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commit 554a5ccc4e4a20c5f3ec859de0842db4b4b9c77e upstream.
If we hit this error when mounted with errors=continue or
errors=remount-ro:
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used:2940: comm ext4.exe: Allocating blocks 5090-6081 which overlap fs metadata
then ext4_mb_new_blocks() will call ext4_mb_release_context() and try to
continue. However, ext4_mb_release_context() is the wrong thing to call
here since we are still actually using the allocation context.
Instead, just error out. We could retry the allocation, but there is a
possibility of getting stuck in an infinite loop instead, so this seems
safer.
[ Fixed up so we don't return EAGAIN to userspace. --tytso ]
Fixes: 8556e8f3b6 ("ext4: Don't allow new groups to be added during block allocation")
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c65d5c6c81a1f27dec5f627f67840726fcd146de upstream.
If we encounter a filesystem error during orphan cleanup, we should stop.
Otherwise, we may end up in an infinite loop where the same inode is
processed again and again.
EXT4-fs (loop0): warning: checktime reached, running e2fsck is recommended
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:758: group 2, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 6117 vs 0 free clusters
Aborting journal on device loop0-8.
EXT4-fs (loop0): Remounting filesystem read-only
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_free_blocks:4895: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_ext_remove_space:3068: IO failure
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_ext_truncate:4667: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_orphan_del:2927: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (00000000618192a0): orphan list check failed!
[...]
EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (0000000061819748): orphan list check failed!
[...]
EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (0000000061819bf0): orphan list check failed!
[...]
See-also: c9eb13a9105 ("ext4: fix hang when processing corrupted orphaned inode list")
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5b9554dc5bf008ae7f68a52e3d7e76c0920938a2 upstream.
If s_reserved_gdt_blocks is extremely large, it's possible for
ext4_init_block_bitmap(), which is called when ext4 sets up an
uninitialized block bitmap, to corrupt random kernel memory. Add the
same checks which e2fsck has --- it must never be larger than
blocksize / sizeof(__u32) --- and then add a backup check in
ext4_init_block_bitmap() in case the superblock gets modified after
the file system is mounted.
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6a7fd522a7c94cdef0a3b08acf8e6702056e635c upstream.
If ext4_fill_super() fails early, it's possible for ext4_evict_inode()
to call ext4_should_journal_data() before superblock options and flags
are fully set up. In that case, the iput() on the journal inode can
end up causing a BUG().
Work around this problem by reordering the tests so we only call
ext4_should_journal_data() after we know it's not the journal inode.
Fixes: 2d859db3e4 ("ext4: fix data corruption in inodes with journalled data")
Fixes: 2b405bfa84 ("ext4: fix data=journal fast mount/umount hang")
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 646caa9c8e196880b41cd3e3d33a2ebc752bdb85 upstream.
Commit 06bd3c36a733 (ext4: fix data exposure after a crash) uncovered a
deadlock in ext4_writepages() which was previously much harder to hit.
After this commit xfstest generic/130 reproduces the deadlock on small
filesystems.
The problem happens when ext4_do_update_inode() sets LARGE_FILE feature
and marks current inode handle as synchronous. That subsequently results
in ext4_journal_stop() called from ext4_writepages() to block waiting for
transaction commit while still holding page locks, reference to io_end,
and some prepared bio in mpd structure each of which can possibly block
transaction commit from completing and thus results in deadlock.
Fix the problem by releasing page locks, io_end reference, and
submitting prepared bio before calling ext4_journal_stop().
[ Changed to defer the call to ext4_journal_stop() only if the handle
is synchronous. --tytso ]
Reported-and-tested-by: Eryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f70749ca42943faa4d4dcce46dfdcaadb1d0c4b6 upstream.
An extent with lblock = 4294967295 and len = 1 will pass the
ext4_valid_extent() test:
ext4_lblk_t last = lblock + len - 1;
if (len == 0 || lblock > last)
return 0;
since last = 4294967295 + 1 - 1 = 4294967295. This would later trigger
the BUG_ON(es->es_lblk + es->es_len < es->es_lblk) in ext4_es_end().
We can simplify it by removing the - 1 altogether and changing the test
to use lblock + len <= lblock, since now if len = 0, then lblock + 0 ==
lblock and it fails, and if len > 0 then lblock + len > lblock in order
to pass (i.e. it doesn't overflow).
Fixes: 5946d0893 ("ext4: check for overlapping extents in ext4_valid_extent_entries()")
Fixes: 2f974865f ("ext4: check for zero length extent explicitly")
Cc: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 47be61845c775643f1aa4d2a54343549f943c94c upstream.
We triggered soft-lockup under stress test which
open/access/write/close one file concurrently on more than
five different CPUs:
WARN: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 11s! [who:30631]
...
[<ffffffc0003986f8>] dput+0x100/0x298
[<ffffffc00038c2dc>] terminate_walk+0x4c/0x60
[<ffffffc00038f56c>] path_lookupat+0x5cc/0x7a8
[<ffffffc00038f780>] filename_lookup+0x38/0xf0
[<ffffffc000391180>] user_path_at_empty+0x78/0xd0
[<ffffffc0003911f4>] user_path_at+0x1c/0x28
[<ffffffc00037d4fc>] SyS_faccessat+0xb4/0x230
->d_lock trylock may failed many times because of concurrently
operations, and dput() may execute a long time.
Fix this by replacing cpu_relax() with cond_resched().
dput() used to be sleepable, so make it sleepable again
should be safe.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9446385f05c9af25fed53dbed3cc75763730be52 upstream.
FUSE_HAS_IOCTL_DIR should be assigned to ->flags, it may be a typo.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 69fe05c90ed5 ("fuse: add missing INIT flags")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9ebce595f63a407c5cec98f98f9da8459b73740a upstream.
fuse_flush() calls write_inode_now() that triggers writeback, but actual
writeback will happen later, on fuse_sync_writes(). If an error happens,
fuse_writepage_end() will set error bit in mapping->flags. So, we have to
check mapping->flags after fuse_sync_writes().
Signed-off-by: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 4d99ff8f12eb ("fuse: Turn writeback cache on")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ac7f052b9e1534c8248f814b6f0068ad8d4a06d2 upstream.
Due to implementation of fuse writeback filemap_write_and_wait_range() does
not catch errors. We have to do this directly after fuse_sync_writes()
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 4d99ff8f12eb ("fuse: Turn writeback cache on")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 05eb6e7263185a6bb0de9501ccf2addc52429414 upstream.
Radix trees may be used not only for storing page cache pages, so
unconditionally accounting radix tree nodes to the current memory cgroup
is bad: if a radix tree node is used for storing data shared among
different cgroups we risk pinning dead memory cgroups forever.
So let's only account radix tree nodes if it was explicitly requested by
passing __GFP_ACCOUNT to INIT_RADIX_TREE. Currently, we only want to
account page cache entries, so mark mapping->page_tree so.
Fixes: 58e698af4c63 ("radix-tree: account radix_tree_node to memory cgroup")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470057188-7864-1-git-send-email-vdavydov@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a47241cdeee2689ee7089ec95cadfcf66588fbdb upstream.
Presently, a corrupted or malicious UDF filesystem containing a very large
number (or cycle) of Logical Volume Integrity Descriptor extent
indirections may trigger a stack overflow and kernel panic in
udf_load_logicalvolint() on mount.
Replace the unnecessary recursion in udf_load_logicalvolint() with
simple iteration. Set an arbitrary limit of 1000 indirections (which would
have almost certainly overflowed the stack without this fix), and treat
such cases as if there were no LVID.
Signed-off-by: Alden Tondettar <alden.tondettar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c1892c37769cf89c7e7ba57528ae2ccb5d153c9b upstream.
file_remove_privs() is called with inode lock on file_inode(), which
proceeds to calling notify_change() on file->f_path.dentry. Which triggers
the WARN_ON_ONCE(!inode_is_locked(inode)) in addition to deadlocking later
when ovl_setattr tries to lock the underlying inode again.
Fix this mess by not mixing the layers, but doing everything on underlying
dentry/inode.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 07a2daab49c5 ("ovl: Copy up underlying inode's ->i_mode to overlay inode")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 10eec60ce79187686e052092e5383c99b4420a20 upstream.
This prevents a double-fetch from user space that can lead to to an
undersized allocation and heap overflow.
Fixes: 54dbc1517237 ("vfs: hoist the btrfs deduplication ioctl to the vfs")
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cb7d224f82e41d82518e7f9ea271d215d4d08e6e upstream.
If the lockd service fails to start up then we need to be sure that the
notifier blocks are not registered, otherwise a subsequent start of the
service could cause the same notifier to be registered twice, leading to
soft lockups.
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Fixes: 0751ddf77b6a "lockd: Register callbacks on the inetaddr_chain..."
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e06b933e6ded42384164d28a2060b7f89243b895 upstream.
- m_start() in fs/namespace.c expects that ns->event is incremented each
time a mount added or removed from ns->list.
- umount_tree() removes items from the list but does not increment event
counter, expecting that it's done before the function is called.
- There are some codepaths that call umount_tree() without updating
"event" counter. e.g. from __detach_mounts().
- When this happens m_start may reuse a cached mount structure that no
longer belongs to ns->list (i.e. use after free which usually leads
to infinite loop).
This change fixes the above problem by incrementing global event counter
before invoking umount_tree().
Change-Id: I622c8e84dcb9fb63542372c5dbf0178ee86bb589
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ulanov <andreyu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b403f0e37a11f84f7ceaf40b0075499e5bcfd220 upstream.
v9fs may be used as lower layer of overlayfs and accessing f_path.dentry
can lead to a crash. In this case it's a NULL pointer dereference in
p9_fid_create().
Fix by replacing direct access of file->f_path.dentry with the
file_dentry() accessor, which will always return a native object.
Reported-by: Alessio Igor Bogani <alessioigorbogani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alessio Igor Bogani <alessioigorbogani@gmail.com>
Fixes: 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay")
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7bc9491645118c9461bd21099c31755ff6783593 upstream.
Although the extent tree depth of 5 should enough be for the worst
case of 2*32 extents of length 1, the extent tree code does not
currently to merge nodes which are less than half-full with a sibling
node, or to shrink the tree depth if possible. So it's possible, at
least in theory, for the tree depth to be greater than 5. However,
even in the worst case, a tree depth of 32 is highly unlikely, and if
the file system is maliciously corrupted, an insanely large eh_depth
can cause memory allocation failures that will trigger kernel warnings
(here, eh_depth = 65280):
JBD2: ext4.exe wants too many credits credits:195849 rsv_credits:0 max:256
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 50 at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:293 start_this_handle+0x569/0x580
CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: ext4.exe Not tainted 4.7.0-rc5+ #508
Stack:
604a8947 625badd8 0002fd09 00000000
60078643 00000000 62623910 601bf9bc
62623970 6002fc84 626239b0 900000125
Call Trace:
[<6001c2dc>] show_stack+0xdc/0x1a0
[<601bf9bc>] dump_stack+0x2a/0x2e
[<6002fc84>] __warn+0x114/0x140
[<6002fdff>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1f/0x30
[<60165829>] start_this_handle+0x569/0x580
[<60165d4e>] jbd2__journal_start+0x11e/0x220
[<60146690>] __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x60/0xa0
[<60120a81>] ext4_truncate+0x131/0x3a0
[<60123677>] ext4_setattr+0x757/0x840
[<600d5d0f>] notify_change+0x16f/0x2a0
[<600b2b16>] do_truncate+0x76/0xc0
[<600c3e56>] path_openat+0x806/0x1300
[<600c55c9>] do_filp_open+0x89/0xf0
[<600b4074>] do_sys_open+0x134/0x1e0
[<600b4140>] SyS_open+0x20/0x30
[<6001ea68>] handle_syscall+0x88/0x90
[<600295fd>] userspace+0x3fd/0x500
[<6001ac55>] fork_handler+0x85/0x90
---[ end trace 08b0b88b6387a244 ]---
[ Commit message modified and the extent tree depath check changed
from 5 to 32 -- tytso ]
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f0fe970df3838c202ef6c07a4c2b36838ef0a88b upstream.
There are legitimate reasons to disallow mmap on certain files, notably
in sysfs or procfs. We shouldn't emulate mmap support on file systems
that don't offer support natively.
CVE-2016-1583
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
[tyhicks: clean up f_op check by using ecryptfs_file_to_lower()]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 78c4e172412de5d0456dc00d2b34050aa0b683b5 upstream.
This reverts commit 2f36db71009304b3f0b95afacd8eba1f9f046b87.
It fixed a local root exploit but also introduced a dependency on
the lower file system implementing an mmap operation just to open a file,
which is a bit of a heavy hammer. The right fix is to have mmap depend
on the existence of the mmap handler instead.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6343a2120862f7023006c8091ad95c1f16a32077 upstream.
(Another one for the f_path debacle.)
ltp fcntl33 testcase caused an Oops in selinux_file_send_sigiotask.
The reason is that generic_add_lease() used filp->f_path.dentry->inode
while all the others use file_inode(). This makes a difference for files
opened on overlayfs since the former will point to the overlay inode the
latter to the underlying inode.
So generic_add_lease() added the lease to the overlay inode and
generic_delete_lease() removed it from the underlying inode. When the file
was released the lease remained on the overlay inode's lock list, resulting
in use after free.
Reported-by: Eryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com>
Fixes: 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay")
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 63d2f95d63396059200c391ca87161897b99e74a upstream.
The value `bytes' comes from the filesystem which is about to be
mounted. We cannot trust that the value is always in the range we
expect it to be.
Check its value before using it to calculate the length for the crc32_le
call. It value must be larger (or equal) sumoff + 4.
This fixes a kernel bug when accidentially mounting an image file which
had the nilfs2 magic value 0x3434 at the right offset 0x406 by chance.
The bytes 0x01 0x00 were stored at 0x408 and were interpreted as a
s_bytes value of 1. This caused an underflow when substracting sumoff +
4 (20) in the call to crc32_le.
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88021e600000
IP: crc32_le+0x36/0x100
...
Call Trace:
nilfs_valid_sb.part.5+0x52/0x60 [nilfs2]
nilfs_load_super_block+0x142/0x300 [nilfs2]
init_nilfs+0x60/0x390 [nilfs2]
nilfs_mount+0x302/0x520 [nilfs2]
mount_fs+0x38/0x160
vfs_kern_mount+0x67/0x110
do_mount+0x269/0xe00
SyS_mount+0x9f/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x71
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466778587-5184-2-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp
Signed-off-by: Torsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com>
Tested-by: Torsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e7c0b5991dd1be7b6f6dc2b54a15a0f47b64b007 upstream.
overlay needs underlying fs to support d_type. Recently I put in a
patch in to detect this condition and started failing mount if
underlying fs did not support d_type.
But this breaks existing configurations over kernel upgrade. Those who
are running docker (partially broken configuration) with xfs not
supporting d_type, are surprised that after kernel upgrade docker does
not run anymore.
https://github.com/docker/docker/issues/22937#issuecomment-229881315
So instead of erroring out, detect broken configuration and warn
about it. This should allow existing docker setups to continue
working after kernel upgrade.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 45aebeaf4f67 ("ovl: Ensure upper filesystem supports d_type")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 21765194cecf2e4514ad75244df459f188140a0f upstream.
d_type check requires successful creation of workdir as iterates
through work dir and expects work dir to be present in it. If that's
not the case, this check will always return d_type not supported even
if underlying filesystem might be supporting it.
So don't do this check if work dir creation failed in previous step.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 45e8a2583d97ca758a55c608f78c4cef562644d1 upstream.
POSIX allows files with trailing spaces or a trailing period but
SMB3 does not, so convert these using the normal Services For Mac
mapping as we do for other reserved characters such as
: < > | ? *
This is similar to what Macs do for the same problem over SMB3.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b8da344b74c822e966c6d19d6b2321efe82c5d97 upstream.
In sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate(), the ntlmssp blob is allocated
statically and its size is an "empirical" 5*sizeof(struct
_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE) (320B on x86_64). I don't know where this value
comes from or if it was ever appropriate, but it is currently
insufficient: the user and domain name in UTF16 could take 1kB by
themselves. Because of that, build_ntlmssp_auth_blob() might corrupt
memory (out-of-bounds write). The size of ntlmssp_blob in
SMB2_sess_setup() is too small too (sizeof(struct _NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE)
+ 500).
This patch allocates the blob dynamically in
build_ntlmssp_auth_blob().
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4fcd1813e6404dd4420c7d12fb483f9320f0bf93 upstream.
Azure server blocks clients that open a socket and don't do anything on it.
In our reconnect scenarios, we can reconnect the tcp session and
detect the socket is available but we defer the negprot and SMB3 session
setup and tree connect reconnection until the next i/o is requested, but
this looks suspicous to some servers who expect SMB3 negprog and session
setup soon after a socket is created.
In the echo thread, reconnect SMB3 sessions and tree connections
that are disconnected. A later patch will replay persistent (and
resilient) handle opens.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cfc9fde0b07c3b44b570057c5f93dda59dca1c94 upstream.
The upper dentry may become stale before we call ovl_lock_rename_workdir.
For example, someone could (mistakenly or maliciously) manually unlink(2)
it directly from upperdir.
To ensure it is not stale, let's lookup it after ovl_lock_rename_workdir
and and check if it matches the upper dentry.
Essentially, it is the same problem and similar solution as in
commit 11f3710417d0 ("ovl: verify upper dentry before unlink and rename").
Signed-off-by: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b99c2d913810e56682a538c9f2394d76fca808f8 upstream.
Before 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs: Make f_path...") file->f_path pointed to
the underlying file, hence suid/sgid removal on write worked fine.
After that patch file->f_path pointed to the overlay file, and the file
mode bits weren't copied to overlay_inode->i_mode. So the suid/sgid
removal simply stopped working.
The fix is to copy the mode bits, but then ovl_setattr() needs to clear
ATTR_MODE to avoid the BUG() in notify_change(). So do this first, then in
the next patch copy the mode.
Reported-by: Eryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 07a2daab49c549a37b5b744cbebb6e3f445f12bc upstream.
Right now when a new overlay inode is created, we initialize overlay
inode's ->i_mode from underlying inode ->i_mode but we retain only
file type bits (S_IFMT) and discard permission bits.
This patch changes it and retains permission bits too. This should allow
overlay to do permission checks on overlay inode itself in task context.
[SzM] It also fixes clearing suid/sgid bits on write.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Eryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 03bea60409328de54e4ff7ec41672e12a9cb0908 upstream.
When truncating a file we should check write access on the underlying
inode. And we should do so on the lower file as well (before copy-up) for
consistency.
Original patch and test case by Aihua Zhang.
- - >o >o - - test.c - - >o >o - -
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int ret;
ret = truncate(argv[0], 4096);
if (ret != -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "truncate(argv[0]) should have failed\n");
return 1;
}
if (errno != ETXTBSY) {
perror("truncate(argv[0])");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
- - >o >o - - >o >o - - >o >o - -
Reported-by: Aihua Zhang <zhangaihua1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a4859d75944a726533ab86d24bb5ffd1b2b7d6cc upstream.
When using the 'default_permissions' mount option, ovl_permission() on
non-directories was missing a dput(alias), resulting in "BUG Dentry still
in use".
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 8d3095f4ad47 ("ovl: default permissions")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 64c12921e11b3a0c10d088606e328c58e29274d8 upstream.
The test for !trans->blocks_used in btrfs_abort_transaction is
insufficient to determine whether it's safe to drop the transaction
handle on the floor. btrfs_cow_block, informed by should_cow_block,
can return blocks that have already been CoW'd in the current
transaction. trans->blocks_used is only incremented for new block
allocations. If an operation overlaps the blocks in the current
transaction entirely and must abort the transaction, we'll happily
let it clean up the trans handle even though it may have modified
the blocks and will commit an incomplete operation.
In the long-term, I'd like to do closer tracking of when the fs
is actually modified so we can still recover as gracefully as possible,
but that approach will need some discussion. In the short term,
since this is the only code using trans->blocks_used, let's just
switch it to a bool indicating whether any blocks were used and set
it when should_cow_block returns false.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4ac1c17b2044a1b4b2fbed74451947e905fc2992 upstream.
During page migrations UBIFS might get confused
and the following assert triggers:
[ 213.480000] UBIFS assert failed in ubifs_set_page_dirty at 1451 (pid 436)
[ 213.490000] CPU: 0 PID: 436 Comm: drm-stress-test Not tainted 4.4.4-00176-geaa802524636-dirty #1008
[ 213.490000] Hardware name: Allwinner sun4i/sun5i Families
[ 213.490000] [<c0015e70>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0012cdc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[ 213.490000] [<c0012cdc>] (show_stack) from [<c02ad834>] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0)
[ 213.490000] [<c02ad834>] (dump_stack) from [<c0236ee8>] (ubifs_set_page_dirty+0x44/0x50)
[ 213.490000] [<c0236ee8>] (ubifs_set_page_dirty) from [<c00fa0bc>] (try_to_unmap_one+0x10c/0x3a8)
[ 213.490000] [<c00fa0bc>] (try_to_unmap_one) from [<c00fadb4>] (rmap_walk+0xb4/0x290)
[ 213.490000] [<c00fadb4>] (rmap_walk) from [<c00fb1bc>] (try_to_unmap+0x64/0x80)
[ 213.490000] [<c00fb1bc>] (try_to_unmap) from [<c010dc28>] (migrate_pages+0x328/0x7a0)
[ 213.490000] [<c010dc28>] (migrate_pages) from [<c00d0cb0>] (alloc_contig_range+0x168/0x2f4)
[ 213.490000] [<c00d0cb0>] (alloc_contig_range) from [<c010ec00>] (cma_alloc+0x170/0x2c0)
[ 213.490000] [<c010ec00>] (cma_alloc) from [<c001a958>] (__alloc_from_contiguous+0x38/0xd8)
[ 213.490000] [<c001a958>] (__alloc_from_contiguous) from [<c001ad44>] (__dma_alloc+0x23c/0x274)
[ 213.490000] [<c001ad44>] (__dma_alloc) from [<c001ae08>] (arm_dma_alloc+0x54/0x5c)
[ 213.490000] [<c001ae08>] (arm_dma_alloc) from [<c035cecc>] (drm_gem_cma_create+0xb8/0xf0)
[ 213.490000] [<c035cecc>] (drm_gem_cma_create) from [<c035cf20>] (drm_gem_cma_create_with_handle+0x1c/0xe8)
[ 213.490000] [<c035cf20>] (drm_gem_cma_create_with_handle) from [<c035d088>] (drm_gem_cma_dumb_create+0x3c/0x48)
[ 213.490000] [<c035d088>] (drm_gem_cma_dumb_create) from [<c0341ed8>] (drm_ioctl+0x12c/0x444)
[ 213.490000] [<c0341ed8>] (drm_ioctl) from [<c0121adc>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x3f4/0x614)
[ 213.490000] [<c0121adc>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c0121d30>] (SyS_ioctl+0x34/0x5c)
[ 213.490000] [<c0121d30>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<c000f2c0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x34)
UBIFS is using PagePrivate() which can have different meanings across
filesystems. Therefore the generic page migration code cannot handle this
case correctly.
We have to implement our own migration function which basically does a
plain copy but also duplicates the page private flag.
UBIFS is not a block device filesystem and cannot use buffer_migrate_page().
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
[rw: Massaged changelog, build fixes, etc...]
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e547f2628327fec6afd2e03b46f113f614cca05b upstream.
Olga Kornievskaia reports that the following test fails to trigger
an OPEN_DOWNGRADE on the wire, and only triggers the final CLOSE.
fd0 = open(foo, RDRW) -- should be open on the wire for "both"
fd1 = open(foo, RDONLY) -- should be open on the wire for "read"
close(fd0) -- should trigger an open_downgrade
read(fd1)
close(fd1)
The issue is that we're missing a check for whether or not the current
state transitioned from an O_RDWR state as opposed to having transitioned
from a combination of O_RDONLY and O_WRONLY.
Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu>
Fixes: cd9288ffaea4 ("NFSv4: Fix another bug in the close/open_downgrade code")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d20cb71dbf3487f24549ede1a8e2d67579b4632e upstream.
In "NFSv4: Move dentry instantiation into the NFSv4-specific atomic open code"
unconditional d_drop() after the ->open_context() had been removed. It had
been correct for success cases (there ->open_context() itself had been doing
dcache manipulations), but not for error ones. Only one of those (ENOENT)
got a compensatory d_drop() added in that commit, but in fact it should've
been done for all errors. As it is, the case of O_CREAT non-exclusive open
on a hashed negative dentry racing with e.g. symlink creation from another
client ended up with ->open_context() getting an error and proceeding to
call nfs_lookup(). On a hashed dentry, which would've instantly triggered
BUG_ON() in d_materialise_unique() (or, these days, its equivalent in
d_splice_alias()).
Tested-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cbebaf897e5c4862567eb799dc84acc5d7ee2678 upstream.
Since commit 0bcbf039f6b2, nfs_readpage_release() has been used to
unlock the page in the read code.
Fixes: 0bcbf039f6b2 ("nfs: handle request add failure properly")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5e3a98883e7ebdd1440f829a9e9dd5c3d2c5903b upstream.
pnfs_generic_commit_cancel_empty_pagelist calls nfs_commitdata_release,
but that is wrong: nfs_commitdata_release puts the open context, something
that isn't valid until nfs_init_commit is called, which is never the case
when pnfs_generic_commit_cancel_empty_pagelist is called.
This was introduced in "nfs: avoid race that crashes nfs_init_commit".
Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 999653786df6954a31044528ac3f7a5dadca08f4 upstream.
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <david@sinquin.eu>
[agreunba@redhat.com: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 485e71e8fb6356c08c7fc6bcce4bf02c9a9a663f upstream.
Factor out part of posix_acl_xattr_set into a common function that takes
a posix_acl, which nfsd can also call.
The prototype already exists in include/linux/posix_acl.h.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5cc1fb2a093e254b656c64ff24b0b76bed1d34d9 upstream.
To avoid racing entry into nfs4_get_vfs_file().
Make init_open_stateid() return with locked stateid to be unlocked
by the caller.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit feb9dad5209280085d5b0c094fa67e7a8d75c81a upstream.
It used to be the case that state had an rwlock that was locked for write
by downgrades, but for read for upgrades (opens). Well, the problem is
if there are two competing opens for the same state, they step on
each other toes potentially leading to leaking file descriptors
from the state structure, since access mode is a bitmap only set once.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d50039ea5ee63c589b0434baa5ecf6e5075bb6f9 upstream.
Also simplify the logic a bit.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e6ec03a25f12b312b7e0c037fe4a6471c4ee5665 upstream.
It's an analogue of commit 7500c38a (fix the braino in "namei:
massage lookup_slow() to be usable by lookup_one_len_unlocked()").
The same problem (->lookup()-returned unhashed negative dentry
just might be an autofs one with ->d_manage() that would wait
until the daemon makes it positive) applies in do_last() - we
need to do follow_managed() first.
Fortunately, remaining callers of follow_managed() are OK - only
autofs has that weirdness (negative dentry that does not mean
an instant -ENOENT)) and autofs never has its negative dentries
hashed, so we can't pick one from a dcache lookup.
->d_manage() is a bloody mess ;-/
Spotted-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 97c1df3e54e811aed484a036a798b4b25d002ecf upstream.
Add this trivial missing error handling.
Fixes: 1b852bceb0d1 ("mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 695e9df010e40f407f4830dc11d53dce957710ba upstream.
In rare cases it is possible for s_flags & MS_RDONLY to be set but
MNT_READONLY to be clear. This starting combination can cause
fs_fully_visible to fail to ensure that the new mount is readonly.
Therefore force MNT_LOCK_READONLY in the new mount if MS_RDONLY
is set on the source filesystem of the mount.
In general both MS_RDONLY and MNT_READONLY are set at the same for
mounts so I don't expect any programs to care. Nor do I expect
MS_RDONLY to be set on proc or sysfs in the initial user namespace,
which further decreases the likelyhood of problems.
Which means this change should only affect system configurations by
paranoid sysadmins who should welcome the additional protection
as it keeps people from wriggling out of their policies.
Fixes: 8c6cf9cc829f ("mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d71ed6c930ac7d8f88f3cef6624a7e826392d61f upstream.
MNT_LOCKED implies on a child mount implies the child is locked to the
parent. So while looping through the children the children should be
tested (not their parent).
Typically an unshare of a mount namespace locks all mounts together
making both the parent and the slave as locked but there are a few
corner cases where other things work.
Fixes: ceeb0e5d39fc ("vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible")
Reported-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3d56c25e3bb0726a5c5e16fc2d9e38f8ed763085 upstream.
Ascend-to-parent logics in d_walk() depends on all encountered child
dentries not getting freed without an RCU delay. Unfortunately, in
quite a few cases it is not true, with hard-to-hit oopsable race as
the result.
Fortunately, the fix is simiple; right now the rule is "if it ever
been hashed, freeing must be delayed" and changing it to "if it
ever had a parent, freeing must be delayed" closes that hole and
covers all cases the old rule used to cover. Moreover, pipes and
sockets remain _not_ covered, so we do not introduce RCU delay in
the cases which are the reason for having that delay conditional
in the first place.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e54ad7f1ee263ffa5a2de9c609d58dfa27b21cd9 upstream.
This prevents stacking filesystems (ecryptfs and overlayfs) from using
procfs as lower filesystem. There is too much magic going on inside
procfs, and there is no good reason to stack stuff on top of procfs.
(For example, procfs does access checks in VFS open handlers, and
ecryptfs by design calls open handlers from a kernel thread that doesn't
drop privileges or so.)
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2f36db71009304b3f0b95afacd8eba1f9f046b87 upstream.
This prevents users from triggering a stack overflow through a recursive
invocation of pagefault handling that involves mapping procfs files into
virtual memory.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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