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2021-03-04btrfs: handle space_info::total_bytes_pinned inside the delayed ref itselfJosef Bacik5-117/+74
commit 2187374f35fe9cadbddaa9fcf0c4121365d914e8 upstream. Currently we pass things around to figure out if we maybe freeing data based on the state of the delayed refs head. This makes the accounting sort of confusing and hard to follow, as it's distinctly separate from the delayed ref heads stuff, but also depends on it entirely. Fix this by explicitly adjusting the space_info->total_bytes_pinned in the delayed refs code. We now have two places where we modify this counter, once where we create the delayed and destroy the delayed refs, and once when we pin and unpin the extents. This means there is a slight overlap between delayed refs and the pin/unpin mechanisms, but this is simply used by the ENOSPC infrastructure to determine if we need to commit the transaction, so there's no adverse affect from this, we might simply commit thinking it will give us enough space when it might not. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10 Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-04btrfs: splice remaining dirty_bg's onto the transaction dirty bg listJosef Bacik1-7/+12
commit 938fcbfb0cbcf532a1869efab58e6009446b1ced upstream. While doing error injection testing with my relocation patches I hit the following assert: assertion failed: list_empty(&block_group->dirty_list), in fs/btrfs/block-group.c:3356 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3357! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 24351 Comm: umount Tainted: G W 5.10.0-rc3+ #193 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:assertfail.constprop.0+0x18/0x1a RSP: 0018:ffffa09b019c7e00 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000056 RBX: ffff8f6492c18000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff8f64fbc27c60 RSI: ffff8f64fbc19050 RDI: ffff8f64fbc19050 RBP: ffff8f6483bbdc00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffa09b019c7c38 R11: ffffffff85d70928 R12: ffff8f6492c18100 R13: ffff8f6492c18148 R14: ffff8f6483bbdd70 R15: dead000000000100 FS: 00007fbfda4cdc40(0000) GS:ffff8f64fbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fbfda666fd0 CR3: 000000013cf66002 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: btrfs_free_block_groups.cold+0x55/0x55 close_ctree+0x2c5/0x306 ? fsnotify_destroy_marks+0x14/0x100 generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0xa0 cleanup_mnt+0x12d/0x190 task_work_run+0x5c/0xa0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1b1/0x1d0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x54/0x280 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This happened because I injected an error in btrfs_cow_block() while running the dirty block groups. When we run the dirty block groups, we splice the list onto a local list to process. However if an error occurs, we only cleanup the transactions dirty block group list, not any pending block groups we have on our locally spliced list. In fact if we fail to allocate a path in this function we'll also fail to clean up the splice list. Fix this by splicing the list back onto the transaction dirty block group list so that the block groups are cleaned up. Then add a 'out' label and have the error conditions jump to out so that the errors are handled properly. This also has the side-effect of fixing a problem where we would clear 'ret' on error because we unconditionally ran btrfs_run_delayed_refs(). CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-04btrfs: fix reloc root leak with 0 ref reloc roots on recoveryJosef Bacik1-3/+1
commit c78a10aebb275c38d0cfccae129a803fe622e305 upstream. When recovering a relocation, if we run into a reloc root that has 0 refs we simply add it to the reloc_control->reloc_roots list, and then clean it up later. The problem with this is __del_reloc_root() doesn't do anything if the root isn't in the radix tree, which in this case it won't be because we never call __add_reloc_root() on the reloc_root. This exit condition simply isn't correct really. During normal operation we can remove ourselves from the rb tree and then we're meant to clean up later at merge_reloc_roots() time, and this happens correctly. During recovery we're depending on free_reloc_roots() to drop our references, but we're short-circuiting. Fix this by continuing to check if we're on the list and dropping ourselves from the reloc_control root list and dropping our reference appropriately. Change the corresponding BUG_ON() to an ASSERT() that does the correct thing if we aren't in the rb tree. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-04btrfs: abort the transaction if we fail to inc ref in btrfs_copy_rootJosef Bacik1-2/+3
commit 867ed321f90d06aaba84e2c91de51cd3038825ef upstream. While testing my error handling patches, I added a error injection site at btrfs_inc_extent_ref, to validate the error handling I added was doing the correct thing. However I hit a pretty ugly corruption while doing this check, with the following error injection stack trace: btrfs_inc_extent_ref btrfs_copy_root create_reloc_root btrfs_init_reloc_root btrfs_record_root_in_trans btrfs_start_transaction btrfs_update_inode btrfs_update_time touch_atime file_accessed btrfs_file_mmap This is because we do not catch the error from btrfs_inc_extent_ref, which in practice would be ENOMEM, which means we lose the extent references for a root that has already been allocated and inserted, which is the problem. Fix this by aborting the transaction if we fail to do the reference modification. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-04btrfs: add asserts for deleting backref cache nodesJosef Bacik1-3/+6
commit eddda68d97732ce05ca145f8e85e8a447f65cdad upstream. A weird KASAN problem that Zygo reported could have been easily caught if we checked for basic things in our backref freeing code. We have two methods of freeing a backref node - btrfs_backref_free_node: this just is kfree() essentially. - btrfs_backref_drop_node: this actually unlinks the node and cleans up everything and then calls btrfs_backref_free_node(). We should mostly be using btrfs_backref_drop_node(), to make sure the node is properly unlinked from the backref cache, and only use btrfs_backref_free_node() when we know the node isn't actually linked to the backref cache. We made a mistake here and thus got the KASAN splat. Make this style of issue easier to find by adding some ASSERT()'s to btrfs_backref_free_node() and adjusting our deletion stuff to properly init the list so we can rely on list_empty() checks working properly. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in btrfs_backref_cleanup_node+0x18a/0x420 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112402950 by task btrfs/28836 CPU: 0 PID: 28836 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 5.10.0-e35f27394290-for-next+ #23 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xbc/0xf9 ? btrfs_backref_cleanup_node+0x18a/0x420 print_address_description.constprop.8+0x21/0x210 ? record_print_text.cold.34+0x11/0x11 ? btrfs_backref_cleanup_node+0x18a/0x420 ? btrfs_backref_cleanup_node+0x18a/0x420 kasan_report.cold.10+0x20/0x37 ? btrfs_backref_cleanup_node+0x18a/0x420 __asan_load8+0x69/0x90 btrfs_backref_cleanup_node+0x18a/0x420 btrfs_backref_release_cache+0x83/0x1b0 relocate_block_group+0x394/0x780 ? merge_reloc_roots+0x4a0/0x4a0 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x26e/0x4c0 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x52/0x120 btrfs_balance+0xe2e/0x1900 ? check_flags.part.50+0x6c/0x1e0 ? btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x120/0x120 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xa06/0xcb0 ? _copy_from_user+0x83/0xc0 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x3a7/0x460 btrfs_ioctl+0x24c8/0x4360 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 ? check_chain_key+0x1f4/0x2f0 ? __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20 ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x18/0x30 ? check_chain_key+0x1f4/0x2f0 ? lock_downgrade+0x3f0/0x3f0 ? handle_mm_fault+0xad6/0x2150 ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xfc/0x9d0 ? ioctl_file_clone+0xe0/0xe0 ? check_flags.part.50+0x6c/0x1e0 ? check_flags.part.50+0x6c/0x1e0 ? check_flags+0x26/0x30 ? lock_is_held_type+0xc3/0xf0 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1b/0x60 ? do_syscall_64+0x13/0x80 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 ? __fget_light+0xae/0x110 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc3/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f4c4bdfe427 RSP: 002b:00007fff33ee6df8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff33ee6e98 RCX: 00007f4c4bdfe427 RDX: 00007fff33ee6e98 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000078 R10: fffffffffffff59d R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff33ee8a34 R15: 0000000000000001 Allocated by task 28836: kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.18+0xbe/0xd0 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x410/0xcb0 btrfs_backref_alloc_node+0x46/0xf0 btrfs_backref_add_tree_node+0x60d/0x11d0 build_backref_tree+0xc5/0x700 relocate_tree_blocks+0x2be/0xb90 relocate_block_group+0x2eb/0x780 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x26e/0x4c0 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x52/0x120 btrfs_balance+0xe2e/0x1900 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x3a7/0x460 btrfs_ioctl+0x24c8/0x4360 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc3/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Freed by task 28836: kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x20/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x1f/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0xf3/0x140 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 kfree+0xde/0x200 btrfs_backref_error_cleanup+0x452/0x530 build_backref_tree+0x1a5/0x700 relocate_tree_blocks+0x2be/0xb90 relocate_block_group+0x2eb/0x780 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x26e/0x4c0 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x52/0x120 btrfs_balance+0xe2e/0x1900 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x3a7/0x460 btrfs_ioctl+0x24c8/0x4360 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc3/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888112402900 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address is located 80 bytes inside of 128-byte region [ffff888112402900, ffff888112402980) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:0000000028b1cd08 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888131c810c0 pfn:0x112402 flags: 0x17ffe0000000200(slab) raw: 017ffe0000000200 ffffea000424f308 ffffea0007d572c8 ffff888100040440 raw: ffff888131c810c0 ffff888112402000 0000000100000009 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888112402800: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888112402880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff888112402900: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888112402980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888112402a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20201208194607.GI31381@hungrycats.org/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-04btrfs: do not warn if we can't find the reloc root when looking up backrefJosef Bacik1-1/+1
commit f78743fbdae1bb31bc9c9233c3590a5048782381 upstream. The backref code is looking for a reloc_root that corresponds to the given fs root. However any number of things could have gone wrong while initializing that reloc_root, like ENOMEM while trying to allocate the root itself, or EIO while trying to write the root item. This would result in no corresponding reloc_root being in the reloc root cache, and thus would return NULL when we do the find_reloc_root() call. Because of this we do not want to WARN_ON(). This presumably was meant to catch developer errors, cases where we messed up adding the reloc root. However we can easily hit this case with error injection, and thus should not do a WARN_ON(). CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reported-by: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-04btrfs: do not cleanup upper nodes in btrfs_backref_cleanup_nodeJosef Bacik1-7/+0
commit 7e2a870a599d4699a626ec26430c7a1ab14a2a49 upstream. Zygo reported the following panic when testing my error handling patches for relocation: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/backref.c:2545! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 3 PID: 8472 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 14 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, Call Trace: btrfs_backref_error_cleanup+0x4df/0x530 build_backref_tree+0x1a5/0x700 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x22/0x30 ? release_extent_buffer+0x225/0x280 ? free_extent_buffer.part.52+0xd7/0x140 relocate_tree_blocks+0x2a6/0xb60 ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50 ? do_relocation+0xc10/0xc10 ? kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x6a3/0xcb0 ? free_extent_buffer.part.52+0xd7/0x140 ? rb_insert_color+0x342/0x360 ? add_tree_block.isra.36+0x236/0x2b0 relocate_block_group+0x2eb/0x780 ? merge_reloc_roots+0x470/0x470 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x26e/0x4c0 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x52/0x120 btrfs_balance+0xe2e/0x18f0 ? pvclock_clocksource_read+0xeb/0x190 ? btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x120/0x120 ? lock_contended+0x620/0x6e0 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x1e0/0x1e0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x1f9/0x460 btrfs_ioctl+0x24c8/0x4380 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 ? check_chain_key+0x1f4/0x2f0 ? __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20 ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x18/0x30 ? check_chain_key+0x1f4/0x2f0 ? lock_downgrade+0x3f0/0x3f0 ? handle_mm_fault+0xad6/0x2150 ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xfc/0x9d0 ? ioctl_file_clone+0xe0/0xe0 ? check_flags.part.50+0x6c/0x1e0 ? check_flags.part.50+0x6c/0x1e0 ? check_flags+0x26/0x30 ? lock_is_held_type+0xc3/0xf0 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1b/0x60 ? do_syscall_64+0x13/0x80 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 ? __fget_light+0xae/0x110 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc3/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This occurs because of this check if (RB_EMPTY_NODE(&upper->rb_node)) BUG_ON(!list_empty(&node->upper)); As we are dropping the backref node, if we discover that our upper node in the edge we just cleaned up isn't linked into the cache that we are now done with this node, thus the BUG_ON(). However this is an erroneous assumption, as we will look up all the references for a node first, and then process the pending edges. All of the 'upper' nodes in our pending edges won't be in the cache's rb_tree yet, because they haven't been processed. We could very well have many edges still left to cleanup on this node. The fact is we simply do not need this check, we can just process all of the edges only for this node, because below this check we do the following if (list_empty(&upper->lower)) { list_add_tail(&upper->lower, &cache->leaves); upper->lowest = 1; } If the upper node truly isn't used yet, then we add it to the cache->leaves list to be cleaned up later. If it is still used then the last child node that has it linked into its node will add it to the leaves list and then it will be cleaned up. Fix this problem by dropping this logic altogether. With this fix I no longer see the panic when testing with error injection in the backref code. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-04erofs: initialized fields can only be observed after bit is setGao Xiang2-2/+18
commit ce063129181312f8781a047a50be439c5859747b upstream. Currently, although set_bit() & test_bit() pairs are used as a fast- path for initialized configurations. However, these atomic ops are actually relaxed forms. Instead, load-acquire & store-release form is needed to make sure uninitialized fields won't be observed in advance here (yet no such corresponding bitops so use full barriers instead.) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210209130618.15838-1-hsiangkao@aol.com Fixes: 62dc45979f3f ("staging: erofs: fix race of initializing xattrs of a inode at the same time") Fixes: 152a333a5895 ("staging: erofs: add compacted compression indexes support") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.3+ Reported-by: Huang Jianan <huangjianan@oppo.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-04proc: use kvzalloc for our kernel bufferJosef Bacik1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 4508943794efdd94171549c0bd52810e2f4ad9fe ] Since sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handler we have been pre-allocating a buffer to copy the data from the proc handlers into, and then copying that to userspace. The problem is this just blindly kzalloc()'s the buffer size passed in from the read, which in the case of our 'cat' binary was 64kib. Order-4 allocations are not awesome, and since we can potentially allocate up to our maximum order, so use kvzalloc for these buffers. [willy@infradead.org: changelog tweaks] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6345270a2c1160b89dd5e6715461f388176899d1.1612972413.git.josef@toxicpanda.com Fixes: 32927393dc1c ("sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handler") Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> CC: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04NFSv4: Fixes for nfs4_bitmask_adjust()Trond Myklebust1-7/+8
[ Upstream commit 45901a231723a5a513ff08477983f3a274a6a910 ] We don't want to ask for the ACL in a WRITE reply, since we don't have a preallocated buffer. Instead of checking NFS_INO_INVALID_ACCESS, which is really about managing the access cache, we should look at the value of NFS_INO_INVALID_OTHER. Also ensure we assign the mode, owner and owner_group flags to the correct bit mask. Finally, fix up the check for NFS_INO_INVALID_CTIME to retrieve the ctime, and add a check for NFS_INO_INVALID_CHANGE. Fixes: 76bd5c016ef4 ("NFSv4: make cache consistency bitmask dynamic") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04ocfs2: fix a use after free on errorDan Carpenter1-1/+7
[ Upstream commit c57d117f2b2f2a19b570c36f2819ef8d8210af20 ] The error handling in this function frees "reg" but it is still on the "o2hb_all_regions" list so it will lead to a use after freew. Joseph Qi points out that we need to clear the bit in the "o2hb_region_bitmap" as well Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YBk4M6HUG8jB/jc7@mwanda Fixes: 1cf257f51191 ("ocfs2: fix memory leak") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04ext: EXT4_KUNIT_TESTS should depend on EXT4_FS instead of selecting itGeert Uytterhoeven1-2/+1
[ Upstream commit 302fdadeafe4be539f247abf25f61822e4a5a577 ] EXT4_KUNIT_TESTS selects EXT4_FS, thus enabling an optional feature the user may not want to enable. Fix this by making the test depend on EXT4_FS instead. Fixes: 1cbeab1b242d16fd ("ext4: add kunit test for decoding extended timestamps") Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122110234.2825685-1-geert@linux-m68k.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04ext4: fix potential htree index checksum corruptionTheodore Ts'o1-4/+3
[ Upstream commit b5776e7524afbd4569978ff790864755c438bba7 ] In the case where we need to do an interior node split, and immediately afterwards, we are unable to allocate a new directory leaf block due to ENOSPC, the directory index checksum's will not be filled in correctly (and indeed, will not be correctly journalled). This looks like a bug that was introduced when we added largedir support. The original code doesn't make any sense (and should have been caught in code review), but it was hidden because most of the time, the index node checksum will be set by do_split(). But if do_split bails out due to ENOSPC, then ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node() won't get called, and so the directory index checksum field will not get set, leading to: EXT4-fs error (device sdb): dx_probe:858: inode #6635543: block 4022: comm nfsd: Directory index failed checksum Google-Bug-Id: 176345532 Fixes: e08ac99fa2a2 ("ext4: add largedir feature") Cc: Artem Blagodarenko <artem.blagodarenko@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04ceph: fix flush_snap logic after putting capsJeff Layton1-4/+6
[ Upstream commit 64f36da5625f7f9853b86750eaa89d499d16a2e9 ] A primary reason for skipping ceph_check_caps after putting the references was to avoid the locking in ceph_check_caps during a reconnect. __ceph_put_cap_refs can still call ceph_flush_snaps in that case though, and that takes many of the same inconvenient locks. Fix the logic in __ceph_put_cap_refs to skip flushing snaps when the skip_checking_caps flag is set. Fixes: e64f44a88465 ("ceph: skip checking caps when session reconnecting and releasing reqs") Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04nfsd: register pernet ops last, unregister firstJ. Bruce Fields1-7/+7
[ Upstream commit bd5ae9288d6451bd346a1b4a59d4fe7e62ba29b7 ] These pernet operations may depend on stuff set up or torn down in the module init/exit functions. And they may be called at any time in between. So it makes more sense for them to be the last to be registered in the init function, and the first to be unregistered in the exit function. In particular, without this, the drc slab is being destroyed before all the per-net drcs are shut down, resulting in an "Objects remaining in nfsd_drc on __kmem_cache_shutdown()" warning in exit_nfsd. Reported-by: Zhi Li <yieli@redhat.com> Fixes: 3ba75830ce17 "nfsd4: drc containerization" Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04isofs: release buffer head before returnPan Bian2-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 0a6dc67a6aa45f19bd4ff89b4f468fc50c4b8daa ] Release the buffer_head before returning error code in do_isofs_readdir() and isofs_find_entry(). Fixes: 2deb1acc653c ("isofs: fix access to unallocated memory when reading corrupted filesystem") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210118120455.118955-1-bianpan2016@163.com Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04quota: Fix memory leak when handling corrupted quota fileJan Kara1-3/+8
[ Upstream commit a4db1072e1a3bd7a8d9c356e1902b13ac5deb8ef ] When checking corrupted quota file we can bail out and leak allocated info structure. Properly free info structure on error return. Reported-by: syzbot+77779c9b52ab78154b08@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 11c514a99bb9 ("quota: Sanity-check quota file headers on load") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04ubifs: Fix error return code in alloc_wbufs()Wang ShaoBo1-1/+3
[ Upstream commit 42119dbe571eb419dae99b81dd20fa42f47464e1 ] Fix to return PTR_ERR() error code from the error handling case instead fo 0 in function alloc_wbufs(), as done elsewhere in this function. Fixes: 6a98bc4614de ("ubifs: Add authentication nodes to journal") Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04ubifs: replay: Fix high stack usage, againArnd Bergmann1-1/+3
[ Upstream commit 410b6de702ef84fea6e7abcb6620ef8bfc112fae ] An earlier commit moved out some functions to not be inlined by gcc, but after some other rework to remove one of those, clang started inlining the other one and ran into the same problem as gcc did before: fs/ubifs/replay.c:1174:5: error: stack frame size of 1152 bytes in function 'ubifs_replay_journal' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than=] Mark the function as noinline_for_stack to ensure it doesn't happen again. Fixes: f80df3851246 ("ubifs: use crypto_shash_tfm_digest()") Fixes: eb66eff6636d ("ubifs: replay: Fix high stack usage") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04ubifs: Fix memleak in ubifs_init_authenticationDinghao Liu1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 11b8ab3836454a2600e396f34731e491b661f9d5 ] When crypto_shash_digestsize() fails, c->hmac_tfm has not been freed before returning, which leads to memleak. Fixes: 49525e5eecca5 ("ubifs: Add helper functions for authentication support") Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04jffs2: fix use after free in jffs2_sum_write_data()Tom Rix1-0/+3
[ Upstream commit 19646447ad3a680d2ab08c097585b7d96a66126b ] clang static analysis reports this problem fs/jffs2/summary.c:794:31: warning: Use of memory after it is freed c->summary->sum_list_head = temp->u.next; ^~~~~~~~~~~~ In jffs2_sum_write_data(), in a loop summary data is handles a node at a time. When it has written out the node it is removed the summary list, and the node is deleted. In the corner case when a JFFS2_FEATURE_RWCOMPAT_COPY is seen, a call is made to jffs2_sum_disable_collecting(). jffs2_sum_disable_collecting() deletes the whole list which conflicts with the loop's deleting the list by parts. To preserve the old behavior of stopping the write midway, bail out of the loop after disabling summary collection. Fixes: 6171586a7ae5 ("[JFFS2] Correct handling of JFFS2_FEATURE_RWCOMPAT_COPY nodes.") Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04fs/jfs: fix potential integer overflow on shift of a intColin Ian King1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 4208c398aae4c2290864ba15c3dab7111f32bec1 ] The left shift of int 32 bit integer constant 1 is evaluated using 32 bit arithmetic and then assigned to a signed 64 bit integer. In the case where l2nb is 32 or more this can lead to an overflow. Avoid this by shifting the value 1LL instead. Addresses-Coverity: ("Uninitentional integer overflow") Fixes: b40c2e665cd5 ("fs/jfs: TRIM support for JFS Filesystem") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04io_uring: fix possible deadlock in io_uring_pollHao Xu1-2/+15
[ Upstream commit ed670c3f90a67d9e16ab6d8893be6f072d79cd4c ] Abaci reported follow issue: [ 30.615891] ====================================================== [ 30.616648] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 30.617423] 5.11.0-rc3-next-20210115 #1 Not tainted [ 30.618035] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 30.618914] a.out/1128 is trying to acquire lock: [ 30.619520] ffff88810b063868 (&ep->mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220 [ 30.620505] [ 30.620505] but task is already holding lock: [ 30.621218] ffff88810e952be8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x3f0/0x5b0 [ 30.622349] [ 30.622349] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 30.622349] [ 30.623289] [ 30.623289] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 30.624243] [ 30.624243] -> #1 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 30.625263] lock_acquire+0x2c7/0x390 [ 30.625868] __mutex_lock+0xae/0x9f0 [ 30.626451] io_cqring_overflow_flush.part.95+0x6d/0x70 [ 30.627278] io_uring_poll+0xcb/0xd0 [ 30.627890] ep_item_poll.isra.14+0x4e/0x90 [ 30.628531] do_epoll_ctl+0xb7e/0x1120 [ 30.629122] __x64_sys_epoll_ctl+0x70/0xb0 [ 30.629770] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 [ 30.630332] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 30.631187] [ 30.631187] -> #0 (&ep->mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 30.631985] check_prevs_add+0x226/0xb00 [ 30.632584] __lock_acquire+0x1237/0x13a0 [ 30.633207] lock_acquire+0x2c7/0x390 [ 30.633740] __mutex_lock+0xae/0x9f0 [ 30.634258] __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220 [ 30.634879] __io_arm_poll_handler+0xbf/0x220 [ 30.635462] io_issue_sqe+0xa6b/0x13e0 [ 30.635982] __io_queue_sqe+0x10b/0x550 [ 30.636648] io_queue_sqe+0x235/0x470 [ 30.637281] io_submit_sqes+0xcce/0xf10 [ 30.637839] __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x3fb/0x5b0 [ 30.638465] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 [ 30.638999] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 30.639643] [ 30.639643] other info that might help us debug this: [ 30.639643] [ 30.640618] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 30.640618] [ 30.641402] CPU0 CPU1 [ 30.641938] ---- ---- [ 30.642664] lock(&ctx->uring_lock); [ 30.643425] lock(&ep->mtx); [ 30.644498] lock(&ctx->uring_lock); [ 30.645668] lock(&ep->mtx); [ 30.646321] [ 30.646321] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 30.646321] [ 30.647642] 1 lock held by a.out/1128: [ 30.648424] #0: ffff88810e952be8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x3f0/0x5b0 [ 30.649954] [ 30.649954] stack backtrace: [ 30.650592] CPU: 1 PID: 1128 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.11.0-rc3-next-20210115 #1 [ 30.651554] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 [ 30.652290] Call Trace: [ 30.652688] dump_stack+0xac/0xe3 [ 30.653164] check_noncircular+0x11e/0x130 [ 30.653747] ? check_prevs_add+0x226/0xb00 [ 30.654303] check_prevs_add+0x226/0xb00 [ 30.654845] ? add_lock_to_list.constprop.49+0xac/0x1d0 [ 30.655564] __lock_acquire+0x1237/0x13a0 [ 30.656262] lock_acquire+0x2c7/0x390 [ 30.656788] ? __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220 [ 30.657379] ? __io_queue_proc.isra.88+0x180/0x180 [ 30.658014] __mutex_lock+0xae/0x9f0 [ 30.658524] ? __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220 [ 30.659112] ? mark_held_locks+0x5a/0x80 [ 30.659648] ? __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220 [ 30.660229] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x40 [ 30.660885] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x46/0x110 [ 30.661471] ? __io_queue_proc.isra.88+0x180/0x180 [ 30.662102] ? __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220 [ 30.662696] __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220 [ 30.663273] ? __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x220/0x220 [ 30.663875] __io_arm_poll_handler+0xbf/0x220 [ 30.664463] io_issue_sqe+0xa6b/0x13e0 [ 30.664984] ? __lock_acquire+0x782/0x13a0 [ 30.665544] ? __io_queue_proc.isra.88+0x180/0x180 [ 30.666170] ? __io_queue_sqe+0x10b/0x550 [ 30.666725] __io_queue_sqe+0x10b/0x550 [ 30.667252] ? __fget_files+0x131/0x260 [ 30.667791] ? io_req_prep+0xd8/0x1090 [ 30.668316] ? io_queue_sqe+0x235/0x470 [ 30.668868] io_queue_sqe+0x235/0x470 [ 30.669398] io_submit_sqes+0xcce/0xf10 [ 30.669931] ? xa_load+0xe4/0x1c0 [ 30.670425] __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x3fb/0x5b0 [ 30.671051] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xde/0x180 [ 30.671719] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x2b/0x80 [ 30.672380] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 [ 30.672901] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 30.673503] RIP: 0033:0x7fd89c813239 [ 30.673962] Code: 01 00 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 27 ec 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 30.675920] RSP: 002b:00007ffc65a7c628 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001aa [ 30.676791] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fd89c813239 [ 30.677594] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000014 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 30.678678] RBP: 00007ffc65a7c720 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000003000000 [ 30.679492] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000400ff0 [ 30.680282] R13: 00007ffc65a7c840 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 This might happen if we do epoll_wait on a uring fd while reading/writing the former epoll fd in a sqe in the former uring instance. So let's don't flush cqring overflow list, just do a simple check. Reported-by: Abaci <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Fixes: 6c503150ae33 ("io_uring: patch up IOPOLL overflow_flush sync") Signed-off-by: Hao Xu <haoxu@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04btrfs: fix double accounting of ordered extent for subpage case in ↵Qu Wenruo1-1/+2
btrfs_invalidapge [ Upstream commit 951c80f83d61bd4b21794c8aba829c3c1a45c2d0 ] Commit dbfdb6d1b369 ("Btrfs: Search for all ordered extents that could span across a page") make btrfs_invalidapage() to search all ordered extents. The offending code looks like this: again: start = page_start; ordered = btrfs_lookup_ordered_range(inode, start, page_end - start + 1); if (ordred) { end = min(page_end, ordered->file_offset + ordered->num_bytes - 1); /* Do the cleanup */ start = end + 1; if (start < page_end) goto again; } The behavior is indeed necessary for the incoming subpage support, but when it iterates through all the ordered extents, it also resets the search range @start. This means, for the following cases, we can double account the ordered extents, causing its bytes_left underflow: Page offset 0 16K 32K |<--- OE 1 --->|<--- OE 2 ---->| As the first iteration will find ordered extent (OE) 1, which doesn't cover the full page, thus after cleanup code, we need to retry again. But again label will reset start to page_start, and we got OE 1 again, which causes double accounting on OE 1, and cause OE 1's byte_left to underflow. This problem can only happen for subpage case, as for regular sectorsize == PAGE_SIZE case, we will always find a OE ends at or after page end, thus no way to trigger the problem. Move the again label after start = page_start. There will be more comprehensive rework to convert the open coded loop to a proper while loop for subpage support. Fixes: dbfdb6d1b369 ("Btrfs: Search for all ordered extents that could span across a page") Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04btrfs: clarify error returns values in __load_free_space_cacheZhihao Cheng1-1/+5
[ Upstream commit 3cc64e7ebfb0d7faaba2438334c43466955a96e8 ] Return value in __load_free_space_cache is not properly set after (unlikely) memory allocation failures and 0 is returned instead. This is not a problem for the caller load_free_space_cache because only value 1 is considered as 'cache loaded' but for clarity it's better to set the errors accordingly. Fixes: a67509c30079 ("Btrfs: add a io_ctl struct and helpers for dealing with the space cache") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04f2fs: fix a wrong condition in __submit_bioDehe Gu1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 39f71b7e40e21805d6b15fc7750bdd9cab6a5010 ] We should use !F2FS_IO_ALIGNED() to check and submit_io directly. Fixes: 8223ecc456d0 ("f2fs: fix to add missing F2FS_IO_ALIGNED() condition") Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Dehe Gu <gudehe@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ge Qiu <qiuge@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04f2fs: fix to avoid inconsistent quota dataYi Chen2-0/+8
[ Upstream commit 25fb04dbce6a0e165d28fd1fa8a1d7018c637fe8 ] Occasionally, quota data may be corrupted detected by fsck: Info: checkpoint state = 45 : crc compacted_summary unmount [QUOTA WARNING] Usage inconsistent for ID 0:actual (1543036928, 762) != expected (1543032832, 762) [ASSERT] (fsck_chk_quota_files:1986) --> Quota file is missing or invalid quota file content found. [QUOTA WARNING] Usage inconsistent for ID 0:actual (1352478720, 344) != expected (1352474624, 344) [ASSERT] (fsck_chk_quota_files:1986) --> Quota file is missing or invalid quota file content found. [FSCK] Unreachable nat entries [Ok..] [0x0] [FSCK] SIT valid block bitmap checking [Ok..] [FSCK] Hard link checking for regular file [Ok..] [0x0] [FSCK] valid_block_count matching with CP [Ok..] [0xdf299] [FSCK] valid_node_count matcing with CP (de lookup) [Ok..] [0x2b01] [FSCK] valid_node_count matcing with CP (nat lookup) [Ok..] [0x2b01] [FSCK] valid_inode_count matched with CP [Ok..] [0x2665] [FSCK] free segment_count matched with CP [Ok..] [0xcb04] [FSCK] next block offset is free [Ok..] [FSCK] fixing SIT types [FSCK] other corrupted bugs [Fail] The root cause is: If we open file w/ readonly flag, disk quota info won't be initialized for this file, however, following mmap() will force to convert inline inode via f2fs_convert_inline_inode(), which may increase block usage for this inode w/o updating quota data, it causes inconsistent disk quota info. The issue will happen in following stack: open(file, O_RDONLY) mmap(file) - f2fs_convert_inline_inode - f2fs_convert_inline_page - f2fs_reserve_block - f2fs_reserve_new_block - f2fs_reserve_new_blocks - f2fs_i_blocks_write - dquot_claim_block inode->i_blocks increase, but the dqb_curspace keep the size for the dquots is NULL. To fix this issue, let's call dquot_initialize() anyway in both f2fs_truncate() and f2fs_convert_inline_inode() functions to avoid potential inconsistent quota data issue. Fixes: 0abd675e97e6 ("f2fs: support plain user/group quota") Signed-off-by: Daiyue Zhang <zhangdaiyue1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Dehe Gu <gudehe@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Junchao Jiang <jiangjunchao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ge Qiu <qiuge@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yi Chen <chenyi77@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04mm: proc: Invalidate TLB after clearing soft-dirty page stateWill Deacon1-4/+5
[ Upstream commit 912efa17e5121693dfbadae29768f4144a3f9e62 ] Since commit 0758cd830494 ("asm-generic/tlb: avoid potential double flush"), TLB invalidation is elided in tlb_finish_mmu() if no entries were batched via the tlb_remove_*() functions. Consequently, the page-table modifications performed by clear_refs_write() in response to a write to /proc/<pid>/clear_refs do not perform TLB invalidation. Although this is fine when simply aging the ptes, in the case of clearing the "soft-dirty" state we can end up with entries where pte_write() is false, yet a writable mapping remains in the TLB. Fix this by avoiding the mmu_gather API altogether: managing both the 'tlb_flush_pending' flag on the 'mm_struct' and explicit TLB invalidation for the sort-dirty path, much like mprotect() does already. Fixes: 0758cd830494 ("asm-generic/tlb: avoid potential double flush”) Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210127235347.1402-2-will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04f2fs: compress: fix potential deadlockChao Yu3-6/+11
[ Upstream commit 3afae09ffea5e08f523823be99a784675995d6bb ] generic/269 reports a hangtask issue, the root cause is ABBA deadlock described as below: Thread A Thread B - down_write(&sbi->gc_lock) -- A - f2fs_write_data_pages - lock all pages in cluster -- B - f2fs_write_multi_pages - f2fs_write_raw_pages - f2fs_write_single_data_page - f2fs_balance_fs - down_write(&sbi->gc_lock) -- A - f2fs_gc - do_garbage_collect - ra_data_block - pagecache_get_page -- B To fix this, it needs to avoid calling f2fs_balance_fs() if there is still cluster pages been locked in context of cluster writeback, so instead, let's call f2fs_balance_fs() in the end of f2fs_write_raw_pages() when all cluster pages were unlocked. Fixes: 4c8ff7095bef ("f2fs: support data compression") Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-04debugfs: do not attempt to create a new file before the filesystem is initalizedGreg Kroah-Hartman1-0/+3
commit 56348560d495d2501e87db559a61de717cd3ab02 upstream. Some subsystems want to add debugfs files at early boot, way before debugfs is initialized. This seems to work somehow as the vfs layer will not allow it to happen, but let's be explicit and test to ensure we are properly up and running before allowing files to be created. Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> Reported-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210218100818.3622317-2-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-04debugfs: be more robust at handling improper input in debugfs_lookup()Greg Kroah-Hartman1-1/+1
commit bc6de804d36b3709d54fa22bd128cbac91c11526 upstream. debugfs_lookup() doesn't like it if it is passed an illegal name pointer, or if the filesystem isn't even initialized yet. If either of these happen, it will crash the system, so fix it up by properly testing for valid input and that we are up and running before trying to find a file in the filesystem. Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> Tested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210218100818.3622317-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-26cifs: Set CIFS_MOUNT_USE_PREFIX_PATH flag on setting cifs_sb->prepath.Shyam Prasad N1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit a738c93fb1c17e386a09304b517b1c6b2a6a5a8b ] While debugging another issue today, Steve and I noticed that if a subdir for a file share is already mounted on the client, any new mount of any other subdir (or the file share root) of the same share results in sharing the cifs superblock, which e.g. can result in incorrect device name. While setting prefix path for the root of a cifs_sb, CIFS_MOUNT_USE_PREFIX_PATH flag should also be set. Without it, prepath is not even considered in some places, and output of "mount" and various /proc/<>/*mount* related options can be missing part of the device name. Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-02-26mm: provide a saner PTE walking API for modulesPaolo Bonzini1-2/+3
commit 9fd6dad1261a541b3f5fa7dc5b152222306e6702 upstream. Currently, the follow_pfn function is exported for modules but follow_pte is not. However, follow_pfn is very easy to misuse, because it does not provide protections (so most of its callers assume the page is writable!) and because it returns after having already unlocked the page table lock. Provide instead a simplified version of follow_pte that does not have the pmdpp and range arguments. The older version survives as follow_invalidate_pte() for use by fs/dax.c. Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-26mm: simplify follow_pte{,pmd}Christoph Hellwig1-5/+4
commit ff5c19ed4b087073cea38ff0edc80c23d7256943 upstream. Merge __follow_pte_pmd, follow_pte_pmd and follow_pte into a single follow_pte function and just pass two additional NULL arguments for the two previous follow_pte callers. [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: merge fix for "s390/pci: remove races against pte updates"] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201111221254.7f6a3658@canb.auug.org.au Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201029101432.47011-3-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-26ntfs: check for valid standard information attributeRustam Kovhaev1-0/+6
commit 4dfe6bd94959222e18d512bdf15f6bf9edb9c27c upstream. Mounting a corrupted filesystem with NTFS resulted in a kernel crash. We should check for valid STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute offset and length before trying to access it Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210217155930.1506815-1-rkovhaev@gmail.com Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c584225dabdea2f71969 Signed-off-by: Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot+c584225dabdea2f71969@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+c584225dabdea2f71969@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-26ceph: downgrade warning from mdsmap decode to debugLuis Henriques1-2/+2
commit ccd1acdf1c49b835504b235461fd24e2ed826764 upstream. While the MDS cluster is unstable and changing state the client may get mdsmap updates that will trigger warnings: [144692.478400] ceph: mdsmap_decode got incorrect state(up:standby-replay) [144697.489552] ceph: mdsmap_decode got incorrect state(up:standby-replay) [144697.489580] ceph: mdsmap_decode got incorrect state(up:standby-replay) This patch downgrades these warnings to debug, as they may flood the logs if the cluster is unstable for a while. Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-23btrfs: fix crash after non-aligned direct IO write with O_DSYNCFilipe Manana1-1/+5
Whenever we attempt to do a non-aligned direct IO write with O_DSYNC, we end up triggering an assertion and crashing. Example reproducer: $ cat test.sh #!/bin/bash DEV=/dev/sdj MNT=/mnt/sdj mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV > /dev/null mount $DEV $MNT # Do a direct IO write with O_DSYNC into a non-aligned range... xfs_io -f -d -s -c "pwrite -S 0xab -b 64K 1111 64K" $MNT/foobar umount $MNT When running the reproducer an assertion fails and produces the following trace: [ 2418.403134] assertion failed: !current->journal_info || flush != BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_DATA, in fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1467 [ 2418.403745] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2418.404306] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3286! [ 2418.404862] invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI [ 2418.405451] CPU: 1 PID: 64705 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G D 5.10.15-btrfs-next-87 #1 [ 2418.406026] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 2418.407228] RIP: 0010:assertfail.constprop.0+0x18/0x26 [btrfs] [ 2418.407835] Code: e6 48 c7 (...) [ 2418.409078] RSP: 0018:ffffb06080d13c98 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 2418.409696] RAX: 000000000000006c RBX: ffff994c1debbf08 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 2418.410302] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 2418.410904] RBP: ffff994c21770000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2418.411504] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000010000 [ 2418.412111] R13: ffff994c22198400 R14: ffff994c21770000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 2418.412713] FS: 00007f54fd7aff00(0000) GS:ffff994d35200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2418.413326] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2418.413933] CR2: 000056549596d000 CR3: 000000010b928003 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 [ 2418.414528] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2418.415109] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2418.415669] Call Trace: [ 2418.416254] btrfs_reserve_data_bytes.cold+0x22/0x22 [btrfs] [ 2418.416812] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] [ 2418.417380] btrfs_buffered_write+0x1b0/0x7f0 [btrfs] [ 2418.418315] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x2a9/0x770 [btrfs] [ 2418.418920] new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1c0 [ 2418.419430] vfs_write+0x2bb/0x3b0 [ 2418.419972] __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x90/0xc0 [ 2418.420486] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [ 2418.420979] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 2418.421486] RIP: 0033:0x7f54fda0b986 [ 2418.421981] Code: 48 c7 c0 (...) [ 2418.423019] RSP: 002b:00007ffc40569c38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000012 [ 2418.423547] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f54fda0b986 [ 2418.424075] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: 000056549595e000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 2418.424596] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000400 [ 2418.425119] R10: 0000000000000400 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff [ 2418.425644] R13: 0000000000000400 R14: 0000000000010000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 2418.426148] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic (...) [ 2418.429540] ---[ end trace ef2aeb44dc0afa34 ]--- 1) At btrfs_file_write_iter() we set current->journal_info to BTRFS_DIO_SYNC_STUB; 2) We then call __btrfs_direct_write(), which calls btrfs_direct_IO(); 3) We can't do the direct IO write because it starts at a non-aligned offset (1111). So at btrfs_direct_IO() we return -EINVAL (coming from check_direct_IO() which does the alignment check), but we leave current->journal_info set to BTRFS_DIO_SYNC_STUB - we only clear it at btrfs_dio_iomap_begin(), because we assume we always get there; 4) Then at __btrfs_direct_write() we see that the attempt to do the direct IO write was not successful, 0 bytes written, so we fallback to a buffered write by calling btrfs_buffered_write(); 5) There we call btrfs_check_data_free_space() which in turn calls btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand() and that calls btrfs_reserve_data_bytes() with flush == BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_DATA; 6) Then at btrfs_reserve_data_bytes() we have current->journal_info set to BTRFS_DIO_SYNC_STUB, therefore not NULL, and flush has the value BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_DATA, triggering the second assertion: int btrfs_reserve_data_bytes(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 bytes, enum btrfs_reserve_flush_enum flush) { struct btrfs_space_info *data_sinfo = fs_info->data_sinfo; int ret; ASSERT(flush == BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_DATA || flush == BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_FREE_SPACE_INODE); ASSERT(!current->journal_info || flush != BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_DATA); (...) So fix that by setting the journal to NULL whenever check_direct_IO() returns a failure. This bug only affects 5.10 kernels, and the regression was introduced in 5.10-rc1 by commit 0eb79294dbe328 ("btrfs: dio iomap DSYNC workaround"). The bug does not exist in 5.11 kernels due to commit ecfdc08b8cc65d ("btrfs: remove dio iomap DSYNC workaround"), which depends on a large patchset that went into the merge window for 5.11. So this is a fix only for 5.10.x stable kernels, as there are people hitting this bug. Fixes: 0eb79294dbe328 ("btrfs: dio iomap DSYNC workaround") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10 (and only 5.10) Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1181605 Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-23btrfs: fix backport of 2175bf57dc952 in 5.10.13David Sterba1-3/+3
There's a mistake in backport of upstream commit 2175bf57dc95 ("btrfs: fix possible free space tree corruption with online conversion") as 5.10.13 commit 2175bf57dc95. The enum value BTRFS_FS_FREE_SPACE_TREE_UNTRUSTED has been added to the wrong enum set, colliding with value of BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLE. This could cause problems during the tree conversion, where the quotas wouldn't be set up properly but the related code executed anyway due to the bit set. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20210219111741.95DD.409509F4@e16-tech.com Reported-by: Wang Yugui <wangyugui@e16-tech.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10.13+ Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-17ovl: expand warning in ovl_d_real()Miklos Szeredi1-5/+8
commit cef4cbff06fbc3be54d6d79ee139edecc2ee8598 upstream. There was a syzbot report with this warning but insufficient information... Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-17ovl: skip getxattr of security labelsAmir Goldstein1-7/+8
[ Upstream commit 03fedf93593c82538b18476d8c4f0e8f8435ea70 ] When inode has no listxattr op of its own (e.g. squashfs) vfs_listxattr calls the LSM inode_listsecurity hooks to list the xattrs that LSMs will intercept in inode_getxattr hooks. When selinux LSM is installed but not initialized, it will list the security.selinux xattr in inode_listsecurity, but will not intercept it in inode_getxattr. This results in -ENODATA for a getxattr call for an xattr returned by listxattr. This situation was manifested as overlayfs failure to copy up lower files from squashfs when selinux is built-in but not initialized, because ovl_copy_xattr() iterates the lower inode xattrs by vfs_listxattr() and vfs_getxattr(). ovl_copy_xattr() skips copy up of security labels that are indentified by inode_copy_up_xattr LSM hooks, but it does that after vfs_getxattr(). Since we are not going to copy them, skip vfs_getxattr() of the security labels. Reported-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com> Tested-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/2nv9d47zt7.fsf@aldarion.sourceruckus.org/ Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-02-17ovl: perform vfs_getxattr() with mounter credsMiklos Szeredi1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 554677b97257b0b69378bd74e521edb7e94769ff ] The vfs_getxattr() in ovl_xattr_set() is used to check whether an xattr exist on a lower layer file that is to be removed. If the xattr does not exist, then no need to copy up the file. This call of vfs_getxattr() wasn't wrapped in credential override, and this is probably okay. But for consitency wrap this instance as well. Reported-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-02-17tmpfs: disallow CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64 on alphaSeth Forshee1-1/+1
commit ad69c389ec110ea54f8b0c0884b255340ef1c736 upstream. As with s390, alpha is a 64-bit architecture with a 32-bit ino_t. With CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64=y tmpfs mounts will get 64-bit inode numbers and display "inode64" in the mount options, whereas passing "inode64" in the mount options will fail. This leads to erroneous behaviours such as this: # mkdir mnt # mount -t tmpfs nodev mnt # mount -o remount,rw mnt mount: /home/ubuntu/mnt: mount point not mounted or bad option. Prevent CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64 from being selected on alpha. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210208215726.608197-1-seth.forshee@canonical.com Fixes: ea3271f7196c ("tmpfs: support 64-bit inums per-sb") Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.9+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-17tmpfs: disallow CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64 on s390Seth Forshee1-1/+1
commit b85a7a8bb5736998b8a681937a9749b350c17988 upstream. Currently there is an assumption in tmpfs that 64-bit architectures also have a 64-bit ino_t. This is not true on s390 which has a 32-bit ino_t. With CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64=y tmpfs mounts will get 64-bit inode numbers and display "inode64" in the mount options, but passing the "inode64" mount option will fail. This leads to the following behavior: # mkdir mnt # mount -t tmpfs nodev mnt # mount -o remount,rw mnt mount: /home/ubuntu/mnt: mount point not mounted or bad option. As mount sees "inode64" in the mount options and thus passes it in the options for the remount. So prevent CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64 from being selected on s390. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210205230620.518245-1-seth.forshee@canonical.com Fixes: ea3271f7196c ("tmpfs: support 64-bit inums per-sb") Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.9+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-13squashfs: add more sanity checks in xattr id lookupPhillip Lougher1-9/+57
commit 506220d2ba21791314af569211ffd8870b8208fa upstream. Sysbot has reported a warning where a kmalloc() attempt exceeds the maximum limit. This has been identified as corruption of the xattr_ids count when reading the xattr id lookup table. This patch adds a number of additional sanity checks to detect this corruption and others. 1. It checks for a corrupted xattr index read from the inode. This could be because the metadata block is uncompressed, or because the "compression" bit has been corrupted (turning a compressed block into an uncompressed block). This would cause an out of bounds read. 2. It checks against corruption of the xattr_ids count. This can either lead to the above kmalloc failure, or a smaller than expected table to be read. 3. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption. [phillip@squashfs.org.uk: fix checkpatch issue] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/270245655.754655.1612770082682@webmail.123-reg.co.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-5-phillip@squashfs.org.uk Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk> Reported-by: syzbot+2ccea6339d368360800d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-13squashfs: add more sanity checks in inode lookupPhillip Lougher1-8/+33
commit eabac19e40c095543def79cb6ffeb3a8588aaff4 upstream. Sysbot has reported an "slab-out-of-bounds read" error which has been identified as being caused by a corrupted "ino_num" value read from the inode. This could be because the metadata block is uncompressed, or because the "compression" bit has been corrupted (turning a compressed block into an uncompressed block). This patch adds additional sanity checks to detect this, and the following corruption. 1. It checks against corruption of the inodes count. This can either lead to a larger table to be read, or a smaller than expected table to be read. In the case of a too large inodes count, this would often have been trapped by the existing sanity checks, but this patch introduces a more exact check, which can identify too small values. 2. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption. [phillip@squashfs.org.uk: fix checkpatch issue] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/527909353.754618.1612769948607@webmail.123-reg.co.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-4-phillip@squashfs.org.uk Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk> Reported-by: syzbot+04419e3ff19d2970ea28@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-13squashfs: add more sanity checks in id lookupPhillip Lougher4-12/+45
commit f37aa4c7366e23f91b81d00bafd6a7ab54e4a381 upstream. Sysbot has reported a number of "slab-out-of-bounds reads" and "use-after-free read" errors which has been identified as being caused by a corrupted index value read from the inode. This could be because the metadata block is uncompressed, or because the "compression" bit has been corrupted (turning a compressed block into an uncompressed block). This patch adds additional sanity checks to detect this, and the following corruption. 1. It checks against corruption of the ids count. This can either lead to a larger table to be read, or a smaller than expected table to be read. In the case of a too large ids count, this would often have been trapped by the existing sanity checks, but this patch introduces a more exact check, which can identify too small values. 2. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-3-phillip@squashfs.org.uk Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk> Reported-by: syzbot+b06d57ba83f604522af2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+c021ba012da41ee9807c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+5024636e8b5fd19f0f19@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+bcbc661df46657d0fa4f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-13squashfs: avoid out of bounds writes in decompressorsPhillip Lougher1-1/+7
commit e812cbbbbbb15adbbbee176baa1e8bda53059bf0 upstream. Patch series "Squashfs: fix BIO migration regression and add sanity checks". Patch [1/4] fixes a regression introduced by the "migrate from ll_rw_block usage to BIO" patch, which has produced a number of Sysbot/Syzkaller reports. Patches [2/4], [3/4], and [4/4] fix a number of filesystem corruption issues which have produced Sysbot reports in the id, inode and xattr lookup code. Each patch has been tested against the Sysbot reproducers using the given kernel configuration. They have the appropriate "Reported-by:" lines added. Additionally, all of the reproducer filesystems are indirectly fixed by patch [4/4] due to the fact they all have xattr corruption which is now detected there. Additional testing with other configurations and architectures (32bit, big endian), and normal filesystems has also been done to trap any inadvertent regressions caused by the additional sanity checks. This patch (of 4): This is a regression introduced by the patch "migrate from ll_rw_block usage to BIO". Sysbot/Syskaller has reported a number of "out of bounds writes" and "unable to handle kernel paging request in squashfs_decompress" errors which have been identified as a regression introduced by the above patch. Specifically, the patch removed the following sanity check if (length < 0 || length > output->length || (index + length) > msblk->bytes_used) This check did two things: 1. It ensured any reads were not beyond the end of the filesystem 2. It ensured that the "length" field read from the filesystem was within the expected maximum length. Without this any corrupted values can over-run allocated buffers. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-1-phillip@squashfs.org.uk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-2-phillip@squashfs.org.uk Fixes: 93e72b3c612adc ("squashfs: migrate from ll_rw_block usage to BIO") Reported-by: syzbot+6fba78f99b9afd4b5634@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk> Cc: Philippe Liard <pliard@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-13nilfs2: make splice write available againJoachim Henke1-0/+1
commit a35d8f016e0b68634035217d06d1c53863456b50 upstream. Since 5.10, splice() or sendfile() to NILFS2 return EINVAL. This was caused by commit 36e2c7421f02 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops"). This patch initializes the splice_write field in file_operations, like most file systems do, to restore the functionality. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1612784101-14353-1-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Joachim Henke <joachim.henke@t-systems.com> Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com> Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.10+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-13pNFS/NFSv4: Improve rejection of out-of-order layoutsTrond Myklebust1-6/+16
[ Upstream commit d29b468da4f940bd2bff2628ba8d2d652671d244 ] If a layoutget ends up being reordered w.r.t. a layoutreturn, e.g. due to a layoutget-on-open not knowing a priori which file to lock, then we must assume the layout is no longer being considered valid state by the server. Incrementally improve our ability to reject such states by using the cached old stateid in conjunction with the plh_barrier to try to identify them. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-02-13pNFS/NFSv4: Try to return invalid layout in pnfs_layout_process()Trond Myklebust1-1/+7
[ Upstream commit 08bd8dbe88825760e953759d7ec212903a026c75 ] If the server returns a new stateid that does not match the one in our cache, then try to return the one we hold instead of just invalidating it on the client side. This ensures that both client and server will agree that the stateid is invalid. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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