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Modify all read & write verifiers to differentiate
between CRC errors and other inconsistencies.
This sets the appropriate error number on bp->b_error,
and then calls xfs_verifier_error() if something went
wrong. That function will issue the appropriate message
to the user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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Many/most callers of xfs_update_cksum() pass bp->b_addr and
BBTOB(bp->b_length) as the first 2 args. Add a helper
which can just accept the bp and the crc offset, and work
it out on its own, for brevity.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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Many/most callers of xfs_verify_cksum() pass bp->b_addr and
BBTOB(bp->b_length) as the first 2 args. Add a helper
which can just accept the bp and the crc offset, and work
it out on its own, for brevity.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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Some calls to crc functions used useful #defines,
others used awkward offsetof() constructs.
Switch them all to #define to make things a bit cleaner.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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Today, if
xfs_sb_read_verify
xfs_sb_verify
xfs_mount_validate_sb
detects superblock corruption, it'll be extremely noisy, dumping
2 stacks, 2 hexdumps, etc.
This is because we call XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR in xfs_mount_validate_sb
as well as in xfs_sb_read_verify.
Also, *any* errors in xfs_mount_validate_sb which are not corruption
per se; things like too-big-blocksize, bad version, bad magic, v1 dirs,
rw-incompat etc - things which do not return EFSCORRUPTED - will
still do the whole XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR spew when xfs_sb_read_verify
sees any error at all. And it suggests to the user that they
should run xfs_repair, even if the root cause of the mount failure
is a simple incompatibility.
I'll submit that the probably-not-corrupted errors don't warrant
this much noise, so this patch removes the warning for anything
other than EFSCORRUPTED returns, and replaces the lower-level
XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR with an xfs_notice().
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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When xfs_readsb() does the very first read of the superblock,
it makes a guess at the length of the buffer, based on the
sector size of the underlying storage. This may or may
not match the filesystem sector size in sb_sectsize, so
we can't i.e. do a CRC check on it; it might be too short.
In fact, mounting a filesystem with sb_sectsize larger
than the device sector size will cause a mount failure
if CRCs are enabled, because we are checksumming a length
which exceeds the buffer passed to it.
So always read twice; the first time we read with NULL
buffer ops to skip verification; then set the proper
read length, hook up the proper verifier, and give it
another go.
Once we are sure that we've got the right buffer length,
we can also use bp->b_length in the xfs_sb_read_verify,
rather than the less-trusted on-disk sectorsize for
secondary superblocks. Before this we ran the risk of
passing junk to the crc32c routines, which didn't always
handle extreme values.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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My earlier commit 10e6e65 deserves a layer or two of brown paper
bags. The logic in that commit means that a CRC failure on the
primary superblock will *never* result in an error return.
Hopefully this fixes it, so that we always return the error
if it's a primary superblock, otherwise only if the filesystem
has CRCs enabled.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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xfs_mount_validate_sb doesn't check sb_inopblock for sanity
(as does its xfs_repair counterpart, FWIW).
If it's out of bounds, we can go off the rails in i.e.
xfs_inode_buf_verify(), which uses sb_inopblock as a loop
limit when stepping through a metadata buffer.
The problem can be demonstrated easily by corrupting
sb_inopblock with xfs_db and trying to mount the result:
# mkfs.xfs -dfile,name=fsfile,size=1g
# xfs_db -x fsfile
xfs_db> sb 0
xfs_db> write inopblock 512
inopblock = 512
xfs_db> quit
# mount -o loop fsfile mnt
and we blow up in xfs_inode_buf_verify().
With this patch, we get a (very noisy) corruption error,
and fail the mount as we should.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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Today, if xfs_sb_read_verify encounters a v4 superblock
with junk past v4 fields which includes data in sb_crc,
it will be treated as a failing checksum and a significant
corruption.
There are known prior bugs which leave junk at the end
of the V4 superblock; we don't need to actually fail the
verification in this case if other checks pan out ok.
So if this is a secondary superblock, and the primary
superblock doesn't indicate that this is a V5 filesystem,
don't treat this as an actual checksum failure.
We should probably check the garbage condition as
we do in xfs_repair, and possibly warn about it
or self-heal, but that's a different scope of work.
Stable folks: This can go back to v3.10, which is what
introduced the sb CRC checking that is tripped up by old,
stale, incorrect V4 superblocks w/ unzeroed bits.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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The kbuild test robot indicated that there were some new sparse
warnings in fs/xfs/xfs_dquot_buf.c. Actually, there were a lot more
that is wasn't warning about, so fix them all up.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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Currently the xfs_inode.h header has a dependency on the definition
of the BMAP btree records as the inode fork includes an array of
xfs_bmbt_rec_host_t objects in it's definition.
Move all the btree format definitions from xfs_btree.h,
xfs_bmap_btree.h, xfs_alloc_btree.h and xfs_ialloc_btree.h to
xfs_format.h to continue the process of centralising the on-disk
format definitions. With this done, the xfs inode definitions are no
longer dependent on btree header files.
The enables a massive culling of unnecessary includes, with close to
200 #include directives removed from the XFS kernel code base.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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xfs_trans.h has a dependency on xfs_log.h for a couple of
structures. Most code that does transactions doesn't need to know
anything about the log, but this dependency means that they have to
include xfs_log.h. Decouple the xfs_trans.h and xfs_log.h header
files and clean up the includes to be in dependency order.
In doing this, remove the direct include of xfs_trans_reserve.h from
xfs_trans.h so that we remove the dependency between xfs_trans.h and
xfs_mount.h. Hence the xfs_trans.h include can be moved to the
indicate the actual dependencies other header files have on it.
Note that these are kernel only header files, so this does not
translate to any userspace changes at all.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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The on-disk format definitions for the directory and attribute
structures are spread across 3 header files right now, only one of
which is dedicated to defining on-disk structures and their
manipulation (xfs_dir2_format.h). Pull all the format definitions
into a single header file - xfs_da_format.h - and switch all the
code over to point at that.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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If we get EWRONGFS due to probing of non-xfs filesystems,
there's no need to issue the scary corruption error and backtrace.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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__xfs_printk adds its own "\n". Having it in the original string
leads to unintentional blank lines from these messages.
Most format strings have no newline, but a few do, leading to
i.e.:
[ 7347.119911] XFS (sdb2): Access to block zero in inode 132 start_block: 0 start_off: 0 blkcnt: 0 extent-state: 0 lastx: 1a05
[ 7347.119911]
[ 7347.119919] XFS (sdb2): Access to block zero in inode 132 start_block: 0 start_off: 0 blkcnt: 0 extent-state: 0 lastx: 1a05
[ 7347.119919]
Fix them all.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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Signed-off-by: Zhi Yong Wu <wuzhy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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xfs_mount.c is shared with userspace, but the only functions that
are shared are to do with physical superblock manipulations. This
means that less than 25% of the xfs_mount.c code is actually shared
with userspace. Move all the superblock functions to xfs_sb.c and
share that instead with libxfs.
Note that this will leave all the in-core transaction related
superblock counter modifications in xfs_mount.c as none of that is
shared with userspace. With a few more small changes, xfs_mount.h
won't need to be shared with userspace anymore, either.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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