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2012-07-31proc: do not allow negative offsets on /proc/<pid>/environDjalal Harouni1-3/+6
__mem_open() which is called by both /proc/<pid>/environ and /proc/<pid>/mem ->open() handlers will allow the use of negative offsets. /proc/<pid>/mem has negative offsets but not /proc/<pid>/environ. Clean this by moving the 'force FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET flag' to mem_open() to allow negative offsets only on /proc/<pid>/mem. Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-31proc: environ_read() make sure offset points to environment address rangeDjalal Harouni1-6/+7
Currently the following offset and environment address range check in environ_read() of /proc/<pid>/environ is buggy: int this_len = mm->env_end - (mm->env_start + src); if (this_len <= 0) break; Large or negative offsets on /proc/<pid>/environ converted to 'unsigned long' may pass this check since '(mm->env_start + src)' can overflow and 'this_len' will be positive. This can turn /proc/<pid>/environ to act like /proc/<pid>/mem since (mm->env_start + src) will point and read from another VMA. There are two fixes here plus some code cleaning: 1) Fix the overflow by checking if the offset that was converted to unsigned long will always point to the [mm->env_start, mm->env_end] address range. 2) Remove the truncation that was made to the result of the check, storing the result in 'int this_len' will alter its value and we can not depend on it. For kernels that have commit b409e578d ("proc: clean up /proc/<pid>/environ handling") which adds the appropriate ptrace check and saves the 'mm' at ->open() time, this is not a security issue. This patch is taken from the grsecurity patch since it was just made available. Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-14fs: add nd_jump_linkChristoph Hellwig1-2/+1
Add a helper that abstracts out the jump to an already parsed struct path from ->follow_link operation from procfs. Not only does this clean up the code by moving the two sides of this game into a single helper, but it also prepares for making struct nameidata private to namei.c Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14fs: move path_put on failure out of ->follow_linkChristoph Hellwig1-4/+8
Currently the non-nd_set_link based versions of ->follow_link are expected to do a path_put(&nd->path) on failure. This calling convention is unexpected, undocumented and doesn't match what the nd_set_link-based instances do. Move the path_put out of the only non-nd_set_link based ->follow_link instance into the caller. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14stop passing nameidata to ->lookup()Al Viro1-8/+10
Just the flags; only NFS cares even about that, but there are legitimate uses for such argument. And getting rid of that completely would require splitting ->lookup() into a couple of methods (at least), so let's leave that alone for now... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14stop passing nameidata * to ->d_revalidate()Al Viro1-11/+11
Just the lookup flags. Die, bastard, die... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-06-04vfs: Fix /proc/<tid>/fdinfo/<fd> file handlingLinus Torvalds1-7/+10
Cyrill Gorcunov reports that I broke the fdinfo files with commit 30a08bf2d31d ("proc: move fd symlink i_mode calculations into tid_fd_revalidate()"), and he's quite right. The tid_fd_revalidate() function is not just used for the <tid>/fd symlinks, it's also used for the <tid>/fdinfo/<fd> files, and the permission model for those are different. So do the dynamic symlink permission handling just for symlinks, making the fdinfo files once more appear as the proper regular files they are. Of course, Al Viro argued (probably correctly) that we shouldn't do the symlink permission games at all, and make the symlinks always just be the normal 'lrwxrwxrwx'. That would have avoided this issue too, but since somebody noticed that the permissions had changed (which was the reason for that original commit 30a08bf2d31d in the first place), people do apparently use this feature. [ Basically, you can use the symlink permission data as a cheap "fdinfo" replacement, since you see whether the file is open for reading and/or writing by just looking at st_mode of the symlink. So the feature does make sense, even if the pain it has caused means we probably shouldn't have done it to begin with. ] Reported-and-tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-06-01fs, proc: introduce /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children entryCyrill Gorcunov1-0/+3
When we do checkpoint of a task we need to know the list of children the task, has but there is no easy and fast way to generate reverse parent->children chain from arbitrary <pid> (while a parent pid is provided in "PPid" field of /proc/<pid>/status). So instead of walking over all pids in the system (creating one big process tree in memory, just to figure out which children a task has) -- we add explicit /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children entry, because the kernel already has this kind of information but it is not yet exported. This is a first level children, not the whole process tree. Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-06-01proc: pass "fd" by value in /proc/*/{fd,fdinfo} codeAlexey Dobriyan1-4/+4
Pass "fd" directly, not via pointer -- one less memory read. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-06-01proc: don't do dummy rcu_read_lock/rcu_read_unlock on error pathAlexey Dobriyan1-6/+7
rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() is nop for TINY_RCU, but is not a nop for, say, PREEMPT_RCU. proc_fill_cache() is called without RCU lock, there is no need to lock/unlock on error path, simply jump out of the loop. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-06-01proc: use mm_access() instead of ptrace_may_access()Cong Wang1-5/+2
mm_access() handles this much better, and avoids some race conditions. Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-06-01proc: remove mm_for_maps()Cong Wang1-6/+1
mm_for_maps() is a simple wrapper for mm_access(), and the name is misleading, so just remove it and use mm_access() directly. Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-06-01proc: clean up /proc/<pid>/environ handlingCong Wang1-21/+24
Similar to e268337dfe26 ("proc: clean up and fix /proc/<pid>/mem handling"), move the check of permission to open(), this will simplify read() code. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-05-30mm, oom: normalize oom scores to oom_score_adj scale only for userspaceDavid Rientjes1-2/+3
The oom_score_adj scale ranges from -1000 to 1000 and represents the proportion of memory available to the process at allocation time. This means an oom_score_adj value of 300, for example, will bias a process as though it was using an extra 30.0% of available memory and a value of -350 will discount 35.0% of available memory from its usage. The oom killer badness heuristic also uses this scale to report the oom score for each eligible process in determining the "best" process to kill. Thus, it can only differentiate each process's memory usage by 0.1% of system RAM. On large systems, this can end up being a large amount of memory: 256MB on 256GB systems, for example. This can be fixed by having the badness heuristic to use the actual memory usage in scoring threads and then normalizing it to the oom_score_adj scale for userspace. This results in better comparison between eligible threads for kill and no change from the userspace perspective. Suggested-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-05-24Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-8/+85
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman: "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete implementation. Highlights: - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe. - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe. - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared uids remains the same. - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or better than it is today. - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or operationally with the user namespace enabled. - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1 billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to 164ns per stat operation). - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value. Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause entertaining failures in userspace. - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails. I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and handle the case where setuid fails. - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we can't map. - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities. My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1." Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits) userns: Silence silly gcc warning. cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids. userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate. userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces. userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace. userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs ...
2012-05-19Merge branch 'akpm' (Andrew's patch-bomb)Linus Torvalds1-12/+8
Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton. * emailed from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (4 patches) frv: delete incorrect task prototypes causing compile fail slub: missing test for partial pages flush work in flush_all() fs, proc: fix ABBA deadlock in case of execution attempt of map_files/ entries drivers/rtc/rtc-pl031.c: configure correct wday for 2000-01-01
2012-05-19proc: move fd symlink i_mode calculations into tid_fd_revalidate()Linus Torvalds1-29/+14
Instead of doing the i_mode calculations at proc_fd_instantiate() time, move them into tid_fd_revalidate(), which is where the other inode state (notably uid/gid information) is updated too. Otherwise we'll end up with stale i_mode information if an fd is re-used while the dentry still hangs around. Not that anything really *cares* (symlink permissions don't really matter), but Tetsuo Handa noticed that the owner read/write bits don't always match the state of the readability of the file descriptor, and we _used_ to get this right a long time ago in a galaxy far, far away. Besides, aside from fixing an ugly detail (that has apparently been this way since commit 61a28784028e: "proc: Remove the hard coded inode numbers" in 2006), this removes more lines of code than it adds. And it just makes sense to update i_mode in the same place we update i_uid/gid. Al Viro correctly points out that we could just do the inode fill in the inode iops ->getattr() function instead. However, that does require somewhat slightly more invasive changes, and adds yet *another* lookup of the file descriptor. We need to do the revalidate() for other reasons anyway, and have the file descriptor handy, so we might as well fill in the information at this point. Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-05-18fs, proc: fix ABBA deadlock in case of execution attempt of map_files/ entriesCyrill Gorcunov1-12/+8
map_files/ entries are never supposed to be executed, still curious minds might try to run them, which leads to the following deadlock ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.4.0-rc4-24406-g841e6a6 #121 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- bash/1556 is trying to acquire lock: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+.+.}, at: do_lookup+0x267/0x2b1 but task is already holding lock: (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: prepare_bprm_creds+0x2d/0x69 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}: validate_chain+0x444/0x4f4 __lock_acquire+0x387/0x3f8 lock_acquire+0x12b/0x158 __mutex_lock_common+0x56/0x3a9 mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x40/0x45 lock_trace+0x24/0x59 proc_map_files_lookup+0x5a/0x165 __lookup_hash+0x52/0x73 do_lookup+0x276/0x2b1 walk_component+0x3d/0x114 do_last+0xfc/0x540 path_openat+0xd3/0x306 do_filp_open+0x3d/0x89 do_sys_open+0x74/0x106 sys_open+0x21/0x23 tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+.+.}: check_prev_add+0x6a/0x1ef validate_chain+0x444/0x4f4 __lock_acquire+0x387/0x3f8 lock_acquire+0x12b/0x158 __mutex_lock_common+0x56/0x3a9 mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x45 do_lookup+0x267/0x2b1 walk_component+0x3d/0x114 link_path_walk+0x1f9/0x48f path_openat+0xb6/0x306 do_filp_open+0x3d/0x89 open_exec+0x25/0xa0 do_execve_common+0xea/0x2f9 do_execve+0x43/0x45 sys_execve+0x43/0x5a stub_execve+0x6c/0xc0 This is because prepare_bprm_creds grabs task->signal->cred_guard_mutex and when do_lookup happens we try to grab task->signal->cred_guard_mutex again in lock_trace. Fix it using plain ptrace_may_access() helper in proc_map_files_lookup() and in proc_map_files_readdir() instead of lock_trace(), the caller must be CAP_SYS_ADMIN granted anyway. Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-05-16userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriateEric W. Biederman1-8/+8
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-04-26userns: Rework the user_namespace adding uid/gid mapping supportEric W. Biederman1-0/+77
- Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers - Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed. * Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today, leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test. - Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added if a mapping does not exist. - Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping. Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid and gid mapping. Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the slight weirdness worth it. - Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar to what we do with jiffies. - Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are trivial but a little atypical. Performance: In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same. The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache. My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were not in the processors cache. My results: v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled) All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests that ran in the cpu cache. So in summary the performance impact is: 1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out. 8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-03-30Merge branch 'x86-x32-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x32 support for x86-64 from Ingo Molnar: "This tree introduces the X32 binary format and execution mode for x86: 32-bit data space binaries using 64-bit instructions and 64-bit kernel syscalls. This allows applications whose working set fits into a 32 bits address space to make use of 64-bit instructions while using a 32-bit address space with shorter pointers, more compressed data structures, etc." Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/{Kconfig,vdso/vma.c} * 'x86-x32-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (71 commits) x32: Fix alignment fail in struct compat_siginfo x32: Fix stupid ia32/x32 inversion in the siginfo format x32: Add ptrace for x32 x32: Switch to a 64-bit clock_t x32: Provide separate is_ia32_task() and is_x32_task() predicates x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls x86/x32: Fix the binutils auto-detect x32: Warn and disable rather than error if binutils too old x32: Only clear TIF_X32 flag once x32: Make sure TS_COMPAT is cleared for x32 tasks fs: Remove missed ->fds_bits from cessation use of fd_set structs internally fs: Fix close_on_exec pointer in alloc_fdtable x32: Drop non-__vdso weak symbols from the x32 VDSO x32: Fix coding style violations in the x32 VDSO code x32: Add x32 VDSO support x32: Allow x32 to be configured x32: If configured, add x32 system calls to system call tables x32: Handle process creation x32: Signal-related system calls x86: Add #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT to <asm/sys_ia32.h> ...
2012-03-22procfs: mark thread stack correctly in proc/<pid>/mapsSiddhesh Poyarekar1-6/+6
Stack for a new thread is mapped by userspace code and passed via sys_clone. This memory is currently seen as anonymous in /proc/<pid>/maps, which makes it difficult to ascertain which mappings are being used for thread stacks. This patch uses the individual task stack pointers to determine which vmas are actually thread stacks. For a multithreaded program like the following: #include <pthread.h> void *thread_main(void *foo) { while(1); } int main() { pthread_t t; pthread_create(&t, NULL, thread_main, NULL); pthread_join(t, NULL); } proc/PID/maps looks like the following: 00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804 /home/siddhesh/a.out 00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804 /home/siddhesh/a.out 019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] 7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so 7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so 7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so 7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so 7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so 7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so 7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so 7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so 7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so 7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so 7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so 7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vsyscall] Here, one could guess that 7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 is a stack since the earlier vma that has no permissions (7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000) but that is not always a reliable way to find out which vma is a thread stack. Also, /proc/PID/maps and /proc/PID/task/TID/maps has the same content. With this patch in place, /proc/PID/task/TID/maps are treated as 'maps as the task would see it' and hence, only the vma that that task uses as stack is marked as [stack]. All other 'stack' vmas are marked as anonymous memory. /proc/PID/maps acts as a thread group level view, where all thread stack vmas are marked as [stack:TID] where TID is the process ID of the task that uses that vma as stack, while the process stack is marked as [stack]. So /proc/PID/maps will look like this: 00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804 /home/siddhesh/a.out 00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804 /home/siddhesh/a.out 019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] 7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack:1442] 7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so 7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so 7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so 7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so 7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so 7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so 7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so 7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so 7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so 7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so 7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so 7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vsyscall] Thus marking all vmas that are used as stacks by the threads in the thread group along with the process stack. The task level maps will however like this: 00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804 /home/siddhesh/a.out 00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804 /home/siddhesh/a.out 019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] 7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so 7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so 7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so 7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482 /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so 7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so 7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so 7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so 7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938 /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so 7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so 7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so 7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348 /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so 7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vsyscall] where only the vma that is being used as a stack by *that* task is marked as [stack]. Analogous changes have been made to /proc/PID/smaps, /proc/PID/numa_maps, /proc/PID/task/TID/smaps and /proc/PID/task/TID/numa_maps. Relevant snippets from smaps and numa_maps: [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ pgrep a.out 1441 [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/smaps | grep "\[stack" 7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack:1442] 7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1442/smaps | grep "\[stack" 7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1441/smaps | grep "\[stack" 7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/numa_maps | grep "stack" 7f8a44492000 default stack:1442 anon=2 dirty=2 N0=2 7fff6273a000 default stack anon=3 dirty=3 N0=3 [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1442/numa_maps | grep "stack" 7f8a44492000 default stack anon=2 dirty=2 N0=2 [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1441/numa_maps | grep "stack" 7fff6273a000 default stack anon=3 dirty=3 N0=3 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] Signed-off-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@gmail.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org> Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-02sched: Clean up parameter passing of proc_sched_autogroup_set_nice()Hiroshi Shimamoto1-2/+1
Pass nice as a value to proc_sched_autogroup_set_nice(). No side effect is expected, and the variable err will be overwritten with the return value. Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4F45FBB7.5090607@ct.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2012-02-19Wrap accesses to the fd_sets in struct fdtableDavid Howells1-1/+1
Wrap accesses to the fd_sets in struct fdtable (for recording open files and close-on-exec flags) so that we can move away from using fd_sets since we abuse the fd_set structs by not allocating the full-sized structure under normal circumstances and by non-core code looking at the internals of the fd_sets. The first abuse means that use of FD_ZERO() on these fd_sets is not permitted, since that cannot be told about their abnormal lengths. This introduces six wrapper functions for setting, clearing and testing close-on-exec flags and fd-is-open flags: void __set_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt); void __clear_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt); bool close_on_exec(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt); void __set_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt); void __clear_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt); bool fd_is_open(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt); Note that I've prepended '__' to the names of the set/clear functions because they require the caller to hold a lock to use them. Note also that I haven't added wrappers for looking behind the scenes at the the array. Possibly that should exist too. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174942.23314.1364.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-02-03Fix race in process_vm_rw_coreChristopher Yeoh1-20/+0
This fixes the race in process_vm_core found by Oleg (see http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1235667/ for details). This has been updated since I last sent it as the creation of the new mm_access() function did almost exactly the same thing as parts of the previous version of this patch did. In order to use mm_access() even when /proc isn't enabled, we move it to kernel/fork.c where other related process mm access functions already are. Signed-off-by: Chris Yeoh <yeohc@au1.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-02-02proc: make sure mem_open() doesn't pin the target's memoryOleg Nesterov1-1/+13
Once /proc/pid/mem is opened, the memory can't be released until mem_release() even if its owner exits. Change mem_open() to do atomic_inc(mm_count) + mmput(), this only pins mm_struct. Change mem_rw() to do atomic_inc_not_zero(mm_count) before access_remote_vm(), this verifies that this mm is still alive. I am not sure what should mem_rw() return if atomic_inc_not_zero() fails. With this patch it returns zero to match the "mm == NULL" case, may be it should return -EINVAL like it did before e268337d. Perhaps it makes sense to add the additional fatal_signal_pending() check into the main loop, to ensure we do not hold this memory if the target task was oom-killed. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-02-02proc: unify mem_read() and mem_write()Oleg Nesterov1-58/+32
No functional changes, cleanup and preparation. mem_read() and mem_write() are very similar. Move this code into the new common helper, mem_rw(), which takes the additional "int write" argument. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-02-02proc: mem_release() should check mm != NULLOleg Nesterov1-2/+2
mem_release() can hit mm == NULL, add the necessary check. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-18Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-4/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit: (29 commits) audit: no leading space in audit_log_d_path prefix audit: treat s_id as an untrusted string audit: fix signedness bug in audit_log_execve_info() audit: comparison on interprocess fields audit: implement all object interfield comparisons audit: allow interfield comparison between gid and ogid audit: complex interfield comparison helper audit: allow interfield comparison in audit rules Kernel: Audit Support For The ARM Platform audit: do not call audit_getname on error audit: only allow tasks to set their loginuid if it is -1 audit: remove task argument to audit_set_loginuid audit: allow audit matching on inode gid audit: allow matching on obj_uid audit: remove audit_finish_fork as it can't be called audit: reject entry,always rules audit: inline audit_free to simplify the look of generic code audit: drop audit_set_macxattr as it doesn't do anything audit: inline checks for not needing to collect aux records audit: drop some potentially inadvisable likely notations ... Use evil merge to fix up grammar mistakes in Kconfig file. Bad speling and horrible grammar (and copious swearing) is to be expected, but let's keep it to commit messages and comments, rather than expose it to users in config help texts or printouts.
2012-01-18proc: clean up and fix /proc/<pid>/mem handlingLinus Torvalds1-106/+39
Jüri Aedla reported that the /proc/<pid>/mem handling really isn't very robust, and it also doesn't match the permission checking of any of the other related files. This changes it to do the permission checks at open time, and instead of tracking the process, it tracks the VM at the time of the open. That simplifies the code a lot, but does mean that if you hold the file descriptor open over an execve(), you'll continue to read from the _old_ VM. That is different from our previous behavior, but much simpler. If somebody actually finds a load where this matters, we'll need to revert this commit. I suspect that nobody will ever notice - because the process mapping addresses will also have changed as part of the execve. So you cannot actually usefully access the fd across a VM change simply because all the offsets for IO would have changed too. Reported-by: Jüri Aedla <asd@ut.ee> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-18audit: only allow tasks to set their loginuid if it is -1Eric Paris1-3/+0
At the moment we allow tasks to set their loginuid if they have CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. In reality we want tasks to set the loginuid when they log in and it be impossible to ever reset. We had to make it mutable even after it was once set (with the CAP) because on update and admin might have to restart sshd. Now sshd would get his loginuid and the next user which logged in using ssh would not be able to set his loginuid. Systemd has changed how userspace works and allowed us to make the kernel work the way it should. With systemd users (even admins) are not supposed to restart services directly. The system will restart the service for them. Thus since systemd is going to loginuid==-1, sshd would get -1, and sshd would be allowed to set a new loginuid without special permissions. If an admin in this system were to manually start an sshd he is inserting himself into the system chain of trust and thus, logically, it's his loginuid that should be used! Since we have old systems I make this a Kconfig option. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-18audit: remove task argument to audit_set_loginuidEric Paris1-1/+1
The function always deals with current. Don't expose an option pretending one can use it for something. You can't. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-13proc: fix null pointer deref in proc_pid_permission()Xiaotian Feng1-0/+2
get_proc_task() can fail to search the task and return NULL, put_task_struct() will then bomb the kernel with following oops: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 IP: [<ffffffff81217d34>] proc_pid_permission+0x64/0xe0 PGD 112075067 PUD 112814067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP This is a regression introduced by commit 0499680a ("procfs: add hidepid= and gid= mount options"). The kernel should return -ESRCH if get_proc_task() failed. Signed-off-by: Xiaotian Feng <dannyfeng@tencent.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-11procfs: add hidepid= and gid= mount optionsVasiliy Kulikov1-1/+68
Add support for mount options to restrict access to /proc/PID/ directories. The default backward-compatible "relaxed" behaviour is left untouched. The first mount option is called "hidepid" and its value defines how much info about processes we want to be available for non-owners: hidepid=0 (default) means the old behavior - anybody may read all world-readable /proc/PID/* files. hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but their own. Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now protected against other users. As permission checking done in proc_pid_permission() and files' permissions are left untouched, programs expecting specific files' modes are not confused. hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/PID/ will be invisible to other users. It doesn't mean that it hides whether a process exists (it can be learned by other means, e.g. by kill -0 $PID), but it hides process' euid and egid. It compicates intruder's task of gathering info about running processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated privileges, whether another user runs some sensitive program, whether other users run any program at all, etc. gid=XXX defines a group that will be able to gather all processes' info (as in hidepid=0 mode). This group should be used instead of putting nonroot user in sudoers file or something. However, untrusted users (like daemons, etc.) which are not supposed to monitor the tasks in the whole system should not be added to the group. hidepid=1 or higher is designed to restrict access to procfs files, which might reveal some sensitive private information like precise keystrokes timings: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3 hidepid=1/2 doesn't break monitoring userspace tools. ps, top, pgrep, and conky gracefully handle EPERM/ENOENT and behave as if the current user is the only user running processes. pstree shows the process subtree which contains "pstree" process. Note: the patch doesn't deal with setuid/setgid issues of keeping preopened descriptors of procfs files (like https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/7/368). We rely on that the leaked information like the scheduling counters of setuid apps doesn't threaten anybody's privacy - only the user started the setuid program may read the counters. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-11procfs: introduce the /proc/<pid>/map_files/ directoryPavel Emelyanov1-0/+355
This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file. Opening a symlink results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one. For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/ | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so This *helps* checkpointing process in three ways: 1. When dumping a task mappings we do know exact file that is mapped by particular region. We do this by opening /proc/$pid/map_files/$address symlink the way we do with file descriptors. 2. This also helps in determining which anonymous shared mappings are shared with each other by comparing the inodes of them. 3. When restoring a set of processes in case two of them has a mapping shared, we map the memory by the 1st one and then open its /proc/$pid/map_files/$address file and map it by the 2nd task. Using /proc/$pid/maps for this is quite inconvenient since it brings repeatable re-reading and reparsing for this text file which slows down restore procedure significantly. Also as being pointed in (3) it is a way easier to use top level shared mapping in children as /proc/$pid/map_files/$address when needed. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [gorcunov@openvz.org: make map_files depend on CHECKPOINT_RESTORE] Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Reviewed-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Reviewed-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-11procfs: make proc_get_link to use dentry instead of inodeCyrill Gorcunov1-10/+10
Prepare the ground for the next "map_files" patch which needs a name of a link file to analyse. Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-11tracepoint: add tracepoints for debugging oom_score_adjKAMEZAWA Hiroyuki1-0/+3
oom_score_adj is used for guarding processes from OOM-Killer. One of problem is that it's inherited at fork(). When a daemon set oom_score_adj and make children, it's hard to know where the value is set. This patch adds some tracepoints useful for debugging. This patch adds 3 trace points. - creating new task - renaming a task (exec) - set oom_score_adj To debug, users need to enable some trace pointer. Maybe filtering is useful as # EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/task/ # echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_newtask/filter # echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_rename/filter # echo 1 > $EVENT/enable # EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/oom/ # echo 1 > $EVENT/enable output will be like this. # grep oom /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace bash-7699 [007] d..3 5140.744510: oom_score_adj_update: pid=7699 comm=bash oom_score_adj=-1000 bash-7699 [007] ...1 5151.818022: task_newtask: pid=7729 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000 ls-7729 [003] ...2 5151.818504: task_rename: pid=7729 oldcomm=bash newcomm=ls oom_score_adj=-1000 bash-7699 [002] ...1 5175.701468: task_newtask: pid=7730 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000 grep-7730 [007] ...2 5175.701993: task_rename: pid=7730 oldcomm=bash newcomm=grep oom_score_adj=-1000 Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-07Merge branches 'vfsmount-guts', 'umode_t' and 'partitions' into ZAl Viro1-1/+1
2012-01-04vfs: take /proc/*/mounts and friends to fs/proc_namespace.cAl Viro1-114/+0
rationale: that stuff is far tighter bound to fs/namespace.c than to the guts of procfs proper. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-04switch procfs to umode_t useAl Viro1-1/+1
both proc_dir_entry ->mode and populating functions Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2011-11-10Revert "proc: fix races against execve() of /proc/PID/fd**"Linus Torvalds1-103/+43
This reverts commit aa6afca5bcaba8101f3ea09d5c3e4100b2b9f0e5. It escalates of some of the google-chrome SELinux problems with ptrace ("Check failed: pid_ > 0. Did not find zygote process"), and Andrew says that it is also causing mystery lockdep reports. Reported-by: Alex Villacís Lasso <a_villacis@palosanto.com> Requested-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Requested-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-11-03Merge branch 'akpm' (Andrew's incoming - part two)Linus Torvalds1-43/+103
Says Andrew: "60 patches. That's good enough for -rc1 I guess. I have quite a lot of detritus to be rechecked, work through maintainers, etc. - most of the remains of MM - rtc - various misc - cgroups - memcg - cpusets - procfs - ipc - rapidio - sysctl - pps - w1 - drivers/misc - aio" * akpm: (60 commits) memcg: replace ss->id_lock with a rwlock aio: allocate kiocbs in batches drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c: fix typo in code comment drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c: determine page allocation flag can_sleep outside loop w1: disable irqs in critical section drivers/w1/w1_int.c: multiple masters used same init_name drivers/power/ds2780_battery.c: fix deadlock upon insertion and removal drivers/power/ds2780_battery.c: add a nolock function to w1 interface drivers/power/ds2780_battery.c: create central point for calling w1 interface w1: ds2760 and ds2780, use ida for id and ida_simple_get() to get it pps gpio client: add missing dependency pps: new client driver using GPIO pps: default echo function include/linux/dma-mapping.h: add dma_zalloc_coherent() sysctl: make CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL default to n sysctl: add support for poll() RapidIO: documentation update drivers/net/rionet.c: fix ethernet address macros for LE platforms RapidIO: fix potential null deref in rio_setup_device() RapidIO: add mport driver for Tsi721 bridge ...
2011-11-03proc: fix races against execve() of /proc/PID/fd**Vasiliy Kulikov1-43/+103
fd* files are restricted to the task's owner, and other users may not get direct access to them. But one may open any of these files and run any setuid program, keeping opened file descriptors. As there are permission checks on open(), but not on readdir() and read(), operations on the kept file descriptors will not be checked. It makes it possible to violate procfs permission model. Reading fdinfo/* may disclosure current fds' position and flags, reading directory contents of fdinfo/ and fd/ may disclosure the number of opened files by the target task. This information is not sensible per se, but it can reveal some private information (like length of a password stored in a file) under certain conditions. Used existing (un)lock_trace functions to check for ptrace_may_access(), but instead of using EPERM return code from it use EACCES to be consistent with existing proc_pid_follow_link()/proc_pid_readlink() return code. If they differ, attacker can guess what fds exist by analyzing stat() return code. Patched handlers: stat() for fd/*, stat() and read() for fdindo/*, readdir() and lookup() for fd/ and fdinfo/. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-11-02filesystems: add set_nlink()Miklos Szeredi1-6/+6
Replace remaining direct i_nlink updates with a new set_nlink() updater function. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2011-11-01oom: remove oom_disable_countDavid Rientjes1-13/+0
This removes mm->oom_disable_count entirely since it's unnecessary and currently buggy. The counter was intended to be per-process but it's currently decremented in the exit path for each thread that exits, causing it to underflow. The count was originally intended to prevent oom killing threads that share memory with threads that cannot be killed since it doesn't lead to future memory freeing. The counter could be fixed to represent all threads sharing the same mm, but it's better to remove the count since: - it is possible that the OOM_DISABLE thread sharing memory with the victim is waiting on that thread to exit and will actually cause future memory freeing, and - there is no guarantee that a thread is disabled from oom killing just because another thread sharing its mm is oom disabled. Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-08-06vfs: show O_CLOEXE bit properly in /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<fd> filesLinus Torvalds1-1/+9
The CLOEXE bit is magical, and for performance (and semantic) reasons we don't actually maintain it in the file descriptor itself, but in a separate bit array. Which means that when we show f_flags, the CLOEXE status is shown incorrectly: we show the status not as it is now, but as it was when the file was opened. Fix that by looking up the bit properly in the 'fdt->close_on_exec' bit array. Uli needs this in order to re-implement the pfiles program: "For normal file descriptors (not sockets) this was the last piece of information which wasn't available. This is all part of my 'give Solaris users no reason to not switch' effort. I intend to offer the code to the util-linux-ng maintainers." Requested-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@akkadia.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-08-06oom_ajd: don't use WARN_ONCE, just use printk_onceLinus Torvalds1-1/+1
WARN_ONCE() is very annoying, in that it shows the stack trace that we don't care about at all, and also triggers various user-level "kernel oopsed" logic that we really don't care about. And it's not like the user can do anything about the applications (sshd) in question, it's a distro issue. Requested-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> (and many others) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-07-27proc: fix a race in do_io_accounting()Vasiliy Kulikov1-3/+13
If an inode's mode permits opening /proc/PID/io and the resulting file descriptor is kept across execve() of a setuid or similar binary, the ptrace_may_access() check tries to prevent using this fd against the task with escalated privileges. Unfortunately, there is a race in the check against execve(). If execve() is processed after the ptrace check, but before the actual io information gathering, io statistics will be gathered from the privileged process. At least in theory this might lead to gathering sensible information (like ssh/ftp password length) that wouldn't be available otherwise. Holding task->signal->cred_guard_mutex while gathering the io information should protect against the race. The order of locking is similar to the one inside of ptrace_attach(): first goes cred_guard_mutex, then lock_task_sighand(). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-07-26oom: make deprecated use of oom_adj more verboseDavid Rientjes1-4/+3
/proc/pid/oom_adj is deprecated and scheduled for removal in August 2012 according to Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt. This patch makes the warning more verbose by making it appear as a more serious problem (the presence of a stack trace and being multiline should attract more attention) so that applications still using the old interface can get fixed. Very popular users of the old interface have been converted since the oom killer rewrite has been introduced. udevd switched to the /proc/pid/oom_score_adj interface for v162, kde switched in 4.6.1, and opensshd switched in 5.7p1. At the start of 2012, this should be changed into a WARN() to emit all such incidents and then finally remove the tunable in August 2012 as scheduled. Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-07-23Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-3/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (107 commits) vfs: use ERR_CAST for err-ptr tossing in lookup_instantiate_filp isofs: Remove global fs lock jffs2: fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() killing a directory fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() on ramfs et.al. mm/truncate.c: fix build for CONFIG_BLOCK not enabled fs:update the NOTE of the file_operations structure Remove dead code in dget_parent() AFS: Fix silly characters in a comment switch d_add_ci() to d_splice_alias() in "found negative" case as well simplify gfs2_lookup() jfs_lookup(): don't bother with . or .. get rid of useless dget_parent() in btrfs rename() and link() get rid of useless dget_parent() in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c fs: push i_mutex and filemap_write_and_wait down into ->fsync() handlers drivers: fix up various ->llseek() implementations fs: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA properly in all fs's that define their own llseek Ext4: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA generically Btrfs: implement our own ->llseek fs: add SEEK_HOLE and SEEK_DATA flags reiserfs: make reiserfs default to barrier=flush ... Fix up trivial conflicts in fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_super.c due to the new shrinker callout for the inode cache, that clashed with the xfs code to start the periodic workers later.