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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs"
This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus
effectively commits
7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION")
2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")
that the merge brought in).
It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric
biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of
in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].
The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells
is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in
order to not impact the rest of the merge window.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Create a request_key_net() function and use it to pass the network
namespace domain tag into DNS revolver keys and rxrpc/AFS keys so that keys
for different domains can coexist in the same keyring.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
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When mapping NFS identities using the NFSv4 idmapper, we want to substitute
for the uids and gids that would normally go on the wire as part of a
NFSv3 request. So we use the same mapping in the NFSv4 upcall as we
use in the NFSv3 RPC call (i.e. the mapping stored in the rpc_clnt cred).
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if
a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side
manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal
construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned.
Fix this by the following changes:
(1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead.
(2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the
payload available outside of security/keys/.
(3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons
record and operation name.
Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the
keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked.
Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases
where we are expecting to fall through.
Warning level 2 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=2
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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Even though the caller of nfs_idmap_prepare_message() checks return
code in their side but it's better to add an error check for match_int()
so that we can avoid unnecessary operations when bad int arg is
detected.
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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In nfs_idmap_read_and_verify_message there is an incorrect sprintf '%d'
that converts the __u32 'im_id' from struct idmap_msg to 'id_str', which
is a stack char array variable of length NFS_UINT_MAXLEN == 11.
If a uid or gid value is > 2147483647 = 0x7fffffff, the conversion
overflows into a negative value, for example:
crash> p (unsigned) (0x80000000)
$1 = 2147483648
crash> p (signed) (0x80000000)
$2 = -2147483648
The '-' sign is written to the buffer and this causes a 1 byte overflow
when the NULL byte is written, which corrupts kernel stack memory. If
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is set we see a stack-protector panic:
[11558053.616565] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffffa05b8a8c
[11558053.639063] CPU: 6 PID: 9423 Comm: rpc.idmapd Tainted: G W ------------ T 3.10.0-514.el7.x86_64 #1
[11558053.641990] Hardware name: Red Hat OpenStack Compute, BIOS 1.10.2-3.el7_4.1 04/01/2014
[11558053.644462] ffffffff818c7bc0 00000000b1f3aec1 ffff880de0f9bd48 ffffffff81685eac
[11558053.646430] ffff880de0f9bdc8 ffffffff8167f2b3 ffffffff00000010 ffff880de0f9bdd8
[11558053.648313] ffff880de0f9bd78 00000000b1f3aec1 ffffffff811dcb03 ffffffffa05b8a8c
[11558053.650107] Call Trace:
[11558053.651347] [<ffffffff81685eac>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
[11558053.653013] [<ffffffff8167f2b3>] panic+0xe3/0x1f2
[11558053.666240] [<ffffffff811dcb03>] ? kfree+0x103/0x140
[11558053.682589] [<ffffffffa05b8a8c>] ? idmap_pipe_downcall+0x1cc/0x1e0 [nfsv4]
[11558053.689710] [<ffffffff810855db>] __stack_chk_fail+0x1b/0x30
[11558053.691619] [<ffffffffa05b8a8c>] idmap_pipe_downcall+0x1cc/0x1e0 [nfsv4]
[11558053.693867] [<ffffffffa00209d6>] rpc_pipe_write+0x56/0x70 [sunrpc]
[11558053.695763] [<ffffffff811fe12d>] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1e0
[11558053.702236] [<ffffffff810acccc>] ? task_work_run+0xac/0xe0
[11558053.704215] [<ffffffff811fec4f>] SyS_write+0x7f/0xe0
[11558053.709674] [<ffffffff816964c9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Fix this by calling the internally defined nfs_map_numeric_to_string()
function which properly uses '%u' to convert this __u32. For consistency,
also replace the one other place where snprintf is called.
Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Stephen Johnston <sjohnsto@redhat.com>
Fixes: cf4ab538f1516 ("NFSv4: Fix the string length returned by the idmapper")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.4+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall() is supposed to be called with 'aux' pointing
to a 'struct idmap', via the call to request_key_with_auxdata() in
nfs_idmap_request_key().
However it can also be reached via the request_key() system call in
which case 'aux' will be NULL, causing a NULL pointer dereference in
nfs_idmap_prepare_pipe_upcall(), assuming that the key description is
valid enough to get that far.
Fix this by making nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall() negate the key if no
auxdata is provided.
As usual, this bug was found by syzkaller. A simple reproducer using
the command-line keyctl program is:
keyctl request2 id_legacy uid:0 '' @s
Fixes: 57e62324e469 ("NFS: Store the legacy idmapper result in the keyring")
Reported-by: syzbot+5dfdbcf7b3eb5912abbb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@gmail.com>
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nfs_idmap_get_desc() can't actually return zero. But if it did then
we would return ERR_PTR(0) which is NULL and the caller,
nfs_idmap_get_key(), doesn't expect that so it leads to a NULL pointer
dereference.
I've cleaned this up by changing the "<=" to "<" so it's more clear that
we don't return ERR_PTR(0).
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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Static checkers have gotten clever enough to complain that "id_long" is
uninitialized on the failure path. It's harmless, but simple to fix.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:
(1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
to protect the key.
(2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
used to protect the key and the may be being modified.
Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:
(1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:
dereference_key_locked()
user_key_payload_locked()
(2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:
dereference_key_rcu()
user_key_payload_rcu()
This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
__rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
_nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
do_mount+0x254/0xf70
SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
system_call+0x38/0xe0
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.
This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.
To this end:
(1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
the vetting function. This is called as:
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *key_type,
unsigned long key_flags,
const union key_payload *key_payload),
where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.
[*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.
The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
link.
The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
through keyring_alloc().
Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
is called.
(2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to
key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
restriction check.
(3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring
with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.
(4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the
pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL.
(5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It
should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in
a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
authoritative keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.
Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
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The idmap_init() and idmap_quit() functions only exist to call the
_keyring() version. Let's just call the keyring() functions directly.
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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Delete jump to a label on the next line, when that label is not
used elsewhere.
A simplified version of the semantic patch that makes this change is as
follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@r@
identifier l;
@@
-if (...) goto l;
-l:
// </smpl>
Also drop the unnecessary ret variable.
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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I added the nfs4 prefix to make it obvious that this file is built into
the NFS v4 module, and not the generic client.
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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