| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
Next patch will expand ioctl code and fuse/file.c is large enough as it is.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Add a mount option to allow using dax with virtio_fs.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
We have been calling it virtio_fs and even file name is virtio_fs.c. Module
name is virtio_fs.ko but when registering file system user is supposed to
specify filesystem type as "virtiofs".
Masayoshi Mizuma reported that he specified filesytem type as "virtio_fs"
and got this warning on console.
------------[ cut here ]------------
request_module fs-virtio_fs succeeded, but still no fs?
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1234 at fs/filesystems.c:274 get_fs_type+0x12c/0x138
Modules linked in: ... virtio_fs fuse virtio_net net_failover ...
CPU: 1 PID: 1234 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1 #1
So looks like kernel could find the module virtio_fs.ko but could not find
filesystem type after that.
It probably is better to rename module name to virtiofs.ko so that above
warning goes away in case user ends up specifying wrong fs name.
Reported-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Add a basic file system module for virtio-fs. This does not yet contain
shared data support between host and guest or metadata coherency speedups.
However it is already significantly faster than virtio-9p.
Design Overview
===============
With the goal of designing something with better performance and local file
system semantics, a bunch of ideas were proposed.
- Use fuse protocol (instead of 9p) for communication between guest and
host. Guest kernel will be fuse client and a fuse server will run on
host to serve the requests.
- For data access inside guest, mmap portion of file in QEMU address space
and guest accesses this memory using dax. That way guest page cache is
bypassed and there is only one copy of data (on host). This will also
enable mmap(MAP_SHARED) between guests.
- For metadata coherency, there is a shared memory region which contains
version number associated with metadata and any guest changing metadata
updates version number and other guests refresh metadata on next access.
This is yet to be implemented.
How virtio-fs differs from existing approaches
==============================================
The unique idea behind virtio-fs is to take advantage of the co-location of
the virtual machine and hypervisor to avoid communication (vmexits).
DAX allows file contents to be accessed without communication with the
hypervisor. The shared memory region for metadata avoids communication in
the common case where metadata is unchanged.
By replacing expensive communication with cheaper shared memory accesses,
we expect to achieve better performance than approaches based on network
file system protocols. In addition, this also makes it easier to achieve
local file system semantics (coherency).
These techniques are not applicable to network file system protocols since
the communications channel is bypassed by taking advantage of shared memory
on a local machine. This is why we decided to build virtio-fs rather than
focus on 9P or NFS.
Caching Modes
=============
Like virtio-9p, different caching modes are supported which determine the
coherency level as well. The “cache=FOO” and “writeback” options control
the level of coherence between the guest and host filesystems.
- cache=none
metadata, data and pathname lookup are not cached in guest. They are
always fetched from host and any changes are immediately pushed to host.
- cache=always
metadata, data and pathname lookup are cached in guest and never expire.
- cache=auto
metadata and pathname lookup cache expires after a configured amount of
time (default is 1 second). Data is cached while the file is open
(close to open consistency).
- writeback/no_writeback
These options control the writeback strategy. If writeback is disabled,
then normal writes will immediately be synchronized with the host fs.
If writeback is enabled, then writes may be cached in the guest until
the file is closed or an fsync(2) performed. This option has no effect
on mmap-ed writes or writes going through the DAX mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:
- Have no license information of any form
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Directory reading code is about to grow larger, so split it out from dir.c
into a new source file.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Add a new INIT flag, FUSE_POSIX_ACL, for negotiating ACL support with
userspace. When it is set in the INIT response, ACL support will be
enabled. ACL support also implies "default_permissions".
When ACL support is enabled, the kernel will cache and have responsibility
for enforcing ACLs. ACL xattrs will be passed to userspace, which is
responsible for updating the ACLs in the filesystem, keeping the file mode
in sync, and inheritance of default ACLs when new filesystem nodes are
created.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
In preparation for posix acl support, rework fuse to use xattr handlers and
the generic setxattr/getxattr/listxattr callbacks. Split the xattr code
out into it's own file, and promote symbols to module-global scope as
needed.
Functionally these changes have no impact, as fuse still uses a single
handler for all xattrs which uses the old callbacks.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
CUSE enables implementing character devices in userspace. With recent
additions of ioctl and poll support, FUSE already has most of what's
necessary to implement character devices. All CUSE has to do is
bonding all those components - FUSE, chardev and the driver model -
nicely.
When client opens /dev/cuse, kernel starts conversation with
CUSE_INIT. The client tells CUSE which device it wants to create. As
the previous patch made fuse_file usable without associated
fuse_inode, CUSE doesn't create super block or inodes. It attaches
fuse_file to cdev file->private_data during open and set ff->fi to
NULL. The rest of the operation is almost identical to FUSE direct IO
case.
Each CUSE device has a corresponding directory /sys/class/cuse/DEVNAME
(which is symlink to /sys/devices/virtual/class/DEVNAME if
SYSFS_DEPRECATED is turned off) which hosts "waiting" and "abort"
among other things. Those two files have the same meaning as the FUSE
control files.
The only notable lacking feature compared to in-kernel implementation
is mmap support.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
|
|
Add a control filesystem to fuse, replacing the attributes currently exported
through sysfs. An empty directory '/sys/fs/fuse/connections' is still created
in sysfs, and mounting the control filesystem here provides backward
compatibility.
Advantages of the control filesystem over the previous solution:
- allows the object directory and the attributes to be owned by the
filesystem owner, hence letting unpriviled users abort the
filesystem connection
- does not suffer from module unload race
[akpm@osdl.org: fix this fs for recent dhowells depredations]
[akpm@osdl.org: fix 64-bit printk warnings]
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
This patch adds the file operations of FUSE.
The following operations are added:
o open
o flush
o release
o fsync
o readpage
o commit_write
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
This patch adds the read-only filesystem operations of FUSE.
This contains the following files:
o dir.c
- directory, symlink and file-inode operations
The following operations are added:
o lookup
o getattr
o readlink
o follow_link
o directory open
o readdir
o directory release
o permission
o dentry revalidate
o statfs
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
This adds the FUSE device handling functions.
This contains the following files:
o dev.c
- fuse device operations (read, write, release, poll)
- registers misc device
- support for sending requests to userspace
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
|
This patch adds FUSE core.
This contains the following files:
o inode.c
- superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode,
clear_inode, put_super, show_options)
- registers FUSE filesystem
o fuse_i.h
- private header file
Requirements
============
The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is
the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace
process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the
kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated
privileges.
The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must
not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious
requirements arising from this are:
- mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the
help of the mounted filesystem
- mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in
other users' or the super user's processes
- mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from
other users' and the super user's processes
These are currently ensured with the following constraints:
1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner
can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for
directories)
2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced
3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied
all access to the filesystem
1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a
setuid root application doing the actual mount operation.
3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel
I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph
H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into
mainline in this form.
The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their
current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as
discussed in this thread).
Suggested improvements that would address these limitations:
- implement shared subtrees
- allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces
first-class objects)
- implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module
With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may
be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the
security requirements.
Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even
to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact
order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some
ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is
not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs
setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current
approach too.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
