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path: root/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
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2008-04-29sysctl: add the ->permissions callback on the ctl_table_rootPavel Emelyanov1-2/+2
When reading from/writing to some table, a root, which this table came from, may affect this table's permissions, depending on who is working with the table. The core hunk is at the bottom of this patch. All the rest is just pushing the ctl_table_root argument up to the sysctl_perm() function. This will be mostly (only?) used in the net sysctls. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Cc: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29sysctl: merge equal proc_sys_read and proc_sys_writePavel Emelyanov1-39/+11
Many (most of) sysctls do not have a per-container sense. E.g. kernel.print_fatal_signals, vm.panic_on_oom, net.core.netdev_budget and so on and so forth. Besides, tuning then from inside a container is not even secure. On the other hand, hiding them completely from the container's tasks sometimes causes user-space to stop working. When developing net sysctl, the common practice was to duplicate a table and drop the write bits in table->mode, but this approach was not very elegant, lead to excessive memory consumption and was not suitable in general. Here's the alternative solution. To facilitate the per-container sysctls ctl_table_root-s were introduced. Each root contains a list of ctl_table_header-s that are visible to different namespaces. The idea of this set is to add the permissions() callback on the ctl_table_root to allow ctl root limit permissions to the same ctl_table-s. The main user of this functionality is the net-namespaces code, but later this will (should) be used by more and more namespaces, containers and control groups. Actually, this idea's core is in a single hunk in the third patch. First two patches are cleanups for sysctl code, while the third one mostly extends the arguments set of some sysctl functions. This patch: These ->read and ->write callbacks act in a very similar way, so merge these paths to reduce the number of places to patch later and shrink the .text size (a bit). Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Cc: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-15Embed a struct path into struct nameidata instead of nd->{dentry,mnt}Jan Blunck1-1/+1
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata. Together with the other patches of this series - it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on <dentry,vfsmount> pairs - it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed - it reduces the overall code size: without patch series: text data bss dec hex filename 5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux with patch series: text data bss dec hex filename 5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux This patch: Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack] Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-08procfs: constify function pointer tablesJan Engelhardt1-2/+2
Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@computergmbh.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Acked-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Bryan Wu <bryan.wu@analog.com> Acked-by: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-26Fix pointer mismatches in proc_sysctl.cDavid Howells1-2/+4
Fix pointer mismatches in proc_sysctl.c. The proc_handler() method returns a size_t through an arg pointer, but is given a pointer to a ssize_t to return into. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08Remove redundant check from proc_sys_setattr()John Johansen1-5/+2
notify_change() already calls security_inode_setattr() before calling iop->setattr. Alan sayeth This is a behaviour change on all of these and limits some behaviour of existing established security modules When inode_change_ok is called it has side effects. This includes clearing the SGID bit on attribute changes caused by chmod. If you make this change the results of some rulesets may be different before or after the change is made. I'm not saying the change is wrong but it does change behaviour so that needs looking at closely (ditto all other attribute twiddles) Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14[PATCH] sysctl: hide the sysctl proc inodes from selinuxEric W. Biederman1-0/+1
Since the security checks are applied on each read and write of a sysctl file, just like they are applied when calling sys_sysctl, they are redundant on the standard VFS constructs. Since it is difficult to compute the security labels on the standard VFS constructs we just mark the sysctl inodes in proc private so selinux won't even bother with them. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14[PATCH] sysctl: reimplement the sysctl proc supportEric W. Biederman1-0/+478
With this change the sysctl inodes can be cached and nothing needs to be done when removing a sysctl table. For a cost of 2K code we will save about 4K of static tables (when we remove de from ctl_table) and 70K in proc_dir_entries that we will not allocate, or about half that on a 32bit arch. The speed feels about the same, even though we can now cache the sysctl dentries :( We get the core advantage that we don't need to have a 1 to 1 mapping between ctl table entries and proc files. Making it possible to have /proc/sys vary depending on the namespace you are in. The currently merged namespaces don't have an issue here but the network namespace under /proc/sys/net needs to have different directories depending on which network adapters are visible. By simply being a cache different directories being visible depending on who you are is trivial to implement. [akpm@osdl.org: fix uninitialised var] [akpm@osdl.org: fix ARM build] [bunk@stusta.de: make things static] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>