). Get rid of _current_user_ns. This requires nsown_capable() to be defined in capability.c rather than as static inline in capability.h, so do that. Request_key needs init_user_ns defined at current_user_ns if !CONFIG_USERNS, so forward-declare that in cred.h if !CONFIG_USERNS at current_user_ns() define. Compile-tested with and without CONFIG_USERNS. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> [ This makes a huge performance difference for acl_permission_check(), up to 30%. And that is one of the hottest kernel functions for loads that are pathname-lookup heavy. ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-24userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespaceSerge E. Hallyn1-1/+3
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace. - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace. The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left. I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals. Changelog: 11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor 12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether he was the creator. Reverse those checks. 12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case 01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper 01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion 02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to it! Fix the check in cap_capable(). 02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable, fixing a compile failure. 02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use kernel-doc format. 02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable(). 02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable. (Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version acked by him) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs] [serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-08-20keys: __rcu annotationsArnd Bergmann1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>