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Only functions doing more than one read are modified. Consumeres
happened to deal with possibly changing data, but it does not seem like
a good thing to rely on.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.
To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.
The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.
While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.
In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:
/proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
this scenario:
lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
drwx------ root root /root
drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
-rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret
Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"All kinds of stuff. That probably should've been 5 or 6 separate
branches, but by the time I'd realized how large and mixed that bag
had become it had been too close to -final to play with rebasing.
Some fs/namei.c cleanups there, memdup_user_nul() introduction and
switching open-coded instances, burying long-dead code, whack-a-mole
of various kinds, several new helpers for ->llseek(), assorted
cleanups and fixes from various people, etc.
One piece probably deserves special mention - Neil's
lookup_one_len_unlocked(). Similar to lookup_one_len(), but gets
called without ->i_mutex and tries to avoid ever taking it. That, of
course, means that it's not useful for any directory modifications,
but things like getting inode attributes in nfds readdirplus are fine
with that. I really should've asked for moratorium on lookup-related
changes this cycle, but since I hadn't done that early enough... I
*am* asking for that for the coming cycle, though - I'm going to try
and get conversion of i_mutex to rwsem with ->lookup() done under lock
taken shared.
There will be a patch closer to the end of the window, along the lines
of the one Linus had posted last May - mechanical conversion of
->i_mutex accesses to inode_lock()/inode_unlock()/inode_trylock()/
inode_is_locked()/inode_lock_nested(). To quote Linus back then:
-----
| This is an automated patch using
|
| sed 's/mutex_lock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_lock(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_unlock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_unlock(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_lock_nested(&\(.*\)->i_mutex,[ ]*I_MUTEX_\([A-Z0-9_]*\))/inode_lock_nested(\1, I_MUTEX_\2)/'
| sed 's/mutex_is_locked(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_is_locked(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_trylock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_trylock(\1)/'
|
| with a very few manual fixups
-----
I'm going to send that once the ->i_mutex-affecting stuff in -next
gets mostly merged (or when Linus says he's about to stop taking
merges)"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
nfsd: don't hold i_mutex over userspace upcalls
fs:affs:Replace time_t with time64_t
fs/9p: use fscache mutex rather than spinlock
proc: add a reschedule point in proc_readfd_common()
logfs: constify logfs_block_ops structures
fcntl: allow to set O_DIRECT flag on pipe
fs: __generic_file_splice_read retry lookup on AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE
fs: xattr: Use kvfree()
[s390] page_to_phys() always returns a multiple of PAGE_SIZE
nbd: use ->compat_ioctl()
fs: use block_device name vsprintf helper
lib/vsprintf: add %*pg format specifier
fs: use gendisk->disk_name where possible
poll: plug an unused argument to do_poll
amdkfd: don't open-code memdup_user()
cdrom: don't open-code memdup_user()
rsxx: don't open-code memdup_user()
mtip32xx: don't open-code memdup_user()
[um] mconsole: don't open-code memdup_user_nul()
[um] hostaudio: don't open-code memdup_user()
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs RCU symlink updates from Al Viro:
"Replacement of ->follow_link/->put_link, allowing to stay in RCU mode
even if the symlink is not an embedded one.
No changes since the mailbomb on Jan 1"
* 'work.symlinks' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
switch ->get_link() to delayed_call, kill ->put_link()
kill free_page_put_link()
teach nfs_get_link() to work in RCU mode
teach proc_self_get_link()/proc_thread_self_get_link() to work in RCU mode
teach shmem_get_link() to work in RCU mode
teach page_get_link() to work in RCU mode
replace ->follow_link() with new method that could stay in RCU mode
don't put symlink bodies in pagecache into highmem
namei: page_getlink() and page_follow_link_light() are the same thing
ufs: get rid of ->setattr() for symlinks
udf: don't duplicate page_symlink_inode_operations
logfs: don't duplicate page_symlink_inode_operations
switch befs long symlinks to page_symlink_operations
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Writing to /proc/$pid/coredump_filter always returns -ESRCH because commit
774636e19ed51 ("proc: convert to kstrto*()/kstrto*_from_user()") removed
the setting of ret after the get_proc_task call and incorrectly left it as
-ESRCH. Instead, return 0 when successful.
Example breakage:
echo 0 > /proc/self/coredump_filter
bash: echo: write error: No such process
Fixes: 774636e19ed51 ("proc: convert to kstrto*()/kstrto*_from_user()")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.3+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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new method: ->get_link(); replacement of ->follow_link(). The differences
are:
* inode and dentry are passed separately
* might be called both in RCU and non-RCU mode;
the former is indicated by passing it a NULL dentry.
* when called that way it isn't allowed to block
and should return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD) if it needs to be called
in non-RCU mode.
It's a flagday change - the old method is gone, all in-tree instances
converted. Conversion isn't hard; said that, so far very few instances
do not immediately bail out when called in RCU mode. That'll change
in the next commits.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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/proc/pid/oom_adj exists solely to avoid breaking existing userspace
binaries that write to the tunable.
Add a comment in the only possible location within the kernel tree to
describe the situation and motivation for keeping it around.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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So the /proc/PID/stat 'wchan' field (the 30th field, which contains
the absolute kernel address of the kernel function a task is blocked in)
leaks absolute kernel addresses to unprivileged user-space:
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', wchan);
The absolute address might also leak via /proc/PID/wchan as well, if
KALLSYMS is turned off or if the symbol lookup fails for some reason:
static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
unsigned long wchan;
char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN];
wchan = get_wchan(task);
if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0) {
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
return 0;
seq_printf(m, "%lu", wchan);
} else {
seq_printf(m, "%s", symname);
}
return 0;
}
This isn't ideal, because for example it trivially leaks the KASLR offset
to any local attacker:
fomalhaut:~> printf "%016lx\n" $(cat /proc/$$/stat | cut -d' ' -f35)
ffffffff8123b380
Most real-life uses of wchan are symbolic:
ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm
and procps uses /proc/PID/wchan, not the absolute address in /proc/PID/stat:
triton:~/tip> strace -f ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm 2>&1 | grep wchan | tail -1
open("/proc/30833/wchan", O_RDONLY) = 6
There's one compatibility quirk here: procps relies on whether the
absolute value is non-zero - and we can provide that functionality
by outputing "0" or "1" depending on whether the task is blocked
(whether there's a wchan address).
These days there appears to be very little legitimate reason
user-space would be interested in the absolute address. The
absolute address is mostly historic: from the days when we
didn't have kallsyms and user-space procps had to do the
decoding itself via the System.map.
So this patch sets all numeric output to "0" or "1" and keeps only
symbolic output, in /proc/PID/wchan.
( The absolute sleep address can generally still be profiled via
perf, by tasks with sufficient privileges. )
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150930135917.GA3285@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Convert from manual allocation/copy_from_user/... to kstrto*() family
which were designed for exactly that.
One case can not be converted to kstrto*_from_user() to make code even
more simpler because of whitespace stripping, oh well...
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and is
only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set.
Each mapped file region gets a symlink in /proc/<pid>/map_files/
corresponding to the virtual address range at which it is mapped. The
symlinks work like the symlinks in /proc/<pid>/fd/, so you can follow them
to the backing file even if that backing file has been unlinked.
Currently, files which are mapped, unlinked, and closed are impossible to
stat() from userspace. Exposing /proc/<pid>/map_files/ closes this
functionality "hole".
Not being able to stat() such files makes noticing and explicitly
accounting for the space they use on the filesystem impossible. You can
work around this by summing up the space used by every file in the
filesystem and subtracting that total from what statfs() tells you, but
that obviously isn't great, and it becomes unworkable once your filesystem
becomes large enough.
This patch moves map_files/ out from behind CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
adjusts the permissions enforced on it as follows:
* proc_map_files_lookup()
* proc_map_files_readdir()
* map_files_d_revalidate()
Remove the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restriction, leaving only the current
restriction requiring PTRACE_MODE_READ. The information made
available to userspace by these three functions is already
available in /proc/PID/maps with MODE_READ, so I don't see any
reason to limit them any further (see below for more detail).
* proc_map_files_follow_link()
This stub has been added, and requires that the user have
CAP_SYS_ADMIN in order to follow the links in map_files/,
since there was concern on LKML both about the potential for
bypassing permissions on ancestor directories in the path to
files pointed to, and about what happens with more exotic
memory mappings created by some drivers (ie dma-buf).
In older versions of this patch, I changed every permission check in
the four functions above to enforce MODE_ATTACH instead of MODE_READ.
This was an oversight on my part, and after revisiting the discussion
it seems that nobody was concerned about anything outside of what is
made possible by ->follow_link(). So in this version, I've left the
checks for PTRACE_MODE_READ as-is.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: catch up with concurrent proc_pid_follow_link() changes]
Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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/proc/*/cmdline code checks if it should look at ENVP area by checking
last byte of ARGV area:
rv = access_remote_vm(mm, arg_end - 1, &c, 1, 0);
if (rv <= 0)
goto out_free_page;
If ARGV is somehow made empty (by doing execve(..., NULL, ...) or
manually setting ->arg_start and ->arg_end to equal values), the decision
will be based on byte which doesn't even belong to ARGV/ENVP.
So, quickly check if ARGV area is empty and report 0 to match previous
behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Debug info and other statistics fixes and related enhancements"
* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched/numa: Fix numa balancing stats in /proc/pid/sched
sched/numa: Show numa_group ID in /proc/sched_debug task listings
sched/debug: Move print_cfs_rq() declaration to kernel/sched/sched.h
sched/stat: Expose /proc/pid/schedstat if CONFIG_SCHED_INFO=y
sched/stat: Simplify the sched_info accounting dependency
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Expand /proc/pid/schedstat output:
- enable it on CONFIG_TASK_DELAY_ACCT=y && !CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS kernels.
- dump all zeroes on kernels that are booted with the 'nodelayacct'
option, which boot option disables delay accounting on
CONFIG_TASK_DELAY_ACCT=y kernels.
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl
Cc: ricklind@us.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5ccbef17d4bc841084ea6e6421d4e4a23b7b806f.1435654789.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Commit 818411616baf ("fs, proc: introduce /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children
entry") introduced the children entry for checkpoint restore and the
file is only available on kernels configured with CONFIG_EXPERT and
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
This is available in most distributions (Fedora, Debian, Ubuntu, CoreOS)
because they usually enable CONFIG_EXPERT and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
But Arch does not enable CONFIG_EXPERT or CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
However, the children proc file is useful outside of checkpoint restore.
I would like to use it in rkt. The rkt process exec() another program
it does not control, and that other program will fork()+exec() a child
process. I would like to find the pid of the child process from an
external tool without iterating in /proc over all processes to find
which one has a parent pid equal to rkt.
This commit introduces CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN and makes
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE select it. This allows enabling
/proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children without needing to enable
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE and CONFIG_EXPERT.
Alban tested that /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children is present when the
kernel is configured with CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN=y but without
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
Signed-off-by: Iago López Galeiras <iago@endocode.com>
Tested-by: Alban Crequy <alban@endocode.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Djalal Harouni <djalal@endocode.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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/proc/$PID/cmdline truncates output at PAGE_SIZE. It is easy to see with
$ cat /proc/self/cmdline $(seq 1037) 2>/dev/null
However, command line size was never limited to PAGE_SIZE but to 128 KB
and relatively recently limitation was removed altogether.
People noticed and ask questions:
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/199130/how-do-i-increase-the-proc-pid-cmdline-4096-byte-limit
seq file interface is not OK, because it kmalloc's for whole output and
open + read(, 1) + sleep will pin arbitrary amounts of kernel memory. To
not do that, limit must be imposed which is incompatible with arbitrary
sized command lines.
I apologize for hairy code, but this it direct consequence of command line
layout in memory and hacks to support things like "init [3]".
The loops are "unrolled" otherwise it is either macros which hide control
flow or functions with 7-8 arguments with equal line count.
There should be real setproctitle(2) or something.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix a billion min() warnings]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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its only use is getting passed to nd_jump_link(), which can obtain
it from current->nameidata
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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a) instead of storing the symlink body (via nd_set_link()) and returning
an opaque pointer later passed to ->put_link(), ->follow_link() _stores_
that opaque pointer (into void * passed by address by caller) and returns
the symlink body. Returning ERR_PTR() on error, NULL on jump (procfs magic
symlinks) and pointer to symlink body for normal symlinks. Stored pointer
is ignored in all cases except the last one.
Storing NULL for opaque pointer (or not storing it at all) means no call
of ->put_link().
b) the body used to be passed to ->put_link() implicitly (via nameidata).
Now only the opaque pointer is. In the cases when we used the symlink body
to free stuff, ->follow_link() now should store it as opaque pointer in addition
to returning it.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull fourth vfs update from Al Viro:
"d_inode() annotations from David Howells (sat in for-next since before
the beginning of merge window) + four assorted fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
RCU pathwalk breakage when running into a symlink overmounting something
fix I_DIO_WAKEUP definition
direct-io: only inc/dec inode->i_dio_count for file systems
fs/9p: fix readdir()
VFS: assorted d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/inode.c helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/cachefiles: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs library helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotations
VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: net/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: net/unix: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: kernel/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: audit: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: Fix up some ->d_inode accesses in the chelsio driver
VFS: Cachefiles should perform fs modifications on the top layer only
VFS: AF_UNIX sockets should call mknod on the top layer only
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The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused,
will eventually be converted to void.
See: commit 1f33c41c03da ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to
seq_has_overflowed() and make public")
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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that's the bulk of filesystem drivers dealing with inodes of their own
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace related fixes from Eric Biederman:
"As these are bug fixes almost all of thes changes are marked for
backporting to stable.
The first change (implicitly adding MNT_NODEV on remount) addresses a
regression that was created when security issues with unprivileged
remount were closed. I go on to update the remount test to make it
easy to detect if this issue reoccurs.
Then there are a handful of mount and umount related fixes.
Then half of the changes deal with the a recently discovered design
bug in the permission checks of gid_map. Unix since the beginning has
allowed setting group permissions on files to less than the user and
other permissions (aka ---rwx---rwx). As the unix permission checks
stop as soon as a group matches, and setgroups allows setting groups
that can not later be dropped, results in a situtation where it is
possible to legitimately use a group to assign fewer privileges to a
process. Which means dropping a group can increase a processes
privileges.
The fix I have adopted is that gid_map is now no longer writable
without privilege unless the new file /proc/self/setgroups has been
set to permanently disable setgroups.
The bulk of user namespace using applications even the applications
using applications using user namespaces without privilege remain
unaffected by this change. Unfortunately this ix breaks a couple user
space applications, that were relying on the problematic behavior (one
of which was tools/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c).
To hopefully prevent needing a regression fix on top of my security
fix I rounded folks who work with the container implementations mostly
like to be affected and encouraged them to test the changes.
> So far nothing broke on my libvirt-lxc test bed. :-)
> Tested with openSUSE 13.2 and libvirt 1.2.9.
> Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
> Tested on Fedora20 with libvirt 1.2.11, works fine.
> Tested-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com>
> Ok, thanks - yes, unprivileged lxc is working fine with your kernels.
> Just to be sure I was testing the right thing I also tested using
> my unprivileged nsexec testcases, and they failed on setgroup/setgid
> as now expected, and succeeded there without your patches.
> Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
> I tested this with Sandstorm. It breaks as is and it works if I add
> the setgroups thing.
> Tested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> # breaks things as designed :("
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests
userns; Correct the comment in map_write
userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled
userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis
userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex
userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings
userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping
userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings
userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished
userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings.
groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks
mnt: Clear mnt_expire during pivot_root
mnt: Carefully set CL_UNPRIVILEGED in clone_mnt
mnt: Move the clear of MNT_LOCKED from copy_tree to it's callers.
umount: Do not allow unmounting rootfs.
umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force
mnt: Update unprivileged remount test
mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount
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- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups
A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
future in this user namespace.
A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.
- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
their parents.
- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do
not allow checking the permissions at open time.
- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map
for the user namespace is set.
This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace
level will never remove the ability to call setgroups
from a process that already has that ability.
A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by
creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling
setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled.
Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this
is a noop. Prodcess with privilege become processes without
privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path
to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call
setgroups. So this remains within the bounds of what is possible
without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Merge first patchbomb from Andrew Morton:
- a few minor cifs fixes
- dma-debug upadtes
- ocfs2
- slab
- about half of MM
- procfs
- kernel/exit.c
- panic.c tweaks
- printk upates
- lib/ updates
- checkpatch updates
- fs/binfmt updates
- the drivers/rtc tree
- nilfs
- kmod fixes
- more kernel/exit.c
- various other misc tweaks and fixes
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (190 commits)
exit: pidns: fix/update the comments in zap_pid_ns_processes()
exit: pidns: alloc_pid() leaks pid_namespace if child_reaper is exiting
exit: exit_notify: re-use "dead" list to autoreap current
exit: reparent: call forget_original_parent() under tasklist_lock
exit: reparent: avoid find_new_reaper() if no children
exit: reparent: introduce find_alive_thread()
exit: reparent: introduce find_child_reaper()
exit: reparent: document the ->has_child_subreaper checks
exit: reparent: s/while_each_thread/for_each_thread/ in find_new_reaper()
exit: reparent: fix the cross-namespace PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER reparenting
exit: reparent: fix the dead-parent PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER reparenting
exit: proc: don't try to flush /proc/tgid/task/tgid
exit: release_task: fix the comment about group leader accounting
exit: wait: drop tasklist_lock before psig->c* accounting
exit: wait: don't use zombie->real_parent
exit: wait: cleanup the ptrace_reparented() checks
usermodehelper: kill the kmod_thread_locker logic
usermodehelper: don't use CLONE_VFORK for ____call_usermodehelper()
fs/hfs/catalog.c: fix comparison bug in hfs_cat_keycmp
nilfs2: fix the nilfs_iget() vs. nilfs_new_inode() races
...
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proc_flush_task_mnt() always tries to flush task/pid, but this is
pointless if we reap the leader. d_invalidate() is recursive, and
if nothing else the next d_hash_and_lookup(tgid) should fail anyway.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
"The big thing in this pile is Eric's unmount-on-rmdir series; we
finally have everything we need for that. The final piece of prereqs
is delayed mntput() - now filesystem shutdown always happens on
shallow stack.
Other than that, we have several new primitives for iov_iter (Matt
Wilcox, culled from his XIP-related series) pushing the conversion to
->read_iter()/ ->write_iter() a bit more, a bunch of fs/dcache.c
cleanups and fixes (including the external name refcounting, which
gives consistent behaviour of d_move() wrt procfs symlinks for long
and short names alike) and assorted cleanups and fixes all over the
place.
This is just the first pile; there's a lot of stuff from various
people that ought to go in this window. Starting with
unionmount/overlayfs mess... ;-/"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (60 commits)
fs/file_table.c: Update alloc_file() comment
vfs: Deduplicate code shared by xattr system calls operating on paths
reiserfs: remove pointless forward declaration of struct nameidata
don't need that forward declaration of struct nameidata in dcache.h anymore
take dname_external() into fs/dcache.c
let path_init() failures treated the same way as subsequent link_path_walk()
fix misuses of f_count() in ppp and netlink
ncpfs: use list_for_each_entry() for d_subdirs walk
vfs: move getname() from callers to do_mount()
gfs2_atomic_open(): skip lookups on hashed dentry
[infiniband] remove pointless assignments
gadgetfs: saner API for gadgetfs_create_file()
f_fs: saner API for ffs_sb_create_file()
jfs: don't hash direct inode
[s390] remove pointless assignment of ->f_op in vmlogrdr ->open()
ecryptfs: ->f_op is never NULL
android: ->f_op is never NULL
nouveau: __iomem misannotations
missing annotation in fs/file.c
fs: namespace: suppress 'may be used uninitialized' warnings
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo:
"Nothing too interesting. Just a handful of cleanup patches"
* 'for-3.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
Revert "cgroup: remove redundant variable in cgroup_mount()"
cgroup: remove redundant variable in cgroup_mount()
cgroup: fix missing unlock in cgroup_release_agent()
cgroup: remove CGRP_RELEASABLE flag
perf/cgroup: Remove perf_put_cgroup()
cgroup: remove redundant check in cgroup_ino()
cpuset: simplify proc_cpuset_show()
cgroup: simplify proc_cgroup_show()
cgroup: use a per-cgroup work for release agent
cgroup: remove bogus comments
cgroup: remove redundant code in cgroup_rmdir()
cgroup: remove some useless forward declarations
cgroup: fix a typo in comment.
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Extract the mm_access() code from __mem_open() into the new helper,
proc_mem_open(), the next patch will add another caller.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Now that d_invalidate always succeeds and flushes mount points use
it in stead of a combination of shrink_dcache_parent and d_drop
in proc_flush_task_mnt. This removes the danger of a mount point
under /proc/<pid>/... becoming unreachable after the d_drop.
Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Now that d_invalidate always succeeds it is not longer necessary or
desirable to hard code d_drop calls into filesystem specific
d_revalidate implementations.
Remove the unnecessary d_drop calls and rely on d_invalidate
to drop the dentries. Using d_invalidate ensures that paths
to mount points will not be dropped.
Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Use the ONE macro instead of REG, and we can simplify proc_cpuset_show().
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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Use the ONE macro instead of REG, and we can simplify proc_cgroup_show().
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"This is a bunch of small changes built against 3.16-rc6. The most
significant change for users is the first patch which makes setns
drmatically faster by removing unneded rcu handling.
The next chunk of changes are so that "mount -o remount,.." will not
allow the user namespace root to drop flags on a mount set by the
system wide root. Aks this forces read-only mounts to stay read-only,
no-dev mounts to stay no-dev, no-suid mounts to stay no-suid, no-exec
mounts to stay no exec and it prevents unprivileged users from messing
with a mounts atime settings. I have included my test case as the
last patch in this series so people performing backports can verify
this change works correctly.
The next change fixes a bug in NFS that was discovered while auditing
nsproxy users for the first optimization. Today you can oops the
kernel by reading /proc/fs/nfsfs/{servers,volumes} if you are clever
with pid namespaces. I rebased and fixed the build of the
!CONFIG_NFS_FS case yesterday when a build bot caught my typo. Given
that no one to my knowledge bases anything on my tree fixing the typo
in place seems more responsible that requiring a typo-fix to be
backported as well.
The last change is a small semantic cleanup introducing
/proc/thread-self and pointing /proc/mounts and /proc/net at it. This
prevents several kinds of problemantic corner cases. It is a
user-visible change so it has a minute chance of causing regressions
so the change to /proc/mounts and /proc/net are individual one line
commits that can be trivially reverted. Unfortunately I lost and
could not find the email of the original reporter so he is not
credited. From at least one perspective this change to /proc/net is a
refgression fix to allow pthread /proc/net uses that were broken by
the introduction of the network namespace"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc: Point /proc/mounts at /proc/thread-self/mounts instead of /proc/self/mounts
proc: Point /proc/net at /proc/thread-self/net instead of /proc/self/net
proc: Implement /proc/thread-self to point at the directory of the current thread
proc: Have net show up under /proc/<tgid>/task/<tid>
NFS: Fix /proc/fs/nfsfs/servers and /proc/fs/nfsfs/volumes
mnt: Add tests for unprivileged remount cases that have found to be faulty
mnt: Change the default remount atime from relatime to the existing value
mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
mnt: Move the test for MNT_LOCK_READONLY from change_mount_flags into do_remount
mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount
namespaces: Use task_lock and not rcu to protect nsproxy
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If you're applying this patch, all /proc/$PID/* files were converted
to seq_file interface and this code became unused.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently lookup for /proc/$PID first goes through spinlock and whole list
of misc /proc entries only to confirm that, yes, /proc/42 can not possibly
match random proc entry.
List is is several dozens entries long (52 entries on my setup).
None of this is necessary.
Try to convert dentry name to integer first.
If it works, it must be /proc/$PID.
If it doesn't, it must be random proc entry.
Based on patch from Al Viro.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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* remove proc_create(NULL, ...) check, let it oops
* warn about proc_create("", ...) and proc_create("very very long name", ...)
proc code keeps length as u8, no 256+ name length possible
* warn about proc_create("123", ...)
/proc/$PID and /proc/misc namespaces are separate things,
but dumb module might create funky a-la $PID entry.
* remove post mortem strchr('/') check
Triggering it implies either strchr() is buggy or memory corruption.
It should be VFS check anyway.
In reality, none of these checks will ever trigger,
it is preparation for the next patch.
Based on patch from Al Viro.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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proc_uid_seq_operations, proc_gid_seq_operations and
proc_projid_seq_operations are only called in proc_id_map_open with
seq_open as const struct seq_operations so we can constify the 3
structures and update proc_id_map_open prototype.
text data bss dec hex filename
6817 404 1984 9205 23f5 kernel/user_namespace.o-before
6913 308 1984 9205 23f5 kernel/user_namespace.o-after
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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thread
/proc/thread-self is derived from /proc/self. /proc/thread-self
points to the directory in proc containing information about the
current thread.
This funtionality has been missing for a long time, and is tricky to
implement in userspace as gettid() is not exported by glibc. More
importantly this allows fixing defects in /proc/mounts and /proc/net
where in a threaded application today they wind up being empty files
when only the initial pthread has exited, causing problems for other
threads.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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