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[ Upstream commit 5da431b71d4b9be3c8cf6786eff9e2d41a5f9f65 ]
[BEHAVIOR CHANGE]
Since commit f6fca3917b4d ("btrfs: store chunk size in space-info
struct"), btrfs no longer can create larger data chunks than 1G:
mkfs.btrfs -f -m raid1 -d raid0 $dev1 $dev2 $dev3 $dev4
mount $dev1 $mnt
btrfs balance start --full $mnt
btrfs balance start --full $mnt
umount $mnt
btrfs ins dump-tree -t chunk $dev1 | grep "DATA|RAID0" -C 2
Before that offending commit, what we got is a 4G data chunk:
item 6 key (FIRST_CHUNK_TREE CHUNK_ITEM 9492758528) itemoff 15491 itemsize 176
length 4294967296 owner 2 stripe_len 65536 type DATA|RAID0
io_align 65536 io_width 65536 sector_size 4096
num_stripes 4 sub_stripes 1
Now what we got is only 1G data chunk:
item 6 key (FIRST_CHUNK_TREE CHUNK_ITEM 6271533056) itemoff 15491 itemsize 176
length 1073741824 owner 2 stripe_len 65536 type DATA|RAID0
io_align 65536 io_width 65536 sector_size 4096
num_stripes 4 sub_stripes 1
This will increase the number of data chunks by the number of devices,
not only increase system chunk usage, but also greatly increase mount
time.
Without a proper reason, we should not change the max chunk size.
[CAUSE]
Previously, we set max data chunk size to 10G, while max data stripe
length to 1G.
Commit f6fca3917b4d ("btrfs: store chunk size in space-info struct")
completely ignored the 10G limit, but use 1G max stripe limit instead,
causing above shrink in max data chunk size.
[FIX]
Fix the max data chunk size to 10G, and in decide_stripe_size_regular()
we limit stripe_size to 1G manually.
This should only affect data chunks, as for metadata chunks we always
set the max stripe size the same as max chunk size (256M or 1G
depending on fs size).
Now the same script result the same old result:
item 6 key (FIRST_CHUNK_TREE CHUNK_ITEM 9492758528) itemoff 15491 itemsize 176
length 4294967296 owner 2 stripe_len 65536 type DATA|RAID0
io_align 65536 io_width 65536 sector_size 4096
num_stripes 4 sub_stripes 1
Reported-by: Wang Yugui <wangyugui@e16-tech.com>
Fixes: f6fca3917b4d ("btrfs: store chunk size in space-info struct")
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2f44013e39984c127c6efedf70e6b5f4e9dcf315 ]
During stress testing with CONFIG_SMP disabled, KASAN reports as below:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0xe5/0xc30
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881094223f8 by task stress/7789
CPU: 0 PID: 7789 Comm: stress Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1-00002-g0d53d2e882f9 #3
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
..
__mutex_lock+0xe5/0xc30
..
z_erofs_do_read_page+0x8ce/0x1560
..
z_erofs_readahead+0x31c/0x580
..
Freed by task 7787
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x20/0x30
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40
__kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x190
kmem_cache_free+0xed/0x380
rcu_core+0x3d5/0xc90
__do_softirq+0x12d/0x389
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0x97/0xb0
call_rcu+0x3d/0x3f0
erofs_shrink_workstation+0x11f/0x210
erofs_shrink_scan+0xdc/0x170
shrink_slab.constprop.0+0x296/0x530
drop_slab+0x1c/0x70
drop_caches_sysctl_handler+0x70/0x80
proc_sys_call_handler+0x20a/0x2f0
vfs_write+0x555/0x6c0
ksys_write+0xbe/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
The root cause is that erofs_workgroup_unfreeze() doesn't reset to
orig_val thus it causes a race that the pcluster reuses unexpectedly
before freeing.
Since UP platforms are quite rare now, such path becomes unnecessary.
Let's drop such specific-designed path directly instead.
Fixes: 73f5c66df3e2 ("staging: erofs: fix `erofs_workgroup_{try_to_freeze, unfreeze}'")
Reviewed-by: Yue Hu <huyue2@coolpad.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902045710.109530-1-hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5bd9628b784cc5e38e1c7ebb680bbd6ee741230e ]
If erofs_fscache_alloc_request fail and then goto out, it will return 0.
it should return a negative error code instead of 0.
Fixes: d435d53228dd ("erofs: change to use asynchronous io for fscache readpage/readahead")
Signed-off-by: Sun Ke <sunke32@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jingbo Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220815034829.3940803-1-sunke32@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6ca64ac2763149fb66c0b4bf12f5e0977a88e51d ]
Since commit 6a921de58992 ("btrfs: zoned: introduce
space_info->active_total_bytes"), we're only counting the bytes of a
block group on an active zone as usable for metadata writes. But on a
SMR drive, we don't have active zones and short circuit some of the
logic.
This leads to an error on mount, because we cannot reserve space for
metadata writes.
Fix this by also setting the BLOCK_GROUP_FLAG_ZONE_IS_ACTIVE bit in the
block-group's runtime flag if the zone is a conventional zone.
Fixes: 6a921de58992 ("btrfs: zoned: introduce space_info->active_total_bytes")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7903192c4b4a82d792cb0dc5e2779a2efe60d45b ]
rxrpc and kafs between them try to use the receive timestamp on the first
data packet (ie. the one with sequence number 1) as a base from which to
calculate the time at which callback promise and lock expiration occurs.
However, we don't know how long it took for the server to send us the reply
from it having completed the basic part of the operation - it might then,
for instance, have to send a bunch of a callback breaks, depending on the
particular operation.
Fix this by using the time at which the operation is issued on the client
as a base instead. That should never be longer than the server's idea of
the expiry time.
Fixes: 781070551c26 ("afs: Fix calculation of callback expiry time")
Fixes: 2070a3e44962 ("rxrpc: Allow the reply time to be obtained on a client call")
Suggested-by: Jeffrey E Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c919c164fc87bcca8e80b3b9224492fa5b6455ba ]
smb3 fallocate zero range was not grabbing the inode or filemap_invalidate
locks so could have race with pagemap reinstantiating the page.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 400d0ad63b190895e29f43bc75b1260111d3fd34 ]
SMB2_ioctl() is always called with is_fsctl = true, so doesn't make any
sense to have it at all.
Thus, always set SMB2_0_IOCTL_IS_FSCTL flag on the request.
Also, as per MS-SMB2 3.3.5.15 "Receiving an SMB2 IOCTL Request", servers
must fail the request if the request flags is zero anyway.
Signed-off-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit dec9b2f1e0455a151a7293c367da22ab973f713e upstream.
There is a very common pattern of using
debugfs_remove(debufs_lookup(..)) which results in a dentry leak of the
dentry that was looked up. Instead of having to open-code the correct
pattern of calling dput() on the dentry, create
debugfs_lookup_and_remove() to handle this pattern automatically and
properly without any memory leaks.
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Kuyo Chang <kuyo.chang@mediatek.com>
Tested-by: Kuyo Chang <kuyo.chang@mediatek.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YxIaQ8cSinDR881k@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d5b81ced74afded85619ffbbe9c32ba9d82c9b1e upstream.
The commit 2ce543f47843 ("btrfs: zoned: wait until zone is finished when
allocation didn't progress") implemented a zone finish waiting mechanism
to the write path of zoned mode. However, using
wait_var_event()/wake_up_all() on fs_info->zone_finish_wait is wrong and
wait_var_event() just hangs because no one ever wakes it up once it goes
into sleep.
Instead, we can simply use wait_on_bit_io() and clear_and_wake_up_bit()
on fs_info->flags with a proper barrier installed.
Fixes: 2ce543f47843 ("btrfs: zoned: wait until zone is finished when allocation didn't progress")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.16+
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cac5c44c48c9fb9cc31bea15ebd9ef0c6462314f upstream.
The commit 7d7672bc5d10 ("btrfs: convert count_max_extents() to use
fs_info->max_extent_size") introduced a division by
fs_info->max_extent_size. This max_extent_size is initialized with max
zone append limit size of the device btrfs runs on. However, in zone
emulation mode, the device is not zoned then its zone append limit is
zero. This resulted in zero value of fs_info->max_extent_size and caused
zero division error.
Fix the error by setting non-zero pseudo value to max append zone limit
in zone emulation mode. Set the pseudo value based on max_segments as
suggested in the commit c2ae7b772ef4 ("btrfs: zoned: revive
max_zone_append_bytes").
Fixes: 7d7672bc5d10 ("btrfs: convert count_max_extents() to use fs_info->max_extent_size")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.12+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 47311db8e8f33011d90dee76b39c8886120cdda4 upstream.
Users may have explicitly configured their tracefs permissions; we
shouldn't overwrite those just because a second mount appeared.
Only clobber if the options were provided at mount time.
Note: the previous behavior was especially surprising in the presence of
automounted /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/.
Existing behavior:
## Pre-existing status: tracefs is 0755.
# stat -c '%A' /sys/kernel/tracing/
drwxr-xr-x
## (Re)trigger the automount.
# umount /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
# stat -c '%A' /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/.
drwx------
## Unexpected: the automount changed mode for other mount instances.
# stat -c '%A' /sys/kernel/tracing/
drwx------
New behavior (after this change):
## Pre-existing status: tracefs is 0755.
# stat -c '%A' /sys/kernel/tracing/
drwxr-xr-x
## (Re)trigger the automount.
# umount /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
# stat -c '%A' /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/.
drwxr-xr-x
## Expected: the automount does not change other mount instances.
# stat -c '%A' /sys/kernel/tracing/
drwxr-xr-x
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220826174353.2.Iab6e5ea57963d6deca5311b27fb7226790d44406@changeid
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4282d60689d4f ("tracefs: Add new tracefs file system")
Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 27893dfc1285f80f80f46b3b8c95f5d15d2e66d0 upstream.
In some cases of failure (dialect mismatches) in SMB2_negotiate(), after
the request is sent, the checks would return -EIO when they should be
rather setting rc = -EIO and jumping to neg_exit to free the response
buffer from mempool.
Signed-off-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1122f40072731525c06b1371cfa30112b9b54d27 ]
For now, enqueuing and dequeuing on-demand requests all start from
idx 0, this makes request distribution unfair. In the weighty
concurrent I/O scenario, the request stored in higher idx will starve.
Searching requests cyclically in cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read,
makes distribution fairer.
Fixes: c8383054506c ("cachefiles: notify the user daemon when looking up cookie")
Reported-by: Yongqing Li <liyongqing@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Yin <yinxin.x@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeffle Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220817065200.11543-1-yinxin.x@bytedance.com/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220825020945.2293-1-yinxin.x@bytedance.com/ # v2
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c93ccd63b18c8d108c57b2bb0e5f3b058b9d2029 ]
The cache_size field of copen is specified by the user daemon.
If cache_size < 0, then the OPEN request is expected to fail,
while copen itself shall succeed. However, returning 0 is indeed
unexpected when cache_size is an invalid error code.
Fix this by returning error when cache_size is an invalid error code.
Changes
=======
v4: update the code suggested by Dan
v3: update the commit log suggested by Jingbo.
Fixes: c8383054506c ("cachefiles: notify the user daemon when looking up cookie")
Signed-off-by: Sun Ke <sunke32@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Jeffle Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Jingbo Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220818111935.1683062-1-sunke32@huawei.com/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220818125038.2247720-1-sunke32@huawei.com/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220826023515.3437469-1-sunke32@huawei.com/ # v4
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 899b7f69f244e539ea5df1b4d756046337de44a5 ]
We're seeing a weird problem in production where we have overlapping
extent items in the extent tree. It's unclear where these are coming
from, and in debugging we realized there's no check in the tree checker
for this sort of problem. Add a check to the tree-checker to make sure
that the extents do not overlap each other.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b40130b23ca4a08c5785d5a3559805916bddba3c ]
We have been hitting the following lockdep splat with btrfs/187 recently
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.19.0-rc8+ #775 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
btrfs/752500 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff97e1875a97b8 (btrfs-treloc-02#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110
but task is already holding lock:
ffff97e1875a9278 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{3:3}:
down_write_nested+0x41/0x80
__btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110
btrfs_init_new_buffer+0x7d/0x2c0
btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x120/0x3b0
__btrfs_cow_block+0x136/0x600
btrfs_cow_block+0x10b/0x230
btrfs_search_slot+0x53b/0xb70
btrfs_lookup_inode+0x2a/0xa0
__btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x5f/0x280
btrfs_async_run_delayed_root+0x24c/0x290
btrfs_work_helper+0xf2/0x3e0
process_one_work+0x271/0x590
worker_thread+0x52/0x3b0
kthread+0xf0/0x120
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
-> #1 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{3:3}:
down_write_nested+0x41/0x80
__btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110
btrfs_search_slot+0x3c3/0xb70
do_relocation+0x10c/0x6b0
relocate_tree_blocks+0x317/0x6d0
relocate_block_group+0x1f1/0x560
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x23e/0x400
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x4c/0x140
btrfs_balance+0x755/0xe40
btrfs_ioctl+0x1ea2/0x2c90
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
-> #0 (btrfs-treloc-02#2){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire+0x1122/0x1e10
lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2d0
down_write_nested+0x41/0x80
__btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110
btrfs_lock_root_node+0x31/0x50
btrfs_search_slot+0x1cb/0xb70
replace_path+0x541/0x9f0
merge_reloc_root+0x1d6/0x610
merge_reloc_roots+0xe2/0x260
relocate_block_group+0x2c8/0x560
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x23e/0x400
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x4c/0x140
btrfs_balance+0x755/0xe40
btrfs_ioctl+0x1ea2/0x2c90
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
btrfs-treloc-02#2 --> btrfs-tree-01 --> btrfs-tree-01/1
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(btrfs-tree-01/1);
lock(btrfs-tree-01);
lock(btrfs-tree-01/1);
lock(btrfs-treloc-02#2);
*** DEADLOCK ***
7 locks held by btrfs/752500:
#0: ffff97e292fdf460 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x208/0x2c90
#1: ffff97e284c02050 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_balance+0x55f/0xe40
#2: ffff97e284c00878 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x236/0x400
#3: ffff97e292fdf650 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: merge_reloc_root+0xef/0x610
#4: ffff97e284c02378 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x1a8/0x5a0
#5: ffff97e284c023a0 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x1a8/0x5a0
#6: ffff97e1875a9278 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 752500 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ #775
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x73
check_noncircular+0xd6/0x100
? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140
__lock_acquire+0x1122/0x1e10
lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2d0
? __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110
down_write_nested+0x41/0x80
? __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110
__btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110
btrfs_lock_root_node+0x31/0x50
btrfs_search_slot+0x1cb/0xb70
? lock_release+0x137/0x2d0
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50
? release_extent_buffer+0x128/0x180
replace_path+0x541/0x9f0
merge_reloc_root+0x1d6/0x610
merge_reloc_roots+0xe2/0x260
relocate_block_group+0x2c8/0x560
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x23e/0x400
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x4c/0x140
btrfs_balance+0x755/0xe40
btrfs_ioctl+0x1ea2/0x2c90
? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140
? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140
? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
This isn't necessarily new, it's just tricky to hit in practice. There
are two competing things going on here. With relocation we create a
snapshot of every fs tree with a reloc tree. Any extent buffers that
get initialized here are initialized with the reloc root lockdep key.
However since it is a snapshot, any blocks that are currently in cache
that originally belonged to the fs tree will have the normal tree
lockdep key set. This creates the lock dependency of
reloc tree -> normal tree
for the extent buffer locking during the first phase of the relocation
as we walk down the reloc root to relocate blocks.
However this is problematic because the final phase of the relocation is
merging the reloc root into the original fs root. This involves
searching down to any keys that exist in the original fs root and then
swapping the relocated block and the original fs root block. We have to
search down to the fs root first, and then go search the reloc root for
the block we need to replace. This creates the dependency of
normal tree -> reloc tree
which is why lockdep complains.
Additionally even if we were to fix this particular mismatch with a
different nesting for the merge case, we're still slotting in a block
that has a owner of the reloc root objectid into a normal tree, so that
block will have its lockdep key set to the tree reloc root, and create a
lockdep splat later on when we wander into that block from the fs root.
Unfortunately the only solution here is to make sure we do not set the
lockdep key to the reloc tree lockdep key normally, and then reset any
blocks we wander into from the reloc root when we're doing the merged.
This solves the problem of having mixed tree reloc keys intermixed with
normal tree keys, and then allows us to make sure in the merge case we
maintain the lock order of
normal tree -> reloc tree
We handle this by setting a bit on the reloc root when we do the search
for the block we want to relocate, and any block we search into or COW
at that point gets set to the reloc tree key. This works correctly
because we only ever COW down to the parent node, so we aren't resetting
the key for the block we're linking into the fs root.
With this patch we no longer have the lockdep splat in btrfs/187.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0a27a0474d146eb79e09ec88bf0d4229f4cfc1b8 ]
These definitions exist in disk-io.c, which is not related to the
locking. Move this over to locking.h/c where it makes more sense.
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 17661ecf6a64eb11ae7f1108fe88686388b2acd5 ]
When smb client open file in ksmbd share with O_TRUNC, dos attribute
xattr is removed as well as data in file. This cause the FSCTL_SET_SPARSE
request from the client fails because ksmbd can't update the dos attribute
after setting ATTR_SPARSE_FILE. And this patch fix xfstests generic/469
test also.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fe54833dc8d97ef387e86f7c80537d51c503ca75 ]
If share is not configured in smb.conf, smb2 tree connect should return
STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME instead of STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_PATH.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 42f86b1226a42bfc79a7125af435432ad4680a32 ]
In some cases xattr is too fragmented,
so we need to load it before writing.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 550842cc60987b269e31b222283ade3e1b6c7fc8 upstream.
After commit 0737e01de9c4 ("ocfs2: ocfs2_mount_volume does cleanup job
before return error"), any procedure after ocfs2_dlm_init() fails will
trigger crash when calling ocfs2_dlm_shutdown().
ie: On local mount mode, no dlm resource is initialized. If
ocfs2_mount_volume() fails in ocfs2_find_slot(), error handling will call
ocfs2_dlm_shutdown(), then does dlm resource cleanup job, which will
trigger kernel crash.
This solution should bypass uninitialized resources in
ocfs2_dlm_shutdown().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220815085754.20417-1-heming.zhao@suse.com
Fixes: 0737e01de9c4 ("ocfs2: ocfs2_mount_volume does cleanup job before return error")
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ba0803050d610d5072666be727bca5e03e55b242 upstream.
smb3 fallocate punch hole was not grabbing the inode or filemap_invalidate
locks so could have race with pagemap reinstantiating the page.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a1d2eb51f0a33c28f5399a1610e66b3fbd24e884 upstream.
Since commit:
cifs: alloc_path_with_tree_prefix: do not append sep. if the path is empty
alloc_path_with_tree_prefix() function was no longer including the
trailing separator when @path is empty, although @out_len was still
assuming a path separator thus adding an extra byte to the final
filename.
This has caused mount issues in some Synology servers due to the extra
NULL byte in filenames when sending SMB2_CREATE requests with
SMB2_FLAGS_DFS_OPERATIONS set.
Fix this by checking if @path is not empty and then add extra byte for
separator. Also, do not include any trailing NULL bytes in filename
as MS-SMB2 requires it to be 8-byte aligned and not NULL terminated.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7eacba3b00a3 ("cifs: alloc_path_with_tree_prefix: do not append sep. if the path is empty")
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f87904c075515f3e1d8f4a7115869d3b914674fd upstream.
When a disk is removed, bdi_unregister gets called to stop further
writeback and wait for associated delayed work to complete. However,
wb_inode_writeback_end() may schedule bandwidth estimation dwork after
this has completed, which can result in the timer attempting to access the
just freed bdi_writeback.
Fix this by checking if the bdi_writeback is alive, similar to when
scheduling writeback work.
Since this requires wb->work_lock, and wb_inode_writeback_end() may get
called from interrupt, switch wb->work_lock to an irqsafe lock.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220801155034.3772543-1-khazhy@google.com
Fixes: 45a2966fd641 ("writeback: fix bandwidth estimate for spiky workload")
Signed-off-by: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Michael Stapelberg <stapelberg+linux@google.com>
Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e6e3dec6c3c288d556b991a85d5d8e3ee71e9046 upstream.
When punching a hole into a file range that is adjacent with a hole and we
are not using the no-holes feature, we expand the range of the adjacent
file extent item that represents a hole, to save metadata space.
However we don't update the generation of hole file extent item, which
means a full fsync will not log that file extent item if the fsync happens
in a later transaction (since commit 7f30c07288bb9e ("btrfs: stop copying
old file extents when doing a full fsync")).
For example, if we do this:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f -O ^no-holes /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xab 2M 2M" /mnt/foobar
$ sync
We end up with 2 file extent items in our file:
1) One that represents the hole for the file range [0, 2M), with a
generation of 7;
2) Another one that represents an extent covering the range [2M, 4M).
After that if we do the following:
$ xfs_io -c "fpunch 2M 2M" /mnt/foobar
We end up with a single file extent item in the file, which represents a
hole for the range [0, 4M) and with a generation of 7 - because we end
dropping the data extent for range [2M, 4M) and then update the file
extent item that represented the hole at [0, 2M), by increasing
length from 2M to 4M.
Then doing a full fsync and power failing:
$ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/foobar
<power failure>
will result in the full fsync not logging the file extent item that
represents the hole for the range [0, 4M), because its generation is 7,
which is lower than the generation of the current transaction (8).
As a consequence, after mounting again the filesystem (after log replay),
the region [2M, 4M) does not have a hole, it still points to the
previous data extent.
So fix this by always updating the generation of existing file extent
items representing holes when we merge/expand them. This solves the
problem and it's the same approach as when we merge prealloc extents that
got written (at btrfs_mark_extent_written()). Setting the generation to
the current transaction's generation is also what we do when merging
the new hole extent map with the previous one or the next one.
A test case for fstests, covering both cases of hole file extent item
merging (to the left and to the right), will be sent soon.
Fixes: 7f30c07288bb9e ("btrfs: stop copying old file extents when doing a full fsync")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.18+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9ea0106a7a3d8116860712e3f17cd52ce99f6707 upstream.
In btrfs_get_dev_args_from_path(), btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb() can fail if
the path is invalid. In this case, btrfs_get_dev_args_from_path()
returns directly without freeing args->uuid and args->fsid allocated
before, which causes memory leak.
To fix these possible leaks, when btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb() fails,
btrfs_put_dev_args_from_path() is called to clean up the memory.
Reported-by: TOTE Robot <oslab@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Fixes: faa775c41d655 ("btrfs: add a btrfs_get_dev_args_from_path helper")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.16
Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Signed-off-by: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b51111271b0352aa596c5ae8faf06939e91b3b68 upstream.
For a filesystem which has btrfs read-only property set to true, all
write operations including xattr should be denied. However, security
xattr can still be changed even if btrfs ro property is true.
This happens because xattr_permission() does not have any restrictions
on security.*, system.* and in some cases trusted.* from VFS and
the decision is left to the underlying filesystem. See comments in
xattr_permission() for more details.
This patch checks if the root is read-only before performing the set
xattr operation.
Testcase:
DEV=/dev/vdb
MNT=/mnt
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
mount $DEV $MNT
echo "file one" > $MNT/f1
setfattr -n "security.one" -v 2 $MNT/f1
btrfs property set /mnt ro true
setfattr -n "security.one" -v 1 $MNT/f1
umount $MNT
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ced8ecf026fd8084cf175530ff85c76d6085d715 upstream.
When testing space_cache v2 on a large set of machines, we encountered a
few symptoms:
1. "unable to add free space :-17" (EEXIST) errors.
2. Missing free space info items, sometimes caught with a "missing free
space info for X" error.
3. Double-accounted space: ranges that were allocated in the extent tree
and also marked as free in the free space tree, ranges that were
marked as allocated twice in the extent tree, or ranges that were
marked as free twice in the free space tree. If the latter made it
onto disk, the next reboot would hit the BUG_ON() in
add_new_free_space().
4. On some hosts with no on-disk corruption or error messages, the
in-memory space cache (dumped with drgn) disagreed with the free
space tree.
All of these symptoms have the same underlying cause: a race between
caching the free space for a block group and returning free space to the
in-memory space cache for pinned extents causes us to double-add a free
range to the space cache. This race exists when free space is cached
from the free space tree (space_cache=v2) or the extent tree
(nospace_cache, or space_cache=v1 if the cache needs to be regenerated).
struct btrfs_block_group::last_byte_to_unpin and struct
btrfs_block_group::progress are supposed to protect against this race,
but commit d0c2f4fa555e ("btrfs: make concurrent fsyncs wait less when
waiting for a transaction commit") subtly broke this by allowing
multiple transactions to be unpinning extents at the same time.
Specifically, the race is as follows:
1. An extent is deleted from an uncached block group in transaction A.
2. btrfs_commit_transaction() is called for transaction A.
3. btrfs_run_delayed_refs() -> __btrfs_free_extent() runs the delayed
ref for the deleted extent.
4. __btrfs_free_extent() -> do_free_extent_accounting() ->
add_to_free_space_tree() adds the deleted extent back to the free
space tree.
5. do_free_extent_accounting() -> btrfs_update_block_group() ->
btrfs_cache_block_group() queues up the block group to get cached.
block_group->progress is set to block_group->start.
6. btrfs_commit_transaction() for transaction A calls
switch_commit_roots(). It sets block_group->last_byte_to_unpin to
block_group->progress, which is block_group->start because the block
group hasn't been cached yet.
7. The caching thread gets to our block group. Since the commit roots
were already switched, load_free_space_tree() sees the deleted extent
as free and adds it to the space cache. It finishes caching and sets
block_group->progress to U64_MAX.
8. btrfs_commit_transaction() advances transaction A to
TRANS_STATE_SUPER_COMMITTED.
9. fsync calls btrfs_commit_transaction() for transaction B. Since
transaction A is already in TRANS_STATE_SUPER_COMMITTED and the
commit is for fsync, it advances.
10. btrfs_commit_transaction() for transaction B calls
switch_commit_roots(). This time, the block group has already been
cached, so it sets block_group->last_byte_to_unpin to U64_MAX.
11. btrfs_commit_transaction() for transaction A calls
btrfs_finish_extent_commit(), which calls unpin_extent_range() for
the deleted extent. It sees last_byte_to_unpin set to U64_MAX (by
transaction B!), so it adds the deleted extent to the space cache
again!
This explains all of our symptoms above:
* If the sequence of events is exactly as described above, when the free
space is re-added in step 11, it will fail with EEXIST.
* If another thread reallocates the deleted extent in between steps 7
and 11, then step 11 will silently re-add that space to the space
cache as free even though it is actually allocated. Then, if that
space is allocated *again*, the free space tree will be corrupted
(namely, the wrong item will be deleted).
* If we don't catch this free space tree corruption, it will continue
to get worse as extents are deleted and reallocated.
The v1 space_cache is synchronously loaded when an extent is deleted
(btrfs_update_block_group() with alloc=0 calls btrfs_cache_block_group()
with load_cache_only=1), so it is not normally affected by this bug.
However, as noted above, if we fail to load the space cache, we will
fall back to caching from the extent tree and may hit this bug.
The easiest fix for this race is to also make caching from the free
space tree or extent tree synchronous. Josef tested this and found no
performance regressions.
A few extra changes fall out of this change. Namely, this fix does the
following, with step 2 being the crucial fix:
1. Factor btrfs_caching_ctl_wait_done() out of
btrfs_wait_block_group_cache_done() to allow waiting on a caching_ctl
that we already hold a reference to.
2. Change the call in btrfs_cache_block_group() of
btrfs_wait_space_cache_v1_finished() to
btrfs_caching_ctl_wait_done(), which makes us wait regardless of the
space_cache option.
3. Delete the now unused btrfs_wait_space_cache_v1_finished() and
space_cache_v1_done().
4. Change btrfs_cache_block_group()'s `int load_cache_only` parameter to
`bool wait` to more accurately describe its new meaning.
5. Change a few callers which had a separate call to
btrfs_wait_block_group_cache_done() to use wait = true instead.
6. Make btrfs_wait_block_group_cache_done() static now that it's not
used outside of block-group.c anymore.
Fixes: d0c2f4fa555e ("btrfs: make concurrent fsyncs wait less when waiting for a transaction commit")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.12+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f2c3bec215694fb8bc0ef5010f2a758d1906fc2d upstream.
If the replace target device reappears after the suspended replace is
cancelled, it blocks the mount operation as it can't find the matching
replace-item in the metadata. As shown below,
BTRFS error (device sda5): replace devid present without an active replace item
To overcome this situation, the user can run the command
btrfs device scan --forget <replace target device>
and try the mount command again. And also, to avoid repeating the issue,
superblock on the devid=0 must be wiped.
wipefs -a device-path-to-devid=0.
This patch adds some info when this situation occurs.
Reported-by: Samuel Greiner <samuel@balkonien.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/b4f62b10-b295-26ea-71f9-9a5c9299d42c@balkonien.org/T/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0+
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 59a3991984dbc1fc47e5651a265c5200bd85464e upstream.
If the filesystem mounts with the replace-operation in a suspended state
and try to cancel the suspended replace-operation, we hit the assert. The
assert came from the commit fe97e2e173af ("btrfs: dev-replace: replace's
scrub must not be running in suspended state") that was actually not
required. So just remove it.
$ mount /dev/sda5 /btrfs
BTRFS info (device sda5): cannot continue dev_replace, tgtdev is missing
BTRFS info (device sda5): you may cancel the operation after 'mount -o degraded'
$ mount -o degraded /dev/sda5 /btrfs <-- success.
$ btrfs replace cancel /btrfs
kernel: assertion failed: ret != -ENOTCONN, in fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c:1131
kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3750!
After the patch:
$ btrfs replace cancel /btrfs
BTRFS info (device sda5): suspended dev_replace from /dev/sda5 (devid 1) to <missing disk> canceled
Fixes: fe97e2e173af ("btrfs: dev-replace: replace's scrub must not be running in suspended state")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0+
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 47bf225a8d2cccb15f7e8d4a1ed9b757dd86afd7 upstream.
At btrfs_del_root_ref(), if btrfs_search_slot() returns an error, we end
up returning from the function with a value of 0 (success). This happens
because the function returns the value stored in the variable 'err',
which is 0, while the error value we got from btrfs_search_slot() is
stored in the 'ret' variable.
So fix it by setting 'err' with the error value.
Fixes: 8289ed9f93bef2 ("btrfs: replace the BUG_ON in btrfs_del_root_ref with proper error handling")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.16+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0c3bc7899e6dfb52df1c46118a5a670ae619645f ]
While looking at our current POSIX ACL handling in the context of some
overlayfs work I went through a range of other filesystems checking how they
handle them currently and encountered ntfs3.
The posic_acl_{from,to}_xattr() helpers always need to operate on the
filesystem idmapping. Since ntfs3 can only be mounted in the initial user
namespace the relevant idmapping is init_user_ns.
The posix_acl_{from,to}_xattr() helpers are concerned with translating between
the kernel internal struct posix_acl{_entry} and the uapi struct
posix_acl_xattr_{header,entry} and the kernel internal data structure is cached
filesystem wide.
Additional idmappings such as the caller's idmapping or the mount's idmapping
are handled higher up in the VFS. Individual filesystems usually do not need to
concern themselves with these.
The posix_acl_valid() helper is concerned with checking whether the values in
the kernel internal struct posix_acl can be represented in the filesystem's
idmapping. IOW, if they can be written to disk. So this helper too needs to
take the filesystem's idmapping.
Fixes: be71b5cba2e6 ("fs/ntfs3: Add attrib operations")
Cc: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Cc: ntfs3@lists.linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit efd4149342db2df41b1bbe68972ead853b30e444 ]
These bits should only be valid when the ptes are present. Introducing
two booleans for it and set it to false when !pte_present() for both pte
and pmd accountings.
The bug is found during code reading and no real world issue reported, but
logically such an error can cause incorrect readings for either smaps or
smaps_rollup output on quite a few fields.
For example, it could cause over-estimate on values like Shared_Dirty,
Private_Dirty, Referenced. Or it could also cause under-estimate on
values like LazyFree, Shared_Clean, Private_Clean.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220805160003.58929-1-peterx@redhat.com
Fixes: b1d4d9e0cbd0 ("proc/smaps: carefully handle migration entries")
Fixes: c94b6923fa0a ("/proc/PID/smaps: Add PMD migration entry parsing")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fcfc8be1e9cf2f12b50dce8b579b3ae54443a014 ]
A destination server while doing a COPY shouldn't accept using the
passed in filehandle if its not a regular filehandle.
If alloc_file_pseudo() has failed, we need to decrement a reference
on the newly created inode, otherwise it leaks.
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: ec4b092508982 ("NFS: inter ssc open")
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bf1ac16edf6770a92bc75cf2373f1f9feea398a4 ]
Idmapped mounts should not allow a user to map file ownsership into a
range of ids which is not under the control of that user. However, we
currently don't check whether the mounter is privileged wrt to the
target user namespace.
Currently no FS_USERNS_MOUNT filesystems support idmapped mounts, thus
this is not a problem as only CAP_SYS_ADMIN in init_user_ns is allowed
to set up idmapped mounts. But this could change in the future, so add a
check to refuse to create idmapped mounts when the mounter does not have
CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the target user namespace.
Fixes: bd303368b776 ("fs: support mapped mounts of mapped filesystems")
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220816164752.2595240-1-sforshee@digitalocean.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit f369b07c861435bd812a9d14493f71b34132ed6f upstream.
The motivation of this patch comes from a recent report and patchfix from
David Hildenbrand on hugetlb shared handling of wr-protected page [1].
With the reproducer provided in commit message of [1], one can leverage
the uffd-wp lazy-reset of ptes to trigger a hugetlb issue which can affect
not only the attacker process, but also the whole system.
The lazy-reset mechanism of uffd-wp was used to make unregister faster,
meanwhile it has an assumption that any leftover pgtable entries should
only affect the process on its own, so not only the user should be aware
of anything it does, but also it should not affect outside of the process.
But it seems that this is not true, and it can also be utilized to make
some exploit easier.
So far there's no clue showing that the lazy-reset is important to any
userfaultfd users because normally the unregister will only happen once
for a specific range of memory of the lifecycle of the process.
Considering all above, what this patch proposes is to do explicit pte
resets when unregister an uffd region with wr-protect mode enabled.
It should be the same as calling ioctl(UFFDIO_WRITEPROTECT, wp=false)
right before ioctl(UFFDIO_UNREGISTER) for the user. So potentially it'll
make the unregister slower. From that pov it's a very slight abi change,
but hopefully nothing should break with this change either.
Regarding to the change itself - core of uffd write [un]protect operation
is moved into a separate function (uffd_wp_range()) and it is reused in
the unregister code path.
Note that the new function will not check for anything, e.g. ranges or
memory types, because they should have been checked during the previous
UFFDIO_REGISTER or it should have failed already. It also doesn't check
mmap_changing because we're with mmap write lock held anyway.
I added a Fixes upon introducing of uffd-wp shmem+hugetlbfs because that's
the only issue reported so far and that's the commit David's reproducer
will start working (v5.19+). But the whole idea actually applies to not
only file memories but also anonymous. It's just that we don't need to
fix anonymous prior to v5.19- because there's no known way to exploit.
IOW, this patch can also fix the issue reported in [1] as the patch 2 does.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220811103435.188481-3-david@redhat.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220811201340.39342-1-peterx@redhat.com
Fixes: b1f9e876862d ("mm/uffd: enable write protection for shmem & hugetlbfs")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 67f4b5dc49913abcdb5cc736e73674e2f352f81d upstream.
Currently, when the writeback code detects a server reboot, it redirties
any pages that were not committed to disk, and it sets the flag
NFS_CONTEXT_RESEND_WRITES in the nfs_open_context of the file descriptor
that dirtied the file. While this allows the file descriptor in question
to redrive its own writes, it violates the fsync() requirement that we
should be synchronising all writes to disk.
While the problem is infrequent, we do see corner cases where an
untimely server reboot causes the fsync() call to abandon its attempt to
sync data to disk and causing data corruption issues due to missed error
conditions or similar.
In order to tighted up the client's ability to deal with this situation
without introducing livelocks, add a counter that records the number of
times pages are redirtied due to a server reboot-like condition, and use
that in fsync() to redrive the sync to disk.
Fixes: 2197e9b06c22 ("NFS: Fix up fsync() when the server rebooted")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4a2c5b7994960fac29cf8a3f4e62855bae1b27d4 ]
There is issue as follows when test f2fs atomic write:
F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 2th superblock
F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc_offset: 0
F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_check_nid_range: out-of-range nid=1, run fsck to fix.
F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_check_nid_range: out-of-range nid=2, run fsck to fix.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in f2fs_get_dnode_of_data+0xac/0x16d0
Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000028 by task rep/1990
CPU: 4 PID: 1990 Comm: rep Not tainted 5.19.0-rc6-next-20220715 #266
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0x91
print_report.cold+0x49a/0x6bb
kasan_report+0xa8/0x130
f2fs_get_dnode_of_data+0xac/0x16d0
f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x2a5/0x1030
move_data_page+0x3c5/0xdf0
do_garbage_collect+0x2015/0x36c0
f2fs_gc+0x554/0x1d30
f2fs_balance_fs+0x7f5/0xda0
f2fs_write_single_data_page+0xb66/0xdc0
f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x716/0x1420
f2fs_write_data_pages+0x84f/0x9a0
do_writepages+0x130/0x3a0
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x87/0xa0
file_write_and_wait_range+0x157/0x1c0
f2fs_do_sync_file+0x206/0x12d0
f2fs_sync_file+0x99/0xc0
vfs_fsync_range+0x75/0x140
f2fs_file_write_iter+0xd7b/0x1850
vfs_write+0x645/0x780
ksys_write+0xf1/0x1e0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
As 3db1de0e582c commit changed atomic write way which new a cow_inode for
atomic write file, and also mark cow_inode as FI_ATOMIC_FILE.
When f2fs_do_write_data_page write cow_inode will use cow_inode's cow_inode
which is NULL. Then will trigger null-ptr-deref.
To solve above issue, introduce FI_COW_FILE flag for COW inode.
Fiexes: 3db1de0e582c("f2fs: change the current atomic write way")
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 23339e5752d01a4b5e122759b002cf896d26f6c1 ]
F2FS_IOC_ABORT_VOLATILE_WRITE was used to abort a atomic write before.
However it was removed accidentally. So revive it by changing the name,
since volatile write had gone.
Signed-off-by: Daeho Jeong <daehojeong@google.com>
Fiexes: 7bc155fec5b3("f2fs: kill volatile write support")
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5fa2cffba0b82336a2244d941322eb1627ff787b ]
Coverity complains about assigning a pointer based on
value length before checking that value length goes
beyond the end of the SMB. Although this is even more
unlikely as value length is a single byte, and the
pointer is not dereferenced until laterm, it is clearer
to check the lengths first.
Addresses-Coverity: 1467704 ("Speculative execution data leak")
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 09beadf289d6e300553e60d6e76f13c0427ecab3 ]
As Wenqing Liu <wenqingliu0120@gmail.com> reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216285
RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10
f2fs_update_meta_page+0x84/0x570 [f2fs]
change_curseg.constprop.0+0x159/0xbd0 [f2fs]
f2fs_do_replace_block+0x5c7/0x18a0 [f2fs]
f2fs_replace_block+0xeb/0x180 [f2fs]
recover_data+0x1abd/0x6f50 [f2fs]
f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x12ce/0x3250 [f2fs]
f2fs_fill_super+0x4459/0x6190 [f2fs]
mount_bdev+0x2cf/0x3b0
legacy_get_tree+0xed/0x1d0
vfs_get_tree+0x81/0x2b0
path_mount+0x47e/0x19d0
do_mount+0xce/0xf0
__x64_sys_mount+0x12c/0x1a0
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The root cause is segment type is invalid, so in f2fs_do_replace_block(),
f2fs accesses f2fs_sm_info::curseg_array with out-of-range segment type,
result in accessing invalid curseg->sum_blk during memcpy in
f2fs_update_meta_page(). Fix this by adding sanity check on segment type
in build_sit_entries().
Reported-by: Wenqing Liu <wenqingliu0120@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao.yu@oppo.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 141170b759e03958f296033bb7001be62d1d363b ]
As Dipanjan Das <mail.dipanjan.das@gmail.com> reported, syzkaller
found a f2fs bug as below:
RIP: 0010:f2fs_new_node_page+0x19ac/0x1fc0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1295
Call Trace:
write_all_xattrs fs/f2fs/xattr.c:487 [inline]
__f2fs_setxattr+0xe76/0x2e10 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:743
f2fs_setxattr+0x233/0xab0 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:790
f2fs_xattr_generic_set+0x133/0x170 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:86
__vfs_setxattr+0x115/0x180 fs/xattr.c:182
__vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x125/0x5f0 fs/xattr.c:216
__vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1cf/0x260 fs/xattr.c:277
vfs_setxattr+0x13f/0x330 fs/xattr.c:303
setxattr+0x146/0x160 fs/xattr.c:611
path_setxattr+0x1a7/0x1d0 fs/xattr.c:630
__do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:653 [inline]
__se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:649 [inline]
__x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xbd/0x150 fs/xattr.c:649
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
NAT entry and nat bitmap can be inconsistent, e.g. one nid is free
in nat bitmap, and blkaddr in its NAT entry is not NULL_ADDR, it
may trigger BUG_ON() in f2fs_new_node_page(), fix it.
Reported-by: Dipanjan Das <mail.dipanjan.das@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao.yu@oppo.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b10b85fe5149ee8b39fbbf86095b303632dde2cd ]
When mounting overlayfs in an unprivileged user namespace, trusted xattr
creation will fail. This will lead to failures in some file operations,
e.g. in the following situation:
mkdir lower upper work merged
mkdir lower/directory
mount -toverlay -olowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper,workdir=work none merged
rmdir merged/directory
mkdir merged/directory
The last mkdir will fail:
mkdir: cannot create directory 'merged/directory': Input/output error
The cause for these failures is currently extremely non-obvious and hard to
debug. Hence, warn the user and suggest using the userxattr mount option,
if it is not already supplied and xattr creation fails during the
self-check.
Reported-by: Alois Wohlschlager <alois1@gmx-topmail.de>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 69cb8e9d8cd97cdf5e293b26d70a9dee3e35e6bd ]
This patch avoids an attempt to resize the filesystem to an
unaligned cluster boundary. An online resize to a size that is not
integral to cluster size results in the last iteration attempting to
grow the fs by a negative amount, which trips a BUG_ON and leaves the fs
with a corrupted in-memory superblock.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Kiselev <okiselev@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0E92A0AB-4F16-4F1A-94B7-702CC6504FDE@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1e1c2b86ef86a8477fd9b9a4f48a6bfe235606f6 ]
Block range to free is validated in ext4_free_blocks() using
ext4_inode_block_valid() and then it's passed to ext4_mb_clear_bb().
However in some situations on bigalloc file system the range might be
adjusted after the validation in ext4_free_blocks() which can lead to
troubles on corrupted file systems such as one found by syzkaller that
resulted in the following BUG
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/ext4.h:3319!
PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 28 PID: 4243 Comm: repro Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.19.0-rc6+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ext4_free_blocks+0x95e/0xa90
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? lock_timer_base+0x61/0x80
? __es_remove_extent+0x5a/0x760
? __mod_timer+0x256/0x380
? ext4_ind_truncate_ensure_credits+0x90/0x220
ext4_clear_blocks+0x107/0x1b0
ext4_free_data+0x15b/0x170
ext4_ind_truncate+0x214/0x2c0
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x15/0x30
? ext4_discard_preallocations+0x15a/0x410
? ext4_journal_check_start+0xe/0x90
? __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x2f/0x110
ext4_truncate+0x1b5/0x460
? __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x2f/0x110
ext4_evict_inode+0x2b4/0x6f0
evict+0xd0/0x1d0
ext4_enable_quotas+0x11f/0x1f0
ext4_orphan_cleanup+0x3de/0x430
? proc_create_seq_private+0x43/0x50
ext4_fill_super+0x295f/0x3ae0
? snprintf+0x39/0x40
? sget_fc+0x19c/0x330
? ext4_reconfigure+0x850/0x850
get_tree_bdev+0x16d/0x260
vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xb0
path_mount+0x431/0xa70
__x64_sys_mount+0xe2/0x120
do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80
? do_user_addr_fault+0x1e2/0x670
? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7fdf4e512ace
Fix it by making sure that the block range is properly validated before
used every time it changes in ext4_free_blocks() or ext4_mb_clear_bb().
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=5266d464285a03cee9dbfda7d2452a72c3c2ae7c
Reported-by: syzbot+15cd994e273307bf5cfa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220714165903.58260-1-lczerner@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b24e77ef1c6d4dbf42749ad4903c97539cc9755a ]
Now if check directoy entry is corrupted, ext4_empty_dir may return true
then directory will be removed when file system mounted with "errors=continue".
In order not to make things worse just return false when directory is corrupted.
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220622090223.682234-1-yebin10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit d4073595d0c61463ec3a87411b19e2a90f76d3f8 upstream.
The goto out calls kfree(value) on an uninitialized pointer. Just
return directly as the other error paths do.
Fixes: 460bbf2990b3 ("fs/ntfs3: Do not change mode if ntfs_set_ea failed")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 37a530bfe56ca9a0d3129598803f2794c7428aae upstream.
There is null pointer dereference because i_op == NULL.
The bug happens because we don't initialize i_op for records in $Extend.
Fixes: 82cae269cfa9 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block")
Reported-by: Liangbin Lian <jjm2473@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 460bbf2990b3fdc597601c2cf669a3371c069242 upstream.
ntfs_set_ea can fail with NOSPC, so we don't need to
change mode in this situation.
Fixes xfstest generic/449
Fixes: be71b5cba2e6 ("fs/ntfs3: Add attrib operations")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cd39981fb92adf0cc736112f87e3e61602baa415 upstream.
Pointer to options was freed twice on remount
Fixes xfstest generic/361
Fixes: 82cae269cfa9 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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